
The Place of Values in Economics

Author(s): George Raymond Geiger

Source: *The Journal of Philosophy*, Jun. 19, 1930, Vol. 27, No. 13 (Jun. 19, 1930), pp. 350-361

Published by: Journal of Philosophy, Inc.

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2015256>

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at <https://about.jstor.org/terms>



is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *The Journal of Philosophy*

JSTOR

THE PLACE OF VALUES IN ECONOMICS¹

IT must be clear that the discipline of economics, ever since its rather recent severance from the classic concepts of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century political economy, has made a determined effort to follow the path prescribed by the descriptive sciences. The word "theory" itself has become increasingly suspect with recent economists and is being supplanted by more characteristic and suggestive terms, "statistics," "quantitative analysis," and the like. Even more unpopular are the ethical and logical concepts that once constituted almost the entire fabric of the science. Economics—to cite, as an example, the contentions of Professor Davenport and Professor Mitchell—must develop technologically, not logically, and statistically, not ethically. It must seek for data, but shun standards, correlate facts, but avoid values, be descriptive, not normative.

If one should approach the economist with a plea for the recognition or the creation of values, if there is expressed the somewhat pious hope that economic data are to be organized in terms of economic welfare, he is politely referred to some of the other social disciplines, to sociology, perhaps, or to that vague field of social ethics. But should one follow the suggestion of the economist, with what is he confronted? It will be found that these other social enterprises are likewise engaged in a precipitous rush to the goal of description. Should economics, for instance, point to sociology for norms, it will be discovered that sociology is busily engaged in neglecting standards for case histories. The social sciences are yearning to be natural sciences. They are no longer content with remaining even historical descriptions; they must "go physical." No longer must the stigmas of "theoretical" or "deductive" or "introspective" or "arm-chair technique" or "closet approach" be placed upon the social sciences.

It must be clear also that the cause of this about-face may be traced to the antagonistic reaction of the social disciplines, particularly economics, to the classic ethical formulations of the early nineteenth century, coupled with the increased data that have resulted from a new and more technical methodology. The ideal of nineteenth-century political economy may be said to have aimed at the expression of ethical judgments in terms of logical classifications. Present-day economics is seeking the other pole, and in-

¹ Read at the meeting of the American Philosophical Association, December 30, 1929, New York City.

stead presents the description of phenomena in terms of passionless, judgment-proof graphs.²

Now, this perhaps exaggerated portrait must not be construed as a criticism of the more recent technique of economic science. That criticism would be as foolhardy as it would be foolish. Certainly the collection of data and the emphasis upon inductive processes must be welcomed and must be made the foundation of any enterprise that presumes to construct a rigorous discipline. However, the difficulty that must be suggested here is that found in the embarrassing situation in which values are placed by such a shifting of incidence on the part of the social sciences. Moral values have long since been expelled from the physical sciences, and now they are being squeezed out of the social sciences. Indeed, it would begin to appear that the exorcism of standards and norms is now a prerequisite for any enterprise which desires to achieve respectability.

This difficulty, therefore, presents itself: where are values to find a refuge and how are they to exercise control? Of course, the realm of values may again seek a haven from such snubbing in some remote region of ethics, carefully insulated from the more lowly disciplines. That certainly would be nothing new; ethics has always striven to inhabit such an ethereal kingdom and has suffered nostalgia when removed from the upper air, but characteristically it had sought that speculative world itself while now it seems to be banished there. The danger, then, that may result from the expulsion of values from economics and the other social sciences, is the re-introduction, from another angle, of the traditional cleavage between ethics and the humble sciences that was so characteristic a part of former philosophy. That cleavage must be recognized to be present whether the approach be that of classic theory which held that ethics was too exalted a creature to be hampered by the crudities of empiricist techniques, or that of the modern economist who refuses to be annoyed by the distractions that a consideration of standards would introduce into facts. The certain effect of both approaches is to make values remote and inoperative, to segregate judgment from description, and to present us with a dilemmatic choice between a social science that is without values or a social ethics that is without facts. Yet we must not forget, to distort a famous line, that "facts without values are blind; values without facts are empty."

The danger that is suggested here is not one that need greatly

² If this paper appears to exaggerate certain distinctions and approaches, that exaggeration is realized as such and perhaps may charitably be interpreted as suggesting emphasis.

concern the physical sciences. They have traditionally—that is, since the birth of modern science—been exempt from the moral justification that has been demanded of the more hybrid social disciplines. Science has been recognized as disinterested and therefore privileged, and ideally ethics has been permitted to trouble the scientist as little as it has the artist. Such an esthetic point of view, however, will hardly carry over to the enterprise of economics. Here, values are by no means implicit in the functions and operations of economic concepts, but are bound up inextricably with the meanings and operations of other disciplines of control, that is, of extra-economic social and moral agencies. Take, for example, the concept of property or the distinction between earned and unearned income. Contemporary economics is attempting to operate with property as a phenomenon that is simply nothing more or less than the last step in a long and arduous evolutionary development. It is a given, an economic datum that is to be approached quantitatively, with perhaps at most a statistical investigation into its internal efficiency; that is to say, for purposes of economic science, it is to be accepted for what it is. Present-day economics likewise seems to be endeavoring to lump together all phases of income, avoiding distinctions between earned and unearned varieties of wealth. (Professor Davenport's definitions of capital and property are particularly suggestive in this connection.) Income, like property, is to be accepted as a concept resulting from the operations of economics, its values lying within the range of the science itself.

While such a procedure definitely represents the "scientific" aim of economics, namely, the attempt to handle its material dispassionately without the slant or direction that valuation would introduce, still the benedictions that have been reserved for that approach in the physical sciences can with but little success, it seems, be dispensed in fields such as that of economics. Property and income, that is, can scarcely be accepted with the same equanimity that is accorded in the natural sciences to paramoecia or quanta or catalysts. The subject-matter that concerns economics has often had too checkered a career to submit gracefully to the calmness that a quantitative or even an historical survey cheerfully bestows. In other words, the exemption of the data of physical disciplines from ethical standards is a unique privilege, and possible only because of the intrinsic values—perhaps dominantly esthetic—which are present in the creative operations and technique of science; whereas perhaps because the social enterprises are too tainted with earth and Adam, with man and man's possessions, too humanistic (to use a word somewhat inaccurately), the divorce of facts from

values in such endeavors would tend to cripple their social significance and to make complete the isolation of ethics.

This, however, must not be interpreted as a plea for the wholesale fusion of economics and ethics. It is rather the suggestion that, since it has been the insistence of much recent philosophy that ethics concern itself with the more prosaic enterprises in order to proceed upon its path of evaluating with sufficient descriptive material, a converse demand should be made upon economics to the effect that it in turn be not too neglectful of the responsibility of judging. One can not ask too much of ethics. While it must attempt to grasp the significant findings of other studies, it can not be expected, for example, to delve into the technical and often dismal details of economics. Nor, on the other hand, can an enterprise such as economics be required to act as a surrogate for moral speculation. But it may be demanded that just as ethics must place no insulation between itself and the social sciences, so likewise these alleged descriptive techniques can not rightfully disavow all consideration of values. Maybe a plea for a little less division of labor would be in order, for so long as economics and ethics each concentrates rigidly upon its specific approach, the one being descriptive and the other interpretive, the significant marginal spheres which surround each enterprise will never be able to coincide. There can be little intelligent coöperation if each social science is to remain descriptively isolated, each one outdoing the other in its disparagement of directing elements.

It has been mentioned above that the slighting of values in economics and the other social sciences has been, in part, a reactionary shift away from the eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century ethical approach. That ethical approach may perhaps be typified by the concept of natural rights. It is realized full well that even a mention of natural rights is always dangerous. Any discussion of the topic, even the briefest—as this will necessarily be—must labor under a genuine embarrassment, the difficulty of examining a cadaver without being suspected of the mutilation or, on the other hand, of the resurrection of the dead.

Nevertheless, it seems in point here, as a possible example of a reconciliation of fact and value in political and economic theory, to mention the more recent interpretation of the classic doctrine of rights. There must first be taken for granted, of course, in an approach to such a concept, an awareness of the complete disapproval of the traditional formulation of the doctrine. The arguments that have been employed against natural rights are now almost commonplace: for example, that the “individual,” upon whose metaphysical status as a discrete and autonomous entity the whole problem of rights depends, is a concept quite questionable

when tested by an organismic standard of social processes; that the concept "natural" is a very poor methodological instrument, since it demands a criterion essentially unempirical, intuitive, noetic, "rationalistic," and since, as experience has unmistakably shown, it has been used to justify all manner of doctrine; that these rights were too rigid, too absolute, and likewise too many in number, that they "multiplied essences" and were therefore inapplicable for purposes of expediency and utility; that the whole concept of natural rights, instead of being any ultimate and eternal precious charter of liberties, was rather a clearly traceable historical phenomenon that came into such tremendous import largely because it was used as a weapon by eighteenth-century liberals; all this must be recognized as legitimate and familiar criticism of the natural rights approach to the relation of the individual to society, criticism, moreover, which reaches back to early nineteenth-century English jurists and political theorists, Bentham, Burke, Austin.

However, the thought that will be suggested here is that the metaphysical interpretation of the doctrine of natural rights, which perhaps well deserved the strictures that have been directed against it, was essentially a narrow and over-rigorous interpretation. It is quite true that "natural" as a political and economic criterion is unsound as a metaphysical concept, i.e., that there is no warrant for postulating an eighteenth-century apotheosis of Nature as the basis of social orders and economic systems, and unsound also—for want of a better word—as an epistemological concept, namely, that there is no way of knowing when the "natural" state is achieved, that no bell rings at its realization. But when corrections and allowances are made in terminology, it may be recognized that "natural" means normative, and that the seeking after the natural is ethical and not metaphysical; it is a demand for standards and criteria, the symbol—perhaps hypostatized—for values. And it is under the aspect of this non-metaphysical interpretation that the concept of natural rights, and likewise that of natural law, are being subject to a new evaluation, at least in certain disciplines such as that of jurisprudence.

The philosophy of law, just as that of economics, experienced in the nineteenth century a decided revolt against the absolutism of eighteenth-century legal concepts represented, for instance, by the natural law of Blackstone, and jurisprudence became concerned with an historical approach such as that of Savigny and later with what Roscoe Pound calls the emphasis of the "mechanical sociologists." The scientific spirit of the late nineteenth century could brook no philosophizing in law, and so the law became a social "language" or a set of evolutionary formulas which could be

traced and discussed, but which it would be futile to attempt to direct or to evaluate. However, just as the over-emphasis of the metaphysical approach by the eighteenth century resulted in this onslaught upon natural rights and natural law, so there has been in legal philosophy a reaction against the over-historicism and neglect of values of nineteenth century jurisprudence. The work of the Natural Rights school in France, of Kohler and Stammler in Germany who, although opposed to the natural rights concept, oppose even more vigorously the mere descriptive and historical approach to legal theorizing, and of jurists such as Dean Pound and Justice Holmes in this country—also some of the writings of Professor Hocking and Professor Cohen—definitely point to a changing interpretation of some of the classic concepts, an interpretation that emphasizes the ethical rather than the traditional metaphysical approach.

Dean Pound can write that, "Already there is a revival of natural law, not of the natural law that would have imposed upon us an idealized version of the law of the past as something from which we might never escape, but of a creative natural law that would enable us to make of our received legal materials, as systematized by the legal science of the last century, a living instrument of justice in the society of to-day and to-morrow. Such a natural law will not call upon us to turn treatises on ethics or economics or sociology directly into institutes of law. But it will not be content with a legal science that refuses to look beyond or behind formal legal precepts and so misses more than half of what goes to make up the law."³

This is, of course, not an essay in jurisprudence and the only point that is intended in these last paragraphs is that the criterion of "natural" is not one that has been summarily and permanently banished. It remains in ethics if not in metaphysics. It is a symbol of the cry for better things—for better laws, better social orders, better economic systems. A "natural" order, a "natural" right, a "natural" law are postulated because men seek to find some sure basis for the things that "ought" to be. If they can point to Nature, then their demands seem more solidly grounded. Here in Nature is the way things should be; look to the "natural" standard and then criticize, value, improve. It is true that such a standard may be admittedly a creative fiction; granted that there is no "natural" this or that in the nature of things, and granted that, if there were, no one would ever know when it had been reached; still, "natural" has a significance that was certainly not exhausted, perhaps not really understood, by eighteenth-cen-

³ *Law and Morals* (University of North Carolina Press, 1924), pp. 87-88.

tury metaphysicians. The significance is basically that of a dissatisfaction with existing conditions, a discontent with mere description and the colorless technique of scientific statement, and is instead a reaching forward to ideals and goals.

This point, however, will be misinterpreted if it is thought to imply a criticism of the descriptive, historical, scientific approach. It is simply the suggestion that the appeal to norms is one that is corrective of much of the narrowness that may result from too strict a worship of data and too studied a neglect of values. It is an appeal that refuses to accept conditions with equanimity simply because they are facts. All this seems to be suggested by "natural" and perhaps that is why the concept can not be for long disregarded. As a specific program, "natural" may be of little service, but as a recognition of the place of values, it serves an essential purpose. The argument that is crudely expressed here is summed up, in connection with its presence in the problems of law, by Professor Hocking: "The law of any place and time is either subject to criticism or it is not. Unless the idea of 'improvement' and the idea of the 'law' are somehow incongruous, there must be at least a logical distinction between what the law is and what it ought to be. This is so evident to common sense that any opposing view would seem possible only by way of reaction from some atrocious misuse of the idea. It was the fate of the Natural Rights schools to provoke such a reaction, and to send an entire century of legal philosophers burrowing among the facts of law past and present for instruction which they agreed could not be found in ideals set up in total independence of history. Now, at the opening of still another century, we find common sense once more taking courage. The Natural Right-ists were right in at least one respect: the question, What ought the law to be? is a pertinent question, and they were even right in assuming that the human will had something to do about it."⁴

It may be in place to mention just a word as to the meaning of a previous statement, namely, that the standard of natural is "admittedly a creative fiction." What is meant by this is that a recognition of a presumptive, hypothetical character in an approach to concepts such as those of natural rights and natural law will not only remove much of the absolutism that was so objectionable a feature of the classic doctrines, but will also prepare the only possible way for a re-admittance of such concepts into present-day theory. For example, it may be true that from the standpoints of law and politics men are endowed with no innate, imprescriptible, natural rights. Still,

⁴ *The Present Status of the Philosophy of Law and Right* (Yale University Press, 1926), pp. 4-5.

for purposes of social manipulation, they must be treated, and, in fact, have been treated, as if they did possess such rights. This is a transition from metaphysics to ethics, and an important transition. An "as if" approach—that of a necessary fiction or a creative presumption—postulates as a regulative factor, not as a categorical statement, that "the claims or demands or desires of a human being" (to use Pound's phrase) must direct legal and social, political and economic thought. Therefore, if such claims and demands and desires are to constitute the reasonable test of the efficacy of political structures and social orders and economic systems, the human being must be considered "as if" he possessed such claims independent of social arrangement. If not, criticism, because entirely internal, would die still-born.

A doctrine of rights is not one that can be unconditionally expelled from political and social theory, but it needs definite qualification, and this presumptive handling of the concept seems to introduce the most valuable type of qualification. It recognizes that rights are fundamentally a name for ethical claims flowing from the very nature of the individual, and that the concept of rights introduces a theory which includes man as an ethical factor as opposed to a view which excludes such a factor. It is an approach that concerns itself with values, but since the treatment of rights is hypothetical it does not attempt to read them existentially into the social structure. The eighteenth-century natural rights concept, from a metaphysical standpoint, was "pure" fiction, whereas the ethical, "as if" interpretation is a "creative" fiction, a moral presumption.

A presumptive approach, moreover, recognizes no hard and fast order that is eternal and unchangeable. Presumptions and fictions change; they are empirically determinable and mould themselves to fit the exigencies of utility. The natural rights of an "as if" world, for example, would possess the same characteristics as that "as if" world—they would be relative, variable, and not too enamored by the charms of rational absolutism. They do not constitute an immutable ideal system to which the contingent, positive legal right must conform, but they are concepts that vary according to their usefulness. They are "interests which we think ought to be secured; demands which human beings may make which we think ought to be satisfied," and those interests and demands are neither universal nor eternal. Interests and demands are elastic, and therefore presumptive natural rights are elastic. The absolute character of the older doctrine may really be said to have been its basic defect; it disturbed the late nineteenth century because science and history could discover no such absolute na-

ture, and it is even more annoying to present tendencies which attempt to work with and to use concepts. A rigid system of absolutes is not an easy thing to manipulate, to operate with, and that handicap, rather than any metaphysical one, is the damaging feature of classic natural rights. But the characteristic argument against this rigidity of rights can not be brought to bear upon an interpretation that recognizes and demands that rights be made amenable to conditions which are in a state of transformation, an interpretation that holds that such concepts must be tested by a standard of social efficiency. As Professor Hocking states: "And now the name of 'natural right' can only creep into sight with the reassuring placard, 'changing content guaranteed.'" ⁵

This tentative, empirical quality that is thus being attributed to a concept that was originally absolute and intuitional is, of course, the only possible basis for a re-interpretation of the natural rights doctrine such as that which has been a characteristic theme in much recent jurisprudence. There can be no attempt made here at all to discuss that approach, but it seems clear that the more important of the French jurists, for example, who are concerned with the question take, if not a fictional, hypothetical attitude, at least the position that any acceptance of natural rights must be founded upon social utility, a utility, moreover, that is changing and developing. Whether it be the functional conception of Duguit or the plea for "idealism" of Charmont, "the reassuring placard, 'changing content guaranteed,'" is always present. No one could be more bitter against the metaphysical notion of a social contract and of inherent, inalienable rights than Duguit,⁶ yet his essentially psychological postulate of an "individual" and of an "individual will and mind as the basis of all phenomena" re-introduces a doctrine of rights as a necessary condition for that "individual's functioning"—such functioning, as he attempts to show, being a necessary element in the social structure. Charmont, likewise, speaking of the revived concept of natural law, states that "it reconciles itself with the idea of evolution, with that of utility. It loses its absolute, immutable character, for it possesses only a variable content."⁷

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 79.

⁶ See *Modern French Legal Philosophy*, by Fouillée, Charmont, Duguit, and Demogue (Scott and Chamberlain trans.), Vol. VII of the Modern Legal Philosophy Series (the Boston Book Company, 1916); Part II, chap. IX; also chap. VIII. (Selections in these chapters are taken from Duguit's *L'Etat: Le Droit Objectif et la Loi Positive*.)

⁷ *Modern French Legal Philosophy*, p. 146. (From Charmont's *La Renaissance du Droit Naturel*.)

Professor Morris R. Cohen has written a very suggestive paper, "Jus

“Natural rights” and “natural law,” then, “can only creep into sight” in a greatly amended form. They must become empirical, elastic, workable. If all these qualifications really transform the traditional concept into something entirely different, that difference is essentially one of content; although their connotations have undergone a fundamental adjustment, the phrases and the “form” of natural rights may well remain—as indeed they have—a part of the literature and discussions of jurisprudence and political theory.

This lengthy digression concerning natural rights has been introduced simply as a suggested illustration of the resurrection of values in a social science. It has been recognized that a philosophy of law can not continue to concentrate solely upon descriptive or historical material, as was the ideal of late nineteenth-century jurisprudence. Values and standards, such as those symbolized by the ethical rather than the metaphysical significance of the concept “natural,” can not forever be excluded. They return, under a radically different qualitative form, it is true, but still as representative of a perennial ethical plea.

The question, therefore, that must be raised here is whether economics and the other social sciences can continue to the goal of description and quantification with a resolute and calm determination to ignore anything that savors of valuation and judgment. Will they be more successful than jurisprudence and better preserve their physical science attributes? Or will ethics begin to creep back?⁸ Or should there be the definite and unconcealed attempt to thrust values again into economics? Shall a discipline such as economics which is concerned with probably the most vital and menacing problems that a social order is called upon to face be praised for accepting the material that comes to it without attempting to evaluate, to criticize, to amend?

Nature Rediviva,” (*The Philosophical Review*, Vol. XXV, No. 6, November, 1916, pp. 761-777), which contains an account of this newer interpretation of natural law.

⁸ Since the preparation of this paper there has appeared John A. Hobson's latest volume on *Economics and Ethics* (D. C. Heath and Company, 1929), in which he seems to suggest that ethics should return and is returning to economic speculation. Hobson's book, which, as the foreword correctly states, is a pioneer work in the field (the only previous recent material being some articles by Professor Ayres, Professor Fite, and Professor Perry; there are older discussions by Keynes, C. S. Devas, J. S. Mackenzie, and Professor Elwood, and, of course, Bonar's classic *Philosophy and Political Economy* which, however, is almost entirely historical), would appear to make this paper gratuitous. Still, it is believed that this discussion approaches the relationship between economics and ethics from a slightly different angle from that of Hobson's thesis, and certainly in a much less technical manner.

Economics, since it is an enterprise that investigates man's attempts to satisfy his material wants, may indeed be considered, in an age of industrialism and competition such as this, in an "acquisitive society," as the "science of survival." Economics and no longer biology seems to be the technique that treats of the struggle for existence. Those fittest who survive and flourish in an acquisitive, competitive society must be studied, not by biology or even psychology, but rather as specimens subject to economic analysis. The point is more than a facetious one. It suggests perhaps that the phenomena which are the materials for the operations of economics are too portentous, too indicative of unsolved moral problems to be accepted uncritically as the subject-matter of a descriptive or historical science. By uncritically is meant here specifically the failure to distinguish between the normal and the pathological, a failure which is not present in some of the disciplines which economics seems to choose as models. Psychology, for example, does not confuse the healthy and the morbid; economics too often does. And the cause may perhaps be located in the absence of norms and standards.

One more point: There have recently been launched attacks upon the over-specialization of contemporary science and technical knowledge—the late pronouncements of President Butler and President Angell are illustrative (the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* represents a more overt realization)—and the plea has been made for the introduction of an intellectual synthesis, of an age of system-construction. Modern physics is being hailed in many quarters as the locus of such a physical synthesis. This challenge directed against an over-specialized concern with minutiae, against an ignoring-of-the-forest-for-the-trees technique, seems to be even more applicable to the social sciences than to the natural sciences, more applicable perhaps because that hyper-specialized technique does not appear to fit the social enterprises as neatly as it does the physical disciplines; great gaps of body show here and there. However, this indictment of over-specialization should not be confined to the realm of fact itself, but must be expanded so as to embrace in its charge a criticism of the exclusion, upon the grounds of specialization, of value from fact, an exclusion which banishes from the social sciences vision along with values. This warning of the dangers of such a type of specialization seems particularly pertinent in the case of economics.

It is felt here that economics may become richer and more vital if it puts aside, at least partially, certain feverish efforts to resemble physics or biology. It need not fear that a re-introduction of values would open the way for a wholesale return of all the con-

cepts of classic political economy, for, as has been noted, when a doctrine of ethical import such as that of natural rights is resurrected, it reappears in a new garb; the new form corresponds to the empirical instead of the rational. There is scarcely opportunity in this connection to mention the significant alteration that such a new form effects in ethical as well as in economic operations. It may be suggested, however, that the recent emphasis, as in Professor Dewey, upon the operational point of view (using the expression made current by contemporary scientific thinking) as applied to ethics, namely, that values as well as concepts be tested in terms of their operations, may benefit perhaps from a greater degree of coincidence between two such disciplines as economics and ethics; there may be disclosed a new approach to their mutual operations which would tend to make the one more susceptible to direction and the other less void of content. Certainly, there need be no fear of such a coincidence unless economics, on the one hand, begins to realize that it has been operating largely with surface material, or ethics, on the other, that it has too often neglected material of any nature.

It is a somewhat depressing paradox that facts and values seem so often at odds in economics. The pendulum appears to swing from the thesis that the science must be a branch of logic and ethics, to the antithesis that it must shun the dim region of norms. Surely, there must be a synthesis that unites both in a common field of thought.

GEORGE RAYMOND GEIGER.

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH DAKOTA.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Logic of Events. An Introduction to a Philosophy of Time.

ANDREW P. UCHENKO. (University of California Publications in Philosophy, Vol. 12, No. 1.) Berkeley: University of California Press. 1929. x + 180 pp.

Dr. Uchenko has undertaken a heroic task—to reconcile the phenomenology of the spirit with the principles of mathematics. Blessed are the peace-makers; if they can enforce the peace they have dictated. Sometimes in logic as in life, it may be doubted whether conciliation can be as genuine and curative as a good, whole-hearted divorce.

This philosopher would eat his cake and have it. A Hegelian at heart, he would like to keep the fusion of logical with epistemological problems which makes German metaphysics look so rational