

CHAPTER III

BRADDOCK'S DEFEAT AND THE BATTLE OF LAKE GEORGE 1752-1754

IN order that a clear and accurate conception may be formed of the relative conditions prevailing in their respective North American colonies at the time when England and France began their final and decisive struggle for empire on the continent, it is necessary to survey, first, the numerical strength of each Colonial establishment in white people; second, the numerical strength and general fighting power of the Indian tribes under the control of or in alliance with each; third, the methods of each respectively in dealing with the Indians; and, fourth, the effect of their diverse methods in winning and holding the fealty of the Indian tribes.

With regard to the relative numbers of white people resident in the North American colonies of the two countries, it may be said that at the beginning, or just before the be-

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ginning, of the French war, the Marquis Duquesne, then (1752) just appointed Governor-General of Canada, reported that there were in all the French Canadian possessions then known as New France a white male population of 22,000, inclusive of the royal or regular troops then garrisoning the various military strongholds in Canada. As these troops at that time numbered about 3,000 to 3,500, it follows that the civilian white adult male population of all French Canada in 1752 did not exceed 19,000. The English colonies, stretching along the Atlantic coast from Maine to Georgia, had at the same time nearly if not quite 1,600,000 people, of whom at least 200,000 were adult males. At first glance any one would say that a contest between 22,000 men on one side and 200,000 or thereabouts on the other, would necessarily be a farce, but as a matter of fact, it took the 200,000, backed by all the power of England, seven years to conquer the 22,000.¹

¹ It is unquestionable that the marquis, in his estimate of 22,000, etc., meant to include only males capable of bearing arms or of military age. This would have embraced all males between sixteen and sixty years old under the militia regulations then prevailing in "New France." He must have had in mind only the able-bodied male population, because Voltaire, writing of the same period, says: ". . . And while the population of British America was over 1,200,000, that of all

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During the progress of the seven years' struggle, the white French population of Canada was increased by some 3,000 or 4,000 civilian adventurers, and the French Govern-

Canada, Cape Breton, and Louisiana could not have exceeded 80,000 souls." If Voltaire's estimate of the total white population—80,000—and Duquesne's estimate of the number of males capable of bearing arms—18,000 to 19,000 besides the regular troops—were both correct, it would argue an extraordinarily large proportion of adult males—about one in every four of the total population—but that was always true of Canada under French rule. The adult males outnumbered the grown women in a proportion never less than two to one. This was because as a rule Frenchmen came to Canada single and formed alliances with Indian women. The immigration of married men with their families was exceptional.

Dr. Woodrow Wilson, in his *History of the American People*, says (p. 4, vol. ii) that "probably there were not more than 12,000 Frenchmen, all told, in America when William became king (1689)." This, of course, was sixty-three years prior to the Marquis Duquesne's estimate of the number of males capable of bearing arms, and about the same length of time previous to Voltaire's estimate of 80,000 of all sexes and ages. However, on p. 98 of the same volume, Dr. Wilson, writing of the period of 1750-52, adopts Voltaire's estimate of 80,000 as the total white population of Canada at the outbreak of the old French War. But Voltaire's estimate of the total white population of the English colonies in 1753, which in his own original phrase is "plus que douze-cent mille" [more than 1,200,000], is too low. No census was taken in those days. The tide of immigration was not at flood. We had by Franklin's estimate about 2,500,000 white people in the American colonies in 1776. Taking the two extremes and calculating on the basis that an actuary would adopt, we have figured out that the total population of the Anglo-American colonies in 1753 was not less than one million six hundred

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ment succeeded in reenforcing its garrisons or its field force there with seven regiments of regular infantry, besides some small units of other arms of the service, which will be noted later on.

As against this reenforcement, it may be said that from the beginning to the end of the struggle England landed in the colonies, from time to time, a total force of 18,000 British regular troops, and besides, supported the campaigns on land by an exertion of her sea power, which, during the last four years of the struggle, practically obliterated all means of communication between France and her Canadian colonies.

Therefore, we have calculated that during the whole seven years' struggle, the French had in North America, exclusive of Louisiana, about 22,000 white civilians (males), and be-

thousand (1,600,000) souls, which included about 200,000 negro slaves. At any rate, the first reliable census—1800—showed that natural increase for forty-seven years could not have produced the difference between Voltaire's estimate of 1753 and the actual count of 1800, for between those two dates the volume of immigration was not enough to make up the difference. As for the State of New York, with which this work mainly deals, an enumeration in 1790—seven years after the close of the Revolution—showed a population of 341,000; and New York at that time was fourth of the States in number of people, being exceeded by Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Virginia.

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tween 10,000 and 11,000 regular troops. As before remarked, this disparity of numbers—not less than ten to one, so far as white males of military age were concerned—might seem appalling, but when due account is taken of the radical and fundamental difference between the systems of the two nations in their respective colonies, the numerical inequality, to a great extent, loses its significance. Colonization from the English point of view, as practised in the colonies of the Atlantic seaboard, meant permanent improvement, home-making, the building of commercial cities and towns, the clearing of forests, creation of farms, cultivation of the soil, manufactures of various kinds, and a general commerce by sea and by land. The meaning of this, so far as concerned the Indian, was a constant policy of driving him back, of obtaining his lands from time to time by hook or by crook, by nominal purchase or by conquest. It meant also a traffic with him that was insufficiently regulated, if regulated at all, and, as a rule, in this traffic the Indian was cheated out of his products with as little hesitation or compunction as he had previously been cheated out of his lands. The result of all this was that wherever the English colonists encountered the Indian, they made an enemy of him. This

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was true along the whole coast and back to the Allegheny range of mountains, with the single exception of the Iroquois Confederacy, or the Six Nations, living in central and western New York.

On the other hand, the French system of colonization was simply a military occupation. The French never colonized Canada—they simply garrisoned it. They did not covet the lands of the Indian. All their policy was shaped to discourage permanent settlement of French colonists on any considerable scale. The most that the French did in the way of permanent settlement was the building of three good-sized towns—Quebec, Montreal, and Louisburg—together with a number of smaller towns and villages; but these cities, towns, and villages were little more than rendezvous or places of arms, either for defense pure and simple against foreign aggression, such as Louisburg, or as depots or entrepôts for their Indian trade, which was, from beginning to end, the lifeblood of the French colonial system in Canada. There was never a time in the history of French Canada, from the advent of Samuel Champlain, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, until the final evacuation of the country, after the fall of Montreal in 1760,

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when the agriculture of New France or Canada produced anything like a sufficient supply of foodstuffs for the needs of its white inhabitants, comparatively few as they were.¹

¹ "In 1753," says Voltaire, "the exports of Canada amounted to but £68,000, while its imports were £208,000. During the same year the exports of the English provinces were £1,486,000, their imports £983,000. In 1755 Canadian imports were 5,203,272 livres, its exports only 1,515,730 livres. 'Le Canada coutait beaucoup et rapportait très peu' [Canada costs a great deal and returns very little]" pursues Voltaire; and he proceeds to argue that the policy of expending so much blood and treasure in maintaining and defending such an unprofitable dependency is unstatesmanlike and wrong. Voltaire then goes on to say: "Si la dixième partie de l'argent englouti dans cette colonie avait été employé à défricher nos terres incultes en France, on aurait fait un gain considérable. . . . Mais il faut que le roi s'amuse; et cette colonie ruineuse, c'est un de ses joujous!" [If the tenth part of the money squandered on this colony had been used to improve our waste lands in France there would have been a considerable profit. . . . But the king must amuse himself, and this ruinous colony is one of his playthings!] He concludes by describing Canada as "un puisard de l'argent et une grande éponge du sang de la France!" [A sinkhole for the money and a vast sponge for the blood of France!] This may have been nothing more than Voltaire's habitual cynicism, but there is no disputing his facts. In the long run France spent on Canada ten times the money she received in return, shed the blood of her sons in torrents by land and sea to defend it, and then lost all ignominiously in the end. The deduction is plain: her system was false. It was opposed to the genius of modern civilization and hence had to fall, but we can not help admiring the desperate courage and the unflinching fortitude with which she defended it to the last gasp.

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The Indians soon found out that the French did not want their lands, did not wish to cut down and clear away their forests, did not propose a policy which would disturb them or compel them to move from the habitations of their forefathers to new forests and new hunting-grounds. Therefore, the jealousy and hatred with which the Indians farther south regarded the English colonies was never felt or cherished toward the French. In the social sense, the Frenchman was much better adapted to deal with the Indian character than the Englishman. The Englishman as a rule disliked to associate with Indians. He considered them an inferior race—dirty, slovenly, and on all accounts to be avoided whenever possible. On the other hand, the Frenchman made himself at home in the Indian villages; married, or in a less formal way allied himself with their women; raised large families of half-breeds; learned their language, or taught them his own, or both; traded with them, in the main honestly; and, above all, was never afraid of them. The result of all this was that when the two powers arrived at the threshold of their final struggle for control in North America, the French could count on the support of the entire fighting strength of every tribe of Indians

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east of the Mississippi and north of the Ohio, excepting alone the Iroquois.

Now, to this happy method of ingratiating themselves socially and politically with the Indians, the French had the additional advantage of the labors of their priests, the Jesuit Fathers. These devoted men, beginning away back early in the seventeenth century, traversed the entire continent, visited almost every tribe of Indians, not merely east of the Mississippi River, but passed beyond it to the Missouri, and even to the foot-hills of the Rocky Mountains, introducing their peculiar rites into every tribe, and impressing the sacredness of their personality upon the abundant superstition of the Indians. It is really an open question whether the tact, benevolence, and good nature displayed by the French traders and soldiers had been as potent an influence in bringing the great mass of western Indians under French control as the ministrations of their black-robed priests. Be that as it may, they had brought them at the time now under consideration—say 1753-54—completely under French sway, and not only that, but they also at that time seriously disputed with the English the control of the western tribe of the Iroquois nation itself—the Senecas—who were by far the largest and

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most powerful clan of the Six Nations. However, as this particular subject belongs to a later phase, we will not further discuss it here.

Proceeding now to consider the numerical strength of the Indians under the control of either power, it may be said that in 1753-54 the population of the Six Nations was variously estimated. In 1752, immediately after the Marquis Duquesne assumed the Governor-Generalship of Canada, Captain Joncaire, who had for many years been the principal "Indian Intelligence Officer" for the Government of Canada, reported to the Governor-General that, according to the best of his information, the total number of the Iroquois was very nearly 25,000—or 22,000 at least. Of these, he calculated that the Senecas numbered two-fifths, or about 9,000 to 10,000; the Cayugas and Onondagas together, about 6,000 to 6,500; the Oneidas about 3,500; and the Mohawks—including a clan allied to them known as the "River Indians"—about 4,500; and the Tuscaroras—a remnant of the once powerful tribe of that name, formerly living in the western Carolinas, who had been received and adopted into the Six Nations—at from 500 to 600 souls. This estimate was probably excessive, because in Sir William

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Johnson's papers, under date of the year 1753, appears an estimate of the numbers of these Indians, in which he places the total at about 19,000, maintaining generally almost exactly the same proportions, tribe for tribe, as those stated by Captain Joncaire. It may be a question as to which of the two had the better means of information. Sir William Johnson derived his estimate from detailed statements made to him by chiefs of all the tribes, and of the different clans in each tribe. It was not an exact census, as that term is understood in modern practise, but it came as near to a census as was possible in the circumstances. At the same time, Joncaire had unusual facilities for ascertaining the numbers, or any other facts that he desired to obtain concerning the Iroquois.

Joncaire was a characteristic product of the times in which he lived and the circumstances under which he had his being.

Parkman, historian *par excellence* of the French *régime* in North America, frequently refers to Joncaire's activity among the Indians. But he seems to merge two individuals in one. For example, he makes a Joncaire busy among the Senecas around Niagara as early as 1704, at the beginning of Queen Anne's War; and then prolongs his career

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until the downfall of French power in 1759-60. Besides, he speaks of him as "Chabert Joncaire," and says "he was the half-breed son of a French officer, by a Seneca squaw." The facts are as follows: The first of the name to figure prominently in the New World was Jean François Joncaire. He was the son of a subaltern officer of French colonial troops and a full-blood white man. Born about 1682 in France, he was brought by his parents to Canada when about nine years of age—say 1691. His father was a "pioneer officer" or military engineer, and was employed at fort-building and road-making. In a raid against the settlements on the Richelieu early in King William's War a party of Senecas captured young Joncaire and took him to one of their villages in western New York (the present Canandaigua). They adopted him and he lived with them until the interchange of captives a year or so after the Peace of Ryswick. He was then about eighteen years old. He attracted the attention of Cadillac, then commanding the French forces in the Lake region. Through Cadillac's influence he was sent to the Jesuit Academy or Seminary at Quebec for a time, but completed his education in a school of Recollet Friars at Montreal. For some reason he always opposed the Jesuits.

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Early in Queen Anne's War Joncaire, then about twenty-two, was employed as agent or emissary among the western Iroquois—mainly the Senecas and Cayugas. He spoke their language to perfection, and he also knew half a dozen other Indian tongues or dialects. From 1703 or 1704 until the capture of Fort Niagara in 1759, his activity among the western Indians was incessant, and his field of operations ranged from the banks of the Genesee to those of the Ohio, the Mississippi, the Sault Ste. Marie, and the faraway shores of Lake Superior and the Red River of the North. It was a wonderful career; a career that ended only in his seventy-eighth year, and with the fate of French rule in Canada.

About 1714 he took to wife the half-breed daughter of a French trader named Chaubert—or "Chabert," as Parkman spells it—by a Seneca squaw. She bore to him a son, whom he named Chaubert Joncaire. This was the one who—nearly forty years later—commanded the fort at Little Niagara in 1759. This first wife died not long after giving birth to Chaubert Joncaire. The old captain placed the boy in the hands of the Recollet Friars and gave him the best education French Canada could afford. In 1736, when fifty-four years old or thereabouts, Captain

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Joncaire married Mlle. Clauzun, half-breed daughter of the Chevalier de Clauzun by a Huron woman, said to have been the aunt of the famous half-breed Chief Anasthase, who commanded the Indians at the defeat of Braddock.

Mlle. Clauzun bore to him a son, whom he named for her—Jean François Clauzun-Joncaire.

We have given so much space to the history of Captain Joncaire because he was the only Frenchman whose influence among the Iroquois Sir William dreaded, and because his importance as a factor of French power in Canada for nearly sixty of its most thrilling years has been neglected by historians.

He was a man of medium stature, iron constitution, vehement temperament, and the most dauntless courage. His dislike of the Jesuits got him into trouble more than once, and they succeeded on one occasion in inducing the Governor-General to try him by court-martial. But he was triumphantly acquitted and lived to witness the confusion of his enemies.¹

¹ Stone (vol. i, pp. 29-32) speaks of Joncaire as "a Jesuit Brother." This is an error into which Stone was probably led by his knowledge of the fact that Joncaire was educated at the Jesuit Academy of Quebec. He was undoubtedly a zealous Roman Catholic, but never a member of the Order

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But whether his estimate or that of Sir William Johnson be correct, the difference is not material to the subject under discussion.

Turning now to the Indians under French influence or control, we find that they included all the tribes east of the Mississippi, north of the Ohio and north of the Great Lakes, and the New York frontier to the Atlantic seaboard. The principal of these tribes were the St. Regis, Adirondacks, St. Francis, and Abenakis in Lower Canada and the extreme northern part of the present State of New York; the powerful tribes of the Ottawas and the Hurons, who inhabited the rich country bounded by Lake Erie on the south, Lake Huron on the west, and the Ottawa River on the northeast; the Mississago or Michigan Indians; the Mackinaws, or Mackinacs—a small tribe—and the Saginaws, who inhabited the northern part of what is now Indiana and the southern peninsula of Michigan; the Winnebagos and Menominees of Wisconsin, together with a branch of the powerful Chipewewa tribe, who inhabited the northern peninsula of Michigan and Wisconsin in the neigh-

of Jesuits. The academies of that sect educated many laymen or secular pupils. In fact, when Joncaire was a student there were no other institutions in Canada where the higher branches were taught.

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borhood of Fort Mackinaw or Mackinac; the Pottawottomis, Kickapoos, Sauks, and a mixed tribe then known as the Wabash Indians, inhabiting what is now eastern Illinois and southern Indiana.

The total number of these Indians in direct communication or in close alliance with the French was estimated as high as 90,000 in 1752. This, which was Joncaire's estimate, is perhaps an exaggeration, but for present purposes it is not necessary to discuss that point. This estimate of 90,000 French Indians appears in St. Martin's History of New France,¹ an old work compiled during the French possession of the country, and published in Paris a few years afterward, and it is given on the authority of Joncaire. Besides the Indians above enumerated, there were at that time in Ohio the powerful tribes of the Shawnees, Miamis, and the Wyandots, besides a considerable clan of the Delawares, who had emigrated from Pennsylvania and settled at and about the forks of the Muskin-

¹ Father St. Martin may be termed the last of the great Jesuits of Canada. Born in Quebec, 1699, and educated as a Jesuit priest, he began mission work among the Hurons and Ottawas in 1721 or 1722. When Sir William Johnson visited Detroit in 1761, Father St. Martin was at the Huron mission near by, and the baronet paid him a visit, which will be further noticed in this work.

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gum River and in the valleys of the Tuscarawas and Walhonding Rivers.

For some reason the French had never taken the pains to put themselves *en rapport* with the Ohio Indians that they did with those farther west and north. We have never seen any explanation of this omission. There was apparently no reason for it, because at any time prior to the conquest of Canada the French were the only white people who had access to the Ohio Indians on any friendly terms whatsoever, and most of the trade of the Shawnees, Wyandots, and Miamis was carried on with the French, from whom they obtained guns, ammunition, cutlery, cooking utensils, blankets, etc., almost exclusively, at the French trading-posts of Presque Isle, Cuyahoga, Maumee, and Detroit. Prior to 1748 no English or Colonial trader had crossed the Allegheny Mountains. In fact, prior to that time no Englishman or colonist had crossed the range except a few daring hunters like Gist, Grady, and Post—and these had to carry their lives in their hands.

But, apart from numerical considerations, apart from the genius of the French in ingratiating themselves into the good graces of the Indians, apart from the tremendous leverage of the clerical power exercised by the Jesuit

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Fathers, and apart from the ineptness of the English colonists in dealing with the Indians, there was still another factor of organic difference between the English and French systems on this continent, which was, perhaps, more important than all the others—at least it was a factor which gave a quick mobility and a constant vitality to the French power that were totally wanting in the English Colonial system. The thirteen English colonies, at the beginning of the old French war, were all autonomous, semi-independent, self-governing commonwealths. Each had its governor, its council or assembly elected by the people, and everything that it did or that was done in its name must be the subject of discussion and legislation. Then, among the several colonies also was a good deal of bickering, of jealousy, and in some cases vexatious disputes about boundaries and jurisdictions leading up to the very threshold of internecine war. For these reasons the English colonies were indolent and procrastinating in the conception of any operations that required united action, and even when the difficulties of conception and design had been overcome, they were, if possible, slower in execution.

On the other hand, the French *régime* in Canada was a solid, compact body. There

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was no representative government nor the semblance of one. The Governor-General at Quebec was within his domain a monarch as absolute as the Bourbon king at Versailles. His word was law and his orders gospel. Every able-bodied Frenchman in Canada was at all times a soldier *in esse* or *in posse*. He was constantly enrolled in what was termed the Canadian militia,¹ and his term of liability

¹ Garneau, in his *Histoire du Canada*, quotes Montcalm as saying: "The Canadian militia are better soldiers than the American provincials, man for man. But they are too few; and when they are once in the field there is no reserve from which to recruit their ranks." This remark is worth consideration. The French Canadian is always brave. He is hardy and can live on a diet that would starve an American. He is inured to all possible rigors of climate. The military system that prevailed under French rule in Canada made him at least a half-regular soldier all the time. In war every company commander of Canadian militia was a French regular officer. The "habitans" could hold only subaltern rank. Every company had a French regular drill-sergeant. Their discipline and regulations in every respect were those of the regular troops. They never mutinied or deserted and seldom complained; if they did their shrift was short. They were the soldiers of a despotic government and they knew it.

On the other hand the American Provincial troops were volunteers, freemen; and they carried a good deal of their democracy into the field with them. While they marched and fought well and endured marvelous fatigues and privations at times, they were always prompt to find fault if any was to be found. It was impossible to bring them up—or down—to the regular standard of discipline. More than one British officer who ordered a provincial soldier to be flogged fell with

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to service was from the age of sixteen years anywhere to decrepitude. Moreover, the male sex largely predominated in the white population of Canada, the proportion being, in the average for the 160 years between the advent of Samuel Champlain and the downfall of French power in 1760, as two to one.

In a word, French Canada may be said to have been under perpetual martial law. All the conceptions and designs were secretly planned in the palace of the Governor-General at Quebec. All the orders were issued without publicity, and such was the prevailing discipline in all grades of society and throughout the local military force, that the execution of these plans and designs was always as swift as their consideration had been secret. It does not seem that any contrast of systems could be more perfectly antipodal than this, or that any comparison of methods could exhibit wider extremes.

Thus far we have dealt only with the white people and the Indians proper, but in Canada there was another element which did not exist

a bullet in his back at the next battle or skirmish. From the purely disciplinary point of view there is every reason to agree with the sentiment that Garneau quotes from Montcalm. But judging by results, wherever the Canadian militia and the American provincials came together, neither one supported by regulars, history does not verify Montcalm's theory.

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to any extent in the English colonies. That was the element of the half-breeds. At the time when the Marquis Duquesne became Governor-General, the half-breed or mixed-race population of French Canada was nearly as numerous as the white race itself. These half-breeds, the offspring of French traders and soldiers by Indian women, were scattered through every tribe. They were to be found in every Indian village. They were the leading race in hunting and trapping. They were the common carriers of supplies and of articles of trade and barter all over the French Northwest. They were a brave, active, indefatigable, and intelligent race. In peace, they carried the name and the influence of France to the remotest Indian tribes; in war, they were, under the peculiar conditions that prevailed, more formidable in combat than the French regulars themselves, and more effective than the full-blood Indians, combining, as they did, the disciplinary aptitude of the one with the subtle woodcraft of the other. As a rule, in the campaigns they were not grouped in military bodies of their own or by themselves, but were distributed among the Indians, whom they instructed by their superior knowledge and encouraged by their unflinching example. It is hardly too much to say

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that at the period under discussion the race of French Canadian half-breeds formed the most important factor of the military strength of France in North America. Under such conditions, France and England, with their respective American colonies, began about the end of 1754 their final struggle for absolute supremacy on this continent.

The hope of the American colonists that the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle would inaugurate another long peace, like that which intervened between the end of Queen Anne's War in 1714 and the beginning of King George's in 1743, had proved illusory. The ink was hardly dry on the treaty of 1748 when the French began measures for carrying out a plan long cherished. This plan contemplated nothing less than the seizure of all the country west of the Alleghenies, the "hinterland," as modern diplomatists say, of the English colonies. The English had always nominally claimed this back country south of the Great Lakes and parallel with the Atlantic front of their colonies, to the banks of the Mississippi. But they had never made the slightest effort to settle it, to open trade within its borders, or even to explore it.

The French, on the contrary, had explored it nearly a hundred years before the period of

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which we now write (1754). They had established numerous trading-posts and a few small villages, such as Old Vincennes within the present State of Indiana, Kaskaskia in Illinois, and St. Charles and St. Genevieve in Missouri. They had established several routes through this region between Canada and their settlements at the mouth of the Mississippi, now Louisiana. One of these routes was from the head of Lake Michigan to the Illinois River, and thence down that stream and the Mississippi to New Orleans. Another was up the Maumee to its head waters, thence by portage to the head waters of the Wabash, and so on down. Another was from their trading-post at Cuyahoga to the head waters of the Miami, thence down that stream to the Ohio. In short, their traders, priests, and voyageurs had, for more than half a century, permeated the region, forming alliances with the Indian tribes, converting many of them to the Catholic faith, marrying their women, supplying them with firearms and ammunition, and practising, in short, all the arts of French colonization—or rather, of French occupation.

In any struggle that might occur between France and England for the actual possession and control of this vast territory, it is there-

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fore apparent that the French must have a very great initial advantage. And this advantage was enhanced by the fact that the French, from their places of arms in Canada, could communicate with all parts of the region by water, or through a level and easily traversed country. The English, on the other hand, could reach it only by long marches over difficult mountains, where they would have to cut their roads as they advanced, and where their columns and their supply-trains would be beset at every step by the lurking savage allies of the French. In the first part of his reign Louis XV neglected the French colonies in America. His great-grandfather, Louis XIV, throughout his long reign, made them the objects of his especial solicitude. But the neglect and, to some extent, the oppressive regulations of trade and immigration in the first thirty years of the reign of Louis XV had seriously weakened the French power in Canada. Moreover, Louis XV had made Canada a sort of penal colony; not, indeed, for common criminals, but a place of exile for officers who fought duels or failed to pay their debts, for broken-down noblemen; in short, for all classes of genteel offenders not quite bad enough for the Bastille.

Among other things, this had caused an

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actual decrease of the white population. When Louis XIV died, in 1715, there were at least 30,000 white men in Canada; whereas, when the Marquis Duquesne assumed the Governor-Generalship, he reported only 22,000. Prior to Duquesne all the Governors-General during the reign of Louis XV had been mere creatures of the court, possessing neither aptitude nor ambition for the performance of their duties, or the extension of French power and influence. The appointment of Duquesne itself was a change of policy, from the halting, the indecisive, and the weak to the aggressive, the determined, and the strong. This change of policy was due mainly, if not wholly, to the influence of Madame de Pompadour, who, since her alliance with Louis, in 1745, had never ceased her efforts to arouse his interest in the vast possessions of France in the New World, and at last her eloquence and tact had brought the luxurious and careless monarch to something like a sense of his obligations.

Simultaneously with the selection of the Marquis Duquesne to succeed M. de la Galissonière as Governor-General, Louis XV began quietly to prepare for another war. All ships of war on the stocks at Toulon, Brest, l'Orient, Rochefort, and La Rochelle

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were ordered to be pushed to completion at the earliest date. Vessels in need of repair were ordered to be thoroughly overhauled, and all defects made good. Twelve thousand additional seamen and marines were ordered to be recruited for the fleet. All the military and naval arsenals of the country were filled with munitions. The regular regiments were ordered to be recruited up to the maximum establishment. Most significant of all, ten regiments of regulars, comprising some of the oldest and most famous *corps d'élite* in the French army, were ordered to be in readiness for service beyond the seas. Of these, seven were intended for Canada and three for the East Indies.

Those destined for Canada were the regiments of Artois, of Bearn, of Languedoc, of Guienne, of Burgundy, of Picardy, and the famous Regiment de la Reine. Under the system of organization prevailing in the French army at that time, the full war strength of an infantry regiment of the line was twelve companies of 103 of all ranks each, with eight field and staff officers, or a total of 1,244 to the regiment. But when sent on foreign service two companies were left at home to form a depot for recruiting and training purposes, so that the

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actual strength in the field would be a maximum of 1,038. In addition to these infantry regiments, Louis ordered four companies (batteries) of light artillery and a siege-train to be in readiness for Canadian service. The batteries were of six guns each (light 8-pounders or howitzers) and 140 men.

The siege-train had twelve heavy guns (12- and 18-pounders) and 280 heavy artillerists. At first Walsh's regiment of the Irish Brigade—the selfsame men who, seven years before, had stemmed the English tide and turned the fortunes of the day at Fontenoy—was included in the Canadian contingent. But for some reason, they were sent to reenforce La Bourdonnais and Lally at Pondicherry in the East Indies. However, the total strength of the Canadian reenforcement was about 7,500, and it was made up of the best troops in the French regular army.

The sending of French regular regiments of territorial titles to Canada or anywhere beyond seas was itself a remarkable innovation. Hitherto the French regulars employed in Canada had been regiments specially recruited for colonial service. They were, in fact, organized in a manner quite similar to the "Foreign Legion" of our times. They were, of course, regular troops in every sense;

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borne on the army list under the head of "Corps de la Marine et des Colonies," and their officers held equivalent and interchangeable rank with the line regiments of territorial title.

These preparations began in 1752. Duquesne was appointed to succeed la Gallissonière in 1751, and went immediately to Canada.¹ But on arriving there, he requested the latter to hold the office a few months in order that he (Duquesne) might have opportunity to make a personal survey of the frontiers and of the general situation incognito. Early in 1752 Duquesne, accompanied only by Captain Joncaire, Captain Beaujeu (who subsequently commanded the French and Indians at the defeat of Braddock), together with half a dozen half-breed trailers and hunters, journeyed from Presque Isle (now Erie, Pa.) to the junction of the Allegheny and Monongahela

¹ Madame d'Hausset says that Duquesne's instructions were in Madame de Pompadour's handwriting, and all that the king had to do with them was to sign his name. She also says that when Duquesne was leaving Versailles, de Pompadour sent for him and gave him a magnificent seal ring, the seal of which was cut in an immense ruby. "Now," she said, "Monsieur le Marquis, I want you to put that seal on articles of capitulation for Boston, New York, and Philadelphia. France must be supreme in the New World and you must make her so." It would appear that the gracious madame gave the gallant marquis a large contract.

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Rivers, and indicated the spot where the fort afterward named for him should be built.

There is nothing in history to show that the English Government or any of the colonial governments had adequate knowledge of these tremendous preparations; and their first intimation of the French scheme was in the fall of 1753, when Captain Joncaire established a fort at Venango, the confluence of French Creek with the Allegheny River. This was the third in a chain of posts hugging the western slope of the Allegheny Mountains, and designed by Duquesne to cut the English off from the Ohio Valley. The first of the posts was Presque Isle, the second Fort Le Boeuf, thirteen miles south of the former, and at the head of canoe navigation on French Creek; Venango, the third; and they were calculated to serve as intermediate stations between Lake Erie and the grand fortress to be built at the head of the Ohio.

In our time it is difficult to believe that such secrecy with regard to such portentous movements could be maintained. Nowadays every nation knows all about every other nation's army, its navy, and its movements with either or both. But in those days, under the Bourbon rule in France, absolute secrecy was possible. No outsider could get within

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gunshot of a French dockyard or arsenal. Men employed in them were under oath not to divulge anything. If they did divulge, it was rated high treason, and punishable by death. Thus it happened that the French were able to penetrate far into territory claimed by the British, establish lines of communication, and build substantial forts without the English knowing anything about it, and all this in a time of profound peace.

At last the British Government awoke to the fact that things were going wrong in the American colonies. Tidings of the disasters on the Virginia frontier—of Trent's surrender of the fort at the head of the Ohio, and of Washington's capitulation at Fort Necessity—reached England in August, 1754. These tidings were so bad that they infused a spasm of energy into even the ridiculous ministry of the absurd Duke of Newcastle. But, after all, it was not the Duke of Newcastle who really acted. At that time the Captain-General and commander-in-chief of the British army was William Augustus, Duke of Cumberland. He had the additional advantage of being the king's favorite son. And he was unquestionably the best soldier—if not the only one—that the House of Hanover has produced. Cumberland did not wait upon the moods and

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tenses of the fat-witted Prime Minister. As Captain-General, he had control of military affairs in the colonies as well as in England in time of war—and this was certainly such a time.

Therefore, without consulting the ministry or any one else—unless, perhaps, his father, the king—Cumberland ordered the Forty-fourth Regiment of Foot, Colonel Sir Peter Halket, and the Forty-eighth Regiment, Colonel Thomas Dunbar, to be put in instant readiness for service in the American colonies. He also sent letters of service in the king's name to General Sir William Pepperell and Colonel William Shirley—then Governor of Massachusetts — authorizing and directing them to raise two regiments of infantry in the colonies, to be known as Royal Provincial or Royal American regiments, to be enrolled in the British regular army list, and to be paid and provided for by the king the same as any other British regulars. These orders bore date of September 19, 1754—less than four weeks after the news of the disastrous result of Washington's campaign reached London.

Other provisions were made by the Duke of Cumberland for the employment of Provincial troops, and of such Indians as might adhere to the English cause. On the whole,

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Cumberland calculated that his scheme would serve to put in the field in the American colonies a force of at least 14,000 men by the opening of spring in 1755, and of this force he intended—including the small garrisons already in the colonies—that about 4,000 should be British regulars. It should be remarked at this point that the numerical strength of the British regular army in 1754 was at its lowest ebb. After the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle—which the French always called a truce—the silly Duke of Newcastle imagined that the millennium had come, and, if he could have had his way, would probably have disbanded the British army altogether.

Be this as it may, a man of different mold was directing this particular affair. Without going into details, the Duke of Cumberland selected Major-General Sir Edward Braddock to command the British troops destined for the American colonies, and at the same time made him commander-in-chief of all the British forces in North America—regular, Provincial, and Indian. After arranging for transportation of his troops, ordnance, and supplies, Braddock himself, with his staff, sailed from the Downs in the famous old *Centurion*—which had been Anson's flagship in that wonderful cruise round the world a dec-

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ade before—on the 21st of December, 1754, and reached Hampton Roads after a most tempestuous passage, the 20th of February, 1755. The convoy of transports, with the troops, ordnance stores, and general supplies, sailed from Cork the 14th of January, 1755, were dispersed at sea, and, as they arrived from day to day in the Chesapeake, were worked up the Potomac to Alexandria, where the last of them, the Severn, with four companies of the Forty-eighth—Dunbar's regiment—on board, arrived the 15th of March.

Detailed description of Braddock's campaign would be foreign to the scope of this little book. But on his arrival in this country he did some things in his capacity as commander-in-chief which do more credit to his memory than does the battle in which he fell. Chief among these things was the appointment of Sir William Johnson, in the name and by authority of the king, to be General Superintendent of Indian Affairs for the whole of British North America. This appointment was made in March, 1755, less than a month after General Braddock's arrival in Hampton Roads.

The story of Braddock's fatal expedition is known to most well-read American school-boys. They know it, not because it was Brad-

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dock's expedition or Braddock's defeat, but because the name and fame of George Washington are intimately associated with it. No attempt to describe it will be made here. Suffice to say that on the 10th of June, 1755, Braddock's army left Fort Cumberland 2,150 strong, as stated in the journal of Captain Orme, of the general's staff. This force consisted of 1,400 British regulars, about 500 Virginia Provincials, and a miscellaneous force of 250 more, composed of three independent companies, in the king's pay, each about 60 strong; a small troop of Provincial Light Horse from Virginia—about 30 men—10 guides, and 30 sailors from the Centurion, sent along to help handle the artillery of the expedition. It was a tedious march, during which not more than ten miles a day was traversed, by reason of the delay in making a road practicable for the wagon-train and the heavier arms.

Braddock, fretted by these delays, finally, by the advice of Sir Peter Halket, Captain Orme, and his special Provincial aide-de-camp, Major George Washington, determined to leave the heavy baggage and guns behind with a guard of 700 men under Colonel Dunbar, and to push forward, by forced marches, with a column in light march-

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ing order, composed of 1,000 British regulars and 400 Virginia Provincials. This column started the 19th of June, taking with it eight of the lightest guns with their tumbrils; the provisions—twenty days' rations—being carried on packhorses. The rest, so far as this little volume has space to deal with the subject, is soon told. On the 9th of July, Braddock, with his column of 1,400, crossed the Monongahela a few miles above its confluence with the Allegheny forming the Ohio River.

Here the British column fell into an ambushade of French and Indians under Captain Beaujeu of the French regular army, and in less than an hour was hopelessly defeated, utterly routed, and almost annihilated. English historians have described it as the most complete disaster that ever befell a British force. General Braddock and all the field-officers present were either killed or wounded. The total loss out of 1,460 officers and men was 456 killed outright or mortally wounded, and 521 wounded, many of whom were so disabled that they fell that night or the next day under the tomahawks of the pursuing savages. Of the total force of 1,460, only 483 escaped fit for duty—and many of these received slight wounds. The Virginia Pro-

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vincials did their best to cover the retreat, but they, too, were overwhelmed.

When the wreck of Braddock's army reached the reserve under Colonel Dunbar, the latter partook of their panic, and a disgraceful flight back to Fort Cumberland ensued, baggage, supplies, cannon, and everything else that could impede flight being abandoned. It was the greatest defeat ever suffered by the whites in frontier warfare—greater even than St. Clair's—and the most wonderful victory ever won by the Indians. We have noted that Braddock's force was 1,460 of all ranks. The force of French and Indians that destroyed it has been variously estimated. Doubtless the most accurate statement is that of Captain Joncaire, who organized the Indian part of the force, and who would have commanded in the battle but for an accident that happened to him early in the morning of the day on which it occurred.

Just after daylight he mounted his pony and was riding at top speed through a new clearing full of logs and stumps, when the pony stumbled, throwing the captain over his head. The result was a dislocated left shoulder and severe contusions in the head. He was carried to the fort unconscious, and remained in that condition several hours—being,

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in fact, roused from his stupor by the triumphant yells of his Indians returning from their field of victory. He says in his journal that the force actually in contact with Braddock's army was composed of 600 Indians, 20 cadets (half-breed boys under training for military service), and 16 white Frenchmen, of whom 7 were regular officers—a total of 636.

The 600 Indians, he says, represented as many as ten tribes, it having been his policy in organizing the force to take a small number of picked warriors from each tribe, partly with a view to stimulate rivalry, and partly to identify as many different tribes as possible with the French cause. He gives a list embodying an exact statement of the number present from each tribe, and this list includes 80 Senecas and 18 Cayugas; so that one-sixth of the Indians who defeated Braddock belonged to the traditional "friends of the English," the Iroquois! The principal chief and commander of all the Indians was the celebrated Huron half-breed Anasthose, who was said to be a grandson of Count de Frontenac. The second-in-command was Pontiac, then a young war-chief of the Ottawas. The total loss of the French and Indians in Braddock's defeat was 3 white men (includ-

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ing Captain Beaujeu) killed and 2 wounded; 2 cadets wounded; 7 Indians killed and 17 wounded—a total of 10 killed and 21 wounded.

Winthrop Sargent, in his History of Braddock's Expedition, says that the force under Captain Beaujeu consisted of "600 Indians, 146 Canadian militia, 72 French regulars, and 20 cadets—total, 838." But Joncaire says that all but 16 of the French regulars and all the Canadian militia were retained at the fort by Captain Contrecoeur—"who," he says, rather sardonically, "did not imagine that success was possible, and was among the last to realize the magnitude and glory of the victory. He had made all arrangements for a capitulation with the honors of war!"

Perhaps Joncaire was prejudiced against Contrecoeur. The latter was only a captain of infantry of the line, and the 72 French regulars at Fort Duquesne were simply his own company of the regiment of Languedoc. Joncaire had long held the commission, pay, and allowances of a "First Captain of Marine Infantry" in the regular army of France, and was borne on the "extra" or "special-service list" of his regiment—that of Toulon. A "First Captain of Marine Infantry" was, by title, only a captain, but the real rank was equivalent to that of major in the British

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service. He therefore ranked both Contrecoeur and St. Pierre, who were only captains of infantry of the line. But, as he had never actually served with his regiment, and as his rank was honorary rather than substantive, they were always disputing his precedence over them. However, at the time of Braddock's defeat, Joncaire was recognized at "Government House" in Quebec as the commander of the French and Indian forces in the Ohio Valley. He was over seventy years old at the time of the accident above related, and he never again had much use of his left arm. He never attempted field service after the Braddock campaign.¹

¹ During the rest of the war Captain Joncaire made his headquarters most of the time at Fort Niagara, where he was captured in 1759 when that stronghold surrendered to Sir William Johnson's army. In his "list of prisoners" Sir William describes him as "captain of marines," and in the same list appears the name of his half-breed son, "Chabeare" (Chaubert) Joncaire, who commanded a company of half-breed rangers. He was sent to England with the other captured officers, and upon his release in 1762 returned to Canada. He settled on his farm near St. Catharines, where he died in 1775, over ninety years old.

Sir William went to Niagara in 1766 to hold a council with delegates of the Northwestern Indians who had recently been engaged in Pontiac's war and now wanted to make peace. It may be mentioned as a curious fact that these Indians, who all belonged either to the Algonquin or the Ojibway (Chipewa) grand divisions of the Indian race, could not be per-

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Unquestionably the general trend of public opinion in this country has, for nearly a century and a half, been unfavorable to General Braddock, and prejudiced toward his memory. We have neither time nor space here to debate the question whether public opinion in this instance is right or wrong, but whatever his faults may have been, Braddock lacked neither breadth of perception, boldness of design, nor bravery in execution. It is worth while to say here that George Washington, who was his aide-de-camp, and stood by him when he breathed his last, never, in all his writings or his conversations, had

sueded to come to Johnson Hall because that would compel them to pass through the Iroquois tribes, their hereditary foes. Therefore Sir William had to meet them at Niagara. His journal during this conference contains the following entry:

“. . . Had the pleasure of a visit from the venerable Captain Joncaire, now past seventy (eighty), but hale and hearty and a most loyal subject of our king. We had a long talk in Iroquois, as I knew no French and he no English. He asked me to give his two sons, ‘Chabeare’ (Chaubert) and Jean François (Clauzun), something to do in our Indian service. I found them to be quarter-breeds, their mother having been a half-breed. Discovering that they were very capable fellows and loyal, I appointed one of them, Jean François, interpreter and assistant agent at St. Mary’s [Sault Ste. Marie], and ‘Chabeare’ in the same capacity at our new post of Green Bay among the Menominees. They were all very grateful and declared their content with British rule.”

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anything but the kindest words to say of Edward Braddock. He was undoubtedly a martinet, rough in manner, and, perhaps, severe if not cruel in his methods of discipline, but he was nevertheless a thoroughbred soldier and a skilful tactician, within the teachings of the school in which he had been trained, and a general strategist of far more than ordinary ability.

After his arrival in this country he lost no time. Upon reaching Hampton Roads, almost his first act was to summon a council of Colonial governors to meet him at Alexandria, Virginia. The governors who accepted the invitation and attended this council were those of Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. The other colonies, except South Carolina and Georgia, which took no part in the conference, were represented by their lieutenant-governors. Sir William Johnson was present at this conference by special invitation. He and Benjamin Franklin were the only members of it who were not governors or lieutenant-governors of colonies. At this conference General Braddock outlined the strategy which he had planned for his campaign at large. He proposed four expeditions. One of these was to be carried out in Nova Scotia under the

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governor of that province—Lawrence—with the object of finally expelling the French from that peninsula, but it had no direct connection with the other three projects, and need not be considered here.

The main projects were: first, an expedition to be commanded by Braddock himself for the reduction of Fort Duquesne and expulsion of the French from the Ohio Valley; second, an expedition to be commanded by Governor Shirley of Massachusetts for the reduction of Fort Niagara, with the ultimate object of cutting French communication between Lake Ontario and the upper lakes; the third was an expedition for the reduction of Crown Point, then the southernmost fortress of the French on the New York frontier. As commander of this last-mentioned expedition he named Sir William Johnson, at the same time appointing him, as has already been remarked, General Superintendent of Indian Affairs for the whole of British North America in the name of the king. The scope of this work, as already intimated, does not admit discussion of the expeditions assigned to Braddock himself, Shirley, or Governor Lawrence of Nova Scotia, but we may find space for some detail of Sir William Johnson's expedition against Crown Point.

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As soon as the conference at Alexandria was over, Johnson returned as rapidly as he could to the Mohawk Valley, and immediately summoned a conference of Iroquois chiefs to meet him at Mount Johnson. With this messenger he sent a belt of wampum to each chief, informing him of the appointment he had received as the direct royal superintendent of all the North American Indians, which was a very considerable promotion over the commission he had recently held as superintendent of the Iroquois only. Upon receipt of this information the Indians did not need urging. The news, says Stone, that their brother Warragh-i-ya-gey had again been raised up to power among them, spread like wildfire. Within ten days from the date of his call for this conference, over 1,000 Indians assembled at Mount Johnson. So unprecedented and unexpected was the number present—by far the largest assemblage of Indians ever before convened—that Sir William Johnson was altogether taken by surprise, and his food-supply completely overwhelmed. He had to call in the assistance of a large number of his most prosperous neighbors for fifteen or twenty miles up and down the Mohawk Valley to help him out in this respect. On the 21st of June he opened the

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council by a speech, in which he informed the Indians that he had been delegated to command a certain expedition against a certain important fortress of the enemy, that the forces to be placed at his disposal were to be Provincial troops from Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Connecticut, and New York, and that it was expected that about one thousand picked warriors from the Six Nations should form part of his force, to be commanded by the venerable chief sachem of the Mohawks and senior chief of all the Iroquois—Hendrick. The usual interchange of oratory then took place, after which the Indians departed for their respective castles and villages, full of enthusiasm and promising to place a thousand warriors at his disposal within six weeks or two months. So well satisfied with the results of this council was Sir William that he wrote to the Duke of Cumberland shortly after that “there are very few if any among the whole Iroquois Confederacy who, in the present dispute between the French and our Crown, do not sincerely wish us success, and are disposed to assist our arms.”

Sir William now proceeded energetically to organize his expedition. According to the original plan, the force employed was to consist of 2,500 Provincial troops from Massa-

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chusetts, New Hampshire, and Connecticut; 1,000 from New York, and 1,000 Indians—4,500 altogether. Before the end of July all the forces destined for the reduction of Crown Point had assembled under Sir William's command at Albany. The contingents of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New York were a little in excess of the required number. New Hampshire sent 500 men organized in seven companies under command of Colonel Joshua A. Blanchard. The Massachusetts and Connecticut troops were commanded by Colonel Phineas Lyman. The only disappointment he experienced was that a little less than 600 Indians responded to the call, instead of the thousand expected. This, however, was because the quota of Senecas, which according to the population of the respective tribes had been fixed at 400, was dilatory, and, in fact, was not mobilized in time to take any active part in the campaign. This was due partly to the lingering seeds of disaffection which had been sown by the French emissaries among the Senecas during the past three years, but mainly to the fact that just at the time when Hi-o-ka-to and Captain Montour were assembling their warriors at the Falls of the Genesee—say about the middle of July—they received the stunning

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and utterly demoralizing news of Braddock's defeat, which had occurred the 9th of that month.

These tidings threw the whole of the Seneca Nation into a ferment of doubt and hesitancy, which all the eloquence of Montour and all the stalwart bullying of Hi-o-ka-to were powerless to overcome. All they could do was to send runners to Sir William, informing him of the state of affairs. Montour persuaded perhaps twenty-five or thirty Seneca warriors to accompany him, and joined Johnson's forces at Saratoga, and they were the only Senecas engaged in the expedition. Hi-o-ka-to stayed behind, declaring his determination to bring the allotted contingent of Senecas along if, as he expressed it, he "had to drag every mother's son of them by the scalp-lock!" On the 6th of August Sir William decided not to wait any longer for the Seneca contingent, and sent Colonel Lyman forward with the New York and Massachusetts troops to erect a fort on the bank of the Hudson River at the south end of the great portage between that river and Lake George, to which he gave the name of Fort Edward. At this time an unfortunate controversy arose between Sir William and Governor Shirley, growing out of the Govern-

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or's pique at what he considered some lack of suitable personal attention toward him on Johnson's part. This controversy resulted in considerable correspondence of a more or less acrimonious character, which our present limits of space preclude us from reproducing. Suffice to say in general terms that the whole affair grew out of the personal vanity of Governor Shirley brought, as it was, in contact with Sir William's matter-of-fact, businesslike way of transacting affairs.

On the 8th of August Sir William himself set out from Albany with the stores, baggage-train, and artillery and the rest of the troops, including four companies of the New York regiment, which, coming from Dutchess and Ulster counties down the river, were a little behind those raised in Albany County. This force was accompanied by the Chief Hendrick with a hundred and fifty Mohawk warriors, among whom was Joseph Brant, then a mere boy of thirteen years, but, notwithstanding his extreme youth, able to carry a light gun (a small fowling-piece presented to him by Sir William) that he had, and serving in the ranks.

Sir William arrived at Fort Edward on the 14th of August, where he was joined by

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250 more Indians, making the total number about 400; and afterward 120 more came in by small squads. The New England and New York troops were full of ardor and impatient of delay. The news of Braddock's defeat had not only not disheartened them, but had made them all the more anxious to be led against Crown Point. They considered this expedition a measure for the defense of their fire-sides. One of the Provincial officers, belonging to the Massachusetts contingent, Major Thomas Williams, wrote a letter to his wife, in which he said, among other things: "I endeavor to keep myself calm and quiet under our slow progress, and await God's time, but the advance seems very slow." Colonel Lyman was equally restive under the delay. Indeed, a day or two before Sir William's arrival at Fort Edward, he had set 300 of his men to work to cut a road across the hills to Fort Ann, supposing that the army would proceed against Crown Point by way of Wood Creek and the head of Lake Champlain.

Sir William, on his arrival, called a council of war to decide upon the best route, and the result of this council was that Colonel Lyman's movement was countermanded. A scouting party of forty soldiers, under Captain John Stark, with thirty Indians, was then

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sent out to reconnoiter the whole country in the vicinity of Lake George. When these scouts returned another council of war was held on the 22d of August, in which the officers, upon hearing their report, unanimously decided that the Lake George route appeared to them the most eligible, and that it ought to be immediately adopted as the plan of campaign. In a previous chapter we have mentioned that about the close of King George's War, seven years before, Sir William had made a road from the head of Lake George to Fort Edward or Glens Falls, but this road had been neglected. Many trees had fallen across it, and it had to be cleared out. So 2,000 men were sent forward to restore this road, with orders also to erect at the head of the lake a fort, with suitable buildings in which to store arms and other munitions of war when they should arrive.

Then, leaving Colonel Lyman to await the rest of the troops, and the New Hampshire Provincials to complete and garrison the fort, Sir William set out on the 26th of August with 3,400 men for the lake—a distance of about fifteen miles—and reached it at dusk on the 28th. After some reconnoitering he selected on the 29th a position for his camp which was on a bluff shore of the lake,

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flanked at both ends by thickly wooded swamps where small creeks emptied in. The French had always called this lake "St. Sacrament," and Sir William now solemnly changed it to Lake George, "not only," as he said, "in honor of His Majesty the King, but to assure his undoubted dominion here." Although Lake George had been used for many years as a means of communication, both for warlike and commercial purposes, between Canada and Albany, yet its shores were still a primeval forest, where no house had ever been built or a spot of land cleared. The troops immediately set about clearing a place for a camp capable of sheltering 5,000 men, and providing housing for their military stores.

Meanwhile, Colonel Lyman, as soon as all the dilatory troops arrived, left at Fort Edward a garrison of 250 Connecticut Provincials and five companies of the New York regiment,¹ and with the rest of his force joined the camp at Lake George on September 3d, bringing with him all the heavy artillery.

¹ We have used the term "regiment" in speaking of the New York contingent. But besides Schuyler's regiment of ten companies there were four independent companies, commanded by Captains Davis, Ten Eyck, Munro (Rangers), and Vrooman.

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Johnson had expected to be joined at the lake by many more warriors of the Six Nations. He expected at least 600, although he had received tidings from Hi-o-ka-to and information from Captain Montour, who had then arrived with his small detachment at his camp, that there was little hope of the full Seneca contingent of 400 being available. In the meantime, de Vaudreuil, who had just succeeded Duquesne as Governor-General of Canada, learned by papers, taken at the wreck of Braddock's army, of Shirley's proposed expedition against Niagara, and as a counter-movement he had arranged an attack upon Oswego, but learning subsequently that Sir William Johnson's expedition was advancing by way of Lake George against Crown Point, he changed his purpose. He called back the French force already on its way to Oswego, and sent them under Baron Dieskau to meet Sir William's forces.

The baron left a large force—about 1,200 men—at Crown Point, and taking with him 280 French regulars of the Regiment de la Reine, 800 Canadian militia, and between 600 and 700 Indians, proceeded up Lake Champlain and landed at the head of that lake, with the intention of marching across the country and attacking Fort Edward in Johnson's rear,

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with a view of cutting off his retreat and in the hope of thereby annihilating his army. If he should be able to accomplish this, the route to Albany and the lower settlements on the Hudson would be open and undefended. On the fourth day, however, after leaving the head of Lake Champlain, the French army found itself on the road to Lake George, instead of to Fort Edward, and Dieskau discovered through his scouts that he was only four miles from the fortified camp which Sir William Johnson had made on the bank of the lake. Here Dieskau halted and sent forward a party of Indians, under the direction of Captain de St. Pierre, to reconnoiter. In the course of their reconnaissance they encountered and killed a courier whom General Johnson had sent to warn the garrison at Fort Edward of their danger. Dieskau, discovering from this fact that Sir William was on the alert, gave the Indians under his command the choice of either attacking the fort or marching against Sir William's camp at the lake. The Indians, who never had any stomach for artillery, and having been told by a prisoner that the camp at the lake had no cannon, positively refused to attack the fort, but expressed their desire to be led against the fortified camp. Dieskau thereupon

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marched through the forests toward Lake George, and encamped that night on the banks of a small pond a little to the eastward of the Lake George road, and at the southern foot of French Mountain.

About nightfall on the 7th of September, Johnson learned through his scouts that a large body of men were marching toward his camp. Early the next morning he sent out about 800 Provincials under Colonel Ephraim Williams, and the whole force of Hendrick's Iroquois warriors, led by the venerable chief himself, to find the enemy. What we have called "a fortified camp" was simply an abatis or rough log breastwork, made by felling trees across the foot of the camp and lopping down their branches. There was no earthwork or other pretense of regular fortification, excepting that places were cleared through the log-slashing to form a kind of embrasure for the four cannon that he had with him at the lake. Dieskau, advised by his Indian scouts of the movement of Colonel Williams and Hendrick, arranged an ambuscade, and the detachment, when about two and a half miles from the camp, walked right into it, the column being led by Hendrick and his warriors. Dieskau had ordered that his men should reserve their fire until the Provin-

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cial and Iroquois were entirely within the half circle of his ambush, but before the detachment had gone that far, one of the enemy's muskets went off accidentally, whereupon the attack began. Volley after volley was poured with murderous effect upon the Indians in front and upon the left of Williams' column of Provincials. Hendrick, who was riding at the head of his column—a large, corpulent man, and wearing a brilliant uniform—formed a conspicuous mark for the enemy's bullets, and was killed at the first fire.

The venerable warrior was in his eightieth year when he fell in battle. Colonel Williams was also killed a few minutes after Hendrick, being shot through the head as he was in the act of mounting a rock in order better to direct the movements of his men, his horse having been shot under him a few minutes before. The Provincials and Indians now broke, and retreated in some confusion, the enemy following close at their heels, yelling and firing. Reaching a small pond near the road to the lake, Lieutenant-Colonel Cole of the Massachusetts Provincials succeeded in rallying two hundred or more of them in a favorable position, and stationing his men behind trees at a point where the road ran close to the

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pond, forming a sort of defile, checked the pursuit. Sir William, as soon as he heard the firing, had sent Cole with 300 men to cover the retreat, subsequently reenforcing them with 200 more under Major Whiting. The check given the advancing enemy at this little pond—which has ever since been known in the local phrase as “Bloody Pond”—enabled the survivors of the force of Williams and Hendrick to reach the fortified camp, into which they clambered pell-mell over the fallen trees and brush, weary, dejected, and dispirited. Had Dieskau been able, as he had intended, to take advantage of the confusion produced in Sir William's camp by the arrival of these panic-stricken fugitives, and while his own men were completely flushed with success, he might possibly have made a grand rush and carried the improvised barrier or abatis by storm; although, notwithstanding the demoralization at the first onset, the subsequent proceedings indicate that even this would have been doubtful. It was not believed by the Indians and Canadians that Sir William had any artillery in his camp at the lake, but when they arrived in sight of the breastwork they saw that he had four guns mounted, whereupon they halted and took shelter in the woods. This left only the

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French regulars for attack, and before Dieskau could rally and reinspire his Indians and Canadians, the Provincials had found time in which to improve their defenses and recover from their previous demoralization.

As soon as Dieskau had rallied and brought his Canadians and Indians to the front again, the 280 French regulars attacked Sir William's flimsy defenses in the center, advancing rapidly and firing by platoons. The Provincials, however, stood firm, and the regulars, after losing about 70 men in attacking the center, were withdrawn. Dieskau then made an attack with his Canadians on the left flank of Johnson's camp, but with no better effect. Finally, discovering that there was a gap of about 20 or 25 yards between the right of the slashing which covered Johnson's camp and the bank of the thickly wooded and impassable swamp that defended his right flank, Dieskau determined upon a desperate charge of his regulars in column of platoons to get through this gap. Had this succeeded, it would have turned Johnson's right. The regulars, of whom about 210 were now left, charged at this gap as they might have charged at Fontenoy, Dieskau leading them in person. He had expected an easy victory, but now the stubbornness of the resist-

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ance and the comparative feebleness of the attacks which his Canadian militia had made filled him with forebodings. He could not bear the idea that he, the favorite pupil and at one time chief aide-de-camp to the great Marshal Saxe, should be beaten in the forests of America by an army of backwoodsmen, commanded by a farmer!

It may, perhaps, be fortunate for the destinies of the Anglo-Saxon race in this country that this, the only practicable open breach in Sir William's line of defense, was held by four companies of the New Hampshire Provincials, and they were commanded by their senior captain, who, though senior to the other captains in rank, was junior to them all in years. The four companies of New Hampshire Provincials numbered about 260 to 280 men. The fighting in the breach was, for the most part, hand-to-hand. Perhaps half of the New Hampshire men had bayonets; those who had none used the butts of their muskets, as there was no time to reload. This desperate combat lasted perhaps seven or eight minutes. At its end the French commander-in-chief, Dieskau, was mortally wounded and a prisoner. Of his 210 magnificent French regulars belonging to "de la Reine"—the most famous regiment in the

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French army—only 41 escaped unhurt. The loss of the New Hampshire Provincials was between 90 and 100 out of—say 260 to 280.

It may not be uninteresting to know that the unflinching young senior captain of the New Hampshire Provincials, who held his “embattled farmers” to their deadly work in that breach against the flower of the French regulars, was John Stark, then only twenty-seven years old. Further comment does not seem necessary.

The battle was over. Dieskau’s army, abandoning all its baggage, and many of his men throwing away their guns, fled toward Crown Point. The Provincials were extremely desirous of pursuing them, but Sir William Johnson, knowing that a large reserve had been left behind at Crown Point, and also realizing the exhausted condition of his troops, who had suffered very considerable losses, did not deem pursuit prudent, and though urged by Colonel Lyman to permit a strong advance, peremptorily forbade it, and ordered his troops to rest on their arms. In fact, Sir William himself had received a severe wound in his efforts to rally the Indians when they retreated to the breastwork after the death of Hendrick. He

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was outside the breastwork on horseback,¹ shouting to the Indians in their own tongue, and to a considerable extent restoring confidence and order among them. Wishing to look behind him for a moment, he put one hand upon the pommel and the other upon the cantle of his saddle, and rising up in his stirrups, he turned half round. Just as he did so a bullet from the French line in the woods struck him in the left hip back of the joint, grazing the bone, passing through the fleshy part of the hip, to the right and upward at an angle of about 45 degrees, and lodging in the large muscle just below the small of the back, making a very severe and painful, though not dangerous, flesh wound. Painful as this wound was, Sir William kept his saddle until the crisis was over. When he did dismount his left leg was quite paralyzed, and his left boot full of blood. He did not even let his

¹ A curious incident occurred in this battle. Sir William had taken with him in the campaign a magnificent imported thoroughbred stallion which he used as a charger in parades, reviews, etc. He had two other horses of more common and less valuable kind that he used in battle. At the beginning of this action he had one of his orderlies take the stallion to a place near the shore of the lake where he would be, as was supposed, out of range; but a stray bullet struck the blooded stallion in the head and killed him, while the plebeian nag Sir William rode in the thick of the *mêlée* came out unhurt! The stallion was worth £1,000, the nag perhaps £20.

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men know that he had been hit. Fortunately, it was an Indian bullet—only about half the size of the ounce-ball of the regulation musket. Curiously enough, he and the French commander, Baron Dieskau, were taken to the surgeons at the same time, and Sir William directed them to dress the wounds of his fallen antagonist before they attended to his own. The bullet that wounded Sir William—a half-ounce ball from an Indian's gun—lodged just beneath the skin at the lower end of the great muscle on the left side of the small of the back, and was easily extracted by cutting through the skin.

There was at the time considerable criticism in military circles of Sir William's failure to follow up this victory more closely, and he himself used to say in reply to these criticisms, that if he had not been disabled, the probability is that he would have yielded to the importunities of Colonel Lyman and other officers to pursue the retreating enemy. His force was considerably superior numerically to the French and Indians. The highest estimate we have ever seen of Dieskau's force was that it amounted to 1,800 men, of whom about 1,100 were whites or half-breeds—280 or 300 French regulars—and 800 Canadian militia, together with about 700 Indians. Sir

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William had under his command at the beginning of the action not less than 3,000 to 3,200 men, of whom about 500 were Indians; but he knew that a reserve of at least 1,200 good troops—regulars and Canadian militia—had been left at Crown Point; and as the distance between that place and this battle-field was less than a day's forced march, there was danger of a counter attack which, falling as it must have done upon raw troops thoroughly tired out and considerably shaken by their losses, might have proved disastrous.

Stone says that when Colonel Lyman begged that he might take the Massachusetts and the New York troops, with such of the Indians as might be rallied to follow him, and pursue the enemy, Sir William replied: "Much as I admire your spirit and honor your purpose, colonel, I have reason to expect that the reserve left at the Point will join the force we have been contending with, during the night, and then the attack on this position is likely to be renewed to-morrow. Therefore, I consider it dangerous to weaken my force by dividing it." The question whether this view of the situation was sufficient to justify his refusal of Lyman's request is, of course, purely a matter of speculation. It was one of those cases where there can be no rule of

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action except the judgment of the commanding officer on the spot. One thing is to be said of Sir William Johnson, however, and that is, in whatever capacity of life or in whatever emergency, private or public, civil or military, he was always cool and cautious, and if in any military operation he committed an error, it was always sure to be on the side of prudence. "The proof of the pudding, etc.," is exemplified in his case. He commanded two very important expeditions during the old French war—the one under consideration and the one which resulted in the capture of Fort Niagara—and it must be said of him that if he never won any great, brilliant, or startling victory, he never got whipped!

No farther advance was made by the forces under Sir William Johnson toward Crown Point. It was getting late in the season. After deducting the losses in the battle of Lake George, and taking account of the fact that most of the Indians returned to their homes soon afterward, thus reducing Johnson's force to less than 2,400 all told, it appears reasonable that he should pause at the idea of attempting to storm or even besiege a regular fortification like Crown Point with that number of men, none of whom were regu-

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lar troops, when the work itself was sure to be defended by a force very nearly equal, and likely to be largely reenforced from Canada. The cooperating colonies of New York, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New Hampshire showed no disposition to reenforce Johnson. So that on the whole we think it may justly be said that, in pursuing the course he did—that is to say, of fortifying the positions he had gained, and of making sure of his lines of communication in his rear—Sir William displayed in a marked degree that virtue which is generally described by the aphorism that “discretion is the better part of valor.” At any rate, the king and the Duke of Cumberland appeared to be perfectly satisfied with what he had achieved, because, as soon as the news of the battle of Lake George reached England, he was made a baronet of the hereditary class, and promoted to the rank of major-general in the British regular army, on the Colonial establishment.

One of the best expressions I have seen with regard to the real value of Sir William Johnson's victory at Lake George was made by Cortlandt Van Rensselaer. He said the principal value of this victory was its influence in rallying the spirits and restoring the confidence of the American colonies. Much

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had been expected from the three expeditions planned at Alexandria and sent against the French. Disappointment and sorrow had already followed Braddock's terrible defeat. A different though not less bitter feeling had been experienced at the failure of Shirley's expedition against Fort Niagara. While General Johnson had not achieved the ultimate object of his expedition—which was to take Crown Point—he had inflicted a terrible and destructive defeat upon a powerful French force, led by the best general the French had on this side of the ocean, in which that general was himself placed *hors de combat* forever. Not only were the colonies filled with rejoicing, but the influence of the triumph went over to England, and the deeds of the Provincials at Lake George became familiar to the ears of royalty and were applauded by the eloquence of orators on the floor of Parliament. The moral effects of a battle, in which the forces arrayed against each other were comparatively small, have rarely been greater or more decisive in the whole range of military annals. Viewed simply in its military aspect, the battle of Lake George was the only successful achievement in all the thirteen colonies during the campaign of 1755.

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Although General Johnson's expedition, as already remarked, failed in its ultimate object in reducing Crown Point, it still had a glamour in the brilliant success of a hard-fought and well-won pitched battle. In war success in one direction may and does often overbalance reverse or shortcoming in another. At the very least, or at the minimum of its importance, it was, after all, the one great event of the campaign of 1755. Above all, it was purely an achievement of the yeomanry of New York and New England. Not a single British regular was there, either officer or enlisted man, and certainly not the least, if not, indeed, the greatest of its values, was the lesson it taught to the military world that American Provincials could successfully face and overcome French regulars.

Sir William Johnson's wound practically disabled him for about three months, and for the rest of his life he always walked with a slight halt or limp in the left leg. However, he did not leave the camp, but continued in command, giving his personal attention to his duties. As soon as his wound was sufficiently healed to enable him to leave his bed, it was his habit to be carried about on a litter, inspecting the fortifications of the base of operations he had gained, di-

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recting the movements of scouting parties and forays into the enemy's country—in short, commanding his forces quite as actively and as efficiently as he might have done had he come out of the battle unscathed. He did not return to his home at Mount Johnson until after winter set in. Then Colonel Lyman—now promoted to the regular rank of brigadier-general on the colonial establishment—was left in command of the northern line of defenses, and no further operations were attempted until the following spring. After the death of Hendrick he was succeeded as principal sachem of the Mohawks by the elder Brant, whom we have previously called Nicklaus. In the battle at Lake George, Brant succeeded Hendrick in command of the Indians. Sir William's influence may have had something to do with this selection, because there was another prominent candidate for the succession. At this time the elder Brant may have been considered Sir William's "father-in-law," because, a little more than a year previously, he had made Brant's daughter Mary the object of his affections and mistress of his household. As to the other and more exalted distinction which Hendrick had so long held—that of senior chief of the Iroquois Confederacy, which was an

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elective position, not hereditary—was left vacant for twenty years, until in 1775 Joseph Brant was chosen to fill it.

Joseph Brant was present in this battle, though only thirteen years old. In his description he says: "When the firing began I was so overcome that I had to seize hold of a sapling to steady myself. But I instantly thought that such feelings were not those of a warrior, and went on loading and firing the small gun I had, the same as the others. . . . My father, seeing me standing in an open space, somewhat roughly ordered me to get behind a tree—which I hastily obeyed, though I had not before thought of taking cover."

In January, 1756, Sir William, having fully recovered from his wounds, went to New York city to lay his annual report before the Governor and confer with the Committee of Supply, whose custom it was to have him explain in detail his recommendations for Indian appropriations. We have already noted that during the campaign of 1755 some friction occurred between Sir William and Governor Shirley. After the death of Braddock, Shirley resumed the position in which the former had superseded him—that of commander-in-chief in British North America.

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He set up the singular contention that, as Sir William had been appointed and commissioned by Braddock to be General Superintendent of Indian Affairs at Large, his authority ended with Braddock's life, and must be renewed or approved by his successor!

Acting upon this theory, Shirley had, at the beginning of the year, served upon Sir William a new commission, accompanied with a mass of "instructions," all of which were unnecessary and most of which were absurd. Sir William determined now to settle the matter once for all. He replied politely to Shirley, and as he always did everything openly and aboveboard, he informed him of his intention to lay the whole affair before the king and ministry. He did this in two letters—one to Secretary Fox of the Board of Trade and the Colonies, the other to the king himself. In due time Secretary Fox addressed to him a letter containing a royal commission as "Agent, Sole Superintendent of the Six Nations and all other Indians inhabiting British territory, north of the Carolinas and the Ohio River," with a fixed salary of £600 per annum, and a like amount for official expenses. At the same time the ministry addressed circular letters to all the

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Colonial governors, enclosing copies of Sir William's new commission, informing them that "it was the act of the king himself through an order in council," and "forbidding any Colonial governor to transact any business with the Indians or hold any communication with them except through Sir William Johnson."

This action settled his status for all time, and he henceforth had a free hand. Shirley, ignominiously snubbed, had to content himself with a personal hatred toward the baronet, which he ever afterward ardently cherished.¹ Shirley was an active, energetic man, of considerable ability in many directions. But he was full of vanity, subject to small jealousies and petty piques. These traits weakened and seriously compromised the efficiency of an otherwise strong character and fertile mind. He could never forgive Sir William

¹ Shirley's subsequent splenetic and impotent hatred was amusing rather than inconvenient to Sir William. In one of his letters to Gen. Jeffrey Amherst in 1759, between whom and the baronet the warmest friendship existed, he says:

"Shirley hates me. I am sorry for him; I almost pity him. He has many good traits that are good and useful, but he has also a few small traits that are bad and harmful—more to himself than to any one else. His trouble lies in his tendency to subordinate the great traits to the small ones. I do not know of another instance where the makings of a great character have been so spoiled by foibles."

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for winning the battle of Lake George against Dieskau, the French commander-in-chief, while he (Shirley) was retreating in disorder from Oswego, pursued by a French colonel!