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Source: *The Journal of Southern History*, Aug., 1958, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Aug., 1958), pp. 319-331

Published by: Southern Historical Association

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2954987>

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The Anti-Imperialists, the Philippines, and the Inequality of Man

By CHRISTOPHER LASCH

THE CESSION OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS TO THE UNITED States precipitated a great debate on the nature of our foreign policy and our national destiny. Opinion on the wisdom of retaining the Philippines was divided without regard to party or section; indeed, the intrusion of the expansionist issue into the politics of the period tended for a time to obliterate sectionalism. Yet sectional considerations, particularly in the South, were not absent from the debate. Southern Democrats were almost unanimous in condemning "imperialism," on the grounds that Asiatics, like Negroes, were innately inferior to white people and could not be assimilated to American life. Two decades earlier such arguments would have called forth angry rejoinders from the North. That the South's recourse to them at the end of the century did not revive the old controversy over Reconstruction revealed the extent to which Northern liberals had retreated from the implications of their emancipation of the Negro—a retreat the irony of which Southern statesmen never tired of expounding. An examination of the debate over imperialism helps to explain this remarkable change in Northern opinion and thereby enables us to see Southern racialism, so prevalent in the nineties, in a larger perspective. Thus a revaluation of an experience essentially national, not sectional, compels a revaluation of sectional history as well. Just as the corruption of the Reconstruction governments was paralleled by corruption in Northern state governments and in Washington, as historians are beginning to show, so at a somewhat later date illiberalism in the South also had its counterpart

in the North. The retreat from idealism was a national, not a local, phenomenon.

That Northerners of the expansionist persuasion made no reply to those who in the course of challenging the annexation of the Philippines challenged some of the fundamental assumptions of American democracy should come as no surprise. The expansionists were in a delicate predicament. Men who favored acquiring the Philippines on the grounds that the natives were unfit for self-government could hardly afford to apply another logic to the Negro problem in the South; Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, among others, might well look back on his recent Force Bill as a youthful indiscretion which it were prudent to forget.¹ But one would not have expected anti-imperialists in the North to share this reluctance to revive the dispute over equality. Because they professed a fervid devotion to the rights of man, the anti-imperialists might have been expected to guide the debate over annexation to higher ground by rejecting outright the leading argument both of the expansionists and of the Southern anti-expansionists, namely that men are created unequal. Most historians have in fact assumed that anti-imperialism was genuinely liberal in inspiration and that the anti-imperialists were voicing objections to colonialism now commonly accepted.²

The position of the anti-imperialists does at first appear to have been sensible and straightforward: that is, that imperialism was not only inexpedient but unjust, a departure from the historic principles of the Declaration of Independence. But a closer examination of certain facets of anti-imperialism may require us to see the anti-imperialists in a rather different light. Their argument did not foreshadow the liberalism of the Good Neighbor

¹ On expansionist ideology see Julius W. Pratt, *Expansionists of 1898* (Baltimore, 1936), Albert K. Weinberg, *Manifest Destiny* (Baltimore, 1935), and Richard Hofstadter, *Social Darwinism in American Thought* (rev. ed., Boston, 1955), *passim*.

² There are few works which deal directly with anti-imperialism and none which analyze in any detail the anti-imperialist argument. Fred H. Harrington, "The Anti-Imperialist Movement in the United States, 1898-1900," in *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* (Cedar Rapids, 1914-), XXII (September 1935), 211-30, is the standard reference; see also the same author's "Literary Aspects of American Anti-Imperialism," in *New England Quarterly* (Baltimore, 1928-), X (December 1937), 650-67, and Maria C. Lanzar, "The Anti-Imperialist League," in *Philippine Social Science Review* (Manila, 1929-), III (August 1930), 7-41. The assumptions to which I allude are to be found scattered through many other secondary works too numerous and too general to cite here.

policy. It was in fact no more liberal than that of the expansionists. Indeed, it resembled the expansionist rationale, against which it appeared to be a protest, far more closely than it does any of the objections we might today raise against a colonial policy, or for that matter than it resembled the theories of Thomas Jefferson. It was a product of the late nineteenth century, not of the eighteenth or twentieth centuries. The anti-imperialists, like the imperialists, saw the world from a pseudo-Darwinian point of view. They accepted the inequality of man—or, to be more precise, of races—as an established fact of life. They did not question the idea that Anglo-Saxons were superior to other people, and some of them would even have agreed that they were destined eventually to conquer the world. They did not quarrel with the idea of “destiny”; they merely refused to believe that destiny required such strenuous exertions of the American people, particularly when they saw in those exertions the menace of militarism and tyranny. There were important differences of opinion, of course, between those who favored and those who opposed the annexation of the Philippines, but for the moment it is perhaps more important to dwell on the matters on which they agreed. Most middle-class Americans of the 1890’s agreed in attaching great importance to the concept of race, and it was that agreement which gave the intellectual life of the period its peculiar tone.

It is characteristic of the period that neither side in the debate over the Philippines was content to rest its case on considerations of expediency alone, although the expansionist clique on whom defense of the “large policy” devolved tried to rouse the business community, which was apathetic toward the whole question of expansion, with visions of glittering markets in China.³ But economic arguments could too easily be attacked as sordid, and the expansionists preferred to stand on higher ground. They appealed to “manifest destiny,” an old idea, and to the newer, post-Darwinian idea that it was the manifest *duty* of higher civilizations to displace lower ones, either through outright elimination (as the white man had eliminated the Indian) or through

³ See, for example, the speech of Albert J. Beveridge to the Middlesex Club (Boston), April 27, 1898, in his *The Meaning of the Times and Other Speeches* (Indianapolis, 1908), 37-46; and Henry Cabot Lodge’s speech in the Senate, March 7, 1900, in *Congressional Record*, 56 Cong., 1 Sess., 2628-29.

a process of uplift and "Christianization." It was as carriers of civilization, they argued, that the American people were obliged to annex the Philippines, however disagreeable the obligation might appear.⁴

The anti-imperialists, largely ignoring the economic and strategic arguments for annexation, replied with a moral argument of their own. They admitted that our history, as the expansionists were fond of showing, was a record of territorial expansion, but they fixed the limits of our westward destiny at the shores of the Pacific. The American destiny, they contended, was merely continental, not global. All of the areas previously acquired by the United States had been on the North American continent, and all except Alaska had been contiguous to the old states. Because they were contiguous and because they were thinly populated, they came to be settled by citizens from the older states, by white, Protestant, English-speaking people—by a population, in short, indistinguishable from that of the older states. The new territories, therefore, could be, and were, admitted to statehood. (Alaska, again, was the single exception.)

But to annex distant islands already heavily populated by racial aliens, the anti-imperialists maintained, would be a momentous and disastrous departure from the past. The Filipinos, for any number of reasons, could not become American citizens; they would have to be governed as subjects. But how could a republic have subjects? For the United States to acquire the Philippines without admitting their people to full citizenship would amount to government without the consent of the governed—a flat contradiction of the cardinal principle of American democracy, the principle over which we separated from England, the principle of the Declaration of Independence. Nor was this all. As a result of the initial injustice, others would follow. A large standing army would have to be created in order to defend our new possessions not only against foreign powers but against the natives themselves, who were already in revolt against American rule; and an army called into being for the purpose of crushing freedom abroad would ultimately be used to destroy it at home. The administration had already begun to censor news from the Philippines, in order to create the impression that the

⁴ Summaries of the imperialist argument appear in the works cited above, note 1.

hostilities there were purely defensive in character, and the anti-imperialists saw in this an evil omen—proof that if the United States persisted in imperialism, she would eventually go the way of Rome.⁵

The exponents of annexation could offer no satisfactory answer to all this. Instead, they attempted to create a dilemma of their own—to show that there was no satisfactory alternative to annexation. Accordingly they argued that the Filipinos were not “ready” for self-government and if left to themselves would fall into the hands of a native dictator or a foreign conqueror.⁶ But not a single expansionist proposed that the privileges of citizenship be extended to the Philippines. They assumed that the Filipinos would have to be governed as second-class citizens, and with that assumption they departed from the natural-rights philosophy of the Declaration of Independence, exactly as their antagonists accused them of doing. Senator Henry M. Teller, an expansionist, confessed that to hold the islanders as subjects would be “rather objectionable in a republic”; but there seemed no choice.⁷ Not all the expansionists had similar reservations, but almost all of them recognized and admitted the implications of their policy for the doctrine of natural rights. In effect, they substituted for the Jeffersonian proposition that the right to liberty is “natural”—hence universal—the proposition that rights depend on environment—on “civilization,” of which there were now seen to be many stages of development; on race; even on climate. A pseudo-Darwinian hierarchy of cultural stages, unequal in the capacity for enjoyment of the rights associated with self-government, replaced the simpler and more liberal theory of the Enlightenment, which recognized only the distinction between society and nature. “Rights,” as absolutes, lost their mean-

⁵ Samples of anti-imperialist thought: George S. Boutwell, *Party or Country?* (Boston, 1900) and *Republic or Empire?* (Boston, 1900); David Starr Jordan, *Imperial Democracy* (New York, 1899); George F. Hoar, *The Lust of Empire* (New York, 1900) and *No Constitutional Power to Conquer Foreign Nations and Hold Their People in Subjection against Their Will* (Boston, 1899); Richard F. Pettigrew, *Imperial Washington* (Chicago, 1922); Moorfield Storey, *Is It Right?* (Chicago, 1900) and, with Marcial P. Lichauco, *The Conquest of the Philippines by the United States* (New York, 1926).

⁶ McKinley's famous rationalization is the classic example; see Charles S. Olcott, *William McKinley* (2 vols., Boston, 1916), II, 110-11. See also Theodore Roosevelt's speech at Grand Rapids, Michigan, September 7, 1900, in his *Works* (National Edition, 20 vols., New York, 1926), XIV, 352-59.

⁷ *Cong. Record*, 55 Cong., 3 Sess., 969 (January 24, 1899).

ing by becoming relative to time and place. Rights now depended on a people's "readiness" to enjoy them.⁸

It is not surprising that the anti-imperialists accused the expansionists of abandoning the Declaration of Independence. What is surprising is that their own arguments were no closer to the spirit of that document than the ones they denounced with such fervor. The anti-imperialists were in fact no more Jeffersonian in their essential outlook than Theodore Roosevelt or Henry Cabot Lodge or Alfred T. Mahan was, for they did not challenge the central assumption of imperialist thought: the natural inequality of men. The imperialists at least had the merit of consistency; they made no professions of Jeffersonianism. The anti-imperialists, on the other hand, invoked the name of Jefferson at every opportunity.

Some light on the anti-imperialists is shed by the high proportion of Southerners among them. In the Senate, only four of twenty-eight Southern senators favored unconditional ratification of the treaty with Spain, and Southerners led the attack on the treaty in debate.⁹ Their arguments against ratification clearly reflected the lingering bitterness of Reconstruction, as well as more recent movements to exclude Negroes from the benefits of citizenship. Annexation of the Philippines, they argued, would merely compound the race problem by introducing into the country what Senator John W. Daniel of Virginia called a "mess of Asiatic pottage."¹⁰ Benjamin R. Tillman of South Carolina was especially active in the anti-imperialist cause, playing ingenious variations on the racial theme. At times he gave it a distinctly Darwinian note: ". . . we [he said, referring to the South] understand and realize what it is to have two races side by side that can not mix or mingle without deterioration and injury to both and the ultimate destruction of the civilization of the higher."¹¹ At other times he gave it a pro-labor bias: ". . . here are 10,000,000

⁸ For the influence of Darwinism on imperialist thought see Hofstadter, *Social Darwinism*, ch. ix.

⁹ The four Southern senators who argued for the treaty were Marion Butler and Jeter C. Pritchard (North Carolina), John L. McLaurin (South Carolina), and Edmund W. Pettus (Alabama); see *Cong. Record*, 55 Cong., 3 Sess. (January-February 1899), *passim*. Five others voted for the treaty but had clear reservations about doing so. The vote is in *Journal of the Executive Proceedings of the Senate*, 55 Cong., 1284 (February 6, 1899).

¹⁰ *Cong. Record*, 55 Cong., 3 Sess., 1430 (February 3, 1899).

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 1532 (February 7, 1899).

Asiatics who will have the right as soon as the pending treaty is ratified, to get on the first ship that they can reach and come here and compete in the labor market of the United States.”¹² In a more somber mood, he appeared to speak more in sorrow than in anger: “. . . coming . . . as a Senator from . . . South Carolina, with 750,000 colored population and only 500,000 whites, I realize what you are doing, while you don’t; and I would save this country from the injection into it of another race question which can only breed bloodshed and a costly war and the loss of the lives of our brave soldiers.”¹³ More often, however, he spoke with biting irony which revealed the Negro, not the Filipino, as the real source of his anxiety and, further, which showed that he was more interested in embarrassing the North—in forcing its senators to admit to a contradiction—than he was in preventing the acquisition of the Philippines. When Knute Nelson of Minnesota, once an abolitionist, declared that the Filipinos were incapable of self-government, Tillman replied: “I want to call the Senator’s attention to the fact, however, that he and others who are now contending for a different policy in Hawaii and the Philippines gave the slaves of the South not only self-government, but they forced on the white men of the South, at the point of the bayonet, the rule and domination of those ex-slaves. Why the difference? Why the change? Do you acknowledge that you were wrong in 1868?”¹⁴

It is unnecessary to insist that such arguments did not spring from a deep-seated attachment to the Declaration of Independence. But it would be manifestly unfair to judge the whole anti-imperialist movement on the basis of its Southern wing, particularly when many Northern men of the persuasion were clearly uncomfortable at finding themselves in the company of men like Tillman. An examination of their own arguments, however, discloses no important difference from that of the Southerners, except that Northern anti-imperialists did not dwell on the par-

¹² *Ibid.*, 1380 (February 2, 1899).

¹³ *Ibid.*, 1389 (February 2, 1899).

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 836-37 (January 20, 1899). According to Tillman’s biographer, “His grievance, the real motive for his opposition, was the refusal of the Republicans to admit inconsistencies in their views of colored people. He wanted the Republicans to confess their conduct toward the colonials as frankly as he was confessing his toward the blacks.” Francis B. Simkins, *Pitchfork Ben Tillman, South Carolinian* (Baton Rouge, 1944), 355.

allel with the Southern Negro problem—something they were by this time anxious to forget. One is left with the impression that it was not the Southern argument as such that disconcerted the Northerners, but the use to which the South put it. When it came to giving reasons why the Philippines should not be annexed, North and South found themselves in close agreement.¹⁵

Anti-imperialists contended that the Filipinos, unless they were given their independence, would have to be held in subjection, since they could not be admitted as citizens. What is interesting is the manner in which they arrived at the latter conclusion. A brief study of the process reveals a Darwinism as thoroughgoing as that of the imperialists themselves.

In the first place, the anti-imperialists argued, if the Filipinos became citizens, they would migrate to the United States and compete with American labor—a prospect especially alarming in view of the racial composition of the islands. As Samuel Gompers declared: “If the Philippines are annexed, what is to prevent the Chinese, the Negritos, and the Malays coming to our own country?”¹⁶ This was more than an economic argument. It implied that those people were accustomed to a low standard of living and, what is more, that they were incapable, by virtue of their race, of longing for anything better. It implied that Orientals, in short, would work for low wages because they could not, and never would, appreciate the finer things of life which money alone could buy. This view had already come into vogue on the West Coast, where it was particularly popular with organized labor; it is not surprising, therefore, to find Gompers appealing to it.

¹⁵ A few Northern anti-imperialists, like Moorfield Storey, defended the rights of the Negro, and accordingly did not object to imperialism on racial grounds; but these were rare exceptions. For Storey see Mark A. De Wolfe Howe, *Portrait of an Independent* (Boston, 1932). Even men like E. L. Godkin, who could not be called racists, were willing at least to approve use of Darwinian arguments by others. See, for instance, *Nation* (New York, 1865-), LXVII (July 28, 1898), 62; (August 4, 1898), 81.

¹⁶ Quoted in an anonymous pamphlet, *Expensive Expansion* (Boston, 1900), 9. For similar arguments see James W. Stillman, *Republic or Empire?* (Boston, 1900); Edwin D. Mead, *The Present Crisis* (Boston, 1899), *passim*; and George S. Boutwell, speech of February 23, 1900, in New England Anti-Imperialist League, *Second Annual Report* (Boston, 1900), 18.

Another labor argument was that defense of the Philippines would require a large standing army, which labor would be taxed to support. See George F. McNeil, in *Speeches at the Meeting in Faneuil Hall, June 15, 1898* (Boston, 1898), 29.

If cheap Filipino labor would compete unfairly with American labor, cheap Filipino goods could be expected to compete unfairly with American goods. If we took over the islands, we could neither prevent immigration nor levy protective import duties. Annexation would therefore injure both capital and labor.¹⁷

But the Filipinos would also be given the vote. Considering, again, the racial composition of the islands, the results would clearly be ruinous. Carl Schurz declared:

If they become states on an equal footing with the other states they will not only be permitted to govern themselves as to their home concerns, but will take part in governing the whole republic, in governing us, by sending senators and representatives into our Congress to help make our laws, and by voting for president and vice-president to give our national government its executive. The prospect of the consequences which would follow the admission of the Spanish creoles and the negroes of the West India islands and of the Malays and Tagals of the Philippines to participation in the conduct of our government is so alarming that you instinctively pause before taking the step.¹⁸

The same sentiments were expressed by James L. Blair of St. Louis, the son of the old Free Soil leader Francis Preston Blair. "History," Blair said, "shows no instance of a tropical people who have demonstrated a capacity for maintaining an enduring form of Republican government."¹⁹ To admit such a people into a share in the government of the United States would be self-destructive. David Starr Jordan warned his countrymen: "If we govern the Philippines, so in their degree must the Philippines govern us."²⁰ Or as Champ Clark put it even more forcefully in the House of Representatives: "No matter whether they are fit to govern themselves or not, they are not fit to govern us [ap-
plause]."²¹

But if it was undesirable for the Filipinos to come to the United States or to take part in American government, was it not still

¹⁷ See, for example, Mead, *The Present Crisis, passim*.

¹⁸ "The Issue of Imperialism," in Frederic Bancroft (ed.), *Speeches, Correspondence and Political Papers of Carl Schurz* (6 vols., New York, 1913), VI, 8-9.

¹⁹ James L. Blair, *Imperialism, Our New National Policy* (St. Louis, 1899), 18.

²⁰ "Colonial Expansion," in Jordan, *Imperial Democracy*, 48.

²¹ *Cong. Record*, 56 Cong., 1 Sess., 1520 (February 5, 1900).

possible that Americans would emigrate to the Philippines and gradually displace the native culture? The anti-imperialists denied that any such outcome was possible. In the first place, "the two races could never amalgamate"; "the racial differences between the Oriental and Western races are never to be eradicated."²² But suppose the Filipinos were eliminated by force or herded into reservations, like the American Indians. Even then, the anti-imperialists insisted, annexation would be unwise, for the fact was that neither the "northern" (or "Anglo-Saxon" or "Germanic") race nor democratic institutions could survive in a tropical climate. "Civilization," said Jordan, "is, as it were, suffocated in the tropics."²³ On another occasion he explained that the Philippines "lie in the heart of the torrid zone, 'Nature's asylum for degenerates.'" "Neither the people nor the institutions of the United States can ever occupy the Philippines," he said. "The American home cannot endure there, the town-meeting cannot exist."²⁴ Schurz echoed the same refrain:

They are . . . situated in the tropics, where people of the northern races, such as Anglo-Saxons, or generally speaking, people of Germanic blood, have never migrated in mass to stay; and they are more or less densely populated, parts of them as densely as Massachusetts—their population consisting almost exclusively of races to whom the tropical climate is congenial— . . . Malays, Tagals, Filipinos, Chinese, Japanese, Negritos, and various more or less barbarous tribes. . . .²⁵

Such arguments clearly showed that the anti-imperialists had abandoned the natural-rights philosophy of the Declaration of Independence for a complicated Darwinian view of the world. According to this view, which appeared to be substantiated by the science of the day and by the writings of historians like Herbert Baxter Adams, geography, race, and political institutions were inextricably intertwined. The temperate zone—specifically

²² Blair, *Imperialism*, 23.

²³ Jordan, *Imperial Democracy*, 45.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 93, 97.

²⁵ Schurz, "The Issue of Imperialism," in Bancroft (ed.), *Speeches*, VI, 6. The idea that democratic institutions were not adaptable to the tropics appears, in various forms, in the same writer's "Our Future Foreign Policy," *ibid.*, V, 481-84; in Thomas B. Reed, MS. on imperialism, 1898, in Samuel W. McCall, *Life of Thomas Brackett Reed* (Boston, 1914), 256, 258; and in *Nation*, LXVIII (March 16, 1899), 196. According to the latter, "Our government was made for peaceable, industrious, homogeneous, Protestant men."

the northern part of it—bred the “Germanic” race, from which Americans were descended. Free institutions were associated with the rise of that race; a study of other cultures showed no similar institutions. Because they alone were capable of using liberty wisely, the Germans had already risen to a cultural level far beyond that of any other race and were possibly destined to supplant all others. In view of their inability to survive in the tropics, however, it was not quite clear how this was to be accomplished; and for that reason, perhaps, the anti-imperialists preferred to see the Anglo-Saxons stay at home, in their native habitat. In any case, to mingle their blood with that of Asiatics would be a fatal departure from what Charles Francis Adams, for example, called the “cardinal principle in our policy as a race.” He referred to our Indian policy, which he admitted had been harsh; but it had “saved the Anglo-Saxon stock from being a nation of half-breeds.”²⁶ The acquisition of the Philippines would again endanger the purity of the old stock, on which America’s very survival depended.

An examination of the arguments against annexation of the Philippines leads to a number of interesting conclusions. In the first place, it is difficult, after having read their writings and speeches, to convince oneself that the anti-imperialists had the better of the argument, as historians have tended to assume. Whatever the merits of the expansionists’ contention that the Filipinos were not ready for self-government, the expansionists were at least consistent in the conclusions which they drew from it. If it was true that the Filipinos could not govern themselves, the humane policy (although not necessarily the wisest one) was to govern them ourselves. The anti-imperialists, on the other hand, while sharing the expansionists’ basic assumption (an assumption contrary to the spirit of American democracy), were perfectly willing to leave the Filipinos to their fate—certainly a most un-Christian policy if they were indeed unable to manage their own affairs.²⁷ So far as the moral argument had any validity at all, the anti-imperialists were on weak ground; and since they

²⁶ Charles Francis Adams, *Imperialism and the Tracks of Our Forefathers* (Boston, 1899), 10.

²⁷ A remark of Bourke Cockran was characteristic. “An imperial system,” he said, “might result in benefit to those islanders. I won’t dispute that, but I do insist that it would be absolutely ruinous to this nation.” Speech of February 23,

insisted on treating the question as a matter of right and wrong, it seems fair to judge them accordingly.

But it is not possible to condemn anti-imperialists for holding certain opinions on race unless one is willing to condemn the entire society of which they were a part. The fact is that the atmosphere of the late nineteenth century was so thoroughly permeated with racist thought (reinforced by Darwinism) that few men managed to escape it. The idea that certain cultures and races were naturally inferior to others was almost universally held by educated, middle-class, respectable Americans—in other words, by the dominant majority. The widespread and almost unconscious adherence to it was unmistakably manifested, in the same period, in the national policy toward minorities more familiar to American experience than the Filipinos, and in particular toward immigrants and Negroes. This was the period of the first serious restrictions on immigration; it was the period of the South's successful re-elimination of the Negro from white society. Men who called themselves liberals—survivors of the antislavery crusade and the battles of the sixties and seventies on behalf of the Negroes: liberal Republicans, mugwumps, “independents”—acquiesced in these developments. A study of anti-imperialism makes it a little clearer why they did, for the anti-imperialist movement was dominated by these same men—men like Schurz, Adams, Jordan, and Moorfield Storey.²⁸ Except for

1900, in New England Anti-Imperialist League, *Second Annual Report*, 31. Godkin's *Nation* was likewise unconcerned with what might eventually happen to the natives: “We do not know why the Filipinos have not the right to try to govern themselves as well as any other people. If they fail we consider it no concern of ours, any more than to accelerate their progress towards civilization and self-government.” *Nation*, LXVIII (October 27, 1898), 309.

The equanimity with which most anti-imperialists contemplated the suffering which might befall the Filipinos paralleled their attitude toward minorities at home—farmers and laborers, for instance; they knew there was suffering, but they denied that it was the business of government to alleviate it.

²⁸ The clear connection between the anti-imperialist movement and earlier movements for liberal reform has never received much attention; and it concerns us here only in passing. It should be pointed out, however, that although the movement received widespread and varied support, it was led and dominated by men like Schurz, Godkin, Storey, Adams, Blair, Edward Atkinson, Erving Winslow, and Gamaliel Bradford, who had at one time or another been active on behalf of antislavery agitation, civil service reform, free trade, and other “liberal” causes. These men regarded party politicians who joined the struggle—politicians like Tillman, Bryan, and even Senator George F. Hoar—with distinctive misgivings, as not wholly sincere in their opposition to the “large policy.” This suspicion was not without basis.

Storey, these men had now receded from their earlier idealism. They continued to speak of their part in the struggle for Negro rights, to refer to it with pride, but by referring to it as a fight which had already been won they indicated their indifference to the continuing plight of the Southern Negro. Indeed, they had abandoned him, as they now proposed to abandon the Filipinos. They had no further interest in crusading; the times, it appeared, called for retrenchment.