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## CHURCHILL AND THE JEWS: THE HOLOCAUST\*

This paper will focus primarily on the policy and reactions of Winston Churchill, Prime Minister of England from May, 1945 until July, 1945 to the destruction of European Jewry. In one respect the task before the historian is difficult, since he is forced to draw conclusions from a dearth of evidence, due to a conspicuous abstention by Churchill from any activity on behalf of European Jewry during the war.

It is my opinion that the studies written so far on British policy towards European Jewry have passed over Churchill's role too lightly. In particular, I would question the prevalent conclusion that amid all the insensitivity, even callousness of the officials, Churchill was a lone exception in comprehending "the historical significance" of the Holocaust.

### A.

Churchill's long association with the Jews and Zionism stretched from his very earliest childhood. Those relations were at times ambivalent, and at times chequered. There is no reason to suppose that Churchill was not tarred with some of the more traditional prejudices that characterised the class from which he came. There is evidence that he subscribed to many of the stereotyped images regarding the Jews' prodigious wealth, power and influence.

The young Winston became familiar at first hand with these so-called Jewish accoutrements from his father's somewhat irregular relations with the first Baron Rothschild, Nathaniel Mayer. As a recent study has pointed out, the younger Winston significantly omitted the nature of his father Randolph's relations with Rothschild. He did not mention his:

growing intimacy with Rothschild, to whom he "turned for everything" by 1888, to whom he entrusted cabinet secrets, the interest of whose firm

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\*This article derives from a paper given at the Annual Conference of the American Historical Association in New York, in December, 1985.

he pressed in Persia, India and Burma, who was—to general discomfiture—his closest adviser as Chancellor of the Exchequer, and to whose bank he owed £66,000 when he died.<sup>1</sup>

Winston, with his father, was a frequent guest at the Rothschild country estate, Tring; and on more than one occasion, Winston, or his father, mobilised Rothschild's connections to further his, Winston's, career. In 1905, Winston encountered a further aspect of Jewish influence, when he stood as Liberal candidate for a constituency, N.W. Manchester, with a large proportion of Jewish voters. (It may be noted that during his campaign, Winston supported the Territorialists, who favoured a temporary Jewish national home in East Africa, rather than the Zionists—this for the prosaic reason that N.W. Manchester was a stronghold of the Territorialists.)<sup>2</sup>

On one occasion, in June, 1914, Churchill was even accused by a fellow member of Parliament of sinking to anti-Semitic rhetoric, in order to push through a measure to which he had expected serious opposition. The occasion was the so-called “Shell debate”, when Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, proposed that the government purchase a majority shareholding in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. Churchill defended the purchase of oil reserves in a remote, vulnerable area, with an attack against what he called the cut-throat malpractices of the Royal Dutch Shell Company. In particular, he focussed on the Anglo-Jewish head of the combine, Sir Marcus Samuel.

Sir Marcus had already been made the butt of an anti-Semitic campaign in 1911, when the Shell Company had been castigated as the root cause of a taxi-strike, the result of a rise in the price of petroleum. The animosity and the prejudice of those affluent classes which used the taxicab is reflected well in the following passage from the *Sporting Times*, a paper which catered to their leisure needs. As Chaim Bermant has put it, the paper's comment on Sir Marcus Samuel was made in one of its “less sporting moments”:

Sir Marcus Samuel is a typical Jew. He is a pronounced Jew. You could never take him for anything else. He is stout, swarthy, black-haired, thick-nosed, thick-lipped, bulge-eyed—in short, he fulfils every expectation that one habitually forms of the prosperous Jew . . .<sup>3</sup>

In the opinion of Bermant, when Churchill was faced with the task of persuading the House of Commons to make a dubious investment in foreign oil resources, while traditional sources were able to provide all Britain's needs, “Churchill was too much of a demagogue to forego the applause to be had from attacking someone who was not only at the head of a vast combine but a Jew, and an unpopular Jew at that.”<sup>4</sup>

Churchill's oblique references to sharp practices by the Shell Company (rather than to the Anglo-Dutch combine), went down very badly

in the house. Churchill referred to “a long, steady squeeze by the oil trusts all over the world”, but he reserved his main attack for Shell which, he asserted, had engineered the attack on the government’s proposed purchase. He stated facetiously:

We have no quarrel with the “Shell”. We have always found them courteous, considerate, ready to oblige, anxious to serve the Admiralty, and to promote the interests of the British Navy and the British Empire—at a price. The only difficulty has been the price.<sup>5</sup>

Press reports noted that at that point Churchill beamed in the direction of Samuel Samuel, M.P., a relative of Sir Marcus, and a member of the board of the oil combine. (Sir Marcus himself was absent from the debate.)<sup>6</sup>

Churchill’s personal asides came in for heavy criticism from both sides of the House, both from those who later voted for, and from those who voted against his bill. Conservative member George Lloyd (a future High Commissioner to Egypt, and Churchill’s appointee as Colonial Secretary in 1940) commented: “I must say that many of us think, with due respect, that the personal imputation with regard to the hon member’s interests in oil companies comes very badly indeed from the other side.” Yet the most outspoken attack on Churchill came from Mr Watson Rutherford, M.P., who in fact voted *for* the motion. He explained that he had been at a loss initially to comprehend Churchill’s personal attack on Samuel. He had then deduced that the First Lord, fearing the difficulty he would encounter in passing the bill, had decided that “the best course of action to get them to support it was to raise the question of monopoly and to do a little Jew-baiting.” Rutherford suggested that the true reason for the sharp rise in oil prices was simply the great rise in demand, and not “because some evilly-disposed gentlemen of the Hebrew persuasion had put their heads together.”<sup>7</sup>

During the debate, Churchill was challenged several times to substantiate his charges that Shell asked exorbitant prices. He declined to reply, on grounds of security. It was a charge that Churchill never substantiated, because it was simply untrue.<sup>8</sup>

The incident may be counted among the numerous political blunders that punctuated Churchill’s long career. This was apparently the only incident of this kind, and cannot therefore be taken to indicate any long-standing prejudice. However, the incident does reflect the extent and depth of anti-Jewish prejudice in England at the time, whether at the grass-roots level, or as a factor to be exploited in the House of Commons by a politician who feels himself to be in desperate straits.

The reverse side of the Churchill coin was a strong liberal, humanitarian tradition. From 1904-1905, Churchill was one of the leaders of the parliamentary opposition to the Balfour administration’s bill to regulate

and supervise the immigration of aliens (primarily Russian Jews). The Liberal Party, which Churchill joined in 1904, took the line that the proposed legislation infringed the hallowed principle of granting political asylum to victims of persecution. Yet Churchill's motives cannot be said to have been entirely altruistic.

When he had crossed the floor of the House in 1904, Churchill had been selected as prospective Liberal candidate for the preponderantly Jewish constituency of N.W. Manchester, one of the centres of the campaign against the aliens bill. A natural bond of mutual interest was soon formed between Churchill and the influential Jewish leaders in his constituency. As his son and biographer noted later: "It is not without significance that many of his leading supporters in Manchester were Jews."<sup>9</sup> Whether, as one historian has concluded, Churchill was motivated by a mix of "expediency, political tactics, and his own humanitarianism alike"<sup>10</sup> or whether "the influence of a militant Jewish vote merely intensified and stiffened an attitude and line of action which would have become apparent anyway",<sup>11</sup> it seems clear that Churchill was not motivated exclusively by humanitarian liberalism.<sup>12</sup>

During the 1930's, Churchill's sense of humanity was outraged by the Nazi persecution of the Jews. Clement Attlee has testified how, one day, he met Churchill at the House of Commons, and the latter recalled what was being inflicted on the Jews, all the time "with tears pouring down his cheeks."<sup>13</sup> This sense of outrage never left him. During the latter stages of the war, once "the terrible secret" of Hitler's "final solution" was exposed, Churchill would make repeated references, to different audiences, to it being "the most horrible crime ever committed in history." However, this historian must ask also to what extent, if any at all, were those laudable sentiments followed by any meaningful actions?

## B.

The first issue to be clarified is what was the general policy of the Churchill government to European Jewry during World War Two? Of course, Churchill himself did not personally formulate or execute that policy, quite to the contrary. Albeit, as we shall note below, Churchill did intervene actively to ensure that there would be no infringement (at least not in the Jews' case) of that cardinal principle of Allied high policy, that there would be no negotiation with the enemy, short of total and absolute surrender. At the same time, it must be stressed that Churchill could not have failed to have been aware of his government's policy towards the Jews. However, not only did he never seriously dispute or contest it (as he did on numerous occasions on the question of Zionism and Palestine), but he refused to be actively involved. His personal assistant, Brendan

Bracken, was given to understand that he, Bracken, should not bring any issues concerning the Holocaust to the Prime Minister, but that Foreign Secretary Antony Eden had full authority to determine the government's policy in this sphere.<sup>14</sup> Where necessary, replies to appeals sent to Churchill were drafted at the Foreign Office, and returned to No. 10 Downing Street for Churchill's signature.

The principles guiding Foreign Office policy were as follows: no aid to the Jews in Nazi-occupied Europe, if that meant breaking the strict economic blockade which Britain imposed on the Continent; as noted already, no negotiations, short of absolute surrender, with the Germans; and no large-scale movement of refugees out of Europe. The Foreign Office feared that any large-scale population movements would exert pressure on Allied supply lines, or that any significant admissions of refugees into Britain herself or into her colonial empire would present an insuperable problem of feeding the extra mouths. And last, but perhaps not least, there was the ever-nagging fear that a flood of Jewish refugees would create an irresistible pressure for the entry of some into Palestine, thereby forcing Britain to exceed the limit of 75,000 laid down in the Palestine White Paper of May, 1939.<sup>15</sup> This rationale was given lucid, if cold-hearted, expression in a Foreign Office reply of February, 1943 to an alleged offer by the Romanian government to release some 70,000 Jews, deported previously to Transnistria. In the Foreign Office view, the Romanian offer was:

clearly a piece of blackmail which, if successful, would open up an endless process on the part of Germany and her satellites in south-eastern Europe of unloading, at a given price, all their unwanted nationals on overseas countries. . . . To admit the method of blackmail and slave-purchase would mean serious prejudice to the successful prosecution of the war. The blunt truth is that the whole complex of human problems raised by the present German domination of Europe, of which the Jewish question is an important but by no means the only aspect, can only be dealt with completely by an Allied victory, and any step calculated to prejudice this is not in the interest of the Jews in Europe.<sup>16</sup>

In a pioneering classic on the subject, Professor Bernard Wasserstein lays the major part of the blame for the fact that so few Jews were able to escape Europe during the first two years of the war at the door of the British government. This was because while the Germans yet favored a policy of evacuation over extermination, the British did their best to seal off all escape routes to Palestine:

From mid-1941 the escape routes from south-east Europe were effectively barred by the Germans and their allies to all save a handful of intrepid or fortunate refugees.

The British government thus found itself superseded by the Germans

from 1941 as the major agency preventing Jewish escape from Europe to Palestine.<sup>17</sup>

During the war itself, the Foreign Office adhered rigidly to the doctrine that the Jews were not a nation, but a religious community, who would have to await their turn for liberation, along with their fellow citizens in the countries of their residence. Of course, this required some myopia in regard to Hitler's actual policy, which had determined genocide for the Jews as such, and not as citizens of the various European countries in which they lived. At times, quite absurd reasoning was employed. One example is a minute authored by Richard Law, Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office. The following is a response written in December, 1942 to a Jewish appeal to establish a separate relief organization for the Jews:

The Jews without doubt suffered enormously by Hitler's deliberate policy, but other people have suffered as well, and to segregate the Jews as a racial problem in Europe would surely play into the hands of anti-Semitism.<sup>18</sup>

Thus it was argued that more important than trying to save lives was the need to observe caution, to avert any increase in anti-Semitism! The Foreign Office dogma was not entirely free of logical inconsistencies, and at times even produced fits of conscience. For example, the Allies' broadcast warnings of retribution for crimes against the Jews, publicised in December, 1942, produced universal expectations which the government had no intentions of living up to. Five days after the declaration, a Foreign Office official noted:

How can we say that "we have every sympathy and willingness to play our part" when we refuse to take any positive steps of our own to help these wretched creatures? Why should anyone else do anything if we refuse?<sup>19</sup>

Underpinning Foreign Office policy lay the dogma that the Jews were not a nation and that they should not be given a state of their own in Palestine, as the Zionists demanded, but should assimilate in Nazi-free post-war Europe. This 'principle' was undoubtedly re-enforced by the fear that should the government waiver in its White Paper policy an Arab rebellion would sweep Palestine and perhaps spread to other parts of the Middle East. Thus, for example, when in July, 1940 arrangements were made for the evacuation of Polish soldiers from south-east Europe to Palestine, the High Commissioner of Palestine suggested to the Colonial Office that only non-Jewish Poles be considered. He added that "he had reason to believe that Polish authorities would be willing to arrange that only non-Jews should come to Palestine".<sup>20</sup>

Foreign Office minutes all too frequently reflected tinges of anti-

Semitism, and comments such as ‘These Jews are never satisfied’, abound. There was a significant contrast between the niggardly quantities of food relief the government allowed to be sent to the Jews of central and eastern Europe, and the operation whereby the Allies supported the entire food needs of the population of Axis-occupied Greece between 1942 and the end of the war. The critical difference between support of the Jews and of the Greeks was in the presence, or lack, of a political motive. While the Allies wanted to ensure the survival of an independent, pro-western Greece, they had no intention of ‘flooding’ Palestine, or the colonies, not to mention Britain herself, with masses of European Jews. Thus all the Zionists’ pleas for a national military unit were turned down (except for the Jewish Brigade, during the closing stages of the war) for fear that such a unit would place the Allies in the Jews’ debt at the peace conference.

Therefore, the Jews of Europe would have to await rescue and liberation along with the other nationals of the Continent. As one official noted in May, 1943, not without a certain cynicism: “We cannot give any assurance that we propose to collaborate in the German policy of a ‘Judenrein’ Europe”.<sup>21</sup> Such views persisted after the war too. Foreign Secretary Bevin argued that the vast majority of European Jews would have to remain in Europe, for surely, the Allies had fought the war precisely in order to rid Europe of racism! In August, 1946, Winston Churchill endorsed Bevin’s view emphatically:

. . . No one can imagine that there is room in Palestine for the great masses of Jews who wish to leave Europe, or that they could be absorbed in any period which it is useful to contemplate. The idea that the Jewish problem could be solved or even helped by a vast dumping of the Jews in Europe into Palestine is really too silly to consume our time in the House of Commons this afternoon . . .<sup>22</sup>

This speech was made less than a month after the infamous Kielce pogroms in Poland. Some 175,000 Polish Jews had returned to their Polish ‘homeland’ after the war. On 4 July, 1946, the medieval charge of blood libel was revived against the Jews of Kielce, and in the pogrom which followed, in which government forces took part, and against which the local bishop refused to intervene, 42 Jews were brutally murdered, and hundreds injured. Within three months, over 100,000 Jews had fled back to the West.<sup>23</sup>

The officials who were responsible for executing this policy, and some of their superiors, have come in for a generous dose of criticism, and rightly so. Even when allowances are made for the psychological barriers which inhibited a full and prompt appreciation of the nature of the final solution, there undoubtedly remain other factors too—indifference bordering on prejudice, insensitivity and remoteness from the



travails of 'foreigners', not to mention political motives, grounded in what is commonly called "the national interest". However, it is a cardinal feature of the British political system, and a healthy one at that, that the Minister and not the officials bear responsibility, and ultimate responsibility is borne by the head of the government, the Prime Minister. Even had the ministers involved been entirely ignorant of what had been going on (which they were not), they would yet be responsible. The fact that ministers, and the Prime Minister as well, knew less than they might have done, was due to the fact that they deliberately averted their eyes. As we shall note below, Churchill was in fact intimately involved, in 1944, in the inter-connected issues of the rescue of Hungarian Jewry and the bombing of the Auschwitz death camp.

Whatever the case, Churchill was *not* regarded as a disinterested or detached party by his contemporaries. Among those who found most difficulty in comprehending Churchill's aloofness were the Jews themselves. In December, 1942, on the eve of the Allies' declaration promising retribution to the Nazis, James de Rothschild wrote to Churchill, asking him to receive a delegation of leading British Jews. His letter stated: "I can imagine what the Prime Minister feels about the unspeakable torments through which the Jews in Europe are going through at present, and I hope that he will agree to receive us." But Churchill's response did not match up to Rothschild's anticipation. Routinely, Rothschild's letter was passed on to the Foreign Office, with a covering note from Churchill's secretary, advising the department that the Prime Minister's office would not be sending any acknowledgement, and that the Foreign Office, in its reply, should make it clear that it was handling the request, at the Prime Minister's request.<sup>24</sup> As in his dealings with the Zionist leader, Dr Chaim Weizmann, there was clearly an element of uneasy, unclear conscience in Churchill's behaviour.

On 19 December, 1942, Churchill received a personal appeal from Samuel Zygielbojm, on behalf of Polish Jewry. Zygielbojm, Jewish Bundist deputy to the Polish National Council in London, informed the Prime Minister that hundreds of thousands of Polish Jews were being done to death, and that of a total of 3½ million Polish Jews, barely one-third still survived. He begged Churchill "to find the means to save those few Polish Jews who still may have survived". There is no record of any reply from Churchill, and there was no Allied intervention to stop the slaughter.<sup>25</sup> "Reprisal bombings" were considered, but rejected by the Chiefs of Staff, on the grounds that such action might escalate acts of brutality against civilians and captured British pilots. and might provoke a stream of like appeals from other allies. There remained too the usual "anti-Semitic" bugbear: "Since Hitler had depicted this war as one against the Jews, any air-raid avowedly on their behalf would merely serve enemy propaganda."<sup>26</sup> In July, 1944 Churchill toyed

once more with the idea of retaliation-bombing, this time as a counter to the German 'V-weapon', but the air staff advised against. During the war at least half a million German civilians were killed by air bombing, but specific reprisal bombings were never carried out.<sup>27</sup>

On 12 May, 1943, Zygielbojm committed suicide, in protest at Allied inaction and hypocrisy. In a note written just before his death, he indicted the Allies:

The responsibility for this crime—the assassination of the Jewish population—rests above all on the murderers themselves, but falls indirectly upon the whole human race, on the Allies and their governments, who have so far taken no firm steps to put a stop to these crimes . . .<sup>28</sup>

The leaders of Anglo-Jewry refused to believe that a government headed by Churchill could at one and the same time express its revulsion at what the Nazis were doing, and yet prevent Jews escaping occupied Europe, due largely to their fears that some of the escapees might find their way to Palestine. In January, 1943, the Marchioness of Reading, President of the British Section of the World Jewish Congress, wrote to Churchill what he later called "one of the many moving appeals recently addressed to the government". Her letter deplored the bureaucracy's obtuseness to "the horrible plight of the Jews at the mercy of the Nazis", and laid down a challenge:

I have said to myself what can I do, who can help? and the answer is clearly, only Mr Churchill can help and I can at least write and beg him to do so. In other days I would have come in sackcloth and ashes to plead for my people; it is in that spirit that I write. Some can still be saved, if the iron fetters of red-tape are burst asunder . . . I learn with amazement that His Majesty's representatives in Turkey withhold certificates for Palestine and threaten deportation to those who have escaped, because they are 'illegal'. England cannot merely sink to such hypocrisy that our members of Parliament stand to show sympathy to the Jewish dead and meanwhile her officials are condemning these same Jews to die? *You cannot know of such things. I do not believe you would tolerate them.* There are still some 40,000 certificates for Palestine under the White Paper regulations. Mr Churchill will you not say they are to be used now, for any who can escape, man woman or child? Is it possible, is it really possible to refuse sanctuary in the Holy Land?<sup>29</sup>

Churchill did not intervene, and the residue of the White Paper immigration certificates were not placed at the disposal of any Jew who might escape Europe. As usual, Churchill's reply was drafted for him by the Foreign Office, which made enigmatic references to "the great practical difficulties" in arranging any exodus of European Jews, and about the danger of inhibiting secret negotiations then under way.<sup>30</sup> In February, 1943, the government granted a special allocation of 4000 certifi-

cates for children from Bulgaria; the remainder of the quota were deliberately rationed so as to last for the duration of the war.

Leaders of Anglo-Jewry continued to be troubled by the Prime Minister's apparent acquiescence in Foreign Office policy towards the Jews but, like their compatriots across the Atlantic, who endured similar qualms about the policy of the Roosevelt administration, they did not make their anxieties public. But those close to Churchill felt constrained at times to pour out their private anxieties as in the following extract from a private letter written to Churchill by his old friend, Lord Melchett, in May, 1944:

There is one psychological factor which I think ought not to be overlooked . . . That is the feeling of frustration and exasperation which this policy has caused—coming as it does from a government over which Mr Churchill presides. His wholehearted championship of our cause in the past has made our people turn to him as a saviour and it has been extremely difficult even for an intelligent population to understand how some of these acts could be carried out by a government under his leadership, unless it be either that the information was kept from him or that it was put forward in some perverted form.<sup>31</sup>

### C.

In retrospect, it may be claimed that the options open to the Allies during the first years of the war, when the Germans overran much of Europe, were admittedly limited. However, it may also be claimed that warnings, and/or demonstrations by the Allies would have given hope to, or at least sounded the warnings much earlier for, much of European Jewry; in addition, a demonstration of Allied sincere intent might have persuaded the Nazis to have slowed down, or even postpone their 'Jewish' policy. In the words of a Jewish Agency spokesman, proposing the bombing of the Auschwitz camp, in July, 1944, such Allied action would "give the lie to the oft-repeated assertions of Nazi spokesmen that the Allies are not really so displeased with the work of the Nazis in ridding Europe of Jews."<sup>32</sup>

However, as the allies took the offensive, and "the tide turned", the military options for inhibiting or halting the continuing slaughter of the Jews increased significantly. Reference will be made here to just two initiatives, which overlapped each other in the summer of 1944; the Joel Brand 'trucks for blood' mission, and the proposal to bomb the Auschwitz death camp and the railway lines leading to it.

#### *I. The 'Blood for Trucks Offer'*

On 19 May, 1944, Joel Brand, a member of the Hungarian Zionist Relief

and Rescue Committee, brought to the west an offer from Adolf Eichmann (which in fact originated from his superior, Himmler), to release one million Jews, primarily the remnants of Hungarian Jewry. (Hungary had fallen under direct German occupation the previous March.) In return, the Germans asked for 10,000 trucks and quantities of food and provisions. In a clumsy attempt to split the Allies, it was promised that the materiel would be used only in the east, i.e. against the Soviets.

By 1 June, 1944, the British War Cabinet, with Churchill in the chair, had in fact rejected the scheme, since it would involve an infringement of the policy of no negotiation with the enemy short of total surrender.<sup>33</sup> Other arguments against accepting the offer were that the movement of 1 million Jews across Europe, and the costs of their maintenance in Allied or in neutral countries would inhibit the prosecution of the war, and would establish a dangerous precedent for the future extortion of 'blood-money'. In addition, not least of the government's anxieties, was that such a large movement of Jews must exert an irresistible pressure for mass migration to Palestine. This latter factor was certainly high up in the considerations of those Foreign Office officials in charge of policy in the Middle East. The closing passage of the following minute shows quite clearly how the strict adherence to the White Paper immigration quota was elevated to the level of an Allied war priority:

We do not, of course, wish to impede the escape of Jews from Hitler's clutches, but we must always bear in mind the fundamental facts of the Palestine immigration problem; namely, that the outstanding balance of 27,500 places for Jewish immigration *must* if possible be made to last for the whole of the remaining period of the war against Germany.

Eastern Department must ask Refugee Department, who handle refugee questions for the *whole* Foreign Office, not to dissociate themselves from the needs of other departments. . . . If H.M. government's policy is wrongly handled on the refugee question, if too many undesirables are admitted to strengthen the Hagana, or if Palestine is suddenly flooded by a spate of Jews, as the Jewish Agency desire, we shall almost certainly have to cope with Arab disturbances over the whole Middle East . . . This would be intolerable in the year of the second front. Nothing could serve the German purpose better and we must not get into a position of being unable to refuse an uncontrollable flood of immigrants if German policy changes, as much as we wish to pursue a humanitarian policy.<sup>34</sup>

However, the British could not simply dismiss the matter out of hand, since the Americans were involved too, having heard direct of the Brand mission from their consul in Istanbul. The Americans too had their ulterior motives, although these forced them to different conclusions from those of the British side. As put retrospectively by a Foreign Office brief:

The only reason why, at the outset, H.M. government did not dismiss the Gestapo proposals with contempt was that the U.S. government, particularly in an election year, is deperately anxious that nothing, however fantastic, has been neglected which might lead to the rescue of Jews.<sup>35</sup>

In its representations to both the British and the American governments, the Jewish Agency urged that Brand be allowed to return to Budapest, if only as a tactic to draw out the negotiations, and thereby hold up further deportations to Auschwitz, estimated to be proceeding at the rate of 12,000 a day. The Foreign Office, now apprehensive lest they be charged with insensibility to the fate of the Jews, suggested as a counter that negotiations with the Germans might be carried on via the Swiss government, rather than via Brand. The Department reported to the ambassador in Washington that it had refused to 'dangle a carrot' before the Germans. The ambassador was asked to check on the Agency's claim that the American War Refugee Board (set up the previous January, at the behest of Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau Jr.) was constitutionally permitted to deal directly with the Germans. The British view was that any direct contact with the Germans would ruin Soviet trust in the West.<sup>36</sup>

On this occasion, Churchill took a more stringent view than his Foreign Office. When he received copies of the Foreign Office telegrams to Washington, he minuted: "Surely we cannot negotiate with the Germans on this matter, certainly not without the Cabinet being consulted. This is not the time to have negotiations with the enemy."<sup>37</sup> Eden had to explain to Churchill that they could not "entirely disregard Jewish interest in this matter", and it was therefore thought best to lay all the possible options before the Americans. Churchill concurred, but insisted that not only would there *not* be any negotiation with the enemy, but any approach whatever would have to receive the prior sanction of the Cabinet.<sup>38</sup>

Inconveniently for the British side, the Americans did agree to 'dangle the carrot' before the Germans. On 9 July, they proposed that Brand himself should be allowed to return to Budapest, to tell the Germans that the Allies would convey their views via a protecting power. The Americans suggested that the Allies consider arrangements for accommodating all Jews allowed to leave German-controlled territories, in Allied or neutral countries. These steps were predicated, naturally, upon Soviet assent.<sup>39</sup> In fact, the Russians had been informed of the Brand mission by the British ambassador in Moscow, on 14 June. Four days later, the Soviets laid down their own emphatic veto: "on any conversations whatsoever with the German government."<sup>40</sup>

In any case, Churchill himself had determined against any negotiations with the Germans on behalf of Hungarian Jewry, whether to realise

the rescue of the one million Jews, or simply as a delaying tactic. Upon receipt of the American reply, Churchill enquired of his own staff about the nature of the negotiations proposed by the Americans. It was explained to the Prime Minister that:

it is quite usual to negotiate with the enemy through a protecting power, and this is done when, for example, we wish to arrange an exchange of prisoners of war. It has even been done in other instances with the object of getting Jews out of German hands.<sup>41</sup>

However, the staff brief concluded, the Foreign Office was not committed to any approach through a protecting power, and had been keeping the ball in play due mainly to the dangers of a point-blank refusal and, because of "*the continued clamour of Jews in London.*"<sup>42</sup>

It was on the basis of this brief that Churchill laid down his personal veto on any form of negotiation on behalf of Hungarian Jewry, on 11 July. It seems to this writer that there is a certain logical inconsistency (or failure to comprehend the enormous stakes involved, for the Jews) between the first and the second parts of Churchill's directive to Eden. At the date of writing, Churchill had been apprised in full concerning the deadly capacity of the Auschwitz death camp, and the number of victims it had already claimed. (See below.) Thus, in the first part of his much-quoted minute, Churchill referred to the final solution as follows:

There is no doubt that this is probably the greatest and most horrible crime ever committed in the whole history of the world, and it has been done by scientific machinery by nominally civilised men in the name of a great state and one of the leading races in Europe. It is quite clear that all concerned in this crime who may fall into our hands, including the people who only obeyed orders by carrying out the butcheries, should be put to death after their association with the murders has been proved.<sup>43</sup>

But Churchill was pre-occupied with a retribution to be exacted *after* the war, one that would be of little consolation to those 100,000's of Jews about to be drawn into the Nazis' deadly net, over whose release the projected negotiations were concerned. There was a literally-fatal gap between Churchill's horror at the nature of the crimes described to him, and his rigid adherence to the sacred principle of no negotiation with the enemy. And this, even after his own staff had explained to him that the very same principle had in fact been waived on several occasions, not only to secure the release of Allied prisoners of war, but "even" to secure the release of Jews! Even the Foreign Office saw some point in dragging out some form of negotiation, to gain a stay of execution, although there was certainly no intention of actually bringing such negotiations to any successful conclusion.

But Churchill himself, while expressing his abhorrence of the crime then in process, concluded that same minute:

I cannot therefore feel that this is the kind of ordinary case which is put through a protecting power, as, for instance, the lack of feeding or sanitary conditions in some particular prisoners' camp. There should therefore in my opinion be no negotiations of any kind on this subject. Declarations should be made in public, so that everyone connected with it will be hunted down and put to death.<sup>44</sup>

Upon receipt of Churchill's directive, Eden summoned a further meeting of the War Cabinet's Committee on Refugees. In the interim, Eden himself had received an additional piece of key information. British intelligence now reported that Brand's mission was merely a smoke-screen to cover the Gestapo's principal object, the initiation of separate peace talks with Britain and the United States.<sup>45</sup> Supplied with the new information, Eden convened his committee which, as might be expected, voted against all further consideration of the Brand scheme.<sup>46</sup>

Eden's report on the committee's decision back to Churchill relied heavily upon the new intelligence as the primary reason now for rejecting "the combined Brand-Gestapo approach". Once again, Eden felt constrained to explain to Churchill the need for caution in their reply to the Americans, due to the 'Jewish interest'. (This was a novel reversal of the roles usually played by the two men on the Palestine issue.) Eden warned of:

The differences of opinion we shall probably encounter in Washington, where electoral necessities and the War Refugee Board backed by Mr Morgenthau dictate a willingness to play with any scheme, however objectionable . . . which can be represented as rescuing European Jews.<sup>47</sup>

Churchill endorsed the line taken by Eden ('I entirely agree') and the draft drawn up by the Foreign Secretary for the Americans.

On the very day that the Foreign Office telegram was despatched to Washington, the story of the Brand mission was leaked to the press. The *New York Herald Tribune* condemned the scheme as a form of "low extortion"; on the next day the London *Times* ran a story under the headline—"Monstrous Offer", and stated that the Allies would not fall for the German ruse of provoking a rift between the West and the Soviets. The Zionists reconciled themselves to the fact that the Brand mission had been finally aborted.<sup>48</sup>

At this distance, any judgements passed on the Allied reactions to the Brand mission must perforce be partly moral, and partly hypothetical. It is impossible to assess with any certainty just how many Jews could have been saved. On 18 July, 1944, Admiral Horthy in fact called a halt to further deportations of Hungarian Jews, although Auschwitz itself continued to exact its toll of Jews from other countries. Undoubtedly, at the time of the long-awaited second front (the Normandy landings had begun in June, 1944), the Allies were justifiably concerned not to fall into



any German trap to split the Allies. But who can now say what the British attitude might have been had there not been the nagging problem of what to do with the rescued refugees, or what to tell the Arabs if large numbers made their way to Palestine? It would appear that even Churchill himself was concerned about the latter point. One tantalising piece of evidence, the diary of Henry Morgenthau Jr., indicates that Churchill too would not breach the Palestine White Paper immigration quotas for the sake of any Jewish refugees that might be rescued. During a visit to London by the Secretary of the Treasury, in August, 1944, he discussed the situation of Hungarian Jewry with Eden and Churchill. Churchill is recorded as having stated that he was against lifting the White Paper quota in order to get Hungarian Jews out, since he had promised the Arabs that while the war was on he would allow that quota to stand.<sup>49</sup>

When all considerations are taken into account, the gap between the alleged appreciation of 'the enormity of the crime', and the terrible, uncharacteristic paucity of Allied ingenuity, suggests that indeed, the murder of millions of Jews was a secondary consideration for Allied leaders, for Churchill as much as for anyone. The actual process of negotiation may have of itself saved lives, even had there been no positive outcome. Therefore, to quote Prof. Bauer, "The real conclusion is that Brand did not fail. It was the West that failed."<sup>50</sup>

## *II. The Project to Bomb Auschwitz*

The proposal to bomb the Auschwitz death camp, and the railway lines leading to it, was also the subject of intensive debate within the government, during July and August, 1944. Where the Brand proposal was rejected on grounds of high policy (though less worthy motives were also influential too), the Auschwitz project was turned down on alleged logistical grounds which in fact were disingenuous. Contrary to what the Jews were told at the time, the Allies *did* have the resources, the technical know-how and the logistical capacity to have carried out such an operation successfully.

On 6 July, 1944, Eden told Churchill of an appeal he had just received from Dr Weizmann, asking the British government "to do something to mitigate the appalling slaughter of Jews in Hungary". Weizmann reported that 60,000 Jews were being gassed and burned to death each day at Birkenau (the death camp at Auschwitz II; the figure apparently should have been 6000). Eden told Churchill that the figure of 60,000 might be an exaggeration, but on the next day, he himself gave the same figure, in a second report, describing the four crematoria at Birkenau. It was alleged that over the past year, some 1½ million Jews had been murdered in this single camp.<sup>51</sup>



The Auschwitz camp had been operating since 1942 but until 1944 it had been known only as a place where “terrible things happened to Polish non-Jews, above all, to ‘Aryan’ Poles seized for resistance activity inside Poland itself”. A few isolated reports on Auschwitz had been printed in the western press, but for various reasons had not made any impact. As noted by Martin Gilbert: “These ‘lost’ references to Auschwitz-Birkenau do add up to a definite and detailed picture, which, had it been taken in, might well have served as a basis for general knowledge and for requests for publicity, warnings, or action.”<sup>52</sup> Since April, 1944, detailed information was supplied by escapees, by the Swedish government and by the Czech government-in-exile.<sup>53</sup>

On 8 July, 1944, the day after Eden’s second report to Churchill, the *Times* published a full report on Auschwitz-Birkenau, based on information supplied by the Polish Ministry of Information. The article noted that on 15 May, 1944, 62 railway carriages filled with Jewish children aged two to eight years had been despatched to Auschwitz, and that every day since, six train-loads of Jews had “been put to death in the gas chambers of that dreaded concentration camp.”<sup>54</sup>

It can hardly be claimed that there was any dearth of information! On the day that he received Eden’s second report on Auschwitz, together with the Zionist appeal to bomb the camp, Churchill responded with characteristic, spontaneous humanity:

Is there any reason to raise these matters in the Cabinet? You and I are in entire agreement. Get anything out of the Air Force you can and invoke me if necessary. Certainly appeal to Stalin. On no account have the slightest negotiations, direct or indirect with the Huns. By all means bring it up if you wish to, but I do not think it necessary.<sup>55</sup>

It will be recalled that on 11 July, just four days after the exchange of these internal minutes, Churchill had vetoed the Brand mission, while avowing that the Nazi treatment of the Jews was “the greatest and most horrible single crime ever committed in the whole history of the world.”<sup>56</sup>

It would seem that it is upon the evidence of these two minutes alone that until now, the historians have exempted Churchill from the general execration heaped upon the British government for its failure to take any action against Auschwitz. It has been claimed that Churchill was the one man “who did understand the enormity of the crimes”,<sup>57</sup> and that it was the narrow-minded, bigoted officials who “got the better of Churchill on this particular issue”, and that Churchill, “with his broader imagination, was almost alone in his grasp of the magnitude of the disaster”, whereas in contrast, “the narrower horizons of the official mind rarely stretched to encompass the vastness of the horror which had overtaken the Jews of Europe.” On this occasion, an admittedly powerful, pugnacious Prime Minister was forced to tread warily, when faced with the

unanimous opinion of the Whitehall bureaucracy (“a dangerous animal when aroused”), which was determined to prevent a mass flight of Jews from Europe.<sup>58</sup>

It is not my purpose either to trace again the discussion of the project through the corridors of Whitehall, nor indeed to contest the verdict that the officials of the Foreign Office and the Air Ministry delayed and sabotaged the bombing project.<sup>59</sup> The point to be considered here is whether those officials or their ministers were in fact even questioned, cautioned or warned by Churchill, during the nearly two months for which the project was under consideration? If Churchill did indeed comprehend “the enormity of the crime”, then why, in plain language, did he not press his ministers and their officials to actually *do* something about it? In order to substantiate the claim that the bureaucrats were able “to thwart the will even of the most powerful Prime Minister in British history”, evidence must be brought to prove that that will was in fact exerted. But the reader of the accounts quoted here will search in vain for any hint that Churchill so much as even gave a second thought to the Auschwitz project, after his much-quoted directive to Eden, to ‘get what he could from the RAF’. We are informed that at the end of August, 1944, when the project was finally abandoned, Churchill was apparently abroad, and “does not appear to have been told of the decision.”<sup>60</sup>

Churchill’s government, at all levels, had learned only too well that the Prime Minister was not a man whose determination could be thwarted with impunity. Quite to the contrary, Churchill was a man with a penchant for delving into the most petty of administrative details, even at the height of the greatest crisis.<sup>61</sup> It would not have been at all difficult for Churchill to have uncovered the tactics being employed by the bureaucrats, nor the disingenuity of the excuse finally given the Zionists for abandoning the project. (The Americans in fact had abandoned the project on 4 July, three days before it was raised in London.<sup>62</sup>) Not only *was* Auschwitz within range of Allied bombers, but it was in fact situated within a key target area for Allied strategic bombing, in Upper Silesia. This area, with its synthetic oil and rubber complexes, became a top priority bombing target on the eve of the Normandy landings. American bombers regularly overflowed the Auschwitz camp during August and September, 1944; they in fact photographed it several times, and even dropped bombs on it, by mistake!<sup>63</sup>

It is also argued that Churchill was too pre-occupied with the larger issues of running the war, and thus the bureaucrats were able to take advantage. However, this argument is greatly weakened by the fact of Churchill’s very deep involvement in another episode, which at this very same time was unravelling in a theatre of the war quite removed from the French coasts.

On 1 August, 1944, the Polish Home Army rebelled against the Nazi

regime in Warsaw. The revolt began in the evident anticipation of an imminent Soviet conquest. The western alliance, and Churchill in particular, took an especial interest in the fortunes of the Polish Home Army, a non-Communist, pro-western force, whose success or demise would probably determine the political character of the post-war regime in Poland. Stalin too made the same calculation and, drawing the opposite conclusion to Churchill's, he halted the advance of the Red Army some ten miles short of Warsaw itself. Thus the Germans were permitted to decimate the poorly-supplied Poles.

The British government, and Churchill personally, made every possible effort to fly in aid to the Polish revolt. The RAF was ordered to drop supplies on Warsaw, notwithstanding warnings that losses would be prohibitive, and that the chances of the supplies reaching the Poles were minimal. Of the 181 bombers which flew to Warsaw between 8 August and 20 September, 1944, 31 failed to return. On one day alone, 18 September, 1,284 supply canisters were dropped in the Warsaw area; a mere 288 actually reached Polish hands, and the rest fell to the Germans.<sup>64</sup> Without Soviet support on the ground, the air missions were doomed, involving what many would regard as a pointless waste of valuable pilots' lives and war materiel for a cause that was already lost.

But this operation was one in which Churchill took a personal interest, down to the operational level. He followed the progress of the sorties via the Air Ministry, headed by his long-standing associate, Sir Archibald Sinclair.<sup>65</sup> He sent personal appeals to Stalin to allow Allied planes to make refuelling stops at Soviet air bases and tried to mobilise Roosevelt to exert pressure on the unwilling Soviet dictator.<sup>66</sup>

In the United States, on the eve of the presidential elections, the air missions served as demonstrations to the large electorate of Polish origins of the government's humanitarian concern for the tragic fate of a devastated ally. In England, especially at No. 10 Downing Street, there was a deep concern to work for a pro-western regime in Poland after the war. The missions to Warsaw may have served an important post-war political interest, but they did not serve any immediate military or strategic goal. As such, they were a departure from the principle, invoked inevitably in the case of any plans to rescue Jews, of not diverting military resources from the supreme cause of defeating the Germans.

By coincidence, the Auschwitz and the Warsaw projects not only occurred at the same time, but also involved approximately the same geographical area. At the very same time that British officials were explaining to the Zionists that Allied planes did not have the capacity to reach Auschwitz, their planes were in fact flying "just to the west of Cracow, virtually over Auschwitz itself", on their way to Warsaw. Churchill's biographer informs us that maps used by the pilots, showing the routes, are to be found in Churchill's private archives.<sup>67</sup>

In short, it is obvious that the Allies, whether the officials, or their political superiors, had their own set of priorities, and that the fate of the Jews was not high up on their list. To quote Martin Gilbert once more:

It was the agony of Warsaw, not the agony of the Jews that had come to dominate the telegraphic exchanges of the Allied leaders.<sup>68</sup>

The incredible efforts made to salvage the Polish revolt indicate the resources that might be tapped, if only there was a will, and a priority-clearance. But this was *not* the case either with the Brand proposals or the Auschwitz project.

In the light of all of the above, can it yet be maintained that Churchill was unique in his comprehension of the “historical significance of the Holocaust”? It may be stated immediately that it took a generation to pass after the war before it was possible to begin to understand this terrible historical event, with its repercussions not only for the Jewish people, but for the very essence of civilization itself. One might even venture to suggest that in fact Churchill himself later shrank from facing any deep examination of his own inaction during the war. The following passage, from a speech of Churchill’s before the House of Commons in August, 1946, might indicate, quite apart from the obvious distortion of history, a conscience that was unable to come to terms with Allied policy to the Jews during the war:

I must say that I had no idea, when the war came to an end, of the horrible massacres which had occurred; the millions and millions that have been slaughtered. That dawned on us gradually after the war was over.<sup>69</sup>

#### POSTSCRIPT

What conclusions were drawn by the Zionist leadership after the war? In contrast to latter-day historians, they did not exculpate Allied leaders, neither Churchill, nor Roosevelt.

After the war, the Zionist leaders expected Churchill to make good his promise to Weizmann (given at their last-ever meeting on 4 November, 1944) to make a ‘generous’ partition of Palestine once the war with Germany was concluded. The Zionists regarded the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine as the minimum whereby the Allies could offer some recompense and restitution for the price paid by the Jewish people during the war.

When Churchill procrastinated, and finally replied that nothing could be done for the Zionists until the peace conference, the leaders’ frustration and bitterness overflowed. Rabbi Fishman, of the religious

*Mizrahi* movement, thought the time had come to break their silence over British inaction:

... they should tell the Cabinet and particularly the Prime Minister that preaching to them was not enough; the P.M. had done nothing for them during his period of office ... No people had been fooled as the Jewish people had been fooled by the British government. He would have to say that in America.<sup>70</sup>

Rabbi Fishman was expressing a universal Jewish sentiment, but the other leaders opposed his tactics. They knew they could not permit themselves the luxury of alienating Churchill, who was expected by all to secure a second term as Prime Minister. In addition, there was the well-founded fear that if the leaders publicised their real feelings about the Churchill administration, widespread disorders would sweep Palestine.

Ben-Gurion regarded Churchill's reply as:

... the greatest blow they had received. People here and in America were living in a fool's paradise. In America their people thought that Dr Weizmann had an offer in his pocket of a Jewish state in a part of Palestine ... Mr Churchill had no bad intentions towards them; he still considered himself as a friend of Zionism. But what Mr Churchill believed and things as they existed were quite different ... For him the delay was an escape, a way out ... The Jewish people had been let down completely ... They were absolutely powerless and helpless, but it was most evil to deceive their people.<sup>71</sup>

Yet no Jewish leader felt more deceived and betrayed than did Dr Chaim Weizmann. For more than a generation, he had steered Zionism on a pro-British orientation, and since the late 1930's had placed his trust in Churchill personally. Weizmann agreed with Ben-Gurion that had Churchill wanted to settle matters, he could have done so. As it was, the Prime Minister's letter was "an insult to their intelligence".<sup>72</sup> In a further speech, in closed session, one week before the British general elections, Weizmann threw off the veneer of diplomatic finesse acquired during some 40 years of intercourse with the British establishment, and reverted to the style of the persecuted Diaspora Jew, the tribune of a vanquished, helpless people:

The P.M., General Smuts, the late President Roosevelt, had all let them down, maybe not intentionally, but inadvertently. They made promises which they did not carry out or mean to carry out. They were only a small people; he could not fight Churchill or Truman, but he could keep his conscience clear by telling them 'You have done what you have done, but you cannot expect me to swallow it'. He felt very bitter; he had reached the end of a long road. They had tried their best.

He had no confidence in the meeting of the Big Three. Nobody cared

what happened to the Jews. Nobody had raised a finger to stop them being slaughtered. They did not even bother about the remnant which had survived.<sup>73</sup>

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NOTES

1. Cf. R.F. Foster, *Lord Randolph Churchill* (Oxford, 1981), p. 395, and R. Davis, *The English Rothschilds* (Chapel Hill, 1983), p. 202.
2. Cf. Randolph S. Churchill, *Winston S. Churchill*, Vol. 1, *Youth: 1874-1900* (Boston, 1966), pp. 174, 206, 273-74, 330; also Michael J. Cohen, *Churchill and the Jews* (London, 1985).
3. Chaim Bermant, *The Cousinhood: The Anglo-Jewish Gentry* (London, 1971), p. 287.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 308.
5. *H.C. Deb.* 5th Series, Vol. LXIII, col 1151.
6. R. Henriques, *Marcus Samuel* (London, 1960), p. 581.
7. *H.C. Deb.* 5th Series, Vol. LXIII, cols 1153, 1229.
8. A detailed study of the episode will be found in M. Jack, "The Purchase of the British Government's Shares in the British Petroleum Company, 1912-1914," *Past and Present*, No. 39 (April, 1968), pp. 139-168.
9. Randolph S. Churchill, *Winston S. Churchill: The Young Statesman, 1901-1914* (Boston, 1967), p. 80.
10. B. Gainer, *The Alien Invasion: The Origins of the Aliens Act of 1905* (London, 1972), p. 146.
11. A. Garrard, *The English and Immigration, 1880-1910* (Oxford, 1971), p. 143.
12. Cf. also Cohen, *Churchill and . . .*, pp. 17-25, 35-40.
13. C.E. Attlee, "An Observer Appreciation," in P. Stansky (ed.), *Churchill: A Profile* (London, 1973), p. 196.
14. M. Sompolinski, *The Anglo-Jewish Leadership, the British Government and the Holocaust*, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Bar-Ilan University, 1977, p. 230 (in Hebrew).
15. *Ibid.*
16. Foreign Office-Washington Embassy, 27 February, 1943, FO 371/36676, W3019.
17. Bernard Wasserstein, *Britain and the Jews of Europe, 1939-1945* (Oxford, 1978), pp. 39, 45.
18. R. Law-Major T.L. Dugdale (Chairman of Conservative Party), 7 December, 1942, FO 371/32682, W16534.
19. Minute of 22 December, 1942, FO 371/32682, W 17521.
20. Quoted in Wasserstein, *Britain and . . .*, pp. 353-54.
21. Quoted in review of Wasserstein, by J.P. Fox, in *European Studies Review*, Vol. 10/1 (1980). At the time of writing, Fox was employed by the Foreign Office.
22. *H.C. Deb.* 5th Series, Vol. 426, col 1252, 1 August, 1946.
23. Yehuda Bauer, *A History of the Holocaust* (New York, 1982), p. 341.

24. Rothschild-Col. Harvie Watt, 16 December, 1942, Prem 4/51/8, and Martin (Churchill's secretary)-V.G. Lawford, 18 December, 1942, FO 371/32682, W17520.
25. Martin Gilbert, *Auschwitz and the Allies* (New York, 1981), p. 100.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 106-107. It should be noted that reprisal bombings were considered at the request of the Polish government, on behalf of the Poles—the Jewish cause was tagged on by Churchill.
27. Wasserstein, *Britain and . . .*, pp. 306-307.
28. *Ibid.*, pp. 304-305.
29. Lady Reading-Churchill, 16 January, 1943, Prem 4/51/8. My emphasis.
30. Churchill-Lady Reading, 21 February, 1943, *Ibid.*
31. Quoted in J. Goodman, *The Mond Legacy* (London, 1982), p. 192.
32. Z4/14870, Central Zionist Archives (hereafter CZA), quoted in Gilbert, *Auschwitz and the Allies*, p. 279.
33. Meeting of Cabinet Committee on Refugees, 31 May, 1944, CAB 95/15/32, and Cabinet meeting on 1 June, 1944, in Gilbert, *Auschwitz and . . .*, p. 218.
34. Minute by Charles Baxter, head of Eastern Department, 17 February, 1944, FO 371/42723, WR2188.
35. J.R. (44) 19, 12 July, 1944, FO 371/42810, WR323.
36. Foreign Office tels. 5958, 5959, 1 July, 1944, Prem 4/51/10.
37. Churchill minute, 2 July, 1944, FO 371/42759, W10025.
38. Eden-Churchill, 6 July, and Churchill minute, 8 July, 1944, Prem 4/51/10.
39. Halifax-Foreign Office, 9 July, 1944, FO 371/42808, WR149.
40. B. Wasserstein, *Britain and . . .*, p. 256.
41. Minute of 10 July, 1944, Prem 4/51/10.
42. *Ibid.* My emphasis.
43. Churchill-Eden, 11 July, 1944, FO 371/42809, WR274; copy in Prem 4/51/10, reprinted in Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War: Vol. VI, Triumph and Tragedy* (London, 1954), p. 597.
44. *Ibid.*
45. Cf. Yehuda Bauer, *The Holocaust in Historical Perspective* (Seattle, 1978), p. 81.
46. Minutes of Committee meeting on 13 July, 1944, FO/371 42810, WR 323.
47. Eden-Churchill, 16 July, 1944, FO/371 42809, WR 274. Copy in Prem 4/51/10.
48. *New York Herald Tribune*, 18 July, and *Times*, 19 July, 1944, quoted in Y. Bauer, *The Holocaust in . . .*, pp. 149-50.
49. Morgenthau memo on trip to London, August, 1944, *The Morgenthau Diaries*, Book. no. 762, p. 205, the Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park.
50. Y. Bauer, *The Holocaust in . . .*, pp. 154-155.
51. Eden-Churchill, 6 and 7 July, 1944, Prem 4/51/10.
52. M. Gilbert, *Auschwitz and . . .*, p. 340.
53. Bauer, *The Holocaust in . . .*, p. 138.
54. *The Times*, 8 July, 1944, p. 3.
55. Churchill-Eden, 7 July, 1944, Prem 4/51/10, and FO 371/42809, WR 276.
56. Cf. above, p. 15. Two days later, Churchill coined the same phrase, in a private letter to Lord Melchett; Cf. Z4/14.69611. CZA.
57. M. Gilbert, *Auschwitz and . . .*, p. 341.
58. B. Wasserstein, *Britain and . . .*, pp. 350, 38-39.

59. Ibid, pp. 307-321, M. Gilbert, *Auschwitz and . . .*, cap. 31, and M. Cohen, *Churchill and . . .*

60. B. Wasserstein, *Britain and . . .*, p. 316.

61. Cf. Arthur Bryant, *Triumph in the West, Vol. 1, Turn of the Tide, 1939-1943*, based on the diaries of Field-Marshal Viscount Alanbrooke (London, 1957), pp. 300-301. Alanbrooke was the Chief of the Imperial General Staff for most of the war.

62. Y. Bauer, *History of . . .*, p. 321.

63. Cf. David Wyman, "Why Auschwitz Was Never Bombed," *Commentary*, Vol. 65, no. 5 (May, 1978), pp.

64. Details in *ibid*, pp. 44-46.

65. Sinclair had been Churchill's aide de camp, when he served on the western front from 1916-1917, and served as Churchill's private secretary from 1918-1922.

66. Cf. correspondence in FO 800/412.

67. M. Gilbert, *Auschwitz and . . .*, p. 322. The maps are on p. 323.

68. *Ibid*, p. 322.

69. Speech of 1 August 1946, *H.C. Deb.* 5th Series, Vol. 426, col. 1258.

70. Discussion of Zionist Political Committee, London, 23 May, 1945, ZA/302/29, CZA.

71. Discussion of Zionist Political Committee, London, 13 June, 1945, *ibid*.

72. Weizmann speech on 14 June, 1945, *ibid*.

73. Weizmann speech on 27 June, 1945, *ibid*.