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Police Power: Theodore Roosevelt, American Diplomacy, and World Order

JAMES HOLMES

INTRODUCTION

Is America waging war against an irregular armed force and its state sponsors, or is its counterterrorist campaign an exercise in global law enforcement, connoting judicial remedies to inter-state violence? By what right can the nation prosecute such a campaign on the soil of sovereign nations? These were two of the most nettlesome questions for policymakers after the September 11, 2001, attacks on New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania—questions that were not only of academic interest, but also carried consequences of the utmost gravity.

To provide a fresh perspective on the use of American power in the early twenty-first century, this article investigates the diplomacy of the early twentieth century. Theodore Roosevelt (TR), president of the United States from 1901 to 1909, confronted a security milieu that had many features in common with today's volatile environment: rapid economic integration, governments that were unable to discharge their responsibilities towards foreigners and their own citizens, and even an anarchist movement that felled Roosevelt's predecessor, William McKinley.

In an effort to cope with what we would call "failed states," unable or unwilling to perform the duties that went hand-in-hand with state sovereignty, Roosevelt devised an "international police power." Long neglected by scholars, TR's vision of the police power may furnish a model for U.S. foreign relations a

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century after he enunciated it. This astonishingly supple doctrine involved the use of diplomacy, mediation, finance, law enforcement, and armed force as each case warranted.

Strikingly, President Roosevelt grafted the police power onto the Monroe Doctrine, the venerable principle of U.S. foreign policy that sought to deter

TR confronted a security milieu that had many features in common with that of today's volatile environment.

European territorial aggrandizement in the New World. His "Roosevelt Corollary" to the doctrine gave the police power a preemptive hue. "Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society," proclaimed Roosevelt's December 1904 message to Congress, "may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western hemisphere

the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly...to the exercise of an international police power."¹

TR cited the police power to justify preemptive diplomatic and military action on several occasions during his tenure in the Oval Office. However, several key elements of the Roosevelt Corollary remained vague:

- What was an international police power, and what justified its use?
- What authorities could lawfully exercise this international police power?
- Whence did they derive this power, and what were its limits?
- What kind of strategy was to be used to carry out international police actions?

In an effort to answer these vexing questions, this article will derive a template for assessing today's War on Terrorism and other foreign policy enterprises by examining the theory and practice of international police action under Roosevelt. In so doing, it will place a useful new analytical tool in the hands of statesmen and students of world affairs.

THE POLICE POWER IN AMERICAN DOMESTIC LAW

Everything in Theodore Roosevelt's background—his childhood, education at Harvard and Columbia, and practical experience in public administration—prodded him to shape a kind of international constabulary duty.² He maintained that while private acts of generosity were all very well, communal action was the only effective way to redress the inequities that were the fallout of the Industrial Revolution. Roosevelt was steeped in the Victorian conception of *noblesse oblige* inculcated by his father, "the best man I ever knew,"³ as well the fanciful conceptions of chivalry that prevailed among the aristocracy of the antebellum South.⁴

Thus, he believed strongly that individual philanthropy could help the weakest members of society.

However, he maintained that late-nineteenth-century American society, characterized as it was by an ethos of untrammled individualism and laissez-faire economics, would be unable to stem the ill effects of the Industrial Revolution. TR bemoaned the dearth of instruction on communal virtue and responsibility, both in his schoolboy education and at Harvard University. He reprimanded American academic, business, and political leaders who, he thought, verged on acquiescing in “a riot of lawless business individualism which would be quite as destructive to real civilization as the lawless military individualism of the Dark Ages.”⁵ Throughout his entire public career, Roosevelt prescribed collective action, spearheaded by government, as an antidote to excessive individualism.

The American legal order was evolving in a direction convivial to Roosevelt’s Progressive outlook on politics and society. This involved reinterpreting the “police power” of government through the medium of judicial action, and, as a corollary, a creeping expansion of federal supervision over state and local affairs. “When the Constitution was adopted,” noted a mid-twentieth-century analyst, “the states possessed what lawyers style the ‘police power,’” meaning “the power to regulate the conduct and relations of the members of society,” and in effect “the general power of legislation.”⁶ The police power gravitated towards Washington from the late nineteenth century on, culminating in the New Deal, which, under the tutelage of Theodore’s nephew Franklin, arrogated unprecedented authority to the federal government.

From his legal studies at Columbia Law School,⁷ his omnivorous reading—he was said to read two to three books a day, even in the White House⁸—and his service in posts such as U.S. civil service commissioner and New York City police commissioner, TR was familiar with this legal concept. It often cropped up in his correspondence and public statements⁹ and helped mold his thinking about international affairs. The doctrine of police power was in rapid flux in Roosevelt’s day, partly as a result of the Industrial Revolution and partly as a result of the perennial power struggle between the states and the federal government. The Industrial Revolution also bestowed unprecedented authority on private commerce, and, as Progressives insisted, only an activist government could tame private commercial interests.

What was the police power? In the early nineteenth century, Chief Justice John Marshall described it as “that immense mass of legislation, which embraces every thing within the territory of a state, not surrendered to the general government.”¹⁰ Judge Stephen J. Field supplied the Supreme Court’s contemporary understanding of the concept, defining it as “the power of the state, sometimes

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termed its police power, to prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education and good order of the people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the state, develop its resources and add to its wealth and prosperity.”¹¹ These were sweeping powers indeed. The police power was left undefined in the text of the U.S. Constitution. Consequently, it fell to the courts to determine precisely what matters the state and local governments were permitted to regulate, and what matters were appropriate for congressional action.

The dual structure of American government was one factor propelling the evolution of the police power. A second factor was the Fourteenth Amendment, passed in the wake of the American Civil War, the contours of which lawmakers and judges were exploring. Much of the case law of the Roosevelt era revolved around whether police laws or regulations discriminated against particular classes of people, and thus ran afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause.¹² Third, Progressives such as TR

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advocated interpreting the commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution broadly as a lever for federal action in matters hitherto thought to be the exclusive province of municipalities and states.¹³

Finally, American presidents could deploy federal armed forces to restore order if unrest in one of the states escalated beyond the capacity of the state militia to respond, such as in clashes between labor and capital.

Article IV, section 4, of the U.S. Constitution mandated that the federal government “guarantee to each State in this Union a Republican Form of Government...”¹⁴ Unrest on the scale of the 1894 Pullman strike or the 1902 anthracite-coal strike could portend a social revolution that would unconstitutionally deprive the afflicted state of a republican form of government.¹⁵ For TR, whose Progressivism had a strong defensive flavor, the prospect of revolution was anathema. This attitude explains his readiness to use force to throttle violent labor strikes.

It then follows that federal involvement in state and local affairs could stem from public disorder, from commerce that crossed state borders and thus defied state regulation, or from defects in the existing framework of laws and regulations governing public welfare. It was the duty of sovereign and civilized nations to preserve civil peace and tend to the public well-being. Theodore Roosevelt was reared on these notions, and they appeared time and again in his writings.

SHORTCOMINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER

There was no supranational authority able to perform a similar supervisory

role when national governments failed to carry out the duties accompanying state sovereignty. How did Roosevelt build the case for an international police power? Shorn of all the philosophical trappings and flowery legal rhetoric of which he was fond, the problem of world order ultimately boiled down to force. He was candid on this point. "There is of course no analogy at present between international law and private or municipal law," Roosevelt explained to Carl Schurz, a political ally *cum* antagonist and the outspoken vice president of the Anti-Imperialist League,¹⁶ "because there is no sanction of force for the former while there is for the latter."

Asked to throw his political weight behind disarmament efforts in the wake of the Russo-Japanese War, to which he had mediated an end, earning the Nobel Peace Prize for his pains, President Roosevelt replied,

Inside our own nation the law-abiding man does not have to arm himself against the lawless simply because there is some armed force—the police, the sheriff's posse, the national guard, or the regulars—which can be called out to enforce the laws. At present there is no similar international force to call on, and I do not yet see how it could at present be created. Hitherto peace has often come only because some strong and on the whole just power has by armed force, or the threat of armed force, put a stop to disorder.¹⁷

The military and police functions mingled freely in Roosevelt's mind.

Clearly some stopgap solution to the vacuum that existed in the international legal order was needed. Theodore Roosevelt proposed a theory of international intervention that was at once breathtakingly ambitious and restrained in execution. He maintained that a power of legislation and regulation existed in the international sphere, just as it did within sovereign states. Since the rudimentary international legal order of Roosevelt's day lacked a superior political authority able to wield this international police power, he envisioned leaving it to the major powers for the time being.

When a government failed to discharge its legal obligations towards foreign nations and its own citizens, the local great power might rightfully intervene in its affairs, even those affairs normally thought to be within the government's own domestic jurisdiction. To cope with anarchy, each great power thus would exercise a kind of legal jurisdiction in its geographic neighborhood. Yet, this did not bestow on the great powers a license for wanton military adventurism or territorial aggrandizement. The police power had to be deployed judiciously and in self-denying fashion. This was a revolutionary concept for diplomats and military men suckled on self-interested *realpolitik*.¹⁸

As long as the great powers were acting as a substitute for the mythical international authority, declaimed Roosevelt, it would be foolhardy for them to disarm. However, over the long term, he envisioned a more permanent solution.

Pointing to the anarchic condition of the international legal order, Roosevelt told the Nobel Prize committee that in “new and wild communities where there is violence”—probably alluding here to his experiences and writings on the American West—individuals had to protect themselves, “and until other means of securing his safety are devised,” they should not surrender the arms on which their safety hinged.¹⁹ And so it was with nations. Roosevelt reminded the committee that in “any community of any size” on the domestic level, “the authority of the courts rests upon actual or potential force;” that is, “on the existence of a police, or on the knowledge that the able-bodied men of the country are both ready and willing to see that the decrees of judicial and legislative bodies are put into effect.” Consequently, he prescribed “the establishment of some kind of international police power,” entrusted to a multinational League of Peace, made up of “those great nations which sincerely desire peace,” that would be “competent and willing to prevent violence as between nations.”²⁰

In order to advance the cause of peace in the barbarous world, great powers that were “honestly bent on peace” should found a “League of Peace not only to keep the peace among themselves, but also to prevent, by force if necessary, its being broken by others.” The main barrier to realizing the lofty aims of the Hague system arose from “the lack of any executive power, of any police power, to enforce the decrees of the [Hague] court.” Fittingly for a former New York City police commissioner, TR espoused the creation of an international police force to supply the sanction of force that was lacking in the international legal order. Once that goal was achieved, national armed forces could turn to the more mundane chore of internal policing.²¹ Minimal standing armies, and a more pacific world order, would be the end result.

LITMUS TESTS FOR GREAT-POWER CONSTABULARY ACTION

Theodore Roosevelt’s distinctive blend of a militant attitude towards world order with a heavy emphasis on tactful diplomacy is worth considering as a model for American foreign policy in our own day. By what right could America resort to armed force? Roosevelt founded his doctrine of the police power both on concrete American interests and on lofty idealism. In the realm of *realpolitik*, he mainly feared the menace posed by the burgeoning German High Seas Fleet and its architects in Berlin.²² Drawing on the works of an American strategist, Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, Kaiser Wilhelm II and Admiral Tirpitz had set out to acquire a chain of naval bases ringing the globe in order to improve their access to Kiaochow, Germany’s “own Hong Kong” that had been recently acquired on the Chinese mainland.²³

Consequently, they turned their covetous eyes on the Caribbean, where the United States was pressing ahead with plans to build an isthmian canal.²⁴ In 1902,

when the Germans took part in a multinational naval blockade of Venezuela that featured a battle between a German gunboat and a shore facility, President Roosevelt ordered a powerful U.S. Navy squadron to the area to shadow the European flotilla and deter a seizure of Venezuelan territory—a seizure that might have handed the Kaiser a naval base in America’s backyard. The Venezuelan affair was in all likelihood the catalytic event that spurred Roosevelt to spell out a doctrine of preemptive international police action. While he did not object to punitive action against President Cipriano Castro, whom he privately dubbed “an unspeakably villainous little monkey,”²⁵ the President believed he could not allow the Europeans to occupy Venezuelan soil.²⁶

Were TR’s concerns exaggerated? Perhaps. But forcible recovery of debts was a common practice of the day. If a government balked at repaying its foreign creditors, those creditors appealed to their own governments for assistance, and those governments in turn dispatched warships to the area to put steel behind their legal claims. The European powers typically seized the customs facilities

of the state that had defaulted and distributed the revenues among their nationals. This left them in possession of foreign territory, often for an extended period of time.²⁷ Even a temporary occupation of a customs house, reasoned President Roosevelt, could mutate into a permanent European maritime presence in the Caribbean basin and thwart the approaches to the isthmus. From his standpoint, this was an intolerable affront to the Monroe Doctrine and the U.S. national interest.

Consequently, the President cast about for some rationale for preemptive action. “If we are willing to let Germany or England act as the policeman of the Caribbean,” he told Elihu Root, his secretary of state, “then we can afford not to interfere when gross wrongdoing occurs. But if we intend to say ‘hands off’ to the powers of Europe, then sooner or later we must keep order ourselves.”²⁸ At that time he had something sweeping in mind. While a “control of the finances of Venezuela through American and European financial institutions would be condemned by public opinion here,” he foretold that a “second attempt of foreign powers to collect their debts by force would simply not be tolerated here. I often think that a sort of protectorate over South and Central America is the only way out.” As his thinking matured, TR ultimately scaled back his notion of a protectorate over “wretched republics”²⁹ such as Castro’s Venezuela, declaring a more limited right to police the Americas.

Hard-nosed self-interest was clearly one element nudging TR towards some

Roosevelt’s distinctive blend of a militant attitude towards world order with a heavy emphasis on tactful diplomacy is worth considering as a model for American foreign policy in our own day.

kind of preemptive diplomacy. The role of altruism in Roosevelt's foreign policy was another element.³⁰ Though not couched in exactly those terms, the concept of the republican peace coursed through Theodore Roosevelt's writings on world affairs. Like many internationalists, Roosevelt maintained that constitutional republics were less likely to fight one another. It was in the interest of the advanced powers, then, to preserve and widen the circle of republics, referred to in his writings, somewhat cavalierly, as "civilization." For TR, two results flowed from the logic of the republican peace. First, the civilized powers should make every effort to resolve their disputes through pacific means such as the Hague tribunals. Only by suppressing great-power war, with its attendant barbarities, could the existing frontiers of civilization be preserved.

In 1907, for instance, President Roosevelt instructed the American delegation to The Hague to press for an ambitious slate of initiatives: an agreement mandating international arbitration, the establishment of a permanent court to hear such cases, a prohibition on the use of force to collect debts, an agreement on the immunity of private property at sea, a clearer definition of the rights of neutrals, and, insofar as possible, arms limitations. Significantly, the conference did agree to renounce forcible debt collection, easing the fears that had induced Roosevelt to enunciate the Roosevelt Corollary in the first place.³¹ In light of his advocacy, one perceptive analyst has suggested that TR's "second corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine asserted "the right of the United States to interfere in European quarrels that were likely to compromise its security."³²

Second, the civilized states, particularly those of the English-speaking world, should attempt to shepherd backward nations into the community of constitutional republics. Therefore, they should deploy an international police power in their geographic neighborhoods. In extreme cases, Roosevelt envisioned using military force to discipline wayward nations: "of recent years, wars between the great civilized powers have become less and less frequent. Wars with barbarous or semi-barbarous peoples come in an entirely different category, being merely a most regrettable but necessary international police duty which must be performed for the sake of the welfare of mankind."³³ Here again, Roosevelt conflated the military and police functions under which force might be used.

This was a special mission of the United States in the New World. Pointing to the beneficent influence of the English-speaking peoples, TR asserted that it was "for the interest of civilization that the United States themselves, the greatest branch of the English-speaking race, should be dominant in the Western Hemisphere."³⁴ Indeed, according to Roosevelt, this was the patriotic duty of the American citizenry. Although he doubted the ability of a democracy to sustain a consistent foreign policy—only ingrained dogmas such as the Monroe Doctrine, he said, could withstand factional bickering³⁵—Roosevelt declared that "it would be well were we sufficiently farsighted steadily to shape our policy with the view

to the ultimate removal of all European powers from the colonies they hold in the Western hemisphere.”³⁶

What Theodore Roosevelt had in mind was a kind of stewardship—a benign, transitory imperialism that was superior to the amoral, self-interested brand practiced by the European states. What concrete justifications did Roosevelt outline for meddling in the affairs of the less advanced states? The litmus tests for intervention laid out in the “Roosevelt Corollary” were two: “chronic wrongdoing” that tempted the European great powers to aggrandize themselves in the New World, contrary to the Monroe Doctrine, and governmental “impotence” that likewise conjured up the specter of great power encroachment.

Governmental impotence that could be exploited by rival great powers preoccupied TR during his tenure in the Oval Office. He stepped in to ward off European territorial aggrandizement in Venezuela when the Castro government reneged on its

foreign debt. Roosevelt’s response to upheaval in the Caribbean basin culminated in 1904, when he issued his corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. This policy statement declared that the United States might exercise limited supervision of the affairs of island nations, especially in regions where the great powers might be tempted to wrest away coaling stations. Naval bases in the Caribbean Sea would imperil vital sea lanes, accounting for TR’s preoccupation with that region.³⁷

Though he never intervened in the affairs of sovereign states for purely humanitarian reasons—say, to thwart a government’s abuse of its own citizens—that seems to be what Roosevelt was contemplating when he spoke of “chronic wrongdoing.” He privately fantasized, for example, about launching a crusade to chasten Turkey for the abuses wrought against ethnic Armenians in the 1890s, but recognized that an American people still skeptical of foreign political entanglements would never support such a venture. Needless to say, the Porte never received its comeuppance at American hands.³⁸

Nor, to Roosevelt’s dismay, did Europe act to quench savagery along its frontiers. “The great blot on European international morality in the closing decade of this century,” thundered Roosevelt, “has been not a war, but the infamous peace kept by the joint action of the great powers, while Turkey inflicted the last horrors of butchery, torture, and outrage upon the men, women, and children of despairing Armenia. War was avoided; peace was kept; but what a peace!”³⁹ For him the failure of the European powers to police their own periphery exemplified the moral failings of *realpolitik*, and underscored the need for a more beneficent strain of diplomacy, predicated not only on enlightened self-interest, but also on personal standards of morality.⁴⁰

For TR, the failure of the European powers to police their own periphery exemplified the moral failings of realpolitik.

“JURISDICTION”

How far afield could the civilized states rightfully conduct police actions? A point of mild discord among Roosevelt’s cohort of expansionists was exactly how far the Monroe Doctrine should extend geographically. This debate shaped both the theory and practice of international policing.

An experienced military officer attuned to the limitations of naval power, Alfred Thayer Mahan maintained that American power ebbed as the distance from the nation’s coastlines increased, particularly when there were no forward bases to support power projection. That was the U.S. Navy’s predicament south of the Caribbean basin. Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts, a close friend of the President and a kindred spirit of his on matters military and diplomatic, informed TR that Mahan “takes the view that we should not undertake to keep Europe out of South America below the Caribbean Sea, that Northern South America and Central America are enough for us to protect.” Senator Lodge temporized on this point, confiding that he did “not agree with this view [of Mahan’s] at all, and yet I see the difficulties of enforcing the Monroe Doctrine in Southern Brazil, for example, and in getting our people to understand the importance of doing so at such a distant point.”⁴¹

Staking out the pole opposite from Mahan was William Howard Taft, who declared that Monroe’s maxim had extended the military frontiers of the United States to encompass the entire Western Hemisphere. “By virtue of this doctrine,” he informed an audience in Columbus, Ohio, “we in effect and for defensive purposes

Roosevelt hoped that the Japanese would do their part to bring China along the road to civilization which they had traveled.

extend the frontiers of the United States far beyond the actual confines of our territory, to Central America and the islands of the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean, to the mouths of the Orinoco and the Amazon, to Magellan and Tierra del Fuego.”⁴²

Roosevelt inclined to Mahan’s more limited view and later assured Argentina, Brazil, and Chile that he would welcome policing activities on their part in South America. In practice, the “jurisdiction” asserted by the United States during the Roosevelt presidency extended only to the Caribbean basin, a sphere of vital U.S. interest because of the sea lanes leading to the prospective isthmian canal. The limitations on the U.S. military’s ability to project force throughout the Western Hemisphere played a major role in his calculations.⁴³

Outside the Americas, we have seen that Roosevelt expected Europe to police adjoining regions. Moreover, giddy at the success of Japanese arms against Russia in 1904, Roosevelt told Cecil Arthur Spring Rice that Japan had

a “paramount interest” in the Yellow Sea basin, just as the United States had in the Caribbean. Consequently, he hoped that the Japanese would do their part to bring China along the road to civilization which they had traveled. “I thought it for the interest of all the world,” he reported telling the Japanese minister, “that each part of the world should be prosperous and well policed.”⁴⁴ In keeping with his sophisticated understanding of the balance of power, Roosevelt left vague the boundaries of each nation’s domain for constabulary action presumably because he expected that the other powers would collectively act to rein in a government that overstepped its bounds.

What was the upshot of Roosevelt’s theorizing on the international police power? A government that was unable or unwilling to discharge its obligations to foreign powers and its own populace invited great-power intervention on a pre-emptive basis, satisfying both the national interest of the United States and the broader interest of the civilized world. A failure to uphold the duties that accompanied state sovereignty conferred a legal right on a nearby civilized power to step in and perform these functions itself.

SANTO DOMINGO

Legal justification for international police work aside, how did Roosevelt believe the United States should execute its constabulary function? Consider the case of Santo Domingo (1904-1907), which impelled Roosevelt to assert an international police power on behalf of the United States. Rampant political chaos on the island, and demands—punctuated by the appearance of warships in Dominican waters—made on the Dominican government to repay its European creditors, precipitated the Roosevelt administration’s intervention. Clearly, the government was unable to honor its obligations to foreigners as mandated by the doctrine of state sovereignty. Hence, President Roosevelt responded by negotiating an accord with Santo Domingo under which the United States stationed a customs agent on the island to collect customs revenues and distribute them among the government and its creditors.⁴⁵

In this case, then, the constabulary function was less a matter of warfare or law enforcement than of international mediation—backed by the occasional show of U.S. naval force—and public administration. In keeping with the President’s Progressive leanings, nurturing good government on the island was the Roosevelt administration’s principal aim. This testified to the breadth of the police power and the flexibility with which Roosevelt applied it. “I want to do nothing but what a policeman has to do in Santo Domingo,” he informed his friend Joseph Bucklin Bishop, who had questioned the President’s motives for injecting himself into Dominican affairs. “As for annexing the island,” continued TR, “I have about the same desire to annex it as a gorged boa constrictor might have to swallow a porcupine wrong-end-to.”⁴⁶

The United States had no territorial ambitions on the island, and the President vehemently disclaimed any plans to foist wholesale reform on the Dominican government. "If I possibly can I want to do nothing to them. If it is absolutely necessary to do something, then I want to do as little as possible."⁴⁷ What, then, did Roosevelt mean by "what a policeman has to do?" In the case of the Dominican Republic, the U.S. constabulary role evidently meant a show of force to deter both European territorial aggrandizement and another in the litany of uprisings that pockmarked the island's history. Once that had been accomplished, diplomacy did the rest. Washington mediated between Santo Domingo and its foreign creditors, inking a treaty, together with an interim *modus vivendi*, that empowered Roosevelt to station a customs agent on the island to administer Dominican revenues.

A failure to uphold the duties that accompanied state sovereignty conferred a legal right on a nearby civilized power to step in and perform these functions itself.

Like a policeman, Roosevelt planned to avert a violent escalation of unrest, restore public order, stabilize the island's government, and trust that, left to their own devices, the Dominicans would mend their affairs, just as state and local governments were expected to do under the American federal system. This self-denying attitude, a rarity among the great powers of the day, was one of the major innovations of Roosevelt's diplomacy.

QUELLING LATIN AMERICAN MISGIVINGS ABOUT THE COROLLARY

Still, the intemperate wording of the corollary inflamed suspicions in South America that the United States planned to embark on an overtly imperial policy. Taken aback at the negative reception accorded his 1904 message, President Roosevelt set out to allay fears of indiscriminate U.S. meddling. In his 1905 message to Congress, TR proclaimed:

We must recognize the fact that in some South American countries there has been much suspicion lest we should interpret the Monroe Doctrine as in some way inimical to their interests, and we must try to convince all the other nations of this continent once and for all that no just and orderly government has anything to fear from us. There are certain republics to the south of us which have already reached such a point of stability, order, and prosperity that they themselves, though as yet hardly consciously, are among the guarantors of this Doctrine.⁴⁸

The United States regarded these advanced republics as equals and friends worthy

of jointly guaranteeing world order. To provide concrete proof of his goodwill, TR engineered their attendance at the second Hague Conference, signifying their admission to the community of civilized states, and hectored the European governments into renouncing forcible debt recovery.⁴⁹

Moreover, in 1906, Roosevelt dispatched Root on a goodwill tour of South America that culminated in an inter-American conference at Rio de Janeiro. The impression that Washington had malign intentions, Roosevelt wrote in December 1906, "continued to be a serious barrier to good understanding, to friendly intercourse, to the introduction of American capital and the extension of American trade. The impression was so widespread that apparently it could not be reached by any ordinary means." Consequently, said the President, "It was part of Secretary Root's mission to dispel this unfounded impression" during his visits to Latin American capitals.

At the Rio conference, Root disavowed Richard Olney's assertion of *de facto* sovereignty over the Americas, which dated from the Cleveland administration, in no uncertain terms.⁵⁰ While he did not mention the international police power by name, the secretary of state denied that the

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United States had claimed a license to subjugate fellow American republics or indulge in wanton military intimidation. Roosevelt quoted the secretary's remarks approvingly in his 1906 message to Congress: "We wish for no victories but those of peace; for no territory except our own; for no sovereignty except the sovereignty over ourselves." The United States, furthermore, affirmed that

the independence and equal rights of the smallest and weakest member of the family of nations [were] entitled to as much respect as those of the greatest empire, and we deem the observance of that respect the chief guaranty of the weak against the oppression of the strong. We neither claim nor desire any rights or privileges or powers that we do not freely concede to every American republic.⁵¹

Root's Rio address echoed the President's stance on international policing, that is, that the great Latin American republics could wield the police power in their neighborhoods.⁵²

The U.S. diplomatic offensive seemed to work. The Argentine foreign minister, Dr. Luis Drago, called the Doctrine "the traditional policy [by which] the United States without accentuating superiority or seeking preponderance condemned the oppression of the nations of this part of the world and the control of

their destinies by the great powers of Europe.”⁵³ The editor of the *American Journal of International Law* was equally impressed, forecasting that, “while it is impossible to estimate accurately at this moment its effect upon the relation of the North to the South, it is little less than a moral certainty that [Root’s] visit in itself and the friendliness everywhere evidenced will draw the republics into closer relations.”⁵⁴ TR’s lasting popularity in Latin America also signified the success of this charm offensive.⁵⁵ Secretary of State Root’s effectiveness, however, should not obscure the fact that his 1906 Latin American tour was an exercise in political damage control. As Roosevelt well knew, tact is an invaluable attribute in diplomacy, and he had sinned egregiously when he articulated his corollary.

STRATEGIES OF INTERNATIONAL CONSTABULARY WORK

President Roosevelt outlined the whys and wherefores of international policing, but it fell to the United States Marine Corps to furnish a broader picture of how the international constabulary function was implemented during the multitude of interventions undertaken by successive administrations in the early part of the twentieth century. Between 1898 and 1934 the United States engaged primarily in “small wars,” a term then in vogue to describe the pacification of less

developed nations by the major powers. In many respects small wars strategy was the policy embodiment of the police power.

“We neither claim nor desire any rights or privileges or powers that we do not freely concede to every American republic.”

Because it was readily deployable, naval power was the instrument of choice for such skirmishes, although, when an operation demanded massive manpower, the U.S. Army was the main implementer of American policy. Among the armed services, the Marine Corps was the only one

that made a concerted effort to learn the lessons of its small wars. First published in 1935, its *Small Wars Manual* was a systematic analysis of these “banana wars,” distilled into book form by veterans of Caribbean deployments.⁵⁶ It is the best—indeed, the only contemporary—compilation of the principles undergirding U.S. international policing activities in the Roosevelt era and beyond.

The authors emphasized that small wars differed dramatically from conventional wars. Consequently, a far different strategic approach was in order. In conventional wars, force was a last resort, typically brought on to compel a government to do America’s bidding after diplomacy failed. In stark contrast, by intervening in the internal affairs of a foreign state, the United States typically hoped to effect a restoration of order, “to sustain governmental authority, to obtain redress, or to enforce the fulfillment of obligations between the two states.”⁵⁷ In small wars, political leaders

could be expected to maintain tight control of operations, even after they had authorized the use of violence.

The pervasiveness of political considerations, it followed, would strongly influence the tactics and strategies available to the field commander. Thus, observed the manual wryly, U.S. Marines were often nicknamed “State Department Troops.”⁵⁸ The purpose of a police deployment was not total defeat of an enemy nation, but “to restore normal government or to give the people a better government than they had before, and to establish peace, order, and security on as permanent a basis as practicable.” Above all, declared the manual, “there must be instilled in the inhabitants’ minds the leading ideas of civilization, the security and sanctity of life and property, and individual liberty.”⁵⁹ The constabulary function was quite a different thing from conventional warfare.

The *Small Wars Manual* laid out several phases of a constabulary mission. First, because of the tempestuous political conditions that characterized these countries, the marines would be deployed incrementally—“dribble in,” in the authors’ evocative formulation—without a congressional declaration of war that might rouse local sentiments against the United States.⁶⁰ Second, there would be a combat phase featuring a conventional battle, and then, when the revolutionary forces had been defeated, a possibly protracted interval of counterinsurgency warfare.⁶¹

As the military campaign progressed, the marines would initiate a parallel effort to organize a local constabulary, composed of “the best types of natives” and officered by Americans, that would ultimately assume responsibility for internal and external defense, as well as the police function and a host of civil responsibilities. The powers entrusted to the new force were legion:

Among the police duties of the constabulary are the prevention of smuggling and the control of the importation, sale, and custody of arms, ammunition, and explosives. It is also empowered to arrest offenders for infractions of local laws, not only of the state, but also of the territorial subdivisions and municipalities. It is charged with the protection of persons and property, the control of prisons, and the issuance of travel permits and vehicular licenses. The constabulary provides guards for voting places and electoral records, and exerts plenary control during natural disasters, such as floods and earthquakes.⁶²

Atop this imposing list was an additional host of civil duties.

Not only would these efforts at what we would call nation-building begin to equip the native government to resume control of its own affairs, but it would also allow U.S. Navy personnel from the vanguard to return to their duties aboard ship.⁶³ Although the manual envisioned organizing the constabulary along U.S. military lines and schooling its members in U.S. tactics, it allowed considerable latitude for employing native methods of organization, particularly under

emergency conditions that ruled out a more leisurely approach. Because the manual instructed marine commanders to learn the natives' traditions and mores, it also recognized that its prescriptions must be adapted to local conditions.⁶⁴ In general, American troops would not directly carry out policing activities. "United States forces...will not, as a rule, participate in matters concerning police and other civil functions. The military forces usually constitute a reserve which is to be made available only in extreme emergencies to assist the native constabulary in the performance of its purely police mission."⁶⁵

Third, the American expeditionary force would assume control of the native government's executive agencies, leaving the judicial and legislative powers in native hands. Depending on how the combat forces fared, this could involve "the establishment of military government or martial law in varying degree from minor authority to complete control of the principal agencies." In the meantime,

The main point was to preserve the appearance of American commitment to the rule of law, and thus, by example, to nourish respect for law and order among the populace.

U.S. reinforcements would arrive, allowing the marines to "carry the burden of most of the patrolling." The burden of combat patrols would be incrementally transferred to native troops as they were recruited and trained.⁶⁶ The third phase would continue until the insurgents, or "lawless elements," were subdued, and would wind down as the military operation neared success. The marines would begin gradually relinquishing command of the constabulary to native officers, while native officials would begin

to resume control of government executive organs. The American troops, meanwhile, would withdraw to large outposts where they would act as a potent reserve, largely out of sight but available should hostilities flare up again.⁶⁷

Fourth, during the phase dubbed "routine police operations," the occupying force would continue discharging the executive functions while commencing preparations for "free and fair" elections. The *Small Wars Manual* enjoined American commanders to scrupulously avoid taking on "any judicial responsibilities over local inhabitants beyond that expressly provided by proper authority," namely authority flowing from "law and our treaty rights" that had authorized American intervention in the first place. Any judicial powers wielded by U.S. military officials had to be clearly spelled out in "orders from superior authority" to avoid conveying the impression that America was the conqueror, and not a benefactor, of an afflicted nation. The amount of U.S. involvement in the judicial function would vary from operation to operation, depending on the extent of disarray in the native government.⁶⁸

The main point was to preserve the appearance of American commitment

to the rule of law, and thus, by example, to nourish respect for law and order among the populace. Accordingly, the manual laid down precise instructions for conducting and supervising elections. A National Board of Elections, staffed mainly by native officials, would nominally direct the electoral machinery, while an American Electoral Mission made up of U.S. military and civilian personnel would exercise real control of the process. Military forces would be positioned to prevent armed revolutionaries or anyone else from disrupting the balloting process and thus thwarting lawful elections.⁶⁹ Finally, the natives would resume full control of their affairs. The marines would withdraw from the interior and eventually leave the country altogether. The most striking facet of the manual is its close attention to political and social considerations. As befitted the concrete expression of the international police power, the constabulary function clearly involved far more than straightforward combat operations.

CONCLUSIONS

Theodore Roosevelt articulated a limited “international police power”—that is, a limited supervisory authority, akin to the powers exercised by the federal government in the American system—that would be deployed by the major civilized powers in absence of other alternatives. Although he doubted an international authority could be forged in the foreseeable future—because there was little sentiment to knit together such an authority, its emergence was “eons distant”⁷⁰—the police power ultimately resided in the community of civilized states and, as he said, should be entrusted to a League of Peace.

His Roosevelt Corollary, proclaiming the police power, laid out two cases that merited U.S. intervention in the affairs of the American states: governmental impotence and chronic wrongdoing. When these states failed to uphold their sovereign duties, then the United States claimed the right to do so for them. In practice that meant the states of the Caribbean littoral. Strategies of constabulary duty spanned everything from international mediation and supervision of financial arrangements, as in the Dominican case, to combat operations indistinguishable from the small wars as prescribed in the *Small Wars Manual*. Political and strategic prudence would shape the approach taken by Washington in each case.

Finally, statesmen had to wield the international police power not only judiciously, but also tactfully. Stung by the Latin American reaction to his corollary, Theodore Roosevelt realized, albeit belatedly, that the exercise of American power over the long haul would hinge on the acquiescence of foreign nations.

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The United States might intervene abroad in pursuit of its interest or to uphold its principles; but it had to undertake a parallel effort to assure other nations that it was not an imperial power in the traditional mold and thus posed no threat to their sovereignty. Painstaking diplomacy, then, was a crucial adjunct to American constabulary operations. Then, as now, a little persuasion went a long way. ■

NOTES

- 1 Theodore Roosevelt, "Message of the President to the Senate and the House of Representatives," December 6, 1904, *U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1904 (Washington, D.C.: Government Publishing Office, 1905), xli.
- 2 I use the term "international police power" to refer to the quasi-legal authority Roosevelt invoked to justify government action in certain circumstances. When discussing the strategies used to execute international police actions, I refer to a "constabulary function," namely the use of all of the implements of national power to carry out these actions. The military and police functions are elements in this broader mode of international intervention. A new term seemed necessary in order to escape the commonplace, and exceedingly sloppy, use of the term "police action" to describe everything from a full-scale war in Korea to the use of law enforcement to round up members of al-Qaeda.
- 3 Theodore Roosevelt, *Theodore Roosevelt: An Autobiography*, intro. Elting E. Morison (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1913; reprint, New York: Da Capo, 1985), 7.
- 4 "I have always felt that my southern ancestry was responsible for much of my attitude in foreign politics," he confided in 1903. Roosevelt took immense pride that his maternal great-great grandfather, Archibald Bulloch, had been the first president of revolutionary Georgia, and that two of his Georgia uncles had served in the Confederate raider Alabama during its epic battle with USS Kearsarge. Theodore Roosevelt to William Gibbs McAdoo, November 17, 1903, in Theodore Roosevelt, *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, ed. Elting Morison and others, vol. 3 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951-54), vol. 3, 655. Roosevelt, *Theodore Roosevelt: An Autobiography*, 4, 11-13.
- 5 Theodore Roosevelt, *Theodore Roosevelt: An Autobiography*, 27-28.
- 6 Owen J. Roberts, *The Court and the Constitution: The Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), 37.
- 7 He dropped out of Columbia after a year, decrying the legalism and amorality that were rife in the profession, to pursue a political career. Roosevelt to William Gibbs McAdoo, November 17, 1903, in Theodore Roosevelt, *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, vol. 3, 655.
- 8 Asked to list the "kinds of books one ought to read," TR effortlessly disgorged dozens of titles. Among the works of fiction he cited, Roosevelt recommended Shakespeare's histories, notably *Henry the Fourth* and *Henry the Fifth*; *Beowulf*; parts of the *Nibelungenlied*; and Sir Walter Scott's novels, especially *Rob Roy* and *Waverley*. Non-fiction titles included works by Herodotus, Polybius, Thucydides, Aristotle, and Lincoln. Bravery in a good cause, self-sacrifice, protection of the weak, and the exercise of virtue were common threads in these works. Roosevelt to Nicholas Murray Butler, November 4, 1903, in Theodore Roosevelt, *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, vol. 3, 642-644.
- 9 See, for example, Theodore Roosevelt to John Punnett Peters, April 4, 1899, in Theodore Roosevelt, *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, vol. 2, 979-980; Theodore Roosevelt to Bird Sim Coler, April 23, 1900, in Theodore Roosevelt, *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, vol. 2, 1270-1271; and Theodore Roosevelt, "Message of the President to the Senate and the House of Representatives," December 6, 1904, in *U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States*, 1904, x.
- 10 *Gibbons v. Ogden*, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 202 (1824).
- 11 *Barbier v. Connolly*, 113 U.S. 27, 5 S. Ct. 357 (1884). See also John Randolph Tucker, *The Constitution of the United States: A Critical Discussion of Its Genesis, Development, and Interpretation*, ed. Henry St. George Tucker (Chicago: Callaghan & Co., 1899), 859-860.
- 12 The clause mandating that no state "shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
- 13 A self-professed "broad constructionist in constitutional matters," President Roosevelt was known on occasion to blithely wave away even the exact text of the U.S. Constitution, which tended to inhibit state action in matters he believed to be of surpassing importance. The rudiments of a doctrine of police power were evident both in Roosevelt's theorizing and in his actual responses to capital-labor disputes. Like other broad constructionists, TR found constitutional sanction for a federal exercise of police power mainly in the Commerce

- Clause. Among other things, the Roosevelt administration used the commerce power to regulate railroads engaged in interstate carriage. Theodore Roosevelt to Leonard Wood, April 9, 1900, in Theodore Roosevelt, *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, vol. 2, 1251.
- 14 "The Constitution of the United States of America," in *The Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States of America* (Reprint, Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, 1998), 24, 34.
- 15 In 1902, for example, President Roosevelt intervened forcefully to mediate between mine operators and anthracite coal miners in Pennsylvania. Roosevelt recalled that "the coal famine became a national menace as the winter approached....In the populous industrial states, from Ohio eastward, it was not merely calamity, but the direst disaster, that was threatened." He told his friend Lyman Abbott, "I think all competent observers agree that if the strike had not been settled there would have been within thirty days the most terrible riots that this country has ever seen, with as their sequence the necessity of drastic, and perhaps revolutionary measures, by the state governments, or by the national government." The President interposed a federal commission headed by Grover Cleveland to mediate a settlement. Although events never drove him to such an extreme, Roosevelt later confided that he had been prepared to write a request from the Pennsylvania governor to use federal troops to seize and operate the mines by force, despite the "evil precedent" this would set. He found authority for such measures in the Constitution, which required the federal government to guarantee a republican form of government in each state—a form of government that might be overthrown in the wake of a socialist revolution stemming from labor unrest. Theodore Roosevelt, *Theodore Roosevelt: An Autobiography*, 480, 487-492; Theodore Roosevelt to Lyman Abbott, September 5, 1903, in *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, vol. 3, 592.
- 16 Schurz viewed the expansionist project through the prism of the Philippine War, deploring the "deceit, false pretense, brutality, treachery to friends, unconstitutional assumption of power, betrayal of the fundamental principles of our democracy, wanton sacrifice of our soldiers for an unjust cause, cruel slaughter of innocent people, and thus of horrible blood guiltiness without parallel in the history of republics." Carl Schurz to Charles Francis Adams, n.d. [October 7, 1900?], in Carl Schurz, *Reminiscences of Carl Schurz*, vol. 3 (London: John Murray, 1909), 446-447.
- 17 Theodore Roosevelt to Carl Schurz, September 8, 1905, in Theodore Roosevelt, *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, vol. 5, 16-17.
- 18 C. E. Callwell's *Small Wars*, a minor classic in the field of security studies, attests to the prevailing attitude towards "failed states." Forbearance towards these states, said Callwell, an Englishman, was an empty gesture, largely wasted on "uncivilized races" that "attribute leniency to timidity. Fanatics and savages must be thoroughly brought to book or cowed or they will rise again." Charles E. Callwell, *Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice*, 3d ed., intro. Douglas Porch (London: H.M.S.O., 1906; reprint: Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1996), xiii-xiv, 24, 40, 42.
- 19 Theodore Roosevelt, "'International Peace,' Address before the Nobel Prize Committee, Delivered at Christiania, Norway, May 5, 1910," in Theodore Roosevelt, *Memorial Edition: Works of Theodore Roosevelt*, ed. Hermann Hagedorn, vol. 18, American Problems (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1923-26), 414-415.
- 20 Roosevelt, *International Peace*, 414-415.
- 21 *Ibid.*, 414-415.
- 22 In 1901, TR told Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, a close friend, that German military preparations, combined with the failure of the United States to prepare, would soon leave the Kaiser in a position to wrest away a foothold in the West Indies or South America. The United States consequently would be forced to "put up or shut up on the Monroe Doctrine." Theodore Roosevelt to Henry Cabot Lodge, March 17, 1901, in Theodore Roosevelt, *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, vol. 3, 31-32.
- 23 Alfred von Tirpitz, *My Memoirs* (London: Hurst & Blackett, Ltd., 1919), 70.
- 24 Wilhelm II revered Mahan's *Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783* almost as a sacred text. On one occasion he remarked that Mahan was standard reading for German naval officers: "I am just now not reading but devouring Captain Mahan's book and am trying to learn it by heart. It is on board all my ships and [is] constantly quoted by my captains and officers." Wilhelm II, in Robert K. Massie, *Dreadnought: Britain, Germany, and the Coming of the Great War* (New York: Random House, 1991), xxiii-xxiv; Wilhelm II, in J. Leipsius and others, eds., *Die Grosse Politik der europäischen Kabinette*, vol. xiv, part 2 (Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1922-27), no. 3927.
- 25 Theodore Roosevelt to John Hay, April 2, 1905, *Theodore Roosevelt Papers*, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
- 26 "If any South American state misbehaves towards any European country," said Roosevelt, "let the European country spank it"—so long as no breach of the principles of 1823 was involved. Theodore Roosevelt to Hermann Speck von Sternburg, July 12, 1901, in Theodore Roosevelt, *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, vol. 3, 115-116.

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- 27 The great powers finally foreswore forcible debt collection at the 1907 Hague conference, at the urging of President Roosevelt, among others. Theodore Roosevelt, "Message of the President to the Senate and the House of Representatives," December 3, 1907, in *U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1907*, lxi-lxii.
- 28 Theodore Roosevelt to Elihu Root, June 7, 1904, in Theodore Roosevelt, *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, vol. 4, 821-823.
- 29 German Foreign Ministry Communiqué, March 3, 1903, in Dexter Perkins, *A History of the Monroe Doctrine* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1963), 235.
- 30 For an excellent review of the role of morality in Roosevelt's diplomacy, see Frederick W. Marks III, "Morality as a Drive Wheel in the Diplomacy of Theodore Roosevelt," *Diplomatic History* 2, no. 1 (winter 1978): 43-62.
- 31 Theodore Roosevelt, "Message of the President to the Senate and the House of Representatives," December 3, 1907, in *U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1907*, lxi-lxii.
- 32 Serge Ricard, "Theodore Roosevelt: Principles and Practice of a Foreign Policy," *Theodore Roosevelt Association Journal* 18 (Fall-Winter 1992): 2-6.
- 33 Theodore Roosevelt, "Message of the President to the Senate and the House of Representatives," December 3, 1901, in *U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1901*, xxxvi.
- 34 Theodore Roosevelt to Henry White, March 30, 1896, in Theodore Roosevelt, *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, vol. 1, 523.
- 35 Theodore Roosevelt to Cecil Arthur Spring Rice, December 27, 1904, in Theodore Roosevelt, *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, vol. 4, 1082-1088.
- 36 Theodore Roosevelt to William Sheffield Cowles, April 5, 1896, in Theodore Roosevelt, *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, vol. 1, 524.
- 37 Like Kaiser Wilhelm and Admiral Tirpitz, Roosevelt subscribed to the Mahanian view of maritime strategy, which focused his attention on the Caribbean sea lanes. "I suppose I need not tell you that as regards Hawaii I take your views absolutely, as indeed I do on foreign policy generally," he told Captain Mahan on one occasion. Theodore Roosevelt to Alfred Thayer Mahan, May 3, 1897, in Theodore Roosevelt, *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, vol. 1, 607-608.
- 38 Theodore Roosevelt to George Otto Trevelyan, May 13, 1905, in Theodore Roosevelt, *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, vol. 4, 1173-1176.
- 39 Theodore Roosevelt, "Expansion and Peace," *Independent*, December 21, 1899, in Theodore Roosevelt, *National Edition: Works of Theodore Roosevelt*, ed. Hermann Hagedorn, vol. 13, *The Strenuous Life: Essays and Addresses* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1926), 333.
- 40 "Unquestionably," averred President Roosevelt's 1906 message to Congress, "no nation can afford to disregard proper considerations of self-interest, any more than a private individual can do so. But it is equally true that the average private individual in any really decent community does many actions with reference to other men in which he is guided, not by self-interest, but by public spirit, by regard for the rights of others, by a disinterested purpose to do good to others, and to raise the tone of the community as a whole." The nation, which was no more than the aggregation of such individuals, "must often act, and as a matter of fact often does act, toward other nations in a spirit not in the least of mere self-interest, but paying heed chiefly to ethical reasons." As more of the world ascended towards civilization, the ethical standards expected of nations would rise correspondingly. Theodore Roosevelt, "Message of the President to the Senate and the House of Representatives," December 3, 1906, in *U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1906*, xl.
- 41 Henry Cabot Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, March 30, 1901, in Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, *Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, 1884-1918*, ed. Henry Cabot Lodge and Charles F. Redmond, vol. 1 (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1925; reprint, New York: Da Capo, 1971), 486-487.
- 42 William Howard Taft, "Address Before the Board of Trade of Columbus, Ohio, April 2, 1908," in William Howard Taft, *Present Day Problems* (Freeport: Books for Libraries Press, 1908; reprint, 1967), 81.
- 43 Henry Cabot Lodge to Theodore Roosevelt, March 30, 1901, in Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, *Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, 1884-1918*, ed. Henry Cabot Lodge and Charles F. Redmond, vol. 1, 486-487.
- 44 Theodore Roosevelt to Cecil Arthur Spring Rice, June 13, 1904, in Theodore Roosevelt, *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, vol. 4, 829-833.
- 45 President Roosevelt bragged that, in the wake of the "Modus Vivendi" and subsequent treaty, the Dominican government received 45 percent of its customs revenues, far more than had been the case before Washington
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- had stepped in. "Modus Vivendi," Dominican Republic, signed Santo Domingo, April 1, 1905, *Consolidated Treaty Series 8566* (1971), vol. 7, 194-195; Jacob H. Hollander, "The Convention of 1907 between the United States and the Dominican Republic," *American Journal of International Law* 1, vol. 2 (April 1907), 289-290; "Collection and Application of Customs Revenues," Dominican Republic, signed Santo Domingo February 8, 1907, *Consolidated Treaty Series 8566* (1971), vol. 7, 197-198; Theodore Roosevelt, "Message from the President of the United States, Transmitting a Protocol of an Agreement between the United States and the Dominican Republic, Providing for the Collection and Disbursement by the United States of the Customs Revenues of the Dominican Republic, Signed on February 4, 1905," in Theodore Roosevelt, *The Works of Theodore Roosevelt: Executive Edition*, vol. 3 (New York: P. F. Collier & Son, n.d. [1908?]), 241-242; Theodore Roosevelt to Alvey Augustus Adee, March 28, 1905, in Theodore Roosevelt, *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, vol. 4, 1148-1149.
- 46 Theodore Roosevelt to Joseph Bucklin Bishop, February 23, 1904, in Theodore Roosevelt, *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt*, vol. 4, 734-735.
- 47 Ibid.
- 48 Theodore Roosevelt, "Message of the President to the Senate and the House of Representatives," December 5, 1905, in *U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1905*, xxxiii.
- 49 Theodore Roosevelt, "1906 Annual Message," in *U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1906*, xlvii-xlviii, liv.
- 50 During the Cleveland administration's showdown with Great Britain in the 1895 Venezuela border dispute, Olney had made the extravagant claim that "[t]oday the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition." This understandably did not endear him to Latin American nations that were already primed to take a skeptical view of U.S. foreign policy. Richard Olney to Thomas F. Bayard, July 20, 1895, in Ruhl J. Bartlett, ed., *The Record of American Diplomacy: Documents and Readings in the History of American Foreign Relations*, 4th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1964), 341-345.
- 51 Theodore Roosevelt, "1906 Annual Message," in *U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1906*, xlvii.
- 52 Elihu Root, *Latin America and the United States: Addresses by Elihu Root*, ed. Robert Bacon and James Brown Scott (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1917), xiv-xv.
- 53 Luis Drago, in Theodore Roosevelt, "1906 Annual Message," in *U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1906*, xlvii-xlviii.
- 54 James Brown Scott, "Editorial Comment," *The American Journal of International Law* 1, no. 1 (January 1907), 143.
- 55 So popular was Root's message that, on one memorable occasion, Brazilian students had to be prevented from unharnessing the horses drawing his carriage and pulling the carriage through the streets of Rio themselves. Similar acclaim greeted TR during a post-presidential tour in 1913. Frederick W. Marks III, *Velvet on Iron: The Diplomacy of Theodore Roosevelt* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1979), 182-185.
- 56 U.S. Marine Corps, *Small Wars Manual: United States Marine Corps 1940*, intro. Ronald Shaffer, 2d. ed. (Washington, D.C.: Government Publishing Office, 1940; reprint, Manhattan, Kansas: Sunflower University Press, 1972), v-xv.
- 57 Ibid., Chapter I, 12.
- 58 Ibid., Chapter I, 11-14.
- 59 Ibid., Chapter I, 28-29, 32.
- 60 Ibid., Chapter I, 5, 8-9.
- 61 Ibid., Chapter I, 26-28.
- 62 Ibid., Chapter XII, 8-9.
- 63 Ibid., Chapter I, 5-6.
- 64 Ibid., Chapter I, 26-27.
- 65 Ibid., Chapter I, 43.
- 66 Ibid., Chapter I, 1-7.
- 67 Ibid., Chapter I, 5.
- 68 Ibid., Chapter I, 7.
- 69 Ibid., Chapter XIV, 29-35.
- 70 Theodore Roosevelt, "True Americanism," *Forum*, April 1894, in *Works: National*, vol. 13, 17.
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