

The Worker, the Union and the Democratic Workplace

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The Worker, the Union and the Democratic Workplace

By KENNETH O. ALEXANDER*

ABSTRACT. Much attention has been devoted to the potential gains in *work satisfaction* and *productivity* that can result from more democratic *work organization*. In the U.S. the willingness of *management* to share power is a key factor in the transfer from authoritarianism, as is widely recognized. Less widely recognized are the *worker* and the *union* as impediments to change. Various characteristics and interests of both, many related to the long history of the authoritarian workplace, make transition difficult. A particular set of conditions, not generally prevailing in the U.S., would be necessary for a pervasive *joint union, management, worker* thrust toward more *participatory* work organization.

I

Introduction

THE MOUNTAIN OF LITERATURE dealing with work reorganization continues to grow. Indeed, the rate of growth in recent years seems to be increasing, with little respect for the jurisdictional boundaries of academic disciplines. Economics, sociology, political science, industrial relations, management, organizational behavior—as well as other older or newer, broader or narrower fields of study—have all contributed. The topic has escaped the confines of academia entirely and receives frequent treatment in the public media.

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The centuries-old interest in work arises out of its core role in people's lives. The renewed interest reflects greater awareness of the potential improvement in both productive efficiency and satisfaction from work itself that can result from change in the workplace. Generally, the change proposed is a shift from traditional authoritarian organization to participatory organization. The promise of improvement in individual and social welfare understandably makes the topic of interest both to a variety of academic disciplines and to society at large. Furthermore, proposed change in the locus of power and decision-making attracts ideological comment, especially from those long critical of capitalism's concentration of power in the hands of owners and managers.

In the midst of all this, any article is narrow. This one focuses on the United States, though recognizing that the whole issue in the U.S. has been influenced by earlier developments in Scandinavia and Britain, co-determination in Germany, the kibbutz in Israel, Mondragon in Spain, worker's management in Yugoslavia, etc. It is not historical, but rather takes the current situation and considers prospects for change in work organization. Finally, it focuses on workers and unions in the change process.

Moreover, treatment here focuses on the worker and union as constituting impediments to change. Especially over the last fifteen years or so, U.S. experience documents both success and failure in attempting change to participatory systems. A better understanding of transitional difficulties for workers and unions lends insight into why the pace of successful change has not been more rapid. For workers and unions do not necessarily welcome a greater role in workplace decision-making.

This focus on the worker and the union, and especially the union, is to contribute something on topics which have received relatively little emphasis. As Kochan and Dyer have pointed out, much of the literature has developed as though unions did not exist.¹ There is no intended de-emphasis for the important role for U.S. management in any change from authoritarianism to participation. For without at least the consent and approval of management as the current legitimate holder of the power in the production process, it is axiomatic that little change of any sort can take place. This key role for management, and the necessity and methods for change from the inherited philosophy of Taylorism, have received relatively heavy emphasis.

It is difficult for management to give up power, prestige, prerogatives and status in order to venture into the unfamiliar and risky terrain of participatory organization. The yielding of power means some loss of control, and failure of the attempt could have serious consequences for the enterprise. For some managers, the push into participation has come from pressure on the enterprise emanating from the recession of the early 1980s and intensified foreign com-

petition. Consequently, some observers expect a general movement back toward authoritarianism with the return to more normal times.²

Risks and fears of failure will tempt some managers to inaugurate some change in accordance with the 'new' managerial philosophy, but yield little or nothing in the way of real power-sharing. Some forms of flextime, job enlargement and job enrichment would fall in this category. Or, management could revert to authoritarianism at the first sign of difficulty under a new arrangement (when some form of difficulty and some type of disappointed expectation is almost inevitable). Then too, there will be cases in which management change will emanate from a motive to coopt employees and thereby prevent, weaken or eliminate unionism. In such cases, the worker, the union, or both are not likely to be supportive, either initially or eventually.

In general, the posture of worker and union toward organizational change will be interdependent with the commitment, motives and methods of management. Yet, there is a general inertia inhibiting change that lies with workers and unions, aside from the (admittedly important) characteristics of management. The cases we have of attempted organizational change typically involve workers and unions as reacting to change proposed by management. Workers and unions can be receptive to change, but by and large they have not been initiators of change. We have witnessed no grass-roots thrust for participatory work emanating from the American worker. Similarly, American unions generally have not adopted such change as a major goal. Rather than initiating change, unions frequently have reacted with varying degrees of initial caution and suspicion when the issue has appeared.

There is no denying that firm commitment and genuine willingness on the part of management to share power are key ingredients. Their absence accounts for both absence of change and failed attempts at change. But they should be regarded as necessary, though not necessarily sufficient, ingredients of change. Their existence may be essential to successful change; on the other hand, their existence does not guarantee that change will be effected, or, if it is, that it will endure.³ Much will depend upon the reactions of worker and union.

II

The Worker

THOUGH NOT AN INEVITABLE RESULT, there is little question that participatory work organizations can enhance job satisfaction. This is reflected in the term 'quality of work,' so often encountered in the literature. Psychology speaks of higher-order needs of self-fulfillment and self-actualization; ideology discusses reducing worker alienation under capitalism; economics uses 'psychic income.' Whatever

the terminology, the transfer from authoritarian to participatory work organizations can enhance individual, and therefore social, welfare (though not measured by any conventional statistical series). It is this potential that accounts, at least in part, for the huge amount of interdisciplinary writings on work re-organization.

Potential is one thing; realization of that potential is something else. How does a work organization get from here to there? Workers can be receptive to change, as case studies of successful change indicate. But institutional realities are such that workers are dependent upon management, and sometimes also the union, to inaugurate change. Furthermore, workers are familiar with the realities of typical authoritarian structures. As explicit inferiors in such structures they may have some degree of fear and suspicion concerning changes proposed by those with the power to affect many dimensions of their welfare.

Participation holds the potential for satisfaction of Maslowian⁴ higher-order needs, but workers will give priority to the possible threat to lower-order and more basic needs of job, income and security. The extent of this fear and suspicion probably is related to past labor-management relations of the enterprise, as well as to the work history of the individual. In any event, successful transition requires the allaying of these fears before the necessary worker acceptance and cooperation is forthcoming. The worker must be assured that the new arrangement will not result in job loss or reduction in the economic terms of employment, or that it can contribute to their preservation.

Similarly, workers may view attempted change as a form of 'speedup,' as a sophisticated attempt by management to increase production standards.⁵ This is most likely to arise where workers have had experience with scientific management, time and motion study, and where some adversarial tradition has been built up on the issue of work speeds. Of course, increased production efficiency can be expected to be a primary motivation for management's attempt to initiate change. Success will depend, at least partially, on disassociating this from the often-emotional issue of work pace, as well as upon provisions for sharing of gains with workers. However, emphasis on the need for improved productivity and product quality can facilitate change when workers are convinced that market developments threaten the welfare, or even survival, of the enterprise, and thereby pose a threat to worker jobs, income and security. This has been part of the story in at least some degree of change which has taken place in such industries as autos and steel, where the double impact of recession and foreign competition has been particularly severe.

The above could be termed general concerns of workers. In addition, individual workers and specific work groups have different vested interests in the existing organizational arrangement, and visualize different degrees of loss and

gain in the prospect of change. While some may expect relative loss, others may expect relative gain. Consequently, to some degree change will be a divisive issue among workers, not conducive to the enthusiastic cooperation which would facilitate change. Those enjoying preferred positions by way of status, compensation, skill, job content or position in the production process will tend to oppose or obstruct degradation of that position, whether by participatory methods or not. As an illustrative extreme, the skilled worker at the top of the pay scale would not be disposed to support job rotation and payment to individuals on the basis of the number of different jobs mastered rather than on the basis of one permanent job, an arrangement marking some of the attempts at change. This is similar to a common problem within management. More participatory systems threaten drastic reduction or change in the functions of middle and first-line supervision. Consequently, it is often difficult for management to win their support for change.⁶

This recognition of differences among workers must include differences in tastes or preferences as between authoritarian and participative systems. Some individuals simply will prefer authoritarianism, not wishing to make their work a more central part of their lives. Whatever their forms of creativity, self-expression, self-fulfillment, etc., they prefer to exercise these in their non-work and leisure-time activities. They do not wish to substitute the tyranny of the group for the tyranny of management. Much has been made of the Japanese system. Cultural differences do not prohibit the adoption of similar participatory systems in the United States. But the greater willingness of the Japanese worker to sacrifice individualism to group norms, as well as the Orwellian aspect of 'participation by authoritarian edict'⁷ which marks Japanese systems, make the transition more difficult in the United States.

The American worker is nurtured in a system claiming to be a meritocracy and emphasizing individual competition. Witte feels that the basic conflict between these notions and the greater democracy and equality of participatory systems warrants the view that 'industrial democracy will remain an academic exercise, a dream.'⁸ This degree of pessimism seems extreme. After all, participatory organization's major purpose is to free individual expression from its confines under authoritarianism. Yet, the difficulties of getting the authority-to-participation transition are often underestimated. Often, the attempt fails; established participatory systems erode.⁹

Transition difficulties for workers are usually part of the reasons for failure. Time after time, case studies of failure will cite the failure to educate workers adequately as a contributing cause. Workers cling to the individualistic, self-protective posture which has evolved under authoritarianism. This is not irrational behavior on the part of workers, considering the probability of failure and retro-

gression to authoritarianism. Yet, rational action for the prospect of failure increases the probability of failure. Something of a vicious circle can operate in the vein of 'thinking so can make it so.' Transition problems and the hangover of old work attitudes can be avoided and minimized at new work sites ('green-fields') with careful selection of workers for appropriate job and organizational attitudes. This was the case at the relatively-successful General Foods, Topeka, Kansas dog food plant. Nissan, prior to the opening of its light truck plant in Smyrna, Tennessee in 1983, engaged in extensive interviewing and selection out of the job candidate pool.

Relationship with co-workers is a significant determinant of job satisfaction. A worker does not lightly risk damage to position within the peer group. If collectivist goals of participatory organization require negative action against a recalcitrant or uncooperative fellow worker, or involve issues which split the work group (and such matters inevitably would arise), it will be tempting to revert to authoritarianism rather than damage interpersonal relationships.¹⁰ This could be mitigated by an explicit formula for the sharing of efficiency gains with the workers, under which collective action was associated with collective and individual economic gain for workers.

There is little unanimity on the general, long-run relationship between workplace participation and worker attitudes. Will experience under participation result in the American worker replacing individualistic competition with the collectivist goals and norms of more cooperative production organization? Views differ. Witte, for example, is doubtful.¹¹ Rothschild-Whitt, on the other hand, feels gradual experience with participatory organization will bring it about.¹² Among those with ideological concerns, a similar difference exists over whether experience with participation will result in an ever-expanding demand for collectivism culminating in the grand collectivism of socialism.¹³

III

The Union

THE PRESENCE OF A UNION brings additional considerations to any discussion of the transfer from authoritarian to participatory work organizations. The union is composed of workers but constitutes an institutional entity in itself. Historically, it arose to protect the worker against the exercise of managerial power in authoritarian organizations.

The 'business unionism' that evolved in the United States does not challenge managerial authority in any ideological sense. However, its major purpose is to restrict and restrain that power in the interests of the workers. The union will represent worker interest in bargaining with management over the basic question

of the labor-management division of the returns from production, over the 'sharing of the pie,' if you will. Issues representing this basic struggle are sometimes termed 'distributive.'¹⁴

In addition, the union will restrict management treatment of the individual worker. Historically, the law has given little protection to the worker, as summed up in the old expression: 'There's no law in the shop.' With unionism, the worker was no longer left to unrestrained power of management. Rather, the worker would have specified contractual rights in such areas as job duties, work pace, job tenure, job transfer, etc. Unilateral management authority was replaced with a system of jurisprudence. The rewards, terms and conditions of employment are specified in a written contract of fixed duration, enforceable at law.

This is a thumbnail sketch of the typical adversarial union-management relationship that will require substantial modification for any successful transition to participatory organization. Throughout history unions have had to struggle against management for their very existence and survival. That struggle is not over. The pro-management philosophy and administration of labor law marking the Reagan administration, combined with intensified economic pressures of the recent recession as well as foreign competition, have prompted many American managers to launch an intensified campaign to forestall or eliminate unionism. Often the campaign is conducted by consultants, carrying impressive academic credentials, and marked by sophisticated techniques including variants of participation and quality-of-worklife programs.

Understandably, the general reaction of American unions toward work reorganization is marked by a healthy degree of suspicion and distrust. Howard D. Samuel, president of the AFL-CIO Industrial Union Department, recently observed that too often management initiatives on new work arrangements represent 'mostly a surface effort to dump its collective bargaining obligations, or to avoid them in the first place.'¹⁵

Thus, there is good reason for the general caution and skepticism with which American unions have responded to new work arrangements. This caution and skepticism are not restricted to those cases in which management's motive threatens the very existence of unionism. Workers have resorted to unions historically as a collective means of protection against management authority, otherwise subject to very little restriction in the workplace. So long as workers regard their unions as performing this vital function, unions will embrace new cooperative work arrangements at some peril. A union which is eager to cooperate in establishing new work arrangements may be viewed as 'cozying up to management,' as abrogating its historic function. Vital worker approval of the union can be weakened if union support for new work arrangements is not matched by membership support. Similarly, that approval can be weakened if

the union stands apart from participatory change that is desired by a workforce. Hence, change will be dependent upon the history of the worker-union-management relationship and the degree of trust among the parties.

Just as workers can be concerned about the role of their union in the light of traditional adversary roles, the union can be concerned about the workers. In one form or another, new work arrangements bring the worker into closer cooperation with management. This, over time, can coopt the worker, whether intended by management or not. With the lessening of authoritarianism workers will see a lesser need for unions as a protection against it. There is a role for unions in participatory organizations, but it is a new and uncertain one and the transfer from the old adversarial relationship with management is a risky business for unions, especially if they cooperate with participation programs that ultimately fail.¹⁶

One basic function of unions that will remain under any work organization is the representation of the workers in the sharing of the proceeds of production. The old question of the labor-capital split, of so much historic ideological interest, will remain. New work organizations challenge unions to turn their attention from shares of the pie to enlarging the pie, from 'distributive' to 'integrative' issues.¹⁷ Somehow, unions will have to function as ally of management in enlarging the pie and adversary of management in sharing the pie.

New work organizations promise a larger pie through the tapping of a vast reservoir of productive input from workers, but it is difficult for unions to transfer to the dual role. It is too simplistic to view the divisive issue of shares as reserved to occasional contract negotiations. Rather, the issue is reflected in a host of existing contractual clauses which have evolved out of the old adversarial relationship: work pace, production standards, job content, job transfer rights, wage differentials, seniority provisions, etc. Any significant re-organization of work is bound to impinge on such specifics of existing contracts.¹⁸ A union faces very difficult decisions as to when and under what circumstances it will allow variation from protective contract provisions, often procured only after a long history of hard bargaining with management. As Kochan and Katz put it:

These newer forms of organization have profound implications for the industrial relations system and pose severe challenges for the local union since they encourage communication and problem-solving outside of the formal grievance procedure, introduce much greater diversity and variation in practices and experiences within a given bargaining unit, and significantly modify the traditional seniority-based job allocation and compensation system. The challenge for the local union under this type of system lies in finding ways to support greater worker involvement and opportunities for worker growth and open communications while still maintain (sic) the solidarity and strength needed to protect its base of rank-and-file support. Failing to do so risks either discouraging a process that may be popular or eroding the power needed to engage management effectively on larger distributive and strategic issues.¹⁹

When experimentation with new work organization results in unexpected problems and disappointments, as is highly likely, the union will be tempted to return to the protection of formal contract rules. Similarly, management, facing the difficult and more subtle challenges of participatory organization, will be tempted to revert to authoritarianism and the refuge of historic prerogatives. Here too, there is little really new. The 1970s and '80s have been a time of great interest in work organization, but Jacoby points out that the above union and management considerations have contributed to the erosion of cooperative work schemes in earlier U.S. history.²⁰

The Kochan and Katz quotation refers to problems 'within a given bargaining unit.' But work organizations in the U.S., within plants as well as companies, often are composed of multiple bargaining units, each with its own contract with management, and with different unions and different membership by job, pay and status. This compounds the task of getting basic agreement for change and increases the hazards in the delicate task of accomplishing a transition. Different unions, union officials and union members will have different views as to the desirability of change, and will have different relative positions to consider in weighing the benefits and costs of any transition.

Then there is the question of the scope of participation. Workers will take part in decision-making over what range of issues? The scope could range from worker suggestions about lavatory conditions to socialism.²¹ It is a matter of both practical and ideological concern. Workers may be most interested and make the greatest contribution on those issues directly related to the specific tasks they perform. But, as emphasized by Poole, the best of efforts and cooperation at this 'shop floor' level can be swamped by broader changes and exclusively management decisions concerning investment policies, equipment selection, plant location, product mix, etc.²²

In their case studies, Kochan, Katz and Mower found a desire by workers to participate in 'strategic' managerial decisions, whether or not they were involved in some system of worker participation.²³ And unions would not like to leave participation to a narrow range of issues unilaterally prescribed by management. Howard D. Samuel, President of the AFL-CIO Industrial Union Department, quoted earlier, also described many organizational changes as shallow and stated:

What is needed is a much more deep-seated change in labor-management relationships, in which workers through their unions are kept informed of major decisions affecting production and employment, and have the means of influencing those decisions to protect the best interests of workers and the company.²⁴

But much of American management would not accept this kind of incursion into the heart of historic prerogatives. The success and durability of organizational change, then, also will depend upon higher-level managerial decision-making

and its motivational impact on workers participating in lower-level decision-making.

Besides wishing some knowledge of and input into the broader decisions which can impact the enterprise, the union has a role to play in monitoring the overall structure and functioning of any participatory scheme. Participation cannot mean chaos or the inefficiency and time-consumption of collective input into every possible decision. Therefore, there must be some structure, organization and rules to channel participatory efforts. The worker whose input is solicited only on narrow job tasks will have no overall picture of all this. The union can represent the collective interests of the workers in monitoring the overall structure and functioning of the participatory organization, just as it historically has been their collective representative in bargaining with management. It can help guard the system against the temptations of eroding back toward authoritarianism and degenerating to some form of managerial manipulation of the workers. Both Cornforth²⁵ and Hochner²⁶ have discussed this as a viable role for unions, even in the case of worker-owned enterprise.

IV

Concluding Observations

MANY OF THE U.S. PARTICIPATORY work arrangements could be squeezed into two general classifications:

1. Some market threat to the economic health and survival of the enterprise prompts management to compromise its authority and union and worker to modify traditional adversarial postures. All are driven by a quest for greater security. Workers and unions are motivated more by the basic needs of job and income security than by a desire to make work more meaningful.

2. New operations ('greenfields'), where there is no adversarial hangover from the past, no union, and management often pre-selects employees to obtain a new workforce of individuals most receptive to participatory organization.

Relatively rare are those occasions which seem to be envisioned by some writers and could be described as:

3. A secure economic environment where trust among management, workers and union is such as to prompt a joint agreement to drop the old adversarial authoritarianism and launch a participatory scheme in a direct attempt to satisfy higher worker needs of job satisfaction and achieve greater productive efficiency.

If the above third scenario were to become more common, movement toward democratic work would become more sustained and pervasive in the U.S. But it does not seem likely. Economic threat of some sort is necessary before many

managements will launch an attempt at change. Without it, the temptation is to enjoy the traditional perquisites of power.

Workers and unions may go along with change, not out of a quest for more meaningful work but because of the fundamental concern of both with job and income security. Generally speaking, the U.S. worker enjoys less in the way of basic job and income security than his European counterpart. Understandably, unions and workers will turn their direct focus on more meaningful work as a goal only when the more fundamental security concerns are met.

Under what circumstances could the third scenario prevail, with management, workers and unions joining in a thrust toward more democratic work? There would have to be general confidence that sustained full employment would prevail, supported by greater public protection against remaining threats to job and income security by way of economic dislocations. This would allow workers and unions to turn from their basic security concerns and seek more meaningful job content. It would allow them to become prime movers toward more democratic work, rather than merely reacting to management initiatives out of their old security concerns.

Management would have to be pressured to drop traditional authoritarianism and seek the greater efficiencies that can come from tapping the productive ingenuity of all participants in production. The pressure could not come from recession, which places workers and unions in the position of reactors rather than partners. It would have to come from enhanced market competition, brought about by such measures as invigorated antitrust policy and reduced protectionism to enhance international competition.

This combination of circumstances does not prevail in the United States, and is not likely to prevail. Some current movements are the precise opposite of those described. Hence, movement toward alternative work organizations will continue to be sporadic and uneven, and to some degree waxing and waning with conditions of relative recession and prosperity.

Notes

1. Thomas A. Kochan and Lee Dyer, "A Model for Organizational Change in the Context of Labor-Management Relations," *Journal of Applied Behavioral Science*, Vol. 12, No. 1 (January, 1976), pp. 59-78.

2. Thomas Q. Gilson, Discussion of T. A. Kochan and H. C. Katz, "Collective Bargaining, Work Organization and Worker Participation: The Return to Plant-Level Bargaining," *Proceedings*, Industrial Relations Research Association, Spring, 1983, pp. 532-33; Daniel J. B. Mitchell, "Recent Union Contract Concessions," *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1982), Vol. 1, pp. 165-201.

3. For a lengthy case study in which the strong support of top management did not result in successful change, see John F. Witte, *Democracy, Authority, and Alienation in Work: Workers' Participation in an American Corporation* (Chicago and London: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1980).

4. Abraham Maslow, *Motivation and Personality* (New York: Harper and Row, 1954).
5. The union, as the representative of worker interests, will reflect these concerns. See following text and Leonard A. Schlesinger and Richard E. Walton, "Work Restructuring in Unionized Organizations: Risks, Opportunities, and Impact on Collective Bargaining," *Proceedings*, Industrial Relations Research Association, 29th annual meeting, 1977, pp. 345-51.
6. Both tendencies, within the workforce and within management, were found in case studies in Thomas A. Kochan, Harry C. Katz and Nancy R. Mower, *Worker Participation and American Unions: Threat or Opportunity?* (Kalamazoo, MI: W. E. Upjohn Institute, 1984).
7. For more on this, see the latter chapters of Robert E. Cole, *Work, Mobility, and Participation: A Comparative Study of American and Japanese Industry* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1979).
8. John F. Witte, *op. cit.*; see Ch. 10.
9. See some of the cases in Daniel Zwerdling, *Workplace Democracy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1980) and in Robert Zager and Michael P. Roscow, *The Innovative Organization* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1982).
10. This is discussed at greater length in Jane J. Mansbridge, "Fears of Conflict in Face-to-Face Democracies," Chapter 5 in Frank Lindenfeld and Joyce Rothschild-Whitt, *Workplace Democracy and Social Change* (Boston: Porter Sargent Publishers, 1982).
11. John F. Witte, *op. cit.*
12. Joyce Rothschild-Whitt, "The Collectivist Organization: An Alternative to Bureaucratic Models," Ch. 1 in F. Lindenfeld and J. Rothschild-Whitt, *op. cit.*
13. For further discussion, see Edward S. Greenberg, "Context and Cooperation: Systematic Variation in the Political Effects of Workplace Democracy," *Economic and Industrial Democracy*, Vol. 4, No. 2 (May, 1983), pp. 191-223.
14. Richard E. Walton and Robert B. McKersie, *A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965).
15. "Worklife Plans Given Mixed Reviews," *AFL-CIO News*, January 28, 1984.
16. There is evidence that local union leaders are generally more receptive than national leaders to changes toward participation and forms of worker ownership. See T. A. Kochan, H. C. Katz and N. R. Mower, *op. cit.*, Chs. 5 and 6, and W. F. Whyte, T. H. Hammer, C. B. Meek, R. Nelson and R. N. Stern, *Worker Participation and Ownership* (Ithaca, New York: ILR Press, Cornell University, 1983), Ch. 5. In their "Yo-Yo Model," Hammer and Stern suggest that unions will alternate in moving toward and away from cooperation with management over time. Tove H. Hammer and Robert N. Stern, "A Yo-Yo Model of Cooperation: Union Participation in Management at the Rath Packing Company," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, Vol. 39, No. 3 (April, 1986), pp. 337-49.
17. Terms in quotes from R. E. Walton and R. B. McKersie, *op. cit.*
18. The practical importance of recognizing this is emphasized in W. F. Whyte, T. H. Hammer, C. B. Meek, R. Nelson and R. N. Stern, *op. cit.*, especially pp. 51-54.
19. Thomas A. Kochan and Harry C. Katz, "Collective Bargaining, Work Organization, and Worker Participation: The Return to Plant-Level Bargaining," *Proceedings*, Industrial Relations Research Association, Spring 1983, p. 529.
20. Sanford M. Jacoby, "Union-Management Cooperation in the United States: Lessons from the 1920's," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, Vol. 37, No. 1 (October, 1983), pp. 18-33.
21. For discussion of the diverse meanings and implications of worker participation, see Santiago Roca and Didier Retour, "Participation in Enterprise Management: Boggled Down Concepts," *Economic and Industrial Democracy*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (February, 1981), pp. 1-26, and Steven A. Peterson, Thomas A. Leitko and Wilford G. Miles, "Worker Participation and the Spillover Effect:

The Case of Labor-Management Committees," *Economic and Industrial Democracy*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (February, 1981), pp. 27-44.

22. Michael Poole, *Workers' Participation in Industry* (London and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975), Ch. 2.

23. T. A. Kochan, H. C. Katz and N. R. Mower, *op. cit.*

24. *AFL-CIO News*, *op. cit.*

25. Chris Cornforth, "Trade Unions and Producer Co-operatives," *Economic and Industrial Democracy*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (February 1982), pp. 17-30.

26. Arthur Hochner, "Worker Ownership, Community Ownership, and Labor Unions: Two Examples," *Economic and Industrial Democracy*, Vol. 4, No. 3 (August, 1983), pp. 345-69.

An International Construction Database

SEVERAL EUROPEAN COUNTRIES have cooperated in establishing ICONDA, an international database for building construction, engineering, architecture and town planning. It went online in September, 1986, recorded 130,000 citations and plans to increase at a minimum rate of 35,000 citations a year.

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Chinese-American Economists Organize

THE NEW ORGANIZATION for Chinese-American economists, the Chinese Economic Association of North America, of which Professor Teh-wei Hu of the Department of Social and Administrative Health Sciences of the School of Public Health, University of California-Berkeley, is president, will hold its first joint session with the American Economic Association at the end of this year.

The session, with the general title, "Social Economics: System Performance and Evaluation," has been set tentatively for December 29, 1987, but the date should be checked in the catalogue of the Allied Social Science Association meetings in Chicago December 28-30. For further information, write Dr. Ben-chieh Liu, P.O. Box 552, Lisle, IL 60532. The organization is open to Chinese Americans and citizens of other North American countries of Chinese ancestry, Chinese nationals resident in North America, and North Americans not of Chinese ancestry interested in the economy of China and its problems.