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# A Revisionist View of Nixon's Foreign Policy

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Foreign policy is the area in which Richard Nixon's unprecedented resignation as president over Watergate has least obscured his achievements. The geopolitical and structural approaches he brought to foreign policy in a time of transition—marked by an end of the bipartisan Cold War consensus—have generally been praised, with the exception of his conduct of the war in Vietnam.

Any revisionist approach to Nixon's management of foreign policy must begin by attempting to place in perspective the complex interaction that developed between Nixon and Henry Kissinger, whose "advanced megalomania" remains legendary.<sup>1</sup> In retrospect, I believe that one of the most unfortunate decisions the president-elect made during the interregnum was to appoint Kissinger, about whom all Nixon knew was that as a Nelson Rockefeller supporter Kissinger had been openly disdainful of him and his bid for the Republican nomination in 1968. If Nixon thought Kissinger's views on U.S. policy were important, he could have employed him as consultant to the National Security Council (NSC), as the Kennedy administration had done. This opinion, however, was not shared either by Nixon or most of his former advisers, one of whom insisted to me that "the care and feeding of Henry" was worth all the paranoia, backbiting, leaking, rumor-mongering, and pseudo-intellectual posturing that Kissinger brought to the White House.<sup>2</sup>

Why Nixon chose Kissinger to head the NSC is still not entirely clear—given they had not met before the 1968 election and Kissinger's views on foreign policy did not coincide with Nixon's. A review of Kissinger's career only partially explains the president's choice.

## **Kissinger: The Best "Bastard Feudalist"**

Paid, rather than unpaid service, gave rise to a system of patronage, known as "bastard feudalism," at the end of the medieval period that would continue to the present.<sup>3</sup> Payment for services rendered became the "quintessence" of that system. Once appointed, Kissinger typically began to make himself indispensable to Nixon, as only the most skillful twentieth-century "bastard feudalist" could. He later referred to White House politics under Nixon as "not so different from life at royal courts." Others have referred to the intrigue permeating Nixon's Oval Office as having the "atmosphere of an Italian Renaissance Court." However described, one thing is true about Kissinger's brand of "bastard feudalism": "he derived his power wholly from the favor of a miscreant lord in the White House."<sup>4</sup>

Although there were other prominent "bastard feudalists" in the first Nixon administration, notably Spiro Agnew, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, and John Connally, Henry Kissinger was probably the most prized. Kissinger's career had been dependent upon, and molded by, a succession of patron/mentors, the next to last and most influential of whom, before Richard Nixon, having been Nelson A. Rockefeller. None of Kissinger's earlier patron/

mentors during his military service or while studying at Harvard had the financial means to become other than intellectual catalysts for him. Not until the Rockefeller family became responsible for Kissinger's prominence as a specialist in international affairs, did his career come to embody the twentieth century version of paid feudal patronage. A good synthesizer of other people's ideas, Kissinger had basically edited, but claimed sole authorship for, two books: *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy* (1957) and *The Necessity for Choice: Prospects for American Foreign Policy* (1961). Likewise, his third and fourth books, the *Necessity for Choice* (1960) and *The Troubled Partnership* (1965) were also based on study group reports of the Council on Foreign Relations.<sup>6</sup> This role as summarizer would stand Kissinger in good stead when he headed the National Security Council under Nixon.

At first glance Nixon and Kissinger—an American Quaker and a German-American Jew—appear to have been the odd couple of American foreign policy. Given his long and close association with the Rockefeller family and his own blunt criticisms of Nixon, Kissinger himself apparently did not think that he would last six months in the new Nixon administration. Yet by the time these two men came together in 1968 they had developed similar operational styles.<sup>7</sup> Both relished covert activity and liked making unilateral decisions; both distrusted bureaucracies; both resented any attempt by Congress to interfere with initiatives; and both agreed that the United States could impose order and stability on the world only if the White House controlled policy by appearing conciliatory but acting tough. While neither had headed any complex organization, both thought “personalized executive control” and formal application of procedures would lead to success.

Even more coincidental, perhaps, each had a history of failure and rejection, which made them susceptible to devising ways of protecting themselves and their positions of power. Often the concern for protection appeared as obsession with eavesdropping, whether wiretaps or reconnaissance flights. They eavesdropped on themselves: Nixon by installing an automatic taping system in the oval office, Kissinger by having some of his meetings and all of his phone conversations taped or transcribed from notes.

Many of these same personal and professional characteristics had hindered Kissinger during his brief encounter with the Kennedy administration. Between 1961 and 1962, when he acted as a low-level adviser to the National Security Council, his arrogantly paranoid style was not “in” among the “best and brightest.” They found Kissinger, as so many had on the Council of Foreign Affairs at best “an adornment,” and at worst dull and pompous whose platitudinous views were too cautious and conventional for JFK's “risk-making” foreign policy. Aside from “advocating patience” he ran headlong into personal and policy conflicts with Kennedy's NSC Adviser McGeorge Bundy.<sup>8</sup> Despite his early social and intellectual problems with JFK's NSC, Kissinger retained ties with the Democratic administration of Lyndon Johnson, by relaying gossip and his opinions. He traveled twice to South Vietnam in 1965 and 1967 at the invitation of Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge as part of a government-sponsored academic delegation to promote the war effort. Kissinger also became involved in a short, abortive attempt to secretly negotiate an end to the war in Vietnam through two French intermediaries only to find the North Vietnamese attitude “baffling.” In retrospect, he remained baffled by the North Vietnamese from 1969 to 1973.<sup>9</sup>

During the 1968 presidential nomination campaign, Kissinger wrote speeches for Rockefeller. Finding himself out on a limb in March 1968, when Rockefeller withdrew from the race to become the GOP presidential candidate, as a bastard feudalist Kissinger was willing to switch allegiances, even if it meant working for a man he “profoundly distrusted” and had described as a demagogue who did not “have the right to rule” and was “not fit to be President.”<sup>10</sup> He may have cinched his appointment in Nixon's administration during the presidential campaign when he leaked information to the Nixon people

about Johnson's negotiations with the Vietnamese; or it may have been that John Mitchell, who also had close ties to Rockefeller, recommended Kissinger; or it may have been the aura of his Harvard, intellectual reputation, or simply Nixon's desire to strike a blow at Rockefeller by "stealing" someone close to him. Probably a combination of all these factors that resulted in Nixon's appointment of Kissinger as special assistant to the president for National Security Affairs—even though they did not share similar views on foreign policy.<sup>11</sup>

In particular, Kissinger did not share Nixon's optimistic approach to diplomacy and proclivity for taking risky, far-reaching foreign policy actions. When vice president under Eisenhower, Nixon said: "I am not necessarily a respecter of the *status quo* in foreign affairs. I am a *chance taker* in foreign affairs. I would take chances for peace." Along these same lines, Nixon told Kissinger in August 1969, "just because [I] supported [something] as a private individual does not mean [I] will as president."<sup>12</sup>

In contrast, practically every analyst of Kissinger's ideas points out their essentially conservative (and profoundly pessimistic), nineteenth-century European roots. Before joining the Nixon administration, Kissinger's ideas (and dense writing style) seemed to have changed little from the time he wrote his Ph.D. dissertation, in which he recommended Metternich's principles about a system of alliances among conservative regimes to check the forces of revolution to the modern, Western world. Kissinger's early writings presaged what his memoirs finally confirmed; namely, the mind of "a middle-level manager who has learned to conceal vacuity with pretentious verbiage."<sup>13</sup>

Kissinger's pre-1968 political science writings conveyed very conventional cold warrior ideas about Vietnam, detailed a type of anti-communist views opposed to grand designs in foreign policy and, at best, only paid occasional lip service to the necessity for some risk-taking. And as a "inveterate conceptualizer," he was seldom on top of specific contemporary issues in his search for piecemeal solutions.<sup>14</sup>

Prior to 1968 Kissinger opposed most of the geopolitical views he later espoused under Nixon, such as *détente* with the Soviet Union, greater "partnership" with Europe (because he thought NATO was in a state of "disarray"), and the need to shift the focus of U.S. foreign policy to Asia. In contrast to Nixon's innovative diplomatic views on the eve of his presidency, Kissinger's remained conceptually and tactically grounded far back in the 1950s and 1960s, which he misleadingly projected on to Nixon saying after the Republican nominating convention in 1968: "I'm very worried that Nixon's coldwar [sic] outlook has remained frozen since his vice-presidential years in the fifties and that therefore in the seventies, in the waning military pre-eminence of American power, *it could lead him into taking undue risks.*" About the only diplomatic ideas that Nixon and Kissinger shared by 1969, which can be documented, was their distrust of the bureaucracy in formulation of policy and their belief it was time to get out of Vietnam. Neither had any specific notion about how to accomplish the latter and it remained for the president to lead the way toward genuinely innovative, grand designs for redirecting of U.S. diplomacy.<sup>15</sup>

Much to the surprise of those who knew him best, this short, pugnacious individual became a "swinger" and reigning White House wit. Kissinger behavior and demeanor had not changed. But without competition from John F. Kennedy's charisma and his prototype yuppy cronies, Kissinger emerged not only as the "best" bastard feudalist, but also as the life of the party, who had the ear not only of the president but also of every reporter because he became an invaluable anonymous source of information. "If anyone leaks anything," he purportedly told his NSC assistants at their very first staff meeting, "I will do the leaking." Such leaks haunted the first Nixon administration, while ensuring Kissinger's popularity with the Washington press corps from then to the present. As Leslie Gelb later noted: "the

most powerful thing to a newsmen is information . . . Kissinger began gradually cutting other people out of the information flow . . . if they really wanted to know what was going on [in foreign policy] there was only one place to go.”<sup>16</sup>

The person Kissinger most effectively undercut was Secretary of State William Rogers. Conflicts between Rogers and Kissinger usually ended in favor of the latter until the secretary of state finally resigned in September 1973. Kissinger replaced him while remaining special assistant for national security affairs. As Secretary of State Rogers ended up so far out of the White House “loop” when it came to the administration’s often secret diplomacy that Nixon seldom wrote him any of his now famous, impromptu memoranda or comments on daily news summaries. However, the president wrote to others criticizing Rogers’s inability “to keep a secret,” lack of initiative, and general “dovishness.” The absence of a working relationship between Rogers and Nixon, despite their long association under Eisenhower, allowed, in part, for Kissinger’s ascendancy on foreign policy matters. (Interestingly, in April 1973 Nixon considered bringing Rogers—not Kissinger—into a negotiating role between the administration and then Attorney General John Mitchell over Watergate matters because “he is clean” and “from the public point of view the Dean of the Cabinet.”)<sup>17</sup>

Contrary to conventional wisdom, however, Watergate became Kissinger’s Waterloo as well as Nixon’s. After Nixon resigned in August 1974 Kissinger was unable to initiate any new policies under President Gerald Ford even though he continued to head both the State Department and the National Security Council until October 1975.

### **Reorganizing the National Security Council**

Shortly after Nixon and Kissinger joined forces, they put into place a White House-centered model for formulating foreign policy by reorganizing the National Security Council. They turned the NSC into *the* foreign policy forum within the White House. In theory the State Department was to implement NSC policy, but often in practice, Nixon’s and Kissinger’s personal management of policy merged formulation and operational functions inside the NSC system. Instead of continuing to lament the “Nixinger” NSC system, it is time to begin to reexamine it.

While claiming to take an “agnostic” view of these dramatic structural and function changes within the NSC, Kissinger readily accepted it with the rationalization that a “President should not leave the presentation of his options to one of the Cabinet departments or agencies.” Although he implied in his memoirs that this reorganization of the NSC system did not increase his power, there is no doubt it did. He shrewdly employed his elite staff to keep foreign policy experts in the State and Defense Departments, as well as in other government agencies, off balance and overworked by having to respond to requests for National Security Study Memorandum (NSSMs).<sup>18</sup>

Later, former Secretary of State William Rogers criticized the revitalized NSC system under Nixon. Rogers specifically said that the NSC should have had more regular meetings, that the secretary of the treasury should have been a member of the NSC, and that the assistant to the president for national security had become “too much of a policy maker.”<sup>19</sup> Acknowledging that Nixon “was antagonistic to the State Department,” Rogers denied that the president was personally hostile toward him or other top foreign service personnel. He noted that despite the president’s disdain for the department’s bureaucracy (with which Rogers was “tremendously impressed”), it gave an “amazing” amount of support to Nixon’s policies. Rogers thought that the secretary of state and not the head of the NSC “should be the principal [foreign policy] adviser” to the president and that only problems that could not be resolved within State “should go to the NSC for final resolution.” Other witnesses

testifying before the Murphy Commission, including Elliot Richardson, George Kennan, Clark Clifford, and Dean Rusk, also criticized the NSC dominated system for formulating foreign policy created by Nixon and Kissinger.<sup>20</sup>

In actuality, however, the National Security Council, as a debating forum for presenting options to the president, was *not* utilized to decide the policies of Vietnamization, the Nixon Doctrine, the secret Kissinger negotiations with North Vietnam, Nixon's New Economic Policy (NEP), the intervention in Chile that culminated in President Salvador Allende's overthrow, or the planning of Nixon's trip to China. All of these were presented to the NSC, if at all, as *fait accompli*. Indeed, one might ask when the NSC system *was* used. During Nixon's first year as president the NSC decided to begin the secret bombing of Cambodia and to respond to the EC-121 incident, involving the shootdown of a U.S. Navy reconnaissance plane by North Korea. Later in his administration the NSC played a role in other events: the attempt to keep Taiwan in the United Nations with a "two China" policy; the decision to conduct incursions into Cambodia and Laos; the *détente* agreements with the Soviet Union; Middle Eastern policy *before* the 1973 October War; and policy in Angola and southern Africa in general.

In summary, when a decision could be carried out that did not depend on the civilian or military bureaucracy for implementation, the newly organized NSC was ignored, whether the action was covert or not. It was utilized, however, whenever the covert or overt policy required large-scale bureaucratic support. So Nixon and Kissinger bypassed the NSC whenever they did not need the bureaucracy to carry out their policies. Kissinger proceeded to recreate the NSC system (what John Osborne has called "Henry's Wonderful Machine") within the State Department. In the long run, however, the mammoth bureaucracy of "Foggy Bottom" defeated the formidable Kissinger. His methods simply did not work as effectively, even as illusions, outside the wired Oval Office and political influence of Richard Nixon. Kissinger, of course, has not admitted any defects in either his restructuring of the NSC or State Department under Nixon.

Another related aspect of the "Nixinger" approach to foreign affairs was that both men set arbitrarily high standards of performance for their subordinates within the bureaucracy. Nixon and Kissinger usually found such bureaucrats wanting and they resented having to rely on those whom they considered to be largely incompetent. This negative attitude toward the bureaucracy increased pressure on all of the government agencies responsible for major foreign or domestic policies to produce impossible results, or to fudge on them. A perfect example can be found in the exaggerated reports about the effectiveness of the bombing and later invasion of Cambodia by systems analysts working for both Kissinger and the Pentagon. Ultimately top civilian and military officials consciously or unconsciously came to believe these protestations about the success of attacking communist sanctuaries. In this circuitous fashion, Nixon's and Kissinger's suspicions about bureaucratic inefficiency created a situation in which they insisted on unrealistic results, leading to reports which stretched the truth and—in the case of Vietnam—lengthened the war based on false expectations about victory.

Consequently, the first lesson to be learned from the Nixonian legacy for presidential policy making is that centralized decision making can be as seductive as it is productive. Neither the president nor his closest advisers should lie to themselves or to others about the efficiency or efficacy of one set of structural or reporting procedures over another. Above all, they should not expect too much from structural reform or from bureaucratic reports made under duress. If these minimum caveats are not heeded, the best structural changes can produce and rationalize the worst policies.

Largely because Kissinger, backed by the president, insisted that his new NSC system was a success, other officials believed him. Many other White House officials working on domestic matters desperately tried to duplicate, or at least to emulate, Kissinger's self-proclaimed structural successes, only to be left wondering why he succeeded and they failed. The fact of the matter is that Kissinger, especially during his first year in office, never told them the truth; namely, that the NSC was failing to live up to either his or the president's expectations; and that they preferred to ignore the entire system whenever possible.

### **The Nixon Doctrine and Pentagonal Global Economics**

Nixon unexpectedly initiated his grand geopolitical design for U.S. foreign policy when he presented what became known as the Nixon Doctrine to a group of reporters on July 25, 1969, on a non-quotation basis at a background press briefing in Guam, the first stop on an around-the-world trip.<sup>21</sup> Years later when I asked Nixon why he had announced this important doctrine in such an offhand manner, he said that it was for the same reasons that two years later on July 6, 1971, he introduced his five-power or "pentagonal" global economic concept: to avoid having it leaked in advance by State Department bureaucrats; and to avoid telling Kissinger which would have entailed NSSMs on the subject and, in turn, would have entailed a National Security Council discussion before his proclamation. In both instances he also specifically denied "getting" these particular diplomatic ideas from either Kissinger or that they "originated in the bureaucracy" by being presented to him like choices on a menu.<sup>22</sup>

Despite Kissinger's claims to the contrary, eyewitness accounts indicated beyond any doubt that Nixon's own pronouncement took Kissinger so much by surprise that "Henry quarrel[ed] with RN [Richard Nixon] when he came off the stage about it . . . [and] was not happy with what RN said." According to this observer, Nixon condescendingly told to Kissinger: "you'll learn, relax." Kissinger was no more pleased with Nixon's unilateral pronouncement about a "pentagonal balance of power," discussed below.<sup>23</sup>

While the Nixon Doctrine was initially aimed at "southern tier" Third World counties in East Asia as "essentially a rationale for retrenchment," it came to represent the formal institutionalization of the policy of Vietnamization, that is, U.S. support for regional security and local self-sufficiency generally in the Far East. It also had important international implications for the Atlantic Alliance because, like *détente* with the Soviet Union, it embodied "a genuine American acceptance of the implications of nascent multipolarity—the so-called 'new pluralism.'" The Nixon Doctrine was, in fact, the corollary, in particular, to *détente* between the U.S. and USSR and, in general, to the president's pentagonal approach to world affairs. As such, it allowed the United States to begin to resolve the contradiction that had plagued its foreign policy throughout the Cold War containment years: how to maintain its commitments abroad while at the same time reducing its direct military involvement. "The local efforts suggested by the Nixon Doctrine were not narrowly conveyed as an adjunct to the global *modus vivendi* achieved at the super power level," according to Robert S. Litwak. "Rather, they were to serve as a kind of regional safety-net, presumably consonant with American interests should there develop a local crack in the stable structure."<sup>24</sup>

The Nixon Doctrine also "repudiated the rationale under which the United States had first become involved in Vietnam." It therefore transformed that conflict from a "strategic contest between the proxies of two great powers—the United States and China—into a dirty little war that could . . . be lost or settled in a way that would not gravely damage American interests or increase threats."<sup>25</sup> Hence, Nixon Doctrine was more necessary from an American perspective as a foundation block upon which to build the later *détente*

agreements with the Soviet Union (and China), than the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) legislation, despite the greater domestic attention that the latter received in the United States during the spring and summer of 1969.

By 1971 it had evolved into the internationalization of the policy of Vietnamization or, at the very least, its blanket application to the Far East, the purpose of this new presidential foreign policy doctrine became, according to Nixon,

to provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of any nation allied with us . . . in cases involving other types of aggression we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility for the manpower for its defense.

Succinctly, Nixon wanted “to ensure that there were no more Vietnams in the future.”<sup>26</sup> The subsequent invasions of Cambodia and Laos violated the intent if not the letter of the Nixon Doctrine.

The unilateral, unexpectedness of the Nixon Doctrine also caused problems for Kissinger and his NSC staff. Among other things since the president originally presented it on “non-quotation basis,” it was not officially a part of the public record until he summarized it in a November 1969 address on Vietnam and again at a press conference in December. Nixon’s most complete explanation of it can be found in his first report to Congress on foreign policy on February 25, 1971. NSC staffer Robert Osgood was particularly disturbed by the doctrine’s vagueness and the fact that its “low posture” was being mistaken among journalists and academics for “inaction or lack of imagination.” The fact that it also upstaged his own “Review of the World Situation,” written on July 7 for Kissinger and the president, contributed to Osgood’s concern about what the Nixon Doctrine meant.<sup>27</sup>

Kissinger, characteristically taking credit for policy he neither initiated nor liked, reportedly insisted when it became evident that the secret bombing of Cambodia violated the president’s doctrine: “We wrote the goddamn doctrine, we can change it.” Later in his memoirs, Kissinger concluded that “there was less to [it] than met the eye.”<sup>28</sup>

In Kansas City on July 6, 1971, Nixon made another unilateral announcement. This time he established a five-power or “northern tier” strategy which he hoped would replace the bipolar, confrontational aspects of the Cold War. Instead of continuing to deal primarily with the Soviet Union, Nixon wanted to bring the five great economic regions of the world—the United States, the USSR, mainland China, Japan, and Western Europe—into constructive negotiation and mutually profitable economic competition. Admitting that the United States could not long maintain its post-World War II position of “complete preeminence or predominance,” Nixon outlined a “pentagonal strategy” which would promote peace and economic progress by “linking” the interests of the major regional powers. Kissinger never officially endorsed this five-power geopolitical, preferring the more exclusive Rockefeller “trilateral” approach that embraced only the U.S., Japan, and the Common Market nations of Western Europe (including England).

### **International Economics**

Nixon’s pentagonal strategy led him to deal extensively with foreign economic policy. In this financial realm Nixon employed far fewer questionable tactics (with the exception of the economic warfare his administration conducted against Salvador Allende’s government in Chile) and followed the advice of a much broader group of advisers, than he did with other aspects of his diplomacy.



Nixon attributed his interest in international economics to Eisenhower's Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, when he served as vice-president in the 1950s and tried to create a Foreign Economic Council. Failing in this, Nixon said that his travels abroad in the 1950s only confirmed his belief that foreign leaders understood economics better than leaders of the United States and he was determined to remedy this situation as president. Nixon faced two obstacles in this effort: Kissinger (as he has put it: "international economics was not Henry's bag"); and State Department people who saw "economic policy as government to government," which limited their diplomatic view of the world and made them so suspicious or cynical (or both) about the private sector that they refused to promote international commerce to the degree that Nixon thought they should. "Unlike the ignoramuses I encountered among economic officers at various embassies in the 1950s and 1960s," Nixon told me, "I wanted to bring economics to the foreign service."<sup>29</sup>

Nixon's interest in and knowledge of international trade increased after 1962 when he was out of public office practicing law in New York. With the Wall Street firm of Nixon, Mudge, Rose, Guthrie, and Alexander, which merged in 1967 with Caldwell, Trimble, and Mitchell, he handled some cases dealing with international economics and multinational corporations.<sup>30</sup> From these two decades of experience with international and domestic economic matters, Nixon attempted as president to rationalize the formulation of foreign economic policy — definitely not Henry Kissinger's areas of expertise. Partially because they were not a "team" on foreign economic policy and in part because Nixon bypassed the NSC entirely in formulating his New Economic Policy in 1971, the president relied not on his national security adviser, but on other free-thinking outsiders when formulating foreign economic policy. Even the Rockefeller brothers, Kissinger mentor/patrons were not able to exercise the influence on economic policy they would have liked to because they could not use Henry as conduit on this issue.<sup>31</sup>

United States foreign economic policy took on new importance not only because of the energy crisis following the October War, but also because of the international aspects of Nixon's 1971 New Economic Policy. Faced with a gold drain and a trade deficit the Nixon administration initiated the New Economic Policy (NEP) which, in addition to wage and price controls, allowed the dollar "to float" on international markets to increase markets abroad and stop any more speculative pressures against the dollar.

Although Secretary of the Treasury John Connally dominated the foreign economic views of the Nixon administration largely through the formulation and implementation of the NEP during his short service in the administration as secretary of the treasury from February 1971 to May 1972, the president ultimately relied more on sustained support and advice in the person of George Shultz. Shultz succeeded Connally in 1972 and also became head of the new cabinet-level Council on Economic Policy (CEP).

Next to John Connally and Shultz, Nixon was most impressed with the economic views of Peter G. Peterson who, after starting out in 1971 as assistant to the president for international economic affairs, became secretary of commerce in January 1972. In January 1971, Nixon convinced Congress to establish an entirely new cabinet-level Council on International Economic Policy (CIEP), with Peterson as executive director. The CIEP's mission was to fill an existing void in the federal structure by coordinating domestic and foreign policy. Nixon thought the CIEP so important that he initially chaired its meetings, as it attempted to "deal with international economic policies (including trade investment, balance of payments, and finance) as a coherent whole."<sup>32</sup>

For a variety of reasons, not the least of which was Kissinger's general disinterest in the complicated and unglamorous aspects of international economics, in 1975 the Murphy

Commission on the Organization of Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy recommended (with Kissinger's whole-hearted support) that the CIEP be abolished.

Despite CIEP's ultimate failure to centralize U.S. foreign economic policy, the Nixon administration dealt successfully with a number of international economic issues including the Trade Reform Act of 1973, the president's Expropriation Policy Statement of 1972, preparation and follow up on economic issues for the 1972 summit meeting with the Soviets, the on-going lend lease settlements, all commercial and maritime agreements, and international investment policy, and the expropriation of U.S. property by foreign countries, on a case-by-case basis. In the long run, jurisdictional problems involving the CIEP, the Commission on International Trade and Investment Policy, and the National Advisory Council of the treasury department prevented any systematic centralization of foreign economic policy issues.

### **Kissinger's Concept of Linkage**

Before joining the administration, Kissinger had not shown any interest in global economic linkages, nor had he linked Moscow to any potential settlement of the war in Vietnam, as Nixon had. Ultimately, however, Kissinger coined the word "linkage." He belatedly broadened it (rhetorically at least) to include other issues such as trade, food policy, and arms control, and Third World competition with the Soviet Union.<sup>33</sup> Linkage became associated more with Kissinger than Nixon during their years together. The concept fit Kissinger's penchant for complicated schemes described in impenetrable language, but linkage posed more problems than it resolved. First and foremost it never worked with respect to the Soviet Union in negotiations with Vietnam or the Salt I talks, and it made "Nixinger" foreign policy indifferent to Third World concerns, except insofar as they could be "linked" to conflicts between the U.S. and U.S.S.R.

From the beginning of the Nixon administration linkage relegated entire areas of the world such as southern Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America—areas commonly referred to as the Third World—to a secondary place in the president's (and his national security adviser's) political approach to foreign policy. Nixon and Kissinger also largely ignored foreign economic policy considerations in dealing with the Third World, preferring, instead, to "link" events in such countries to power relations among the major nations. Linkage, therefore, accounts for many of the seemingly erratic aspects of U.S. foreign policy in Third World areas which fell outside of the parameters of pentagonal strategy. Nixon was more interested in maintaining American spheres of influence in the Third World than in the economic needs of these developing nations.

### **Third World Mistakes**

The diminished cold warriorism of "Nixingerism" in general usually did not apply in the Third World because linkage, based on indiscriminate geopolitical calculations, led to actions that often underplayed economic reality and/or the human dimension of individual situations. This proved particularly true for U.S. diplomacy from 1969 to 1974 in already established or emerging, small nations. In a particularly frank memorandum to Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Kissinger on March 2, 1970, Nixon said that "he [Kissinger] must not let members of his staff of members or the establishment and the various Departments think that I do 'not care' about the under-developed world. I do care, but what happens in those parts of the world is not, in the final analysis going to have significant effect on the success of our foreign policy in the foreseeable future."<sup>34</sup>

This attitude led to such policies as the “tilt” toward Pakistan in 1971 in its war with India; the racist “tar baby” policy adopted for all of Africa in 1970 favoring cooperation with white minorities against black nationalist movements; the use of the CIA and American businesses to destabilize the democratically elected communist regime of Salvador Allende in Chile beginning in 1971, which contributed to his downfall in 1973; inaction in face of starving Biafrans during the Nigerian civil war of 1969–1970; and tactics favoring the rightist military junta who overthrew Archbishop Makarios in 1974 which encouraged the subsequent Turkish invasion of Cyprus.

In each of these instances, the administration acted globally without considering the unique local and historical aspects of the situation. For example, relations with India deteriorated because Pakistan served as the conduit to China in the early secret stages of rapprochement and not only led to Pakistan’s suppression of Bangladesh’s independence, but also to India’s decision to develop nuclear weapons—all because Nixon and Kissinger decided that the United States “could not let an American/Chinese friend (Pakistan) get screwed in a confrontation” where the Soviets seemed to be allying with India.<sup>35</sup> The grand geopolitical design may have been “grand” by superpower standards, but it remained ineffectually grandiose with respect to the Third World.

### **Rapprochement with China**

Improved relations with the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union are often cited as the most successful diplomatic achievements of Nixon’s presidency. They were two important parts of the president’s pentagonal strategy. From 1949 until 1979 the United States refused to recognize the communist government of the People’s Republic of China. Not until the early 1970s during Nixon’s first administration did the U.S. government begin to reverse this standard Cold War policy of nonrecognition with a number of unilateral gestures of reconciliation, which ultimately brought about rapprochement (the establishment of friendly relations) under Nixon and recognition under President Jimmy Carter in 1979.

Setting in motion a process that ended in recognition of China remains one of Nixon’s most long lasting diplomatic accomplishments. Normalization of U.S. relations with China was designed to bring this giant communist nation into the ranks of “civilized” nations. Long before Nixon sent Kissinger on a secret mission to Peking in July 1971 to arrange the details of his own visit there the following year, the president had used the State Department and other government agencies to make various unilateral gestures of reconciliation, indicating that he wanted fundamental improvements in relations between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. It remains one of the best examples of a “Presidentially imposed, Presidentially-initiated policy.”<sup>36</sup>

The opening of relations with China was on Nixon’s mind from the beginning of his presidency because he had been thinking about it for some time. He had given notice in a widely circulated 1967 article that questioned such Cold War assumptions as nonrecognition of mainland China. Raymond Price, a leading speech writer for Nixon beginning in 1967 and the man that the former president considered the “ablest of his staff” both before and after his presidency, helped Nixon articulate his views on China in the 1967 *Foreign Affairs* article. Price accompanied Nixon on his round-the-world trip in 1967 and observed first hand how he was struggling to re-evaluate the entire Asian question.<sup>37</sup> Additionally, William Safire not only noted the care with which Nixon weighed every word in his 1967 article, but also that it received national distribution after being condensed for *Reader’s Digest*.<sup>38</sup> Theodore White indicated that Nixon told him about his intentions to change relations with China in March 1968. Nixon had quietly discussed China with foreign leaders

when out of office in the 1960s, according to C. L. Sulzberger. Another correspondent, Henry Brandon, reported that as early as 1954 Nixon told a group of reporters that “it was important to end the isolation of China gradually and [recommended doing] this by reopening trade relations and cultural exchanges.”<sup>39</sup>

However, like so many of Nixon's foreign and domestic policies, better relations with China was also an idea whose time was ripe for implementation. By the mid-1960s China specialists had openly begun to complain about continuing to isolate the People's Republic and even though anti-Chinese sentiments loomed large in the public mind because of its support for the North Vietnamese, China had been gaining international credibility for over twenty years. As leader of the nonaligned nations, China challenged both superpowers' right to dictate to Third World nations, its ties with the Soviet Union had been severely strained, if not actually broken, by 1969, and the cultural revolution inside China had subsided. Thus, conditions were propitious for rethinking Chinese-American relations—a fact not lost on Nixon—a man always in tune with his times.

It has often been said that only a conservative Republican could alter U.S. relations with the People's Republic of China at the height of the Cold War. Yet Nixon knew that even with his reputation as a cold warrior he would face conservative criticism for opening up China to the West, especially if his “two China” policy failed (as it did). Kissinger, having played “catch-up on the changes in American/Sino relations set in motion by the president, worried more about how to present the historic change in policy on China to liberals. At a meeting recorded by Haldeman, between Ron Zielger, Nixon's press secretary, and Kissinger, the two men speculated that liberals would simply claim rapprochement simply another “Tricky Dick” policy that came about without consultation with Congress. Kissinger, convinced that the “libs will try to piss on it as an election year gimmick,” said that “if [liberals] do [charge this] we say they've unmasked [them]selves: you're not against *what* we're doing; you're against the fact *we* are doing it.”<sup>40</sup>

Despite the obvious importance and success of rapprochement with the People's Republic of China (symbolized by the president's globally televised trip in February 1972 with its attendant joint “Shanghai Communiqué”), Nixon never believed that the media gave it as much credit as he would have liked. As late as 1988 he was still trying to claim as much credit for rapprochement as possible, saying: “We changed the world. If it had not been for the China initiative, which only I could do at that point, we would be in a terrible situation today with China aligned with the Soviet Union and with Soviet Union's power.”<sup>41</sup>

### **Détente with the USSR**

Likewise détente initiated with the Soviet Union during the Nixon administration proved more controversial at the time than in retrospect. It represented nothing more or less than a political and economic process for: avoiding nuclear war; building a network of mutually advantageous relationships; and modifying Soviet behavior by gaining its *de facto* acceptance of international cooperation and competition (sometimes referred to as “competitive coexistence”). In a word, détente was intended to preserve international stability by according the Soviet Union a greater stake in the *status quo*. To a lesser degree détente also reflected the domestic and international economic problems the United States faced as a result of the Vietnamese war. At the time, the one thing détente *did not* represent under the Nixon administration was a continuation of the traditional Cold War policy of containment (the standard way the United States had fought the Cold War against the Soviet Union since the late 1940s).<sup>42</sup>

Détente was very dependent on the personal interactions between individual leaders, and their perceptions of their respective nation's relative strength or of any tangible benefits accruing from "relaxed tensions." For example, the Soviet Union never viewed détente as a static condition or *status quo* concept in the way that the United States did. Inside the USSR the perceptual factors promoting détente by the beginning of the 1970s were: the idea that history was on their side, improving Sino-American relations, U.S. unilateral troops withdrawals from Vietnam, Nixon's acceptance of strategic nuclear parity, certain economic considerations, and the personal relationship between Nixon, Kissinger, and General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev.<sup>43</sup>

Of all the considerations going into establishing détente between the U.S. and USSR, only nuclear parity, or mutual deterrence, posed serious problems for military and civilian decision makers within the Nixon administration. Nuclear parity forced the United States to change its targeting policy from one of "assured mutual destruction" (MAD), that is, massive retaliation to any Soviet nuclear attack, to "limited nuclear options" to prevent the failure of the mutual deterrence against military installations from escalating into nuclear devastation of American cities. After three years of internal debate, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger announced the doctrine bearing his name. It outlined a new nuclear targeting policy for the United States: Soviet use of nuclear weapons would prompt limited, regional nuclear operations by the U.S. (including targeting Soviet forces outside the USSR) in order to stop the conflict before both nations were destroyed.<sup>44</sup>

There is no direct evidence, however, that because of Soviet concern over the success of Nixon's trip to China in February 1972, rapprochement became indirectly "linked" to negotiations leading to ten formal agreements signed in Moscow between the United States and the USSR in May 1972. These agreements provided for: prevention of military incidents at sea and in the air; scholarly cooperation and exchange in the fields of science and technology; cooperation in health research; cooperation in environmental matters; cooperation in the exploration of outer space; facilitation of commercial and economic relations; and, *most important*, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; the Interim Agreement on the Limitations on Strategic Arms (SALT I); and the Basic Principles of U.S.-Soviet Relations.<sup>45</sup>

In the area of arms control, détente possessed the potential not only to substitute for containment, but also to transcend the Procrustean ideological constraints which were at the very heart of the post-World War II conflict between these two nations. This potential was never fully realized in large measure because Nixon and Kissinger chose to give priority to SALT talks over Multiple Independently-targeted Re-entry Vehicles (MIRV) talks. Also, until the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union almost thirty years later, their immediate successors proved unable (or unwilling) to build upon the delicate distinction between containment and détente which they left behind. Finally, there was no changed leadership or reformed structural base in the USSR (or the former Soviet block countries) to reinforce the concept of détente inside or outside its borders during the last half of the 1970s, as began to appear at the end of the 1980s. Thus, the Nixon-Brezhnev détente remained essentially tactical because communism had not yet significantly begun to recede.

### **No Peace or Honor in Vietnam**

It was clearly in Nixon's psychic and political self-interest to end the war in Vietnam as soon as possible. Although Nixon came to office committed to negotiate a quick settlement, he ended up expanding and prolonging the conflict in the name of peace and honor. While unilaterally withdrawing U.S. combat troops in Vietnam under a policy

known as Vietnamization, Nixon allowed Kissinger as special assistant to the president for national security affairs to become involved in largely nonproductive, secret negotiations with the North Vietnamese from August 4, 1969 to January 25, 1972 (when they were made public over Kissinger's protestations).

Only marginally better terms were finally reached in 1973 which had not been agreed to in 1969. The trade-off between Hanoi's agreement that President Nguyen Van Thieu could remain in power in return for allowing its troops to remain in place in South Korea pales when compared to the additional 20,552 American lives lost during this three-year period—especially when the inherent weaknesses of the Saigon government by 1973 are taken into consideration. The most embarrassing evidence of this weakness occurred when President Ford was forced to order an emergency evacuation of the last remaining U.S. troops from Saigon in April 1975. Neither Nixon nor Kissinger ever admitted that their policies destabilized most of Indochina leading to horrific events in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam in which hundreds of thousands lost their lives.<sup>46</sup>

With the exception of ending the draft, creating an all-volunteer army, and finally publicly endorsing the return of U.S. prisoners of war (POWs) as a major condition of peace, practically every action taken by Nixon with respect to Vietnam (including the Vietnamization program for withdrawing U.S. troops) created resentment, suspicion, and opposition from those who opposed the war.<sup>47</sup> The only area in which the administration consciously and successfully courted public opinion over the war in Vietnam turned out to be the POW issue. Nixon did not consider the POWs or those missing in action (MIAs) a major public relations possibility when he entered office. He had pledged to bring “an honorable end to the war in Vietnam” when accepting the Republican nomination in 1968, but the POW/MIA issue had not figured prominently in his calculations for a negotiated peace. Return of POWs had always been a condition in negotiations with the North Vietnamese under President Lyndon Johnson, as it was in any previous peace settlement in which the United States had participated.<sup>48</sup>

For the public the POW/MIA issue remained the most popular aspect of the war when it ended. A Harris poll for May 1973 showed that bringing home the POWs ranked first among all foreign policy issues, above relations with the USSR and China, with 81 percent approving of how Nixon had handled this issue with the announcement of the Paris Peace Accords ending the war.

In March 1973, in the same speech in which the Nixon said that “all of our American POWs are on the way home,” he also indicated some “problem areas” such as inadequate accounting for MIAs in Indochina, but he did not specifically mention the possibility of any more being held in North Vietnam. Both Nixon and Kissinger have maintained it was the doves in Congress at the time who prevented any effective military action to find out the truth about POWs when it was still possible to do so in the spring and summer of 1973.<sup>49</sup>

The POWs/MIAs became a popular culture phenomenon in the 1970s and 1980s, despite Pentagon and congressional investigations indicating that there are no more than 200 unresolved MIA cases (out of the 2,266 the Defense Department still lists as missing) and around a dozen POWs unaccounted for. Approximately 300,000 North and South Vietnamese are still considered MIAs. The question resurfaced in the 1990s about whether Nixon and Kissinger did all they could to free servicemen “knowingly” left behind, or whether they both were so desperate to get out of Vietnam they sacrificed POWs.<sup>50</sup>

Several newly declassified 1973 memoranda surfaced at hearings of the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs chaired by John F. Kerry (D-Mass.) in August and

September 1992. They indicated that by 1972 Defense Department intelligence estimated “approximately 350 U.S. military and civilians as missing or captured in Laos.” Presumably these statements about POWs left behind did not refer to the *confirmed* number of POWs held by the North Vietnamese—all of whom were returned, but the alleged POWs in Laos who were not specifically included as a condition of the peace terms since the United States had conducted a covert war primarily in that country. At most it would appear only twenty or thirty more Americans who should have been repatriated from Laos may have been left behind—not hundreds.<sup>51</sup> With the approval of the Senate and business community, President Bill Clinton removed the nineteen-year-old embargo against Vietnam in February 1994, and the Vietnamese government began to cooperate with veterans groups in locating the remains of U.S. soldiers.

Proof that the Nixon administration had abandoned scores of American soldiers to the enemy in 1973 is far from conclusive, but it is clear that the president wanted to “get Vietnam out of the way” because it was becoming embarrassing for him to alternate between statements about the war and Watergate.<sup>52</sup> Thus, their handling of the POW/MIA issue is but one more indication of the way Nixon and Kissinger ended the Vietnam war without peace or honor.

### **Muddle in the Middle East**

In the Middle East Nixon and Kissinger followed a policy of stalemate until the 1973 October War. While Secretary of State William Rogers and Joseph Sisco, an assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs, hammered out an even-handed Middle Eastern plan in 1969 to present to the Soviets, Kissinger met separately with Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin telling him that the White House had no interest in the Rogers Plan. In October 1969 the Soviet Union officially rejected the Rogers Plan, leaving the new Republican administration with no apparent positive alternative until after the October War in 1973 when Kissinger began to shuttle around the Middle East. By the time this breakthrough occurred, stalemate had cost the United States more than Kissinger could ever gain back, even though it freed him to play hopscotch diplomacy among Middle Eastern countries.<sup>53</sup>

Nixon’s first press conferences were alternately optimistic and pessimistic about achieving peace in the Middle East. “I consider it a powder keg, very explosive. It needs to be defused,” he told reporters on January 27, 1969. “I am open to any suggestions that may cool it off and reduce the possibility of another explosion, because the next explosion in the Mideast, I think, could involve very well a confrontation between nuclear powers, which we want to avoid.” On February 6 he remarked that both unilateral and multilateral initiatives were being taken, and by March he said he was “cautiously hopeful” about the progress being made, but warned that the major powers interested in the Middle East could not “dictate to the small nations” in the area. He told me that he had wanted to declare 1973 “The Year of the Middle East,” but that Kissinger and other advisers prevailed in making it instead “The Year of Europe.”<sup>54</sup>

If this indeed is true, Nixon waited too long to focus systematically on Middle Eastern problems because by the fall of 1973 he was preoccupied with unfolding Watergate events. Obviously, Nixon could not have equally addressed all diplomatic fronts at once, and he clearly chose to concentrate on Vietnam, China, and the USSR during his first term. So it made sense for him to have put the Middle East on a back burner until some of his other foreign policy initiatives were achieved. Also, like all modern presidents he probably despaired of bringing order to the area, and hoped that the problems there would somehow resolve themselves before he got around to them. Perhaps Secretary of State Rogers was, indeed,

the only top official to have a concrete plan for handling Middle Eastern affairs during the entire first Nixon administration.

Kissinger certainly did not have a plan. Initially he insisted on only seeing the “big” geopolitical picture in the Middle East—not individual countries, just the United States and Soviet Union. In the end he was reduced to pursuing the tactical interim agreements as Rogers had. Most important in 1969, however, Kissinger feared getting embroiled and bogged down in any area of the world that posed only risks of failure rather than flamboyant successes. He correctly suspected that any new comprehensive policy in the area would fail. “I will never get involved in anything unless I’m sure of success,” he told an Egyptian diplomat in the summer of 1971, and he often remarked that “the Middle East isn’t ready for me.” As late as the summer of 1973 Kissinger remained curiously reluctant to concentrate on the Middle East. “Not until I am Secretary of State,” he presciently remarked, “and more my own man.”<sup>55</sup>

Subsequently Kissinger went to great lengths in *White House Years* to make a virtue out of the vice of having no policy at all. As with many of Kissinger’s convoluted rationalizations, it will take historians years to sort out the truth since his papers are not yet open for research. The stalemate policy, at most, seemed to consist of applying sporadic behavior-modification techniques to Israel beginning in the spring and summer of 1970. For example, promises to Israel of more military equipment were deferred on two occasions in an attempt to prevent any untoward actions against Jordan when that country appeared on the verge of disintegrating. This tactic of behavior modification was often accompanied by such theatrical events as the September 1969 meeting with Prime Minister Golda Meir. The stalemate policy also manifested itself in exaggerated statements. On June 26, 1970, at the beginning of what became the Jordanian crisis, Kissinger announced that it was the goal of American policy to “expel” the Soviets from the Middle East. Although both the White House and the State Department issued statements qualifying the meaning of “expel,” Kissinger refused to back down, thus further undermining the shrinking credibility of Secretary Rogers in his negotiations for an American-Soviet settlement in the Middle East.<sup>56</sup>

On August 7, 1970, Rogers and Sisco arranged an uneasy ceasefire along the Suez Canal, a ceasefire which was violated literally within seconds. For four weeks, however, personal competition and antagonisms between Kissinger, Rogers, and Sisco delayed verification of these violations. By that time the civil war in King Hussein’s Jordan had reached new heights, allowing Nixon and Kissinger to enliven their stalemate approach with another element of theater. In a dramatic move Nixon ordered the rush delivery to Israel of eighteen F-4 supersonic aircraft, the latest electronic-countermeasure (ECM) equipment, and conventional Shrike air-to-ground missiles so that the Israeli air force could neutralize Soviet SAMs in the Suez Canal. While Kissinger had earlier undermined Rogers’s private attempts to restrain the Egyptians, Syrians, and Iraqis by negotiating with the USSR, their major arms supplier, this time he did so by staging another September meeting in Washington with Golda Meir. The charade was not as complicated as their 1969 September encounter had been, but it did end with an interrupted fund-raising banquet in New York which saw Ambassador Yitzhak Rabin rushing to Washington to confer with Kissinger and Prime Minister Meir before he returned to Israel. The next night, on September 21, President Nixon finally assured the ambassador that the United States would intervene on Israel’s behalf against the Egyptians and Soviets should Israel come to the aid of the beleaguered King Hussein.<sup>57</sup>

Thus, the faulty cease-fire along the Suez Canal, and the Jordanian crisis of 1970 totally discredited Rogers and the State Department, setting the stage for the bilateral, personal, often secret shuttle diplomacy of Henry Kissinger following the 1973 October



War. It also effectively ended any remaining doubt about the death of “evenhandedness” associated with the Rogers Plan. However, instead of returning to the openly pro-Israeli diplomacy of previous administrations, this administration preferred a devious cat and mouse approach more in keeping with the personalities of Nixon and Kissinger. Consequently, whenever it was deemed necessary, they enticed Israel and the Arabs (particularly Jordan, Iran, and Saudi Arabia) with military supplies to offset similar arms shipments by the USSR to Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Libya. A free-market policy for arms exports to the Middle East peaked in 1976 at \$15 billion, up 400 percent from 1970.<sup>58</sup> The free-market export of arms to the Middle East under both Nixon and Ford continued under Presidents Carter, Reagan, and Bush until the Gulf War unearthed old criticisms of this policy.

Therefore, while one result of the failed Rogers Plan appeared to be simply a return to traditional regional polarization policies, there were actually two new twists to it: one covert and the other overt. The first consisted of a secret agreement between the Shah of Iran and Nixon in May 1972 making him the world’s leading arms buyer. According to one report, from 1973 to 1977 “more than half of U.S. arms sales abroad (\$15 billion) went to Iran, including weapons more advanced than anything then introduced into America’s own [non-nuclear] arsenal.”<sup>59</sup> Many reports have surfaced claiming that the major accomplishment of the Nixon Doctrine in the Middle East was to encourage the Shah to initiate, without fear of American opposition, as well as over the initial objections of the Saudis, an inflationary spiral in Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil prices to pay for his exorbitant purchases. This special Nixon Doctrine arms arrangement continued essentially unabated under both Ford and Carter until 1979 when the Shah was overthrown.

The second new twist was the emergence in the wake of the 1970 Jordanian crisis of a special Kissinger-Rabin relationship. Unlike the less publicized special arms arrangement with Iran, Kissinger received much attention in the international press as the “good friend” of Israel. Privately, however, he continued to view the Jewish state as only one, albeit special, part of a much larger strategic struggle with the Soviet Union. He solidified his position with Israel by interceding with Rogers on Rabin’s behalf when the secretary of state attempted to pressure Israel into unilateral concessions during negotiations for reopening the Suez Canal in return for jet plane deliveries. In this fashion Kissinger further undermined the secretary of state, and in this instance also secured Rabin’s support for Nixon’s re-election in 1972.<sup>60</sup>

These two results—increased arms sales to Iran and better relations with Israel—indirectly led to two unfortunate developments. They contributed to the OPEC embargo (“Oilgate”) and encouraged Israel’s development of nuclear arms and the frightening possibility that the Israelis would use them if they were “abandoned by the United States and overrun by Arabs.” The likelihood of Israel emulating the biblical figure who killed himself and his enemies has been dubbed the “Samson option.”<sup>61</sup>

The years 1969–1973 constitute an unfortunate and expensive incubation period for the Nixon administration’s Middle East policy because these were the crucial years when control of oil prices shifted inexorably toward the producing nations. Instead of promoting the expansion of domestic production (or the unthinkable: conservation), “Nixingerism” concentrated on other more important geopolitical matters. At the end of the October War, Kissinger’s step-by-step disengagement policy, otherwise known as shuttle diplomacy, emerged full-blown, but too late to prevent or resolve the oil crisis, even if the newly appointed secretary of state had made it his top priority. Although Kissinger’s frantic shuttling about gave the false impression of creating meaningful multilateral arrangements, this approach was not only actually piecemeal and stop-gap in nature, but it was also essentially bilateral and did not address the question of oil prices.<sup>62</sup>

Kissinger soon fell into the post-October War habit of telling the Israelis and Arabs what they wanted to hear, sometimes exceeding both congressional and White House intentions. However, in the wake of the October War in 1973, Kissinger finally ceased calling for the expulsion of the Soviet Union from the area. Realizing that this simply had the effect of further polarizing the Arabs and driving the more militant factions into buying Russian arms, the administration deemed it possible that Arab nationalism would assert itself against Soviet imperialism.<sup>63</sup> And indeed, Sadat's 1972 independent expulsion of Soviet personnel had demonstrated just this to other Middle Eastern nations. Even these changes in U.S. policy came too little, too late—a fact that the cosmetic addition of shuttle diplomacy could not change. Flawed as it already was, “Nixingerism” in the Middle East easily succumbed to the sham of Kissinger's shuttling after the October War as Watergate occupied more and more of the president's time.

Henry Kissinger's flamboyant dominance over Middle Eastern policy from 1973 to 1977 was not based on any comprehensive coherence or strategy; it was all tactical and, hence, it did not contribute to stability in that area of the world. Instead, it led to a condition of “dependence without responsibility.” Since 1967 until the Gulf War, the more Israel and other Middle Eastern nations became dependent upon the United States, the less they had to fear any disruption of their military aid, despite U.S. verbal admonitions.<sup>64</sup>

Relations with OPEC worsened under Nixon when OPEC embargoed oil exports to the United States in October 1973 in retaliation for American support of Israel during the October War. By 1975 only minimal progress toward reconciliation among Egypt, Israel, and Syria had taken place through a series of fragile interim agreements in January 1974, May 1974, and September 1975. There was no subsequent comprehensive review and break through in U.S. Middle East policy until President Carter's 1978 Camp David Accords.

### **Nixonian Foreign Policy Legacy**

Nixon's legacy in foreign affairs goes far beyond his or Kissinger's attempts to control the bureaucracy by restructuring the executive branch of government. Nixon's broad foreign-policy concepts remain the only comprehensive attempt to construct a new Cold War consensus for the 1970s. His early postpresidential books, *The Real War*, *The Real Peace*, and *No More Vietnams*, all implied that détente and other geopolitical maneuvers of his administration were actually only examples of containment by another name. But at the time, regardless of Nixon's later reassessment of them in light of the Iranian and Afghanistan crises, these policies held out the hope that the United States could wage the Cold War differently than it had since 1945. Instead, those who managed U.S. foreign policy for the remainder of the 1970s, including Ford and Kissinger, Carter and Brzezinski, proved unable to build this delicate balance between containment and détente into a new national foreign-policy consensus before problems in the Middle East during the fall of 1979 encouraged a return to traditional cold warriorism. Under Reagan's “evil empire” view of the Soviet Union détente disappeared entirely from the landscape of American diplomacy. Until the USSR began to crumble internally and lose its grip on eastern and central Europe, détente remained, like Nixon himself, a ghost from the past, waiting in the wings to be resurrected by changing world and domestic circumstances.

In the final analysis, Nixon's diplomatic legacy is weaker than he and many others have maintained. For example, the pursuit of “peace and honor” in Vietnam failed; his Middle Eastern policy because of Kissinger's shuttling ended up more show than substance; he had no systematic Third World policy (outside of Vietnam), except to use certain countries as pawns in the geopolitical and ideological battle with the USSR. In fact, his so-called “tar

baby” policy which supported white minority regimes in Africa proved untenable after 1975. Détente with the USSR soon floundered in the hands of his successors; likewise the Nixon Doctrine led to unprecedented arms sales by the United States, and has not prevented use of American troops abroad. Only rapprochement with China remains intact because it laid the foundation for recognition under the Carter administration.

This summary is not meant to discredit Richard Nixon as a foreign policy expert both during and following his presidency, as his post-presidential books, particularly *In the Arena*, *Seize the Moment*, and *Beyond Peace*. It is simply a reminder that the lasting and positive results of his diplomacy faded faster than some aspects of his domestic policies, as indicated in several articles in this special issue. Now that the Cold War is over, his imaginative ways for fighting it from 1969 to 1974 have even lost their importance as precedents his successors in the White House did not follow. In part this is because they were never designed to end the Cold War—only to contain it through new tactics.

### Notes

1. Secretary of Commerce Peter G. Peterson, press briefing, June 27, 1972, p. 17. Robert Finch papers, Occidental College, Los Angeles, CA. Others have noted Kissinger’s megalomania, including Kissinger himself. John Mitchell, for example, once described him as a “psychotic egomaniac” and in commenting on this remark Kissinger agreed that “his ego is massive.” See Phyllis Schlafly and Chester Ward, *Kissinger on the Couch* (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House Publishers, 1975). p. 13.
2. Theodore Draper, *Present History* (New York: Random House, 1983), pp. 218–22; and author’s interview with Raymond Price, January 26, 1983.
3. K. B. McFarlane, *England in the Fifteenth Century* (The Hambeldon Press, 1981), pp. 23–43. According to McFarlane, bastard feudalism consisted of a system in which lords and barons of fifteenth-century England lived in a state of “voluntary interdependence” with talented, younger men who competed for these favors and in whom there existed an “absence of any separate fund of political principles.” Thus bastard feudalism was a “partnership to their mutual benefit, a contract from which sides expected to benefit . . . [and] lordship lasted only so long as it was found to be a good lordship or until it was ousted by a better.”
4. Draper, *Present History*, p. 224 (first and third quotations); and Lloyd C. Gardner, *A Covenant with Power: America and World Order from Wilson to Reagan* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 184 (second quotation).
5. Kissinger’s early heroes and mentors included Fritz Kraemer while he served in the U.S. Army from 1943–46, and Elliot William Yandel when he studied at Harvard. See, Dana Ward, “Kissinger: A Psychohistory,” *History of Childhood Quarterly: The Journal of Psychohistory* 2, no. 3 (Winter 1975) 305–316; Phyllis Schlafly and Chester Ward, *Kissinger on the Couch* (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House), p. 135; Robert D. Schulzinger, *Kissinger: Doctor of Diplomacy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), pp. 10–11; and Harvey Starr, *Kissinger: Perceptions of International Politics* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky), pp. 20–3.
6. Roger Morris, *Uncertain Greatness: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy* (New York: Harper & Row), p. 50; Ward. “Kissinger: A Psychohistory,” p. 318. Apologists for Kissinger seldom comment on the fact that the ideas for his first four books came from the research and concepts of other people, the Council on Foreign Relations, or the Harvard Center for International Affairs. See Schulzinger, *Kissinger*, pp. 12–16.
7. Draper, *Present History*, p. 217. Nixon and Kissinger had apparently met briefly in 1967 at a party given by Clare Boothe Luce, but Nixon makes no mention of this meeting or any other direct contact before 1968. See Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1979), p. 9; and Henry Brandon, *The Retreat of American Power* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1973), p. 25.

8. Seymour Hersh, *Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House* (New York: Summit Books, 1983), p. 13; Morris, *Uncertain Greatness*, pp. 52–3; Schulzinger, *Kissinger*, p. 14; and Schlafly and Ward, *Kissinger on the Couch*, pp. 136–40. Kissinger plays down his conflict with Bundy and his general “outsidedness” during the time he briefly consulted with the Kennedy administration. See Kissinger, *White House Years*, pp. 9, 13–4.
9. Schulzinger, *Kissinger*, pp. 16–8; and Morris, *Uncertain Greatness*, p. 94.
10. Henry Brandon, *The Retreat of American Power* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1973), p. 68; Schlafly and Ward, *Kissinger on the Couch*, p. 139. The “distrusted” and “not fit” quotations were apparently uttered when the Republican nomination went to Nixon at Miami Beach in 1968. Emmet Hughes corroborated Kissinger’s negative remarks in Miami when he recalled that “Henry said . . . Richard Nixon’s being nominated by the Republican party is a disaster and thank God he can’t be elected president or the whole country will be a disaster.” Hughes quoted in transcript for January 11, 1977, Martin Agronsky broadcast, Fawn Brodie Papers, Special Collection Department, Marriott Library, University of Utah, Salt Lake City. For other negative comments about Nixon by Kissinger, see Walter Isaacson, *Kissinger: A Biography* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), p. 217.
11. Author’s interview with John Ehrlichman, April 9, 1984; Hersh, *The Price of Power*, pp. 16–24; Henry Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 10; Richard Nixon, *RN: Memoirs of Richard Nixon* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), p. 323; Tom Wicker, *One of Us: Richard Nixon and the American Dream* (New York: Random House, 1991), pp. 377–81; Clark Clifford with Richard Holbrooke, *Counsel to the President*, (New York: Random House, 1991), p. 584; and Schlafly and Ward, *Kissinger on the Couch*, p. 139.
12. Nixon interview with Stewart Alsop, *Saturday Evening Post*, July 12, 1958, p. 28 (emphasis added). The risk-taking aspects of Nixon’s career are best discussed and analyzed by Leo Rangell in *The Mind of Watergate: An Exploration of the Compromise of Integrity* (New York: Norton, 1980). Also see Kissinger to Nixon, August 27, 1969, with Nixon’s handwritten comment, Box 2, POF, WHSF, NPM, NARA. Although Stephen E. Ambrose relied on Rangell, the first volume of his biography of Nixon uses the term *risk taker* only once, and then it is to compare Truman and Nixon. Likewise, Ambrose asserts that Nixon “thrived on crisis,” but again he makes the comparison with Truman and focuses primarily on the Hiss case. Since Ambrose does not detail the significance between real and false crises in Nixon’s career up to 1962, his book does not go beyond Rangell’s original thesis in helping us understand how the risk-taking aspects of his earlier career related to his ill-fated presidency. See *Nixon: The Education of a Politician 1913–1962* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), pp. 195–6, 222, 637–42.
13. Noam Chomsky, “Deception as a Way of Life,” *Inquiry Magazine*, April 7, 1980, p. 21.
14. Draper, *Present History*, pp. 174–8. The most comprehensive positive analysis of Kissinger’s pre-1968 thinking can be found in a work by his friend and Harvard colleague, Stephen Graubard, *Kissinger: Portrait of a Mind* (New York: Norton, 1973). Even Graubard noted that Kissinger had little to say about contemporary foreign policy issues just before joining the Nixon administration because he “did not know enough about [them].” What is also usually forgotten is that Kissinger’s 1969 article criticizing U.S. policy in Vietnam did not offer any solutions for the problem. Nor did an earlier article in *Look*, for August 9, 1966.
15. Kissinger, “Democratic Structures and Foreign Policy,” “Central Issues in American Foreign Policy,” both in *American Foreign Policy* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1974, expanded version of 1969 edition), pp. 11–136; *idem*, *Troubled Partnership* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965), pp. 9, 232; *idem*, in Richard M. Pfeffer, ed., *No More Vietnams* (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), pp. 11–3; Draper, *Present History*, pp. 173–83, 211–13, 231–5; David Watt, “Kissinger’s Track Back,” *Foreign Policy*, no. 37 (Winter 1979–1980): 59; and Henry Brandon, *The Retreat of American Power* (New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1973), p. 25 (quotation, emphasis added). One only has to compare Kissinger’s writing cited in this footnote with Nixon’s statements and writings in 1967 and 1968 to note their profound differences, especially on China, the Soviet Union, and Europe.

16. Morris, *Uncertain Greatness*, p. 94; and Gelb quoted in Agronsky's broadcast, January 11, 1977, Brodie Papers.
17. Nixon, *Memoirs*, pp. 339, 433–4; Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 26; Draper, *Present History*, pp. 218–9; Nixon's handwritten comments, May, September, n.d., 1969, Box 30, Annotated News Summary [ANS], President's Office File [POF], White House Special File [WHSF], Nixon Presidential Materials [NPM], National Archives and Records Administration [NARA]. Also see transcript, April 14, 1973, pp. 27 (quotations), 38, White House Tapes, Watergate Special Prosecutor Force File Segment [WSPFFS], Conversation No. 428–019, NPM. Nixon even considered postponing a scheduled foreign trip by Rogers because Watergate matters took precedent, saying "Kissinger must understand [there are] bigger things here." In the end Ehrlichman met with Mitchell. One of the best single collections of memoranda by Nixon (usually to Kissinger) about Rogers can be found in Box 85, Staff Secretary Files, Staff Members Office Files [SMOF], WHSF, NPM, NARA.
18. Kissinger, *White House Years*, 1: pp. 42–3 (quotations).
19. Rogers' testimony, March 31, 1975, pp. 13–6 (quotation), 24, Box 43, Murphy Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, Record Group [RG] 220, NARA.
20. *Ibid.*, pp. 18–9, 22, 25, 31. Relevant sections of Richardson's testimony on September 24, 1974, pp. 4–45, can be found in Box 42; Kennan's for September 24, 1974, pp. 51–92, Box 42; Clifford's for March 28, 1974, pp. 134–203; and Rusk's for July 30, 1973, pp. 105–177.
21. Nixon, Press Statement, July 25, 1969, Nixon, *Setting the Course: Major Policy Statements by President Richard Nixon* (New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1970), pp. 300–7.
22. Author's interview with Nixon, January 26, 1983.
23. Nixon to Robert Litwak, June 29, 1984 (document in author's possession); and John Whitaker Oral History Interview, December 30, 1987, pp. 21–22, NPM, NARA.
24. Robert E. Osgood, et al., *Retreat From Empire* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), p. 3 (first quotation); and Robert S. Litwak, *Détente and the Nixon Doctrine: Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Stability* (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 136; Richard W. Stevenson, *Rise and Fall of Détente: Relaxations of Tension in U.S. Soviet Relations, 1953–84* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1985), p. 184.
25. Franz Schurmann, *The Foreign Politics of Nixon: The Grand Design* (Berkeley, CA: Institute of International Studies, 1987), p. 118.
26. William Shawcross, *Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1975), p. 167 (first quotation). In his *Memoirs* Nixon is much more circumspect about the importance of his doctrine saying that it "was misinterpreted by some as signaling a new policy that would lead to total American withdrawal from Asia and from other parts of the world." (p. 395) For his view of it in 1971, see Nixon *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s: A Report to Congress*, February 25, 1971, pp. 12–14 (second quotation).
27. Richard Nixon, *Nixon Public Papers, 1969* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), pp. 544–56, 905–6, 1003–13 [hereinafter cited as *NPP*, Year]; Osgood to Kissinger, November 19, 1969 (quotations, with Osgood's draft of an explanation of the Nixon Doctrine), Box 6, Robert Osgood Papers, The Milton S. Eisenhower Library, Baltimore Maryland; Nixon, *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s: A Report to Congress*, February 25, 1971, pp. 12–14; and Robert Osgood, *Retreat from Empire* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), pp. 1–28; Osgood to NSC Staff, "Overview of the World Situation," July 7, 1969 (declassified for author in 1989), Box 1, EX FO, WHCF, NPM, NARA. Other members of Kissinger's NSC staff (in addition to Osgood) also found Nixon's doctrine problematic.
28. Shawcross, *Sideshow*, p. 145; and Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 222–5 (quotation).
29. Author's interview with Nixon, January 26, 1983.
30. Nixon, *Memoirs*, pp. 248, 250, 279; and Leonard Garment, "Annal of Law," *The New Yorker*, April 17, 1989, pp. 90–110.
31. On several occasions, for example the Rockefellers tried to get through to Nixon about questions they had on his NEP. In one instance in September 1971 Nelson Rockefeller forwarded a letter

- from the vice-president and chief economist for Chase Manhattan Bank of New York to Kissinger only to have his NSC secretary remark: "I can't understand the significance of this [for the NSC], but is safe to assume that anything NAR [Nelson A. Rockefeller] sends to HAK [Henry A. Kissinger] is significant." On another occasion Haldeman blocked a suggested meeting between David Rockefeller and the president about his concerns involving the "international monetary and trade picture" because Kissinger did not insist on the meeting. Later when Ehrlichman met with David Rockefeller (instead of Nixon) his views were not given serious consideration and even NSC staffer Robert Hormats characterized them as "not especially innovative" with impunity. See Box 43, GEN FO, WHCF, NPM, NARA.
32. Shultz's testimony, February 25, 1974, pp. 11–12, 16, 21, Box 41, Peterson's testimony, February 26, 1974, p. 209 (first quotation), Murphy Commission, RG 220, NARA; and I. M. Destler, *Making Foreign Economic Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1980), p. 213 (second quotation). For more details, see Joan Hoff, *Nixon Reconsidered* (New York: Basic Books, 1994), pp. 166–173.
  33. Isaacson, *Kissinger*, pp. 165–6.
  34. Nixon to Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Kissinger, March 2, 1970, Box 229, Haldeman Files, WHSF, NPM, NARA.
  35. Roger's disagreement with the White House during the India-Pakistan war was particularly irritating to Nixon. See Rogers to Nixon, August 10, 1971, declassified for author through MR 1990, Box 36, Jon M. Huntsman to Kissinger, December 6, 1971, declassified 1982, Box 85, SS-CF; Haldeman Notes, December 7, 1971 (quotation), Box 44, January 14, 1972, Part I, Box 45, Haldeman Papers, SMOF, WHSF, NPM, NARA.
  36. John Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 295–8; and Robert J. Art, "Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique," *Policy Sciences: An International Journal* 4 (1973): 482 (quotation), 483.
  37. Leonard Lurie, *The Running of Richard Nixon* (New York: McCann & Geoghegan, Inc., 1972), pp. 301–03; Richard Nixon, "Asia After Vietnam," *Foreign Affairs* 46 (October 1967): 121–24; and author's interview with Nixon, January 26, 1983.
  38. See author's interview with Price, January 26, 1983; Raymond Price, *With Nixon* (New York: Viking Press, 1977), pp. 20–8; and William Safire, *Before the Fall: An Inside View of the Pre-Watergate White House* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1977; reprint of original 1975 Doubleday edition), pp. 474–93.
  39. Theodore White, *The Making of the President, 1968*, (New York: Atheneum Publishers, 1969), p. 148; C. L. Sulzberger, *The World and Richard Nixon* (New York: Prentice Hall Press, 1987), p. 77; and Brandon, *Retreat of American Power*, pp. 181–2.
  40. Haldeman notes, July 15, 1971, Box 44, Part I, Haldeman Files, WHSF, NPM, NARA.
  41. See assorted memoranda from Nixon in Bruce Oudes, ed., *From the President: Richard Nixon's Secret Files* (New York: Harper & Row, 1989), pp. 308–9, 325, 382–5, 396–7, 573, 621 (quoting Nixon on Meet the Press, April 10, 1988).
  42. Raymond L. Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations From Nixon to Reagan* (Washington, D. C.: Brookings Institution, 1985), pp. 33 (quotation)-36, 47; U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Hearings on Détente, 93d Cong. 2nd sess., August–September, 1974*, pp. 239, 301 (quoting Dean Rusk and Kissinger); Richard W. Stevenson, *Rise and Fall of Détente: Relaxation of Tension in U.S.-Soviet Relations, 1953–84* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1985), pp. 6–11, 179–82, 188; Franz Schurmann, *The Foreign Politics of Richard Nixon* (Berkeley, CA: Institute of International Studies, 1987), pp. 80–81, 88. For a strictly economic interpretation of détente see: Marshall I. Goldman, *Détente and Dollars: Doing Business with the Soviets* (New York, 1975); and Keith L. Nelson, "Nixon, Brezhnev, and Détente," unpublished paper delivered at the 1985 Pacific Coast Branch of the American Historical Association. For the argument that détente simply reflected a continuation of George Kennan's ideas about containment, see John Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar*

- American National Security Policy*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 283, *passim*. For more details about the meaning of détente, see Hoff, *Nixon Reconsidered*, pp. 182–7, 203–7.
43. Memorandum of Conversation, March 26, 1974, meeting between Brezhnev and Kissinger (declassified through FOIA, 1993), pp. 2, 13, National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.
  44. Terry Terriff, *The Nixon Administration and the Making of U.S. Nuclear Strategy* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), pp. 1–50, 223–36, *passim*.
  45. Hersh, *Price of Power*, pp. 350–82, 489–502; and Haldeman to Rogers, March 16, 1972 (declassified 1986), Box 199, Haldeman Files, WHSF, NPM, NARA.
  46. Paul Johnson, *Modern Times: The World from the Twenties to the Eighties* (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1983), pp. 654–8; William Shawcross, *The Quality of Mercy: Cambodia, Holocaust and Modern Conscience* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), pp. 45–69, 385–430, *idem*, *Sideshow*, pp. 365–96. Nixon has always specifically denied his policies in Indochina led to the excesses there later. See Nixon, *No More Vietnams*, *passim*; and *idem*, *In the Arena: A Memoir of Victory, Defeat and Renewal* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), p. 342.
  47. Melvin Small, *Johnson, Nixon, and the Doves* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1988), pp. 1–23. Generally speaking Nixon's more liberal aides or advisers were more troubled by the anti-war movement than the president himself and some of them misleadingly tended to attribute their attitudes to him. See: pp. 20, 171, 242 (fnnts. 81, 82, 83, 86) These last two footnotes contain reviews of literature contending that the anti-war movement significantly affected U.S. foreign policy under Johnson and Nixon and literature saying that it did not.
  48. H. Bruce Franklin, "The POW/MIA Myth," *Atlantic Monthly* 268, no. 6 (December 1991): 54; and Herbert G. Stein general letter to constituents with statistics on POWs, December 1, 1970, Box 27, Edward E [Mil] David, Jr., Office of Science and Technology Files, SMOF, WHCF, NPM, NARA.
  49. Nixon, March 29, 1973, *NPP*, 1973, p. 234; *The New York Times*, September 27, 1992, p. 17 (op/ed piece by Leslie H. Gelb); and *International Herald Tribune*, December 1, 1992, p. 7.
  50. For a review of the popular culture and partisan political resurrection of the POW/MIA issue, see Franklin, "POW/MIA Myth," pp. 45–81; H. Bruce Franklin, *M. I. A. or Mythmaking in America* (Brooklyn, N.Y.: Lawrence Hill Books, 1992), pp. 122–66, 182–5 (complete text of Nixon's February 1, 1973 letter); *Time*, "The MIA Industry: Bad Dream Factory," January 13, 1992, pp. 10–16; *USA Today*, July 24, 1992, p. 3A, August 12, 1992, p. 6A; and *The New York Times*, September 22, 1992, p. A6.
  51. Press Release of Kerry Committee, August 11, 1992; Eagleburger to Richardson, n.d. [replying to a March 13 query from Richardson], 1973, Richardson to Kissinger, March 28, 1973, Rogers Shields to Ambassador Hill, May 24, 1973 (declassified 1992), National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; *USA Today*, August 14, 1992, p. 13A; and *The New York Times*, September 22, 1992, pp. A1, A6, September 25, 1992, p. A8; September 27, 1992, p. 17 (op/ed by Leslie H. Gelb); September 25, 1993, p. A8. In 1995 the Pentagon announced that out of 2,000 missing POWs and MIAs bodies, 500 would never be recovered and that it would pursue trying to locate only the remaining 1,500. See *The New York Times*, November 14, 1995, p. A4.
  52. White House Tapes, Watergate Special Prosecutor Force File Segment [WSPFFS], Conversation No. 423–003 (March 27, 1973), p. 2 (Nixon quotation), NPM, NARA; *The New York Times*, September 27, 1992, p. 17 (op/ed piece by Leslie H. Gelb); September 9, 1993, p. A8; and *International Herald Tribune*, April 13, 1993, pp. 1, 2, April 14, 1993, p. 5, April 20, 1993, p. 3. April 24–25, 1993, p. 5.
  53. For more details, see Hoff, *Nixon Reconsidered*, pp. 252–73.
  54. Nixon, *NPP*, 1969, pp. 18, 185; and author's interview with Nixon, January 27, 1983.
  55. Tad Szulc, *Illusion of Peace: Foreign Policy in the Nixon Years* (New York: Viking Press, 1978), p. 101; Edward R. F. Sheehan, *Arabs, Israelis, and Kissinger* (New York: Thomas Crowell, 1976), pp. 17–18 (quotation); Marvin Kalb and Bernard Kalb, *Kissinger* (Boston, MA: Little Brown, 1974), p. 188; Morris, *Uncertain Greatness*, p. 252 (quotation); Nixon, *Memoirs*, pp. 477–85; Kissinger, *White House Years*, pp. 559–629, 1276–1300.

56. Kalb and Kalb, *Kissinger*, pp. 192–193; and Seyom Brown, *The Crises of Power: An Interpretation of United States Foreign Policy During the Kissinger Years* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), pp. 79–82.
57. Brown, *Crises of Power*, pp. 82–87.
58. *Ibid.*
59. *New York Review of Books*, June 26, 1980, p. 19.
60. Szulc, *Illusion of Peace*, pp. 313–14, 329–33; Haldeman Notes, February 26, 1970, Box 41, Haldeman Files, WHSF, NPM, NARA; and Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1982), pp. 289–90.
61. Seymour M. Hersh, *The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and American Foreign Policy* (New York: Random House, 1991), p. 137. The term originally was applied to Israel by Norman Podhoretz in a 1976 *Commentary*.
62. Brown, *The Crisis of Power*, pp. 104–105.
63. *Ibid.*
64. George W. Ball, *Diplomacy for a Crowded World: An American Foreign Policy* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1976), p. 132–152; Ball, “Coming Crisis,” p. 231; and Brown, *Crisis of Power*, pp. 71–101.