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Author(s): Stephen Gill

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Hegemony, consensus and Trilateralism

STEPHEN GILL

This essay attempts to apply concepts of hegemony to the case of contemporary North American–Western European–Japanese ('Trilateral') relations and, more specifically, to analyse the role and importance of a unique international organization, the Trilateral Commission (TC), within Trilateral relations. The essay comprises: (i) a comparison of the Realist and Gramscian concepts of hegemony and relates them to aspects of the post-war international order; (ii) a more extended discussion of the Gramscian concept of hegemony and related concepts; (iii) an exposition of aspects of the 'Trilateral' approach, a discussion of the TC and an interpretation of the TC using Gramscian analysis; and (iv) a discussion of the long-term structural pressures on the Trilateral relationship in the context of a reconstituted hegemony.

During the early and mid-1970s, a great deal of emphasis was given in the literature in international political economy (IPE) to the relative decline of the hegemonic power of the USA, and the implications of this decline for world order. Some of this literature—from both Neo-Realist and Neo-Marxist perspectives¹—corresponded with the argument that the relative decline in the power of the hegemonic state would lead to disorder, increasing antagonisms amongst the major capitalist states, and a collapse in the post-war liberalizing international economic order (LIEO).² This interpretation of the changing post-war system raises two basic questions: Firstly, is it clear that the continuing relative decline of the USA is inevitable? Secondly, is the above, Neo-Realist, concept of hegemony—which equates hegemony with the dominance of one state over others in the system—adequate to explain changes in the US position and the nature of world order, or is there an alternative (i.e. Gramscian) concept which sees hegemony as being constituted by a congruence between social forces, including inter-state relations, and which is more adequate for analysis of the US position and for the post-war world order? This essay concentrates on the second of these questions with respect to the relations between the major capitalist powers. It argues that the Gramscian concept of hegemony—which gives weight to other social forces, notably ideas and institutions, as well as to the material capabilities stressed in the Realist concept—is needed to explain such changes and to shed light on the persistence of the post-war LIEO, despite the apparent relative decline in the power resources of the hegemonic state. Moreover, by using Gramscian analysis we can also attempt to assess contemporary aspects of the global political economy (GPE) and their possible implications for future changes in hegemony and order.

In particular, the essay applies the Gramscian concept of hegemony and other important related concepts, such as 'historic bloc' and 'organic intellectual', to the case of the Trilateral Commission, an influential transnational organization with members drawn from the major capitalist states. The TC is directly concerned with the problems of world order and the maintenance of the LIEO. The TC, more specifically, can be seen as an organization which can help selectively to mobilize and to integrate policy-oriented 'organic intellectuals' from a range of capitalist

countries. It can thus perhaps be seen as one source of influence on the setting of international agendas. It seems to be a private counterpart to the annual summits between the 'big seven' capitalist powers (the USA, Canada, Japan, West Germany, France, Italy and Britain). The existence of the summits implies a recognition of collective interests and the continuing need to try to manage tensions and conflicts.

Thus it may be possible, using the Gramscian concepts, to discuss hegemony in a broader sense than the more state-centric Realist discourse. It may be discussed, for example, in terms of the hegemony of a transnational class, drawn from many countries, dominating and incorporating other classes and interests in a transnational 'historic bloc', more-or-less organized on a world-wide basis. Such domination and incorporation should be seen as rooted in structural dominance, which can be seen as cultural as well as economic.³ This would thus include hegemonic ideas and values, and their embodiment in institutions.

The concept of hegemony in the post-war order

The Realist concept of hegemony is based on the distribution and mobilization of power resources which enable the hegemon to exert power 'over' other actors. The concept of hegemony is thus secondary to the more basic concept of power, and it refers to a type of power relation which, for Realists, is generally understood in Weberian terms, i.e. as the power of a political unit 'over' others. Hegemony, leadership and domination, in this sense, can be seen as types of power relationships. In turn power can be seen in structural terms as well as in relational terms. Structural dominance can be distinguished from active domination, and can be conceived in both material and normative terms, the latter corresponding to ways of seeing and interpreting the world which are so pervasive that they effectively prevent the emergence of alternative 'ways of seeing' and, implicitly, of organizing the world. Such normative structures also condition the ways in which priorities and agendas are conceived and constructed. Leadership implies both a recognition of the particular capacities of the leader and the consent, or at a minimum the acquiescence, of the led.

The Neo-Realist concept of hegemony corresponds more closely to the concept of domination and thus can be used to characterize a range of power relations where coercion is more overt. Thus the relationship of the USSR to its neighbouring communist states might be seen to rest upon the use or potential use of military and economic power resources. Hegemony in this sense is a form of 'power over', based in material power resources and owing little to consent.

The Gramscian concept of hegemony is based upon a structural concept of power, where the constitution of a stable, hegemonic order implies a strong 'fit' or compatibility between dominant ideas, institutions and material capabilities at both national and international levels in the GPE. It can be argued that such a hegemonic 'fit' has generally existed with respect to the relations of the major capitalist powers in the post-war GPE.

The post-1945 international military order has been largely bipolar in structure, reflecting a duopoly of military power in the hands of the USA and the USSR. This duopoly largely persists, particularly with respect to advanced weapon systems. It is not the purpose of this essay to account for the origins and nature of this military structure of bipolarity. More important for our purposes are some of its effects, insofar as they have helped to produce a politico-military structure of alliances, centred around the USA (notably in NATO) and the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact. These alliance structures have helped to reinforce the respective military and political identification of the subordinate powers in each alliance with the alliance leader.

More central for this essay is the fact that for most of the world the dominant mode of production is capitalist, and indeed even the state socialist economies have significant parts of their economies organized on capitalist market principles and trade in the world market. This post-war capitalist system is dominated by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) economies which account for more than two-thirds of the world's production and exchange. This system has also been characterized by a rapid internationalization of production and exchange, a progressive liberalization of trade, and an increasing interpenetration of capital across national boundaries, notably in the OECD economies. This has produced what Keohane and Nye have called a condition of 'complex interdependence', itself underpinned by Ruggie's system of 'embedded liberalism'.

Within this post-war system the USA has been at the centre of military, political and economic developments. It has been the dominant military power, opposed of course by the USSR, and has had a technological and military lead over most other nations due to its military-industrial complex and its massive transnational corporations (TNCs). Hveem has referred to this as a 'global dominance system', a vertically integrated system of control and accumulation, production and distribution on a world scale.⁴ In Hveem's fairly general usage 'dominance' is a relatively permanent state where patterns of control and accumulation systematically favour the dominant unit(s). This form of domination and control is largely indirect, i.e. via the system or structure. It is expressed in a cumulative division of labour, with the advanced capitalist states and their TNCs at the apex. This system is based upon state power and what Hveem calls 'technocapital'. Technocapital rests in the confluence of capabilities of state and corporations which are built upon superiorities in military capacity, technical and productive efficiency, control over capital, information, research and development, knowledge, transportation and communications. This process is leading increasingly to an integrated global system (if we conceive of the world in terms of a system of production and distribution). For Hveem, the class structure of the world does not correspond exactly to this, since 'the upper class' of the world does not merely comprise the dominant capitalists, technocrats or state managers in the major capitalist states, but also their counterparts in the Third World and in the bureaucracies of some state socialist countries.

Hveem's sketch of a theory of GPE concentrates largely on coercive, although often covert and indirect, elements in power relations and to an extent under-represents consensual, cooptative dimensions. These aspects of power—coercion and consent—are brought together in the Gramscian concept of hegemony. The virtue of Hveem's approach, however, is its stress upon the need to analyse the GPE as a dynamic whole. Its concept of hegemony is still similar to the Realist concept in that hegemony is equated with dominance, as well as active domination. Seen from this view, although the material aggregates of US state power may indicate a decline in US hegemony (e.g. the size of its GNP and military expenditures/weapons systems relative to those of other states) it remains at the centre of the post-war system.

Some writers have argued that whilst the USA cannot recover the dominance it achieved during the 1950s and 1960s, its hegemony can be reconsolidated and, with respect to certain of its power resources, perhaps developed.⁵ These writers still largely use the Neo-Realist concept of hegemony, which I will label RH. RH stresses coercive power relations and rivalry between states, and implies that the existence of international order depends upon the existence of a hegemonic state which effectively polices the system. Hegemony is equated with dominance anchored in a preponderance of material power resources. This perspective would tend to analyse the world in terms of the interaction between states, and places much less emphasis

on the global system of production and exchange, which is central to Hveem's analysis and is also crucial for the Gramscian approach. The Realist perspective seems to characterize many of the recent policy initiatives of the Reagan Administration. The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), for example, can be taken as an attempt to wrest back US technological leadership and to reaffirm and extend its military dominance *vis-à-vis* its allies in Western Europe and Japan on the one hand and its adversary the USSR on the other. Moreover, current tensions over trade, money, technology and the inter-allied debate over the nature of the 'Soviet threat' are probably more acute today than at any time since 1945. Thus it can be argued that partly as a result of US attempts to reconstitute its RH, inter-allied tensions and East–West rivalry are becoming more pronounced, reflecting the uneven political and economic development of the USA and Western Europe. Such uneven development is also reflected in the Japanese challenge to the US and West European economies. I will return to this issue in the final section of this essay, but will analyse it then from a Gramscian perspective.

Although such tensions among the major capitalist powers are severe, it should still be stressed that the cornerstone of US foreign policy is its alliance with the other advanced capitalist countries at the apex of the global division of labour. For much of the post-war period this alliance was cemented not only by the growing interdependence of the OECD economies, but also by a consensus on the need to prevent the spread of communism and to oppose the challenge of the Soviet Union. The continuing commitment to this is embodied in the seven-power annual summits. Moreover, the relative decline in US material power resources has not been accompanied by a collapse in the LIEO, a collapse that the cruder variants of the Realist Theory of Hegemonic Stability (THS) would have predicted. Indeed even if it is conceded that there has been a relative decline of the USA's power resources, there has been a progressive if uneven liberalization of the LIEO. The continuing existence of the summits since their inception in 1975 and of other institutions like the OECD, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank also suggests that the relations between the major capitalist states are not simply characterized by rivalry and competition, but are based also upon complementarity and consensus. More sophisticated Realists have noted this as we shall see shortly. What underlies the need for such cooperation is, of course, a matter for debate, but most perspectives would suggest that capitalist states have a 'common interest' in maintaining favourable conditions for capital accumulation and economic growth on a world scale. This implies, among other things, resisting the global challenge of the USSR and its allies, threats from socialist forces elsewhere and Third World challenges, e.g. that from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). This 'common interest' is of course problematical, in that there are a range of possible ways in which it can be pursued. There might be disagreement, for example, about what kind of economic growth to pursue—that based upon the social democratic 'mixed economy', or that which gave freer rein to market forces by favouring the private sector. But such a choice is constrained by structural forces at work in the global political economy, an issue to which I return in the final section of this essay.⁶

Some writers, including a number of TC members, developing the Neo-Realist framework in conjunction with aspects of the Neo-Classical 'rational choice' analysis have described the relationships amongst the major capitalist states as approximating the condition of 'complex interdependence'. This is said to consist in the following three essential characteristics. (i) Multiple channels, which connect societies and which are both (a) transgovernmental (e.g., interaction between the bureaucracies of different states) and (b) transnational (e.g., interaction between private transnational

corporations), as well as the interstate channels normally assumed by Realists. Keohane and Nye point out that (a) applies when ‘we relax the assumption that states act coherently as units, . . . [and (b)] . . . applies when we relax the assumption that states are the only units’. (ii) The agenda of interstate relations comprises a wide range of ‘multiple issues’ in which there is no obvious hierarchy. Thus security issues do not necessarily dominate the international agenda. Such issues often arise from the inter-relatedness of domestic and international problems, and involve different degrees of conflict between the varying coalitions concerned with each issue. (iii) ‘Military force is not used by governments toward other governments in the region, or on the issues when complex interdependence prevails’.⁷

This notion of interdependence became prominent in much US writing in the field of international relations in the 1970s.⁸ If it is possible to characterize a general view in this literature it is that for many issues, particularly economic ones, the nations bound by the condition of complex interdependence have their fates tied together, indicating a need for institutions of collective management and the institutionalization of ‘regimes’ which help mediate the relationships between states and non-state actors in a range of issue areas. The degree to which such regimes can provide stability to the LIEO has been a matter of debate in the GPE literature and some Neo-Realists, notably Ruggie and Keohane, have argued that regimes provide the means for rational cooperation between actors and as such are a stabilizing feature of the post-war system, one that distinguishes it from the inter-war system which was characterized by much more ‘brittle’ institutions. Ruggie has characterized the post-war LIEO as a system of ‘embedded liberalism’, in which a strong ‘fit’ exists between domestic state–society relations (notably those of the major capitalist states) and the international order.⁹ These Neo-Realist perspectives thus allow for a large degree of cooperation between capitalist (and other) states. Such cooperation is based upon rational self-interest and is not simply a response to the domination of a preponderant state. The LIEO can therefore remain stable even if the hegemon is in decline. Thus, although it is conceded that a hegemonic power may be necessary for the creation of a LIEO (the USA invested a great deal of time, effort and material resources in the establishment of the post-war system), it may not be necessary (or sufficient) for its continuation. This more complex Realist approach gives more weight to transnational social forces based upon the assumption of rational self-interest in its explanation of order in the GPE.

Gramscian concepts of hegemony

The work discussed in the above section has enriched Neo-Realist analysis of the LIEO and has helped to indicate that state-centric explanations are not sufficient to grasp the nature of the post-war order. To probe further, we perhaps need an alternative concept of hegemony—one derived from the writings of Antonio Gramsci and developed by R. Cox.¹⁰ This sees hegemony as a dynamic set of structures and processes which are in a dialectical relationship. In common with Hveem’s approach, the Gramscian concept is located within a discourse we can call transnational historical materialism, which seeks to analyse the GPE as an integrated whole. This concept seems particularly fruitful for analysing the relations between the advanced capitalist states, and for explaining the stability of the post-war LIEO. The concept helps to shed light on the importance of ideas and institutions, and notably dominant ‘frameworks of thought’, in the constitution of hegemonic order. According to this view, hegemony occurs when there is an ‘organic’ relationship between the dynamic aspects of an historical order. According to Cox, these aspects of structure and

process are 'ideas' (including values, theories and ideologies), 'institutions' (including the state and other social institutions) and 'material capabilities'. (This roughly corresponds to Hveem's notion of the technocapital as well as the military capabilities of states.) Further there must be a congruence between these 'social forces' at the domestic and international levels. This implies the need for conscious political action and the pursuit of consent and legitimation as necessary to the development and maintenance of hegemony. This is so because, at any point in its evolution, a successful hegemony is one in which consensual aspects of the system come to the fore (although coercion is always potentially in the background). By using this concept, we can view state power as something to be explained (a dependent variable) rather than as the sole explanatory (or independent) variable.¹¹ This concept of hegemony, and other related Gramscian concepts, can thus be used to shed light on important aspects of the post-war system. In particular these concepts will be utilized to show how organizations like the TC can serve to develop the consciousness of, and consensus between, the dominant class factions and governing élites of North America, Japan and Western Europe. The TC might help develop 'frameworks of thought' which are transnational in nature, and which in turn influence the construction of international agendas. In this scheme, the place of ideas and institutions in the explanation of the post-war order is given more weight than in Hveem's analysis which generally sees the GPE as a system of dominance and active domination.

To give a fuller understanding of Gramsci's concept of hegemony (GH), it is necessary to introduce other Gramscian concepts. For our purposes the most important of these are state, 'civil' and 'political' society, 'historic bloc' and 'organic intellectual'.

Gramsci has both a 'restricted' and an 'extended' concept of the state. The restricted concept of the state corresponds to the 'political society' which refers to the state's formal governmental apparatus (both administrative and coercive). The 'extended' concept sees the state comprising both 'political' and 'civil' society. The idea of 'civil society' refers to institutions and social forces normally considered to be private, and where leading class factions rule through 'indirect domination' (e.g. the market system) and, in the political sphere, by the development of consent through the incorporation of allied and to a certain extent opposing classes and factions.

Hegemony is not limited to those functions of the state which pertain to the organization of consent—this is only part, and not the most important part, of GH. The hegemony of a particular class, or faction of a class, requires that it has succeeded in persuading other classes in society to accept its leadership as well as most of its moral, political and cultural values. Such success implies the minimization of the use of force. Its cultural aspects are represented in Gramsci's notion of the 'people-nation', i.e. a national entity with its own cultural traditions and institutions.¹² Each moment of hegemony represents a certain relationship between class forces, the most fundamental of which is that between capitalists and workers. The roots of the hegemony of the capitalists, or a faction of capitalists, are in the organization of the economy.¹³

The concept of the 'historic bloc' refers to a historical congruence between material forces, institutions and ideologies. In Gramscian terms it refers to the way in which various classes and factions of classes are related. In Marxist terminology, the historic bloc is the 'organic' link between structure and superstructure, and it is organized around a set of hegemonic ideas comprising the 'dominant ideology'. For Gramsci, the historic bloc is largely specific to a national context. But Cox has

applied it to the analysis of a 'transnational historic bloc' comprising a 'transnational' coalition of interests. This notion of a transnational historic bloc differs from a 'transnational class alliance', in that more than one class is involved, its basis is more organic (i.e. rooted in the material interests and 'frameworks of thought' or ways of seeing and understanding the social world of a range of classes and other groups), and it involves the governmental institutions and civil societies of a number of countries including weak states. This means that the alliance of social forces it comprises is seen as 'natural' and legitimate by its members. Viewed from this perspective, the post-war social democratic polity and the 'mixed economy' were key ingredients in a historic bloc which incorporated a range of class interests sustaining the LIEO.

According to Gramsci, the historic bloc requires 'organic intellectuals' to help cement the links between structure and superstructure. These intellectuals are the 'concrete articulators' of the hegemonic ideology which provides cohesion to the historic bloc. Intellectuals are not simply producers of ideology, they are also the 'organizers of hegemony', i.e. they also theorize the ways in which the hegemony can be developed or maintained.¹⁴ Thus intellectuals are a steering force in the political rule of a dominant class faction in a historic bloc. The Gramscian idea of the intellectual is 'the entire social stratum which exercises an organizational function in the wide sense—whether in the field of culture or production or political administration'.¹⁵ Gramsci's notion of the intellectual is a practical one—it is counterposed to the literati and 'traditional' intellectuals.

Gramsci paid special attention to the institutional frameworks in which intellectuals develop, produce and disseminate ideologies and theories. He called these 'ideological apparatuses'. The conjunction of various ideologies, including the ruling ideology and the ideological apparatuses, helps to constitute the civil society. Ideology is necessarily produced by, and depends on, a long and difficult and often very contradictory process whereby conceptions of the world are created and destroyed, and reformulated and reconstituted through intellectual activity. To secure its hegemony, therefore, a dominant class or faction of a class needs creative intellectuals to elaborate, modify and disseminate its class conception of the world. Gramsci noted that the task of forming intellectuals into a historic bloc may be partially accomplished for the bourgeoisie by political parties. These parties reflect different factions in the ruling classes and groups. However, this ability may exist outside any parties as a result of the capacity of the strongest elements in the bourgeoisie to use cultural institutions, private associations, universities, educational foundations and parts of the state apparatus.¹⁶

I will apply these Gramscian concepts after a discussion of the origins, development and ideas of the TC.

The Trilateral Commission

The TC was conceived by a small group of Americans. These were: David Rockefeller, the US banker and the key member of the wealthy and internationally influential Rockefeller dynasty; Columbia University academic and Sovietologist Zbigniew Brzezinski; the Brookings Institution director of foreign policy studies Henry Owen; and the director of the Harvard University Center for International Affairs, Robert Bowie. The ideas for creating the TC were formalized by a group drawn from the US, Western Europe and Japan at a meeting at the Rockefeller estate in the Hudson Valley in 1972. Meetings were then held with influential individuals in Japan and Western Europe, and approval for the organization's purposes was

obtained at the highest political levels in the three places. Many heads of major US transnational corporations and US international banks, as well as senior academics from other 'think tanks' and Ivy League universities became members, and generally the key institutions of the US establishment were strongly represented in the TC membership. For example, most of the US members were also members of the prestigious and influential New York Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), an institution often regarded as a shadow US State Department as well as a reflection of the foreign policy perspectives of blue-chip corporate America. This recruitment was matched in Western Europe and Japan. The Commission held its first meeting in 1973, and it is still in existence, although it is required to obtain a mandate for its renewal every three years from its members (i.e. each 'triennium' in TC terminology). This 'triennial' exercise in self-renewal is also an occasion for self-examination and is designed to make the membership continuously aware of the effectiveness of the TC, as well as to keep TC administrators on their toes.

The TC's origins coincided with the end of the long post-war 'boom' in the world economy and with a widespread belief that the hegemony (RH) of the USA in the GPE had been significantly eroded. This decline in US hegemony was associated with increasing problems in 'managing' the GPE, in particular with the 'management of interdependence'. Its origins thus perhaps reflect a particular interpretation of the relations between the advanced capitalist powers, akin to that of Keohane and Nye in *Power and Interdependence*.¹⁷ The 'Trilateral' concept also reflected a concern to manage a transition from a US-centred world capitalist order to a more complex and differentiated order, in which transgovernmental and transnational forces and actors are integrated into the managerial process.

The TC's originators and key early participants argued that the TC was created initially to cope with the changing nature of the relations (in TC terminology, to 'manage interdependence') between the USA and its primary allies and between the 'West' (including Japan), the Third World and the Soviet Bloc. It had also, as a central objective, the promotion and assistance of the incorporation of Japan into the core of the US-centred alliance structure, concomitant with its growing economic strength.

The TC paid early attention to emerging 'crises' and 'contradictions' in the post-war order, as US RH had begun to come under tremendous pressure due, in no small part, to its involvement in Vietnam. During its early years the TC promoted a range of studies concerned with immediate, short-term and medium-term problems for the 'Trilateral' states, e.g. the transition to a floating exchange rate system, North-South cooperation, the 1973 oil crisis, the problems of governability and the problems posed for the legitimacy of transnational enterprise in the wake of the Lockheed bribery scandal.¹⁸ At the same time its organizers hoped that it would provide a forum for considering longer-term issues, as well as promote communication and 'dialogue' amongst the three 'regions', so that the consciousness of each region would change in a way which would be beneficial for 'Trilateral' cooperation. In particular, it was hoped that Western political and economic 'opinion leaders' would come to identify more closely with the Japanese, and in so doing help to bridge the gap in consciousness stemming from the distinct Enlightenment and Confucian 'frameworks of thought' which characterize West and East. Many TC members claim that a good deal of progress has been made in this latter respect since 1973.

The TC's perspective to a large extent reflects the interests and world-view of the more dynamic and internationally mobile forms of capital, as well as the interests of the liberal 'internationalist' elements within the state bureaucracies of the major capitalist states. It is committed to a stable structure of world order which would

promote, amongst other goals, the internationalization and expansion of capitalism. The TC's characteristic ideas, as expressed in their publications and the speeches of members, include a concern for promoting the virtues of the market mechanism, the contribution of private enterprise (especially in the form of transnational corporations) relative to that of the public sector and the desirability of relatively unrestricted trade, capital and technology flows (and logically labour flows too). Also, the TC expresses a concern for the extension of liberal democratic political forms and openly rejects communism. It seeks to 'devise a global system where the communist philosophy withers and has no new converts'.¹⁹

The TC is a private institution, with membership by invitation. The countries represented have slowly increased since it was founded, but no Third World countries have members, although some Third World élites have been consulted in the preparation of reports and a large group of TC members met the Chinese leadership in Peking in 1981. In effect, the TC brings together liberal, conservative and, to a lesser extent, social democratic leaders and élites of the major capitalist states (except Sweden, Switzerland, Austria, Greece, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa) for annual 'plenary' meetings. Meetings are also held more frequently on a national and 'regional' basis. The TC members invariably meet the government leaders of the country hosting the plenary meetings, which are held in rotation in the three 'regions'. (An audience with the Pope took place at the Vatican during the 1983 Rome plenary, and it is worth noting that the Catholic Church is one of the oldest and most influential transnational organizations.) These meetings are highly intensive and involve debating 'task force reports' (which are co-authored by teams drawn from the three 'regions'), hearing up-to-date reviews of the political and economic situation in the host country, the writing and circulation of 'Trilateral memoranda', planning future research topics and deciding on the inclusion of new members (Spanish and Portuguese members were admitted in the early 1980s). The meetings are private—in order to promote 'frank' and off-the-record discussions—but the press is kept informed of the general drift of discussions in briefings and press conferences. Some non-members are invited as observers, normally senior officials from the ministries of foreign and economic affairs of the key member countries.

The TC has three regional chairmen and deputy chairmen, as well as three (administrative) directors. It also has a small administrative and support staff. At its core is an Executive Committee and a small Programme Advisory Board which gives guidance to members and the Executive on areas of study, whilst the Executive uses its considerable influence to recruit new members and obtain funding. Most of the funding for the TC comes from either private donations (from individuals and transnational corporations), from philanthropic foundations (e.g., the Ford, Rockefeller and Lilly Foundations in the USA), or from member governments. Funding has been more difficult in Europe, but similar sources have contributed support. Japanese funding again comes from similar sources and the TC draws upon the resources of the important Japan Centre for International Exchange (JCIE), which is mainly Japanese government-funded.

The TC has a highly prestigious membership, numbering just over 300 members. Each national group of members is selected in rough proportion to that nation's GNP, although paradoxically Japan is accorded 'regional' status and is proportionately over-represented. The three 'regions' are North America (the USA and Canada), Western Europe (the EEC members plus Spain and Portugal) and Japan, i.e. Japan has the same regional status as the whole of Western Europe combined. Moreover, Japan has a much smaller GNP than the USA, but has almost the same number of members. Like most political organizations, the TC is male-dominated. Many of its

members have held high office in government, and the institution received world-wide notoriety when more than 20 of its members filled senior positions in the US Carter Administration, including President Carter, Vice-President Mondale, Secretary of State Vance, Secretary of Defense Brown, National Security Adviser Brzezinski (who had been the director of the TC since it was founded) and Secretary of the Treasury Blumenthal. Co-founders Owen and Bowie also joined the Administration as special representative for economic summits (and senior White House adviser on international economic relations) and deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, respectively. Carter also appointed a former TC member, Paul Volcker, as chairman of the board of governors of the Federal Reserve System, the US central bank. These appointments gave rise to a welter of conspiracy theories from both left and right, claiming that the TC, under the guidance of its 'founding father' David Rockefeller, had organized a (peaceful) coup d'état. TC members have also filled a significant number of high positions in other member countries, although the US membership is by far the most influential.

Although Ronald Reagan attacked George Bush for his former membership of the TC in the 1980 election campaign (Bush's resignation in 1978 from the TC reflected its notoriety among the political right in the USA, a liability for any Republican presidential candidate), he was still persuaded by TC member Henry Kissinger and others to adopt Bush as his running-mate. Reagan's old friend and political adviser, Caspar Weinberger, had of course been a TC member for some time prior to the election and became Secretary of Defense after the Republican triumph. Later George Shultz replaced Alexander Haig as Secretary of State, and Haig joined the TC. TC members must resign if they take high government office, so Weinberger's membership was cancelled when he took over at the Pentagon. However, there are far fewer ex-TC members in senior positions in the Reagan Administration than there were in the Carter Administration.

British SDP leader David Owen is a keen member (and a co-author of a recent TC study) and other notable UK members and former members include Denis Healey, Lord Carrington, Lord Roll and the late Reginald Maudling. Former French Prime Minister Raymond Barre, German Economics Minister Count Lambsdorff and several former Japanese ministers and ambassadors are members. The Japanese membership is in general more influential than its European counterparts, who are more fragmented and often opposed by significant communist and socialist forces in both their own countries and across Europe. Although Japan has sizeable socialist and communist movements, it has been ruled since 1946 by the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The LDP is strongly supportive of the TC, as is the Keidanran (the very powerful Japanese employers organization) and the leadership of the key ministries in the Japanese bureaucracy.

I have elsewhere outlined the different intellectual traditions which comprise the TC approach to the study of international relations: these are a combination of Neo-Realist and Neo-Classical traditions.²⁰ Also indicated above are the basic transnational ideas in the TC, ideas which reflect many of the interests of internationally mobile forms of capital embodied in Hveem's notion of 'technocapital'. As an institution the TC is unique in that its membership is drawn from the public and private élites of the dominant capitalist countries in a private forum organized to promote consensus, raise consciousness and implicitly to develop what Cox refers to as 'a framework of thought' amongst its members. Thus the TC can be said to reflect a basic congruence between ideas, institutions and material capabilities, and acts as a forum for drawing these social forces into contact.

The TC can be viewed as a core organization within a developing transnational

historic bloc. In Gramsci's usage the historical bloc is a dialectical concept—the constituent parts interact to create a larger unity, one which can incorporate a range of class and state interests. The TC provides an international forum where a whole range of economic, social and political forces can come together and begin partially to fuse. Thus their alliance, based upon congruent material forces, can become increasingly organic. The TC membership overlaps with that of other similar institutions, such as Bilderberg and the Atlantic Institute; and the annual Europe–Japan (Hakone) meetings were conceived by TC members and again have an overlap of membership with the TC.²¹ The TC also has overlapping membership with the institutional élites which govern organizations such as the OECD, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, NATO and the EEC. The hegemonic class faction within this historic bloc is the one mentioned above several times—those parts of the national bourgeoisies which are linked to dynamic international production, finance and communication, and their counterparts within the state apparatuses of the capitalist states. Although this transnational class is engaged in international competition, it can be said to have certain 'common interests', the most fundamental of which is the maintenance of favourable conditions for capital accumulation on a world scale. Seen from this perspective the TC can be seen as an important—perhaps the most important—institution for promoting the hegemony of a transnational capitalist class and for incorporating subaltern elements into its hegemony. It is not easy to promote such a formation. This was demonstrated by the failure in the 1970s to amalgamate the TC with the Atlantic Institute and Bilderberg. The merger attempt failed because of Japanese opposition, since for them the TC allowed a much larger representation than either the Atlantic Institute or particularly, Bilderberg, which is almost entirely 'Atlanticist' in membership. However, seen together, these institutions, along with their official counterparts, provide a network in which the ideas and organization of the transnational historic bloc can be developed.

Central to the promotion of the hegemony of transnational capital is the development and articulation of theories and ideologies by its 'organic intellectuals'. The TC membership has a large number of policy-oriented academics and theoreticians drawn from a range of fields. These fields are central to the planning and organization of capitalism on a world scale. Heads of TNCs are directly linked to the dominant mode of production and have the capacity to theorize the conditions for capital accumulation, as well as the methods to promote it worldwide. The TC studies are carried out by such intellectuals, not in the isolation of an ivory tower, but in task forces of 10 to 20 members, drawn from the three Trilateral regions. These task forces bring together theorists and those more directly involved in the making of government policy and corporate strategy. These intellectuals are almost always members of the class in question and invariably have a strong institutional basis in state bureaucracies, TNCs, sometimes (right-wing) trade unions and political parties, think-tanks or élite universities. Moreover when working together they are required to approach problems from a 'Trilateral' perspective, to produce 'Trilaterally' optimal policy proposals. These intellectuals are not simply subordinate, but must approach problems from the perspective demanded. Gramsci's notion of the organic intellectual was originally developed with respect to national cultures, whereas the TC intellectuals are seeking to develop truly transnational perspectives. This is facilitated by the commensurability of their academic discourses, which tend to be rather technocratic and functionalist on the one hand and based in Rational Choice/Neo-Classical theory on the other. However, this may also mean that the pursuit of an optimizing strategy is constrained by the analytical limitations of the discourses used by the TC.




FIG. 1.

The institutional basis of the TC and its social formation within the USA, i.e. its place within the relationship between 'political' and 'civil' society, can be partially indicated by means of Fig. 1. This in Gramscian terms would be seen as the framework of a hegemonic, historic bloc in the USA. In this model, all stages apart from 'law-making' correspond to the concept of civil society and indicate the centrality of US civil society in the making of state policy when compared with the state-dominated USSR. The 'policy planning groups' are central in this oligarchical model of policy making and the most important of these are the TC, its US sister organization the Council on Foreign Relations, and the Council on Economic Development. Each of these has strong membership interlocks as well as frequent interchanges of personnel with the US Executive Branch and the White House staff. The TC, however, draws its membership from all stages and institutions in the policy process, although the majority of its members come from TNCs, philanthropic foundations, think tanks, élite universities, law firms and media organizations. (Indeed many individual TC members are simultaneously on the governing councils of a range of these institutions.) Some members, but not many, are members of Congress.

Seen from this perspective the TC is strategically placed in the centre of a diffuse but interconnected élite political process in the USA. Dye concludes that it is 'one of the central coordinating points in the entire policy-making process'. These policy planning groups are very important in the USA because of its geographically dispersed and relatively diversified élites. This is in contrast with Japan, Britain and France where the national leaders congregate in the capital. There is nothing deterministic about this process. What is fundamental however is that these groups 'endeavour to build consensus among corporate, financial, university, civic, intellectual and government leaders around major policy directions'. The groups 'are influential in a wide range of key policy areas'.²² In Dye's oligarchic model of the policy process, the activities of the 'proximate policy makers' are only the final phase of a much more complex process which is largely determined by the forces in the civil society which structure the options available for the formal law-making institutions.

It is worth noting that the centrality of the TC within the process of consensus building and policy making in the USA provides a link between the domestic political

economy of the US and the GPE, and more particularly between the political economies of the 'Trilateral countries'. However developments in the US are crucial for developments world wide. Cox cites Gramsci's position on this question:

Do international relations precede or follow (logically) fundamental social relations? Any organic innovation in the social structure, through its technical–military expressions, modifies organically absolute and relative relations in the international field too.²³

Cox stresses that by 'organic' Gramsci meant something structural, long-term or relatively permanent. Thus changes in international relations can be traced back to fundamental changes in social relations. Particularly since World War II, the US political economy has become progressively 'internationalized'. Indeed, the TC can be interpreted as the institutional successor to the Council on Foreign Relations, which was limited by its entirely US membership, in that it more effectively reflects the social forces which create the condition of 'complex interdependence'. In this transnational historical materialist view, the state is still the basic entity in international relations and is the place where hegemonies of social classes can be built. What is described in the above section would correspond to a concept of an internationally 'enlarged state' and a process of the 'transnationalization of the state', particularly where larger elements of the state bureaucracies in capitalist nations come to identify their outlook with that of internationally mobile forms of capital.

To the extent that the characteristic transnational ideas and institutions develop, there is a growing possibility of a transnational political coalition emerging. Shared ideas facilitate cooperation and communication between capitalist states, states and transnational organizations, and between these organizations themselves, i.e. at the transgovernmental and transnational levels. Such a transnational coalition of interests in an historic bloc would thus include some parts of labour, some aspects of international organizations and related political interests of other relevant foreign powers.

Cox has tentatively attempted to apply GH to world orders. He periodizes history since 1845 in terms of hegemonic and non-hegemonic orders, viz 1845–75 (hegemonic); 1875–1945 (non-hegemonic); 1945–65 (the USA founds a new hegemonic order); 1965–early 1970s (US hegemonic order erodes and a series of possibilities for transformation emerge). Cox thinks that the most likely possibility is a reconstituted hegemony with a broadening of the management of world capitalism along the lines suggested by the TC, although it is possible instead that the world economy will fragment into economic blocs, producing a Neo-Mercantilist non-hegemonic order. The least likely possibility is a Third World-based counter hegemony organized around demands for a New International Economic Order. The order most likely would give increasing opportunities for the forces of civil society to operate on a world scale. Such a hegemonic concept of world order is founded not only upon the regulation of conflict between states (RH) but also upon a globally-conceived civil society, i.e. a world wide mode of production linking social classes in various countries under the leadership of key class factions in the major Trilateral states (GH). For Cox, this hegemony must be expressed in universal norms (such as sovereignty and private property) as well as rules of behaviour and institutions to regulate those forces of civil society which act across national boundaries. These rules should support the dominant mode of production.²⁴ This latter idea partially corresponds to the Neo-Realist concept of an international regime, a notion strongly endorsed in TC publications, some of which have paid particular attention to the development of regimes in trade and finance, energy and the oceans.²⁵

International organization functions as a 'process through which the institutions of hegemony and its ideology are developed'.²⁶ The TC literature stresses the importance of international institutions and organizations, and the need continually to adapt them to fit changing circumstances. Within these institutions is an informal structure of influence which partially reflects the material capabilities of the members. The TC view is generally that participation in decision making should be organized on a 'flexible basis'. The TC stresses the theme of giving the greatest weight to an inner core of countries with the biggest stake in the making of decisions in a particular issue area. This suggests an image of concentric circles of participation, with the USA involved in all issues, and with the Trilateral countries surrounding the USA participating according to their power resources in the issue area concerned. Thus West Germany, France, Britain and Japan would be most heavily involved in economic issues (the group of five), whilst France and Britain (and perhaps Germany) would carry more weight in the realm of security than any of the other Trilateral countries except the USA. This functionalist view of participation is seen as generating the most efficient form of decision-making, helping to ensure the overall consistency of policies according to Trilateral criteria.²⁷ This notion of participation is compatible with Gramsci's notion of *transformismo* or cooptation, i.e. it maintains the prerogatives of the Trilateral countries on the basis of their material capabilities, whilst absorbing counter-hegemonic ideas and forces. Since the TC was created, new member countries have been admitted (e.g. Spain and Portugal, as well as Norway, Denmark and Eire), and some specialists from Third World and State Socialist countries have been involved in consultations. Also a large meeting was held with the Chinese leadership in Peking, and plans have been made by the TC executive to hold a meeting with a major Third World country, probably India. Plans for a meeting with the Soviet leadership (which had involved preliminary discussions) were aborted after the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.²⁸ This has added legitimacy to the TC's activities and has opened up further transnational channels of interaction and communication.

Uneven development, hegemony and the future of the Trilateral approach

In a fundamental sense, the origins of the TC are structural, and reflect the uneven development of the GPE since 1945. The need for the inclusion of Japan in the core of the USA's alliance system had been foreshadowed in US post-war policies and was becoming clear in the 1960s as it became a full member of the OECD. Its continuing economic success had by 1973 brought it to the 'high table', at least with respect to issues relating to the world economy. The rise of Japan in the post-war world thus created a need for its inclusion at the outset in the TC forum, rather than as an afterthought. However, the continuing 'Japanese challenge' makes 'Trilateral' cooperation more difficult, particularly since Japanese production is so competitive in the world market-place. Japanese economic successes, particularly in Western Europe, are not matched by any broad sense of cultural affinity. This is also true, though less so, in the USA. Thus the conditions for 'Trilateral' cooperation do not seem to be propitious in the 1980s. Looking forward, any long-term assessment of its effectiveness will depend on the degree to which it can help in the maintenance of peaceful, constructive relations between the capitalist states as a possible transition occurs to a new definition of political consensus in a reconstructed hegemony. Such an hegemony seems likely to be more 'liberal' and less social democratic in nature, and implies a shift away from the 'mixed economy' to one that lays more stress on market forces. In such a reconstruction of hegemony, the position of the Western European members of the alliance appears to be the most problematic.

This point requires some further elaboration. The TC was created at a time when, apart from some stresses and strains, and of course the 'trauma' of the 1973 oil shock, the post-war system had enjoyed largely smooth economic growth. The political counterpart to this was social democracy, which was practised in a large number of capitalist states, including the USA (e.g. President Johnson's 'Great Society' programme). The post-war social democratic political consensus can be viewed as an aspect of the post-war structure of the global political economy, with its main ideas and material capabilities 'embedded' in the post-war institutions of the LIEO. This post-war consensus, which permitted some mercantilism and welfarism, represented a strong 'fit' between Cox's three social forces—ideas, institutions and material capabilities—at the national and international levels. It successfully incorporated the varied interests of a range of classes and states in the advanced capitalist states.

However, it can perhaps be argued that this order is now under pressure on both sides of the Atlantic. Not only the USA in the Reagan era, the UK under Thatcher, West Germany under Kohl, but also, more revealingly, France under Mitterand, have moved towards some liberalization of their economies. The highly mercantilist Japanese have, under strong US pressure, moved to open up their protected markets. Many Third World countries have begun to do likewise, often under International Monetary Fund pressure. Such international economic pressures are being felt, not only in Europe, but also in the USA, where the strength of the dollar since 1982 has bolstered a formidable protectionist coalition, at the same time as the USA has attracted huge inflows of foreign capital because of the strong dollar and high real interest rates. Nonetheless, the Reagan Administration has largely resisted the pressure and followed a policy of relatively liberal trade, particularly in those sectors where the US has a comparative advantage. In September 1985 a concerted attempt to reduce the dollar exchange rate was made by the Group of Five capitalist nations (USA, UK, France, West Germany and Japan), in order to defuse US protectionist forces.

Uneven political and cultural development is reflected in the USA's more rapid movement away from post-war social democracy than its Western European partners, where welfarism is more embedded. Helping to undermine the social democratic consensus are the pressures stemming from the increased mobility of international capital, particularly in the context of the economic recessions of the 1970s and 1980s. This, and other factors, have led to a disciplining of labour and trade unionism and a roll-back of welfarism. That is to say that the consensus is being eroded partially as a result of attempts by nation-states to compete to attract more foreign investment.

Clearly some of the processes of socio-political reconstruction are easier in the USA, where welfarism was largely a New Deal phenomenon and is not deeply rooted in the more individualistic culture. In Japan the idea of welfarism operates much more at the corporate or company level, which is perhaps more consistent with corporate views of economic efficiency given the close fit between Japanese notions of the group, mutual obligation, hard work and competence (on the one hand), and economic efficiency (on the other). This reinforces the relative competitive weakness of Western Europe as a region when compared with East Asia and North America.

The forces released under liberal international conditions in the GPE thus seem to be putting increased pressure on the West European socio-political institutions which formed the consensus which originated in the 1930s. It may be harder for West European countries to combine this older, social democratic, political consensus with the more 'economic' part of the contemporary GPE.

Uneven economic development in the GPE, and more specifically between the three major capitalist regions of Western Europe, North America and East Asia, has revealed an increasing West European economic weakness relative to its competitors. This means Western Europe is more willing to do business with Moscow, particularly since it has important political interests in East–West détente. On the other hand, the US–Soviet relationship has deteriorated, and US cold war policies alarm many West European countries. This is partly due to wide divergence in the perception of the nature of the ‘Soviet threat’. Thus the US offer of involvement in SDI places Western European governments in a quandary: not to get involved in research and development may mean Western European countries will lag further behind in the economic and technological race. On the other hand such strategic involvement may imply violation of the SALT 1 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and a considerable deterioration in their political relations with the USSR. The alternative West European Eureka project can be interpreted as an attempt to cope with this problem.²⁹

A new consensus may thus be in the making. The TC has shown awareness of this problem, and sees part of its continuing purpose to help manage the transition to a new consensus which seems to be evolving within an emerging transnational hegemony. Structural changes in the GPE, manifested in the evolving international division of labour, frictions over East–West relations and conflicts in other issue-areas, create the need for policy adaptation by the Trilateral and other countries. This is likely to mean that the TC forum becomes more, not less, important as an institution within transnational hegemony. Our analysis does not imply that Realist concepts of hegemony are no longer of use in the study of international relations—the continuing rivalry between the superpowers and other states ensures its continuing importance. However, the growing importance of transnational social forces in the GPE, such as are reflected in the TC, requires a broader concept of hegemony, i.e. the Gramscian.

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Notes and references

1. These perspectives correspond to those dealt with by D. Sylvan in ‘The Newest Mercantilism’ *International Organisation* xxxv (1981), pp. 375–379. He discusses F. Block, *The Origins of International Economic Disorder: A Study of United States Monetary Policy from World War II to the Present*, (Berkeley, 1977), R. Gilpin, *US Power and the Multinational Corporation*, (London, 1976), and S. Krasner, *Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investments and US Foreign Policy*, (Princeton, 1978).
2. ‘Liberalizing’ is emphasized here since the system as it originated at the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944 was not entirely liberal—a great deal of protectionism was tolerated. The success of the USA, which at the time had a massive preponderance of material and military resources, was to gain acceptance for the principles of multilateralism and the ‘open door’ for foreign investment. However, the system reflected the changed nature of the (now more interventionist) post-war capitalist states. Ruggie argues that the system was ‘embedded’ in the ongoing state–society relations of the major powers, although in principle it was committed to the long term liberalization of trade and capital flows. See J. G. Ruggie, ‘International Regimes, Transactions and Change—Embedded Liberalism in the Post War Economic Order’ *International Organisation*, xxxvi (1982), pp. 379–415.
3. B. Russett, ‘The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony: Or, Is Mark Twain Really Dead?’

- International Organisation*, xxxix (1985), pp. 207–231.
4. H. Hveem, 'The Global Dominance System: Notes on a Theory of Global Political Economy', *Journal of Peace Research*, iv (1973), pp. 319–40.
 5. See J. S. Nye, 'US Power and Reagan Policy', *Orbis*, xxvi (1982), pp. 391–412; J. Petras and R. Rhodes, 'The Reconsolidation of US Hegemony', *New Left Review*, lxxxvii (1976), pp. 37–53; R. O. Keohane *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, (Princeton, 1984); G. Arrighi, 'A Crisis of Hegemony', in S. Amin, G. Arrighi, A. G. Frank and I. Wallerstein (eds.), *Dynamics of Global Crisis*, (New York, 1982) pp. 55–108.
 6. The world political system has been analysed in structural terms by a number of Neo-Realist writers such as K. Waltz [*Theory of International Politics*, (Reading, MA, 1979)]. International economists have analysed what they call the world economy. The term 'global political economy' is meant to refer both to an integrated entity and to the analysis of political and economic structures and processes at a global level. The term GPE is used in preference to the term 'international political economy' which may imply a degree of state-centricity. The conceptualization of such integrated structures and processes is a matter of debate between rival perspectives. For summaries of these different perspectives see P. A. Gourevitch, 'The Second Image Reversed: Domestic Sources of International Politics', *International Organisation*, xxxii (1978), pp. 929–952; R. J. Barry Jones, 'International Political Economy: Perspectives and Prospects', *Review of International Studies*, viii (1982), pp. 39–52; R. Tooze, 'In Search of International Political Economy', *Political Studies*, xxxii (1984), pp. 637–646.
 7. R. O. Keohane and J. S. Nye *Power and Interdependence*, (Boston, 1977), pp. 24–29, quote is on p. 25.
 8. An important early text was R. Cooper, *The Economics of Interdependence*, (New York, 1968).
 9. Ruggie, op. cit. (note 2).
 10. See A. Gramsci, *Selections from 'The Prison Notebooks'* translated by Q. Hoare and G. Nowell Smith (London, 1971); R. Cox, 'Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method' *Millennium*, xii (1983), pp. 162–175; M. Davis, 'The Political Economy of Late Imperial America', *New Left Review*, 143 (1984), pp. 6–38; Keohane, op. cit. (note 5) pp. 31–46.
 11. Cox, 'Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory', *Millennium*, x (1981), p. 139.
 12. J. Joll *Gramsci*, (Glasgow, 1977), p. 99.
 13. A. Showstack-Sassoon, *Gramsci's Politics*, (London, 1980), p. 111.
 14. *Ibid*, p. 116.
 15. Gramsci, op. cit. (note 10) p. 97.
 16. Showstack-Sassoon, op. cit. (note 13) p. 134.
 17. Keohane and Nye, op. cit. (note 7).
 18. See, for a representative selection of TC literature, F. Duchene *et al.*, *The Crisis of International Cooperation*, (New York, 1974); C. F. Bergsten *et al.*, *The Reform of International Institutions*, (New York, 1976); M. Crozier *et al.*, *The Crisis of Democracy*, (New York, 1975); R. Cooper *et al.*, *Towards a Renovated International System*, (New York, 1977); M. Camps *et al.*, *Trilateralism and the International Economy of the 1980s*, (New York, 1982); N. Ushiba *et al.*, *Sharing International Responsibilities among the Trilateral Countries*, (New York, 1983); T. Watanabe *et al.*, *Facilitating Development in a Changing Third World*, (New York, 1983); D. Owen *et al.*, *Democracy Must Work: A Trilateral Agenda for the Decade*, (New York, 1984).
 19. Owen *et al.*, op. cit., (note 18) p. 6.
 20. S. Gill, 'From Atlanticism to Trilateralism' in S. Smith (ed.) *International Relations: British and American Perspectives*, (Oxford, 1985), pp. 185–212.
 21. The Bilderberg Meetings are held annually and in complete secrecy. They originated in the mid-1950s as a private counterpart to the Atlantic Alliance, and helped serve to introduce leaders from various West European countries to their American counterparts. It has been referred to as the 'international' of post-war Atlanticist capitalism. Virtually every post-war major Western leader has attended Bilderberg at one time or another. The meetings ceased temporarily after the Lockheed scandal, since Bilderberg's chairman, Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands, was heavily implicated in the imbroglio. The Atlantic Institute is primarily a research organization and is another private counterpart to NATO. Unlike Bilderberg, it has a significant number of Japanese members, but since its concerns have tended to be in the security field, the Japanese have given it lower priority than the TC. The Hakone meetings are annual and were started in 1977. They involve selected TC members and younger aspiring members of the élites of Japan and the major Western European countries. The originator of these meetings was Max Kohnstamm, the former Private Secretary to Bernhardt, and a previous Chairman of the European branch of the TC.
 22. T. Dye *Who's Running America? The Carter Years*, Second Edition (Englewood Cliffs, 1979), pp. 213, 225, 226.

23. Cox, 'Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations', (note 10) p. 169, citing Gramsci in *The Prison Notebooks*.
24. Cox, op. cit. (note 10) pp. 170–172.
25. Watanabe *et al.*, op. cit. (note 18); J. C. Campbell *et al.*, *Energy: A Strategy for International Action*, (New York, 1974); R. N. Gardner *et al.*, *OPEC, The Trilateral World and the Developing Countries: Arrangements for Cooperation*, (New York, 1975); J. C. Sawhill *et al.*, *Energy: Managing the Transition*, (New York, 1978); M. Hardy *et al.*, *A New Regime for the Oceans*, (New York, 1976).
26. Cox, 'Social Forces, States, and World Orders', (note 11) p. 172.
27. See Cooper *et al.*, op. cit. (note 18) and Ushiba *et al.*, op. cit. (note 18).
28. Interviews with C. Heck, North American Director of the TC, 21 June 1979, 27 July 1982.
29. I am grateful to David Law for bringing some of these points to my attention.
30. Owen *et al.*, op. cit. (note 18) p. 5. On uneven development and the implications of a technology gap emerging between Western Europe, on the one hand, and the USA and Japan on the other, see *ibid.*, p. 63.