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Pakistan's Foreign Relations

M. Zafrulla Khan

Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan was Foreign Minister of Pakistan from 1947 to 1954 and represented Pakistan at the United Nations in the formative years of Pakistan's foreign policy. He is remembered for his forceful advocacy of Pakistan's case on the Kashmir issue at the United Nations, the Palestine cause and freedom for countries under colonial rule. This speech, which he delivered on 18 August 1951 at The Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, is being republished in this issue of Pakistan Horizon, especially for the benefit of the Institute's younger members. It sheds light on the issues with which Pakistan was engaged in the early troubled times of its existence.

Four years ago, almost to a day, Pakistan started, so far as the administrative machinery of the Central Government was concerned, almost from scratch. True we had a handful of officials. But that was all that we had. We did not have chairs for them to sit on, or desks for them to put their papers on, or paper for them to write on, or pens and ink to write with.

In the domain of foreign affairs, we lacked everything. We even lacked officials. For during the British regime, though Indians — Muslims and non-Muslims — had a certain amount of experience in other fields of administration, the field of foreign affairs was barred to them. That was the special preserve of the Viceroy; and very few Indians had anything to do with it even from a distance. So when Pakistan came into existence, it had at its disposal no statesman and few officials with experience of foreign affairs.

Since then, I venture to say, we have made good the deficiency to a certain extent. A Pakistan Foreign Service has been established; and we are generally better equipped than we were to deal with the problems of foreign policy. Through its diplomatic missions abroad, Pakistan is already represented in 23 countries. There is diplomatic representation at Karachi of 38 sovereign states. We propose during the current financial year to open some more missions in foreign countries.

But apart from the official machinery that is needed for the conduct of the foreign policy of the country, it is essential that there must be some apparatus for informing public opinion upon the weighty and complex problems of that policy and for enabling considered views to be expressed about those problems by private persons, so that these views can be taken into consideration by those whose duty it is to mould foreign policy. In the

Pakistan Institute of International Affairs we have such an apparatus. I am convinced that the Institute is doing invaluable work. Indeed, it is the only body that is doing any work of this kind. It arranges meetings which are addressed by Pakistanis and foreigners, who are invariably men of distinction and repute, either as statesmen or experts. Those of you who have had the opportunity to attend some of these meetings would know how useful they are in supplying information about and throwing light upon various aspects of international problems. The Institute conducts research in, and publishes literature on, international relations. Its quarterly journal, called *Pakistan Horizon* has already begun to make its mark abroad in circles which are interested in the study of foreign affairs. It maintains a library which even at the moment is an extremely valuable collection of books and journals on international affairs. The Institute also prepares data papers for and sends delegations to international conferences.

However, the Institute is still poorly housed and meagrely nourished. In fact, it is housed on sufferance and is in urgent need of a building of its own. A plot of land has already been obtained for the building. This site is so good that I consider the Institute very fortunate in having secured it. I am sure there are many here tonight, who wish to be associated with the work of such wide beneficence as this essential work of educating opinion at home in international affairs generally and educating opinion abroad in regard to the attitudes of Pakistan towards international affairs. I am convinced that it would be a good investment to further the objects for which the Institute stands.

May I now pass on to speak about some of the actual problems of foreign policy, with which we are confronted today? When Pakistan was established, in the circumstances to which I have made a brief reference, our very first task naturally was to introduce our new state to the rest of the world. This was not an easy task, having regard to the juxtaposition in which we were placed. There was a certain amount of confusion abroad as to what this Pakistan was. We tried to explain that the subcontinent, hitherto known as India, had been divided into the sovereign states of Pakistan and India. That instead of helping matters merely made the confusion worse. That India had been divided into India and Pakistan sounded absurd. Residuary India was entitled to continue calling itself by the old name, with all the advantages that resulted from it. It was an uphill task to explain to the outside world what Pakistan was, how it came into existence, let alone all that it stood for. I trust that those of you who are regular readers of the foreign press are satisfied that during the course of the last three or four years Pakistan has been fully introduced to the rest of the world.

Our next concern was that, while ensuring the integrity of Pakistan, we should establish friendly and cooperative relations with other sovereign states. We contemplated no aggression against anybody. We had no imperialistic ambitions. On coming into existence we immediately sought and obtained the membership of the United Nations. We were determined to make our fullest contribution to the realization of the ideals and objectives of the United Nations. By that we have stood; and if by that our record is judged, it would be seen that we have not failed in our obligations.

Being a member of the United Nations, Pakistan is like every other sovereign state, represented in the General Assembly. However, Pakistan is also member of the Economic and Social Council, on which eighteen member-states are represented, each elected for a period of three years. Pakistan occupies various positions in the specialized agencies of the United Nations. We are serving, or have served, on the Balkans Commission, the Eritrean Commission, the Libyan Commission and the Korean Commission. Pakistan is also a member of the Peace Observation Commission. We are represented (by the Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court) on the Commission which is engaged in the study of the proposals for the establishment of a court for trying criminal offences of an international character. We are represented on the Commission to which colonial powers submit information with regard to the administration of non-self-governing areas under their rule. That is an activity connected with the Trusteeship Council, although Pakistan is not actually a member of the Trusteeship Council. Pakistan is a candidate, in succession to India, for election to the Security Council, on which eleven states are represented, five as permanent members and six by election. We have every hope that we shall be elected and shall have the opportunity, with effect from January first next year, to serve on the Security Council. This account does not represent an altogether mean achievement for a state that is only four years old.

Pakistan is also a member of the Commonwealth. With regard to the Commonwealth, there appears to be a persistent misconception. It would, therefore, be appropriate if I said a word or two about it. The Commonwealth is now, both in theory and in actual practice, an association of free and equally sovereign nations. Whatever the differences between them in regard to population, resources, strength and the contribution that each can make to their common purposes, their status is absolutely equal. There is no obligation undertaken by one member that is not equally undertaken by the others. There is no restriction upon any member in any sphere of domestic or foreign affairs. There is constant exchange of information and continuous consultation

between them. But each member is free to take any decision it chooses, in its home affairs or with regard to international affairs.

But there is one aspect, a very valuable aspect, of this association of free and equally sovereign states, which today is not quite what it ought to be. It has been an inseparable part of the conception of the Commonwealth that there should be no armed conflict between any of its members. In respect of this, there has recently arisen considerable doubt. A challenge has been presented to the conception of the Commonwealth. Indeed, the Commonwealth today is on its trial. If that challenge is met, if that trial is successfully withstood, the stock of the Commonwealth as a peaceful association of free and equally sovereign states will rise even higher. But if, unfortunately, that should not be so the future of the Commonwealth will not be worth an hour's purchase.

For the permanent safeguarding of peace and the fostering of human prosperity, it is absolutely essential that political domination and economic exploitation, which, during the last two or three centuries, have been the two great instruments of policy of certain nations, should be discarded forever. A good start has been made in this respect. It is only just and fair to mention that Great Britain, four years ago, set an admirable example by cooperating in setting up the sovereign states of Pakistan, India, Burma and Ceylon. This was, to my mind, the greatest act of faith and courage in the history of mankind. It is true that there were errors in working out details. It is also true that for many years before freedom came to these countries, they had been struggling for it. Nevertheless, it was for the first time in human history that without an armed conflict between the rulers and the ruled, the former transferred complete sovereignty to the latter. This fact should be duly recognized.

The people of the colonial areas too should, at the earliest possible moment, be given their sovereignty. This is not merely a human problem, related to the feelings and yearnings of the colonial peoples. But it is an absolutely essential requirement of world peace that foreign domination should disappear from the colonial regions. Domination imports exploitation, no matter how vociferously it might be disclaimed. While exploitation can be practised even without domination, domination always leads to exploitation. Otherwise, why undertake the bother, the expense and the responsibilities of domination? So long as one people, through its position of domination vis-a-vis another people, is deriving certain advantages, that is bound, sooner or later, to incite other peoples to seize that position. So long as there is a victim, there is bound to be aggression. Domination is a direct invitation to aggression. Luckily for mankind, the doctrine that political domination and economic exploitation should give way to independence and economic cooperation is

now accepted on all hands, at any rate on paper. In actual fact, different nations have given effect to it in different degrees. However, the time has now come, when in order to assure international security and to firmly lay the foundations of peace and prosperity for all the people of the world, the doctrine should be fully put into operation. In the short space of time during which Pakistan has enjoyed the opportunities afforded by its sovereign status, it has done everything possible to help forward the independence and freedom of colonial peoples. I might even venture to submit that Pakistan has, in this respect, a proud record. It has served actively to promote the cause of freedom in Indonesia, Libya, Eritrea and Somaliland, to mention only these four.

Indonesia, as you know, has already become independent. Libya, under the resolution that was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, is to become an independent sovereign state by first January next. Eritrea is to become a member of a sovereign federation with Ethiopia. A commission has been already appointed to give effect to that proposal. Somaliland has been placed under trusteeship. Originally it was proposed that the period of this trusteeship should be twenty years and that it should be a single nation trusteeship. Eventually the Assembly was persuaded to agree that the period should be reduced to ten years and that two other nations should be attached with the administering trustee nation to function as observers.

But there are still vast areas and numerous peoples in East Asia and Africa who are awaiting their independence. They are in various stages of political development. Pakistan has pledged itself; and I repeat that pledge, that we shall, in all these cases, without any kind of discrimination, support and help forward the struggle for, or the process of freedom, as the case may be, of these areas and peoples.

Our relations with our neighbours and with the other states of the world, with two exceptions, are most cordial and friendly. It is particularly unfortunate that our relations with India are not good. The world today is harassed and torn and, owing to what is described as the ideological conflict, appears to be fast drifting towards a major disaster. We claim that Pakistan has a positive and constructive ideology of its own. As a matter of fact, as I recently stated, the great urge behind the demand for Pakistan was the desire to secure freedom for putting that ideology into effect. But I particularly wish to draw attention to the fact that Pakistan and India, if they acted together, would be able to make a very valuable contribution to the resolving of the ideological conflict, or at any rate to the maintaining of international peace, in spite of that conflict. Indeed, if they stood together, they could play in world affairs an almost decisive role. Their very situation, their economy, the

considerations of their defence and security, demand that they ought to stand in a friendly cooperative relationship with each other. But at the moment, they are deadlocked. Thus they only serve to render each other completely ineffective, whatever fanciful claims to the contrary some people might make. From what might have been a position of positive and constructive beneficence for the human race, they have been pushed into one that threatens the peace and prosperity of the whole of South Asia and, in its turn, constitutes a grave menace to international security.

One look at the map should be sufficient to convince anybody that a strong, stable, prosperous, friendly and cooperative Pakistan would be the strongest bulwark for the security and prosperity of India. Of course, the same applies the other way about. And though what applies the other way about is fully recognized by us, I am afraid, the reverse of it is not grasped, at least, it is not recognized. I have invited just one look at the map. The matter is so clear that it is not necessary to look at an actual map.

I have often been confronted with this question: Is the distance between West Pakistan and East Pakistan not an incongruity? One has to confess that, in a sense, it is. But it must be accepted, and the problems that it gives rise to must be tackled in a practical manner; and they are being so tackled. However, these two regions of Pakistan occupy a significant position on the land flanks of India. For any reasonable time in the future, nobody expects that any major threat to the security of India can be made effective from across the northern ranges of the Himalayas. Minor threats may arise, but no major land invasion can be undertaken from the north through the Himalayas. Any threat of that kind can come only from the north-east and from the north-west; and it can become formidable and effective only if the invader could traverse East Pakistan or West Pakistan. That is so patent that anybody, even a school child, could comprehend it.

We have an earnest desire to assume and continue in a friendly, cooperative role and discharge our responsibilities to the uttermost, if India will let us. But as you are aware, there are disputes between India and ourselves, legacies, some people regard them, of partition. But none of them need have arisen; or having arisen, none of them need have been prolonged beyond a few weeks. For the statesmen on either side could have found just and fair and reasonable solutions for them.

The principal dispute, as you all know, is about Kashmir. I shall very briefly state what has happened about it during the last year. Sir Owen Dixon, the United Nations Representative, reported to the Security Council that notwithstanding every possible effort that he had made, he

saw no prospect of his arriving at a stage where India would be willing to give its consent to any arrangement which would lead to such demilitarization in Kashmir as would make possible the holding of a fair and impartial plebiscite. After having come to that conclusion, he went on trying to find some solution, outside the two agreed resolutions of the United Nations Commission, accepted by India and Pakistan, and to resolve the deadlock. He proposed the outlines of one such alternative solution, the details of which were to be elaborated after the prime ministers of the two countries had agreed to go into conference with him to discuss it. Pakistan said yes to it; but India said no. Consequently, Sir Owen Dixon could proceed no further with this scheme either.

It has been repeatedly asserted on behalf of India that Sir Owen Dixon has declared that the entry of the tribesmen into Kashmir and the entry of Pakistan forces into Kashmir was contrary to international law. Anyone of you who is interested in the matter has only to read the relevant paragraph of Sir Owen Dixon's report to find out that is exactly what he did *not* say. What he did say was that he had been repeatedly urged by India to make that declaration, but that he had pointed out that the Security Council itself had not pronounced upon that question, that he had not been commissioned and had no authority to pronounce upon it and that he had not investigated it. But he proceeded to say that, in order to obtain agreement upon a scheme of demilitarization, he was prepared to assume that the entry of the tribesmen and of Pakistan forces was contrary to international law. Now, after he has said that the Security Council had made no pronouncement on the matter, that he had not been authorized to go into it, that he had not investigated it and that he was only making an assumption, is it not a misrepresentation of facts to say that Sir Owen Dixon had declared that Pakistan had violated international law? However, making that assumption, Sir Owen Dixon proposed that since the tribesmen had already withdrawn, Pakistan forces should start moving out on a certain date and after a specified number of days from that date, Indian forces should begin to move out, and later the movement of withdrawal of the troops of both sides should be synchronized. Sir Owen said that the Prime Minister of Pakistan vigorously protested against the proposed assumption, but agreed to accept the scheme. However, India rejected it. Thereafter, Sir Owen Dixon made his report to the Security Council.

Then there was a Commonwealth prime ministers' meeting in London in January this year. Some of the prime ministers present at it made efforts to resolve the deadlock. One after another, three suggestions or proposals were made to secure demilitarization of the state of Jammu

and Kashmir. To each of them Pakistan said yes; to each of them India said no.

When the matter went back to the Security Council, it passed its resolution of March 30, 1951, and appointed Dr. Graham to come out to the subcontinent as United Nations Representative and to effect demilitarization of the state of Jammu and Kashmir on the basis of the resolutions of the United Nations Commission of August 13, 1948 and January 5, 1949. These resolutions, both India and Pakistan had accepted. In the original draft of the Security Council resolution, passed on May 30, 1951, it was proposed that the Representative was to effect demilitarization on the basis of the principles contained in the Dixon Report. To this India took objection, saying that it had not accepted that Report. Thereupon, the Security Council modified the resolution to provide that demilitarization was to be on the basis of the two resolutions of the United Nations Commission and that if the Representative failed in his efforts to effect demilitarization, or India and Pakistan failed to agree with regard to demilitarization, he was to report to the Security Council, formulating the questions which, in his opinion, it was necessary to decide, before demilitarization could be effected. Both India and Pakistan were to be invited to agree to the submission of these questions to arbitration by an arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators to be nominated by the President of the International Court of Justice.

In one of his latest pronouncements, the Prime Minister of India has said: 'How can we submit the fate of four million people to arbitration?' India and Pakistan have not been invited to submit to arbitration the fate of four million people. The fate of these people is to be decided by themselves, through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite. As a preliminary step for the organization of that plebiscite, it is necessary that there should be demilitarization. On that, there is an agreement between India and Pakistan, which is enshrined in the two resolutions to which I have referred. Progress in giving effect to these resolutions has been held up, now for considerably over two years, because India puts its own interpretation on certain clauses of these resolutions. It is the differences over the interpretation of these clauses that are to be referred to arbitration. Two persons have entered into an agreement. That agreement has not been repudiated. But before it is given effect to, differences have arisen as to what the parties had really agreed to do. How are these differences to be resolved? How are the differences to be resolved peacefully?

The Prime Minister of India said recently: 'We are ready to resolve the dispute peacefully; it is Pakistan that does not agree.' How is it to be peacefully resolved unless some impartial person or body of persons hears

both sides and says: 'This is what you had agreed to do;' and we are both bound in advance to abide by what that person or body of persons says.

When, after the resolution of March 30, 1951 had been adopted by the Security Council, and we were called upon to express our views with regard to it, we said that we accepted it. We said we had already agreed to the two resolutions of the Commission and were ready to go to demilitarization on the basis of those two resolutions. If questions of interpretation arose over which there were differences and the differences could not be resolved, we would agree to go to arbitration over them. We agreed to that, I added, because as an honourable people, as a member of the United Nations, as a nation that had subscribed to the Charter of the United Nations, that was the only honourable course open to us. But I repeat that it is not the fate of a people that is proposed to be submitted to arbitration; it is only the question whether the interpretation that India seeks to place upon certain clauses of the resolutions relating to demilitarization is or is not tenable.

The Prime Minister of India has said, I believe, in the course of one of his recent letters to our Prime Minister: 'How can we agree to go forward on the basis of the resolutions of the United Nations Commission on Kashmir, without the assurances that were given to us by the United Nation being fulfilled?' Very good; if any assurances were given, the arbitrator will say: 'These are the assurance given, they must be fulfilled;' and we bind ourselves that they must be fulfilled.

A few weeks ago, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, in one of his speeches, about which I gave a press conference, said: 'I can convince anybody from anywhere that our stand on this matter is right and Pakistan's is wrong.' Let him convince the arbitrator. When he can convince anybody from anywhere, as a matter fact, he need not even bother as to who the arbitrator is. He is bound to be somebody from somewhere. But let him be a man of the highest integrity with an absolutely clean record. We shall agree to any such man being appointed. If he takes the view that India takes, we shall accept it. If he takes the view that we take, India should accept it. If he takes a view in between, we should both accept it. How else could a dispute be decided?

Dr. Graham is now engaged on his duties as United Nations Representative. But fresh complications have, in the meantime, been introduced by India. One of them results from the projected Constituent Assembly in Kashmir. When this matter was brought to the notice of the Security Council, the representative of India said that his Government could not stop the people of Kashmir from convening the Assembly, which would be their legislative assembly as well as frame their constitution.

We pointed out that Sheikh Abdullah had repeatedly declared, and Pandit Nehru had given the colour of his support to these declarations, that the Constituent Assembly would decide the question of accession also. The delegate of India replied that he had been authorized by his Government to state that no action by the proposed Constituent Assembly in the matter of accession would stand in the way of the Security Council, whatever that might mean. Now India claims that Kashmir is in accession with India. If that has any meaning, it means that India is responsible for the foreign relations of Kashmir, at least of that portion of Kashmir which is occupied by its troops. That being so, why cannot India clearly declare that the Constituent Assembly will have nothing to do with the question of accession?

The next complication has resulted from the concentration of Indian troops along the borders of West and East Pakistan. The stark fact is, that towards the middle of July, India moved up by far the greater part of its armed forces almost up to the borders of West and East Pakistan, and these troops included the whole of the Indian armour. When Pakistan protested, it was explained on behalf of India: 'Oh ! well, we have done that because there is continuous talk of war in Pakistan.' Talk of war! We have recently issued a selection of statements from speeches made in India and from writings in the Indian press to show what kind of peaceful talk goes on in India. There is often irresponsible talk on both sides. But they want to stop talk of war in Pakistan with their armour and the whole of their armed forces!

The correspondence between the prime ministers of the two countries has now been published. The fact that stands out prominently from this correspondence is that the Prime Minister of Pakistan made a proposal to the Prime Minister of India, which was in effect this: 'You have made these troop movements without anything happening on our side to justify it. I request you to remove this threat to the security of Pakistan by directing the movement back of your troops to their normal peacetime stations. If you agree to do that, I shall do the same, for we too have had to make consequential troop movements. When the immediate threat is removed, we should agree upon a mode of settlement of our outstanding disputes. We should declare that we seek settlement of the dispute over Kashmir through peaceful methods. In the two resolutions of the United Nations Commission, we have already an international agreement about it. We shall go forward with demilitarization on the basis of these resolutions, and go on to the plebiscite. If there should be any differences between us, with respect to these resolutions, we shall accept the guidance of the Security Council. What is unfair in that? How does that give any advantage to Pakistan as against India? How does it place India at any disadvantage?

With regard to the remaining disputes also, the Prime Minister of Pakistan proposed that we should make a declaration that we shall seek their settlement through the peaceful methods of negotiation, mediation and, both of these failing, arbitration or judicial settlement. Is that unfair? We are both members of the United Nations, in whose Charter these methods of settlement are laid down; and all member-states undertake the obligation of seeking the settlement of their disputes through these methods. These methods were not invented by Liaquat Ali Khan. But even if he did invent them, all the more credit to him.

At one time it was said on behalf of India that to go to arbitration would be derogatory to the sovereign status of India. But Article 51 of the Indian Constitution provides that the state shall encourage settlement of international disputes through arbitration. They say so in their Constitution.

With regard to the dispute over canal waters, Pandit Nehru, in the course of one of his letters, has said that he did offer to settle it by judicial determination, but that we turned it down. This is what the Government of India offered: They said that if negotiation should fail, they were prepared that this dispute might be determined by a judicial tribunal, composed of two judges from India and two judges from Pakistan. When we pointed out, 'suppose they got deadlocked,' they replied, 'then we shall again consult together to see what should be done.' Is this determination of a dispute? However, we agreed to accept this proposal, provided India agreed that there shall be a fifth, a neutral judge added to the four, in which case, we said, we shall accept the award, be it a unanimous award or the award of a majority. We said, 'let the four judges go forward; and if they are deadlocked, or if there should be no award, then the matter should be referred to the fifth judge.' The Government of India rejected the proposal, suggesting that we should explore some method of resolving the deadlock, if a deadlock should arise between the four judges. We said, all right, tell us what that method is to be. We are still awaiting a reply to that. That is the kind of judicial determination India believes in.

Then the Prime Minister of Pakistan proposed that in accordance with the agreement reached in April last year, known as the Prime Ministers' Agreement, both countries should stop all propaganda against each other and all propaganda for war and take action against anybody who carries on such propaganda. For months after that Agreement was reached, there was no such propaganda indulged in, or very little of it, in Pakistan, and whenever our attention was drawn to any undesirable thing said or written in Pakistan, we took appropriate steps about it. The Indian press, more particularly the press in West Bengal, carried on and was allowed to carry on, virulent propaganda against Pakistan, notwithstanding the

Agreement to which Pandit Nehru was a party. When the attention of the Prime Minister of India was drawn to it, he admitted that this was so and agreed that it contravened clause C (8) of the Agreement, but he pleaded that he could take no action, because certain provisions of the Indian Constitution stood in the way of this being done.

Finally, the Prime Minister of Pakistan proposed that India and Pakistan make a declaration that neither will attack the territory of the other. To this Pandit Nehru replied that he was prepared to join in making this declaration, provided that when we said that we had no intention of attacking Indian territory, we should include in it the state of Kashmir. In reply, Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan pointed out that was begging the question. How can Kashmir be Indian territory? The whole dispute before the Security Council is whether Kashmir shall accede to India or to Pakistan. Both India and Pakistan have agreed that this question should be settled through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite. That is what will determine whether it is Indian territory or whether it is Pakistan territory. But Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan made it quite clear that the matter being before the Security Council and a ceasefire having been agreed to, the ceasefire being under the observation of the United Nations military observers, we would maintain the ceasefire in Kashmir. So that while Pandit Nehru said to Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan 'you must agree that Kashmir is Indian territory and then say you will not attack any part of Indian territory,' Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan said to Pandit Nehru 'we shall not attack any part of Indian territory, and so far as Kashmir is concerned, though we do not agree that it is Indian territory — that can only be determined through a fair and impartial plebiscite — we shall agree to maintain the ceasefire.'

Was it not quibbling to say after that: 'You reserve the right to attack Kashmir?' Well, India does that kind of thing very well. And the Pandit went on to say: 'You are bound to attack Kashmir.' That reminds me of a story, a very frivolous one, perhaps. There was a young woman coming from a well, with a pitcher of water on her head. The path was narrow. She saw a young man coming from the opposite direction, with a couple of pigeons in his hands. She stood in the middle of the path, looked at him, as women only can, and — I put it in Americanese — she said: 'I am afraid you are going to be fresh with me.' The young man said, 'Nonsense, why should you think I am going to be fresh with you?' 'Oh' she said, 'I am sure you are going to be fresh with me.' He went on protesting and she went on asserting. In the end he said, 'You must be mad. You have got a pitcher of water on your head; I have got a couple of pigeons in my hands. How can I be fresh with you?' She replied, 'Ah! but you are very wily; you will take the pitcher from my head and pour out the water from it; you will invert the pitcher and put your pigeons under it; and then you will be

fresh with me.' Pandit Nehru's behaviour is like that of the young woman in the story.

The Pandit says that he moved up his troops because there was talk of war in Pakistan and only to stop that talk and to secure peace. Thereafter, when we started civil defence preparations, objection was taken to it: 'Now the aggressive designs of Pakistan have become quite clear; they are making civil defence preparations.' You do not attack with civil defence preparations; you attack with troops and armour. Troops and armour have been brought up to our borders; that is to secure peace. Our civil defence preparations are aggression.

Pandit Nehru said the other day that India was not making civil defence preparations and went on very naively to give the reason for it in these words: 'If there is war between India and Pakistan, we shall not be attacked.' What does that mean? I leave it to you to decide. He has also given another reason for what he regards as incitement to civil defence preparations in Pakistan. He says: 'We have won the battle of Kashmir, and consequently there is a sense of frustration in Pakistan that is being given vent to in all this incitement to civil defence preparations.' How they have won the battle of Kashmir, he does not indicate, unless it be in the sense that the Assembly elected under the supervision of the Indian sponsored government of Abdullah, that is, under the shadow of Indian bayonets, would vote for accession to India. If it does not mean that, the statement has no meaning.

Thus we find India turning down proposal after proposal for the peaceful settlement of pending disputes. We find India moving up troops and declaring that it did not intend to use them which, I suppose, Pandit Nehru expects the people to believe. In the whole of this series of disgusting transactions, the most recent one is the most painful. I refer to the memorandum of fourteen leading Muslims of India, which was presented to Dr. Graham on August 14 last at New Delhi. It is a most painful move, not on account of what is said in the memorandum, even though it contains harsh things and allegations that are without foundation, or are on the outside half-truths. One is getting used to that sort of thing. The authors of this document are men who have occupied the highest positions in life and have, in the past, rendered valuable public service, and have been eminent men in their respective walks of life. That they should have been reduced to the necessity of putting signatures to a document of such a character as this memorandum is most painful. I propose to deal with this document briefly. I propose to say nothing that should, in turn, cause any pain or annoyance to its authors. I say with all earnestness that I feel for them the deepest sympathy. People like them, unless placed in a most awful dilemma,

would not subscribe to a document like this. I know them. I still hold them in the highest esteem. I can, therefore, in some small measure gauge the feeling of frustration from which they must be suffering, and suffering continuously. My heart does go to them.

There are several misconceptions under which the authors of the memorandum seem to labour. They say: 'Pakistan has made our position weaker by driving out Hindus from West Pakistan in utter disregard of the consequences of such a policy to us and our welfare. A similar process is in operation in East Pakistan from where Hindus are coming over to India in a larger and larger number.' Now there are two major half-truths in this statement. A good deal happened on both sides of the boundary line of West Pakistan during the summer and autumn months of 1947, which nobody would seek to justify. But it is a calumny to state that it was the result of any desire on the part of Pakistan to drive non-Muslims from West Pakistan.

When I was appearing on behalf of the Muslim League before the Punjab Boundary Commission, in July 1947, at a certain stage of the case it was argued from the other side: Why uproot so many people from the lands and homes to which they have been attached for generations? I could not understand why that argument was advanced. But it was; you will find it in the record of the Commission. I was puzzled by it and replied: Why should any people be uprooted from their homes and lands? That is a positive proof, if proof were necessary, that we had no such idea in our minds even as late as July 1947. The argument from the other side is a positive proof that they already contemplated the withdrawal of non-Muslims from West Pakistan and driving out Muslims from East Punjab.

They started it; and it is absolutely clear on the dates that they started it. And when the vast mass of those wretched, miserable people, who had escaped from carnage in East Punjab, began to arrive in West Pakistan, with tales of the horrors to which they had been subjected, not excluding women and children — in some cases, the eyes of children gouged out and their hands chopped off, the breasts of women cut off, in many cases women stark naked, in some cases trains choked with dead and wounded — of course, the population rose in West Pakistan also. And whenever I have made a reference to this terrible tragedy, I have never sought to excuse either the one side or the other. Nevertheless, it is true that it was started on the other side; and that must be within the knowledge of the signatories of the memorandum presented to Dr. Graham. Yet they lay the blame upon Pakistan and say that Pakistan wanted to get rid of non-Muslims. This is the height of injustice. But it is more. It is the measure of the agony of these gentlemen, agony which has driven them to make such a statement.

Then they say that a similar process is in operation in East Pakistan, from where a larger and larger number of Hindus is coming into India. Not only do they say this, but there is a continuous propaganda, recently revived in the Indian press, to that effect. It is totally without foundation. No doubt, there is a certain amount of coming and going in the normal manner between East Bengal and West Bengal. It is also true that at one time last year, people in large numbers had started withdrawing themselves from either side and going over to the other. But it is absolutely wrong to say that it is a one-sided movement in a larger and larger number. As a matter of fact, recently both from West Bengal and from Assam, a larger number of non-Muslims has gone into East Pakistan than has come out.

Next they say: 'Pakistan expects us to be loyal to her despite her impotence to give us any protection, believing at the same time that we can still claim all the rights of citizenship in the secular democracy of India.' It is a misconception, their entertaining the notion that Pakistan expects them to be loyal to her. On behalf of Pakistan, I want to say this in the clearest possible manner to the Muslims of India: Be true to yourselves, and loyal to your country and to your state. Be loyal citizens of India. Pakistan has no right to impose or demand from you any conflicting loyalty or obligation. At no time has Pakistan expected Indian citizens to have any kind of loyalty or obligation towards Pakistan. It is our heartiest desire that the Muslims in India and non-Muslims in Pakistan should be loyal and law-abiding citizens of the state of which they are citizens, and discharge to the utmost the obligations that a citizen undertakes, explicitly or implicitly, towards his state. When have we either required or expected Indian Muslims to be loyal to Pakistan?

Then they go on to say: 'Pakistan claims Kashmir first on the ground of the majority of the state's people being Muslims, and secondly on the ground of the state being essential to its economy and defence. But they ignore the fact that the Muslims in Kashmir may also have a point of view of their own, that there is a democratic movement with a democratic leadership in the state, both inspired by the progress of a broad-minded, secular, democratic movement in India and both naturally being in sympathy with India.' That the majority of the state's people are Muslims and that the state is essential to the economy and defence of Pakistan are facts. Even they do not deny them. These are patent factors in the situation. But it is wrong to say that we lay claim to the accession of Kashmir to Pakistan on these grounds. However, we could have done so. We could also have claimed it on the ground on which Pandit Nehru condemned the accession of Junagadh to Pakistan. He said that the accession of Junagadh to Pakistan was contrary to what he described as

the principle upon which the partition of the subcontinent had been accepted, i.e., the principle of contiguous Muslim and non-Muslim majority areas. As the vast majority of the people of Junagadh was non-Muslim, he claimed the accession of that state to India. It would have been no sin at all if, on that basis, we had claimed the accession of Kashmir to Pakistan. But we did not, and we do not. We said, in the words of the authors of this memorandum, if indeed they are its authors, that we do not ignore the fact that the Muslims in Kashmir have a point of view of their own. All that we have pleaded for during the last four years, all that we insist upon today is this, that the people of Kashmir should be permitted to freely give expression to their point of view. And that is what is being denied to them.

That the signatories of the memorandum are not unaware of this comes out of their own mouths. They say: 'Pakistan insists upon a fair and impartial plebiscite in Kashmir.' As if that was a sin! They themselves say that Pakistan should not claim Kashmir on the basis of its Muslim majority population or on the basis of economy and defence, but that the people of Kashmir should have a say in the matter. Yet they condemn Pakistan for demanding a fair and impartial plebiscite in Kashmir. How then are you to determine the point of view of the people in Kashmir?

True they ask, why do you not have a plebiscite in the North-West Frontier Province and the tribal areas, in order to determine the issue of Pashtoonistan. But they do not deny that the people of Kashmir ought to have an opportunity through a plebiscite to determine for themselves the future of their state. But they say, why do you not have a plebiscite in the Frontier areas too? This leads me to examine the position with regard to Pashtoonistan.

I said earlier that, with two exceptions, our relations with our neighbours were most cordial and friendly. The two exceptions that I had in mind were India and Afghanistan. Unfortunately, there are differences with Afghanistan over the question of Pashtoonistan. The late Mr. Gandhi raised the question of Pashtoonistan with Lord Mountbatten, and demanded that the North-West Frontier Province should have the choice to decide whether it wanted to accede to India, or accede to Pakistan, or to set itself up as an independent state. This was the only matter in which Lord Mountbatten withstood Mr. Gandhi and the Congress party. The province, he laid it down, could decide whether it wanted to accede to India or to Pakistan; but he would not agree to the third question being raised. But even that was not a denial of what Mr. Gandhi had asked for. Because if the North-West Frontier Province had decided to accede to India, committed to Pashtoonistan, could have converted the province

into Pashtoonistan. But what happened? The Congress party, which claimed to have a vast following in the province and which was committed to converting it into Pashtoonistan, boycotted the plebiscite. Nevertheless, an absolute majority, not of those who went to the polls, but of the total number of voters, voted for accession to Pakistan. The number of those who voted for accession to Pakistan was also larger than the number of voters that had ever voted at a previous election. It thus included the whole of the electorate that was accustomed to go to the polls.

Now, as regards the tribal areas. Hitherto the only way in which the people of these areas expressed their wishes was through the tribal chiefs. Immediately after partition, these chiefs freely entered into agreements with Pakistan. So that there has been no question of coercion, no question of marching in troops and carrying out military operations to compel them. Quite the reverse; we withdrew our troops from the tribal areas. But this is just a pinprick by the signatories of the memorandum.

However, they do appear to be horrified when they say in their memorandum that Pakistan insists upon a fair and impartial plebiscite in Kashmir. But are not those who deny to the Kashmiris a fair and impartial plebiscite, denying to them the right of self determination? Is it they, or we, who wish to treat the people of Kashmir as chattel or cattle?

I now come to the appeal which the signatories of the memorandum make to Dr. Graham. They say: 'If we are living honourably in India today, it is certainly not due to Pakistan which, if anything has, by her policy and action, weakened our position. The credit goes to the broadminded leadership of India, to Mahatma Gandhi and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, to the traditions of tolerance in this country, and to the Constitution which ensures equal rights to all citizens of India, irrespective of their religion, caste, creed, colour or sex. We, therefore, feel that, tragically, as Muslims were misled by the Muslim League and subsequently by Pakistan and the unnecessary suffering which we had to go through in Pakistan and in India since partition, we must be given an opportunity to settle down to a life of tolerance and understanding, to the mutual benefit of the Hindus and Muslims in our country.' They go on to say: 'We are convinced that India will never attack our interests. First of all, it would be contrary to the spirit animating the political movement in this country. Secondly, it would be opposed to the Constitution and the sincere leadership of the Prime Minister. Thirdly, India, by committing such a folly, would be playing straight into the hands of Pakistan.'

Now, this is not only satisfactory but, if true, it is eminently reassuring. There are forty million Muslims in India, and if this statement is correct, we feel greatly reassured. But I do wish to add that the non-Muslims in Pakistan most certainly have a position of honour and security in Pakistan. As to their position under the constitution, our present constitution is exactly the same as was the constitution of India before it adopted its new constitution. So far as our future constitution is concerned, it is now being framed. But the Objectives Resolution has already been passed by our Constituent Assembly, and I challenge anybody to point out in the Objectives Resolution any hint of discrimination against the minorities. Indeed, there is a positive provision that they shall be able to develop their cultures and follow their respective religions with the utmost liberty and that the constitution shall, in every respect, safeguard their rights and their interests. It is specifically laid down that there shall be no discrimination, that there shall be equality before the law, that there shall be equality of opportunity.

True, the Objectives Resolution provides that the constitution shall be such as will enable the Muslims to lead their lives in the individual as well as in the national sphere according to the principles of Islam as laid down in the Quran and the Sunna. This, in itself, is a safeguard for the minorities; and, as is well known, at no time in history has a Muslim state ever tried to interfere with the religious liberty or the political rights or the social system of a non-Muslim community living within its borders. However, I need not go into the details. So far as our constitution is concerned, let anybody discover anything in the Objectives Resolution which, in any respect, is not at least as widely liberal as the provisions of the Indian constitution.

Now, look at the other side of the picture. These very gentlemen, the elite of the Muslim community of India, eminent in various walks of life, say in the same document: 'Our lot is not entirely happy. When partition took place, the Muslims in India were left in the lurch by the Muslim League and its leaders.' This is the picture of a perfectly happy people, who are given their due share in the political and economic life of the country, against whom there is differentiation, who are living in honour, and who are convinced that India shall never, never discriminate against them! They go on to say: 'Our loyalty to India was questioned.' It has not been questioned by us. Then they plead: 'We must be given an opportunity to settle down to a life of tolerance and understanding.' This is on 14th August, 1951, not on 14th August, 1947. Be given an opportunity to settle down to a life of tolerance and understanding! That is, they are still in the middle of the process and have not yet found tolerance and understanding.

It is further stated: 'In her oft-proclaimed anxiety to rescue the three million Muslims from what she describes as the tyranny of Hindus in the state, Pakistan evidently is prepared to sacrifice the interests of forty million Muslims in India.' They go on to say: 'So completely oblivious are they (that is, the people and Government of Pakistan) of our present problems and of our future that they are willing to sell us into slavery if only they can secure Kashmir.' After having already stated that Pakistan insisted upon a fair and impartial plebiscite in Kashmir, what does this mean? It can only mean that if such a plebiscite were held and resulted in Kashmir acceding to Pakistan, its effect on the forty million Muslims of India would be that they would pass into slavery. This would happen in the democratic secular state of India.

They go on: 'Pakistan's policy in general and her attitude towards Kashmir in particular thus tend to create conditions in this country which in the long run can only bring to us, Muslims, widespread suffering and destruction,' and further, 'we should like to impress upon you (that is, upon Dr. Graham) with all the emphasis at our command that Pakistan's policy towards Kashmir is fraught with the gravest peril to the forty million Muslims of India.' What do they ask Dr. Graham to do? Not to proceed with what he has undertaken to do? Not to arrange demilitarization in Kashmir? Not to try to persuade India to agree to it? If it means anything at all, it means that if a free and impartial plebiscite were held in Kashmir and if, as a result of that plebiscite, the people of Kashmir should decide to accede to Pakistan that would constitute the gravest peril to the forty million Muslims of India.

You can judge for yourselves in what extremity these gentlemen have been placed that they should subscribe to a document such as this. Knowing them as I do, I ask what has reduced them to it? It is clear that if you and I had been in India today we would have been compelled to say what they are saying. And that constitutes, before God and man, a complete justification for Pakistan, which they have condemned in such harsh words. Forty million Muslims are now living in a state of inward terror. But for Pakistan, a hundred million Muslims would have been in that terror.