> The great lesson of history is, that all the fine arts hitherto—having been supported by the selfish power of the noblesse, and never having extended their range to the comfort or the relief of the mass of the people—the arts, I say, thus practised, and thus matured, have only accelerated the ruin of the States they adorned; and at the moment when, in any kingdom, you point to the triumphs of its greatest artists, you point also to the determined hour of the kingdom's decline.[618] [**John Ruskin**]

CHAPTER 6

LAISSEZ-FAIRE...
BURNED BY NATIONALIST FIRES AND THE PUSH FOR REFORMS

As the nineteenth century entered its last decades, the differences between societies around the globe became more rather than less distinct. The rapid expansion of heavy industry and concentrated urban living distanced certain Eurasian societies from their neighbors; and, the destiny of people living in eastern and southeastern Eurasia (as well as in Africa and the Far East) became immersed in the struggle for hegemony between Germany, France, Britain and Russia. In the Far East, Japan ascended from disunity and agrarian feudalism to assume a place of tenuous equality among the world's imperial States. The empire of Britain, long the dominant global power, was from this point on subjected to uprisings from indigenous populations and internal political

strife, as well as challenges from Germany, Russia, France, Japan and the United States. The one great common denominator linking the paths taken by these very different societies was the ascendancy of industrial-landlordism in service to the interests of neo-democrat, monarchist, state-socialist and dictator alike. At the same time, the battle cry of class oppression sounded by socialists of all stripes was met by a new and equally vigorous wave of ethnic nationalism. The people of the earth were set on a course that would bring widespread turmoil and destruction as groups competed for geo-political power. One can speculate with very little risk that had the majority of those who held power understood this and possessed a clear vision of the future, the outcome would most likely have gone unchanged. There was nothing vaguely close to a new *Age of Reason* on the horizon. Even Henry George, who spent all of his energy attempting to stimulate structural change and in the process alter the course of events, sounded rather fatalistic when he wrote in 1883:

> A civilization which tends to concentrate wealth and power in the hands of a fortunate few, and to make of others mere human machines, must inevitably evolve anarchy and bring destruction....
>
> The evils that begin to appear spring from the fact that the application of intelligence to social affairs has not kept pace with the application of intelligence to individual needs and material ends. Natural science strides forward, but political science lags....
>
> The progress of civilization requires that more and more intelligence be devoted to social affairs, and this not the intelligence of the few, but that of the many. We cannot safely leave politics to politicians, or political economy to college professors. The people themselves must think, because the people alone can act.[619]

To a large extent, the people would act, but act without very deep thought of where their actions would take them. One explanation for this is offered by Eric Hoffer, who observed in one of his books that "*men who rush into undertakings of vast change usually feel they are in*

possession of some irresistible power."[620] What many of the more thoughtful persons who actually lived through this period felt and observed was of a world in which the capacity to destroy far exceeded other kinds of understanding. Many societies were reaching points of critical mass, their traditions and institutions under tremendous pressure from within and without. Nationalism increasingly functioned as another religion, only weakly challenged by transnationals, most of whom adopted socialism or progressivism as an alternative faith. Unfortunately, almost everywhere one turned irresistible forces seemed to be pulling societies toward state-socialism or totalitarianism rather than toward socio-political arrangements based on the principles of cooperative individualism.

Although Henry George's campaign resurrected the call for a system of law grounded in moral principles, the momentum created by George and his small army of dedicated supporters soon dissipated as the twentieth century moved forward. The machinery of the State was rapidly expanding everywhere, emboldened by organizational and technological advances and feeding off of the parallel growth of landlordism in all its forms.

From the wilderness, the faint voices of the world's few transnationals attempted to counter these developments. They were as yet weakly organized and divided over principles as well as strategy. The promise of peaceful, incremental and democratically enforced change was, in the end, overcome by the all-out competition for global hegemony. Then, finally, in 1914, the chess game turned incredibly violent, thrusting the ancient and emerging Eurasian empires into a war of conquest, enslavement and annihilation. Albert Einstein, who would enchant the next generation with his soft-spoken intellect and concern for humanity, expressed his deep feelings of doom to fellow physicist Paul Ehrenfest:

Europe, in her insanity, has started something unbelievable. In such times one realizes to what a sad species of animal one belongs. I quietly pursue my peaceful studies and contemplations and feel only pity and disgust.[621]

Later in the year, after the extent of the carnage to come became even clearer, Einstein added that he "*wish[ed] that somewhere there existed an island for those who are wise and of good will!*"[622] In this war, there would be nowhere to run, no means to escape involvement. Einstein surely understood that so long as the resort to force was accepted as the means for resolving differences between societies, isolation could never be a permanent escape from tyranny. Only profound changes in attitude and in socio-political arrangements and institutions held out the promise for a peaceful ascent of human civilization.

Many thoughtful persons pinned their hopes for the future on the education of the masses. Public education, often confused as an end rather than a means, became a societal objective advanced by humanitarians as well as despots. With the arrival of sophisticated systems of industrial production and management, more workers needed to be trained to perform at high levels or to function as efficient cogs in the machinery of the State. On the one hand, the imperialist State required a large number of subjects who understood the material sciences and related technologies, while at the same time were willing to trust in an elite group to do their political thinking for them. There were bound to be very able and determined dissidents in every society, taking on leadership roles among those most directly oppressed and victimized by the status quo.

How confident Henry George had become after the positive reception of ***Progress and Poverty***. Yet, even he proved unable to convert popular support into a catalyst for permanent structural change within the few decades allowed to him. Outside of the English-speaking world, the work of cooperative individualists was made impossible by struggles for ethnic sovereignty or national unity. The socio-political philosophies of

state-socialism and the more extreme totalitarianism were effectively employed by individuals competing for control of the machinery of the State all across continental Eurasia. Opposition to the status quo within Germany, France, Italy, Austria-Hungary and Russia was carried forward not by reformers seeking to secure true liberty and equality of opportunity, nor even individuals who believed in the virtues of participatory governance, but by opportunists who positioned themselves in the vanguard of dissent.

In Germany, the emergence of ethnic nationalism and devotion to the State overwhelmed class divisions, so that even the socialists came under the spell once workers achieved a degree of economic stability and well-being. Germany's leaders were focused on the task of turning an entire nation into true believers. Despite efforts by Engels to infuse the German socialist movement with Marxist ideology, only a small group of German socialists led by Karl Kautsky built their party, Sozialistische Partei Deutschlands (SPD), around what could be called Marxist principles. Other socialists considered Marx as one of many founding fathers of their movement and only loosely accepted any ideology as a guiding force. Only by adaptation could German socialists hope to increase their political base in a society where parliamentary institutions dutifully served the State. Faced with such circumstances, Kautsky's chief German rival, Eduard Bernstein, left Germany for Switzerland and then moved on to Britain. There, he worked closely with Engels, while developing his own ideas of how socialist programs ought to be advanced and implemented. As he looked at the progress of industrial landlordism, Bernstein questioned Marx's primary assumptions about the inevitable collapse of the system. "*Social conditions have not developed to such an acute opposition of things and classes as is depicted in the [Communist] Manifesto*,"[623] Bernstein concluded. This suggested the need for a change in strategy if socialists were to gain political power in the near term and affect change:

It is not only useless, it is the greatest folly to attempt to conceal this from ourselves. The number of members of the possessing classes is to-day not smaller but larger. The enormous increase of social wealth is not accompanied by a decreasing number of large capitalists but by an increasing number of capitalists of all degrees. The middle classes change their character but they do not disappear from the social scale.[624]

As one looked around the continent of Europe, the question was whether Germany was unique or simply further along on the road to extremism. Across the channel waters, entering the twentieth century and struggling with its own history and entrenched socio-political arrangements, were the people of Britain.

LIBERALISM: THE BRITISH COMMITMENT TO FORM

Eduard Bernstein was obviously affected in his thinking by the conditions he observed in Britain. He had taken refuge in one of the few European societies where a century of resistance to private and governmental monopolies had achieved concrete, if as yet incomplete and insecure, results. At the same time as the power of the agrarian landlords waned and that of the industrial landlords ascended, the words of Thomas Paine and Richard Cobden could still be heard repeated in the House of Commons. Free traders could still look to the leadership of John Bright in their struggle against the forces of protectionism. Equally important was the fact that a significant number of prominent government leaders were reconciled to the need for incremental reform. Disraeli's government had orchestrated an extension of the suffrage under the Reform Act of 1867 and set the stage for further actions by Gladstone. Despite fears among such defenders of the status quo as Walter Bagehot that any extension of participatory governance would result in anarchy and turmoil, the system of privilege that had for so

long dominated was not immediately or even materially overturned. On the other hand, steps were taken to remove some of the most offensive and outwardly visible inequities in the British constitution of government. For example, when William Gladstone succeeded Disraeli in 1868, he introduced reforms that gave the peasant farmers of Ireland a degree of protection against the absentee landlords. Under his leadership the rights of workers to organize into trades unions were also confirmed as constitutional. Additional social legislation restricted child labor and provided public funds for education. These were measures that gained support during the period of Britain's economic dominance in global markets. As one would expect, the struggle intensified when Britain's systemic weaknesses were exposed to widespread foreign competition and the flow of revenue tightened.

From the 1870s on, British industrialists began to lose their edge in manufacturing technology and production output to producers in other countries, particularly in the United States and Germany. Factories throughout Britain were forced to operate well below capacity, millions of workers lost employment and bankruptcies became a common occurrence. Municipal governments became increasingly hard-pressed to meet the demands of those in need. Circumstances for rural agricultural workers were even worse. Although land prices fell as tenant farmers could no longer pay high rents while marketing their products at prices competitive with imported goods, the monopolistic nature of Britain's system of land tenure and taxation discouraged producers from introducing new methods and technologies. Moreover, wealthy individuals were more likely to invest their financial reserves in North American or Australian land speculations than in British agribusiness or industry. Although free trade significantly lowered the cost of food and some basic goods to the working poor, land monopoly continued to divert wealth to the *agrarian, urban and industrial landlords*. As always, these profits bore no relation to actual labor expended or investment in capital goods. High land costs increased the cost of

production for domestically-produced goods and services in Britain to the breaking point. Profits for everyone except the landed disappeared, and in the face of deep recession, agitation for reform intensified. That dramatic change was on the horizon seemed apparent to the thoughtful (and the fearful); unanswered at this point was what direction the agitation for change would take. Would the parliamentary system accommodate sufficient expansion of participation in government and a more equitable distribution of wealth, or would the unemployed and working poor unite behind leaders whose intent was to forcibly capture the State and nationalize all property? "*A sense of imminent change was in the air—the beginning of the effective Socialist movement in England,*[625]" the eminent British historian John R. Green would later write.

To be sure, the privileged resisted equalitarian as well as humanitarian reforms with all their power. Even many within the ranks of the reformers themselves were more concerned with moral salvation of the individual—through education, temperance and religious revival—than in bringing an end to socio-political arrangements based on privilege. As a group, the reformers were prolific writers and pamphleteers. They applied relentless pressure on Members of Parliament and on a succession of Prime Ministers. Some within the government, such as Joseph Chamberlain, understood that the inequities of the present system had to be brought to an end—either that or truly radical and much less democratic government would be the outcome. Into this atmosphere of political activism and reaction were born a generation of individuals whose words and deeds would dominate events during the decades of the 1880s and 1890s. One of the new generation of reformers, Bertrand Russell (born in 1872), writes of his adolescence:

> ...I was much concerned with politics and economics. I read Mill's ***Political Economy***, which I was inclined to accept completely; also Herbert Spencer, who

seemed to me too doctrinaire in ***The Man Versus the State***, although I was in broad agreement with his bias.

My Aunt Agatha introduced me to the books of Henry George, which she greatly admired. I became convinced that land nationalization would secure all the benefits that Socialists hoped to obtain from Socialism, and continued to hold this view until the war of 1914-1918.[626]

Through this same aunt, Russell had been introduced to the two leaders of Irish nationalism, Michael Davitt and Charles Parnell. Later, at Cambridge, he became close friends with Crompton Davies, who he described as holding to quite individualistic values and whose "*chief enthusiasm was for the taxation of land values.*"[627] By the turn of the century, Davies became one of the leading figures in the Liberal party and was instrumental in assisting Lloyd George to formulate the 1909 budget that sought to implement a tax on land values as a key fiscal reform. "*I do not think he ever asked himself how the State could fail to become immensely powerful if it enjoyed all the revenue to be derived from landownership,*"[628] Russell later reflected, suggesting his own fears of an omnipotent State and a sense that reformers were waging an uphill battle against entrenched power and privilege. As a young man, Russell also became associated with a small and close-knit group of Cambridge intellectuals whose eventual influence in directing British affairs would become quite considerable. Another member of this group, for example, was Alfred North Whitehead, destined to become one of the twentieth century's great mathematicians.

While Russell was still completing his undergraduate work at Cambridge, a collection of reformers loyal to a philosopher and classical scholar named Thomas Davidson in 1883 founded a group dedicated to societal change through educational reform. From this "Fellowship of the New Life" there soon split off a small number of individuals holding varied socialist views. This new group became the Fabian Society and was initially directed by Edward R. Pease and

Hubert Bland. Of the two, Bland was the more radical, pressing for creation of a distinct Socialist Party in Britain. Other early members included George Bernard Shaw, Sidney Webb, Graham Wallas,[629] and Annie Besant. William Clarke, a Cambridge graduate, also found his way into the Fabian camp. These individuals were not, as Engels acknowledged, disciples of Marx. They were nonetheless inextricably linked by sentiment and practical concerns with the Social Democratic Federation and its Marxist objectives. Winston Churchill would later emphasize the evolutionary nature of Fabian objectives and their demonstrated respect for democratic processes, writing that both Sidney Webb and George Bernard Shaw were inclined to work within the existing system and were adverse to forming an independent socialist party.[630]

Proselytizing socialism to the reading public had been tried by H.M. Hyndman, but with little success. Hyndman was indeed a true believer, convinced that the socialist revolution was just over the horizon and waiting for the right circumstances to spark its beginning. He had some reason for optimism that his hopes would come true. This was a time of both political and philosophical turmoil, particularly in Britain where so many exiled European radicals could be found. Yet the enterprise was anything but organized or systematic. The SDF in Britain was plagued by the presence of totalitarian-anarchist and state-socialist extremists. The Fabians were convinced that Britain's workers could not be organized into an effective revolutionary force and resigned themselves to the achievement of reform by means of the legislative process. They were under no illusions about the time and energy that would be demanded of them. They attacked Hyndman and other Marxists, then broke with the Socialist League as well (which was itself taken over by the anarchist wing of the socialist movement). Once established on their own, the Fabians worked to build a political coalition with Radicals within the Liberal party. Expansion of democracy, nationalization of transportation and the mining industry, as well as redistribution

of wealth and income by means of progressive taxation became immediate objectives. Beneath these seemingly practical proposals lurked something far more dangerous and harmful to the long-term prospects for securing and protecting individual liberty. As Bertrand Russell eventually concluded, "*the essence of Fabianism*" *came down to "the worship of the State.*"[631]

This new religion, lacking a truly moral framework, nonetheless left its mark on many reformers, causing them to lose perspective and to ignore the terrible history of the State as an instrument of tyranny and despotism. "*It led both the Webbs and also Shaw into what I thought an undue tolerance of Mussolini and Hitler,*" writes Russell, "*and ultimately into a rather absurd adulation of the Soviet Government.*"[632] Even Russell was not able to see fully the inevitable consequences of transferring privilege from individuals to the State, even if such a transfer was to be accomplished peacefully and by democratic process. Fortunately or unfortunately for the British people, the unfolding of events brought about an accommodation between conservative, radical, liberal and reactionary factions. Britain's socio-political institutions and arrangements would at times move two steps forward, then one step backward; and, at other times, two steps backward, then one step forward.

GERMANY, THE FIRST PLANNED MILITARISTIC INDUSTRIALIZED STATE

Within only a very few societies would the true strength of deeply-rooted individualistic values and democratic institutions prevail against the various forms of totalitarian-directed ethnic nationalism beginning to take hold. Within Germany, the process of moral decay was well under way before the nineteenth century came to a close. A united German state, forged by Bismarck and with leaders anxious to realize their anticipated destiny by expanding eastward, suddenly emerged as

the dominant power on the Eurasian continent. Eastern France had been overrun by German armies in 1870, after which the French no longer served as a check on German expansion. The new German Reich was now ruled by a Kaiser, Wilhelm I, and Germany's militaristic future seemed safely in the hands of a new coalition forged by militarists in league with the nation's agrarian and industrial landlords. Within only twenty years, however, this first generation of nationalist unity developed deep cracks over the government's fiscal, trade and tax policies. In 1888, Wilhelm II succeeded to the throne and, after a prolonged struggle, obtained Bismarck's resignation as imperial chancellor. Despite Germany's continued reliance on the force of arms and its outward display of power, the German state was in a very real sense set adrift.

In the place of Bismarck, Wilhelm II first appointed a moderate aristocrat, Leo von Caprivi, to head the government. Fearful of Prussian militarism, Caprivi introduced reforms designed to expand democracy within Germany, reduce Prussian dominance and check the power of the military. In retaliation, the German agrarian and industrial landlords united with the militarists against Caprivi, who was removed after only four years in office. Absent a tradition of participatory government, privileged Germans were not able to tolerate government whose actions were restricted by moral principles or ethics put into the concrete form of law. W.W. Simon explains that "*Germany in the time of [Wilhelm] II found itself still midway between western constitutionalism and eastern absolutism.*"[633] German philosophers unimpressed by the historical determinism offered by Hegel provided their own doctrine of legal positivism that sanctioned positive law solely on the basis of utility to the interests and survival of the State. Nationalistic fervor penetrated even to the elementary schools, where textbooks were subjectively rewritten to emphasize German (i.e., Prussian) achievements. Anti-Semitism, anti-liberalism and anti-socialism united the German nationalists in their quest for purity and hegemony. A creed of self-sacrifice and dedication to the State developed that distinguished the

Germans from their western neighbors, particularly the British. The German entrance into the global industrial competition advanced with the same intensity, accelerated by the establishment of a university-trained cadre of managers and technologists. The workers, to whom the communists of Marx's generation had looked to spark the socialist revolution, were largely quieted by the combined effects of prosperity, social welfare legislation and nationalism. One consequence was that by the time of the SPD congress of 1891, the influence of Eduard Bernstein and other proponents of evolutionary socialism, or what became known as Revisionism, ascended within the ranks of the German socialists. A radical element remained under the leadership of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebnecht but they were clearly at the fringe and without broad support. Almost alone, Karl Kautsky remained convinced that industrial-landlordism would soon collapse under the weight of its own destructive characteristics and urged that socialists make ready to take power when the time came.

As the militarized German state developed its capacity for the coming geo-political conflict, the socialists and other reformers were of only minor concern to those who held power. The Prussian aristocrats, whose interests rested on preservation of hereditary privilege and monopolistic control over land, now took the offensive against Caprivi's successor, the aged liberal Hohenlobe. Hohenlobe had planned to remove many of these Prussian aristocrats from the government; however, support from Wilhelm II for such a radical purge never materialized. In 1897, a disheartened and nearly broken Hohenlobe resigned. Conservatives now consolidated their control over the Reichstag, taking the country down an increasingly protectionist path. In the short run, both industry and agriculture seemed to benefit. Hohenlobe was succeeded in 1900 by Bernhard von Bulow, the German foreign secretary, an imperialist but one who sought to forge a balance of power between the agrarian and industrial landlords in a manner most beneficial to the German state. At the same time, Bulow

was pressured by a strong and consumer-oriented majority within the Social Democratic Party to water down the protectionist measures presented by Conservatives in the Reichstag.

At the very bottom of socio-political influence stood the tenant farmers and small titleholders, whose rents or taxes and the prices paid for capital and consumer goods kept them at or very near a subsistence level existence. The accumulated effects of this uniquely German socio-political structure proved an impossible barrier to the incremental movement toward greater democracy and equality of opportunity; policies consistent with the principles of cooperative individualism had almost no chance for consideration. The interests of the State, as revealed in the following commentary by Alexander Gerschenkron, were not to be denied simply because of conflict with ethics or moral principles:

> It was the transition from depression to recovery which was bound to place great strain on the bloc and threaten its disruption. But once industrial prosperity was well on the way, industrial circles were not disinclined to support the demands of agrarian protectionists and to bear part of the cost of additional protection. For, apart from the idea that this protection was a necessary prerequisite to the political might of Germany, the maintenance of close ties between industry and agriculture was instrumental in achieving the political isolation of labor.[634]

Tariffs imposed on foreign goods helped to balance the budget of the German government, but retaliation by Germany's trading partners eventually generated rising unemployment. As a consequence, writes Gerschenkron, "*[t]he last prewar years were marked by popular movements against the rising cost of living. Disorders and street demonstrations were taking place in the cities.*"[635] Amidst growing turmoil, Bulow survived as Chancellor until 1909, when Wilhelm II replaced him with a far more pro-Prussian figure, Theobald Bethmann-Hollweg. Remarkably, even the SPD was by now strongly nationalist, its positions governed by

a Revisionist view that merged the interests of the workers with those of the State. Ethnic nationalism was secure as the basis for Germany's relations with its neighboring Eurasian societies.

STRUGGLES AT THE PERIPHERY

Elsewhere on the Eurasian continent, agrarian-dominated hierarchies lingered on in Spain, Italy, and Austria-Hungary, while the defeated French, after yet another civil war, formed yet another Republic. Despite losing Alsace-Lorraine, the new border with Germany established in 1871 left the French in control of very sizable deposits of iron ore which later became the basis for rapid expansion of French industry. Equally important, France was essentially self-sufficient in the production of agricultural goods. To the east, the Turks were forced out of the Balkans and relinquished control over the northern Black Sea territories to Russia. To no avail, Bismarck had opposed this type of colonial expansionism by Germany, with a warning that "*for Germany to acquire colonies would be like a poverty-stricken Polish nobleman providing himself with silks and sables when he needed shirts.*"[636] What Bismarck understood all too well was that while colonies bring riches to a few, their maintenance requires heavy taxation of the majority of citizens and obliges governments to establish a far-flung chain of relatively weak military positions that bleed the homeland of scarce financial reserves.

Despite all logic, ignoring the dictates of all reason, the competition for global hegemony accelerated. By the late nineteenth century, only Liberia and Ethiopia on the African continent escaped European domination or *protection*. And, with the notable exceptions of China and Japan, Asia was similarly carved into Eurasian spheres of influence.

After a brief war in 1898, Spain was forced to abandon its colonial holdings in Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Philippines to the United States. This settlement facilitated U.S. annexation of the Hawaiian Islands but

also initiated competition with Japan in the Pacific. The Japanese had themselves faced the probability of domination by the United States, Russia or any one of several European powers; yet within the span of a few decades a determined leadership pulled the Japanese people out of agrarian feudalism and united them under a highly centralized regime determined to forge its own imperial presence in Asia. G.B. Sansom puts into perspective just how extraordinary was the ascendancy of the Japanese state, observing that "*[t]hey had succeeded in carrying through a political and social program of a revolutionary nature with surprisingly little violence and...with surprisingly little delay.*"[637] By the end of the nineteenth century, the Japanese were prepared to defend their islands. They were not yet enough of an industrial power to enter the core, but they were more than ready to exert themselves whenever and wherever a window of opportunity presented itself.

Although the Japanese were highly ethnocentric and believed in the superiority of their culture, they also demonstrated a profoundly pragmatic view of their circumstance. Traditionally a militaristic society, they immediately understood the need to modernize and industrialize. Many Japanese intellectuals began to send their sons to the West to learn everything they could that would be of value to Japan's nationalistic interests. These young men not only learned mathematics and engineering, they also absorbed the individualistic socio-political ideas of Herbert Spencer[638] and translated the works of John Stuart Mill and other western writers. They were also responsible for replicating western systems of finance, industry and governmental departments. When they returned, they saw to it that industrial cartels were not merely encouraged but heavily subsidized in order to build a modern, industrial base in the shortest time possible. The British were called on and willingly provided their expertise in the construction of a modern navy. With this preparation behind them by the mid-1890s, Japanese nationalists were ready to embark on their first expansionist campaign. Their armies were dispatched to Korea, ostensibly to assist the Koreans in

gaining independence from the Chinese. Victory there added Formosa (Taiwan) and several others islands to Japanese-controlled territory.

Fear of emerging Japanese power then pushed the Koreans and Chinese into a Russian dependency. One immediate result was the construction of a Russian railroad across northern Manchuria to the port city of Vladivostok, greatly facilitating the expansion of the Russian presence in the Pacific. The Japanese, in response, entered into a protective alliance with Britain that placed Korea in the Japanese sphere of influence. After months of fruitless negotiations during 1904 to secure Russian acquiescence to this arrangement, the Japanese attacked and captured Port Arthur (Russia's naval base on the Liaotung Peninsula of northeastern China) and destroyed the Russian Baltic fleet sent to the region's defense. This brief war rewarded the Japanese with an unchallenged hand in Korea. The Russians also ceded the southern half of Sakhalin Island.

The European world was generally surprised by the Japanese demonstration of power. For Asians and other indigenous people long dominated by European colonialism, the Japanese success sent a more direct message. "*For the first time since the days of the conquistadors,*" writes historian L.S. Stavrianos, "*the white man had been beaten, and a thrill of hope ran through the nonwhite races of the globe.*"[639] From this time on, foreigners practicing colonialism or imperialism were to face an endless series of indigenous challenges to their presence, each one bringing their rule closer to eventual collapse and draining their treasuries of desperately needed revenue. Strangely enough, Japanese imperialists were blind to these considerations as they developed their own version of manifest destiny while seeking to gain control of essential raw materials for their expanding industrial machine.

Fuel was added to the fire of Japanese territorial ambitions when Britain subsequently withdrew its fleet from the Far East to a new base at Singapore. The British, experiencing the financial stresses of supporting a vast network of colonial outposts, were forced to make hard deci-

sions and to hope the Japanese would stand ready to protect British interests against Russian incursions. The empire of Britain was, in fact, expanding and contracting simultaneously. There was South Africa, for example, where British domination had been briefly challenged in 1899 by the Boers. More than 400,000 empire troops had been required to defeat a militia of fewer than 90,000 Boers. To the north, the British established a combined commercial and military presence in Egypt, the Sudan, Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda. Where settlers of British heritage were most numerous, however, the direction was one of self-determination. The Canadians had achieved virtual independence with passage in 1867 of the British North America Act and creation of the Dominion of Canada. New Zealanders followed in 1876. The Australians took somewhat longer; however, in 1901 the Commonwealth of Australia brought some four million people together under a loose federation. Britain was returning to its roots as an island nation, its leaders now forced to face up to the serious financial and other practical problems associated with global political commitments.

THE UNITED STATES STRIKES AT THE CORE AND EXPERIMENTS WITH SOCIAL ENGINEERING

The British, German, French, Russian and Japanese imperialists could no longer ignore the potential military threat of a fully industrialized United States. Cuba had served to test the will of *Americans* to pursue an expanded manifest destiny and apply the Monroe Doctrine against Old World power. Grover Cleveland had taken the first step, pressuring Britain to relinquish its claims in Venezuela. Woodrow Wilson, awaiting his turn at the Presidency, noted admiringly in 1901 that, "*[Cleveland's] assertion of the Monroe Doctrine in a new aspect, with a new dignity, even with a new rigor, caught the almost passionate enthusiasm of the country, and made war unnecessary.*"[640] What Cleveland had asked for from the

British—agreement to present specific territorial matters before an independent tribunal—the United States Senate subsequently rejected. The same execution of foreign policy linked to the use of military power helped to orchestrate an uprising of Panamanians against Columbian rule, the success of which yielded to the United States control over the Panama Canal. Theodore Roosevelt displayed absolutely no qualms about the appropriateness of intervening in order to secure the Canal, after which he sent U.S. troops into Santo Domingo, Nicaragua and Haiti. Then, as a demonstration to Europe and Japan of *American* power, he sent the U.S. fleet around the world. In his 1910 campaign for re-election to the Presidency, he declared:

> A nation such as ours cannot possibly play a great part in international affairs, cannot expect to be treated as a weight in either the Atlantic or the Pacific, or to have its voice as to the Monroe Doctrine, or the management of the Panama Canal, heeded, unless it has a strong and thoroughly efficient Navy.[641]

To Roosevelt and others in the United States, the oceans were losing their value as a means of protection against Old World interference. The United States was now ready to emerge from its self-imposed isolation to compete for hegemony as a global sea-going power. In the same speech, Roosevelt described in relation to Panama the promise of extending *the American System* beyond the North American borders of the United States:

> From one of the plague spots of the globe, one of the most unhealthy regions in the entire world, the Isthmus has been turned into a singularly healthy place of adobe, where the death rate is small, and where hundreds of children are now being raised under as favorable conditions as in most parts of the United States. The quarters, food, and water supply are excellent, and the plant the best ever gathered for such a purpose.[642]

Whether the actions of *Americans* in the Western Hemisphere were driven more by a desire to spread the blessings of *the American System* or by geo-political opportunism is a matter of emphasis. The United States had evolved rather quickly into a society of enormous contradictions. Closing of the North American frontier coincided with the progress of European industrialization and the rise of the welfare state, dramatically slowing the migration from northern Europe. At the same time, poverty and mass unemployment drove millions of southern and eastern Eurasians from their homelands. Degradation of agricultural land in southern Italy, caused largely by the same type of absentee landownership that plagued Ireland, sparked a mass migration of landless Italians to the western hemisphere beginning in the 1880s. Their numbers were matched by Russian Jews, fleeing persecution, and by other ethnic groups desperate to escape Russian domination. As one might reasonably expect from a people whose own ties to the Old World were largely forgotten, an anti-immigrant response by *Americans* resulted in restrictive legislation, although the most severe treatment was directed at Asians, who were denied entry under the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. Approximately 300,000 Chinese had come to the New World to work in the gold mines of California and on the railroads. A much smaller number of Japanese arrived as contract laborers to work on the sugar plantations of Hawaii, then continuing on to the mainland. Californians of European heritage reacted bitterly to the transfer of jobs and the decline in wages they attributed to the arrival of Chinese and Japanese workers. The reaction to southern and eastern Europeans, as well as Russian Jews, was less pronounced in the cities of the east, but worker associations made sure these new immigrants were excluded from all but the most menial types of work.

By 1910, some thirteen million people (14.5 percent of the total population of the United States) were foreign-born.[643] *Americans* of northern European heritage, holding almost all positions of wealth and power, were becoming alarmed over the declining homogeneity of the

nation's population. Far from a melting pot, the people of the United States were hard-pressed to find a balance between ethnic isolation in the major (mostly northern) cities and a grudging acceptance of an increasingly diverse population. The foreign-born of the Old World were joined by French-Canadians leaving the poor soils and harsh climates of Nova Scotia and Quebec, by *Americans* of European heritage whose grandparents or great-grandparents had helped to open the rural interior, and by Americans of African heritage who remained miserably poor in the racially segregated South. They hoped for opportunity; what most found was a bare existence threatened daily by disease, crime, subsistence wages, child labor, tenement housing, corrupt public officials and periodic mass unemployment. And, in the competition for subsistence wage jobs and housing, the foreign-born relied on ethnic and family ties for strength against people of other nationalities. They were separated by language and culture and religion and, finally, skin color.

The cities to which they came were undergoing rapid changes in physical structure, stimulated by industrial development and a transportation revolution brought on by the introduction in the 1890s of, first, the electric streetcar and, then, the underground subway. Within the span of a few short years, the horse (and the huge problem of disposing of manure) disappeared from the large cities. When the electric elevator appeared, the skylines (and the selling price of building sites) of New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Chicago and other cities began to dramatically change. In 1913, the retailer W.W. Woolworth built the tallest building in the world at sixty stories. At the same time, another migration of sorts followed along the new transportation lines; those who could afford to do so abandoned the congestion of the inner city, absorbing the open space of the countryside in the creation of suburban rings around the financial and industrial centers. Although the cost of land was rising everywhere, the pace of technological discoveries and streamlined construction methods combined to produce a

nationwide and largely unplanned boom in housing construction. This was an uncontrolled and rather thoughtless unleashing of dysfunctional market forces, executed, as described by Lewis Mumford, "*without respect for historic uses, for topographic conditions, or for social needs.*"[644] Another permanent and not very pleasant result was the creation of places to live that were sterile and void of community. Mumford continues:

> If the layout of a town has no relation to human needs and activities other than business, the pattern of the city may be simplified; the ideal layout for the business man is that which can be most swiftly reduced to standard monetary units for purchase and sale. The fundamental unit is no longer the neighborhood or the precinct, but the individual building lot, whose value can be gauged in terms of front feet: this favors an oblong with a narrow frontage and great depth, which provides a minimum amount of light and air to the buildings, particularly the dwellings, that conform to it. Such units turned out equally advantageous for the land surveyor, the real estate speculator, the commercial builder, and the lawyer who drew up the deed of sale. In turn, the lots favored the rectangular building block, which again became the standard for extending the city.[645]

Despoliation of the land and the dehumanizing aspects of the new urban and suburban conditions did not go unchallenged. Yet *Americans*, few of whom thought a strong central State could emerge to jeopardize their republic, viewed the problems of their society as side-effects of industrialization and large-scale immigration rather than as systemic. Thus, what became the early focus of attention by public officials, social scientists and other activists was the desperate need to rid the cities of human waste and other filth. Clean and reliable sources of water were needed if the cities were to survive as living and working environments. Leading citizens representing many constituencies became alarmed by the high death rates from disease that plagued all segments of the population of their cities. The nation's urban centers

were increasingly maligned in journals and the popular press. Lincoln Steffens, who took over as managing editor of ***McClure's Magazine*** in 1902, journeyed to Chicago, St. Louis, Minneapolis, Cleveland, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia and other large cities, documenting the plight of citizens and the corruption of public affairs in these industrial centers. What he found both angered and worried him. Later, he would write of Pittsburgh, "*It looked like hell, literally.*"[646] *Laissez-faire* had allowed urban and industrial landlordism to exercise license far beyond the limits of responsible citizenship. By his journalism, Lincoln Steffens helped to awaken those who had the most to lose by allowing the status quo to continue. Heavy industries needed large numbers of unskilled and semi-skilled workers. The throngs of newly-arriving immigrants provided the manpower but also presented enormous challenges to municipal governments. Immigrants needed assistance finding work and living quarters and in dealing with the laws and customs of their adopted country. The vanguard within each immigrant group were able to establish themselves well enough, learning to move within the larger society even if not quite accepted as full-fledged *Americans.* As others of their homeland arrived, the established generation of immigrants and first generation of United States-born sons and daughters of immigrants built a system of assistance that was easily converted into political power and the delivery of votes to designated candidates. As the *American* elite migrated to new suburban enclaves, the day-to-day governing of the cities, already subjected to deeply-rooted corruption, came under the control of ethnic groups who now constituted majorities. Their generally poorer constituencies facilitated, in the words of James MacGregor Burns, a worsening pattern of "*corruption, manipulation, links with the underworld, and ties with monopolistic, favor-seeking businessmen.*"[647] In somewhat the same fashion as had occurred in the frontier towns, however, among the children born to immigrants were individuals unwilling to accept the status quo. They joined a widespread populist reaction against urban and industrial

landlordism that, quite different from the socialism of Europe, looked to the ideals of the Founding Fathers for philosophical inspiration.

Mainstream *Americans* of northern European heritage were desperate for a return of leaders directed by a sense of honor and guided by Jeffersonian principles. Many had rallied to the side of Henry George in 1886 and again in 1897 less on the basis of George's specific proposals than because of his strong moral character; and, in response, George stepped forward to run for mayor of New York City against Tammany Hall and the rule of machine politics. The words he spoke on the evening of October 5, 1897, in accepting the Democratic party's nomination, offered hope to those who still had faith in the promise of democracy and the future of the republic:

> I have not sought this nomination directly or indirectly. It has been repugnant to me. My line lay in a different path, and I hoped to tread it; but I hold with Thomas Jefferson that while a citizen who can afford to should not seek office, no man can ignore the will of those with whom he stands when they have asked him to come to the front and represent a principle.[648]

George's close friend and confidant, Louis F. Post, later also answered the call of public service, serving in the administration of Woodrow Wilson. He early on recognized in George's teachings the essence of cooperative individualism and its universal application. And, he was determined to apply those principles to public life. "*Even at its best,*" declared Post, "*loyalty to country, as distinguished from loyalty to right, is a despicable sentiment.*"[649] By this definition of patriotism, he reasoned, "*it is treason to make war save for the preservation of human rights.*"[650] In the first decades of the twentieth century, this sentiment was tragically overwhelmed by the intense competition for control over the world's natural resources, markets and inexpensive labor. Resistance in the United States to involvement in this competition was stronger than in many other nations, and the concerns and attentions of most leading

citizens in the U.S. were focused inward. Yet, even in the U.S., the struggle by transnationals for the recognition of human rights was met head on by an invigorated attachment to ethnic nationalism.

For more than a century, the United States had expanded across the North American continent in decentralized fashion, carving largely self-governing states out of the public domain. By the late nineteenth century, however, the wisdom and appropriateness of such a loosely structured Federal system was called into question by a growing number of critics. On the one hand, the national government was looked to increasingly as the primary instrument for securing the rights of individuals and to providing what most believed to be a level playing field. Real political power was beginning to gravitate away from the elected officials of municipal governments and into the hands of the state governors and the legislatures, but also from state government to the national government. At the same time, reformers clamored for the introduction of direct democracy. Issues of great public concern were in some states to be decided upon by referendum rather than by legislatures filled with politicians controlled by city and state machines. Those elected to office who failed to live up to their promises or proved to be corrupt would be subject to recall. And, the party mechanism of selecting candidates by political maneuvering would eventually be replaced by direct primary elections. A parallel view also emerged that government could be rationalized by placing most decisions into the hands of university-trained experts and by removing many decisions from politicians altogether. Already, the nation's historians, economists and other social scientists were attempting with some assuredness to define and explain the changes taking place in the United States.

The career of Henry George is, in the context of his times, instructive of just how quickly attitudes were changing. He had come from the lower ranks of those who need to labor every day in order to survive, had learned the printing trade and became a conscience-raising journalist in the tradition of Horace Greeley. He did much to stimulate the

thinking of other reformers and in the process attracted the disdain of the world's landlords. Claiming a moral high ground, George also invited the animosity of many mainstream intellectuals. George was not the last person to write in the manner of the classical political economist, but he was one of the last self-schooled philosophers to reach a broad audience. The generation of reformers who followed in the United States were products of mainstream institutions. Henry Demarest Lloyd, for example, emerged from Columbia Law School driven by a reformist zeal and free-trade values. He first joined in the struggle to bring down the machine politics of Tammany Hall in New York, then embarked on a twenty year campaign to break the trusts and combinations that had given so much power to the nation's industrial landlords and financiers. "*Mankind are crowding upon each other in the centres, and struggling to keep each other out of the feast set by the new sciences and the new fellowships*,"[651] warned Lloyd. Unless corrective measures were taken, and taken quickly, more radical (and Old World) institutional solutions might find support:

> The remedy of a State monopoly as an alternative to private monopoly, as suggested in Austria and Germany, has as yet had few advocates in America. Our public opinion, so far as there is any public opinion, restricts itself to favoring recourse to anti-trust laws and to boycotting the monopoly....[652]
>
> In all this our country is not singular. The governments of Europe are used as the instruments of profit for private enterprise to an extent which the people endure only because they do not understand it....[653]

The potential for the people of the United States to restore full liberty to the republic existed, Lloyd believed, and had only to be exercised within the constraints of just law:

> We of America are most sovereign when we sit in Constitutional Convention by our representatives, and change the fundamental law as we will. The Constitutional

Convention gives us the unique power of peaceful and perpetual revolution, to make bloody and spasmodic revolutions unnecessary. Of all the inventions of that ablest group of statesmen the world has seen—the founders of this government—this is the greatest.[654]

Lloyd might have tempered his enthusiasm by recalling the devastation that warfare had imposed on his parent's generation. The American war between the states exhibited many of the same characteristics as Eurasian wars provoked by ethnic nationalism. The sanctity of democratic process and the integrity of the Constitution (as interpreted by defenders of *the Union*) had required enforcement by the use of arms. The United States was not, in the end, a society forged out of the principle of voluntary association. That ideal had long ago been trampled upon by the systematic denial of equality of opportunity and the protection of economic and criminal license ingrained in *the American system.* The limits of peaceful coexistence between groups were being tested by changing demographics and the eroding Jeffersonian-era experience of majority ownership of landed property.

Despite the emergence of national government as the dominant authority over people's lives and a continuous stream of ethnic migrations from south to north and east to west, rural to urban and urban to suburban, the population of the United States was becoming less and less homogeneous. By 1900 the population of New York City reached nearly 3.5 million—a 1,000 percent increase in sixty years. Every other major urban center experienced similar growth. The forces of landlordism collided and combined in these densely populated urban communities. Concentrations of population, industry and commerce drove up the price of land and left the overwhelming majority of workers struggling for a subsistence level existence. For the landed, these circumstances raised no questions of morality. Their pursuit of gain was simply the appropriate response to fortuitous conditions over which they had no control. Historian Oscar Handlin, the son of Russian

immigrant parents, approaches the same circumstances from the perspective of the new arrivals:

> The immigrants find their first homes in quarters the old occupants no longer desire. As business grows, the commercial center of each city begins to blight the neighboring residential districts. The well-to-do are no longer willing to live in close proximity to the bustle of warehouses and offices; yet that same proximity sets a high value on real estate. To spend money on the repair or upkeep of houses in such areas is only wasteful; for they will soon be torn down to make way for commercial buildings. The simplest, most profitable use is to divide the old mansions into tiny lodgings. The rent on each unit will be low; but the aggregate of those sums will, without substantial investment or risk, return larger dividends than any other present use of the property.
>
> Such accommodations have additional attractions for the immigrants. They are close to the familiar region of the docks and they are within walking distance of the places where labor is hired; precious carfare will be saved by living here. In every American city some such district of the first settlement receives the newcomers.[655]

Many new arrivals soon came to regret their decision to leave the Old World even with all of the hardships they left behind. The cities they came to were inhospitable places where their dignity was stripped away by conditions set up to maximize profits without any regard for the obligation to act in accord with moral principles or to treat others justly. In the absence of a stable future, property owners thought only of today. "*The carpenters hammer shut connecting doors and build rude partitions up across the halls; middle-class homes thus become laborers'—only not one to a family, but shared among many,*" writes Handlin. "*What's more, behind the original structures are grassy yards where children once had run about at play. There is to be no room for games now. Sheds and shanties, hurriedly thrown up, provide living space; and if a stable is there, so much the better; that too can be turned to account....*"[656]

Life in the United States for the unpropertied immigrant and the children of immigrants challenged their fortitude and their values. The arriving generation was largely sacrificed to the promise of a better life for the next generation. The security of community found in the rural village, minimal as it might have been, was taken from them and replaced by absolute independence and responsibility for self. Handlin relates what one senses are very personal experiences in describing the use of public schools to Americanize, as quickly as possible, the children of immigrants. What they learned about their adopted country, however, conflicted with their everyday reality. Nothing in their physical environment suggested the existence of a world with clean air and water, sunshine, wild animals or majestic vistas. What is remarkable nonetheless is that despite the odds against them, the best and the brightest made their way into the *American* mainstream. Oscar Handlin was among them. Born in 1915, Handlin's determination carried him through Brooklyn College and to a teaching position at Harvard University. Far larger in number were the first and second generation Americans who took advantage of the darker opportunities their urban existence offered:

> For some the chance came through politics itself; perhaps they gained a proper "in" through roughing-up intransigent voters near the polls. For others the knock came in connection with gambling, or boxing, or labor organization, or in illicit liquor dealing. In whatever form, the ability to amass force in the gang, the willingness to defy rules the binding quality of which they did not recognize, and the burning desire by whatever means to elevate themselves above their origins, led such young men into organized criminality.[657]

The young were also encouraged by everything they experienced in the larger society to abandon all but the superficial ties to their roots. At the same time, their parents struggled to maintain contact with the Old World and the extended family left behind. Their physical surroundings

prevented assimilation. The barrier of language further discouraged mingling with other groups even when they came in daily contact with one another. Not until they mastered enough English as a second language did some of this isolation begin to dissipate. For those who brought with them sufficient financial resources and the experience of farming, the tendency was to establish self-contained enclaves away from mainstream influences. By virtue of large-scale immigration, then, Americans were becoming more and more divided by ethnic heritage, language, religion and culture. By virtue of socio-political arrangements, they were further divided by educational background, financial circumstances and race. One can point to many exceptions, of course, but an examination of the demographics of the United States at the mid-point of the twentieth century shows that the separation of groups by ethnicity and religion as well as straightforward racial segregation was a dominant characteristic of the nation's communities.

By the first decade of the twentieth century, the nativist reaction to open immigration was achieving national attention in the political arena. A commission was established in 1907 to recommend a new immigration policy that would keep out those most likely to become dependent on society. In his annual message to the Congress in 1905, Theodore Roosevelt outlined what he saw as the issues to be resolved:

> [W]e cannot have too much immigration of the right sort and we should have none whatever of the wrong sort....
>
> In dealing with this question it is unwise to depart from the old American tradition and to discriminate for or against any man who desires to come here and become a citizen, save on the ground of that man's fitness for citizenship. It is our right and duty to consider his moral and social quality. His standard of living should be such that he will not, by pressure of competition, lower the standard of living of our own wage-workers; for it must ever be a prime object of our legislation to keep high their standard of living....[658]

The eldest son of Henry George, battling on as best he could in his father's footsteps, in the same year countered with a very different reason why the standard of living for so many was in jeopardy. "*In generations past the abundance of unappropriated or very cheap accessible land welcomed the tide of immigration, which was largely agricultural,*"[659] he reminded his readers. How quickly circumstances had changed. "*But of all the once wide public domains there is now not a free acre that is readily accessible, while the price of land generally has greatly advanced. The stream of poor immigrants is therefore diverted from its natural channel—the rural districts—and is sent into the centers of population.*" Most important, thought George, were the political consequences of concentrating the foreign-born and unpropertied into places where they would begin an American experience far different from what their predecessors had generally found:

> Immigration is bringing us each year between a half and three quarters of a million of people who are not being distributed over the country. While this deepens the misery of the poor in city and town, it leaves a considerable number of the immigrants unemancipated from their Old-World ideas that all Governments are alike in that they oppress the masses of the people, and that the Government of the United States is different only in name and degree from that from which they fled across the ocean.[660]

Under these conditions, the arrival in large numbers of people who shared no bonds of language, tradition or socio-political experience with their *neighbors* and were prevented by diminished equality of opportunity from entering the mainstream, was certain to accelerate the process of wealth concentration. The outward signs of this change in *the American system* were everywhere. A growing number of concerned citizens now believed the era of the robber barons, of unbridled individualism and a laissez-faire approach to business had to be brought to an end. The intellectual and political battles would now be

fought over exactly what reforms would be adopted. To the publisher S.S. McClure, whose magazine had become the steady source of reporting on the cracks appearing in the American constitution, the nation was declining into a quagmire of opportunism and relativism:

> Capitalists, workingmen, politicians, citizens—all breaking the law, or letting it be broken. Who is left to uphold it? The lawyers? Some of the best lawyers in this country are hired, not to go into court to defend cases, but to advise corporations and business firms how they can get around the law without too great a risk of punishment....
>
> There is no one left; none but all of us. Capital is learning (with indignation at labor's unlawful acts) that its rival's contempt of law is a menace to property. Labor has shrieked the belief that the illegal power of capital is a menace to the worker. These two are drawing together. Last November when a strike was threatened by the yard-men on all the railroads centering in Chicago, the men got together and settled by raising wages, and raising freight rates too. They made the public pay. We all are doing our worst and making the public pay. The public is the people. We forget that we all are the people; that while each of us in his group can shove off on the rest the bill of to-day, the debt is only postponed; the rest are passing it on back to us. We have to pay in the end, every one of us. And in the end the sum total of the debt will be our liberty.[661]

McClure had much upon which to base his conclusions. Ida Tarbell had brought to life the story of the Standard Oil Company and the business tactics of John D. Rockefeller. Most upsetting to the thoughtful was the fact that monopoly increasingly served as the basis for the law of the land. Lincoln Steffens was by now convinced that the problems of public and private corruption were systemic rather than circumstantial and his articles provided the evidence. Steffens later reflected in his autobiography that "*what...big and little businesses all had in common was not size but the need of privileges: franchises and special legislation, which required legislative corruption; protective tariffs, interpretations of laws in their special interest or leniency or "protection" in the enforcement of laws, calling for 'pulls' with judges, prosecutors, and the police.*"[662] The decay-

ing of society was everywhere to be seen. Alcoholism, crime and prostitution seemed to have taken over the nation's cities. In retaliation, reformers mobilized the forces of moral indignation against the visual and apparent evils. Jane Addams (1860-1935), who after graduating from Rockford College studied the causes and responses to social problems in Europe, opened Hull House in Chicago as a refuge where immigrants could (temporarily, at least) escape the squalor of their surroundings and develop a sense of community. John Dewey (1859-1952), who joined the faculty of the University of Chicago in the 1890s, added formal education to the arsenal of the practitioners of social engineering—though not without a wholesome respect for the complexity of human relationships:

> Society is one word, but many things. Men associate together in all kinds of ways and for all kinds of purposes. One man is concerned in a multitude of diverse groups, in which his associates may be quite different. It often seems as if they had nothing in common except that they are modes of associated life. Within every larger social organization there are numerous minor groups: not only political subdivisions, but industrial, scientific, religious, associations. There are political parties with differing aims, social sets, cliques, gangs, corporations, partnerships, groups bound closely together by ties of blood, and so on in endless variety. In many modern states and in some ancient, there is great diversity of populations, of varying languages, religions, moral codes, and traditions. From this standpoint, many a minor political unit, one of our large cities, for example, is a congeries of loosely associated societies, rather than an inclusive and permeating community of action and thought.[663]

Under these circumstances, and until enough time might pass to lessen the divisions existing between people, the republic must be perceived by its citizens as open, as allowing the talented to rise and succeed. For Dewey and countless other reformers, the great equalizer—the standard measure of equality of opportunity—rested on access to formal education. Dewey's ideas, in particular, were destined to have an

enormous influence on the direction of incremental reform in the United States during the critical first decades of the twentieth century. The profession of the social scientist began with a small but energetic cadre of intellectuals returned from European sojourns to provide a host of new texts and conduct controlled studies into human sociology. They were convinced that the knowledge they had gained in Europe could be put to use in solving the socio-political and economic problems of the world. The economist Simon Patten, as an example, brought this conviction to his major work, ***New Basis of Civilization***, published in 1907. What Patten concluded was that industrial landlordism (he did not use this term, of course), despite the enormous greed of so many of those individuals who accumulated vast personal financial empires, generated more than enough goods to satisfy the reasonable needs of virtually all people. Over-consumption by the few, not overproduction, was the cause of widespread poverty. He dismissed the analysis presented by Henry George as a reaction to an era of scarcity that no longer existed. Patten called upon the nation to acknowledge the arrival of abundance and develop a practical plan for providing each citizen with a basic level of goods necessary for a decent human existence. He ignored what history taught about human behavior, accepted the idea that systems of production operated outside the archaic constraints of individual motivation and championed a new process of government-controlled wealth redistribution. The signs of progress were everywhere, suggested Patten:

> Many of the obstacles that were insuperable a century ago are falling before the young genius of the mechanical age. Militarism, bad sanitation, inadequate protection from heat and cold, a high birth-rate offsetting a high death-rate—all these obstructions to the broadened consuming power of the poor have been reduced. Ground that lay barren because of ignorance and scarcity of capital and of tools is fertile now because there are tools and money for every feat of agriculture.[664]

Not everyone was quite so sure humanity was on the verge of a great leap forward. William James, speaking to attendees of the 1904 World Peace Congress, concluded that "*[a] millennium of peace would not breed the fighting disposition out of our bone and marrow*"[665] nor the glorification of war in spite of all its horrors. Patten's optimism was nonetheless contagious. Theodore Roosevelt began his inaugural address in 1905 by reminding his fellow citizens of their great good fortune. "*Much has been given us, and much will rightfully be expected from us*," he told them. "*We have duties to others and duties to ourselves; and we can shirk neither.*"[666] Roosevelt later called national attention to an even deeper expression of obligation called for in a book by Herbert Croly[667] published in 1909. Croly expounded a Progressive agenda centered around economic collectivism and government regulation of economic relationships. What this meant for Americans, generally, concluded historian Frederick Jackson Turner, was that "*the defenses of the pioneer democrat began to shift from free land to legislation, from the ideal of individualism to the ideal of social control through regulation by law.*"[668] However, in order to achieve a degree of wealth and income distribution where the standard *no one should have so much that others do not have enough* serves as a bench mark for justice, beneficial intervention would have to include Americans of African, Asian, eastern and southern European as well as indigenous tribal heritage. Such a challenge would prove to be far beyond the capacity of the Progressive agenda and conscience. Conditions under which African-Americans were was forced to exist remained a tragic and highly visible shortcoming of *the American system.*

African-Americans continued everywhere to live at the fringe of the larger society or wholly isolated in rural communities or urban enclaves. Pragmatic leaders within their ranks, such as Booker T. Washington (1859-1915) dedicated themselves to improving the condition of African-Americans by means of self-reliance. His was also a message of optimism, but one that looked to the long-term and to

incremental advances in the direction of equality of opportunity. An audience of largely African-Americans listened as he urged patience and dedication on his race:

> The wisest among my race understand that the agitation of questions of social equality is the extremist folly, and that progress in the enjoyment of all the privileges that will come to us must be the result of severe and constant struggle rather than of artificial forcing. No race that has anything to contribute to the markets of the world is long in any degree ostracized. It is important and right that all privileges of the law be ours, but it is vastly more important that we be prepared for the exercises of these privileges.[669]

Washington seemed to be reminding his fellow African-Americans of the terrible hardships many had endured following emancipation. Without access to land, without access to capital goods, without access to skill-developing employment, they were kept at the bottom of the social and economic ladder. They could not look to the larger society for meaningful support or assistance. They had no choice but to pull together and learn how to cooperate and then compete as a group in the larger arena.

Less patient with the lingering racism pervasive in the United States was W.E.B. DuBois., who had grown up in western Massachusetts and graduated from Fisk University in Tennessee. Then, in 1889 he returned to Massachusetts and enrolled at Harvard University. As did Washington, DuBois understood that education was an essential step toward achieving political equality and widespread material well-being. African-Americans had, in a very real sense, to first create their own parallel society before the walls of segregation would begin to fall. Thus, while acknowledging the presence of racism and discrimination that thwarted the aspirations of African-Americans, DuBois also challenged African-Americans to take responsibility for their own improvement. After completing his education at Harvard, he obtained a grant to study

at the University of Berlin and, not long after his return to the United States, undertook a study of the living conditions of African-Americans in Philadelphia. Consistent with his world views, DuBois came to the conclusion that "*the Negro has much to learn of the Jew and Italian, as to living within his means and saving every penny from excessive and wasteful expenditures.*"[670] Not too many years would pass, however, before DuBois concluded that certain institutional barriers had to fall before the economic emancipation of African-Americans was possible. Isolated, African-Americans would have to join together to form their own communitarian system of wealth creation while waging more effectively their war for political equality and equal protection under the law. Absorbed in this way by what for them amounted to life and death issues, few African-Americans found reason to concern themselves with the work of Georgists and others concerned with ending landlordism. Had African-Americans gained equal access to land in addition to their emancipation from slavery, their ability to raise themselves to a higher socio-economic level would have been far easier. Racism overshadowed the root cause of their poverty. In ***Social Problems***, Henry George had, in fact, tried to reach leading abolitionists and African-Americans with his insights into why emancipation had failed to provide the next generation with greater opportunity:

> We have not really abolished slavery; we have retained it in its most insidious and wide-spread form—in a form which applies to whites as to blacks. So far from having abolished slavery, it is extending and intensifying, and we make no scruple of selling into it our own children—the citizens of the Republic yet to be. For what else are we doing in selling the land on which future citizens must live, if they are to live at all?[671]

DuBois and other leaders among the African-American minority were fighting against their exclusion from participation in the governing process, for access to public institutions and the right to compete for employment against individuals of other races. Still, theirs

was largely a fight for incremental change, moderate in objective and moderate in means. Their quest was not for a fair field with no favors but simply a playing field without race as a consideration. For the most part, the overwhelming majority of African-Americans (as well as other minorities) felt helpless to effect change and found a strange sort of refuge in the urban enclaves or in rural isolation. There they were at least reasonably safe from direct physical threat, and segregation added a degree of vibrancy to communities where far less wealth remained than was generally produced.

Many candidates for political office offered themselves to the voters as reformers who would cleanse the cities of corruption and improve the quality of services provided by government. Even the more earnest seldom thought they could do much to help those at the very bottom of the socio-economic heap. Although the descriptions of conditions as they existed for the majority might suggest the fomenting of radicalism, the pulse of political activism in the United States remained extraordinarily conservative. Rare were the reformers such as Tom L. Johnson (elected Mayor of Cleveland, Ohio) who managed to gain positions of political power espousing systemic changes. Lincoln Steffens recalled in his ***Autobiography*** a conversation with Joseph W. Folk, who was running for governor of Missouri, that says a great deal about the turn-of-the-century political climate:

> One day I saw a book on [Folk's] living-room table, *Social Problems* by Henry George. He saw me see it; we had just been wondering together about the nature and the cure of political corruption.
>
> "That book explains the whole thing," Folk said.
>
> "Have you read it?" I asked.
>
> "No," he said. "I read into it enough to see that that man has it all sized up, and—I dropped it, as I did another book a socialist brought me."
>
> "Why?" I demanded, astonished.

"Oh," said Folk, "if I once got socialism or any other cut-and-dried solution into my head, I'd be ruined—politically. Couldn't get anywhere. But you are not in politics. Why don't you read them?"

I gave him my reason, which was different from his, much better, I thought. My reason was that I had not only read, I had studied those books under a regular professor of political economy at college, and so know that there was nothing in them.[672]

Socialism, an idea arising out of Old World politics, was perceived not only as an unwarranted interference in the affairs of the individual, but as a dangerous intrusion on the principles of voluntary association. Gradually, however, for some by experience and for others by observation, more *Americans* were beginning to recognize far too many similarities between disparities long associated with the Old World and the more recent ills in their own society. Lincoln Steffens began to change his views after spending time with Tom L. Johnson in Cleveland. A year later, with Johnson running for governor of Ohio, the two men met in St. Louis. Johnson now opened up to Steffens and explained his own journey from opportunistic business person to champion of governmental reform. He told Steffens that he had succeeded in business by first recognizing the inherently monopolistic character of an urban transportation system, then gaining control of the street car systems in several cities. Johnson had then been introduced to Henry George's writings. Steffens recalls what next occurred:

Tom Johnson went to New York, called together a group of his rich friends, and put [Social Problems] up to them. They all read Henry George, met one night, and discussed it till daylight. Johnson defended the book; he didn't want to accept its doctrines; he begged his friends to upset them, and they tried; they were able men, too, but Tom Johnson had seen the light, and his friends not only failed to clear his mind of the single-tax theories; they were themselves convinced. They all saw what Henry George pointed out: that excessive riches came unearned to individuals and companies owning land, natural resources, like water, coal, oil, etc., and franchises, such as

steam and street railways, which, being common wealth to start with, became more and more valuable as the growing population increased the need and the value of these natural monopolies. The increased value of them was created by the mere growth of the population, who should have it, and George proposed that government should take it back by taxing nothing but the values of land, natural resources, and monopolies.

Tom Johnson returned to Cleveland, sold out his monopoly business, gradually, and went into politics as a successful business man with a vision, a plan. He ran for Congress, was elected, and there, in Washington, worked and voted against his own interests for the public interest....He could not accomplish much. A large representative body is no place for an executive, he discovered, and the House of Representatives, filled with men nominated by the State machines, had long ago been organized into a stronghold of the system. Tom Johnson consulted with Henry George, and they decided that the thing for Johnson to do was to go to a city, run for mayor, and try for the control so that he could apply the George principles and set an example in policy and in achievement, for all cities, all States.[673]

Johnson was, Steffens concluded, a very practical individual whose principles had been turned into right action after he gained a more complete understanding of what needed to be done to create just socio-political arrangements. "*He cleared my head of a lot of rubbish, left there from my academic education and reform associations,*"[674] admitted Steffens. Simply put, Johnson's target was privilege, in all its forms.

In the end, Johnson's efforts were stampeded by a broad corruption at the state level and the absence of a constituency that fully understood and supported his work. Lincoln Steffens, having extensively traveled the country and gauged the temper of the times, offered this requiem to Johnson and others who shared George's vision and passion:

[Tom Johnson] thought that by removing the cause of his anti-social conduct, he changed, but he had his purpose, too, his ideal, the vision he developed out of a book. Few men have such ideals. The ideals of America, for example, the ideals that came to

Ohio probably from New England and from Old England, are antiquated, dried up, contradictory; honesty and wealth, morality and success, individual achievement and respectability, privileges and democracy—these won't take us very far.

There was something wrong in our ends as well as in our beginnings, in what we are after as well as in what is after us, in American ideals as well as in American conduct and its causes.[675]

Democratic forms, even a Bill of Rights added to the written Constitution, had not prevented in the United States the rise of concentrated wealth and power. The privileged proved themselves worthy defenders of the status quo. In the United States, change would come incrementally and disjointedly. Despite the best efforts of individuals such as Tom L. Johnson, Joseph Fels, Louis F. Post and numerous others who had rallied behind the reform campaign of Henry George, the torch of cooperative individualism was once again falling to the ground. Out of the ashes would arise not a new guiding philosophy but a set of policies, an agenda, that would come to be described by the term *Liberalism*.

By excluding from policy consideration any ideas considered too radical or too reactionary, the overwhelming majority of citizens could be brought within the confines of one of two principle political parties, preventing those at the fringe from gaining office or developing a sustained constituency. There was no master plan to carry out this objective. Timing was important. The course of events both inside and outside the United States nurtured the process. And, finally, changes in the ways people lived, worked and played added an additional dynamic ingredient. None of the societies within the core and few at the periphery remained untouched by the accelerated pace of change. In an era of great drama and upheaval, the role of no other country changed so dramatically as that of the United States.

MELTDOWN AT THE NINETEENTH CENTURY CORE

As the twentieth century arrived, the balance of power between the world's major industrialized nation-states seemed reasonably secure. The mass exodus from the strongest and most stable of these societies had slowed, and the well-being of the average citizen was improving in response to the adoption of laws mitigating the most egregious of landlordism's characteristics. Territorial disputes between the Eurasian nation-states over borders had temporarily abated, even if they continued to compete for imperial hegemony elsewhere. The Japanese were the first to upset the tenuous balance of power by their aggressive move to take control of Korea after devastating Russian forces on land and sea in 1904. The Russian autocracy was irretrievably weakened by this defeat. Opportunists within Russia as well as external enemies sensed the time was coming for a major upheaval.

Within Austria-Hungary, industrialization was generating agitation for reform, but the ancient aristocracy remained unmoved and in control. The situation in Spain was, on the other hand, extremely chaotic. Industrialization in parts of the country had unleashed an organized reform movement against the aristocratic, agrarian landlords and the monarchy. The Italians emerged from a decade of civil unrest under a reform government headed by Giovanni Giolitti, who became Prime Minister in 1903. Giolitti not only nationalized the railroads and pushed for funding of education and national health programs, he also gained for Italians a colonial foothold in northern Africa by taking Libya. With the ascendancy in 1906 of Georges Clemenceau as Prime Minister, France was brought into an alliance with Britain and Russia against Germany and Austria-Hungary. Italy was nominally committed to Germany but had secretly agreed to maintain neutrality in the event of war between Germany and France. To preserve its own empire, Britain was engaged in a massive program to streamline and modernize

its military forces. The French, Russian and German navies followed suit, albeit at some distance.

The nineteenth century ended with British forces stalemated in their war with the Dutch Boers of South Africa. At great cost in lives and resources, Britain subdued the Boers and set the stage for the eventual creation of a South African republic. There was another price paid. "*Never again,*" writes James Morris, "*did the British go to war with the old imperial eclat, or greet their victories with their frank Victorian gusto.*"[676] Two hundred and twenty million pounds had been spent, emptying Britain's treasury and leaving the rest of the empire exposed. Moreover, the uneven conflict—with the Boers fighting for self-determination against the British empire—attracted widespread sympathy to the Boer cause; volunteers from Germany, the United States and Ireland fought against the British, who were coming to be viewed less as champions of Western civilization than as ruthless and despotic conquerors of free people. Elsewhere throughout the empire the first signs of resistance to British presence arose. Most serious was the appearance of Indian nationalism and a boycott in India against everything British.

On the Eurasian continent Wilhelm II was eager to demonstrate German military superiority. Germany challenged the French in 1905 over French designs on Morocco. Britain was wholly unprepared to join France in a war at that time, leaving the French Premier, Maurice Rouvier, with little option but to yield to German demands. Renewed conflict over which European power would control Morocco brought France and Germany precariously close to war just six years later. Only a firm declaration of British support by Lloyd George gave the Germans reason to pause and consider the consequences. Voices of conciliation and reason within and outside the governments of these nations were overwhelmed by a rising tide of militaristic adventurism and nationalistic fervor. It is quite remarkable, therefore, that in Britain the Liberal government of Henry Campbell-Bannerman had come to power in 1905 espousing a platform of gradual disarmament. During

the election he made clear to British voters and foreign leaders alike what the policies of his government would be:

> As to our general policy to our neighbours, our general foreign policy, it will remain the same in Government as it was in Opposition. It will be opposed to aggression and to adventure, it will be animated by a desire to be on the best terms with all nationalities, and to co-operate with them in the common work of civilization....We want relief from the pressure of excessive taxation, and at the same time we want money to meet our own domestic needs at home, which have been too long starved and neglected owing to the demands on the taxpayer for military purposes abroad. How are these desirable things to be secured if in the time of peace our armaments are maintained on a war footing? Remember that we are spending at this moment, I think, twice as much on the army and navy as we spent ten years ago.[677]

Campbell-Bannerman died in 1908 and was succeeded by Herbert Asquith, whose fear of German militarism outweighed any concerns he might have had over the cost of an arms race. The passage of Lloyd George's *people's budget* in 1909 did little to arrest the military build-up. Britain was at the same time plagued by internal strife. Labor strikes became increasingly frequent and violent. The women's suffrage movement was gaining ground; and, civil war became a real threat after the passage in 1914 of a home rule bill for Ireland. In a move that could only be construed as directed against Germany, the British navy was also withdrawn from the Mediterranean and stationed in the North Sea. France assumed the role of policing the Mediterranean to thwart Austria-Hungary and Turkey. In the Balkans, Greek, Bulgarian and Serbian nationalists first drove the Ottoman Turks from the peninsula then turned on one another in a fight for territory. Rumanians and Turks joined forces with the Serbs and Greeks to defeat the Bulgarians. Austria-Hungary then threatened the Serbs with intervention. In the midst of this ethnic, almost tribal, turmoil, the Archduke Francis

Ferdinand (heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary) and his wife were assassinated in Sarajevo by a young Bosnian nationalist.

The reaction in Vienna was based on an assumption that the Serbian government had been intimately involved in the assassination plot. With German support, the Austria-Hungarians demanded they be included in the Serbian investigation. Despite a genuine desire on the part of the Serbs to respond and lessen the probability of conflict, Austria-Hungary declared war late in July. Russia then mobilized in support of Serbia, which was followed by a German demand that Russia demobilize immediately. The French, still expressing a desire to remain neutral, prepared for a German attack against their eastern frontier. After the Russians failed to act, Germany declared war on Russia, crossed the Luxembourg border and drove into Belgium, declaring war on France on August 3. The Belgians fully expected British support based on the fact (disclosed to the public by Francis Neilson in 1915) that "*[t]he General Staffs of both armies had long consulted on the problem and the plans.*"[678] The next morning, German troops invaded Belgium and Britain came into the conflict.

Socialists in France were stunned by the extent to which the German Social-Democrats had united with the conservative ultra-nationalists in pursuit of geo-political hegemony. A general strike in opposition to war had been discussed in 1912 in Switzerland. During the same year, Ulyanov (Lenin), advancing Bolshevik objectives from exile in Paris, met in Prague with his key collaborators. Lenin then moved on to Cracow, closer to the Russian border and St. Petersburg, where he learned that war had broken out between Russia and Germany. After a brief detention by Austrian officials, he made his way to Switzerland, where he monitored events from Berne. As one would expect, Lenin condemned Kautsky for his support of the German government. In France, once the fighting began, the French workers also set aside their allegiance to the common interests of their class and rallied to the side of the government. British Fabians and other socialists were divided

over whether to support the war effort. Graham Wallas, convinced that the war would be long and enormously destructive, pushed for an international meeting with other socialists to discuss strategy for advancing their cause once the war ended. Francis Neilson, one of a dwindling number in Britain who understood the difference between cooperative individualism and what socialism had to offer, raised very much the same issues for consideration by his fellow citizens:

We have time day after day to recount the horrors of war's excesses, the atrocities of German soldiers, the starvation of whole provinces, the terrible plight of refugees; the world is appalled at the avalanche of woe. No one remains neutral; waves of universal sympathy reach higher and higher; from all parts of the globe willing hands send food, raiment, and money to procure shelter for the stricken. But who remains neutral in the fight against poverty, drink, and the myriad atrocities of our economic system which are perpetrated year in and year out and seldom rouse the affluent out of their pernicious apathy?...

...Society will need a new basis when this war is over. Each day tendencies are shaping into efforts. Already the Government works along the very socialistic lines it poured contempt upon a few years ago....Statesmen go whither the currents take them....In a hundred ways every week the Government is driven along the very path it once told the electors to avoid. Amazing revolution without agitation! What is the great force behind the Government to-day, rushing it into channels it abhorred only seven years ago? The exigencies of an Armageddon? The nation fighting for its existence? Whatever the cause of it, more lessons in the workableness of the proposals of British socialists have been given by this Government, since the end of July, than can be found in all the literature of Socialism from Saint-Simon down to Belfort Bax....

The moral and intellectual revolt of the past will be a mere gust in comparison with the whirlwind coming, if something practical is not done very soon after the close of this war. It is not fair, not honest indeed, to ask men to lay down their lives for national justice unless you are determined to give those who live individual justice....

...The time is fast coming when they must choose. What must they choose? Socialism or Individualism? The former we know, the latter has never had a chance;

Christianity, so-called, killed it. Socialism aims at equality, Individualism at equal rights....[679]

Neilson's views were, if not exactly ignored, already considered by many to be archaic and utopian. Management of a modern war—and all that meant for control by the State over systems of production—suggested to many reformers that the age of limited government and individualism had passed. The only real opportunity to bring about change was to gain control of the apparatus of the State for use in the interest of the many. George Bernard Shaw, on the other hand, saw Britain's involvement in the war as a necessary evil rather than an opportunity in the struggle for power, and he was unrelenting in his attack on those whose policies had pulled the world inevitably into war. Still, war heightened one's sense of obligation. Shaw's philosophical colleague, Sidney Webb, for example, served on various war-time committees and was appointed the Fabian representative to the Labour Party Executive.

The Fabians were also strengthened in Britain by an emerging mainstream commitment to social engineering. In 1911, the Liberals made national health care a reality for nearly a third of the population and established a national program of unemployment insurance. War greatly expanded government intervention in the economy and what had long been understood as private arrangements between employers and workers. Railway and steamship lines were essentially taken over by government managers, the trades unions were promised wage stabilization in return for agreeing to government arbitration in all disputes. Limits were placed on industry profits from war production.

To pay for the war, the coalition government headed (after 1916) by Lloyd George, significantly raised the rate of taxation on incomes and borrowed the rest. Landed property was not looked upon in any way as especially deserving of taxation to support the war effort, and the landed made sure of it. By 1918 Britain's national debt exceeded seven billion pounds. One side effect of Britain's policy of moderate taxation

was that despite shortages of many goods and a general rise in prices, the overall condition of the wage laborer in Britain significantly improved during the war years, as did their adherence to the leadership of the trades unions. German submarines sent food-laden ships to the bottom of the ocean, giving renewed economic importance to Britain's rural farmers and agricultural workers. The war also enabled reformers in 1918 to finally gain the vote for all males over the age of twenty-one (and all females over the age of thirty), as well as the removal of property qualifications for the exercise of this right of citizenship. In these important ways, then, Britain emerged from the war a very different society, but also one deeply in debt and faced with dissolution of much of its empire.

The French, on whose territory so much of the fighting was done in the First World War, suffered from the weight of a socio-political structure burdened by extensive privilege, monopolies and widespread corruption. Poverty in France remained far higher than in Germany or Britain and nearly half of the financial reserves held by wealthy French citizens were invested overseas. Socialist, such as Leon Blum, pressed for incremental change, but could not succeed in getting even a modest tax on income adopted. In order to rebuild its military strength, the French government resorted to heavy taxes on consumption and (as did the British) borrowed the rest. Although the national debt of France skyrocketed, a sane fiscal policy could not find enough political support to save the nation from near-collapse. The millions of workers held their government in contempt and, even as hostilities with Germany began, were in constant strife with French industrial landlords. William Shirer goes so far as to conclude, "*In no other country of the West did the working class become so alienated from society as in France.*"[680] And yet, when war came they quieted their discontent and enlisted in the army. The same could be said, remarkably, about the Russians, at least at the beginning of the conflict.

Russia under Alexander III and Nicholas II underwent a period of forced industrialization and the diversion of agricultural production into exports. These were measures the czar and his ministers agreed were essential to the future of the State. All this was financed by heavy taxes on peasant farmers and small business owners, and by foreign loans. To be sure, the implementation of these policies required a heavy hand; and, as a consequence, with each passing day the Russian *Intelligentsia* became increasingly impatient with the corruption and oppression of their government. By the turn of the century even the czar's secret police and military could no longer control the growth of (mostly socialist) revolutionary groups and the spread of open discord. The moderates, who harbored desires to create in Russia a constitutional monarchy and parliamentary system on the British model, held the most direct access to the center of power. As conditions worsened, Marxist and other European socialist doctrines began to find converts among the Intelligentsia. Yet few among the most vigorous revolutionaries believed that the Russian proletariat could be relied on to pursue political objectives. The workers of Britain had been captured by the trades unions and in Germany had been absorbed by the machinery of a militaristic State. Nor were the peasants viewed as reliable revolutionaries; rather, they were distrusted as neo-bourgeoisie interested only in freeing themselves of the landed aristocracy and gaining ownership of the land they tilled. Thus, the revolutionaries focused less on agrarian and industrial-landlordism as systems to be overturned than on gaining control of the State apparatus, substituting totalitarianism for autocracy. Of those who began their revolutionary quest armed with utopian passion, few managed to escape the despotic lure offered in the achievement of power.

Orthodox Marxism came to Russia with George V. Plekhanov, who as a young, populist revolutionary had sought refuge in Germany during 1876. He returned the following year convinced that socialism could be brought about by opportunistic political activism irrespective of

what Marx said about the necessity of first experiencing widespread industrialization under a capitalistic structure. Though Russia remained predominantly rural and agrarian, Plekhanov was convinced the industrial workers could be molded into a fiercesome revolutionary force. He had heard repeatedly from the revolutionary Peter Tkachev that the masses could never be educated to this objective, and that success would depend on the seizure of power by a small, highly-disciplined minority. To his credit, Plekhanov rejected the path of assassination and terrorism and joined forces with the anarchist Paul Akselrod. Together they worked against Tkachev, Andrei Zheliabov and others in a quest to prevent the sacrifice of innocent millions by those whose true pursuit was for raw power. Plekhanov came increasingly under the spell of Marx and Engels; thereafter, he concluded a new strategy was needed in Russia. While the industrial landlords yet remained outside the core of political power, workers must form a united and independent political party capable of governing the country in the interest of their class. Lenin, whose older brother had been executed for his part in a failed assassination attempt against Alexander III, was also convinced of this course of action. Together, they fought bitterly against the influence of Eduard Bernstein's revisionism and the promises of evolutionary socialism.

The radical elements in Russia were aided by the widespread corruption and incompetence that plagued the czarist State. The czar's policies contributed to widespread suffering and famine during 1891 and 1892 and to labor unrest a few years later. A rapidly expanding rural population—unable to gain access to land—was also migrating into the urban centers, where they faced unemployment and miserable living conditions. The Russian experience with industrial landlordism was, if possible, considerably worse than that experienced by workers in Germany and other industrializing societies. As a consequence of this extensive deprivation, discontent combined with an awareness of better conditions elsewhere to generate support for all manner of radical groups.

The application of force by the Russian State hardened resistance and infused the most determined with a desire for vengeance and retribution. Bringing down the autocracy now became a primary political objective. For his part, Nicholas II reacted quickly and harshly to any and all political demonstrations, strikes and rural uprisings. While the philosophers of evolutionary change argued with others within the Intelligentsia over principles and programs, Lenin and other opportunistic radicals practiced their talents in the arts of propaganda, manipulation, deceit, treachery, tyranny and murder. In the first years of the twentieth century, Lenin was instrumental in bringing the strategy of the Social Democratic Party under the control of a Central Committee and turning the members into what Leopold Haimson described as "*a conspiratorial army.*"[681] A corrupt and oppressive Russian State, surrounded by external enemies, provided ideal circumstances in which to make a grab for power.

The next opportunity came in 1905 when the anti-government mood became fever pitched over the war with the Japanese. Protectionism and massive subsidies to industrial landlords had also alienated the ancient landed aristocracy. A far more organized and articulately-led workers' movement agitated for higher wages and better working conditions. The Intelligentsia, emboldened by the successes of European liberalism, pressed for participatory government. The opportunistic Social Democrats waited for the right moment to emerge from the wilderness to direct the course of the revolution. Political assassinations were occurring with troubling frequency, a sure sign that chaos was just ahead. Then, on January 9, workers (and their families) approaching the czar's Winter Palace with a petition were fired upon with the loss of many lives. An uprising and general strike spread from the far-flung cities to the rural communities, bringing production virtually to a halt. Under the advice of Sergei Witte, chairman of Nicholas II's Council of Ministers, the czar relented to public pressure. His *October Manifesto* broke ground for what many accepted as permanent liberalization of the regime. A

new legislative body, the Imperial Duma, was created and universal suffrage granted. When the Army put down the uprisings and restored order, Nicholas II was unduly encouraged and began to take a harder line against dissent. He ordered Peter Stolypin, Minister of the Interior, to pursue the leaders of the uprisings and tighten enforcement of laws against seditious activities. The first and second Dumas proved far too radical for Nicholas II, so he dissolved them and modified the laws of suffrage to ensure a more conservative body. This merely played into the hands of the revolutionaries.

Stolypin held a more realistic view of just how close the regime was to losing control over the people. To quiet peasant discontent, Stolypin introduced a plan for privatization and land redistribution. He also embarked on a program of Russification in the territories built on the establishment of schools. Unfortunately, Nicholas II proved unresponsive to reasoned argument. The influence at court of the mystic, Rasputin, cut him off from his ministers. Moreover, the czar was pressured by reactionary support of ultra-conservatives who came to be known as the Black Hundreds. Their positions of privilege threatened by reform, these ultra-conservative reactionaries assassinated Stolypin in 1911. Russia's remaining statesmen thereafter exhibited a sense of desperation. Early in 1914, one government official detailed in a long memorandum the nation's organizational weaknesses and industrial backwardness. If war came, he stressed, Russia would be defeated and the autocracy would fall:

> The legislative institutions and the intellectual opposition parties, lacking real authority in the eyes of the people, will be powerless to stem the popular tide aroused by themselves, and Russia will be flung into hopeless anarchy, the issue of which cannot be foreseen.[682]

From this point onward, the prospects for Russia to adopt institutions of participatory democracy were hopelessly burdened by deeply-rooted

hatreds. War brought out the worst in the autocracy. In an environment of scarcity, rampant inflation, staggering military defeats and the inept rule of Nicholas II, the collapse finally occurred in the Spring of 1917. Riots began in Petrograd, and the garrison dissolved. In a matter of days the autocracy fell; in its wake, the moderates—rallying around Alexander Kerensky—would try to restore order and keep Russians engaged in the senseless imperialist and territorial war. Peasants seized land and murdered landlords; factory workers united against employers; soldiers deserted and sailors mutinied. Under Trotsky's determined leadership, the Bolsheviks emerged as the dominant revolutionary party. Early in November, the Bolsheviks grabbed power in Petrograd and a week later secured Moscow. By November 9, Lenin had taken over as head of the new government. In March, he explained to his fellow Bolsheviks what had been accomplished and what they still had to do:

...The task of achieving victory over the internal enemy was an extremely easy one. The task of creating the political power was an extremely easy one because the masses had created the skeleton, the basis of this power. The Republic of Soviets was born at one stroke. But two exceedingly difficult problems still remained, the solution of which could not possibly be the triumphal march we experienced in the first months of our revolution—we did not doubt, we could not doubt, that the socialist revolution would be later confronted with enormously difficult tasks.

First, there was the problem of internal organization, which confronts every socialist revolution. The difference between a socialist revolution and a bourgeois revolution is that in the latter case there are ready-made forms of capitalist relationships; Soviet power—the proletarian power—does not inherit such ready-made relationships, if we leave out of account the most developed forms of capitalism, which, strictly speaking, extended to but a small top layer of industry and hardly touched agriculture. The organization of accounting, the control of large enterprises, the transformation of the whole of the state economic mechanism into a single huge machine, into an economic organism that will work in such a way as to enable hundreds of millions of people to be guided by a single plan—such was the enormous

organizational problem that rested on our shoulders....It immediately became clear to everyone who cared to ponder over the tasks of our revolution that only by the hard and long path of self-discipline would it be possible to overcome the disintegration that the war had caused in capitalist society, that only by extraordinarily hard, long, and persistent effort could we cope with this disintegration and defeat those elements aggravating it, elements which regarded the revolution as a means of discarding old fetters and getting as much out of it for themselves as they possibly could. The emergence of a large number of such elements was inevitable in a small-peasant country at a time of incredible economic chaos, and the fight against these elements that is ahead of us, that we have only just started, will be a hundred times more difficult; it will be a fight which promises no spectacular opportunities. We are only in the first stage of this fight. Severe trials await us....

...The reason we achieved such an easy victory...was a fortunate combination of circumstances that protected us for a short time from international imperialism. International imperialism, with the entire might of its capital, with its highly organized war machine, which is a real force, a real stronghold of international capital, could not, under any circumstances, under any conditions, live side by side with the Soviet Republic, both because of its objective position and because of the economic interests of the capitalist class embodied in it, because of commercial connections, of international financial relations. In this sphere a conflict is inevitable. This is the greatest difficulty of the Russian revolution, its greatest historical problem—the need to solve international problems, the need to evoke a world revolution, to effect the transition from our strictly national revolution to the world revolution....[683]

The Russian totalitarian experiment with one man rule and the apparatus of state-socialism was beginning. Lenin ended Russian involvement in the First World War (at the cost of much territory, coal and iron reserves as well as population), published the imperialistic treaties secretly agreed to by the czar with France and Britain, disbursed agents to stir global revolution and repudiated Russia's foreign debt. Within greater Russia, his hold on power was both narrow and tenuous. Resistance brought retaliation and a reliance on violence to maintain

and consolidate Bolshevik control. In the process, a new form of despotism and tyranny was unleashed on the people of the world. The Ukrainians reacted by forming a separate government and breaking from Russia. Non-Russian peoples throughout the empire jumped at the opportunity to claim their sovereignty and declare their independence. Opponents of the Bolshevik coup dragged the peoples of the Russian empire into a devastating civil war:

> In May, 1918, the fury suddenly leaped into the open and raged for almost three terrible years in every community of the Russian Empire with unforgiving finality, pitting Reds against Whites (as the defenders of the old Russia were called), poor peasants against kulaks and Cossacks, city dwellers against villagers, uneducated against educated, socialists against capitalists, Bolsheviks against Mensheviks or Social Revolutionaries, non-Russians against Russians, Christians against Jews, men against men in the frenzy of raw spite....
>
> Pressed against the wall, the Communists fought back with cold fury. The reverses strengthened the discipline of the Red Army which Trotsky had begun to train after Brest-Litovsk; now it began to show its fighting qualities. The Cheka, too, swung into action. Large-scale terror became the order of the day, as thousands and thousands of hostages picked from all strata of society and all opposition groups were shot....[684]

One by one, the opposition forces were destroyed by the Red Army or Bolshevik street fighters. Their success heartened the revolutionary factions elsewhere in Europe. Labor unrest and general strikes hit hard at the stability of governments in France, Italy and Germany. Even in the United States, cradle of democracy and the Progressive spirit, an end to the First World War reopened societal conflicts temporarily subordinated to the perceived national interest.

FINAL FRONTIERS
AMERICAN INDIVIDUALISM AT THE CROSSROADS

In the United States of the early twentieth century, the old order of *laissez-faire* individualism and unregulated industrial landlordism was under relentless attack. In addition to populist agitations, the tenor of political activism was also influenced by the arrival of political refugees from Eurasia, as well as Americans who studied in the European universities, returning with a conviction that government must exercise its latent powers to solve societal problems. The historian Frederick Jackson Turner warned, again, that the closing of the frontier and the appearance of so many societal ills might open the door "*to some Old World discipline of socialism or plutocracy, or despotic rule, whether by class or by dictator.*"[685] There was, Turner argued, precious little time left to introduce reforms and preserve the republic. The very same warning had come from Henry George not so many years before. What Turner and the small number of cooperative individualists now encountered was a blind acceptance among most reformers that only through the capture and exercise of direct governmental power could the privileges sanctioned under *laissez-faire* be brought to an end. Reformers might succeed in getting the Congress and the President to pass anti-monopoly legislation and in breaking up the trusts; these measures would not, could not, counter the momentum of corporate enterprise to become national and then global in scope. Only the creation of equally large labor unions could protect the wages, working conditions and employment of the millions of workers; and, only the creation of a powerful welfare state controlled by reformers and supported by universal suffrage could preserve an equilibrium of power between the industrial landlords and the industrial workers. There was no room in this struggle for ideas suggesting that the interests of the owners of capital goods and of labor were inherently (and potentially) identical, or nearly so.

Industrial workers cannot be blamed for feeling oppressed by industrial landlords who seemed to have politicians and the courts always on their side. The fact that so many workers were of foreign birth and lived at the edge of *the American system* kept them vulnerable to exploitation and intensified their isolation from the mainstream. Melvyn Dubofsky's review of employment and statistics covering the Progressive era suggested there was gradual improvement in wages even in the face of high levels of immigration; at the same time, however, a large portion of the foreign-born work force was unable to put down permanent roots. For the relatively unskilled, mobility remained a necessary part of their ability to remain employed. Among immigrant households living in and around New York City, less than half earned combined incomes sufficient to meet what reformers suggested were the minimum living standards. Working conditions in the resource extracting industries were arguably the worst. "*Coal towns in the hills of West Virginia and Kentucky*," writes Dubofsky, "*saw coal barons rule their industrial serfs in feudal style, but without any of the reciprocal obligations built into the medieval order.*"[686] Thousands of workers were killed each year in industrial accidents, and an equal number died of diseases associated with their working conditions. Strikes and spontaneous walkouts against employers were daily occurrences, involving hundreds of thousands of workers (unionized and not). The reality of working conditions, as well as the predisposition of workers to resort to violence against those by whom they felt oppressed, raises the intriguing question of why the labor movement in the United States did not become overtly radical. The fundamental reason seems to be that workers did not want to overturn the idealized version of *the American system*; what they wanted was fairness from the industrial-landlords and protection of their rights by government, in accordance with the principles upon which the republic had been founded. Their leaders—and the industrial landlords—understood, however, that the workers would support militant action under the right conditions. Faced with the prospect of

ongoing disruptions in production and threats to profits a rapprochement of sorts evolved:

> First and foremost was the...acceptance of industrial capitalism, which may be termed the trade unions' bargain with American employers. In return for allowing unions to bargain for their members over matters of wages, conditions, and security, employers received from labor leaders a general commitment *not* to disturb the capitalist system and a specific promise to adhere to the labor contract, even when it conflicted with the broader principle of workingclass solidarity. Second was the trade unions' rejection of partisan politics and their preference for purely economic action, what has often been labeled "business, or bread-and-butter, unionism." Third, trade unionists rejected the advice and leadership of intellectuals and middle-class reformers.[687]

The leaders of workers in the United States adopted a very different agenda from that of their Old World counterparts. They believed in the socio-political arrangements and institutions of the United States and fought against what they saw as the corrupting nature of big business. To organize was to create what economist John Kenneth Galbraith would later describe as countervailing power.

The early part of the twentieth century brought an almost unbelievable expansion of industrial enterprise. Although many of the leading corporations were still tightly held and dominated by the likes of J.P. Morgan or John D. Rockefeller, many competitors managed to raise financial resources and compete with these so-called *robber barons*. The ownership of numerous corporations was beginning to fall into the hands of investors seeking high returns without direct involvement, the day-to-day production and management decisions delegated to professional managers and technicians. Even John D. Rockefeller sold his shares in Standard Oil and stepped down as president. In 1900, at age sixty-five, Andrew Carnegie finally sold his interest in what became the United States Steel Corporation. However, as proof that the old titans were still a force to be reckoned with, J.P. Morgan raised the financing

not only to acquire Carnegie's holdings but to purchase the Mesabi, Minnesota iron ore deposits as well from John D. Rockefeller (with Rockefeller coming on as a director of U.S. Steel). Standard Oil now had to compete with Texaco, Sun Oil and Gulf Oil, while the mammoth U.S. Steel Corporation faced competition from National Steel, Bethlehem Steel, Jones & Laughlin and others. Henry Ford and William C. Durant put the nation's economy on an entirely new footing with the development of the mass-produced automobile. Hardly less can be said of Thomas Edison's creation of the company that became General Electric in 1892. To be sure, millions of immigrants fought a daily battle for survival in the tenements and factories of the nation's crowded cities or in the mines scattered throughout the country. Yet, everywhere one looked in the first decade of the century there was dramatic change occurring, and enormous quantities of wealth being produced at lower and lower cost. A prosperous *middle class* owned their own homes (usually large enough to be occupied by several generations) and was beginning to purchase automobiles and other new conveniences brought to market by the mass producers.

To say there existed in the United States a strong conservative bias in favor of the status quo is to very much overstate the case. Many of those at the bottom were struggling for daily survival in a land they chose, out of hope and desperation, to come to. Americans of African or indigenous tribal heritage shared most of the same hardships, and worse. Those higher up on the socio-economic ladder were determined to stay there, or do even better. And, those engaged in the making and losing of personal fortunes had little room in their thinking for much philosophical reflection on the human condition. Socialists might attack the expanding system of industrial landlordism; or, as they were apt to describe things, *finance capitalism*. They failed (or refused) to see that what the unpropertied or modestly propertied wanted was not a different type of government or the nationalization of industry but a piece of the action. Despite the hardships, the frustrations and the setbacks, the

overwhelming majority held onto the belief that with time and hard word their living conditions would improve. And, if few were attracted to the rhetoric of the socialists, even fewer found reason to entertain the proposals put forth by Henry George's few surviving Single Taxers. The almost universal dream of all those living in the United States was to own a home and a small piece of land. To many, the idea of taxing land values seemed to run directly counter to the pursuit of this dream.

On the one hand, learned Americans such as Harvard's Thomas N. Carver could observe, that "*[f]rom Adam Smith down, economists have recognized the fact that the fortunate owner of a piece of land whose mere site value, irrespective of all improvements, has increased on his hands, is simply a recipient of good fortune, and that this part of his wealth does not represent his own earnings in any way, shape, or manner.*"[688] Then, armed with this knowledge, Carver simply dismissed Single Taxers for "*assuming that the wealth which goes to one individual in this way is necessarily taken from somebody else, or that it in some way deprives somebody else of what he has earned, and in the belief that by taxing away land values we should eliminate poverty and many other social ills.*"[689] Carver was one of many in a long line of professional and amateur economists who failed to appreciate the distinction between "*taxing away land values*" and bringing down the selling price of deeds to land that would occur once the public collection of location rents reached a high enough level. Single Taxers were calling for the gradual and complete removal of taxes from earned incomes, from capital and personal goods and from commerce. To prevent the increased returns to producers from being appropriated by landlords, communities would have to monitor markets closely and periodically adjust the rate of taxation on land values to make certain all or nearly all location rent was captured as public revenue. If Henry George was correct, the end result of such a dramatic change in the way communities raised public revenue would be to concentrate the greatest portion of the rent fund in a country's population centers. Development theorists today would say that those

who control locations would be motivated to bring their land to its highest and best use in the market. Much less land would be held idle because the annual cost of doing so would tend to be high. As vacant and underutilized land was brought onto the market for development, this increased supply would tend to hold down or even reduce location rent (as well as the selling price of land); however, increased demand would eventually place an upward pressure on location rent (although not on selling prices). This is one of the beauties of raising public revenue in a manner consistent with the observation that price acts as a market-clearing device. With the introduction of The Single Tax, the political economy of a community or society moves beyond being a zero sum game and moves closer to an incubator of markets in which every participant receives an adequate and appropriate return.[690] Almost alone among university economics professors, Harry Gunnison Brown held this opinion. In answer to defenders of orthodox economics and the status quo, and in response to socialists calling for nationalization of private industry, Brown offered this:

> The view presented so consistently in [my writing] that incomes received not in payment for services rendered lack social justification will, of course, not be accepted by the Junker type of mind. More or less plausible arguments may again be advanced as they have often been before, in favor of incomes to privileged classes. It will be alleged that members of these classes, not having to worry about their livelihood, will become efficient officers of state, scholars devoted to research, and, in other ways, profitable social servants. To the argument that if a class is to be supported without definite regard to a special service for which their income is received, in order that such results may accrue, the public might select in a better way the individuals who should make up this class, it will doubtless be replied that, in practice, the public will not select in any such manner as to give equally good results. Or the supporters of a privileged aristocracy may go a step farther and defend its existence, not by virtue of any alleged superior social service, but as being good in itself, as a class for the good of which other classes exist, as constituting "the backbone of the state." To one who

accepts either view above outlined, no argument against exploitation will be convincing, especially if the exploitation is of an ancient sort and has the prescriptive sanction of long usage, as is the case with land rent.[691]

The same principles espoused by Harry Gunnison Brown drove the soap manufacturer Joseph Fels to devote much of his life and a major portion of his personal fortune to the task of ridding the world of monopoly privilege. Frustrated by the entrenched opposition of elected and appointed public officials and by public apathy, Fels established a special fund in 1909 for use in achieving implementation of the *Single Tax* somewhere in the United States. The Joseph Fels Fund counted Lincoln Steffens, Louis F. Post, Henry George, Jr. and Tom L. Johnson among its commissioners and advisors. Fels himself traveled the globe as ambassador for the Georgist reform program. "*What I am after is equal opportunity for all, and special privilege for none,*" he told one British socialist, adding, "*we can't get this unless we closely follow just what Henry George has written in his books.*"[692]

Among those in the United States who gave Fels reason to believe they agreed with his point of view were Newton D. Baker, Secretary of War, and Edward House, Woodrow Wilson's close advisor. Fels met House while in Europe on a campaign to contact not only other Georgists and Single Taxers, but to proselytize to socialists and various groups of land reformers. Unfortunately, these close encounters with the power elite proved of fleeting value. In the end, even the dedication and fortune of Joseph Fels proved insufficient for building a mass movement in the turbulent times of the early twentieth century. Fels succumbed to pneumonia early in 1914. His wife, Mary, carried on his work for the next few years but gradually shifted her interest to the Zionist movement and the establishment of a Jewish homeland. There were still dedicated and talented reformers left within the Georgist ranks, but there were just too few of them to make any real inroads. In any event, the First World War changed everything, even the thrust of

Progressivism in the United States. As historian Arthur Dudden has written, "*Woodrow Wilson's New Freedom and its Progressive offspring dominated domestic developments in the United States until 1916, and thereafter the war overwhelmed everything else, just as it had already done in the countries of Europe...*"[693] Here and there, one might stumble across the Georgist remnant, crusaders demonstrating a continued attachment to individualistic socio-political ideas, tempered by a common sense moral philosophy that recognized the destructive powers of *laissez-faire* liberalism.

There was one rather interesting, if minor, interlude that brought a certain degree of public attention to one member of the remnant, the English playwright, Francis Neilson, elected to Parliament in 1910. Then, in 1914 he traveled to the United States, where the publisher B.W. Huebsch agreed to publish Neilson's controversial book, ***How Diplomats Make War***. The British government made sure the book did not find an audience in the British Isles. Neilson later wrote: "*How the book got into England during the war, I cannot tell, for I know that not a single person to whom I sent it received it.*"[694] Neilson soon met a number of Single Tax proponents in New York City, who came to here him lecture on the causes of the war. Neilson also met and befriended Lincoln Steffens, Clarence Darrow and other leading reformers. Then, in 1918, he was invited to take over editorship of the Chicago-based newspaper, ***Unity***. A year later, Neilson was visited by Oswald Garrison Villard, owner of ***The Nation***. Neilson convinced Villard to hire Albert Jay Nock to write articles on economic policy. A new project intervened, as Neilson and Nock collaborated on the creation of a new periodical, ***The Freeman***, which first appeared in March of 1920.

Albert Jay Nock brought together a talented staff to produce the magazine, and Neilson became an important contributor of material. Under Nock's open style of leadership, ***The Freeman*** sought to introduce readers to "*the long neglected and fallow field of American radicalism*"[695] and the antisocial nature of the State. Nock championed anar-

chy as the socio-political structure demanded by justice, inasmuch as true anarchy meant voluntary association and the absence of coercion. In order to get there from where human civilization stood, he challenged the individual to seek understanding:

> When people really want something and are quite sure what it is, they have abundant resourcefulness about getting it....When they really want economic freedom and once learn what it consists in, they will not be asking us or anyone else how to get it, for they will be too busy taking effective action on programmes of their own devising.[696]

After a promising beginning, ***The Freeman*** slowly faded, lasting only four years. Nock wrote favorably about Henry George's ideas but gave his readers mixed signals as to the method of accomplishing change. Nock does not seem to have shared George's appreciation for the monopolistic side of human nature. History, Nock believed, revealed that our essentially cooperative nature had been corrupted by the institutions of the State. With the collapse of the State, we would find our way back to the original socio-political arrangements built on voluntary association. He gradually tired of the continuous effort demanded to keep ***The Freeman*** up to his personal standards. He and Francis Neilson also tired of one another; and, so, ***The Freeman*** ended publication. Nock departed for Belgium and a desperately needed rest. Despite his desire to achieve in his writing a high degree of disinterested scholarship, his books—which included biographical essays on Thomas Jefferson and Henry George—as well as frequent articles published in H.L. Mencken's ***American Mercury***, offered intensely personal perspectives. If Nock can be said to have lost faith even in the power of learning to pull humankind out of the depths of oppressive socio-political arrangements, Francis Neilson rededicated himself to the task. Historians record that the Single Taxers, or Georgists, had had their moment in the sun and were now fading into the wilderness. Other reformers adopted the more pragmatic approach of working to capture

the institutions of the State, which were everywhere in the industrialized societies accruing powers of planning, directing and social engineering. Individualists were just barely holding a rear-guard action against the onslaught.

Extensive readings, only a representative sampling of which could be integrated into this work, lead one to conclude the political activism of Henry George and the Single Taxers, because of the populist character of the campaign, worked against a widespread appreciation of George's full contribution to socio-political philosophy. In the introduction to a book published in 1967, historian David Donald went to far as to categorize Henry George in with others who, he wrote, "*hunted for a magical formula to reduce the complex dilemmas of an industrial society to the simple moral equation of small-town America.*"[697] To have reached this conclusion, Donald could not have possibly read George's perceptive analysis of industrial depressions and their causes. Unfortunately, Donald's view was one accepted by himself and countless others (apparently) without first-hand reading of not only George but of others such as Bolton Hall, Max Hirsch, Henry George, Jr., Louis F. Post, Francis Neilson or Harry Gunnison Brown. With the disappearance of ***The Freeman***, the circulation of which never exceeded several thousand, there was no widely distributed journal of opinion devoting space to the points of view expressed by those whose ideas most closely reflected the essence of cooperative individualism. Never broad-based, political campaigns by Single Tax advocates lost almost all momentum not long after the death of Joseph Fels. Two leading Georgists, Joseph Dana Miller and Oscar Geiger attempted to keep things going, forming the New York State Single Tax League in 1913. The League was strong enough to hold a convention in Buffalo the following September but soon splintered as the attention of activists shifted to the defense of either peace or preparedness. After the First World War, with Woodrow Wilson's grand plan for global peace in shambles, the Progressive agenda was again brought to the forefront of

U.S. politics. To the extent possible, the Georgist remnant also once again became active.

Miller and Geiger, buoyed by the return of normalcy, convinced the remaining cadre of Single Taxers of the necessity to form a new political party. Fifty delegates met in Chicago in 1920, selecting Robert C. Macauley of Pennsylvania and R.C. Barnum of Ohio as their candidates for president and vice-president, respectively. The party survived, renamed the Commonwealth Land Party, into the 1924 election, running William J. Wallace of New Jersey and John C. Lincoln of Ohio as its candidates. After 1924, left without financial resources and split over strategy and tactics, the movement initiated by Henry George no longer had sufficient strength to compete in national or statewide campaigns. "*The movement as a whole, at that time, was in a sorry state,*" Robert Clancy later wrote. "*Old timers were dying and not enough new converts were being made to replace them. Straggling lecturers spoke here and there. Henry George's works were out of print.*"[698] This was not, however, to be the end; rather, a slow and not wholly sustained rebuilding effort was undertaken. The work received important assistance when a foundation was established with funds left by Robert Schalkenbach, a successful printer, for the purpose of republishing Henry George's writings. In Pennsylvania, Single Tax activists had been successful prior to the First World War in gaining passage of a Graded Tax Law permitting the city of Pittsburgh (as well as Scranton, in the far northeastern part of the state) to split land and improvements into two separate categories for the purposes of applying tax rates. This small group of Pennsylvanians established the Henry George Foundation of America.[699] Annual conventions brought the old guard and occasional new converts together for encouragement, discussion and friendship. The promise of new blood increased in 1932 after Oscar Geiger and Joseph Dana Miller once more collaborated to establish the Henry George School of Social Science in New York City. Francis Neilson provided funds to help establish a branch of the School in Chicago in 1936, under the direction of

John L. Monroe. Geiger lived long enough to get the School off the ground; worn out by long hours of work and meager resources, he died on June 29, 1934. Three years later, Frank Chodorov became director of the School, which was now publishing its own journal, named by its founder, Will Lissner, ***The Freeman***, as an expression of the philosophical link this journal would have to the original. Bertrand Russell and John Dewey became contributors, as did George Bernard Shaw. Despite their personal estrangement, Francis Neilson and Albert Jay Nock supported the project.

Outside of the few Georgist institutions and scattered individual efforts by academicians such as Harry Gunnison Brown, neither the socio-political philosophy nor economic analysis developed by Henry George was given serious treatment in the nation's colleges and universities. By the 1940s, even classical political economy itself, in the manner developed by John Stuart Mill, all but disappeared from the colleges and universities of the United States. The principles of cooperative individualism, rich in the tradition of Thomas Paine and more completely developed by Henry George, survived on the shelves of libraries and in the minds and hearts of a dwindling number of stalwart defenders. In hindsight, their task had been enormous—to achieve by peaceful, democratic and voluntary means fundamental societal restructuring in a world where militancy, reactionary oppression, coercion and direct force characterized life within the nation-state and relations between governments. The world's transnationals, holding and espousing universal values consistent with moral principles, remained small in number and wholly without organization or direction.

FORCE AND COUNTER FORCE
INDUSTRIAL LANDLORDISM AND THE STATE

No one at the turn-of-the-century needed to possess a particularly keen intellect to recognize that tensions were building between industrial landlords and their workers. The millions of unskilled and semi-skilled workers could see that despite a rapidly expanding output of industrial and consumer goods, the control over locations, natural resources and wealth was becoming more rather than less concentrated.[700] In the United States, activists and reformers could point to the actions of individuals such as John D. Rockefeller, Andrew Carnegie and J.P. Morgan as examples of how *the American System* nurtured monopolistic behavior. A second tier of self-made men working the system to their advantage included men such as George Pullman, whose employees lived in a corporate town he constructed and managed according to a strict business plan described by economist Richard T. Ely as "*well-wishing feudalism.*"[701] These industrial landlords were vehemently opposed to trades unions, and engaged in all manner of brutal tactics as they worked to keep the supply of potential labor large, wages low and the work force compliant. As the first decade of the twentieth century arrived, however, they increasingly faced formidable foes. Labor leaders such as Eugene Debs were just as determined and were beginning to win support from reform politicians.

What began to trouble the nation's patrician leaders most was not opposition to the living conditions of those who worked in the mines and factories but the growing attachment of those who led the industrial workers—and many within the middle class—to the rhetoric and programs of socialism. Fear and respect for the radical nature of socialism jolted some within the controlling class out of their complacency in an effort to save the republic from the threat of upheaval. This was certainly the case with Theodore Roosevelt, for example. In his

Autobiography, Roosevelt reflected on what he saw as a great challenge faced by those (himself included) who pursued a Progressive agenda:

> We were no respecters of persons. Where our vision was developed to a degree that enabled us to see crookedness, we opposed it whether great or small. As a matter of fact, we found that it needed much more courage to stand up *openly* against labor men when they were wrong than against capitalists when they were wrong. The sins against labor are usually committed, and the improper services to capitalists are usually rendered, behind closed doors. Very often the man with the moral courage to speak in the open against labor when it is wrong is the only man anxious to do effective work for labor when labor is right.[702]

In the end, the alliance between wholehearted reformers and Progressives such as Roosevelt incrementally cut through rather than moved the mountains of entrenched wealth and power. Public policy in the United States was about to change direction, but do so without a clear vision of the outcome. Political scientists would later look back on what had occurred and characterize the process by the apt term *disjointed incrementalism.*

During the later part of the nineteenth century, Darwin (expanded upon by Herbert Spencer, among others) provided the intellectual foundation for the defense of *laissez-faire.* Roosevelt, realizing that industrial landlordism had grown out of control and was threatening social harmony and political stability, added his influence to the coalition of reformers and Progressives convinced that the only effective response to the excesses of *laissez-faire* was to expand the powers of government to intervene and somehow make certain that such intervention advanced the general welfare. Intellectuals were reminded by Frederick Jackson Turner that universal landownership in the Jeffersonian era had been key to creating a rough equilibrium of power. That equilibrium had disappeared in less than a century. A larger and larger portion of the citizenry was not merely landless but propertyless,

in addition to being alien in traditions and culture. What the nation needed was equality of opportunity obtained by securing each individual's equal birthright of access to nature. The path pursued by most reformers (and welcomed by agrarian and industrial landlords alike) ignored Turner's insights and those made by Henry George. Many came to the conclusion that individual weakness and not socio-political arrangements need to be addressed. Those who enjoyed the best that the United States had to offer—and even many who did not—still held fast to the promise of opportunity that had for so long attracted people from the Old World or lured second, third, fourth or fifth generation Americans into the interior. "*It is in this power of absorption, in this power of organic digestion which no European nation possesses,*" concludes historian Amoury de Riencourt, "*that the United States' capacity for growth and development resides—in fact, in its superb political and social metabolism.*"[703] And, in fact, there is just enough truth in this observation to divert attention from the structural problems inherent in *the American System.* Many felt that not even the United States could take in the large numbers of immigrants from so many different cultures and survive the process.

Leading *Americans* recognized the challenges posed by massive immigration and pressed for action. Not only must the pace of immigration be dramatically slowed, the means had to be found to Americanize those who arrived, bringing them into the mainstream and channeling their discontent into responsible civic involvement. A new generation of European-trained social scientists ensured the best and brightest among them could be brought into contact with mentors who rejected Marx or even Eduard Bernstein as architects for change. The social scientists also had counterparts within the community of legal scholars who were awakening to the bias in favor of privilege by which the law had become so deeply corrupted. For good or ill, they could now look to the U.S. Supreme Court and hear Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., urging his fellow jurists to accept the will of the

majority, "*unless it can be said that a rational and fair man necessarily would admit that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental principles as they have been understood by the traditions of our people and our law.*"[704] Younger reform-minded Progressives were prepared to push the law well beyond even these limits.

One of the brightest and most energetic reformers to enter the law was Louis D. Brandeis, born in 1856, the son of Jewish immigrant parents who left Prague after the failed revolution of 1848. His father had come first. Making his way into the midwest—and after a brief taste of the long hours and tiresome labor on a farm—the elder Brandeis came to the conclusion that life on the land would not be agreeable to the extended family ready to follow him to North America. Settling in the town of Madison, Indiana, on the Ohio River, and then moving to Louisville, Kentucky, the family prospered enough to allow for a leisurely European tour in the early 1870s. Louis did not stay with the others, however; he began studies at Annen-Realschule in Dresden in the fall of 1873 and continued there until 1875 when the family decided to return to the United States. Later that year he entered Harvard Law School, where he performed near the top of his class. He was, at the same time, developing an informed opinion of what constituted a truly just society. While still at Harvard, he wrote in a notebook:

> The aim of civilization is the bettering of the condition of man and advancement of human happiness. This can only be attained by "rounding him off"—and only that degree of concentration of labor, specialism, is conducive to that end and purpose—to civilization itself—as maximizes this rounding off. Man is a complete organism intended to grapple with all questions and conditions of life; he is a world in himself and excessive specialism, individual or local, works against nature.[705]

After graduation, Louis Brandeis settled down to practice law in St. Louis, Missouri. Within a year, however, he was lured back to Boston by one of his Harvard classmates, Samuel D. Warren, Jr. In addition to

building a law practice representing corporate clients and well-to-do individuals, Brandeis also accepted a teaching position at Harvard. He was just twenty-five years old.

Warren eventually left their practice to take over a family business, and Brandeis went on to build the firm with new blood. By the early 1890s his reputation was such that he received an invitation from Francis A. Walker to give a series of lectures on business law at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. While planning this course, Brandeis became deeply interested in the plight of striking Pennsylvania steel workers and their battle against the Carnegie-Illinois Steel Company. Thus, for his lectures he decided not to simply describe the historical evolution of commercial law; rather, he would embark on a full examination of how well the law protected the rights of those who labored in return for paper currency as wages. He went on to demonstrate, to the great chagrin of the nation's industrial landlords, that existing laws merely sanctioned the exercise by corporate employers and others in business of criminal licenses against their employees, communities and customers. At this point his activism pulled him into the ranks of Progressives fighting against political corruption of the legal system. His intellectual contribution to this effort proved to be of enormous benefit. One of the questions he struggled with, for example, was the extent to which freedom of individual action ought to be protected. In the matter of temperance he recommended a level of intervention that acknowledged the reality of human behavior as well as the need for establishing limits to the individual's ability to exercise freedom:

> Liquor drinking is not a wrong; but excessive drinking is. Liquor will be sold; hence the sale should be licensed. Liquor is dangerous; hence the business should be regulated. No regulation can be enforced which is not reasonable.
>
> The better the men who sell liquor, the less the harm done by it. Hence, strive to secure for the business those who are respectable. Self-respect and prosperity are the

most effective guardians of morals. Unenforceable or harassing laws tend to make criminals.[706]

On this and many other issues, Brandeis combined reason with observation in a manner that could have resulted in far more appropriate public policy than what was put into place. He began from the premise that the legitimate and necessary role of government is to secure and protect individual liberty. Against this philosophical point of view were lined up most of the stalwarts who practiced law and controlled the American Bar Association. Brandeis realized that those who sought to preserve the status quo represented serious threats to the republic. And, despite his Old World heritage and education, he came to cherish many of those values inherent in cooperative individualism. There is good reason to believe he was pulled in this direction by personal experience. "*I should tell you about Henry George,*" he wrote to his father in 1889. "*Don't fail to hear him if he comes within reach of you.*"[707] Brandeis was one individual who found in Henry George's writings something far more powerful than a program of tax reform.

His commitment to justice then brought Brandeis into contact with Henry Demarest Lloyd and into the struggle for miners' rights against the Pennsylvania coal companies. In this effort he stressed to both sides their common interests. He met with business and union leaders alike, offering not only legal advice but constructive input on more efficient management. He promoted the idea of industrial democracy as a necessary means of preventing radical and socialist destruction of all existing socio-political arrangements, including those consistent with moral principles. Moreover, he wholeheartedly agreed with Henry George that the long-term fortunes of the wage laborers and the owners of business were directly related. During this period he also debated union leader Samuel Gompers on the question of whether unions ought to be incorporated. His advocacy of the affirmative position brought accusations by Gompers and industrialists alike that he was contributing to class

hatred. His next battle became reform of the life insurance industry, which he accused in detailed fashion of systematic fraud and extortion of uneducated and low income policyholders. This was followed by a fight to open the railway freight industry to competition. He emerged from these battles a major Progressive spokesperson after successfully defending before the U.S. Supreme Court[708] the constitutionality of legislation limiting the working hours of women employed in the nation's factories.

Brandeis was, of course, far from alone in these struggles. The list of Progressives and other reformers working to at least mitigate the societal ills associated with the concentrated control over locations, natural resources, wealth, income and political power was rapidly growing as the nineteenth century ended. I have touched on the contributions of only a few key individuals. Many present studies in contradiction, such as Lincoln Steffens, who in the early part of his career seemed to have recognized and accepted in cooperative individualism the way out of the morass, but ended up supporting the adoption of state-socialism and (in a blind admiration for Lenin and Stalin) totalitarianism. Yet, the synergistic influence of their rather disjointed and often misdirected agitation resulted in important changes breathing new life into the republic, while much of the rest of humanity exchanged whatever liberty they enjoyed (which was little enough) for the tenuous security provided by an all-powerful State. In the United States, commitments to reform measures and to a greater degree of societal justice were supported, importantly, by a prosperous economy and expanding storehouse of wealth.

Discontent, even disillusionment, arose and subsided in the United States with the shifts in economic fortune. Recessions and panics brought pain but were not sufficiently prolonged to convert restlessness into a broadened desire for radical upheaval. The rural base of populism evolved, for example, from a splinter movement into an effective special interest quest for subsidies and appropriations. In much the

same way, the trades unions emerged as advocates of the particular interests of specific groups of wage laborers. New scientific discoveries, technologies and inventions poured out of the nation's colleges, workshops and corporate research facilities. Appearance of the automobile in sizable numbers was already changing the course of industrial investment before the first decade of the twentieth century came to an end. Government failed to effectively protect citizens from criminal and economic licenses imposed by many private monopolies but did not itself absorb much of the wealth they managed to accumulate. Progressives took comfort in the fact that Theodore Roosevelt had led the anti-trust charge against the nation's monopolists and speculators, but this was a stroke on behalf of competition and fairer markets rather than a move to expand the regulatory power of the State. However, when the economy turned downward in 1906, Roosevelt suggested the power of the nation's financial magnates had been at least a contributing factor and ought to be curtailed:

> It may well be that the determination of the government to punish certain malefactors of great wealth has been responsible for something of the troubles, at least to the extent of having caused these men to bring about as much financial stress as they can in order to discredit the policy of the government.[709]

In the face of widespread economic crisis, the industrial landlords attempted to place the blame squarely on the back of Roosevelt and his interventionist policies. Global and domestic forces—natural and those ignited by socio-political arrangements—had come together in dramatic fashion that few among the patricians or reformers were able to comprehend. Many instinctively understood that the portion of economic activity attributable to speculative investments financed by debt was a destabilizing factor. Some of the most unscrupulous market manipulators also controlled the banks, and late in 1907 their collapse caused a panic. Within days the stock market also began a downward

slide that could not be halted. The financiers of the nation gathered around J.P. Morgan in his New York headquarters in a desperate effort to restore public confidence. Morgan sent his emissaries to visit Roosevelt, armed with a plan that would raise the cash necessary to back the markets and rescue the troubled banks. At Morgan's request, the Bank of England dispatched $10 million in gold specie to support the dollar. Miraculously, the panic ended. People once again deposited their financial reserves and the system cranked on.

At the time these events unfolded, the United States still had the most decentralized and least controlled monetary and credit system of any leading industrialized nation. The Panic of 1907 brought the era of *laissez-faire* finance to a close. The U.S. Congress adopted legislation[710] guaranteeing the nation's banks sufficient reserve liquidity to survive runs on their deposits. The banks were also authorized to jointly issue new notes, secured by their non-deposit assets, which could circulate until a panic subsided and then gradually be retired. A new National Monetary Commission was charged with the task of proposing further changes to the system that would improve stability and generate public confidence. Needless to say, widely differing views abound regarding the motives and impact of ensuing changes. Historians continue to debate whether J.P. Morgan acted out of patriotism or simply recognized his own empire was threatened. Public pressure for reform intensified, so much so that within a few years Morgan's business affairs became the subject of government investigation. Upon taking office in 1913, Woodrow Wilson was committed to taking action.

The report of the National Monetary Commission issued the previous year aroused the rancor of Progressives within the Democratic party because of its blatant bias in favor of the status quo. The Commission chairperson, Senator Nelson W. Aldrich of Rhode Island, was a staunch ally of the New York banking establishment (his daughter was married to John D. Rockefeller, Jr.), and he was thoroughly distrusted by Progressives eager for structural reform. The Commission's

report recommended establishment of a privately-controlled central bank, to be capitalized by at least $100 million from member banks all across the nation. The new central bank would issue its own gold-backed notes and be designated to manage the deposits of the U.S. government. This the Progressives saw as a grab for monopolistic control over the nation's supply of credit and a virtual re-establishment of the Second Bank of the United States. Yet, in 1911, economist Frank Taussig acknowledged that the "*decentralized banking system of the United States*" had "*broken down completely in times of stress, not once, but repeatedly,—so often that a remedy of some sort is imperative.*"[711] Either the existing system had to be strengthened, Taussig added, or the nation would have no choice but to create a central bank. The Progressives split over what direction to take. Virginia Congressman Carter Glass, who chaired the House subcommittee on banking reform, supported a plan to establish a decentralized system of reserve banks. William Jennings Bryan pushed for full government control over the banking system and the direct issuance of legal tender. Louis D. Brandeis pressed Wilson to support Bryan, and Brandeis wrote a series of articles published in ***Harper's Weekly*** attacking what he saw as the *Money Trust* with its structure of interlocking directories.

Wilson initially seemed to take the view of Bryan and Brandeis. When word of their plan got out, however, the public response by most bankers was that direct government control was nothing less than pure socialism. When the final bill emerged from Glass's subcommittee, it became clear that the bankers had succeeded in getting most of what they wanted. The final version was passed by the House and Senate in December of 1913, creating twelve privately-controlled Federal Reserve banks governed by a Board comprised of seven members appointed by the President of the United States and confirmed by the U.S. Senate. Although the Bryan-Brandeis faction within the Progressive camp accused Wilson of selling out, the President, historians tell us, was genuinely relieved that the matter was behind him so that he could get on

with what seemed to him more important matters. In the end, he had relied on the advice of his trusted adviser, Edward M. House, not realizing that House was intimately attached to the bankers and, in effect, very much their agent within the administration. House was instrumental in convincing Wilson to fill the Federal Reserve Board with the very bankers and other businessmen the system had ostensibly been created to regulate. House recommended, for example, the appointment of Paul Warburg, a partner in the Wall Street firm of Kuhn, Loeb & Company, to the Board. Within a few years, it would become apparent to Progressives that the system adopted was itself seriously flawed and that deeper reform was needed.

The year 1913 also saw the publication of a work by a young Columbia University professor, Charles A. Beard, that seemed to identify serious cracks in the foundation of the republic. Two years abroad had brought Beard in close association with socialists and other reformers in Britain and exposed him to the consequences of Britain's entrenched system of class-based privilege. He was even considered by the British leader Ramsay MacDonald for a Labour government position. Within the pages of his book, ***An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution,*** Beard dispassionately documented a concentration of wealth, power and vested interest among those who framed the national government for the United States. Defenders of the idealized view that the laws of the United States embodied all that was good and just were not amused. Twenty-two years later, in an introduction to the 1935 edition of his controversial work, Beard observed that "*[p]erhaps no other book on the Constitution has been more severely criticized, and so little read.*"[712] In a case of transparent conservativism, historian Theodore C. Smith went so far in 1934 as to condemn the book as Marxian. To be sure, Progressives and socialists alike did their best to make political use of Beard's evidence that the laws of the land had been constructed from the very beginning to preserve privilege and the personal fortunes of the nation's patrician families. These were, however,

largely intellectual debates that few among the unpropertied heard or cared about. Better working conditions and a living wage remained their primary objectives. The American Federation of Labor (AFL), representing a small but growing percentage the nation's skilled workers, was both moderate in its aims and leadership. After 1905, the nation's unskilled, more migrant, workers began to join the more militant Industrial Workers of the World (IWW). Here there was real danger to the republic.

Mainstream America was becoming anxious, afraid that labor strife would bring wholesale violence. The Socialist party itself began to purge radicals from its ranks, removing the IWW's William D. Haywood in 1913 from the national executive committee. The Federal courts aided in the pacification of the IWW by refusing to grant citizenship to foreign-born individuals who were members. Then, in 1915, Woodrow Wilson authorized an investigation of the IWW's organizing activities in the agricultural districts of California. The mood of the nation was, in fact, changing under the strain of contradictory influences. Industry was already operating on a gigantic scale that had spread to agriculture as well. The natural response adopted by workers was to come together for some degree of security. Patricians and Progressives recognized the need to regulate these competing forces and mitigate the worst consequences of criminal license perpetrated by individuals in the name of their union or business. The general public simply acquiesced to the incremental expansion of government. Justice, admitted Woodrow Wilson, demanded action. Addressing the nation on March 4, 1913, as the new President, Wilson told the country what he intended to do:

> The firm basis of government is justice, not pity....There can be no equality of opportunity, the first essential of justice in the body politic, if men and women and children be not shielded in their lives, their very vitality, from the consequences of great industrial and social processes which they can not alter, control, or singly cope

with. Society must see to it that it does not itself crush or weaken or damage its own constituent parts. The first duty of law is to keep sound the society it serves. Sanitary laws, pure food laws, and laws determining conditions of labor which individuals are powerless to determine for themselves are intimate parts of the very business of justice and legal efficiency.[713]

Woodrow Wilson ended his speech with a "*summon*" of "*all honest men, all patriotic, all forward-looking men*" to assist and counsel him in this endeavor. Based on his subsequent appointments and actions while in office, historian George Tindall later concluded, however, that "*Wilson had never been a strong progressive of the social-justice persuasion.*"[714] Wilson had told the people what he knew they wanted to hear. Now he would proceed at a pace he hoped would threaten few while somehow satisfying many.

More than fifteen thousand Democratic Party faithful, and a handful of sincere reformers, responded to Wilson's initial call. The task of recruiting a cabinet was given to Edward House, in whom Wilson had come to place a great deal of trust despite the fact they had known each other for barely one year. William G. McAdoo, the consumer-oriented and enormously successful head of the Hudson and Manhattan Railroad Company, was brought in as Secretary of the Treasury. He was committed to reigning in monopolies and a program of regulated competition. Brandeis was bypassed for the Attorney General spot in favor of James C. McReynolds, a New York attorney who had been involved in the government's anti-monopoly case against the tobacco trust. For Secretary of State, House chose William Jennings Bryan, the champion of partisan politics who sought to replace as many Republicans as possible without regard to their competence or (history suggests) that of their Democratic successors. Cooperative individualism gained a voice with the appointment of William B. Wilson, a former mine worker and labor organizer, as Secretary of Labor; Louis F. Post became his first assistant. David F. Houston, president of Washington University in St.

Louis, became the first academically trained economist to be appointed to the cabinet. Houston became Secretary of Agriculture. Other appointments seemed stranger, indeed. A New Jersey judge, Lindley M. Garrison was chosen Secretary of War; Josephus Daniels, editor of a Raleigh newspaper, became Secretary of the Navy; the choice of Franklin K. Lane as Secretary of the Interior was an outright reward for political support; and, Texas congressman Albert S. Burleson received the Postmaster General position.

Almost from the beginning, Burleson undermined the Progressive spirit of Wilson's administration by pressing upon Wilson the need to consolidate Democratic Party power if he was to achieve anything at all in the Congress. Yet, in the judgment of Arthur Link, Burleson "*was a superb professional politician, utterly loyal to Wilson, who used the patronage ruthlessly to compel adoption of administration measures.*"[715] Wilson apparently held similar views of how to advance his policy agenda. He revealed to Josephus Daniels that he would "*rather trust a machine Senator when he is committed to your program than a talking Liberal who can never quite go along with others because of his admiration of his own patented plan of reform.*"[716]

The first major test to Wilson's political strategy occurred over tariff reform. Going before a special session of the Congress on April 7, 1913, Wilson argued his case for allowing markets to operate without the burden of tariffs. Despite the efforts of hundreds of lobbyists working against the measure, the House, then the Senate, passed the Underwood-Simmons Tariff bill reducing charges on numerous agricultural products, raw materials and consumer goods. At the same time, the Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution was ratified, followed by adoption of a one percent tax on individual incomes above $3,000. Individuals receiving incomes above $20,000 paid an additional surtax of one percent up to six percent on marginal income over $500,000. Few who voted for this bill looked upon the taxation of income as a socialistic means of income redistribution, but the door had been

opened for the future reliance on individual incomes as a major revenue source for government.

Although Brandeis had been rejected as a candidate for Wilson's cabinet, he was instrumental in convincing the president to create a powerful Federal Trade Commission to regulate business. Wilson revealed the limits beyond which he was unwilling to go by withholding support for measures that would have regulated and restricted child labor. He also failed to fulfill his pledge to extend the vote to women. Late in 1914 he did sign into law the Clayton Antitrust Act. Wilson also sat by while Federal authorities in the District of Columbia and in the southern states reinstitutionalized segregation of the races, discharging many African-Americans from government positions and relegating the remainder to low level support positions. Over Wilson's veto, the Congress responded to pressure from the labor unions and nativist groups, passing legislation that restricted immigration by instituting a literacy test as a condition to entry. Despite the depth of problems remaining to be addressed, Wilson felt he had fulfilled his fundamental campaign promises and was prepared to go no further. With Wilson's subsequent appointments, the more radical Progressives soon became disillusioned.

The Wilson years also produced a confused and contradictory application by U.S. officials of policies toward foreign governments and foreigners, generally. Most Americans who had long ago discarded their Old World heritage were convinced of the moral righteousness of their republic and possessed varying degrees of missionary zeal to spread *the American System*; they were not particularly concerned with the internal problems of Old World societies. More recent immigrant groups tended to see the role of the United States quite differently, and they were the source of activists for the labor unions, socialist groups and organizations dedicated to assisting ethnic and nationalistic causes in the Old World. Woodrow Wilson believed in the republic and in a modified vision of manifest destiny that would spread *the American system*

by example rather than intervention in the internal affairs of other peoples. Standing against even neo-colonialist activities, he prevented participation by U.S. bankers in a consortium planning to finance construction of a new railway system in China. The basis for eventual confrontation with the Japanese was also established during Wilson's first term. Recognition of Sun Yat-sen's national government committed the U.S. to oppose Japanese expansion onto the Asian mainland, even though they were already firmly established in Korea and Manchuria. Relations between the United States and Japan were aggravated further when the California state legislature restricted absentee landownership by Japanese natives. Even the British found reason to question the sincerity of U.S. foreign policy agreements. U.S. shipping had been exempted from paying tolls for use of the Panama Canal, in violation of the 1901 Hay-Pauncefote Treaty.

All too quickly, Wilson's principle of nonintervention disappeared in the western hemisphere. William Jennings Bryan gave in to pressure from agrarian and industrial landlords, committing U.S. military forces for the protection of a despotic and corrupt regime in Nicaragua. Military intervention was also utilized in the Dominican Republic after the eruption of civil war. After a long series of uprisings and unstable regimes in Haiti, Wilson dispatched marines to occupy the capital and pacify the countryside. The fighting "*soon became almost a war of extermination, as the Haitians fought back fanatically....*"[717] At the same time, Wilson, at least, was determined to protect the people in these lands from exploitation by U.S. landlords operating there. He attempted to deal in a straightforward manner with legitimate governments in Central and South America, negotiated a treaty with Columbia and attempted to bring all these nations together under a pact of nonaggression. The U.S. Senate (at the constant urgings of Theodore Roosevelt) refused to ratify the Columbian treaty, and Chile opposed the Pan-American Pact. Despite these setbacks, Wilson had at least in his own mind opened the door for future peaceful cooperation between

sovereign states in the western hemisphere. Where U.S. intervention brought the worst animosity, however, was Mexico. Here, the dictator Porfirio Diaz had been overthrown in 1911 by the idealist reformer, Francisco Madero, who was in turn murdered by one of his generals, Victoriano Huerta. Wilson delayed recognition of this new government because of the circumstances by which Huerta had taken power. U.S. business leaders with significant interests in Mexico urged Wilson to recognize the Huerta regime, on condition that elections be held. Huerta was to agree not to run as a candidate for President. Although infuriated by Wilson's threat of U.S. intervention, Huerta agreed to step aside in favor of his foreign minister, Federico Gamboa. When, on October 10, 1913, Huerta dissolved the Chamber of Deputies and imprisoned over one hundred of its members, Wilson was quick to attach responsibility to the involvement of Europeans with commercial interests in Mexico, the British in particular. Reluctantly, Wilson began to supply arms to Huerta's opposition, the Constitutionalists, who sought sweeping change and were unwilling to share power with any of those who belonged to the landed aristocracy, the army or the existing government. U.S. involvement became direct when, in April of 1914, Wilson used a minor incident as an excuse to order a naval blockade and occupation of Vera Cruz. Even the Constitutionalists vehemently objected to the U.S. action. Reaction in the United States was also highly critical of Wilson. The Constitutionalists now repudiated any U.S. involvement in establishing a new Mexican government at the conclusion of the civil war. Huerta did finally abdicate, and the Constitutionalists assumed power. The U.S. government now intrigued to supplant the Constitutionalist leader, Venustiano Carranza, with Francisco "Pancho" Villa. Within months the country was once again involved in civil war. Opposing both of them were the Zapatistas, indigenous *mestizo* tribesmen determined to take back the land so long controlled by those of European heritage. Their leader, Emiliano

Zapata, was to some extent influenced by socialist ideas conveyed to him by Diaz Soto y Gama. Of Zapata, Henry Bamford Parkes, writes:

> Of all the revolutionary chieftains Zapata alone...wanted nothing and took nothing for himself; and the proclamations which Zapata signed were unrivalled in their clarity and their insight. He alone could sincerely...demand...a social revolution.[718]

Regardless of who assumed power, Mexicans were on the whole victimized by a pattern of random violence and chaos. Wilson, finally accepting Carranza as the leader most likely to bring stability and some degree of democratic government to Mexico, ordered the evacuation of Vera Cruz in October of 1915. Carranza then established the city as his seat of government. Pancho Villa (as well as the Zapatistas) marched into Mexico City as an occupation force rather than as liberating rebels. Carranza worked to gain popular support by proclaiming, among other things, agrarian reform. He promised the indigenous tribes the return of their traditional lands and brought industrial workers into his army. In January, Carranza's army drove Villa out of the capital city and handed him a devastating defeat at Celaya. Villa retreated northward, his army deserting him along the way. Another Carranza army pursued the Zapatistas south of Mexico City into Morelos.

In the United States, Wilson opportunistically shifted full support to Carranza and recognized his government as the legitimate representative of the Mexican people. Villa retaliated by crossing the Rio Grande River into the U.S. and raiding the town of Columbus, New Mexico. Open warfare erupted all along the border between the United States and Mexico, and General John Pershing was sent into Mexico to capture Villa. When this effort proved fruitless and Villa made another raid into Texas, war between the U.S. and Mexico seemed imminent. Somehow, and at least in part because of adverse public opinion in the U.S., war was averted and a peace commission established to work out the problems. Late in January of 1917 Pershing was ordered back to Texas.

Carranza was now free to organize a new constitutional government. More important to Wilson, the United States could now focus on the more troubling events in Europe.

The End of U.S. Isolationist Dreams

Opinion within the United States was severely divided over the conflict in Europe. Most were surprised and shocked that a war of this magnitude could still occur in the world. Those more closely involved with foreign relations recognized that conditions were rapidly deteriorating and that treaty obligations made a broad conflict very likely. When war finally erupted in the summer of 1914, Wilson proclaimed U.S. neutrality. His predominantly English-speaking countrymen mostly supported the British cause. A seldom mentioned fact was, of course, that to take the side of Germany and Austria-Hungary would, as Morison, Commager and Leuchtenburg observe, "*have involved us in a war with our sister democracy, Canada.*"[719] Even the overwhelming majority of German-Americans outspokenly opposed German militarism. Close economic ties, made even closer by Allied needs for war materials, pulled the U.S. toward direct involvement. The loss of the lives of U.S. citizens in attacks by German submarines gradually did the rest.

Most troubling of all to many Americans was the danger that involvement in the war would unleash militarism in the United States. Standing armies and the generals who commanded them were considered by individualistic Americans as a greater risk to the republic than any foreign government. Yet, as the aggressive nature of German militarism became clearer, the nation's journalists and other opinion makers began to make the case for supporting the Allies. Herbert Croly, for one, argued the case for preparedness in the ***New Republic.*** Oswald Garrison Villard, on the other hand, used the editorial pages his family's newspaper, ***The New York Evening Post,*** and its weekly counterpart,

The Nation, to argue the case against a U.S. military build-up.[720] Villard condemned the German government for its failure to prevent the war and for violating Belgian neutrality but urged Americans not to judge the German people too quickly or harshly. He detailed his views in the book ***Germany Embattled***, published in 1915, and emerged as one of the nation's premier pacifists. Michael Wreszin writes that "*[h]e advocated driving from the peace movement all but those who held to the extreme position.*"[721] Villard believed there would be no turning back once the nation's leaders became committed to a centrally-planned program of military preparedness.

Few Americans had as yet grasped that the United States was on the verge of becoming a core participant in the global power struggle. Despite the internationalization of trade and commerce, a naive attachment to ideas of self-reliance and isolation from Old World affairs lingered on. Wilson's ambassador in London, Walter H. Page, held no such illusions. As early as 1913 he expressed his feelings to Wilson that the global hegemony had already changed, and that the United States had little choice but to acknowledge the fact and act accordingly:

> The future of the world belongs to us. A man needs to live here, with two economic eyes in his head, a very little time to become very sure of this. Everybody will see it presently. These English are spending their capital, and it is their capital that continues to give them their vast power. Now what are we going to do with the leadership of the world presently when it clearly falls into our hands?...The great economic tide of the century flows our way. We shall have the big world questions to decide presently. Then we shall need world policies....We are in the international game—not in its Old World intrigues and burdens and sorrows and melancholy, but in the inevitable way to leadership and to cheerful mastery in the future; and everybody knows that we are in it but us. It is sheer blind habit that causes us to continue to try to think of ourselves as aloof.[722]

After the sinking of the steamer Lusitania on May 7, 1915, a harder line was drawn against Germany. Theodore Roosevelt, who had long felt U.S. interests required direct involvement on the side of the Allies, called on the nation to declare war against Germany. Even Villard denounced the sinking as a barbarous act. Wilson dispatched a strongly worded statement demanding the Germans call off submarine warfare against unarmed merchant vessels. William Jennings Bryan, extremely fearful of the losses in lives and material that war would cause, resigned from the cabinet in protest.

Wilson now had to sell the Congress and the nation on a crash program to build a military force capable of decisive intervention. U.S. industry was providing the Allies with increasing quantities of war materials, and yet the U.S. level of preparedness could be described as almost nonexistent. The military budget actually had been cut for 1915. As the year went by, the Republicans relentlessly attacked Wilson for exposing the nation to the possibility of invasion. In mid-1915, Wilson instructed the military to draft a rebuilding plan. With considerable opposition from Progressives and isolationists, enabling legislation was passed during 1916 and the expansion program began in earnest.

One aspect of the political battle occurred over how the added military expenditures were to be paid for. A group of Progressives that included John Dewey, Frederick Howe and George L. Record formed a protest organization, the Association for an Equitable Federal Income Tax, that demanded the burden be carried by those who stood to gain most from wartime expenditures. Representative Warren W. Bailey introduced a tax bill in the House of Representatives with the declaration: "*If the forces of big business are to plunge this country into a saturnalia of extravagance for war purposes in a time of peace, it is my notion that the forces of big business should put up the money.*"[723] The bill passed in the House and was even strengthened by the Senate.

An additional sign that the influence of Progressives remained an important component of Wilson's (and the Democratic Party's) political

survival was the nomination of Louis D. Brandeis to fill a vacancy on the U.S. Supreme Court. Wilson followed by pressing for adoption of legislation establishing workmen's compensation for federal employees and the regulation of child labor. Under pressure from various industrial landlords, however, he also supported *anti-dumping* tariff legislation. Wilson took this record of legislative accomplishment and the fact that the U.S. was still at peace into the election of 1916 against the Republican candidate, Charles Evans Hughes. As the campaign began in earnest in the late summer, Wilson came out in support of the eight hour workday, which was signed into law in September. He also captured the farm vote by supporting a price support system. The Democrats seemed to be the party of peace, growing prosperity and social justice. Wilson was returned to office with what appeared a clear vote of confidence and a mandate to carry out his campaign promises. The Germans cooperated by waiting until after the new year to reopen their own campaign—of unrestricted submarine warfare.

By early 1917, a growing number of Americans realized that Wilson's peace overtures to the belligerents had failed. Neither the Allies nor the Germans were interested in a mere end to hostilities. The war proved to be extremely costly, and each country's leaders was determined to recoup losses by decisive victory on the battlefield and then by the imposition of concessions at the conference table. On February 2, 1917, Wilson addressed a joint session of the U.S. Congress and announced that the United States was ending diplomatic relations with Germany. The country rallied for peace and prepared for war. Shipping across the Atlantic slowed to a crawl, and pressure mounted to dispatch warships to protect merchant vessels from submarine attack. Late in February, the British intercepted a message from the German Foreign Secretary to the Mexican government that urged the Mexicans to join in the coming war against the United States. The Germans also planned to approach the Japanese to join in their alliance. Wilson, astutely recognizing the impact on public opinion, gave this information to the press. Anger and

alarm swept the country. The hard-line non-interventionists made a last ditch effort to deny Wilson the necessary executive power to take the nation into the conflict, but events were moving quickly toward a declaration of war. Three U.S. merchant vessels were sunk in mid-March; a total of 1,500,000 tons went to bottom of the sea during March and April alone. Theodore Roosevelt called for an immediate declaration of war. Wilson hesitated, but only briefly. On April 2 he went before the Congress to ask for the declaration. "*The world,*" declared Wilson, "*must be made safe for democracy.*" The nation, for the most part, quietly followed.

Pacifists and non-interventionists now faced increasing attacks on their character or loyalty, or both. Villard found himself abandoned by friends and put on the defensive by his opponents. One by one the pacifists fell in line. Villard, however, along with the young *Christian Socialist* Norman Thomas, continued to work for a negotiated peace under the auspices of the peace movement's Fellowship of Reconciliation. Within the pages of ***The Post***, Villard waged a battle on behalf of freedom of speech. Norman Thomas declared this was but one more war fought by those at the bottom to maintain the privilege of those at the top. To a member of the clergy who resigned from the Fellowship after U.S. entry into the war, Thomas wrote:

> It is absurd...to say we as a nation are animated in this war purely by love of democracy. Do you really think that our great papers like *The New York Times* which prate about war for democracy are fighting for democracy when they have devoted all their strength to oppose political and industrial democracy at home? Do you think this is a pure love of humanity when they have been the open defenders of a system which produces the unnumbered inhumanities of the industrial life? Do you think Americans in general, with their shameful record of race riots, are purely disinterested redressers of the crimes of Belgium and Armenia?[724]

His views were those of a mostly silent minority, even among socialists. Others, such as Meyer London, who had been elected to the Congress running as a Socialist, reconciled their decision to support the war effort with the hope that victory by the Allies would open the door to significant societal changes. Those who remained tied to the anti-war policies were almost exclusively of European birth. Norman Thomas and Eugene Debs were important exceptions.

To make sure the public heard only the government's war propaganda, Wilson appointed a journalist, George Creel, to head the Committee on Public Information. This committee was provided a powerful weapon when the Congress passed strong legislation against espionage and sedition. Eugene Debs responded in the spring of 1918 by campaigning across the country against Wilson and the government's incursions against individual liberty. After visiting several imprisoned socialists in Canton, Ohio, he opened his speech by declaring that these prisoners had "*come to realize, as many of us have, that it is extremely dangerous to exercise the constitutional right of free speech in a country fighting to make democracy safe for the world.*"[725] A few weeks later he was arrested for sedition, put on trial, convicted and sentenced to ten years in prison (although he did not begin serving his sentence until the First World War had ended). Any and all opposition to the government's war effort was treated as an attack on the republic, and brutally suppressed. Ronald Steel offers this quote from Max Eastman, editor of a socialist newspaper, that fairly sums up the temper of the times:

> You can't even collect your thoughts without getting arrested for unlawful assemblage. They give you ninety days for quoting the Declaration of Independence, six months for quoting the Bible, and pretty soon somebody is going to get a life sentence for quoting Woodrow Wilson in the wrong connection.[726]

Add to this Steel's own conclusion that "*[r]eform was dead, and liberalism itself was suspect*"[727] and one gains a clear sense of the degree to

which intolerance penetrated the thinking of most public officials and, probably, some significant portion of American citizens. Once again in history, war provided an opportunity for statists to strengthen the police powers of government in order to subvert diversity of opinion.

As management of the war effort shifted into high gear, the War Department quickly expanded after its prolonged existence on meager rations. A War Industries Board was established, chaired by Bernard Baruch (a man who had accumulated a sizable fortune by shrewd investments in the stock market). Under the direction of Secretary of War Newton D. Baker, necessity became the mother of interventionism. Felix Frankfurter, Walter Lippmann and many others were brought in to provide intellectual muscle. By late 1917, Lippmann urged Edward House to press upon Wilson that great harm was being done by suppression of constitutional freedoms of speech and press. House went so far as to meet with Villard and Lincoln Steffens to assure them Wilson had not abandoned his commitment to the Progressive agenda. Villard prophetically warned House that Wilson would "*be completely unable to put through his peace program in America unless he [could] rally behind him the liberal and radical opinion of the country.*"[728] Wilson, becoming fearful because of reports from local officials in the Northwest that radical and subversive groups were active, ignored these warnings. A decision was already in the works to deport any aliens who engaged in labor agitation or in any way opposed the government's war effort. He justified this stance on the grounds that survival of the republic was at stake. Preserving political stability and order in the United States outweighed any concerns for due process or other peacetime niceties. The nation's industrial landlords, eager to break the back of the Industrial Workers of the World, were more than willing to provide seed money to this campaign. In Seattle, hundreds, then thousands of alien workers were arrested and detained before the Secretary of Labor called a halt to these roundups. Nativist *Americans* in Seattle nevertheless held deportation hearings on a hundred or so I.W.W. members, most of whom were

migrant lumberjacks or other seasonal workers.[729] In October of 1918, the U.S. Congress gave the Bureau of Immigration even more latitude in deportation of suspected radicals. Where aliens were concerned, the Wilson government declared its acceptance of *guilt by association* as a basis for handing out justice.

In the interim, Edward House (under Wilson's directions) set about to plan for the eventual restoration of peace and restructuring of the Old World. A small working group was formed in New York City that included Walter Lippmann taking on the role of general secretary. By the end of 1917, the initial group had been supplemented by more than a hundred specialists and scholars. They completed their work in time for Wilson to deliver a speech to the Congress on January 8, outlining his Fourteen Points as the basis for the U.S. terms of peace. Neither the British nor the French had been apprised of Wilson's proposals and had no intention whatsoever of a peace without retributions, reparations and territorial demands. Wilson's naive hopes for a new world order were coming to a resounding crash. The war had also cost Wilson critical support at home. Reformers, particularly those who clinged to individualist ideals, were outraged and felt betrayed by what they saw as Wilson's abandonment of principle. Villard attacked the President mercilessly as having shown his true colors in the face of opposition. Albert Jay Nock, who spent the war years in Belgium, hammered away relentlessly against the President. Years later, Nock, allowed himself a fleeting moment to ponder an alternative course that history might have taken:

> Outside the [Georgist] movement, or on the fringes of it, some of the ablest men in the country were "under conviction," as the old-time Methodists used to say. Newton Baker and [Brand] Whitlock were in this group; also Lawson Purdy and William Jay Gaynor, who impressed me as by far the ablest man in our public life. Few know that he might have had the Presidency instead of Wilson if he had consented; he was mayor of New York at the time....I have often wondered what course the country would have taken after 1914 if he had been in Wilson's place.[730]

Yet, for all the chaos, destruction, tyranny and oppression he witnessed, Nock somewhat offhandedly wrote, "*I count myself lucky beyond expression to have lived through the last sixty years rather than the next sixty.*"[731] In Nock's view of the future, much worse was yet to come now that statism had taken hold of the United States, the last bastion of self-governance. Nock's distress is countered by the optimism expressed by Winston Churchill. "*Nothing is final,*" wrote Churchill. "*Change is unceasing and it is likely that mankind has a lot more to learn before it comes to its journey's end.... We might even find ourselves in a few years moving along a smooth causeway of peace and plenty instead of roaming around on the rim of Hell.... Thus we may by patience, courage, and in orderly progression reach the shelter of a calmer and kindlier age.*"[732] What almost every thoughtful person agreed on was that a Second World War would be fought because of the manner in which the first one ended. The world would have to wait until some time after the next global conflict for the arrival of this "*calmer and kindlier age.*"

POSTSCRIPT

This second volume of ***The Discovery of First Principles*** ends here. I have chosen not to repeat details of the First World War; these are readily available to the reader elsewhere. In the final chapter of ***The Guns of August***, historian Barbara Tuchman reflects on the futility of the incredible destruction the belligerents brought to themselves. "*Men could not sustain a war of such magnitude and pain without hope—the hope that its very enormity would ensure that it could never happen again and the hope that when somehow it had been fought through to a resolution, the foundations of a better-ordered world would have been laid,*" writes Tuchman. The reality proved to be quite different, however. "*When at last it was over,*" continues Tuchman, "*the war had many diverse results and one dominant one transcending all others: disillusion.*"[733] Certainly, disillusion played an

important role in the subsequent direction taken by reformers after the war.

Despite Wilson's determined effort to quiet opposition to U.S. entry into the war, there were some who continued to raise their voices against policies they believed were sacrificing sacred principles of liberty at the altar of expedience. Long forgotten today is the impact of Francis Neilson's book, ***How Diplomats Make War***, on the thinking of anti-statists in the United States, particularly. The first edition of the book had appeared anonymously because of Neilson's fear of prosecution by British authorities. His name appeared on a second English language edition in 1916, and the book was soon translated into Swedish and German. A French translation appeared after the war. Shortly after Neilson's arrival in the United States, he was invited to deliver a lecture at Carnegie Hall on secret diplomacy. Early in 1916, Neilson departed for a lecture tour across the heartland of the United States, beginning in Chicago. Later in the year he made the acquaintance of Lincoln Steffens in New York, with whom he shared a "love of fundamental justice."[734] Neilson resumed his lecture tour over the winter of 1916-17, returning to Chicago in the spring. Jane Addams hoped to include Neilson in a national series of peace rallies, but Wilson was now preparing the nation for entry into the war. Neilson records in his autobiography that he was informed by Amos Pinchot of "*the whole story of how America was maneuvered into the war.*"[735] Neilson was warned that continued lectures against the war would be dangerous. Throughout the summer of 1917 he lectured on the potential for a future United States of Europe to emerge out of the war. The government still viewed Neilson with suspicion and always had agents and a stenographer at his lectures. As described earlier in this chapter, after the war ended Neilson collaborated with Albert Jay Nock on ***The Freeman***. Then, at the suggestion of his wife, Neilson and she decided to travel across the Atlantic to see first hand the conditions in England, France and Germany. At this time,

Neilson was among those who still held out hope for a bright future for Europe:

> Much of my time was devoted to the Union of Democratic Control and the work it had undertaken. At different times I must have had six or eight men working in England, France, Italy and Germany, on the diplomatic documents not included in the various colored books. This organization grew in strength and gave promise for a body so utterly unpopular as that which started with the thirty-two men who opposed [Edward] Grey's policy, to gather to it in a few years many of the finest men in Europe, irrespective of party politics.[736]

The question that plagued Neilson, and others, was what could be done about the Treaty of Versailles. "*Not a year passed, until the coming of Hitler,*" wrote Neilson, "*that I did not give my time and money to this mission.*"[737]