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The Ohio Indians and the Coming of the American Revolution in Virginia

By WOODY HOLTON

SCHOOLCHILDREN LEARN THAT THE ROYAL PROCLAMATION OF 1763, which banned colonial settlement and land speculation west of the Appalachian Mountains, helped provoke thirteen American colonies to rebel against Britain. But most historians assert that the Proclamation of 1763 was, in effect, repealed in November 1768, when Iroquois chiefs met British officials at Fort Stanwix, New York, and sold them a vast tract of land west of the Appalachians.¹ This assertion is incorrect with regard to the South. Even after 1768 the British government prohibited its colonists from moving into the portion of the newly purchased territory claimed by Virginia, and the government refused to repeal the Proclamation of 1763. This article will show that the most important reason for the government's refusal was that British statesmen were desperate to avoid a costly war against a powerful coalition of southern and western Indians.²

¹ Eugene M. Del Papa, "The Royal Proclamation of 1763: Its Effect Upon Virginia Land Companies," *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography*, LXXXIII (October 1975), 406–7; Thad W. Tate, "The Coming of the Revolution in Virginia: Britain's Challenge to Virginia's Ruling Class, 1763–1776," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3d Ser., XIX (July 1962), 338; Douglas Southall Freeman, *George Washington: A Biography*. Vol. III: *Planter and Patriot* (New York, 1951), 215–16; John Richard Alden, *The South in the Revolution, 1763–1789* ([Baton Rouge], 1957), 134; Bil Gilbert, *God Gave Us This Country: Tekamthi and the First American Civil War* (New York, 1989), 56–61; Francis S. Philbrick, *The Rise of the West, 1754–1830* (New York, 1965), 25 and 30–31; Brian Slattery, "The Land Rights of Indigenous Canadian Peoples, As Affected by the Crown's Acquisition of Their Territories" (Ph. D. dissertation, Wadham College, Oxford University, 1979), 221; Wilbur R. Jacobs, "British Indian Policies to 1783," in William C. Sturtevant, ed., *Handbook of North American Indians* (20 vols. projected; Washington, 1978–), Vol. IV: Wilcomb E. Washburn, ed., *History of Indian-White Relations*, 11; Hartwell L. Quinn, *Arthur Campbell: Pioneer and Patriot of the "Old Southwest"* (Jefferson, N. C., and London, 1990), 13; Norman K. Risjord, *Jefferson's America, 1760–1815* (Madison, Wisc., 1991), 79–80; Paula Hathaway Anderson-Green, "The New River Frontier Settlement on the Virginia–North Carolina Border, 1760–1820," *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography*, LXXXVI (October 1978), 422.

² The most accurate information on this subject is in Jack M. Sosin, *Whitehall and the Wilderness: The Middle West in British Colonial Policy, 1760–1775* (Lincoln, Neb., 1961); Ran-

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Historians, in addition to claiming that the Fort Stanwix deed voided the Proclamation of 1763, have had another reason for denying that the proclamation helped motivate Virginia land speculators to rebel against Britain. Scholars have pointed out that the Proclamation of 1763 was only a paper barrier that failed to prevent settlers from simply crossing the Appalachian Mountains and establishing farms. Indeed, as a *Virginia Gazette* essayist pointed out in 1773, “not even a second Chinese wall, unless guarded by a million soldiers, could prevent the settlement of the Lands on the Ohio and its dependencies.”³ The ease with which yeomen farm families slipped across the imaginary Proclamation Line has led scholars to assume that the barrier was also ineffective against speculators.⁴ That assumption is wrong; speculators must be distinguished from actual settlers as a separate class with very different interests. Speculators were interested in Indian land because of its exchange value. But they could not cut homesteads from Indian land to sell to farmers until they obtained legal title to the land, and they were prevented from taking title by the Proclamation of 1763.⁵ So the proclamation effectively abolished land speculation. Af-

dolph C. Downes, *Council Fires on the Upper Ohio: A Narrative of Indian Affairs in the Upper Ohio Valley until 1795* (Pittsburgh, 1940); Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650–1815* (Cambridge, Eng., and other cities, 1991), 354; Gregory Evans Dowd, *A Spirited Resistance: The North American Indian Struggle for Unity, 1745–1815* (Baltimore and London, 1992), 42–45; and Michael N. McConnell, *A Country Between: The Upper Ohio Valley and Its Peoples, 1724–1774* (Lincoln, Neb., and London, 1992). None of these scholars focus on the narrow question of whether Indian coalition-building and consequent British limits on land speculation helped induce colonial Americans to rebel against Britain.

³ “A Friend to the True Interests of Britain in America,” *Williamsburg Virginia Gazette* (Rind), January 14, 1773.

⁴ H. J. Eckenrode, *The Revolution in Virginia* (Boston and New York, 1916; rpt., Camden, Conn., 1964), 39; James W. Hays, “The Frontier at Castle’s Woods, 1769–1786,” *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography*, LXXV (October 1967), 410; Herbert Sloan and Peter Onuf, “Politics, Culture, and the Revolution in Virginia: A Review of Recent Work,” *ibid.*, XCI (July 1983), 265; Freeman H. Hart, *The Valley of Virginia in the American Revolution, 1763–1789* (Chapel Hill, 1942), 69–70; Tate, “Coming of the Revolution,” 338; Jack M. Sosin, *The Revolutionary Frontier, 1763–1783* (New York and other cities, 1967), 12; and Risjord, *Jefferson’s America*, 79. Ironically, much of the misinformation about the impact of the Proclamation of 1763 on land speculators comes from “pro-Indian” historians who incorrectly assume that the proclamation was no more effective against speculators than it was against settlers. Georgiana C. Nammack, *Fraud, Politics, and the Dispossession of the Indians: The Iroquois Land Frontier in the Colonial Period* (Norman, Okla., 1969), 93; McConnell, *Country Between*, 243–44; and Daniel M. Friedenberg, *Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Land: The Plunder of Early America* (Buffalo, 1992), Chap. 12.

⁵ William Preston and William Thompson, memorial, October 28, 1778, *Journal of the House of Delegates of the Commonwealth of Virginia; Begun . . . On Monday, the Fifth Day of October, in the Year of Our Lord One Thousand Seven Hundred and Seventy-Eight* (Richmond, 1827; hereinafter *JHD* . . . 1778), 30; Faye Bartlett Reeder, “The Evolution of the Virginia Land Grant System in the Eighteenth Century” (Ph. D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 1937), 120 and 123; and J. R. Pole, *Foundations of American Independence, 1763–1815* (Indianapolis and New York, 1972), 25.

ter Virginia declared independence from Britain, a lawyer for two land companies stated that the Proclamation of 1763 had been “sufficient to prevent the operations of the companies.”⁶

Not only did the Proclamation of 1763 affect settlers and speculators differently; it also affected relations between the two classes. The Proclamation of 1763 prevented Virginia speculators from extracting payment from farmers who settled on Indian land. Before the Privy Council banned western land grants, most Virginia farmers could acquire land only by buying or renting it from landowning gentlemen.⁷ Even the few settlers who received land grants directly from the government had to pay high fees to surveyors and bureaucrats, who were members of the gentry.

All of this changed in 1763, when the Privy Council drew the Proclamation Line. Although colonists who settled beyond the line did so illegally, speculators could not evict them. Speculators could win eviction suits only by establishing clear title to the disputed land, and they could not secure title while the Proclamation of 1763 remained in force. Thus, in the century-old struggle between Virginia farmers and gentlemen over the fruits of the farmers' labor, the Proclamation of 1763 handed an important victory to the farmers. Settlers were able to obtain Indian land without paying any money to speculators. It was partly to reverse the settlers' victory and reclaim the enormous profits of the pre-proclamation days that Virginia land brokers rebelled against Britain.

The remainder of this article is a chronological account of the interaction of Virginia speculators, homesteaders, Indians, and British statesmen during the years 1769 to 1774. The question of how Indians indirectly pushed Virginia speculators toward rebellion against Britain is so complex that this article does not attempt to answer any *other* questions about either Ohio Indians or Virginia land speculators. It says nothing, for instance, about dissension within the Virginia gentry,

⁶ John Taylor, plea, [“Case of the Loyal and Greenbrier Companies,”] May 2, 1783, in Daniel Call, ed., *Reports of Cases Argued and Adjudged in the Court of Appeals of Virginia*, Vol. IV (Richmond, 1833), 29; Isaac Samuel Harrell, *Loyalism in Virginia: Chapters in the Economic History of the Revolution* (Durham, N.C., 1926), 17–18. Although most modern historians play down the importance of the Proclamation of 1763 to the American revolutionaries, the revolutionaries who wrote their own histories considered it a crucial document. Thomas Jefferson, *Notes on the State of Virginia*, edited by William Peden (Chapel Hill, 1955), 195; and Edmund Randolph, *History of Virginia*, edited by Arthur H. Shaffer (Charlottesville, 1970), 166; and “Jno. Heavin's Bond,” July 8, 1776, Campbell-Preston Papers (Archives Branch, Virginia State Library and Archives, Richmond; hereinafter VSL).

⁷ Turk McCleskey, “Rich Land, Poor Prospects: Real Estate and the Formation of a Social Elite in Augusta County, Virginia, 1738–1770,” *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography*, XC VIII (July 1990), 449–86.

a topic that usually features prominently in works on Virginia land speculation.⁸ Nor does it describe the familiar struggle between speculators from Pennsylvania and those from Virginia. Since rival land speculators were united in their opposition to the British government's prohibition of western land grants, this article neglects their rivalry, along with every other subject that is not an essential link in the causation chain connecting Indian coalition-builders to the Virginia speculators' decision to rebel against Britain.

Land speculation was a principal source of income for the Virginia gentry, the 2-to-5 percent of families who stood atop the colony's pyramid of wealth and power.⁹ Starting in 1745, the gentry-dominated Executive Council gave to gentry-owned land companies preliminary grants to millions of acres west of the Appalachian Mountains.¹⁰ But the business of acquiring and selling this land was interrupted, first by the outbreak of the Seven Years' War in 1754 and then by the 1758 Treaty of Easton, which reserved the area west of the Appalachian Mountains for the Indians.¹¹ During this time the Virginia land firms' preliminary grants expired, so most of the companies failed to secure title to the land they claimed and thus were unable to sell it.

Speculators bitterly protested the government's land settlement ban, especially after it was codified in the royal Proclamation of 1763. In lamenting the proclamation, one Virginian, David Robinson, employed an Indian figure of speech: "I shall call upon you some Time next Week and condole with you in your late Misfortune," he wrote fellow speculator William Thompson in February 1764. "Col [William] Preston desires me to assure you that Colo Buchanan is going to London to redress his Grievances . . ." Robinson found widespread opposition to the British government's policy of trading the Indians land—their land—for peace. "Capt. Sayers has been damning

⁸ Marc Egnal, *A Mighty Empire: The Origins of the American Revolution* (Ithaca, N.Y., and London, 1988).

⁹ George Washington to John Posey, June 24, 1767, in John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., *The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources, 1745–1799* (38 vols.; Washington, D.C., 1931–1944), II, 459; Philip Alexander Bruce, *Institutional History of Virginia* (2 vols.; New York and London, 1910), II, 343; David Alan Williams, "Political Alignments in Colonial Virginia Politics, 1698–1750" (Ph. D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1959), 329; McCleskey, "Rich Land, Poor Prospects," 449–86; and Lucille Griffith, *The Virginia House of Burgesses, 1750–1774* (University, Ala., 1970), 175.

¹⁰ April 26, 1745, and July 12, 1749, in H. R. McIlwaine, Wilmer L. Hall, and Benjamin J. Hillman, eds., *Executive Journals of the Council of Colonial Virginia* (6 vols.; Richmond, 1925–1966), V, 172–73 and 296–97 (hereinafter *Executive Journals of the Council*).

¹¹ Warren M. Billings, John E. Selby, and Thad W. Tate, *Colonial Virginia: A History* (White Plains, N. Y., 1986), 252.

this Month about the Loss of the Dunkard's Bottom and is not yet reconciled," he told Thompson in February 1764, " 'Tis a great Mercy that Roanok [River] has not in like Manner been given as a Compliment [to] our good Friends and faithfull Allies, the Shanee Indians."¹²

When Virginia governor Francis Fauquier learned about the Proclamation of 1763, he wrote the Board of Trade urgently requesting that it be revoked. Fauquier warned the board that Virginia "families" (*i.e.*, speculators) might seek reimbursement from Parliament if the government continued to deprive them of Indian land. Although Fauquier alluded darkly to settlers "retaliating upon the Indians for the Injuries they do to these settlers" by bringing about the Proclamation of 1763, the Board of Trade rejected his plea.¹³

The Virginia land speculators' resentment of the Proclamation of 1763 was moderated by their assumption that the restriction was only temporary. This assumption appeared to be borne out late in 1768 when Thomas Walker returned to Virginia with good news. The fifty-three-year-old Walker headed the preeminent land speculation firm in Virginia, the Loyal Company; his great-grandson later called him "as great a land-monger as Genl. Washington."¹⁴ In October and November 1768 Walker had represented Virginia in a treaty congress at Fort Stanwix, New York, where chiefs of the Six Nations of the Iroquois sold to Great Britain a vast tract of land encompassing the western

¹² David Robinson to William Thompson, February 18, 1764, document 2QQ44, Draper Manuscripts (State Historical Society of Wisconsin, Madison, microfilm).

¹³ Fauquier warned that white retaliation could provoke American Indians "to still further Mischief, and so in some measure defeat the pacifick disposition of his Majesty and his Ministers." To Board of Trade, February 13, 1764, in George Reese, ed., *The Official Papers of Francis Fauquier, Lieutenant Governor of Virginia, 1758–1768* (3 vols.; Charlottesville, 1980–1983), III, 1076–79 (quotation on 1078); Board of Trade to Fauquier, July 13, 1764, *ibid.*, 1125. For additional evidence that the Proclamation of 1763 angered Virginians, see William Herbert to William Byrd III, March 6, 1764, in Marion Rose Goble Tinning, ed., *The Correspondence of the Three William Byrds of Westover, Virginia, 1684–1776* (2 vols.; Charlottesville, 1977), II, 768; John Mercer to Charlton Palmer, April 17, 1764, in Lois Mulkearn, ed., *George Mercer Papers Relating to the Ohio Company of Virginia* ([Pittsburgh], 1954), 184–85; November 24 and December 13, 1766, in John Pendleton Kennedy, ed., *Journals of the House of Burgesses of Virginia, 1766–1769* (Richmond, 1906), 37 and 69–70; Jonathan Boucher to Rev. James, March 9, 1767, "Letters of Rev. Jonathan Boucher," *Maryland Historical Magazine*, VII (December 1912), 344; Patricia Givens Johnson, *William Preston, and the Alleghany Patriots* (Pulaski, Va., 1976), 81 and 89; Alfred Procter James, *George Mercer of the Ohio Company: A Study in Frustration* (Pittsburgh, 1963), 59; and February 10, 1764, in Adelaide Lisetta Fries, ed., *Records of the Moravians in North Carolina* (11 vols.; Raleigh, 1922–1969), I, 285. The chorus of complaints from Virginia land speculators against the Proclamation of 1763 belies the statement in a recent survey of colonial Virginia that "no one seemed disposed to fight" the proclamation. Billings, Selby, and Tate, *Colonial Virginia*, 291.

¹⁴ Franklin Minor to Lyman Draper, March 23, 1852, doc. 13ZZa, Draper Mss.

portions of present-day Pennsylvania and Virginia and all of present-day Kentucky and West Virginia.¹⁵

Most people believed that the Fort Stanwix treaty would finally persuade the Privy Council to repeal the Proclamation of 1763; in Virginia it set off a land rush.¹⁶ Veterans of the Seven Years' War, led by George Washington, asked the Executive Council for land bounties that the government had promised them after the war.¹⁷ Thomas Walker reactivated the dormant Loyal Company. He persuaded government surveyors to mark off for the company hundreds of homesteads between November 1768 and April 1769, primarily along the fertile floodplains of the Ohio and Tennessee River systems.¹⁸ In February 1769 Thomas Jefferson, whose late father had been a Loyal Company member, asked the company for 5,000 acres.¹⁹ Jefferson also joined two new syndicates seeking land; his share in each was to be 1,000 acres. In seeking 2,000 acres by joining two different land companies, Jefferson hoped to evade the Privy Council's 1754 instruction prohibiting any person from taking more than 1,000 acres of Indian land.²⁰ Men like Jefferson rejoiced at the Fort Stanwix treaty because they believed it indicated that the Privy Council was preparing to repeal the Proclamation of 1763.

¹⁵ Congress between William Johnson, the Six Nations, and other nations, Fort Stanwix, October 24–November 6, 1768, in Edmund B. O'Callaghan, ed., *Documents Relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York* (15 vols.; Albany, 1856–1887), VIII, 111–37 (hereinafter *DRCHSNY*); Peter Marshall, "Sir William Johnson and the Treaty of Fort Stanwix, 1768," *Journal of American Studies*, I (October 1967), 149–79; Sosin, *Whitehall and the Wilderness*, 172–77; and McConnell, *Country Between*, 248–53.

¹⁶ *Executive Journals of the Council*, VI, 685; David Ross to John Cameron, December 20, 1768, enclosed in John Stuart to the earl of Hillsborough, January 20, 1770, Colonial Office 5/71, 129–31 (British Public Record Office; microfilm at Lamont Library, Harvard University; hereinafter C.O.5); Lewis Preston Summers, *History of Southwest Virginia, 1746–1786, Washington County, 1777–1870* (rpt.; Baltimore, 1966), 93; and McConnell, *Country Between*, 257.


¹⁷ Francis Jennings, *Empire of Fortune: Crowns, Colonies and Tribes in the Seven Years' War in America* (New York and London, 1988), 62–63n48; "Proclamation of 1763," in William Waller Hening, ed., *The Statutes at Large; Being a Collection of All the Laws of Virginia . . .* (13 vols.; Richmond, 1819–1823), VII, 666; and William Byrd to Virginia Executive Council, December 15, 1768, summarized December 19, 1768, *Executive Journals of the Council*, VI, 310.

¹⁸ Loyal Company and Greenbriar Company surveys in Augusta County [November 1768–April 1769], Virginia Land Office Records, VSL; [William Preston], survey for Anne Grayson, March 20, 1769, and William Preston, survey book [1768–1769], folders 589 and 581, Preston Family Papers (Virginia Historical Society, Richmond; hereinafter VHS); William Preston, receipt to Josiah Ramsay, April 13, 1769, folder 5, Wyndham Robertson Papers (Manuscripts Department, University of Chicago library; microfilm at VSL); and John Norton to Thomas Walker, July 8, 1769, container 162, Thomas Walker Papers (part of the William Cabell Rives Collection), (Manuscript Division, Library of Congress; hereinafter LC).

¹⁹ February 18, 1769, Jefferson account book, Jefferson Papers (Manuscripts Department, Alderman Library, University of Virginia; hereinafter UVA).

²⁰ It is incorrect to say, as Jefferson and many of his biographers have, that the author of the Declaration of Independence did not speculate in western land before 1776. Jefferson to James

CONFLICTING ANGLO-INDIAN BOUNDARIES OF 1768



Map drawn by Werner Sensbach

The speculators rejoiced too soon, not realizing that there was a flaw in the Fort Stanwix deed: the Iroquois had not owned the land they sold. In fact they had rarely hunted south of Pennsylvania. Knowing this, the Board of Trade had instructed its representative at the Fort Stanwix congress, William Johnson, superintendent of Indian Affairs for the Northern District, to buy only the land as far west as a straight line drawn from Chiswell's Mines (near where the New River flows north across the North Carolina–Virginia border) nearly due north to Point Pleasant (where the same river, its name changed to the Kanawha, empties into the Ohio). At Fort Stanwix, Johnson, a land speculator, defied the Board of Trade's boundary order and obtained Kentucky for Virginia. But at almost the same time, John Stuart, Johnson's counterpart in the South, complied with the board's order. On October 14, 1768, Stuart held a congress with Cherokee chiefs at Hard Labor, South Carolina, and negotiated the line that the Board of Trade had mandated.²¹ The Hard Labor boundary left Kentucky in Cherokee country; it did not endear Stuart and the Cherokees to Virginia land speculators (see map). "Both Intendant & Indians are on a wrong s[c]ent, at least one very Dif[fer]ent from what we Intend," Augusta County surveyor Thomas Lewis told his deputy and fellow land jobber, William Preston, in January 1769.²² Patrick Henry chose this time to invest in the disputed area. Henry bought 3,335 acres of land on the Holston and Clinch Rivers from his insolvent father-in-law. He recalled later that the boundary that the Cherokee chiefs had negotiated with Stuart "would have cut off the said lands on Holson [*sic*] and Clinch, and under that risque I purchased it, hoping that line would be altered."²³

Virginia land brokers did more than hope. They launched a massive lobbying campaign to persuade Whitehall to accept the Johnson-

Madison, November 11, 1784, in Julian P. Boyd, Lyman H. Butterfield, and Mina R. Bryan, eds., *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson* (25 vols. to date; Princeton, 1950–), VII, 503–4. In fact, Jefferson was one of the few Virginians who joined two of the 1769 land syndicates. William P. Palmer, ed., *Calendar of Virginia State Papers and Other Manuscripts*. Vol. I, 1652–1781 (Richmond, 1875), 262 (hereinafter *CVSP*); Thomas Nelson *et al.* and George Rogers *et al.*, petitions for land [1768–1769], folder 47, Virginia Colonial Papers, VSL. Jefferson hoped to obtain 5,000 acres from the Loyal Company, and he joined another land company in 1773. February 18, 1769, and November 29, 1773, Jefferson account book, Jefferson Papers (UVA). Jefferson was not a *successful* speculator. But the cause of his failure was not a lack of acquisitiveness; it was the Proclamation of 1763.

²¹ Sosin, *Whitehall and the Wilderness*, 171–77.

²² January 14, 1769, doc. 2QQ106, Draper Mss.

²³ Henry's fee book, quoted in William Wirt Henry, *Patrick Henry: Life, Correspondence, and Speeches* (3 vols.; New York, 1891), I, 121.

Iroquois boundary instead of the one the Cherokees had negotiated with Stuart.²⁴ On December 16, 1768, the Executive Council declared that the Stuart-Cherokee boundary “would be highly injurious to this Colony, and to the Crown of Great Britain, by giving to the Indians, an extensive tract of Land”²⁵ In December 1769 the House of Burgesses also implored the British government to let Virginia have Kentucky.²⁶ Although the language of the burgesses’ petition was polite, Loyal Company agent Thomas Walker bluntly paraphrased it as “setting forth the pernicious tendency” of the Stuart-Cherokee line.²⁷ West of this boundary, Virginia land speculators had received preliminary grants totaling six to seven million acres.²⁸ The area Virginia wanted also contained nearly fifty thousand square miles of additional land that would be available to speculators to sell in the future. Virginia would, if the Privy Council honored its petition, nearly double its land area.²⁹

In considering Virginia’s request for Kentucky, British officials were watching the Indians, not Virginia. In the 1760s the Upper Ohio Valley nations—the Mingo (who totaled about 600 people), Shawnees (approximately 1,800 people), and Delawares (about 3,500 souls)—lived in present-day Ohio and hunted below the Ohio River in Kentucky.³⁰ Kentucky was also the principal hunting ground for the

²⁴ Stuart to Johnson, April 14, 1769, and Thomas Gage to Johnson, April 3, 1769, *The Papers of Sir William Johnson* (14 vols.; Albany, 1921–1965), VI, 694 and XII, 709; and Patricia Givens Johnson, *General Andrew Lewis of Roanoke and Greenbrier* (Christiansburg, Va., 1980), 141–53.

²⁵ *Executive Journals of the Council*, VI, 309. Virginia speculators persuaded their new governor, Lord Botetourt, to lobby his government colleagues to give Kentucky to Virginia. Botetourt won one concession for the Virginia speculators: Stuart and the Cherokees agreed to draw a compromise boundary in between the Fort Stanwix and Hard Labor lines. But the line they proposed was much closer to the Hard Labor line than to the one that the Iroquois and Johnson had drawn at Fort Stanwix. It would give the Virginia speculators only a very small portion of Kentucky—a crumb. Thomas Walker and Andrew Lewis to Botetourt, December 14, 1768, Botetourt to Stuart, December 20, 1768, and Botetourt to Walker and Lewis, December 20, 1768, all enclosed in Botetourt to the earl of Hillsborough, December 24, 1768, C.O.5/1347, 63–65, 91–92, and 95–97; Thomas Lewis to William Preston, January 14, 1769, doc. 2QQ106, Draper Mss.; Gage to Hillsborough, April 1, 1769, in Clarence Edwin Carter, ed., *The Correspondence of General Thomas Gage* . . . (2 vols.; New Haven, 1931–1933), I, 222; depositions of Andrew Lewis [1777–1778], in Boyd, Butterfield, and Bryan, eds., *Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, II, 78; and John Richard Alden, *John Stuart and the Southern Colonial Frontier* . . . (Ann Arbor, 1944), 279–81.

²⁶ Botetourt to Hillsborough, December 18, 1769, and enclosed House of Burgesses petition to Botetourt, C.O.5/1348, 63 and 75. See also another enclosure: Botetourt to Stuart, December 18, 1769, C.O.5/1348, 87.

²⁷ To William Preston, January 24, 1770, doc. 2QQ116, Draper Mss.

²⁸ George Washington to Charles Washington, January 31, 1770, in Fitzpatrick, ed., *Writings of George Washington*, III, 2.

²⁹ Jefferson, *Notes on Virginia*, 4.

³⁰ Helen Hornbeck Tanner, ed., *Atlas of Great Lakes Indian History* (Norman, Okla., and London, 1987), 66; McConnell, *Country Between*; and Sturtevant, ed., *Handbook of North*

Cherokees (7,200 people).³¹ As one Cherokee put it in 1775, Indians “looked upon their Cattle or Game in [Kentucky] to be as beneficial to them as the tame Cattle were to the white People.”³² Deerskins were the cash crop of these nations. Cherokee and Upper Ohio Indians were tied more closely to the Atlantic economy than were many white farmers in the backcountry; they imported a higher percentage of their clothing and tools and exported a higher percentage of their produce.

The Cherokees and Upper Ohioans knew that the Virginia land rush set off by the November 1768 Fort Stanwix treaty was a rush for *their* land. Alexander McKee, whose mother was Shawnee, was a British agent charged with monitoring the Upper Ohio Valley Indians. McKee wrote that the “numbers of White people and Surveyors that come out” to the Ohio River in the spring of 1769 “to Settle and Survey the Country about Fort Pitt and down [the] Ohio has set all their Warriors in a rage.”³³ The land rush also angered the Cherokees, as John Stuart, the southern Indian agent, reported. Even as Virginia land speculators accused Stuart’s colleagues in the British government of rapacity, Stuart was himself saying that “the Rapacity of the Land Jobbers in Virginia is insatiable.” He warned that if Virginians occupied Kentucky, they would “divest the Cherokees of every foot of hunting Groun[d] they possess beyond the Mountains.”³⁴

No Indian nation acting alone could do the British much harm. But Pontiac’s Rebellion in 1763 had shown that a broad-based Indian coalition could inflict heavy losses and decisively influence British policy. The nations that had participated in the 1763 revolt had continued to exchange belts proposing a new attack against the British, and the Fort Stanwix treaty intensified their efforts.³⁵ In May 1769 Delaware, Shawnee, and Mingo chiefs traveled west for a meeting with the nations who lived on the Miami and Wabash Rivers—the Mi-

³¹ Peter H. Wood, “The Changing Population of the Colonial South: An Overview by Race and Region, 1685–1790,” in Peter H. Wood, Gregory A. Waselkov, and M. Thomas Hatley, eds., *Powhatan’s Mantle: Indians in the Colonial Southeast* (Lincoln, Neb., and London, 1989), 38; and M. Thomas Hatley, *The Dividing Paths: Cherokees and South Carolinians through the Era of Revolution* (New York and Oxford, 1993).

³² Statement to Richard Henderson, March 1775, paraphrased in deposition of John Lowry [1777–1778], in Boyd, Butterfield, and Bryan, eds., *Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, II, 95. See also McConnell, *Country Between*, 262.

³³ McKee’s journal, enclosed in McKee to William Johnson, September 18, 1769, in *Papers of Sir William Johnson*, VII, 185.

³⁴ To Hillsborough, February 12, 1769, and January 20, 1770, C.O.5/70, 251 (second quotation) and C.O.5/71, 103 (first quotation). See also Thomas Gage to Johnson, April 23, 1769, in *Papers of Sir William Johnson*, VI, 708–9.

³⁵ George Croghan to Johnson, May 10, 1770, in *Papers of Sir William Johnson*, VII, 652.

amis, Piankashaws, Weas, and Misquetons. There they “settled all . . . former Disputes and entred into a Strong and firm Alliance, by which they [agreed?] to Live and die by each other,” as Alexander McKee learned.³⁶ The Indian diplomats agreed to hold a grand congress at Lower Shawnee Town on the Scioto River to try to recruit other nations for their coalition. Shawnee and Delaware carpenters set to work building what McKee called “a very large Council House at Scioto to which they have invited all the Wabash Indians”—and also four Great Lakes nations, “the Hurons, Ottawas, Putiwatimies, and Chepawas.” Most ominously, McKee reported, “all the Chiefs of the Senicas”—the leaders of the largest nation in the British-allied Iroquois Confederacy—“ware to be present.” The Scioto River meeting was held in late June or early July 1769.³⁷

Although these meetings powerfully linked the Upper Ohio nations—the Shawnees, Delawares, and Mingo— with the Indians of the Wabash and Miami Rivers and the Great Lakes, by 1769 the Shawnee and Delaware coalition-builders had “inlarged thire plan,” according to Indian agent George Croghan.³⁸ Shawnee and Delaware chiefs set out on a new venture that greatly alarmed the British government and decisively influenced its land policy. They decided to try to expand the anti-British coalition to include Indian nations south of the Ohio River. The southern nations could greatly strengthen the coalition because they were quite populous. The Creeks had an estimated population of 13,000 in 1760, the Cherokees numbered about 7,200, and the Choctaws and Chickasaws had a combined population of roughly 14,900.³⁹ None of these nations had participated in Pontiac’s Rebellion in 1763. If any of them now joined the anti-British coalition—and if all the nations that had fought with Pontiac agreed to fight again—the new Indian confederacy would be the strongest Britain ever faced.

Recruiting southern Indians for the coalition would not be easy. The southern nations were deeply divided among themselves. For instance, the Creeks battled the Choctaws in a war that claimed at least six hundred lives between 1765 and 1771.⁴⁰ However, almost all southern na-

³⁶ McKee’s journal, *ibid.*, 184. See also Croghan to Johnson, August 8, 1769, *ibid.*, 78–79; and Gage to Hillsborough, September 9, 1769, in Carter, ed., *Correspondence of General Thomas Gage*, I, 235–36.

³⁷ McKee’s journal, in *Papers of Sir William Johnson*, VII, 184.

³⁸ To Johnson, May 10, 1770, *ibid.*, VII, 652.

³⁹ Wood, “Changing Population,” 38.

⁴⁰ Richard White, *The Roots of Dependency: Subsistence, Environment, and Social Change among the Choctaws, Pawnees, and Navajos* (Lincoln, Neb., and London, 1983), 76–78. John

tions shared a hatred for the Indians who lived north of the Ohio River. For their part, the Indians living on the northern tributaries of the Ohio were, British officials knew, “very averst to Makeing paice with the Southren Nations.”⁴¹ The raids and counter-raids that Indian nations directed back and forth across the Ohio River were the British colonists’ best protection against a devastating general Indian attack, and the colonists knew it.⁴²

Although the path to uniting the nations north and south of the Ohio River would be tortuous, in 1769 Delaware and Shawnee coalition-builders began to believe that they could hold to it. They had three reasons for optimism. First, the nations on both sides of the river had a shared interest in preventing Virginia from occupying Kentucky. Second, many Indians on both sides of the river had recently embraced a nativist spirituality that downplayed differences among Indian nations and emphasized the Indians’ common grievances against British America.⁴³ The Upper Ohioans’ final reason to believe that the southerners could be induced to make peace with all the nations north of the Ohio River was that the Cherokees had already made peace with one important group of north-bank nations, the Upper Ohioans themselves.

The Cherokee–Upper Ohio peace grew out of a tragic incident in which no Upper Ohioans had been involved. On May 8, 1765, six Overhill Cherokees passing through Augusta County, Virginia, (they were on the way to attack the Ohio Indians) were killed by a group of Virginians.⁴⁴ As horsemen carried news of the massacre throughout Virginia, colonists braced for a bloody Cherokee counterstrike. But instead of immediately retaliating, Cherokee leaders decided to play on the colonists’ fears in order to win concessions from them. Chiefs hoped to prevent Cherokees from being killed by white Virginians, but the killers whom the Cherokees feared most were the Shawnees,

Stuart acknowledged privately that the British were “the incendiaries who kindled” the Choctaw-Creek war. To Hillsborough, December 2, 1770, in K. G. Davies, ed., *Documents of the American Revolution, 1770–1783* (21 vols.; Shannon, Ireland, 1972–1981), II, 281. See also Johnson to Gage, November 8, 1770, and Gage to Johnson, November 19, 1770, in *Papers of Sir William Johnson*, VII, 993 and 1016; and John Richard Alden, *General Gage in America: Being Principally a History of His Role in the American Revolution* (Baton Rouge, 1948), 136–37.

⁴¹ Croghan to Johnson, May 10, 1770, in *Papers of Sir William Johnson*, VII, 652.

⁴² John Wilkins to Gage, January 2, 1769, in Clarence Edwin Carter and Clarence Walworth Alvord, eds., *Trade and Politics, 1767–1769* (Springfield, Ill., 1921), 483; and Johnson to Gage, September 12, 1769, in *Papers of Sir William Johnson*, VII, 163.

⁴³ Dowd, *Spirited Resistance*, 42–45.

⁴⁴ Andrew Lewis to Francis Fauquier, May 9, 1765, and Fauquier to Board of Trade, June 14, 1765, in Reese, ed., *Official Papers of Francis Fauquier*, III, 1234–36 and 1257.

Delawares, Mingoes (the Upper Ohio nations), and the Iroquois; both the Upper Ohioans and the Iroquois raided the Cherokee towns almost every year, killing some residents and capturing others.⁴⁵ Cherokee diplomats intimated to their Virginia counterparts that if they would arrange peace talks with the Cherokees' northern enemies, the Cherokees would not avenge the 1765 massacre.⁴⁶ The chiefs also demanded that Virginia compensate the massacre victims' families with gifts. Francis Fauquier, the governor of Virginia, agreed to both demands, and by the end of 1768 British officials had successfully helped the Cherokees make peace with both the Iroquois and the Upper Ohioans.⁴⁷

The Cherokee–Upper Ohio peace was the lead strand around which Shawnee and Delaware diplomats hoped to intertwine a whole set of bonds linking all of the nations north of the Ohio River to all of the southern nations.⁴⁸ After these nations had made peace with one another, they would unite in a massive attack against the British settlements. The new alliance was to be proclaimed at a grand congress to be held in the Lower Shawnee Town on the Scioto River; thus it may be thought of as the Scioto Coalition.

Although all three Upper Ohio nations worked to recruit southern nations for the Scioto Coalition, the Shawnees apparently took the lead.⁴⁹ They had the necessary connections: one band of Shawnees had lived among the Creeks through the late 1750s.⁵⁰ Sometime in 1769 a group of Shawnee ambassadors crossed the Ohio River and entered Cherokee country, where they were welcomed in several towns.⁵¹ In the winter of 1769–1770 several Cherokees even accom-

⁴⁵ Johnson to Board of Trade, November 16, 1765, *DRCHSNY*, VII, 777–78; Theda Perdue, "Cherokee Relations with the Iroquois in the Eighteenth Century," in Daniel K. Richter and James H. Merrell, eds., *Beyond the Covenant Chain: The Iroquois and Their Neighbors in Indian North America, 1600–1800* (Syracuse, N.Y., 1987), 137; and Richter, *The Ordeal of the Longhouse: The Peoples of the Iroquois League in the Era of European Colonization* (Chapel Hill and London, 1992), 237–38.

⁴⁶ Fauquier to Board of Trade, August 1, 1765, in Reese, ed., *Official Papers of Francis Fauquier*, III, 1265–66.

⁴⁷ Alden, *John Stuart*, 222–24.

⁴⁸ Gage to Johnson, August 20, 1769, and Croghan to Johnson, September 18, 1769, and May 10, 1770, in *Papers of Sir William Johnson*, VII, 108, 182, and 652; and Johnson to Hillsborough, August 26, 1769, in *DRCHSNY*, VIII, 186.

⁴⁹ John Stuart, congress with Cherokee chiefs, April 10, 1770, enclosed in Stuart to Hillsborough, May 2, 1770, C.O.5/71, 219.

⁵⁰ McConnell, *Country Between*, 209 and 238.

⁵¹ Croghan to Johnson, September 18, 1769, Johnson to Gage, January 5, 1770, Gage to Johnson, April 1, 1771, and May 20, 1770, in *Papers of Sir William Johnson*, VII, 182 and 328, VIII, 58 and XII, 822; and Marjorie G. Reid, "The Quebec Fur-Traders and Western Policy, 1763–1774," *Canadian Historical Review*, VI (March 1925), 29. The coalition builders may have also visited other southern towns. Alexander McKee to George Croghan, February 20, 1770, in *Papers of Sir William Johnson*, VII, 404.

panied the Shawnee diplomats when they went to invite the Creeks, the Cherokees' southern neighbors and frequent enemies, to attend the 1770 Scioto congress.⁵² It seemed possible that the Cherokees might use the congress to make peace with both the western Indians (the Great Lakes, Wabash, and Miami River nations) and the Creeks.

Even as Shawnee diplomats succeeded thus far with the Cherokees, other Shawnee and Delaware diplomats achieved still greater success working the northern side of the Ohio River diplomatic divide. Indian agent George Croghan learned that at a meeting held at a Huron village near Detroit in September 1769, "the Hurons, Chepawas, Ottawas, & Putiwatimies"—the Great Lakes nations that had so recently professed undying enmity for the southern nations—"agreed to Confirm a Peace with the Cherokees." By 1770 most of the Great Lakes and Wabash and Miami River nations had extended the olive branch to all of the nations south of the Ohio.⁵³

The rebel Indians who spent much of 1769 and 1770 putting together the anti-British coalition worked at the same time to gather the sinews of war. One weapon they amassed was people; representatives from the Ohio towns traveled to Pennsylvania, where they persuaded Shawnee, Delaware, and even some Iroquois towns to move out to the Ohio.⁵⁴ The rebels also bought up and stockpiled gunpowder and shot. Croghan learned that Shawnees who traded at Fort Pitt in the fall of 1769 were even "offering thier Horses for Amunition which is very uncommon."⁵⁵

The Ohioans' primary goal in seeking to assemble an anti-British coalition was to prepare for a massive attack aimed at "driving the Virginians over the Mountains."⁵⁶ But the coalition-builders also had another objective—in order to win concessions they would play on British officials' fear of having to fight a costly Indian war. Indian diplomats made it clear to their British counterparts that the only way

⁵² Gage to Johnson, November 19, 1770, in *Papers of Sir William Johnson*, VII, 1016; and Stuart to Botetourt, January 13, 1770, in Davies, ed., *Documents of the American Revolution*, II, 28. For years the Cherokees had "kept on a secret Correspondence with the disaffected Creeks . . ." Stuart to Fauquier, November 24, 1766, in Reese, ed., *Official Papers of Francis Fauquier*, III, 1398.

⁵³ To Johnson, December 22, 1769, in *Papers of Sir William Johnson*, VII, 316.

⁵⁴ Croghan to Johnson, August 8 and December 22, 1769, in *Papers of Sir William Johnson*, VII, 78 and 316.

⁵⁵ To Johnson, December 22, 1769, *ibid.*, 315. See also McKee to Croghan, February 20, 1770, *ibid.*, 405; and Gustarax, quoted by Tyorhansera, Iroquois congress with William Johnson, July 16, 1771, *DRCHSNY*, VIII, 283.

⁵⁶ Croghan to Gage, August 8, 1770, Gage Papers (Clements Library, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor), microfilmed on reel 30 of Francis Jennings, ed., *Iroquois Indians: A Documentary History of the Diplomacy of the Six Nations and Their League* (Woodbridge, Conn.,

to prevent the Scioto Coalition from attacking the colonies was to prevent Virginia from occupying Kentucky. When the Shawnee chief Red Hawk sent a message to George Croghan about an upcoming meeting to discuss settlers' encroachments on Indian land, Red Hawk pointedly told the go-between to let Croghan "know there will be Chiefs from the Southern Indians as well as from all the Western Nations to speak to him at that time."⁵⁷ In 1769 Seneca leaders told northern Indian agent William Johnson that the Ohio nations' proposal to attack the British "might probably be agreed to by too many of the warriors if those affairs which gave them so much uneasiness were not adjusted."⁵⁸

William Johnson, who had a financial stake in the Fort Stanwix land deal, tried to keep his superiors in London from learning that the cause of the Senecas and other nations' "uneasiness" was the colonists' encroachment on their land. But the Indians' message reached London through other channels. In January 1770 John Stuart told the governor of Virginia of his concern that the Fort Stanwix land deal "would be productive of a general Rupture with, and Coalition of all the Tribes on the Continent."⁵⁹ By July 1772 Wills Hill, second viscount Hillsborough, the secretary of state for the colonies, worried that Britain would soon be drawn into a "general Indian War, the expense whereof will fall on this Kingdom."⁶⁰

The king's American expenses had already caused him trouble. So the British government's fear of having to fight a costly war against a powerful coalition uniting southern and western nations decisively influenced its land policy. On June 12, 1770, the very day that Hillsborough received a copy of Stuart's January 1770 letter linking the Cherokee chiefs' complaints about Virginia's designs on Kentucky to their interest in the Scioto Coalition, Hillsborough wrote Stuart assuring him that he caught the connection. The colonial secretary conveyed to his Cherokee counterparts his pleasure that they had tried to discourage their warriors from welcoming the representatives of the Scioto Coalition. In an implicit quid pro quo, Hillsborough at the same time promised Cherokee chiefs that British agents would soon meet them to run a Cherokee-Virginia boundary that left Kentucky in Cherokee country. And Hillsborough made it plain that although this

⁵⁷ N.d., file 31, box 6, Cadwalader Papers (Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia; hereinafter HSP). See also Shawnee speaker in the August 1, 1770, entry in Croghan's journal, in the Gage Papers (reel 30 of Jennings, ed., *Iroquois Indians*).

⁵⁸ Johnson to Hillsborough, August 26, 1769, *DRCHSNY*, VIII, 184.

⁵⁹ To Botetourt, January 13, 1770, enclosed in Botetourt to Hillsborough, February 22, 1770, C.O.5/1348, 145.

⁶⁰ To Johnson, July 1, 1772, *DRCHSNY*, VIII, 302.

boundary would anger the Virginians, the British government was determined to enforce it.⁶¹

Even before Hillsborough made his promise to the Cherokees, British statesmen fearful of provoking an Indian war had begun to block implementation of the Fort Stanwix land deal. On April 25, 1769, the governor of Virginia, Norborne Berkeley, baron de Botetourt, had voided all the surveys done in late 1768 and early 1769 for the Loyal Company and other firms. The governor had also ordered that trans-Appalachian surveying cease. And his Executive Council had rejected the land grant requests that were filed in late 1768 and early 1769 by Washington, Jefferson, Henry, and hundreds of other Virginia gentlemen.⁶²

British officials intensified their campaign against the Stanwix deed as they learned more and more about the Scioto Coalition. The Privy Council denied the House of Burgesses' 1769 petition for Kentucky, and it refused to revoke the Proclamation of 1763.⁶³ Hillsborough pressured William Johnson to tell the Iroquois that Britain would not occupy any of the Fort Stanwix cession south of the mouth of the Great Kanawha—essentially the part claimed by Virginia. Johnson announced the settlement ban at his summer 1770 congress with the Iroquois, a congress attended by both Shawnee and Cherokee diplomats.⁶⁴ In 1770 William Nelson, the acting governor of Virginia following Lord Botetourt's death, feebly protested the government's refusal to let Virginia have Kentucky, but Hillsborough extracted from Nelson a promise to comply with the Proclamation of 1763. Nelson, ever hopeful, wrote Hillsborough in October 1770 to assure him that the Executive Council would grant no trans-Appalachian land until "set at liberty to do it"⁶⁵ Thomas Gage, commander of British

⁶¹ To Stuart, June 12, 1770, C.O.5/71, 253.

⁶² *Executive Journals of the Council*, VI, 314–15. The council also began at this time to refuse to issue trans-Appalachian patents to people suing original patentees to obtain grants that they had forfeited by not fulfilling the conditions. The council had stopped making new patents in 1759 (in compliance with the October 1758 Treaty of Easton) but had repatented six forfeited tracts between 1762 and 1769. Patent Books XXXIV, 335 and XXXVIII, 623, Virginia Land Office Records (VSL). With the exception of bounty grants to Seven Years' War veterans, Virginia issued only four more trans-Appalachian patents before independence. Patent Book XLI, 325 and 438–40.

⁶³ Preventing a costly war against the Indians was not the Privy Council's only reason for maintaining the Proclamation Line. British imperialists also hoped the line would confine American colonists within Britain's economic and political orbit. Charles R. Ritcheson, *British Politics and the American Revolution* (Norman, Okla., 1954), 63–64.

⁶⁴ Hillsborough to Johnson, January 4, 1769, and Johnson, congress with Iroquois, Cherokees, and other nations, German Flats, July 21, 1770, *DRCHSNY*, VIII, 145 and 236.

⁶⁵ October 18, 1770, in John C. Van Horne, ed., *The Correspondence of William Nelson as Acting Governor of Virginia, 1770–1771* (Charlottesville, 1975), 42. See also Thomas Walker to William Preston, May 27, 1771, doc. 2QQ125, Draper Mss.

forces in America, emphasized to Johnson that “the Fear of a Rupture with” the Indians had “no doubt occasioned Virginia to be bounded by” the Kanawha–New River.⁶⁶

The result of the Privy Council’s crackdown on land speculation—and of the Indian coalition-building that had brought it about—was that the Virginia land rush set off by the Fort Stanwix treaty ended in frustration. Virginia speculators were left holding rejected land petitions and worthless surveys.⁶⁷ Virginia land brokers had been denied ten million acres, and this covered only the land grant requests that had actually been filed.⁶⁸ What Virginia speculators had really lost (temporarily, they still hoped) was the opportunity to sell all of Kentucky and the adjoining areas—nearly as much land as they had sold in the entire history of Virginia.⁶⁹

Virginia gentlemen opposed the Proclamation of 1763 and Whitehall’s antisettlement promise to the Indians because these provisions protected settlers from speculators. Although the two restrictions were aimed at both groups, the government was much more successful in denying legal title to speculators than in keeping farm families from moving west. Hundreds of families settled inside the vast tracts claimed by land firms like the Loyal Company. But the typical settler “would not think of paying, until the company could perfect his title; and this they never could do” until after independence, as a Virginia judge explained a generation later.⁷⁰ Squatters vexed Patrick Henry

⁶⁶ September 10, 1769, in *Papers of Sir William Johnson*, VII, 160.

⁶⁷ Unpatented Loyal Company surveys in Augusta County [November 1768–April 1769] and unpatented Greenbriar Company surveys in Augusta County [April–May 1769], Virginia Land Office Records; Thomas Lewis to William Preston, March 15, 1774, doc. 3QQ13, Draper Mss.; and “Copy of Grants of Lands made from April 1745,” file 80, box 40, Etting Collection, Ohio Company Papers (HSP).

⁶⁸ Loyal Company contract, n.d., box 1, Page-Walker Mss. (UVA); Fincastle County surveys, abstracted in Lewis Preston Summers, ed., *Annals of Southwest Virginia, 1769–1800* (Abingdon, Va., 1929), 652–65; George Croghan *et al.* to Alexander Ross, March 6, 1774, Letters Received, Virginia Land Office Records; and Edmund Pendleton to Joseph Chew, January 20, 1774, in David John Mays, ed., *The Letters and Papers of Edmund Pendleton, 1734–1803* (2 vols.; Charlottesville, 1967), I, 92.

⁶⁹ Jefferson, *Notes on Virginia*, 4. One group of speculators did get patents. This was the small group of Seven Years’ War veterans who were able to claim land under Governor Robert Dinwiddie’s 1754 bounty offer. But the Dinwiddie claimants’ good fortune was not shared by the much larger group of veterans claiming land under the Privy Council’s postwar bounty offer, whose claim the Executive Council refused even to consider. These veterans, and every other Virginia land speculator except the Dinwiddie claimants and four other minor exceptions, got nothing.

⁷⁰ J. Carr, decision, *David French v. Successors of the Loyal Company*, 1834, in Benjamin Watkins Leigh, ed., *Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the Court of Appeals, and in the General Court of Virginia* (2d ed.; 12 vols., Richmond, 1854–1875), V, 691. See also Francis Smith, reply brief, *Successors of the Loyal Company v. [Francis Smith et al.?*], May 21, 1823, Superior Court of Chancery, Augusta County, Virginia, folder 14, Wyndham Robertson Papers; and Committee of Propositions and Grievances, report, November 11, 1778, *JHD...1778*, p. 54.

and George Washington.⁷¹ Squatters, Washington explained to the governor of Virginia in 1772, took advantage of the Privy Council's ban on legal western expansion to establish homesteads on the forbidden land. When and if the Proclamation of 1763 was repealed, the squatters planned to bypass the gentry middlemen and "solicit legal Titles" directly from the British government—"on the ground of pre-occupancy"⁷²

Although the Proclamation of 1763 was anathema to every Virginia land speculator, actual settlers were ambivalent about it. On the one hand, the proclamation relieved them of the burden of supporting speculators and landlords and left them, as one put it, "as free as any buck a-goin'."⁷³ On the other hand, it prevented settlers from securing clear title to the land they claimed. Farmers settled west of the Appalachians worried that they would improve a homestead—clear and fence fields, erect buildings, and so forth—only to be evicted by someone who secured title to the tract after the expected repeal of the Proclamation of 1763. Many of these farmers engaged in small-scale land speculation, which suffered the same fate as the grander ventures of the gentry.

Well into the 1770s Shawnee and Delaware chiefs continued to try to piece together the Scioto Coalition. The grand congress that had

⁷¹ "Pennsylvanians in Disputed Territory, 1770s," submitted by William O. Bennett, *North Carolina Genealogical Society Journal*, XVII (May 1991), 95–96. I am grateful to Marjoleine Kars for this reference. See also May 27, 1774, *Executive Journals of the Council*, VI, 562; and *Patrick Henry v. Jacob and Michael Katering*, May 5, 1774, order book, Fincastle County court, in Summers, ed., *Annals of Southwest Virginia*, 628. At least one of the people involved in the land dispute against Patrick Henry, Jacob Katering, later joined in a 1779 rebellion against the Virginia state government. Folder marked "Tories," loose papers, Fincastle County court records (VSL).

⁷² Washington to John Murray, Lord Dunmore, June 15, 1772, in Fitzpatrick, ed., *Writings of George Washington*, III, 86. See also William Crawford to George Washington, August 2, 1771, March 15 and May 1, 1772, and December 29, 1773, in Stanislaus Murray Hamilton, ed., *Letters to Washington and Accompanying Papers* (5 vols.; Boston, 1898–1902), IV, 77, 118–19, 121, and 293–96; May 5, 1772, *Executive Journals of the Council*, VI, 458; Dunmore to the earl of Dartmouth, April 2, 1774, C.O.5/1352, 99; Mississippi Company to Thomas Cumming, March 1, 1767, in Clarence E. Carter, ed., "Documents Relating to the Mississippi Land Company, 1763–1769," *American Historical Review*, XVI (January 1911), 316; "A Copy from the Register of the proceedings of the Loyal Company now in the possession of Edm Pendleton, January 7th, 1815," container 165, Walker Papers; Thomas Walker to William Preston, May 27, 1771, doc. 2QQ125–26, Draper Mss.; Walker to Preston, March 23, 1770, in Archibald Henderson, ed., *Dr. Thomas Walker and the Loyal Company of Virginia* (Worcester, Mass., 1931), 77; Walker to Reese Bowen *et al.*, March 28, 1774, William Fleming Papers (Cyrus Hall McCormack Library, Washington and Lee University, Lexington, Va.; photostat at VSL); Samuel Pepper, William Preston, and William Thompson, "Articles of Agreement . . .," January 3, 1775, folder 860, Preston Family Papers; and Preston to Robert Doack, October 1, 1771, and William Campbell to Margaret Campbell, May 1, 1772, vol. 1, Campbell-Preston Papers (LC).

⁷³ Adam O'Brien, quoted in Reeder, "Evolution of the Virginia Land Grant System," 128.

met in Lower Shawnee Town in the summers of 1769 and 1770 continued to meet during the next few summers. But the pan-Indian attack against the British settlements kept being delayed.⁷⁴ Apparently no southern nation ever sent a large number of its chiefs to the annual Scioto congress; the warfare between the southern Indians and the nations of the Wabash and Miami Rivers continued.⁷⁵ Still, the Indians' organizing efforts were closely monitored by worried British officials. In fact, even as the Scioto Coalition became more and more a phantom, British officials became more and more frightened of it.⁷⁶ The Privy Council resolutely refused to revoke the Proclamation of 1763.

Despite the Privy Council's antiexpansionist policy, optimistic Virginia land dealers held out hope that it would revoke the Proclamation of 1763 soon. There were straws enough to grasp at. John Murray, the fourth earl of Dunmore, became governor late in 1771 and issued patents to a few veterans of the Seven Years' War.⁷⁷ Though only a small percentage of the veterans received patents, and *no* non-veterans received them, Dunmore's actions encouraged other speculators.⁷⁸ Patrick Henry bought up veterans' bounty rights.⁷⁹ Thomas Jefferson joined in a land scheme that promised him at least ten thousand acres.⁸⁰

Henry's and Jefferson's optimism was not shared by George Washington, who had received several bounty patents and hoped to receive many more. "I am not without my fears that we may yet meet with some rubs before this matter is finished," Washington wrote on February 28, 1774. Washington was in a panic because Lord Hillsborough, who had resigned as colonial secretary in 1772 but retained influence in British politics, had declared that American veterans had no right to bounty land. Hillsborough's declaration fueled Washington's patriotism. "I consider it in no other light than as one among many proofs of that nobleman's malignant disposition to Americans," wrote Washington. All officers should share equally in the king's bounty; "I can see no cause why Americans . . . should be stigmatized."⁸¹ Wash-

⁷⁴ Dowd, *Spirited Resistance*, 44–45; White, *Middle Ground*, 354–56; and McConnell, *Country Between*, 266–68.

⁷⁵ "Speech of Six Shawanese at Pittsburgh," June 28, 1773, Chalmers Collection (Rare Books and Manuscripts, New York Public Library; reel 31 of Jennings, ed., *Iroquois Indians*).

⁷⁶ Hillsborough to Johnson, July 1, 1772, *DRCHSNY*, VIII, 302.

⁷⁷ Patent Book XLII, 505–27, Virginia Land Office Records.

⁷⁸ March 11, 1773, *Executive Journals of the Council*, VI, 521.

⁷⁹ [Patrick Henry] to [William Fleming?], November 22, 1773, Fleming Papers.

⁸⁰ November 29, 1773, Jefferson account book, Jefferson Papers (UVA).

⁸¹ To William Preston, February 28, 1774 (typescript), folder 791, Preston Family Papers. See also Peter Hog to Washington, December 11, 1773, and John Armstrong to Washington, December 24, 1773, in Hamilton, ed., *Letters to Washington*, IV, 280–81 and 290–92.

ington was right to worry. The new colonial secretary, William Legge, second earl of Dartmouth, announced on April 6, 1774, in a letter to Governor Dunmore that Virginia veterans were not entitled to claim bounty land, even east of the Proclamation Line.⁸² Only ten of the veterans who tried to redeem the Privy Council's promise of bounty land got patents before Dunmore implemented Dartmouth's order.⁸³

Although the April 1774 order affected only veterans, the Privy Council had voted earlier to abolish *all* free land grants. On February 3, 1774, the council decided that henceforth American land would be sold at auction to the highest bidder.⁸⁴ Would the Privy Council's abolition of land grants actually be enforced in Virginia? George Mason meant to find out. Mason had bought up "headrights" worth fifty thousand acres of land.⁸⁵ On May 27, 1774, Mason, probably with help from Thomas Jefferson, attempted to petition the Executive Council of Virginia to grant him fifty thousand acres west of the Appalachian Mountains.⁸⁶ Mason claimed that he had a "strict Right" to the land; the government could not in justice deny it to him. But on June 17 the Executive Council turned down Mason's request, pointing out that the Proclamation of 1763 was still in force.⁸⁷ So even Virginians willing to bid on land at the auctions established by the Privy Council in February 1774 could not get land west of the mountains—the only good land still unclaimed. Across the Atlantic at this same time, Parliament passed the Quebec Act. In an attempt to restrict colonial settlement of the western branches of the Ohio River, Parliament gave all the land west of the Ohio to Quebec.⁸⁸ Thus the Ohio, the river that the gentry had viewed as a path to wealth, became a barrier instead.

⁸² April 6, 1774, C.O.5/1352, pp. 1–2.

⁸³ Patent Book XLII, 505–27, Virginia Land Office Records.

⁸⁴ Hoping to choke off British emigration and colonial expansion—and to take a bigger share of the profits arising from land sales—the ministry not only established real estate auctions but also set a minimum price for Indian land of sixpence per acre, five times the nominal fee that grantees had paid. Land granted in the future would also pay double the existing quitrents. Dartmouth to nine American governors, February 5, 1774, in Davies, ed., *Documents of the American Revolution*, VIII, 42–45; "Mr. [William] Knox on the proposed mode of granting lands in America . . ." [1773?], Dartmouth Manuscripts (Staffordshire Record Office, Stafford, Eng.); and Bernard Bailyn, with the assistance of Barbara DeWolfe, *Voyagers to the West: A Passage in the Peopling of America on the Eve of the Revolution* (New York, 1986), 49–66.

⁸⁵ The government of Virginia gave fifty acres for every person imported into Virginia to the people who imported them. Billings, Selby, and Tate, *Colonial Virginia*, 41.

⁸⁶ There is a copy of Mason's petition, corrected by Jefferson, in the Jefferson Papers at the Library of Congress. This version of the petition with an assigned date of June 1774 is printed in Boyd, Butterfield, and Bryan, eds., *Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, I, 112–16.

⁸⁷ *Executive Journals of the Council*, VI, 562 (quoted phrase) and 578; and ["Inventory of Mason's Headrights Certificates,"] in Robert A. Rutland, ed., *The Papers of George Mason, 1725–1792* (3 vols. paged consecutively, Chapel Hill, 1970), II, 533.

⁸⁸ Dartmouth to Hillsborough, May 1, 1774, quoted in B. D. Bargar, *Lord Dartmouth and the*

In the fall of 1774 Virginia land dealers made one last effort to obtain the Ohio Valley. The speculators knew that the reason the Privy Council denied them title to the land west of the Appalachians was that the Cherokee and Upper Ohio nations would not give it up. In 1773 and 1774 the Shawnees had (nonviolently) stopped Virginians from surveying their hunting land.⁸⁹ Virginia land dealers believed that a devastating attack against the Shawnee and Mingo towns would force the Upper Ohio nations to sign over Kentucky. Such a cession would not only allow surveyors to mark off Kentucky homesteads without interference but also persuade the Privy Council that the Proclamation of 1763 was no longer needed.⁹⁰

But first the speculators needed a pretext for attacking the Indians. The official explanation for the Virginians' October 1774 invasion of the Ohio country, which was called "Dunmore's War," was that a half-French Mingo named John Logan had raided Virginia settlements. Logan launched his attacks upon learning that a group of Virginians had killed several members of his family in April 1774. However, Logan's raid was only a "pretence" for Virginia's assault, as land dealer Edmund Pendleton acknowledged; Logan's relatives and other Ohio Indians were killed in the spring of 1774 in what may have been a deliberate effort by leading Virginians to provoke a revenge raid that would justify an invasion of the Ohio country.⁹¹ Few if any of the Indians killed by whites in the spring of 1774 were murdered until after April 21, which was the day on which John Connolly, Dunmore's representative at Pittsburgh, issued a circular letter that essentially declared war on the Indians.⁹² Logan's raid was actually quite limited. It was nevertheless well publicized—and exaggerated—by Virginia leaders, who used it to justify a massive invasion of the Ohio country.

American Revolution (Columbia, S.C., 1965), 124. William Knox, Dartmouth's secretary, said that Parliament annexed the region between the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers to Quebec "with the avowed purpose of excluding all further settlement therein." *The Justice and Policy of the Late Act of Parliament for Making More Effectual Provision for the Government of the Province of Quebec* (London, 1774), 43. See also Justin Winsor, "Virginia and the Quebec Bill," *American Historical Review*, I (April 1896), 439–40.

⁸⁹ "Speech of Six Shawanese at Pittsburgh," June 28, 1773 (reel 31 of Jennings, ed., *Iroquois Indians*).

⁹⁰ Francis Jennings, "The Indians' Revolution," in Alfred F. Young, ed., *The American Revolution: Explorations in the History of American Radicalism* (Dekalb, Ill., 1976), 338.

⁹¹ To Joseph Chew, June 20, 1774, in Mays, ed., *Letters and Papers of Edmund Pendleton*, I, 94.

⁹² Downes, *Council Fires*, 160–61; Reuben Gold Thwaites and Louise Phelps Kellogg, eds., *Documentary History of Dunmore's War* (Madison, Wisc., 1905), xiii–xiv and 12n; White, *Middle Ground*, 357; and McConnell, *Country Between*, 275.

“The Oppertunty we hav So long wished for, is now before us,” said William Preston. (Preston was militia lieutenant and land surveyor for Fincastle County, every acre of which was west of the Proclamation Line.)⁹³

In October 1774 an army of two thousand Virginians attacked the Shawnee and Mingo towns (whose warriors numbered fewer than five hundred). The invasion accomplished its immediate goal. In late October Shawnee chiefs came to Dunmore’s field headquarters, Camp Charlotte, and deeded all the land east of the Ohio River—including all of Kentucky—to Virginia. A detachment of Virginians attacked the Mingo towns, killing several people and forcing chiefs to add their names to the deed.⁹⁴

The Virginians had forced Shawnee and Mingo leaders to sign the Camp Charlotte deed not only in order to stop those nations from interfering with the colony’s surveyors but also to persuade the Privy Council to revoke the Proclamation of 1763.⁹⁵ But the council knew that, in Shawnee and Mingo—as well as British—law, deeds signed under duress, as the deed to Kentucky surely was, were void.⁹⁶ For this reason the British government refused to revoke the Proclamation of 1763. By late 1774, when copies of the Camp Charlotte deed reached London, Parliament and the Privy Council also had other reasons, unrelated to Indian affairs, for trying to limit Virginia’s westward expansion. Virginia was in open revolt against Britain, and British officials—even Governor Dunmore—were in no mood to accommodate the rebels.⁹⁷

⁹³ Preston, circular letter, July 20, 1774, in Thwaites and Kellogg, eds., *Dunmore’s War*, 92–93. See also “Virginius,” *Williamsburg Virginia Gazette* (Rind), March 24, 1774; and McConnell, *Country Between*, 275–76. Some historians continue to discuss the 1774 Indian raids without reporting the massacre of John Logan’s relatives that prompted them. Billings, Selby, and Tate, *Colonial Virginia*, 337.

⁹⁴ William Christian to William Preston, November 8, 1774, in Thwaites and Kellogg, eds., *Dunmore’s War*, 301–4. The refusal of other nations to defend the Mingoes and Shawnees has been interpreted by Gregory Dowd as evidence that the effort to build a pan-Indian confederacy had irretrievably failed. *Spirited Resistance*, 45–46. This was not the case. It was customary (and, those with hindsight must acknowledge, wise) for Indian nations that were attacked by large European armies not to confront them head-on but to stay out of their way. Thus the refusal of other nations to come to the defense of the Shawnees and Mingoes indicates nothing about the relationship among the Indian nations.

⁹⁵ None of the land dealers openly stated that persuading the Privy Council to repeal the Proclamation of 1763 was a key reason they had obtained the Camp Charlotte deed. But the speculators surely knew that the deed would be worthless to them unless it persuaded the Privy Council to allow them to take title to Kentucky land.

⁹⁶ Jennings, “Indians’ Revolution,” 343.

⁹⁷ For the details of Dunmore’s War, see Downes, *Council Fires*, Chap. 7; Jack M. Sosin, “The British Indian Department and Dunmore’s War,” *Virginia Magazine of History and Biography*, LXXIV (January 1966), 34–50; Turk McCleskey, “Dunmore’s War,” in Richard L. Blan-

Until 1774 Virginia land speculators had held out hope that the Proclamation of 1763 was, as George Washington had called it in 1767, “a temporary expedient” that would be repealed soon.⁹⁸ That hope disappeared in 1774, when speculators learned in quick succession about the Privy Council’s February abolition of land grants, Dartmouth’s April ban on grants to American veterans, the Executive Council’s June decision to continue enforcement of the Proclamation of 1763, and Parliament’s June passage of the Quebec Act. Virginians were finally certain that the Proclamation of 1763 would never be repealed, and Virginia gentlemen bitterly protested the abolition of land speculation. Veterans of the Seven Years’ War castigated “the present faithless and venal Ministry” for denying them the bounty to which they felt entitled.⁹⁹ Edmund Pendleton, a Loyal Company member, denounced the new system of government land auctions. Pendleton, who had been denied the chance to offer thousands of acres of Indian land for sale, declared in June 1774 that gentlemen “were very angry with the Ministry for degrading Royaltie into the Pedlar hawking lands for sale.” Pendleton, an attorney, said the ministry had probably violated the British constitution by trying to “alter the terms” on which Virginians acquired Indian land. The Privy Council’s land grant ban was also protested by another lawyer, Thomas Jefferson, who declared that King George III “has no right to grant lands of himself.”¹⁰⁰ Gentlemen protested the Quebec Act as well; Richard Henry Lee told the First Continental Congress that it was “the worst grievance” committed by Britain against the citizens of America.¹⁰¹

co, ed., *The American Revolution, 1775–1783: An Encyclopedia* (2 vols. paged consecutively; New York, 1993), 492–97; and McConnell, *Country Between*, 268–79.

⁹⁸ To William Crawford, September 21, 1767, in Fitzpatrick, ed., *Writings of George Washington*, II, 469.

⁹⁹ William Peachey to William Preston, January 24, 1775, folder 863, Preston Family Papers.

¹⁰⁰ Edmund Pendleton to Joseph Chew, June 20, 1774, in Mays, ed., *Letters and Papers of Edmund Pendleton*, I, 92 (first and second quotations); Jefferson, “A Summary View of the Rights of British America,” in Boyd, Butterfield, and Bryan, eds., *Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, I, 133 (third quotation); Dunmore to Dartmouth, June 9, 1774, in Davies, ed., *Documents of the American Revolution*, VIII, 130–31; Thomas Lewis to William Preston, June 8, 1774, doc. 3QQ38, Draper Mss.; Clarence Walworth Alvord, *The Mississippi Valley in British Politics: A Study of the Trade, Land Speculation, and Experiments in Imperialism Culminating in the American Revolution* (2 vols.; Cleveland, 1917), II, 215–16; Johnson, *William Preston*, 114; and Isaac Samuel Harrell, “Some Neglected Phases of the Revolution in Virginia,” *William and Mary Quarterly*, 2d Ser., V (July 1925), 160. On paper the Privy Council had only switched from giving away land to selling it, but many speculators chose to interpret the council’s order as an absolute barrier to acquiring Indian land.

¹⁰¹ Lee and Patrick Henry, speeches in Continental Congress, October 17 and 14, 1774,

Lee exaggerated. It is clear that the British government's decision to abolish Virginia land speculation was not the Virginia patriots' paramount grievance. After all, some speculators did not become patriots, and some patriots had never speculated. But the abolition of land grants was surely a major grievance for Virginia's leading revolutionaries because it hurt almost all of them. George Mason, who would write the constitution for the new Commonwealth of Virginia, had watched the Proclamation of 1763 destroy first his beloved Ohio Company and then his hopes of obtaining 50,000 acres of Kentucky land using headrights.¹⁰² Richard Henry Lee, who would introduce the motion for independence at the Continental Congress, had seen his Mississippi Land Company's hope of obtaining 2,500,000 acres of Indian land disappear behind a double barrier—the Proclamation of 1763 and the Quebec Act of 1774.¹⁰³ Another Mississippi Company member, George Washington, had bought up thousands of acres in veterans' claims to bounty land, only to have Lord Dartmouth deny those claims.¹⁰⁴ Thomas Jefferson participated in three land ventures that would have yielded him a total of 17,000 acres of Indian land, were it not for the Privy Council's land restrictions.¹⁰⁵ Patrick Henry

James Duane's notes, quoted in Bernhard Knollenberg, *Growth of the American Revolution, 1766–1775* (New York and London, 1975), 124 and 383n. See also William Lee to Richard Henry Lee, September 10, 1774, in Worthington Chauncey Ford, ed., *Letters of William Lee, 1766–1783* (3 vols.; Brooklyn, N.Y., 1891; rpt., New York, 1968), I, 89; Samuel W. Jones, "Memoir of the Hon. James Duane," quoted in Jennings, "Indians' Revolution," 340; George Mason to Richard Henry Lee, April 12, 1779, in Rutland, ed., *Papers of George Mason*, II, 499; Thomas Hill to Thomas Adams, August 20, 1774, box 1, Adams Family Papers (VHS); "The Association entered into by the American [Conti]nental Congress . . ." in Boyd, Butterfield, and Bryan, eds., *Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, I, 150; Letter to Mr. Purdie, [April 8, 1775], in William J. Van Schreeven and Robert L. Scribner, comps., *Revolutionary Virginia: The Road to Independence*. Vol. II: *The Committees and the Second Convention, 1773–1775* ([Charlottesville], 1975), 352; Williamsburg *Virginia Gazette* (Rind), September 1, 1774; Adam Stephen to William Fleming, May 31, 1775, quoted in Harry M. Ward, *Major General Adam Stephen and the Cause of American Liberty* (Charlottesville, 1989), 123; Annapolis, October 26, 1774, in William Eddis, *Letters from America*, ed. by Aubrey C. Land (Cambridge, Mass., 1969), 90; Hilda Marion Neatby, *Quebec: The Revolutionary Age, 1760–1791* (Toronto, 1966), 134; Curtis P. Nettels, *The Roots of American Civilization: A History of American Colonial Life* (New York, 1938), 610 and 644; and Winsor, "Virginia and the Quebec Bill," 439 and 442.

¹⁰² July 12, 1749, and May 27 and June 17, 1774, *Executive Journals of the Council*, V, 295–96 and VI, 562 and 578.

¹⁰³ Mississippi Land Company to Thomas Cumming, September 26, 1763, in Carter, ed., "Documents Relating to the Mississippi Land Company," 311–12.

¹⁰⁴ Bartholomew Dandridge to Washington, February 16, 1774, and John David Woelpper to Washington, March 23, 1774, in Hamilton, ed., *Letters to Washington*, IV, 329 and 357.

¹⁰⁵ Jefferson asked the Executive Council for 2,000 acres during the 1768–1769 land rush. He expected to get 5,000 acres from the Loyal Company, and Augustine Claiborne's venture promised him at least 10,000 acres. *CVSP*, I, 262; Thomas Nelson *et al.* and George Rogers

had joined in at least five land adventures between 1767 and 1773.¹⁰⁶ He knew that he had wasted his money acquiring worthless claims—that is, if the ministry had its way.

The ministry did *not* have its way, of course. Led by land speculators, white Virginians declared independence from Britain in 1776 and adopted a state constitution that nullified the Proclamation of 1763 and the Quebec Act.¹⁰⁷ Virginia's new government abandoned London's policy of conciliating the Indians and replaced it with the policy that Governor Thomas Jefferson put forward for the Shawnees in 1780. "The end proposed should be their extermination, or their removal beyond the [Great] lakes or Illinois river," Jefferson told George Rogers Clark, since "the same world will scarcely do for them and us."¹⁰⁸ The infant commonwealth also battled the Cherokees, and it eventually accomplished Jefferson's fundamental goal, which was, he said, to "add to the Empire of liberty an extensive and fertile Country."¹⁰⁹

If the Indians' land was to be taken from them, the question remained: would farm families be allowed to settle Indian land free of charge or would they have to pay speculators for it? This issue was settled by the House of Delegates in June 1779. The assembly revived many of the speculative land claims that the British government had quashed—the Loyal and Greenbriar Companies' grants, George Mason's claim to fifty thousand acres using headrights, and the Seven Years' War veterans' bounty claims. Legislators also adopted a new land law that has been celebrated as democratic but actually made it easier than ever for speculators to obtain Indian land.¹¹⁰ It is true that after the revolution—as before—many farmers did obtain land directly from the government. But the Virginia gentry, by leading Virginia

et al., petitions for land, [1768–1769], folder 47, Virginia Colonial Papers; and February 18, 1769, and November 29, 1773, Jefferson account book, Jefferson Papers (UVA).

¹⁰⁶ Henry to William Fleming, June 17, 1767, doc. 15ZZ3, Draper Mss.; Henry, account book, quoted in Henry, *Patrick Henry*, I, 121; [Patrick Henry] to [William Fleming?], November 22, 1773, Fleming Papers; depositions of Henry, June 4, 1777, and William Christian, June 3, 1777, taken by order of the House of Delegates, *CVSP*, I, 288–90.

¹⁰⁷ Virginia Constitution, adopted June 29, 1776, printed in Rutland, ed., *Papers of George Mason*, I, 309. See also Harrell, *Loyalism in Virginia*, 22.

¹⁰⁸ January 1, 1780, quoted in John E. Selby, *The Revolution in Virginia, 1775–1783* (Charlottesville, 1988), 199; see also Thomas Nelson Jr. to John Page, August 13, 1776, Dearborn Collection (Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.).

¹⁰⁹ To Clark, December 25, 1780, quoted in Selby, *Revolution in Virginia*, 201; see also McConnell, *Country Between*, 281–82; and Ronald Takaki, *A Different Mirror: A History of Multi-cultural America* (Boston, 1993), 47 and 49.

¹¹⁰ Jefferson, *Notes on Virginia*, 136; and Thomas Perkins Abernethy, *Western Lands and the American Revolution* (New York, 1937), 225–28.

into the American Revolution, had recovered one of its largest sources of income—the sale of Indian land to yeomen farmers.

Of course, the American Revolution had many causes. But in Virginia it was partly the result of a complex struggle involving the British government and three American classes—Virginia land speculators, actual settlers, and Ohio Valley Indians. Usually in American history, Indians are seen as the victims of white decisions. However, in this case, the lines of force also ran in the opposite direction; Delaware and Shawnee diplomats powerfully influenced the most important decision white Americans ever made.