CHAPTER IV

SERVICES IN THE LAST PART OF THE WAR
1756–1761

We may pass rapidly over the events of 1756 and 1757. There never were two drearier years in the history of the British Empire. Corruption and imbecility, incarnate in the ministry of Newcastle, seemed to have reached the uttermost dregs of defeat, disgrace, and disaster. And nowhere were the effects so humiliating or so disheartening as in the American colonies. The worst of these effects took the shape of three generals sent over during that period. They were Lord Loudoun, General Abercrombie, and General Webb.

Loudoun was a titled prig, with no knowledge whatever of the conditions of warfare in America, and very little anywhere else. He was equally ignorant of the spirit of the colonists or the genius and working of their institutions. The only things he ever did, or apparently knew how to do, were to

display pomp, procrastinate, and find fault. He despised the Provincial soldiers, held the Colonial governments in contempt, and seemed to think that his orders ought to repeal laws. It is difficult to imagine such utter perversity of conception or such flagrant degeneracy of mental process in a man raised under British institutions as were incarnate in this empty, vapid, puffball of English aristocracy. Fortunately he did not last long. But while he did last, he contrived to bring the war to its most desperate stage, to make French success almost universal from Lake Champlain to the Ohio, and to enshroud the hopeless colonies in a gloom that trenched closely upon the borders of despair. England has raised a big brood of worthless "noblemen" (so-called). But she had never before, nor has she ever since, quite duplicated the pattern of Lord Loudoun.

Abercrombie was a bluff but dull soldier, whose sole idea of warfare was the pasteboard system then in vogue on the continent of Europe. He was brave, even to rashness, but his courage was that of stupidity rather than of reason. He always wanted to do everything with the bayonet, and was apparently too obtuse to see any difference in the chances of that weapon between the open

plains of Europe and the tangled woods of America.

His one effort was the assault of Fort Ticonderoga with 14,000 men, about half of whom were British regulars. Montcalm defended the works with 3,600, of whom less than 2,000 were French regulars. Abercrombie lost 2,000 men in half an hour, inflicting on his adversaries a loss of less than 50. Though he had over twelve thousand men left and a heavy train of siege-artillery that had not been used at all, he made no attempt at regular siege, but retreated precipitately to his base of operations. Sir William Johnson was present with Abercrombie's army at the head of 450 to 500 Indians, but they were not permitted to do anything, and shared the disheartenment of their white comrades. Abercrombie, like Loudoun, was of short duration. His strut upon the American stage was very brief. But while he strutted he managed to paralyze the largest and best-appointed army that had ever been assembled on American soil.

And now we come to Webb. The sole exploit of this "general" was to hold his army in firm leash at Fort Edward, while Montcalm at his leisure besieged and took Fort William Henry, only a few miles away, his Indi-

ans massacring many of the garrison after the surrender. The only help he could vouchsafe to Colonel Munro, commanding the fort, was in the shape of a letter advising him to surrender. But we may let Sir William describe Webb. He said to Colonel Peter Schuyler at Albany, in a talk about the massacre of Fort William Henry shortly after Schuyler's return from Canada on parole:

> Webb's malady is constitutional. If he had let me go, I believe I could have compelled the French to raise the siege. If he had supported me with his whole force, I believe we could have beaten Montcalm. We had nearly seven thousand effective troops, and Munro had about sixteen hundred more in his garrison and fortified camp. Montcalm had no more than six thousand effective. But Webb, instead of marching to the relief of Munro, sent him a letter advising him to surrender on the best terms he could get. You know the rest. I hate to say it, but the truth must be told. Webb enjoys a solitary and unique distinction. He is the only British general—in fact, I may say the only British officer of any rank—I ever knew or heard of who was personally a coward.

That Webb was and is such, no one who served with him or under him could fail to perceive. He was nearly beside himself with physical fear after the fall of Fort William Henry. His army was in good spirits, anxious to fight. The general alone

was panic-stricken! The fate of Braddock, who was an old comrade of his in the Guards, almost upset his mind. At his headquarters in Fort Edward, when I was present, the subject of Braddock's expedition came up, and Webb spoke with almost puerile fear of the horrors of falling into the hands of the Indians. He declared he was sure they would burn him at the stake if they ever caught him, because they knew he was the most dangerous enemy they ever had! (*sic.*)

It was different on the French side. While the English colonies were sweltering in the agony of imbecile command and sweating bloody sweats under the pompous inanity of Loudoun, the brutal stupidity of Abercrombie and the indescribable buffoonery and poltroonery of Webb, the French had their Montcalm! This man was a wonder. We must judge what he did by our knowledge of what he had to do it with. When, in 1756, he took the supreme command of the French forces in Canada, in succession to the Baron Dieskau, defeated, wounded, and captured by Sir William Johnson at Lake George, Montcalm found himself almost wholly dependent on the resources of the colony itself. The impotency of the Newcastle ministry had, indeed, sufficed to paralyze the military arm of England in America on the land. But not even

the Newcastle blight could wholly wreck or even seriously cripple the sea-power of England.

So it happened that while, under Loudoun and Abercrombie and Webb, disaster trod on the heels of disaster by land, the navy of old England proved irrepressible, and with its Hawkes, its Boscawens, and its Howes, made the ocean path between old France and New France all the time well-nigh impassable, and most of the time wholly so. Indeed, the French sixty-gun ship that Montcalm himself came over in was twice in the midst of Howe's squadron between Cape Race and Bay Chaleur, and escaped only by reason of dense fogs. But, if they did not happen to catch Montcalm, they proved abundantly able to intercept most of his supplies and to capture or chase back to France all, or nearly all, of the transports bringing reenforcements.

The result was that when Montcalm assumed command he instantly saw that he must fight it out with such resources in men and supplies as the colony already held, and that he could place no reasonable dependence upon further reenforcement or succor of any kind from the parent state. Here, in this situation, the sea-power of England doubtless wrote the brightest chapter in its history—

brighter, even, in the splendor of its contribution to the sum-total of success and victory, than the page on which are inscribed the words "Nelson" and "Trafalgar."

For, in the final act of the drama, which was a play for the sovereignty of a continent, while such generals as Amherst, Wolfe, Forbes, and Sir William Johnson were striking their fatal blows at French dominion on land, the omnipresent and inevitable fleets of Hawke, Boscawen, and Howe were choking French dominion to death on the sea.

As soon as Montcalm had gotten fairly in the stirrups in 1756, he planned and executed an attack on the important English post of Oswego. This was the key of the western Iroquois country, the principal entrepôt of the English fur-trade in that region, and a base from which Lake Ontario might be commanded by a naval force. It had, in 1756, a garrison of 1,500 or 1,600 men, and a small population of civilian traders, with a few women and children. Montcalm crossed the lake from Oswegatchie, and in August, 1756, invested Oswego with about 2,000 French regulars, 2,000 Canadian militia, and 1,000 Indians—the latter commanded by the afterward famous Pontiac. After a brief resistance the small garrison surrendered at

discretion. The Indians at once desired to indulge in a general massacre, and approached the place where the prisoners were under guard.

Montcalm, determined that the glory of his arms should not be tarnished by cruelty to prisoners, ordered his French regulars to protect the captives at the point of the bayonet. They obeyed to the letter, but it was not until after they had killed six of the Indians and badly wounded eighteen or twenty more that the savages desisted. The able-bodied men of the garrison were taken to Canada as prisoners and the women and children sent to Onondaga Castle under a guard of French regulars. The approach of this escort spread consternation through the Mohawk Valley. The people thought it was the vanguard of an invasion in force. Montcalm, however, destroyed the forts and other buildings, sent belts of peace-wampum to the western Iroquois, and invited them to a conference with the Governor-General at Montreal. He then returned with his whole force to Canada.

The French archives contain evidence that Montcalm's first intention really was to invade New York by way of the Mohawk Valley. But upon a closer reconnaissance, he concluded that the transportation of supplies

by that route would present insuperable difficulties. After the fall of Oswego he had conferences with certain Seneca, Cayuga, and Onondaga chiefs, from whom he gained the impression that in consequence of the recent demonstrations of strength on the part of the French, and weakness of the English, they would remain neutral in the future.

Montcalm, upon his return to Canada, disposed his forces for an invasion of the northern colonies by way of Lake Champlain early the next spring, and made no other movement of importance during the season of 1756. The Canadian Government, however, actively promoted and instigated Indian forays upon the New York, Pennsylvania, and New England border settlements, whereby the whole winter of 1756–57 was kept hideous with ravage and massacre from the Kennebec to the Susquehanna.

Early in 1757 Montcalm moved up Lake Champlain, and on the 18th of March made a demonstration against Fort William Henry, using the ice on Lake George as a roadway of approach. Finding the place too strong to be taken by *coup de main*, he retired to Crown Point, and awaited the opening of navigation. Meantime he began the building of the formidable works known as Fort Ti-

conderoga, as an advanced post some miles south of the Point.

As soon as the lakes were clear of ice he transported a force of about 6,000[1] men—3,000 regulars, 2,000 Canadian militia, and 1,000 Indians—in 250 bateaux, to the head of Lake George, and on the 4th of August invested Fort William Henry and the fortified camp under its guns, held by Colonel Munro with something over 1,600 men. General Webb was at Fort Edward, less than a good day's march distant—only 14 miles—with 4,500 men, about half of whom were regulars. Munro asked for assistance, but Webb believed that Montcalm had at least 14,000 men, and cowered behind the parapets of Fort Edward. Two days after the formal investment of Fort William Henry, Sir William Johnson joined Webb from Albany with nearly 2,000 Provincials and 500 to 600 Indians. He asked Webb to give him another thousand men and let him march at once to the relief of Munro. Webb at first assented, but when Johnson's head of column had got about four

[1] A detachment 1,200 or 1,400 strong under M. de Levi marched down the western shore of the lake. This was a ruse of Montcalm to impress the garrison when they should see de Levi's detachment approaching by land that it was a reenforcement.

miles from Fort Edward, peremptorily recalled him, saying Montcalm was too strong, and expressing fear that Johnson would share the fate of Braddock.

In vain Sir William assured him that his scouts, both Indians and Stark's Rangers, had informed him that the French force did not exceed 6,000. In vain he entreated and expostulated. Webb was firm. Irresolute in everything else, he could be firm only in his poltroonery and consistent only in his cowardice.

Montcalm contented himself with destroying Fort William Henry. That fort had been made the depot of ordnance intended for the movement contemplated against Crown Point. Montcalm found there a siege-train of twelve heavy guns, several mortars, and a large supply of ammunition and stores. These he took away and retired to Ticonderoga, making no attempt on Fort Edward, though his Indians killed and scalped several of Webb's soldiers within sight of its ramparts. Montcalm has been criticized for his failure to follow up this success. But his force was too small. He had only a little over seven thousand men, including the garrison of Crown Point. Webb had nearly as many.

Montcalm naturally shrank from attack-

ing a strong fortification like Fort Edward with a force little if any larger than that of its defenders. Had he been better acquainted with Webb this consideration might not have had so much weight in his mind. Owing to the failure of Governor-General de Vaudreuil to send a promised convoy of wagons and pack animals to him, he was deficient in means of land transport. And besides all this, he knew that the militia of New York, Connecticut, and Massachusetts would be mobilized at once to support Webb. This, in fact, occurred; more than 12,000 militia assembling within striking distance of Fort Edward, a few weeks after the fall of Fort William Henry. Montcalm did all that his resources permitted.

Only one other "great operation" occurred during the season of 1757. Late in the summer Lord Loudoun sailed from Halifax with eleven thousand troops and a fleet of sixteen sail of the line under Admiral Holborn, to attack Louisburg. But just as the fleet was fairly under way, a vessel sent out to reconnoiter arrived with information that the garrison of Louisburg had just received reenforcements, and that the French fleet there was superior to Admiral Holborn's by one ship of the line. His lordship thereupon

countermanded the orders for Louisburg and sailed with his troops for New York!

Arriving in New York, his lordship spent the rest of his valuable time while in the colony trying to bully the Governor and Assembly, and oppressing the inhabitants by billeting his troops upon them. There was no earthly pretext for this outrage, because he had plenty of stores and camp equipage, and was amply prepared to make comfortable winter quarters for his army in camp. His conduct can be attributed to nothing but his arrogance, his ignorance, and his malignity. As a bully and a despot, Loudoun was a great success. In every other capacity he was a failure that beggars language to describe.

But while there was a dearth of large operations in 1757, the tomahawk and scalping-knife were busy along the whole frontier, the most conspicuous foray being that against German Flats on the Mohawk, in November of that year. The thriving village was utterly destroyed and its inhabitants, with a few exceptions, butchered or carried into captivity. It was the most atrocious massacre known since Count de Frontenac's ravage of Schenectady in February, 1690.

When the attack on German Flats was made, Sir William, recently returned from the

northern frontier, was prostrated by the breaking out of his old wound received at Lake George. But he instantly arose, mustered about 300 militia and 250 Indians under Nicklaus Brant, and started to meet the French and Indians, supposing that they would continue their advance down the valley. But they, in their turn, hearing of Sir William's preparation to meet them, hastily retreated to Canada without further effort at destruction, except two or three isolated murders. The forays continued all the winter by small parties, but on the whole not as destructively or through so wide a range as during the previous winter.

The most disastrous effect of all these reverses, so far as Sir William's duties were concerned, was the disaffection they inspired among the western Iroquois. The Senecas and Cayugas openly revolted against English influence. We have noted that Montcalm, when he took Oswego, invited those tribes and the Onondagas to send delegates for a conference with the Governor-General at Montreal. In August, 1757, soon after they learned the fate of Fort William Henry, the Senecas, Cayugas, and Onondagas sent delegates to meet de Vaudreuil. The Oneidas did not send regular delegates, but sev-

eral members of the tribe, including the half-breed chief Antone, went on their own responsibility — as they afterward explained to Sir William, "not to speak with two tongues, but that our brother Warragh-i-gahey might have eyes and ears there to see and hear."

This was probably true, because the Oneidas, though admitted to the sessions of the conference, were regarded by the western Iroquois delegates with suspicion, and were closely watched. The Mohawks and Tuscaroras alone remained firm in their fealty to the English. Sir William was perplexed by these events, but he did not despair. In October, 1757, he wrote a letter to the Duke of Cumberland, which he requested the duke to show to his royal father. In this letter he said:

> . . . But besides all other ill-effects of our reverses during these two years past, is the very important consideration that they have weakened our alliance with the Six Nations almost to the breaking point. The Indian respects nothing so much as power and success, and nothing so little as apparent weakness and reverses. As they say at the race-course, the Indian is always shrewd in "picking out the winner." Judged by their protestations to me after the Battle of Lake George,

one would have thought that no vicissitudes of fortune could cause these Indians to waver. But the victories of Montcalm and the apparent inability of our generals to make the best use of the resources they have, are causing the Indians—that is, the Western Iroquois—to believe that the French are going to win in this contest.

The result is that my influence over them, personal as well as official, is almost gone, and I have no power of my own to restore it. But it could be at once restored by a great victory here for our arms. I do not wish to criticize individuals who are my superiors in rank, but in a general way I must say that the commanders we have in the Colonies now are not adapted to the peculiar responsibilities cast upon them, and while they may be exceedingly competent under the conditions of warfare in Europe, they do not and apparently can not grasp the special military problems presented by our modes of war in the woods. Your Royal Highness is well aware that ours is a kind of warfare that in the main may be termed irregular; and while regular troops, properly commanded and handled, are of great value in its operations, only disaster can result from attempts to apply the teachings of Marlborough and Frederic of Prussia to the problems presented by our war in the wilderness. I am sure there are generals in His Majesty's army who could quickly and effectively adapt themselves to our peculiar conditions, but none of them has as yet been sent here.

Services in Last Part of the War

Thus closed the second of the two dreary years 1756 and 1757. The handful of Frenchmen in Canada appeared about to vanquish the multitude of Britons in the American colonies, and the "balance of power" that the Indians held seemed gradually but surely slipping over into the French side of the scale. Henderson, in his Historical Memoirs of the Duke of Cumberland, says that much of the great change which soon occurred in the management of affairs in America was indirectly due to him.

At last, the puny and pusillanimous ministry of the Duke of Newcastle came to an end. He resigned, with great reluctance, in November, 1756, after being decisively beaten on three or four important votes in the House of Commons. William Pitt succeeded him, and at once began comprehensive measures for the restoration of England's failing prestige. Pitt held the premiership only five months—till April, 1757—but during this brief period he sowed the seeds of success broadcast. However, after Pitt resigned the king found himself unable to form a ministry, and when England had been nearly three months without a government, Newcastle and Pitt formed in the early part of July, 1757, a coalition Cabinet, of which the duke was figurehead,

without a portfolio, and Pitt, in the joint capacity of Secretary for Foreign Affairs and for War, was the actual premier.

Of course, it required some time for this great change to produce results. There were no cables under the ocean then, nor could the sailing ships of those days make definite time-schedules like the steam transports of our era. Therefore, some delay was inevitable before Pitt's genius could express itself across three thousand miles of sea, with only the wings of sailing vessels to carry its inspirations. But toward the end of 1758 the expression of Pitt's genius began to be felt, not only in America, but in India—in other words, all the way from the Ganges to the Ohio. Pitt brought forth a Jeffrey Amherst where Newcastle had a Lord Loudoun; a Wolfe where Newcastle had an Abercrombie, and a Forbes where Newcastle had a Webb!

Before the end of 1758, Amherst had taken Louisburg at one end of the line and Forbes had occupied Fort Duquesne at the other end. The only disaster that year was the bloody repulse of Abercrombie's assault on Ticonderoga, on which sufficient comment has already been made in our brief sketch of that general. Late in 1758 General Sir Jeffrey

Amherst became commander-in-chief of all the British forces in North America, and from that moment the tenor and spirit of the conduct of the war on the part of the English changed.

General Amherst was peculiarly adapted to the situation—more so, doubtless, than any other officer of his rank then in the British army. He was a man of plain, unaffected manners. In all his transactions he was straightforward, frank, and sincere. He had passed several years of his early military life —1735 to 1743—in Colonial garrisons, was widely acquainted in Colonial society, intelligently comprehended the political institutions of the colonies, respected their rights, and admired the pluck which they had so long displayed under incompetent leadership and consequent disaster. He liked the Provincial officers and men, and they liked and confided in him. Prior to his time the rule had been that no Provincial officer should command regular troops.

One of Amherst's first acts was an order to the effect that when regulars and Provincials were serving together, the ranking officer in actual grade should command, whether regular or Provincial, with the reservation only that when a regular and a Provincial

officer of the same grade were operating together, the regular should have the precedence, irrespective of date of commission.

General Amherst was methodical—sometimes almost to the point of slowness, but he was sure, and as the sequel proved, his sturdy prudence served the cause better than brilliant audacity might have done. He has been severely criticized for failing to push on to Canada and reenforce Wolfe after his capture of Ticonderoga and Crown Point in July, 1759, had opened the road. But Isle aux Noix was still formidable, and besides, the French had four quite respectable brigs-of-war on Lake Champlain, while the English had no naval force there whatever. As it turned out, Wolfe did not need his help. Amherst said this himself, and remarked that "Wolfe's behavior at Louisburg, as his second in command, had satisfied him of that general's ability to shift for himself." Moreover, to reach Quebec from the foot of Lake Champlain, a considerable land march had to be made, and Amherst was very deficient in land transport.

The effects of this turn of fortune were soon apparent among the western Iroquois. In the fall of 1758 Sir William Johnson was invited by a number of chiefs of the Senecas,

Cayugas, and Onondagas to meet them in grand council at Onondaga Castle, the location of the "Long House," or what might be called the "Federal Capital" of the Six Nations. On this he asked the advice of Amherst, who was then at Albany. The general advised Sir William not to go to Onondaga Castle, but send a counter-invitation to the chiefs to meet him at his own headquarters, Mount Johnson.

"It is clear that they are beginning to see the turn of the tide, my dear Sir William," wrote Amherst, "and while we must forgive their conduct these two years past, we must not let them forget that it is they, and not we, who are on the stool of repentance. They will come to your house. And when they do, they will respect you more and have a deeper sense of your dignity than if you went to theirs."

The baronet took the general's advice, and the conference, attended by over a hundred Indians, among whom were the principal chiefs of the western Iroquois, was held at Mount Johnson, with the happiest results.

During the winter of 1758-59 General Amherst matured his plans for a comprehensive invasion of Canada. The taking of Louisburg and Fort Duquesne at each extrem-

ity of the long military frontier had clipped the wings of French power.

The French, however, still held the important frontier posts of Ticonderoga, Crown Point, and Fort Niagara. Early in December, 1758, Amherst sent an outline of his plans to Pitt. These plans involved expeditions by land for the reduction of Ticonderoga and Crown Point on Lake Champlain, and of Fort Niagara on the Niagara River. So long as the French held Ticonderoga and Crown Point they could command the approaches to Canada by Lake Champlain, and Fort Niagara was the key to communication by the Great Lakes. Amherst's plans also contemplated a direct attack upon Quebec itself by sea. He gave Pitt his judgment in detail as to the number of troops that would be required for these expeditions, and he also suggested commanders for them.

For the command of the expedition against Quebec he named General James Wolfe, who had been his second in command at the reduction of Louisburg the previous summer. For command of the expedition to Niagara he recommended Sir William Johnson, and he himself undertook to command the operations against Ticonderoga and Crown Point. His recommendation of Wolfe was at

once adopted by Pitt and confirmed by the king.

At that time the genius of British military education and thought ran largely to gravity and slowness. Wolfe was everything but grave and slow, and for that reason, although his career had been thus far brilliant wherever he had an opportunity, he was looked upon in the sage and solemn councils of the Horse Guards as a dare-devil, if not a hair-brained sort of fellow—capable of great things under command of some one else, but hardly fit to be trusted with grave responsibilities of his own. Indeed, when his appointment to command the Quebec expedition became generally known, several prominent men remonstrated with the king himself, and one of them, whose name has not been given to history, declared that Wolfe was a madman. The supposition is that the author of this remark was the Duke of Newcastle himself, though Lord Hervey in his Historical Memoirs of George II does not say so. But, whoever it may have been, the old king, who had become thoroughly disgusted with the conduct of affairs in the American colonies, angrily responded in the decided Dutch brogue he had: "Vell, den, if Volfe is mat, I hope he vill pite some of my udder chenerals!"

All of Amherst's recommendations were adopted, except that Pitt thought it would be best to place a British regular officer of high rank in command of the Niagara expedition, and make Sir William Johnson second in command. The man selected for the command of the Niagara expedition was General John Prideaux, a soldier who had served for many years in the Grenadier Guards and had achieved a high reputation in the war of the Austrian Succession, and also in the operations on the continent of Europe during the war under consideration. The selection of Prideaux proved happy, like all the rest of Pitt's acts. As soon as he arrived in this country and took command of his expedition, which had already been organized by Sir William Johnson, he frankly told the baronet that he should rely upon his experience and judgment implicitly—that he himself "knew nothing of the conditions of warfare in the woods of America, and he was not going to pretend that he did." He told Sir William that he should hold him responsible for proper suggestion and advice every day, and that whenever he (Sir William) advised or suggested anything, he might consider it as done.

Under these circumstances, a force assem-

bled at Oswego under command of Prideaux at the end of June, consisting of 1,200 British regulars, 1,800 Provincials—mostly New Yorkers—and 700 Indians under Sir William Johnson. Before the expedition left Oswego Sir William was joined by 280 more Indians, mostly Senecas and Cayugas. The whole force, therefore, assembled at Oswego was 3,000 white troops and 980 Indians. On the 1st of July General Prideaux, leaving Colonel Haldimand with about 200 regulars and 550 Provincials to hold Oswego, sailed with 2,250 white troops and 980 Indians for Fort Niagara, landed on the 6th of July below the fort, with but trifling resistance, and on the 7th formally invested it. The siege went on without incident of special note until the 19th of July, when General Prideaux was instantly killed by the premature bursting of a shell upon the discharge of a Cohorn mortar, whereupon the command devolved upon Sir William Johnson. Here it is worth while to call attention to the absolute fairness and sense of justice which animated Sir William. In his report of the campaign to General Amherst he said: "Much, in fact most, of the credit of this achievement belongs to the late General Prideaux, because I had carefully studied his plans, which he imparted to me

with perfect freedom, and I executed them with all the precision and skill of which I am capable, departing from them only when compelled to do so by circumstances which he could not have foreseen."

In the meantime Colonel d'Aubrey, commanding the western district of Canada, gathered from the posts at Detroit, Venango, Fort Lebœuf, and Presque Isle, all their garrisons, abandoning them entirely. By this means he assembled a force of about 1,200 men, of whom perhaps 200 were French regulars and 1,000 Canadian militia. With these and some 500 Indians, he hastened from Presque Isle across Lake Erie, and approached Niagara, with the intention of raising the siege. Sir William, however, was well informed of d'Aubrey's movements by his Indian scouts, and on the 20th of July, knowing that the French commander had reached a point about eight miles from the fort, left a sufficient force in the trenches to prevent the garrison from making a successful sortie, and then marched out with the rest of his army to meet the enemy. The force which he took to meet d'Aubrey consisted of 800 British regulars, about 700 Provincials, and all of the Indians, the total strength being a little over 2,300. He disposed his forces

with the British regulars in the front and center, closely supported by the Provincials; on the right he placed the whole contingent of Senecas and Cayugas, some 400 strong, under Hi-o-ka-to and Jean Montour; and on the left flank the rest of his Indians, about 500 strong, commanded by the Onondaga chief Onasdego, and the Mohawk chief Nicklaus Brant.

It is worthy of remark that in this battle young Joseph Brant, son of the chief, though only seventeen years old, served as lieutenant in the Canajoharie company of Mohawks.

It happened that Sir William's Indians forming his two flanks came in sight of the enemy's Indians, similarly formed, a few minutes before the white troops got sight of each other. The field of battle was mostly a grove of large trees, without much underbrush, and there was little impediment to the maneuvring of infantry. The two forces of Indians charged each other furiously, making the scene hideous with their yells. At the same time the British regulars, advancing rapidly through the most open part of the timber, suddenly struck the Canadian militia, who were somewhat demoralized by the fact that their Indian allies began to give way on either flank. The regulars, led by Sir William in person, fired one volley, and then charged

through the open timber with the bayonet. In less than half an hour d'Aubrey's troops, French regulars, Canadians and Indians alike, were totally routed, and fled in the most bewildering confusion, furiously pursued by Sir William's Indians, who, for more than three miles, strewed the ground with their bodies. In this action 146 of the French were killed and 96 soldiers and 17 officers taken prisoners, among whom was the commandant d'Aubrey himself. The number of wounded was not stated in Sir William's report, but it undoubtedly exceeded 300. The force which d'Aubrey had brought to raise the siege was completely dispersed, and was never reorganized.

Sir William then returned to his lines at the fort, and at sundown of the same day sent Major Harvey of his staff to the commander of the fort, informing him of the result of the battle, and advising him to capitulate. Sir William concluded his letter as follows: "I desire not only to avoid further useless effusion of blood, but I must also warn you that if you force me to extremities and compel me to storm your works, I might not have it in my power to restrain my Indians, who would, by an obstinate and fruitless resistance on your part, become too much enraged to be

withheld." The French commander, Pouchet, yielded to this advice, and at seven o'clock the next morning (July 25th) the garrison, consisting of 618 of all ranks, surrendered at discretion. The fort was occupied by Sir William's troops, and the male prisoners were escorted by a detachment of the Forty-fourth Regiment of British regulars to Oswego; from there they were sent to New York, and from New York to England. The women and children, or at least such of them as desired to do so, were allowed to go to Montreal.

It is worthy of remark that, although in this operation Sir William had under his command nearly a thousand Indians, almost half of whom were Senecas and Cayugas—at that time among the savagest of Indian tribes, so far as methods of warfare were concerned—and who were, besides, extremely wrought up by the loss of several of their braves, including two popular chiefs—yet not the least injury or insult was offered by them to the captured garrison, nor did they take any of the private property of the French troops, or of the families that were in the fort. They took only such plunder as Sir William Johnson allotted to them in the way of legitimate spoils. By this exploit Sir William Johnson —then already decorated by the victory at

Lake George—became among the most famous men in all the colonies and in England. General Amherst wrote him a most complimentary letter, praising the skill of his combinations and the efficiency of his execution of them. The Duke of Cumberland also wrote a letter to him saying, in allusion to Sir William's total lack of regular military education or training, that "if all of His Majesty's gentlemen subjects were like yourself, there would be no need of military schools."

The principal strategical consequence of the reduction of Fort Niagara was to sever the last link of communication between the eastern and western possessions of France in North America, and its importance to the general plan of operations was but little if any less than the taking of Fort Ticonderoga and Crown Point about the same time by the main army under General Amherst.

Sir William was extremely attached to General Prideaux. When that officer first arrived in the colony in the spring, while the expedition was forming, he was Sir William's guest at Mount Johnson for several days. In a letter of condolence to the general's relatives in England, Sir William said, among other things:

Services in Last Part of the War

Brief as our association and acquaintance were, I had no friend whose friendship I valued more than that of General Prideaux. He was the soul of honor and courtesy, both in official and personal intercourse. He had no vanities or jealousies or small traits whatsoever. It was his constant custom to spend most of his time in the trenches among the soldiers—a habit indeed to which his untimely death was due. He was as popular among the common soldiers and as much beloved by them as by the officers who had the honor and pleasure of most intimate association with him. By his death the King has lost one of the brightest ornaments of his service.

After the surrender of Fort Niagara, Sir William remained there about two weeks, repairing fortifications and arranging for the comfort of the sick and wounded, both of his own force and of the prisoners, who were unable to be taken away. Then he left Colonel Farquhar in command of the fort, with a garrison of 700 men, and returned by the lake to Oswego, where he arrived on the 7th of August. In a short time Brigadier-General Gage of the regular army came to Oswego, and as he ranked Sir William, assumed the command.

Sir William used to say that no incident of this campaign was more gratifying than

the opportunity it gave him to lead a considerable force of British regulars in a decisive action—a privilege that no Provincial officer up to that time had enjoyed. This was due to General Amherst's order previously noted. Under the conditions that formerly prevailed, Colonel Haviland of the Forty-fourth regulars would have succeeded General Prideaux, notwithstanding that Sir William Johnson was a major-general on the Colonial establishment.

Various schemes were at once set on foot for the reduction of posts on the north side of Lake Ontario, and at the head of the St. Lawrence, including the forts of la Galette, Oswegatchie, and Frontenac. For some reason, General Gage did not approve these plans. Some time later, when General Amherst was apprised of them, and informed that Sir William had vigorously advocated the movement, he coincided with him, and criticized the inaction of Gage, saying, among other things, that a movement of that kind, whether successful or not, must have absorbed the attention of a considerable part of the forces which, in the absence of such attack from the head of the St. Lawrence, were left free to strengthen the hands of Montcalm at Quebec. However, nothing further was

accomplished on the lake frontier during the rest of the summer, and in October Sir William disbanded his Indians and returned to his home at Mount Johnson.

It is not within the scope of this work to describe Wolfe's campaign against Quebec, except in the most general terms. In fact, it hardly needs a new description, because few actions in modern warfare have been more widely chronicled, more thoroughly analyzed, or more permanently committed to fame than that. Hardly ever was there so dramatic a battle; hardly ever have such momentous consequences hung upon the issue of one. Everything about it was dramatic. The stealthy scaling of the steep declivities up to the plateau of Abraham by Wolfe and his soldiers, under cover of night and fog; the surprise and almost dismay of Montcalm when the rising sun disclosed that his adversary had outwitted him; then the desperate effort of the French to retrieve their fortunes; the steady, indomitable tenacity with which the English held their advantage; the final rout of the French; the mortal wounding of both commanders, and the last words of each; Wolfe saying, when his aide-de-camp told him that the French were fleeing: "I am now content to die"; Montcalm, when told by his sur-

geon that he had but a few hours to live, and hearing the tramp of his beaten and retreating troops through the streets of Quebec: "I am glad of it, for I shall not live to witness the surrender of Quebec." All these episodes have made the battle of Quebec not merely a theme for history, but an inspiration of poetry as well.

The forces that Wolfe deployed on the plateau of Abraham were about 5,600 strong —all regulars; one regiment, however, the "Royal American Regiment of Foot," of which the first battalion formed part of Wolfe's army, though in all respects borne on the Regular Establishment, was wholly recruited and mostly officered from the colonies—the only natives of Great Britain serving in it being the lieutenant-colonel in command, a major, two captains, and the surgeon. So far as is known, every enlisted man in it was of colonial birth or citizenship.

Montcalm's force consisted of about 3,500 French regulars and 2,000 to 2,500 Canadian militia. The loss of the British army has been estimated variously at from 800 to 1,000 men killed and wounded. The French loss was never reported. Montcalm's army was, however, practically dispersed. The surviving regulars made their way to Montreal, and

the militia, for the most part, disbanded and went to their homes.

With the fall of Quebec on the one hand, and Fort Niagara on the other, together with the expulsion of the French garrisons from Ticonderoga and Crown Point, the power and dominion of France in Canada was now narrowed down to the remnants of different forces which assembled at Montreal under command of the Governor-General, the Marquis de Vaudreuil. The season, however, was too far advanced for any further operations in the latitude and climate of Canada. General Amherst therefore put all his regular forces in winter quarters, and furloughed his Provincials, that they might spend the winter at their homes. In the meantime he laid his plans for an attack upon Montreal as soon as spring should open in 1760, with the entire disposable British force in the northern colonies.

Nothing of particular note occurred during the winter. In his plan of campaign, General Amherst projected a simultaneous attack on Montreal from three points. General Murray was to come up the St. Lawrence from Quebec. Colonel Haviland, in command of the force which garrisoned Ticonderoga and Crown Point during the winter, was to

move down Lake Champlain and the Richelieu River—reducing Isle aux Noix on his way—and then march across the country to Montreal; while General Amherst was to assemble the main army at Oswego and move across Lake Ontario to the head of the St. Lawrence, reducing the forts at la Galette and Oswegatchie, and thence to descend the St. Lawrence to Montreal. The troops under command of General Stanwix, forming the Department of the Ohio, were recalled, and the garrisons of the smaller forts in the colony of New York were all brought together and made part of General Amherst's grand army at Oswego. He was detained somewhat longer than he had contemplated, mainly by the slowness with which the Provincial troops reassembled. "The colonial troops," he wrote Sir William Johnson, "come in slow. . . . I hope you will do everything in your power to hasten their arrival."

Sir William explained in reply that the delay was greatly due to the drought which prevailed that spring, by which the waters of the Mohawk and Oneida rivers became so low that navigation upon them, which was necessary for the transportation of stores, was greatly retarded and almost suspended. However, all arrangements for the campaign

were completed by the 12th of June, and General Amherst proceeded to Oswego, where an army of 6,000 Provincials and 4,000 British regulars was assembled. On July 25th Sir William Johnson joined him with 650 warriors, and the day before the expedition sailed it was further increased by 700 Senecas and Cayugas, with whom was a considerable number—perhaps 200—of Oswegatchie and Caughnawaga Iroquois, who had previously been under the influence of the French. This made the whole number of Indians under the command of Sir William Johnson, 1,350—the largest force of that race ever assembled on this continent up to that time.[1] General Am-

[1] In this campaign Sir William had his Indians organized in what might be called a "brigade" of two "regiments." One "regiment" was composed of the eastern Iroquois—Onondagas, Mohawks, Oneidas, Tuscaroras, and "River Indians"; the other of the Senecas and Cayugas, or western Iroquois. The "eastern regiment" was something over 600 strong and commanded by the elder Brant (Nicklaus). The "western regiment" was 700 strong and commanded by the redoubtable Hi-o-ka-to, with Captain Montour and Young Cornplanter in command of its two wings. Sir William said that Hi-o-ka-to's command of western Iroquois was the finest body of men in the physical sense that he ever saw assembled. "What a pity it is," he wrote to General Amherst, "that these magnificent Indians could not have seen the right warpath for their interests earlier in the struggle!"

An interesting episode of this campaign was that John Johnson, then eighteen years old, accompanied his father's

herst sent Colonel Haldimand with a command of a thousand men to clear the head of the St. Lawrence of any obstructions that might impede safe navigation, and on the 10th of August embarked from Oswego with his whole army. La Galette and Oswegatchie were reduced without serious resistance, although la Galette, which was defended by Fort Levi, a regular fortification, held out until the 25th of August, when the commandant, Pouchet, surrendered at discretion. He was the same officer whom Sir William Johnson had captured the year before at Fort Niagara, and who had been exchanged. When Fort Levi surrendered the Indians found in the deserted huts of the enemy a few

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division as a lieutenant of Provincials, while Joseph Brant, also eighteen years old, served under his father Nicklaus as captain of the Mohawk Indian company of Canajoharie Castle.

General Amherst's main army as it sailed from Oswego was in three divisions, each about 4,000 strong. The first, composed mainly of regulars, was commanded by General Gage; the second, composed of a battalion of regulars and the New England Provincials, was commanded by Colonel Haldimand; and the third, composed of all the New York Provincials and all the Indians, was under the command of Sir William Johnson. Captain John Stark's Rangers, in two companies, were attached to Sir William's headquarters and reported directly to the commander of the division. Though the Indians had been organized in companies in the Niagara campaign the year previous, this was the first time they had ever been "brigaded" or subjected to regular discipline.

Mohawk scalps, and raising the war-whoop or scalp-yell, desired at once to commence a general massacre.

Sir William immediately suppressed this outbreak in a most peremptory fashion, threatening that if the Indians persisted in their purpose, he would instantly ask General Amherst to back him up with a strong force of British regulars and Provincials, and the fierce intentions of his warriors were thoroughly quelled before they had done any damage. This was the first and last time he ever had occasion to resort to drastic discipline in handling his Indians.

On the 31st of August General Amherst again embarked his army, and proceeded carefully down the St. Lawrence River reconnoitering at every step of his progress, and affording the enemy no opportunity for a surprise. The boats passed the rapids of the St. Lawrence above Montreal, though not without some casualties. Several boats were crushed against the rocks and 46 men were drowned. On the 6th of September Amherst's army arrived within sight of the church spires of Montreal, and so well had his plans been concerted and matured, that, singular as it may seem, General Murray, on the same day, approached it in the other

direction from Quebec. The next day Colonel Haviland also joined the main army with his division from Ticonderoga and Crown Point. General Amherst now completely surrounded the city and sent a message to the Marquis de Vaudreuil, informing him of the exact strength of his army, which, after the junction of the three forces, his own, Murray's, and Haviland's, was over 18,000 strong, exclusive of Sir William Johnson's Indians. He assured the French Governor-General that his most ardent desire was to prevent useless shedding of blood, that he knew exactly the force under the Governor-General's command and the elements of which it was composed, and stated them in his letter with an exactness that startled the marquis.

So far as his own force was concerned, as a proof of his good faith, he invited the marquis, if he so desired, to come to his camp and review it himself. Coming from some men, this sort of thing might have been classed as bravado, but in the case of Sir Jeffrey Amherst it was nothing more than the promptings of his absolute integrity and his perfect sense of honor. General Amherst sent his first communication to the Governor-General late in the afternoon of September 6th. Early in the morning of the 7th de Vaudreuil replied,

assenting in the main to the propositions the General had advanced, but requesting two days for deliberation and consultation with his subordinate officers. This General Amherst cheerfully granted, but the Governor-General did not consume the whole of the time given him. At noon, the 8th of September, he sent a letter to the British commander incorporating the terms of a capitulation that he was willing to sign. This capitulation provided that the French troops then under arms in Montreal should be permitted to march out with the honors of war, retaining their colors and personal effects; that their arms should be stacked in their quarters and not laid down; that they should not be held as prisoners of war, but should be paroled until such time as they could be transported to France; that within a reasonable time all other French prisoners of war held by the British should be released and allowed to return to France; that all British prisoners of war held by the French should be immediately given up; that all captives held by the Indians hitherto in alliance with either party should, as far as practicable, be returned to their homes on both sides; that private property of every kind should be respected, and that the British commander should take

the responsibility of maintaining order in the city and its environs.

To these terms General Amherst added the stipulation that Canada, with all her dependencies, should be surrendered to the Crown of Great Britain, and all claims of France to dominion over any part of Canada or her dependencies should cease. Upon the exchange of these terms, an interview was immediately arranged between General Amherst and the Marquis de Vaudreuil. In this interview General Amherst was supported by General Murray, Sir William Johnson, General Gage, and Colonel Haviland. The Governor-General by only a single aide-de-camp. There was little discussion in this interview. Sir Jeffrey Amherst and the Governor-General passed the usual formalities of politeness, and then General Amherst handed to the marquis his response to the letter embodying the proposed terms of capitulation. He agreed to all of them, but said that it would be necessary to get up some method of distinguishing public from private property, concerning which the Governor-General had made no suggestion. To this the marquis agreed, and a commission was appointed, consisting of Sir William Johnson and General Gage on the British side, and Colonel Levi and another

officer on the French side. Little difficulty, however, was experienced in arriving at the desired distinction. Arrangements also had to be made for provisioning the troops forming the French garrison. When all these preliminaries were settled, de Vaudreuil sadly led his dejected and dilapidated forces out of Montreal, and the town was occupied by a British garrison under General Gage. General Murray was sent back the day after the completion of the capitulation to Quebec with 4,000 men as a garrison.

When the town was about to be occupied by the British forces, General Amherst wrote a note to Sir William Johnson requesting him to take the greatest pains to restrain his Indians from any excesses that they might be disposed to commit. Sir William's characteristic response, much appreciated by Amherst, and which he was afterward fond of relating as a good joke, was as follows:

CAMP BEFORE MONTREAL, *September 9th, 1760.*

MY DEAR GENERAL: Replying to your note of this date, I take pleasure in saying that I shall not only cheerfully hold myself personally responsible for the behavior of every one of my Indians, but if you desire it, I will detail a suitable detachment of my Senecas to act as provost guard in the town!

When we consider that the Senecas were notoriously the worst Indians Sir William had, the humor of this proposition will be apparent. History does not record that General Amherst accepted the generous proposition.

On the 12th of September General Amherst left Montreal for New York, and the next day Sir William embarked with his 1,300 Indians in bateaux, in which they returned by easy stages to Oswego, where they were disbanded.

During this campaign, the same as during the Fort Niagara expedition, the Indians in service received the same pay and allowances as the Provincial troops. When disbanded at Oswego they were paid off, loaded with presents, each Indian receiving, among other things, a new blanket taken from the French public stores captured at Montreal. This event practically terminated the old French War, and brought the entire continent of North America east of the Mississippi River and, generally speaking, north of the vast territory subsequently included in what is known as the Louisiana Purchase, under British rule.

The French still occupied Detroit, Mackinaw, St. Mary's (Sault Ste. Marie), and one

or two other small forts in the country of the upper lakes.

Major Rogers, commander of the Independent Battalion of Scouts, which bears his name, together with his second in command, Captain John Stark, were sent with a suitable escort to notify the garrisons of these posts of the situation. They took with them certified copies of the capitulation signed by the Governor-General, also the orders of the British commander for the temporary regulation of affairs at those posts until a permanent government should be established. This duty was accomplished without difficulty worthy of note.[1]

General Amherst went to New York, where he was received with all possible public demonstrations of joy, and all the honors due to his achievement were bestowed upon him. He was afterward raised to the peerage in England under title of his own name as Baron Amherst.

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[1] When near Detroit Rogers and Stark were met by Pontiac, who demanded to know why they entered his country with an armed force. He had already been apprised by Indian runners of the capitulation at Montreal, but said that de Vaudreuil had no right to surrender him! After some parley, however, Pontiac was appeased and Rogers and Stark went on to Detroit, which was at once surrendered by its commandant, d'Aubrey.

Sir William Johnson

Sir William Johnson, after disbanding and paying off his Indians at Oswego, returned to his home at Mount Johnson, his military career now being at an end.

General Amherst, however, did not consider the work complete, and as soon as the demonstrations in his honor at New York were over, he immediately planned a campaign to begin at once against the French settlements in Louisiana. To this end, knowing that the climate in that region would be unfavorable for the operations of British or Northern Provincials before the month of January, he proposed to sail from New York about the 1st of December with a fleet of 20 sail of the line and a force of about 6,000 British regulars. At the same time he proposed that an expedition, composed of Provincial troops from New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, should rendezvous at Fort Pitt, at the head of the Ohio, and before the close of navigation proceed down the Ohio and Mississippi rivers. This force, he thought, ought to be at least 4,000 strong, and he proposed that it should be placed under the command of Sir William Johnson.

This project, however, was not carried out. Although General Amherst was commander-in-chief of all the forces, and practically in

that capacity viceroy of all the North American colonies, yet his advisers in New York counseled him that it would not be wise to undertake such an expedition without the express consent of the ministry, in view of the fact that during the whole war the British had made no attempt whatever upon the Louisiana colony, and that colony had, so far as any one knew, done nothing to oppose the British arms. General Amherst argued that it would take at least three months before the project could be laid before the ministry, considered by them, and an answer returned. By that time, he said, it would be too near spring for British and northern Colonial troops to operate safely in that latitude and climate. Thereupon, for some reason that never has been explained in history, the whole project was dropped. France was allowed to retain her sovereignty over Louisiana until a day or two before the signing of the definitive treaty, when she ceded all of her possessions known as the colony of Louisiana to the Spanish Crown.

While the subjugation of Canada and the expulsion of French rule gave rest to the officers and troops who had been so arduously and so long engaged accomplishing the result, it only served to vastly enlarge the sphere of

Sir William Johnson's duties and augment his responsibilities as general superintendent of all the North American Indians. Heretofore he had practically only the Iroquois to deal with; now he was called upon to pacify and bring into compliance with the terms of the new situation the great number of Indians in the numerous tribes who inhabited the great west and northwest, and who had previously been wholly under French influence. He foresaw at once that in this task he must encounter at the outset a very great and embarrassing difficulty. He foresaw that English traders would undoubtedly make great efforts to get control of the Indian trade in those regions, and that, in consequence, troubles were likely to arise between them and the French traders, who had so long controlled that commerce, and doubtless difficulties with the Indians themselves would ensue.

The ink was hardly dry on the articles of capitulation of Montreal when Sir William went to New York to consult with General Amherst on this subject. By this time he and the general had become the closest of friends, each confiding absolutely in the other's judgment, and each taking counsel of the other in every great emergency. Sir William explained to the general that in his judgment

the best policy for the British to pursue was to let the French residents of Canada as much alone as possible, and not to interfere with their trade or their personal relations with the Indians. He said he was satisfied that they would all become loyal and faithful subjects of the king, and that their good-will should be sedulously cultivated, and the assistance of their influence with the Indians freely invoked. He also held that it would be unwise to make any attempt at changing the religious influences that had so long been exerted over the Canadian Indians. He argued that any effort to interfere with the influence of the Catholic priests would create distrust among the Indians, whether converted or not. On the whole, he told General Amherst that he believed the best policy for the British to pursue would be—now that they possessed the governing power in Canada—to leave all other conditions as nearly *in statu quo* as possible. To every one of these propositions General Amherst gave hearty assent; and as, in view of the practical veto upon his proposed invasion of Louisiana, he intended soon to sail for England, he promised Sir William that he would exhaust his influence with the ministry and the king to have Sir William's ideas carried into effect.

It is hardly necessary to add that the policy pursued by the British Government toward the French and Indians in Canada, from that day to this, has been based practically upon the system advocated by Sir William Johnson in January, 1761.

Filled as he always was with a profound sense of the responsibilities of his position, and realizing that not only the interests of his government, but that the comfort and well-being of the Indians depended almost wholly upon the management of their affairs, Sir William lost no time in making himself acquainted with the nature and volume of the new duties which the change of rule in Canada had brought upon him. Early in the spring of 1761, in fact, immediately after his return from New York and his interview with General Amherst, previously mentioned, Sir William sent a considerable number of his most trustworthy Indian runners, mostly Mohawks and Oneidas, with some Senecas, to travel all through the country of the Canadian Indians, and those farther west, with messages and belts of peace-wampum, inviting them to send their chiefs and delegates to meet him at a grand council, which he proposed to hold at Detroit some time in August of that year. He set out from Fort Johnson for Detroit on the

5th of July, 1761, accompanied by his son, John Johnson—afterward Sir John—then a youth of nineteen, and his nephew, Lieutenant Guy Johnson. During this journey Sir William kept a journal, in it almost daily recording every incident worthy of historical note that occurred. Among the pleasant duties he had to perform at the outset of this journey was to assemble at the principal castle of each tribe all the Indians who had accompanied General Amherst's expedition to Montreal, for the purpose of distributing to them medals which he and the general had persuaded the Assembly of New York to have struck off for them. Having performed this pleasant duty, which consumed several days, and having attended at the Seneca capital a grand ceremonial in memory of the Indians of that tribe who were killed in the battle of Niagara in 1759, he went on to Niagara, and from there to Detroit. The necessary limits of this volume do not admit of any extended extracts from his extremely interesting journal. By way, however, of exhibiting the fact that in the midst of the most important public duties Sir William never forgot his home or domestic responsibilities, we quote one entry dated Wednesday, October 21, 1761. The following is the exact text:

Wednesday, 21st.—A fine morning, a warm day. Embarked at eight o'clock. At the Three River Rift met Sir Robert Davis and Captain Etherington, who gave me a packet of letters from General Amherst, and a copy of a treaty made at Easton in August by Mr. Hamilton, of Philadelphia, with some scattering Indians who remained about that part of the country—all of little or no consequence. Encamped in the evening about three miles above the Three Rivers. Captain Etherington told me Molly was delivered of a girl—that all were well at my house, where they stayed two days.

In this mission to Detroit Sir William was exceedingly successful; in fact, as he states in the journal from which we have just quoted, he was suprised at the alacrity with which the western and northwestern Indians accepted the new state of affairs. Arriving at Detroit, he held a council, or rather a series of councils, lasting eighteen days. He did not have, nor was it his purpose to have, all the Indians together at one time. He preferred to deal with them tribe by tribe, if possible, or at any rate in numbers not sufficient to form an unwieldy assemblage. While at Detroit he was visited by, and had conferences with, representatives of all the tribes of any importance east of the Mississippi and north of the Ohio. He had no trouble with any of

them, and they all seemed willing to meet the British at least half-way. Some of them, notably the Ottawas and Hurons, who were well aware of the British propensity to gain possession of the lands of the Indians, and whose location in Canada—that is to say, in that rich country embraced in the triangle formed by Lakes Erie and Ontario on the south, the Ottawa River on the northeast, and Lake Huron, Lake St. Clair, the Detroit and St. Clair rivers on the west—appeared anxious on that subject, and pressed Sir William for assurances that their new Great Father, the British king, who had so recently become their guardian, would cause his people to maintain the same land policy toward them that had been for nearly two hundred years maintained by their former Great Father, the king of France. Undoubtedly these were embarrassing propositions for Sir William, because he knew what the British land-hunger meant for the Indians as well as the Indians themselves did. He admits in his journal that he was nonplussed at having this, which had always been the most crucial question in the Indian policy of the British, thrust at him by the Ottawas and the Hurons on the occasion of his first visit to them, but he does not enlighten us as to how he an-

swered their proposition, or, perhaps, how he evaded it.

While at Detroit, Sir William employed as interpreters in dealing with the Hurons, Ottawas, Chippewas, and other Canadian tribes, the Jesuit Fathers St. Martin and Pottier. Father St. Martin was the leading Jesuit of his time. He was the author of the History of New France, referred to in a previous chapter, though it had not been printed at that time. However, Sir William knew all about his rank as an ecclesiastic and his influence over the Indians—particularly the Ottawas, Hurons, and Chippewas. Therefore, the baronet was quite attentive to Father St. Martin. The priest was at that time over sixty years of age, and had passed forty years of his life among the Indians. In 1761 he lived at the Old Huron Mission, a few miles from Detroit on the shore of Lake St. Clair. On the 17th of September Sir William visited him at the mission, recording the event in his journal:

Thursday, 17th.— . . . Arrived at the Huron castle soon after 4 o'clock, where the Indians were drawn up and saluted me. Encamped here. Visited the Mission Priest, Pierre Pottier. Supped with Saint Martin, the famous Jesuit, M. La Bute, and others. Then went to the council room of the

Hurons, where they had everything in good order and three fires burning. . . .

It would appear that Sir William exhausted his powers of diplomacy upon the good old French priest. Father St. Martin had made up his mind to return to France and pass the rest of his life there. Sir William besought him to stay in Canada, where all his life-work had been done, and to use his vast influence with the Indians in the interests of peace under the new *régime*. The priest expressed fear of interference by the English conquerors with the Catholic institutions, so long established among the Indians. Sir William persuaded him not only that there would be no such interference, but that it would be the policy of the English to sustain the priests in their efforts to Christianize and civilize the Indians. Finally, Father St. Martin agreed to remain in Canada, and he was afterward extremely useful under the British rule. A year or two later he went to France to arrange for the printing of his book, but returned to Canada and remained there until his death, some twenty years later. He was the last of the school of Father Marquette, La Salle, Joliet, and Hennepin.

After this visit to the Huron mission, Sir

William set out on his return journey the 20th of September, and arrived at Mount Johnson the 30th of October, having made several stops on the way to visit various forts and Indian villages. Among other things during this trip, the baronet regulated the number of troops to be maintained in the several garrisons required in western Canada, the total being about 1,200 regular troops. He also provided for a force of Indian or half-breed runners and scouts, to be employed in the pay of the king at the several forts and trading-posts.