

12/Industrial Societies: Part III

Question: What is the ideal income?
Answer: 10 per cent more than you've got.
American saying

The Educational Class System

IN TRADITIONAL AGRARIAN SOCIETIES, educational institutions were few in number, and not of great importance from the distributive standpoint. In the main they served but two relevant functions: first, as "finishing schools" for children of the governing class, teaching them the distinctive social skills appropriate to their station in life, and second, as training institutions for boys recruited largely from the retainer class, providing them with some of the skills and knowledge they would need later in the service of their superiors.¹ In neither case, however, did they greatly disturb the

¹ For a classic discussion of the first function, see Thorstein Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class* (New York: New Modern Library, 1934, first published 1899), chap. 14.

transmission of power and privilege from father to son along traditional, hereditary lines.² The competitive element was severely limited because the vast majority of boys were never given an opportunity to attend school, and were therefore condemned to illiteracy. The sons of peasants and artisans learned what they had to know by observing their father or, at best, by serving an apprenticeship with some master craftsman.

One of the major consequences of the modern revolution in knowledge has been the destruction of this ancient, aristocratic system of education. In advanced industrial societies, illiteracy and ignorance are handicaps not only for the illiterate and ignorant, but for the rest of society as well. A high level of productivity in an industrial society requires a labor force which is at least literate, and there is good reason to believe that the level of productivity of the economy is closely related to the level of education of the labor force. Hence, the privileged classes have a vested interest in providing educational opportunity for all—a situation radically different from that in agrarian societies. Furthermore, as a result of the democratization of government, in most industrial societies, the masses of common people have a resource which they can use to demand educational facilities.

Evidence of the change can be found in contemporary statistics on school attendance. In the United States more than 99 per cent of all children aged seven to thirteen attend school, and more than 90 per cent of those aged fourteen to seventeen.³ At ages eighteen and nineteen, nearly 40 per cent are still in attendance. By 1960 approximately 18 per cent of all American young people were graduating from college, and for males the figure was 24 per cent.⁴ While American figures are the highest in the world, other industrial nations are moving in the same direction.⁵

Though the expansion of educational systems has meant increased competition for this valuable resource, one must not exaggerate the degree to which equality of educational opportunity has been approximated. The Wolfe study in the 1950s made it clear that the relationship between intelligence and academic success is far from perfect. It was found that a few

² Pitirim Sorokin takes a contrary position concerning the role of schools in traditional Indian and Chinese societies [see *Social Mobility* (New York: Harper & Row, 1927), pp. 191–193], but more recent research does not support his position (see chaps. 8 and 9 of this volume).

³ *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1962* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1962), p. 115.

⁴ These figures are estimated from the *Statistical Abstract, 1962*, tables 18 and 168.

⁵ See, for example, J. Frederic Dewhurst and Associates, *Europe's Needs and Resources* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961), table 10–9, which shows that in the sixteen nations of Western Europe, the median increase in secondary school enrollments between 1938 and 1955 was 81 per cent. During this same period the population of Western Europe increased only 16 per cent (appendix 2–1, table A).

individuals who ranked in the bottom 5 per cent in ability graduated from college, while some of those in the top tenth of 1 per cent did not graduate from high school.⁶ More specifically, 69 per cent of those in the top 0.1 per cent in terms of intelligence graduated from college, compared with 49 per cent of those in the top 5 per cent, and 34 per cent in the top 20 per cent.⁷ Other studies suggest the same conclusion: *there is a fairly strong positive correlation between intelligence and educational achievement, but no more than this.*⁸

While a number of factors, both social and psychological, are responsible for the imperfect correlation, differences in family background are among the most important. Parents in the professional, managerial, propertied, and political classes are able to provide their children with many advantages, not only financial, but, equally important, such things as linguistic skills, motivation, and facilities for private study. It seems no exaggeration to say that *the family is the most powerful single factor counteracting the egalitarian tendency inherent in modern educational systems.* As noted previously, this factor is apparently just as important in the Soviet Union today as in the United States.⁹

In the more advanced industrial societies, formal educational attainments are becoming an increasingly important resource. This is mainly due to the increasing bureaucratization of modern personnel practices, itself a product of the growth in the size of organizations. In the smaller organizations of an earlier era, hiring, firing, and promotions were occasional matters and likely to be handled in an informal manner. Particularistic criteria were invoked without apology: if the owner's son was promoted over the heads of more experienced men, this was taken for granted. Today, by contrast, it is expected that personnel decisions will be made on the basis of universalistic standards. This means that personnel managers are under pressure to find objective criteria which can be invoked to justify their decisions. Because educational institutions perform a selective function and because information on educational attainment is readily accessible, personnel managers feel, not without justification, that educational criteria can be used as basic criteria in decisions about hiring and promotion. Thus it has come to be that only high school graduates are considered for appointments to certain positions, and only college

⁶ Dael Wolfe, *America's Resources of Specialized Talent* (New York: Harper & Row, 1954), table G.2.

⁷ *Ibid.*, table VI.1.

⁸ See, for example, Burton Clark, *Educating the Expert Society* (San Francisco, Calif.: Chandler, 1962), tables 2.1 and 2.2.

⁹ See p. 332 above, or David Burg, "Observations of Soviet University Students," in Richard Pipes (ed.), *The Russian Intelligentsia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), pp. 80-81.

graduates for others. As a result, *educational status has become increasingly important as a resource in the struggle for power and privilege*. It is becoming a necessary prerequisite for admission to most of the more rewarding occupations in advanced industrial societies. The day when men could rise to the top by serving an apprenticeship under an established professional man, e.g., as in the old practice of "reading the law," or by promotion up through the ranks, is rapidly becoming a thing of the past in bureaucratized industrial societies.¹⁰

These trends in employment practices are leading to an organizational arrangement which closely resembles the caste-like system of the military, with its sharp distinction between officers and enlisted men. Management stands in a position similar to that of the officers, being recruited from outside the organization and brought in over the heads of production workers and others with far more seniority and experience. Typically, recruits to management come directly from the ranks of current college and university graduates. Other employees, who are not required to have this level of education, are not permitted to enter the ranks of management, except perhaps in the capacity of foreman, a marginal role resembling the role of warrant officer in the army. For production workers

¹⁰ See, for example, W. Lloyd Warner and James C. Abegglen, *Occupational Mobility in American Business and Industry, 1928-1952* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1955), p. 198, who show that the percentage of American business leaders with less than a college education dropped from 55 per cent at the time of the Taussig and Joslyn study in 1928, to 24 per cent in 1952, the year of their study. These figures would be even lower if the older executives were removed from the totals. For other figures on the trend, see Mabel Newcomer, *The Big Business Executive* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955), table 24, p. 68. Warner has also shown that college education is now virtually a prerequisite for managerial posts in the Federal government. The percentages with some college education range from a low of 93 per cent in the case of career executives in the civil service, to a high of 98 per cent among military leaders and executives in the Foreign Service. See W. Lloyd Warner et al., *The American Federal Executive* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1963), table 33B, p. 354. Similar patterns are evident elsewhere. See, for example, Roy Lewis and Rosemary Stewart, *The Managers: A New Examination of the English, German and American Executive* (New York: Mentor Books, 1961), chap. 3, on the changing pattern of recruitment for executive positions in British industry; David Granick, *The European Executive* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor, 1964), especially pp. 19-43 and 354-355, on France, Belgium, and Britain; and David Granick, *The Red Executive* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor, 1961), chap. 4, or Nicholas DeWitt, *Education and Professional Employment in the USSR* (Washington, D.C.: National Science Foundation, 1961), on the Soviet Union. With respect to the Soviet Union, Granick states, "I received the impression from conversations that a college education is virtually an absolute requirement for a candidate for an industrial management post" (*Red Executive*, p. 46). A recent (1960) study of Japanese business leaders shows that 91 per cent had university training. See James Abegglen and Hiroshi Mannari, "Japanese Business Leaders: 1880-1960," unpublished manuscript prepared for the Conference on State and Economic Enterprise in Modern Japan, Association for Asian Studies, 1963, p. 47, or James Abegglen, *The Japanese Factory: Aspects of Its Social Organization* (New York: Free Press, 1958), table 1, p. 28.

in industry, as for enlisted men in the army, promotions are usually confined to their own segregated hierarchy, thus limiting severely upward mobility for those without college training.

One curious aspect of this development was uncovered by Warner and Abegglen in their study of American business leaders. They found an *inverse* relationship between the educational attainments of executives in an industry or firm and the rate of growth of that industry or firm.¹¹ This led them to conclude that educational requirements for managerial recruits may have been exaggerated. This conclusion, though admittedly speculative, presents a serious challenge to the functionalist thesis that society uses its rewards to attract the ablest members of society to the most demanding positions and to insure their effective performance in them. Moreover, it suggests that educational attainments are symbols not only of ability and motivation, but also of membership in a favored class whose members are more concerned with the advancement of their personal and class interests than with the well-being of either the nation or the firm.

Statistics compiled in recent years show clearly the relationship between income and education when the disturbing factor of age is controlled. For example, 1960 census returns revealed the following differences in annual income among white American males aged forty-five to fifty-four:¹²

0-7 years of education	\$3,872
8 years of education	\$4,722
1-3 years of high school	\$5,335
4 years of high school	\$5,829
1-3 years of college	\$6,765
4 or more years of college	\$9,233

Comparisons with earlier years show widening differentials both in absolute and relative terms. For example, whereas in 1946 high school graduates earned 26 per cent more than grammar school graduates, by 1958 this figure had jumped to 48 per cent.¹³ Similarly, the differential between high school and college graduates rose from 57 per cent in 1939 to 65 per cent in 1958.¹⁴ Though the time periods involved are much too short to be conclusive, they suggest an important trend.

¹¹ Warner and Abegglen, pp. 140-141.

¹² *U.S. Census of Population, 1960: Occupation by Earnings and Education* (Washington: U.S. Bureau of the Census, n.d.), table 1, p. 3. The figures shown are all median figures.

¹³ Herman P. Miller, "Annual and Lifetime Income in Relation to Education: 1939-1959," *American Economic Review*, 50 (1960), p. 969.

¹⁴ *Ibid.* The difference in the base years in the two comparisons is due to the absence of data on grammar school graduates in 1939.

One might wonder whether education itself is really of great importance, or whether it is merely a symptom of more basic factors, such as intelligence or family background. One recent study indicates that education is no mere symptom, but rather a factor of vital importance in its own right. This study involved a careful survey in 1962 of several hundred male students who enrolled at the University of Illinois in the fall of 1952 but left without graduating. Data were obtained on their current jobs, family background, intelligence (as measured by tests while at the University), and subsequent educational record. It was found that the chief determinant of the status of the jobs the men held in 1962 was their subsequent educational experience. Those who had returned to college and graduated held nearly all of the high status jobs; those who failed to return, or returned but did not graduate were concentrated in the medium and low status jobs. Family background (as measured by the student's father's occupation), and even intelligence, counted for little by comparison with formal educational attainment (as measured by graduation from college).¹⁵

An interesting question which has not yet received the attention it deserves is that of the degree to which educated people have actively striven to enhance the rewards of education. This is a difficult problem for scholars even to recognize: to those who are educated, it seems only natural to encourage education and reward the educated, since in the end "this cannot but redound to the general good." Unfortunately, once one begins to reflect on the matter, it becomes evident that this thesis of the educated class is very similar to that of businessmen who have long insisted that "what is good for business is good for the country." The self-serving aspects of such an ideology, when stated by others, are always obvious, but when stated by one's own group, are not. In one of the few serious treatments of this subject, Michael Young, a British sociologist, has suggested that the modern trend toward socialism and the welfare state may yet be reversed by a new movement toward "meritocracy," an elitist society dominated by the most talented and best educated.¹⁶ Elusive though it is, and difficult to test in any conclusive fashion, this hypothesis deserves careful attention.

Before concluding this examination of the role of education in the distributive process, note must be taken of the unique role educational

¹⁵ See Bruce Eckland, "Academic Ability, Higher Education, and Occupational Mobility," *American Sociological Review*, 30 (1965), pp. 735-746. Some of the statements above are based on data presented in an earlier version of this paper but subsequently deleted.

¹⁶ *The Rise of Meritocracy, 1870-2033: The New Elite of Our Social Revolution* (New York: Random House, 1959).

institutions play in undergirding existing political and distributive systems by disseminating appropriate political ideologies. In totalitarian nations this is done quite openly and without apology, and the results have been most impressive. In the Soviet Union, for example, the great majority of those educated since the Revolution seem to accept without question the legitimacy of the Communist Party's monopoly of political power.¹⁷

In democratic nations this ideological function of educational institutions is less open and also less one-sided. Educational leaders are much more likely to maintain that their institutions are concerned merely with the inculcation of objective truths and the transmission of essential techniques. Usually they avoid partisan political conflict. Nevertheless, a careful examination of the content of the curriculum usually indicates that it is designed to develop in the student a respect for his nation's political traditions and heritage, and that this necessarily implies an acceptance of the basic political arrangements and their distributive correlates. This pattern is most evident in the lower grades and in those institutions which educate children from the lower and middle classes. By contrast, in the better universities, which disproportionately serve the children from the upper and upper-middle strata, more critical views are expressed with some frequency. Though systematic evidence on this point is lacking, it appears that the chief effect of this is to develop a "reformist mentality" in a significant minority of the leaders of the next generation. Such persons are committed to all of the *basic* elements in the political and distributive *status quo*, but accept the need for modification in *secondary* elements. The late President Kennedy or Governor Nelson Rockefeller of New York are good examples of individuals of this type. They are neither revolutionaries nor "standpatters." Their presence in the political leadership of democratic nations contributes greatly to their viability and, as a consequence, reduces the probability of revolution. Thus these developments in the educational sphere strengthen constitutionalism, with all that that implies for the operation of distributive systems.

Racial, Ethnic, and Religious Class Systems

Many, *though not all*, of the more advanced industrial nations of the modern world contain serious racial, ethnic, or religious cleavages. In Canada there is the increasingly serious division between French Catholics and "English" Protestants. West Germany is divided between Catho-

¹⁷ See especially Alex Inkeles and Raymond Bauer, *The Soviet Citizen* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959).

lics and Protestants, as is Holland, where the Protestants are further divided into liberal and conservative groups. Belgium is divided between the Dutch-speaking Flemings and French-speaking Walloons, with the former tending to be staunch Catholics and the latter convinced anti-clericals. Czechoslovakia is divided between Czechs and Slovaks. In the Soviet Union the major division has long been between the Russians and Ukrainians, but there are innumerable other minorities, such as the Latvians, Lithuanians, Estonians, Jews, Armenians, Georgians, Kazakhs, and Uzbeks, to name but a few. In addition, there is the cleavage between believers and nonbelievers. In the United States there are cleavages between Negroes and whites, Jews and Gentiles, Protestants and Catholics, as well as Northerners and Southerners. Finally, even in a relatively homogeneous nation such as Britain, there are distinctions between English, Scots, and Welsh and between the native population, the recent Irish Catholic immigrants, and the still more recent colored immigrants from the West Indies and Pakistan.

So long as such groups are irrelevant to the distributive process, they cannot be considered classes or status groups. When, however, membership in them begins to have an appreciable influence on men's access to important rewards which are in short supply, then it becomes impossible to treat them otherwise. To call such groups classes does not mean that they are only classes, or even that they are identical with other kinds of classes. It does mean, however, that they are groups of people who stand in a common position with respect to some attribute which functions as a resource in the distributive process—in this case, race, ethnicity, religion, or region.

Far too little research has yet been directed at the problem of how much the groups cited above, and others like them, influence the distributive process. The greatest amount of research has been carried out in the United States, where it is clear that all four kinds of groups, racial, ethnic, religious, and regional, play a significant role in the distributive process, and thereby merit the label of class or status group, though in varying degree.

This has been especially evident in the case of the two major racial groups, which have long been referred to by many American sociologists as "castes" in recognition of their peculiar role in the system of stratification. The clearest single measure of their importance is found in census data on the incomes of whites and Negroes. In 1959, for example, the median income for white men was nearly double that for Negro men (\$4,337 vs. \$2,254).¹⁸ This pattern of inequality is repeated in virtually

¹⁸ *U.S. Census of Population, 1960*, vol. I, part 1, table 218.

every other aspect of the distributive system. With respect to education, whites had obtained 10.9 years on the average, compared with 8.2 for Negroes, and it is clear that the *quality* of education afforded the great majority of Negroes was substantially inferior.¹⁹ With respect to housing, the ghetto pattern is so familiar as not to require discussion.²⁰ The same pattern of segregation prevails in formal social relationships, with Negroes denied admission to many clubs, churches, cliques, and, of course, to the great majority of white families which they might enter through marriage. Finally, though Negroes are more than 10 per cent of the total population, they constitute only 1 per cent of the United States Congress, and are also underrepresented in most other public offices.

It is true, of course, that the extent of inequality has been declining for a century, but until recently the rate of decline has been slow. Moreover, the pattern has been erratic, as exemplified by the fact that whites have occasionally crowded Negroes out of skilled trades which they were once permitted to monopolize.²¹ During the 1950s, while gains were made on other fronts, inequality in incomes actually increased. In 1951, for example, the median income for white males was 1.62 times that for non-whites; by 1959 this ratio had climbed to 1.86.²²

Though the white population in the United States is often treated as a homogeneous group, it is, in fact, divided into four major subclasses or status groups which are engaged in a lively competition for scarce resources. These groups, which are defined by a combination of religion and region, are (1) Northern white Protestants, (2) Southern white Protestants, (3) Catholics, and (4) Jews. Though religion is a major basis of classification, this does not mean that all, or even most, of the members of the various groups are devout adherents of the faiths with which they are identified. The term as used here refers to the communal groupings with which most individuals identify themselves and are identified and which serve as the basis for primary type relations, rather than to the

¹⁹ On years of education by race, see *Statistical Abstract*, 1962, table 148. The qualitative inferiority of Negro education, which is no longer disputed by educators, makes the often quoted statistics on the interrelations between income, education, and race rather misleading. Through no fault of his own, the average Negro high school graduate is not nearly so well educated as his white counterpart, and this is undoubtedly a part of the explanation for his lower income levels.

²⁰ See, for example, St. Clair Drake and Horace Cayton, *Black Metropolis: A Study of Negro Life in a Northern City* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1945), chap. 8.

²¹ For example, at one time Negroes largely monopolized the barber trade in Washington, D.C., and many other cities and towns. Later, however, white barbers moved in and took over most of the white clientele.

²² The 1951 figure is calculated from Herman P. Miller, *Income of the American People* (New York: Wiley, 1955), table 51; the 1959 figure is calculated from the *U.S. Census of Population, 1960*, vol. I, part 1, table 218.

churches or formal religious associations.²³ Thus, from the standpoint of status-group membership, the theological commitments of individuals are much less important than the group identifications which they make of themselves and others make of them.

Of these four groups, the Northern white Protestants have traditionally enjoyed the most privileged position. To put the matter in slightly different terms, membership in the Northern white Protestant group has had the greatest resource value. The status of this group has clearly been a function of the political history of the country. The initial settlement of the colonies and the founding of the nation were both actions of a largely Protestant people. As late as 1820, not more than about 1 per cent of the white population was Catholic or Jewish.²⁴ The Negro group, though it totaled 20 per cent of the population in the early years, presented no serious social, political, or economic challenge because the great majority of its members were illiterate, disenfranchised slaves.²⁵ During much of the period from 1790 to 1860 there was a bitter struggle for power between Northern and Southern Protestants, but this was settled in the Civil War with the decisive defeat of the South. After that, Northern white Protestants constituted the most powerful and most privileged status group in the nation.

The relative status of the other groups has been determined basically by their relationship to the dominant Northern white Protestant group. It was this group which determined that membership in the Catholic group was preferable to membership in the Jewish group, and membership in the Jewish group preferable to membership in the Negro group.²⁶ This ranking was not consciously formulated, but was rather a spontaneous by-product of normal social interaction. It was based essentially on the degree of cultural similarity of each of the minority groups to the dominant group, and reflected the relative willingness of members of the dominant group to establish primary relations with members of each of the other groups. Hence Catholics, as Christians, often from Northwest Europe and sometimes English-speaking, were regarded more highly than the non-

²³ For a more detailed discussion of this distinction, see Gerhard Lenski, *The Religious Factor* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1961), especially pp. 18-20 and 35-42. See also Will Herberg, *Protestant-Catholic-Jew* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1956), and Milton Gordon, *Assimilation in American Life: The Role of Race, Religion, and National Origins* (Fair Lawn, N.J.: Oxford University Press, 1964).

²⁴ On the much larger Catholic group, see Gerald Shaughnessy, *Has the Immigrant Kept the Faith?* (New York: Macmillan, 1925). On the Jewish group, see Bernard Weinryb, "Jewish Immigration and Accommodation to America," in Marshall Sklare (ed.), *The Jews: Social Patterns of an American Group* (New York: Free Press, 1958), p. 4.

²⁵ *Statistical Abstract*, 1962, table 15.

²⁶ Recent research suggests that the minority groups have tended to adopt the Northern white Protestant standard of values when evaluating groups other than their own, and to some extent even in evaluating their own group. To the extent that this happens, the influence of the dominant group is reinforced.

Christian Jews from Eastern Europe with their more alien ways, and the latter were regarded more highly than the nonwhite Negroes with their still more alien background. These values, rather than economic status, appear to have been the chief determinant, which explains why the Catholic group has ranked ahead of the more affluent Jewish group.

The position of status groups, like those of other classes, are not immutable. In the last generation, especially, the position of the Northern Protestants has come under heavy attack from all four of its rivals, and the group has lost considerable ground. It is difficult to measure precisely the magnitude of the gains of the "minority" groups or the losses of the historically dominant group, but a few examples are indicative. Within the last generation a considerable number of high political offices which were once regarded as the exclusive preserve of Northern white Protestants have been opened to other groups. Though Kennedy's election to the Presidency in 1960 is the most dramatic example, it is by no means an isolated one.²⁷ In Congress, the Republican Party, the political vehicle of the Northern white Protestants, has declined to the point where it has often been obliged to enter into an informal alliance with the Southern wing of the Democratic Party, the political vehicle of the Southern white Protestants, in order to remain influential. This has meant substantial concessions to special Southern interests, for example, the elimination of the discriminatory pattern of politically determined freight rates which for so long hampered the industrial development of the South. In the business world, the occupational advantages of membership in the Northern Protestant group have been largely eliminated as a result of the bureaucratization of industry, though some advantages probably still remain at the higher status levels where impersonal bureaucratic standards are more difficult to apply.²⁸ For a time, chiefly between World Wars I and

²⁷ In New England this trend began even earlier, thanks to the heavy early immigration of Irish Catholics. See, for example, Robert Dahl, *Who Governs?: Democracy and Power in an American City* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1961), pp. 32-51, on New Haven, Connecticut; Elin Anderson, *We Americans: A Study of Cleavage in an American City* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1938), chap. 10, on Burlington, Vermont; Kenneth Underwood, *Protestant and Catholic: Religious and Social Interaction in an Industrial Community* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), chap. 17, on Holyoke, Massachusetts; or Edward Banfield, *Big City Politics* (New York: Random House, 1965), chap. 2, on Boston.

²⁸ It is interesting to note that in one study of the managerial elite, the percentage of men identifying themselves as Catholics or Jews rose only from 11 to 14 per cent between 1900 and 1950 [see Mabel Newcomer, *The Big Business Executive* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955), table 13]. It should be noted, however, that in both time periods roughly half of the men did not report their religious preference and, furthermore, the percentage of nonreporters rose from 44 to 56 per cent, which may hide an increase in men with less prestigious preferences. Studies of lawyers also suggest that leading law firms have long been slow to hire Jews and members of other ethnic minorities. See, for example, Jack Ladinsky, "Careers of Lawyers, Law Practice, and Legal Institutions," *American Sociological Review*, 28 (1963), pp. 47-54.

II, many of the better educational institutions in the country maintained quotas restricting the number of Jewish students, a policy which chiefly benefited Northern white Protestant students because relatively few applications were received from the other status groups.²⁹ Finally, membership in the Northern white Protestant group has continued to provide entrée to the more exclusive social circles, a resource which can be of considerable economic and political value.

Northern white Protestants are not the only ones who have sought to make in-group membership a resource in the competition for power and privilege. Wherever possible, minority groups have done the same. Thus, when Catholics or Jews have controlled employment possibilities, they have frequently favored members of their own group. This has been especially evident in the distribution of political patronage at the municipal level, where Catholic machines have favored Catholic applicants for positions at city hall and on the police force.³⁰ Also, like Northern white Protestants, members of minority groups have preferred to associate with people from their own group, particularly in the more intimate primary relations, and this has constituted a significant resource, especially for such a prosperous group as the Jews.³¹ Finally, minority groups have usually given their political support to members of their own group, and this, too, has frequently proven an important resource.³² Though such actions are often condemned, at least when practiced by the majority, they represent one of the most natural of human reactions: the expression of support for those most like oneself.

Recent trends have led to a substantial reduction in the degree of inequality generated by the American system of status groups. While many factors have contributed to this, the most important of all has probably been the changing composition of the electorate which resulted from the heavy immigration of non-Protestant groups after 1880, as well as the more recent enfranchisement of the Negro. This combination of factors has reduced Northern white Protestants to the position of a statistical minority in the electorate. According to a large sample survey made by the Bureau

²⁹ See, for example, C. Bezael Sherman, *The Jew within American Society* (Detroit: Wayne State Press, 1961), pp. 174-178.

³⁰ See, for example, Dahl, pp. 40-44, or Underwood, chap. 17 and especially fn. 29, pp. 460-461.

³¹ The Jewish group in particular has tended to be exclusive in its primary relations. See, for example, Milton Gordon, pp. 178-182.

³² See, for example, Lucy Dawidowicz and Leon Goldstein, *Politics in a Pluralistic Democracy: Studies of Voting in the 1960 Election* (New York: Institute of Human Relations Press, 1963); Samuel Lubell, *The Future of American Politics*, rev. ed. (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor, 1956); or Angus Campbell et al., *The American Voter*, (New York: Wiley, 1960), pp. 319-321.

of the Census in 1957, the adult population of this country was distributed as follows: ³³

Northern white Protestants	38 per cent
Roman Catholics	26 per cent
Southern white Protestants	20 per cent
Negro Protestants	9 per cent
Jews	3 per cent
Others and no religion	4 per cent

These demographic trends, combined with a democratic political system, have made it extremely difficult for the Northern white Protestant group to preserve its traditional advantages. Its difficulties have been compounded by the incorporation of so many elements of the democratic-egalitarian ideology into the constitutional system, and even into the personal belief systems of members of the favored group.

Viewing status group stratification in a broadly comparative perspective, it appears that the general trend in most advanced industrial societies is toward a reduction in the degree of inequality between such groups. Weber recognized this half a century ago and explained it as a result of the rising rate of economic change.³⁴ Though he did not say so, we may infer that he saw rapid economic changes as disruptive of established patterns of social relations, and thereby destructive of the important practice of status group segregation.

Without denying the importance of this factor, one may doubt that it is the entire story. The rise and spread of the democratic-egalitarian ideology is clearly involved, and it is not a simple function of the rising rate of economic change. Whatever the relationship between these two variables may ultimately prove to be, the ideological variable is apparently both a more immediate and a more powerful determinant of the trend. This ideology has been a potent weapon in the hands of minority groups, giving their cause the aura of legitimacy. This has had the effect of mobilizing and energizing the members of minority groups, while simultaneously introducing a strong element of uncertainty and confusion into the ranks of their opponents.

In this connection it is interesting to note again that there has been a gradual change in the character of the new ideology. In the eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth centuries, attacks on inequality frequently appeared to be based on an ideological rejection of inequality per se.

³³ "Religion Reported by the Civilian Population of the United States: March, 1957," *Current Population Reports*, Feb. 2, 1958, Series P-20, No. 79, table 2.

³⁴ Max Weber, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, translated by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (Fair Lawn, N.J.: Oxford University Press, 1946), pp. 193-194.

Today, however, attacks on inequality increasingly reflect a rejection of *ascribed* forms of power and privilege, but an acceptance of *achieved* forms. As Michael Young has observed, much of the enthusiasm which was once directed toward the creation of a socialist order in Britain now seems diverted toward the creation of a meritocracy.³⁵ According to the newer logic, the inheritance of power and privilege are wrong but their achievement is not, especially if based on educational achievement. Young's chief concern was with the emergence of this modified ideology in Britain, but it is evident in most other advanced industrial nations, including both the Soviet Union and the United States.³⁶

Though there has apparently been a general reduction in the degree of inequality associated with status group stratification, there has not always been a corresponding decline in the salience of this form of stratification in the minds of citizens. On the contrary, the very struggle to reduce this form of inequality has often had the effect of increasing men's awareness of it. This is clearly evident in the racial struggle in the United States, where the decline in racial inequality has been paralleled by a heightened sense of racial identity. A similar situation may also prevail with respect to conflicts between religious and ethnic groups, as in the case of Canada. Despite a reduction in the degree of inequality between French Catholics and "English" Protestants, Canadians are currently exercised about this problem as they have not been for years. Feelings have grown so intense that more than an eighth of all French Canadians, and more than a quarter of their college graduates, say they favor the dissolution of the Canadian nation.³⁷ A small minority has emerged which is even willing to resort to terror and violence. Such evidence makes it clear that there is no necessary connection between the trend in the degree of status group inequality and the trend in the salience of status group stratification in the minds of men.

The Class System Based on Sex

Another much neglected aspect of the distributive systems of modern societies is the class system based on sex. This neglect has been due in large measure to the tendency of sociologists to treat families, rather than individuals, as the basic unit in systems of stratification.

This mode of analysis works reasonably well in agrarian societies where the power, privilege, and prestige of almost every woman was

³⁵ *Op. cit.*

³⁶ In the Soviet Union it takes the form of an increasing reluctance to press toward the historic goal of communism.

³⁷ *Macleans's*, 76 (Nov. 2, 1963), p. 14.

determined by the status of the man on whom she was dependent and her relation to him. With industrialization, the situation of women has changed rapidly, and it is no longer feasible to view them as merely dependents of some male. With industrialization the number of opportunities outside the traditional dependent roles of wife, daughter, or dependent kinswoman have been greatly increased. In short, the traditional barriers which long separated the female system of stratification from the male, and kept the former dependent on the latter, are clearly crumbling. Hence, in analyses of advanced industrial societies it is impossible to ignore, or treat as obvious, the role of sex in the distributive process.

One of the most dramatic indicators of the change which has occurred is found in the area of politics, long the private domain of men. As recently as 1900 women were permitted to vote only in New Zealand and four states in this country.³⁸ Today they enjoy this right in every advanced industrial nation except Switzerland. In addition, women may seek election or appointment to public office and they have often been successful, even winning, on occasion, cabinet posts and other high governmental offices. Women have also won the right to attend nearly all of the leading institutions of higher education. Virtually all occupations are now open to them, and they enjoy complete equality with respect to the rights of property. Finally, they have won more than equality in the area of divorce legislation.

Nevertheless, despite these many important victories, women still do not enjoy complete equality, and being male remains a resource of considerable value. Nowhere is this more evident than in the job market. Although women are now legally entitled to enter almost any field,³⁹ a variety of obstacles block their entry into the more rewarding ones. Thus, in 1960 women constituted only 6.7 per cent of the doctors, 3.5 per cent of the lawyers, and 0.9 per cent of the engineers in the United States.⁴⁰ In the Soviet Union women are somewhat better off in this respect, constituting nearly a third of the engineers and jurists and three-quarters of the doctors.⁴¹ However, even there the evidence indicates that women are disproportionately concentrated on the margins of the professions and in the lower echelons. A similar pattern exists in the United States, where relatively few women are found in the upper brackets. In 1959, for ex-

³⁸ William J. Goode, *World Revolution and Family Patterns* (New York: Free Press, 1963), p. 55.

³⁹ According to Mikhail Zoshchenko, the Soviet satirist, they have even become managers of men's bathhouses, one of the last outposts of male supremacy.

⁴⁰ *U.S. Census of Population, 1960: Occupational Characteristics*, table 1.

⁴¹ DeWitt, table VI-45. It should be noted that medicine is not so lucrative and prestigious in the Soviet Union as in the United States.

ample, women constituted only 3 per cent of those with incomes of \$10,000 or more, and only 6 per cent of those with incomes of \$7,000 or more.⁴² Were it not for the fact that women constitute about a third of the holders of large estates, these figures would be even smaller.⁴³ One should add that women have been even more conspicuous by their absence from the inner circles of the political elite.

There has been much speculation as to the reasons both for the improvement in the status of women in modern times and for their failure to attain full equality. With respect to the first, William Goode has argued that "the crucial crystallizing variable" responsible was the rise of the democratic-egalitarian ideology.⁴⁴ In his opinion, the demand for equal rights was a logical extension of this ideology, and it succeeded because of the prior spread of this newer view. Goode is highly critical of the view that the rise of a machine technology and the resulting increase in specialization and decline in occupational skills had anything to do with the improved status of women.⁴⁵ He maintains that women have always been capable of mastering the same skills as men, and that such a view is naive.

Without denying the importance of the ideological factor, one may doubt that Goode has done justice to the technological. Few serious scholars would argue today that women were incapable of mastering the necessary skills. They would argue, however, that the limited technological development of agrarian societies made it impossible for any significant number of women to be free to master such skills. To begin with, the high mortality rates prevailing in those societies made it necessary for women to bear far more children than is now necessary, just to maintain the labor force. Furthermore, the absence of laborsaving machines in the home meant that most of their time was required for the performance of necessary household tasks (recognition of this was embodied in the traditional saying that "man must work from sun to sun, but woman's work is never done"). What little time remained was frequently consumed by demands for assistance from the men at times of peak labor, as during the harvest. Added to this was the fact that most specialized skills in agrarian societies were usually acquired through an extended apprenticeship which required the apprentice to live in the master's home—a system not particularly suited to the training of young girls. In short, the problem was not that women were biologically or intellectually incapable of acquiring the more complex skills of the preindustrial era, but rather that social con-

⁴² Calculated from the *Statistical Abstract*, 1962, table 451.

⁴³ Robert Lampman, *The Share of Top Wealth-Holders in National Wealth: 1922-1956* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 96.

⁴⁴ Goode, pp. 56ff.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 55-56.

ditions in agrarian societies made it extremely difficult, and often impossible, for them to do so. Therefore it appears that the modern trend toward increased rights for women is the result of both ideological and technological forces.

With respect to the question of why modern women have failed to achieve full equality, a number of factors appear responsible. To begin with, women still must bear the children, and though the number they bear is substantially reduced, pregnancy, menopause, and menstruation still prove handicaps in the intense competition for the more rewarding jobs.⁴⁶ Furthermore, the traditional family system, which is far from dead, places the burden of primary responsibility on the wife; it is she who must prepare meals, care for house, clothing, and other belongings, and do the shopping, to say nothing of raising the children, entertaining, and participating in civic activities. Though the modern housewife has many mechanical aids, the demands are still heavy and, as many have noted, the level of performance expected of her seems to rise with the introduction of each new laborsaving device. Third, because women have not been as successful as men on the average in the job world, and because there are good reasons for expecting that this will continue to be true, those who control access to such key resources as graduate fellowships or admission to industrial training programs reject women candidates more often than their performance records and other qualifications would warrant.⁴⁷ Finally, because of all this, and because women know there is a much less risky and much more promising route to rewards, most stop striving for success in the world of economics and politics, and compete instead in the marriage market and the world of the family.⁴⁸

Despite the fact that modern feminists are often critical of this choice, they cannot ridicule it. It offers almost as many opportunities for attaining rewards as competition in the man's world, and the probabilities of success are far, far greater.⁴⁹ By an advantageous marriage, a woman may obtain half interest in a very substantial income, entrée into exclusive circles, and leisure to do most of the things she wishes. Even a woman whose marriage is less successful by economic standards is usually provided with a measure of economic security and, after the child-rearing

⁴⁶ It is interesting to note that those men who are most seriously involved in competition in private industry are often reluctant to take extended vacations because of the opportunities they provide their competitors and the dangers such absences involve for them.

⁴⁷ Wolfe, pp. 232-233.

⁴⁸ Perhaps the clearest manifestation of this is the relative lack of commitment to work shown by women. For evidence of this, see, for example, Goode, pp. 63-66.

⁴⁹ As noted previously, in the job world few women reach the upper rungs: most are concentrated on the less rewarding levels.

years, considerable leisure. In addition, of course, marriage yields many rich psychic rewards denied those who do not marry. Judging from the relative lack of interest shown in careers which must be pursued at the expense of marriage, it appears that the attractions of marriage more than match those of careers, in the estimation of most women. Hence, while it is not unreasonable to expect some further reduction in the degree of inequality between the sexes in the world of work, it is unlikely that it will be eliminated or greatly reduced beyond the present level.

The Class System Based on Age

A third resource generally neglected in analyses of the distributive process is age. Perhaps the chief reason for this is that most people pass through the same cycle of years. In other words, age is not a differentiating resource *in the long run*. However, this overlooks the fact that most people are so concerned with their immediate situation that their actions are largely responses to current needs and problems rather than to future prospects. Therefore, age does have consequences for the distributive process which cannot be ignored, especially in modern industrial societies.

The key fact with respect to age stratification in all advanced industrial societies is the economic, political, and general organizational dominance of the older segments of the population. The major instruments of power are largely in their hands. For example, in 1953 the median age of members of the property elite was nearly fifty-four years and, for the very wealthy, or those with estates valued at \$5 million or more, it was nearly sixty-nine.⁵⁰ A similar situation prevails in politics: the median age of United States Senators from 1947 to 1957 was fifty-six years.⁵¹ Moreover, because of the system of seniority which governs the selection of committee chairmen and assignments to key posts, the median age of the more influential members of the Senate was even higher. A study of business leaders in 1952 revealed a median age of fifty-four; another, limited to the managerial elite, found it to be sixty-one years in 1950.⁵² Finally, a study of American military leaders found that their average age was approximately 54.5 years in 1950.⁵³

Much the same situation prevails in other advanced industrial na-

⁵⁰ Calculated from Lampman, tables 48-49.

⁵¹ Calculated from Donald Matthews, *U.S. Senators and Their World* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1960), fig. 1.

⁵² Warner and Abegglen, p. 30, and Newcomer, p. 112.

⁵³ Calculated from Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* (New York: Free Press, 1960), p. 63.

tions. The median age of persons elected to the House of Commons in 1959 was fifty-one years, which means that by the time the next election was called, in 1964, the median age of the members approached fifty-six years.⁵⁴ In Sweden in 1953, the average age of members of the Upper House was fifty-seven years, and in the Lower House, fifty-two.⁵⁵ As Michels recognized half a century ago, even radical and revolutionary organizations eventually come under the domination of older men. The Soviet Union is no exception to this rule. A decade ago, the political elite of the Soviet Union could already be described as "a distinctly middle-aged group."⁵⁶ Today, thanks to the absence of extensive purges in the intervening years, this group is virtually indistinguishable in terms of age from their counterparts in non-Communist nations.

With respect to income, a similar pattern is evident, though the dominance of the older generation is not quite so pronounced. In the United States in 1959, for example, the median age of men with incomes of \$15,000 or more was 49.4 years.⁵⁷ A similar situation seems to prevail elsewhere.

In one respect, however, the younger generation enjoys an advantage over the older. During the current period of rapidly expanding educational opportunities, age and educational attainment are *inversely* correlated in the adult populations of all advanced industrial nations. This affords the younger generation a distinct advantage in societies where job opportunity is so often determined by formal educational attainments. Sooner or later, however, this advantage will disappear, because a pattern of this kind cannot continue indefinitely.

In many ways relations between the generations in advanced industrial nations resemble those in agrarian societies. In one very important respect, however, they differ: *in agrarian societies, young people were largely integrated into the adult world and separated from one another, while in advanced industrial societies, owing to the spread of public education, young people tend to be cut off from the more inclusive adult world and thrown into a narrower world made up almost exclusively of their age peers.* The results of this development will be examined in detail in pages 426 to 428.

⁵⁴ Calculated from D. E. Butler and Richard Rose, *The British General Election of 1959* (London: Macmillan, 1960), p. 125.

⁵⁵ Nils Andrén, *Modern Swedish Government* (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1961), p. 57.

⁵⁶ Raymond Bauer, Alex Inkeles, and Clyde Kluckhohn, *How the Soviet System Works* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956), p. 158.

⁵⁷ Calculated from *U.S. Census of Population, 1960: Occupational Characteristics*, table 31.

Class and Status Consistency

Considering the diversity of resources which affect the distribution of rewards in modern industrial societies, the question inevitably arises as to how they are interrelated. This, in turn, gives rise to questions of how discrepancies in an individual's statuses affect his actions, and how his actions affect the society of which he is a part.

Concern with these problems is a very recent development. As noted earlier, the multidimensional view of stratification itself appeared only a generation ago in the work of Weber and Sorokin. As a result, only a beginning has yet been made in exploring these problems.

With respect to the first problem—the degree of relationship between dimensions—census data, as well as data from other sources, make it clear that the rank of individuals and families in one dimension is never a simple function of rank in another. Correlations between property holdings, political status, occupational status, educational status, status-group rank, age status, and sex status are never perfect, and usually are far from it.

One of the closest relationships is that between education and occupation, but studies in the United States have produced correlation coefficients no higher than .77, and in some instances as low as .30.⁵⁸ At the other extreme there are certain relationships where the correlation is almost .00. This is clearly the case in the relationship between age and sex, and also with respect to relations between the following pairs: sex status and property holdings; age and occupational status; and finally, both age and sex on the one hand and status group rank and educational status on the other. Other relationships tend to fall in the middle range.

In a few rare instances, the correlations between resources are actually negative. This is true with respect to age and sex because women now outlive men. More important, it is true of age and educational status, where the younger generation has more years of schooling than the older generation because of rising educational standards.

The low correlations between the various types of resources indicates that there are substantial numbers of persons who find themselves confronted with inconsistent statuses of every type. As indicated in Chapter

⁵⁸ The highest coefficient comes from Warner's study of "Jonesville." See W. L. Warner et al., *Social Class in America* (Chicago: Science Research, 1949), table 13, p. 172. Godfrey Hochbaum et al. report a correlation of .65 from Minneapolis, in "Socioeconomic Variables in a Large City," *American Journal of Sociology*, 61 (1955), p. 34. Robert Angell reports a figure of .39 for Detroit and .30 from Samuel Stouffer's national survey on communism and civil liberties, in "Preferences for Moral Norms in Three Problem Areas," *ibid.*, 67 (1962), pp. 651-652.

4, on grounds of deductive logic a good case can be made for the hypothesis that discrepancies between major status dimensions can be a source of stress, first of all for the individuals affected and, through them, for the society of which they are a part. As yet there is only a limited amount of systematic research on this subject, but, such as it is, it tends to support the hypothesis. For example, data gathered in two sample surveys of Greater Detroit in the early 1950s showed that persons with discrepant statuses were more likely to support the Democratic Party and take liberal positions on issues than persons of consistent status.⁵⁹ This was especially true in cases where racial-ethnic status was inconsistent with occupational status, and was most pronounced when the inconsistencies were substantial. To a lesser degree, the same pattern prevailed when there were inconsistencies between occupational and educational statuses. In a study based on a national sample, similar results were obtained. Persons with discrepant statuses (involving occupation, education, and income) were more favorably disposed to changes in the distribution of power within American society than those with consistent statuses.⁶⁰

The number of persons affected in this way by status discrepancies does not appear to be large, at least compared with the total population. More important than numbers, however, may be the fact that discrepant status brings into the ranks of the discontented, persons with many badly needed skills and other resources. In other words, such persons are singularly well equipped to provide the leadership and other resources which uneducated members of the working and nonpropertied classes are unable to provide for themselves. As noted previously, status discrepancy and the reactions it produces may well be a major source of the revolutionary leadership which Marx and Engels predicted (without explaining) would come from the ranks of the more privileged classes.

On the basis of limited studies like those cited above, one would hesitate to say that this hypothesis is much more than interesting speculation. However, there is also a considerable body of unsystematic evidence to support it. The role of ethnic and racial minorities in radical movements has long been noted, and it has also been observed that even the success-

⁵⁹ For an earlier examination of one of these samples, using a not completely satisfactory methodology, see Gerhard Lenski, "Status Crystallization: A Non-vertical Dimension of Social Status," *American Sociological Review*, 19 (1954). For data on both samples using a better methodology, see Gerhard Lenski, "Comment," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 28 (1964), especially tables 2 and 3. See also Werner S. Landecker, "Class Crystallization and Class Consciousness," *American Sociological Review*, 28 (1963), pp. 219-229, which analyzes the first of these samples from a different perspective but obtains essentially similar results.

⁶⁰ Irwin Goffman, "Status Consistency and Preference for Change in Power Distribution," *American Sociological Review*, 22 (1957), pp. 275-281.

ful members of these minorities are attracted to such movements; in fact, they often provide much of the leadership.⁶¹

Obviously not all forms of status discrepancy generate political discontent. For example, one finds little of it among wealthy women or young members of the managerial class. One of the tasks for both theory and research in coming years is to specify the conditions under which this type of reaction occurs, and those under which some alternative reaction or none at all, is more likely.

Vertical Mobility

In industrial societies, as in the others we have examined, there are always struggles for power and privilege. Sometimes they take the form of individual struggles, sometimes they involve entire classes. Since the latter often develop as a result of frustrations arising from the former, we shall examine the individual struggles first.

One important difference which emerges from any comparison of agrarian and industrial societies is *the decline in the importance of ascribed factors in the distributive process*. Ancient hereditary distinctions between nobles, freemen, and slaves have been all but eliminated.⁶² The advantages and disadvantages associated with the ascribed, or largely ascribed, qualities of race, ethnicity, and religion have also declined in importance. Finally, the ascribed status of sex has become somewhat less important. At the same time these developments have been occurring, access to educational opportunities has greatly improved and education has become increasingly important as a resource in job competition. The result of all these developments has been an increase in the proportion of rewards available on some kind of competitive basis.

Another factor which has probably increased competition and stimulated mobility is *the changing nature of the economy*. The occupational structure of agrarian societies was not conducive to a high rate of vertical

⁶¹ See, for example, Robert Michels on the role of the Jews in the Socialist movement in Europe, *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of Oligarchical Tendencies in Modern Democracy*, translated by Eden and Cedar Paul (New York: Dover, 1959, first published 1915), pp. 258-262, or S. M. Lipset on the role of ethnic minorities in Canada's Socialist Party, in *Agrarian Socialism* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1950), p. 191. See also Stanislaw Ossowski, *Class Structure in the Social Consciousness*, translated by Sheila Patterson (New York: Free Press, 1963), p. 53, on the role of impoverished members of the Polish nobility in the early revolutionary movements in that country.

⁶² In Britain, one of the few countries where an hereditary class of nobles survives, their rights have been so reduced and the rights of commoners so enlarged that in recent years, for the first time in history, some individuals have found it advantageous to renounce their titles. They have done so chiefly in order to obtain the right to sit in the House of Commons, which has replaced the House of Lords as the locus of political power.

mobility. Too many members of society were obliged to work at the same subsistence level. The occupational structure itself thus limited the volume of upward mobility. Only a small fraction of the population could move upward in any given generation. In modern industrial societies, by contrast, the occupational structure is much more differentiated. There is no single occupation which compels the great majority of the labor force to live at or near the subsistence level. Instead, there are great variations in both income and authority. Hence, the potential for movement is much greater.

While precise comparisons of the rates of mobility in agrarian and industrial societies are not possible, data on a number of industrial societies have become available. These show, for example, that in recent years approximately 30 per cent of the sons of fathers in nonagricultural occupations have been either upwardly or downwardly mobile across the manual-nonmanual line. On a country by country basis, the figures are strikingly uniform, as the following list indicates:⁶³

United States	34 %
Sweden	32 %
Great Britain	31 %
Denmark	30 %
Norway	30 %
France	29 %
West Germany	25 %
Japan	25 %
Italy	22 %

⁶³ The figures for Britain, Denmark, Norway, France, and Japan are calculated from data provided by S. M. Miller, pp. 69-75; the figure for the United States is from "Lifetime Occupational Mobility of Adult Males, March, 1962," U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports* (1964), Series P-23, No. 11, table 1; the figure on Sweden is from Gosta Carlsson, *Social Mobility and Class Structure* (Lund: Gleerup, 1958), p. 93; the figure for Italy is from Joseph Lopreato, "Social Mobility in Italy," *American Journal of Sociology*, 71 (1965), p. 313; the figure for West Germany is the mean of two studies, one reported by S. M. Miller, p. 80, the other by Karl Martin Bolte, *Sozialer Aufstieg und Abstieg* (Stuttgart: Enke, 1959), p. 223 (the figures for the individual studies were 26 and 24 per cent). The French figure is also the average of two studies, the original figures for which were 31 and 27 per cent. I have omitted from the text the results of studies based on less than national surveys, surveys employing questionable procedures, and surveys of nations which cannot be classified as advanced industrial. It may be reported here, however, that these studies yielded the following results: Puerto Rico, 34 per cent; Belgium (average of two local studies), 33 per cent; Australia (one local study), 31 per cent; India (one local study), 27 per cent; U.S.S.R. (survey of emigres), 26 per cent; Brazil (one local community), 25 per cent; Hungary, 25 per cent; Finland (doubtful procedures), 20 per cent; and Italy (doubtful procedures), 18 per cent. All of these figures are based on calculations from data in S. M. Miller, pp. 66-79. The median for the less industrialized nations, i.e., all of the above except Belgium, Australia, and the Soviet Union, is 25 per cent, compared with 30 per cent for the more advanced industrial nations listed in the text above.

If one employs a three-fold scheme of classification for urban occupations combining the lower levels of white collar occupations with the skilled workers whom they increasingly resemble in income, higher and less uniform rates of vertical mobility become evident, as the following figures show: ⁶⁴

United States	55 %
Sweden	48 %
Great Britain	45 %
Denmark	40 %
Japan	36 %

Though we have no comparable figures for agrarian societies of the pre-industrial era, it seems unlikely that such levels of vertical mobility were achieved, except perhaps for short periods under exceptional circumstances, e.g., following a devastating plague or the conquest and subjugation of a foreign country.

Not only does the rate of vertical mobility seem higher in industrial societies, *the nature of the movement is different*. We noted that the dominant pattern of mobility in agrarian societies was *downward*. In industrial societies the volume of upward movement is so much greater that a balance is usually achieved, and, *in most cases, the amount of upward movement exceeds the downward*. This can be seen clearly in the studies of mobility cited above. If one subtracts the number of downwardly mobile from the upwardly mobile, and divides by the number of men in urban occupations who are sons of fathers in urban occupations, one obtains the following coefficients (using a simple manual-nonmanual classification of occupations): ⁶⁵

Sweden	+ .16
United States	+ .15
Japan	+ .09
Norway	+ .07
Italy	+ .07
West Germany	+ .02
France	+ .02
Great Britain	- .001
Denmark	- .03

⁶⁴ The figures for the United States, Sweden, Britain, Denmark, and Japan are calculated from the same bodies of data indicated in footnote 63 above. Norway is omitted because the data reported fail to divide nonmanual occupations, France because of the failure to divide the manual. West Germany is omitted because the upper level of the nonmanual group is so small that it is almost as though there were only two levels, not three.

⁶⁵ The sources used here are the same as those reported in footnote 63 above.

In six of the eight cases, the volume of upward mobility across the manual-nonmanual line exceeded the volume of downward mobility, and in the other two cases the excess of downward mobility is slight. If one shifts to a three-level mode of classification, the pattern changes only slightly.⁶⁶

Even these figures understate the case. Evidence from Sweden, England, Japan, and the United States clearly shows that during the course of men's careers there is a net upward shift from manual to nonmanual occupations.⁶⁷ This fact is important because of the tendency in almost all of these studies to compare sons in mid-career with fathers whose careers are more advanced. If proper allowance could be made for the influence of this biasing tendency, it is likely that all of the coefficients would become positive.

The elimination of the great excess of downward mobility, characteristic of the agrarian societies of the past, has been due chiefly to two factors, both of which have been noted previously. The first has led to an increase in the rate of upward mobility, the second to a decrease in downward. The first is *the radical transformation of the occupational structure of societies brought about by the technological and organizational advances associated with modern industrialization*. With the increasing use of machines, the need for unskilled and semiskilled labor has steadily declined, relatively to the need for more highly skilled and trained personnel (including professional and other nonmanual workers). The organizational revolution had a similar effect: as organizations have grown in size and complexity, the problems of coordination have rapidly multiplied, necessitating the progressive enlargement of clerical and managerial staffs. In short, industrialization has meant a larger proportion of highly rewarded and otherwise desirable jobs.

The second factor is *the introduction and diffusion of effective methods of contraception*. For the first time in history, acceptable and effective means of controlling family size are available to the great majority of

⁶⁶ The coefficients for the five countries for which this is possible are as follows: the United States, +.16; Sweden, +.15; Japan, +.11; Denmark, -.02; and Great Britain, -.05.

⁶⁷ On Sweden, see C. Arnold Anderson, "Lifetime Inter-occupation Mobility Patterns in Sweden," *Acta Sociologica*, 1 (1960), tables 1-A and 2-A, which show a greater movement from the categories "industrial labor" and "general labor" to "urban enterprisers" and "functionaries" than in the reverse direction. On England, Japan, and the United States, see S. M. Lipset and Reinhard Bendix, *Social Mobility in Industrial Society* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1959), table A.1. Since the figures shown in this table are based on comparisons between present job and first job, and since first job may sometimes be only temporary, these figures probably exaggerate the magnitude of the trend. For a more realistic estimate of the magnitude of the shifts, see appendix table I of A. J. Jaffe and R. O. Carleton, *Occupational Mobility in the United States 1930-1960* (New York: King's Crown, 1954), which traces age cohorts through three censuses.

people. No longer are children produced in numbers so far in excess of the capacity of the economy to support them that the large-scale downward mobility characteristic of agrarian societies is inevitable. Now the production of offspring is more nearly geared to the opportunities afforded by the economy.

A third factor which may also have contributed to the redress in the balance between upward and downward mobility is *the rise of the mass media*. Movies, radio, television, magazines and newspapers, as noted earlier, have all helped the lower classes become better informed about the way of life of the more privileged classes. While the mass media often romanticize or otherwise distort what they describe, they transmit many elements quite accurately. The effect has been a considerable reduction in the cultural gulf which historically divided the classes and made upward mobility more difficult.

Industrial societies also differ from agrarian in *the means by which mobility is achieved*. As noted previously, in agrarian societies there were a number of channels through which men might move in their efforts to rise; no single institution played a dominant role in screening candidates for advancement. In industrial societies, as we have seen, every individual is exposed to an extended process of testing and screening by educational institutions, and this is apparently becoming a major determinant of subsequent life chances. Recent data from the United States indicate that slightly more occupational mobility occurs as a result of a man's performance in school than occurs because of his performance on the job. When the first full-time jobs of a large national sample of men aged twenty-five to sixty-four were compared with those of their fathers, it was found that 34 per cent had moved across the manual-nonmanual line. In comparison, when the current jobs of these same men were compared with their first jobs, only 28 per cent had been mobile in this way.⁶⁸ Similar differences were found when the occupational hierarchy was divided into three and four levels.⁶⁹

As a result of the growing number of studies of vertical mobility, it is now possible to compare rates of mobility, both within nations over a period of time, and between nations at roughly the same time. Of the two,

⁶⁸ These figures are based on data presented in tables 2 and 3 in "Lifetime Occupational Mobility of Adult Males, March, 1962," *Current Population Report*, Series P-23, No 11.

⁶⁹ With three levels the figures were 55 and 51 per cent respectively; with four levels, 60 and 55 per cent. The three levels were constituted as follows: (1) professionals, managers, and entrepreneurs, (2) clerks, salesmen, craftsmen, and foremen, (3) operatives, service workers, and laborers except farm and mine. The four levels were constituted in the same way except that the second level was divided with clerks and salesmen constituting one level and craftsmen and foremen another.

the former has received far less attention, probably because of the difficulties involved in obtaining reliable data for earlier periods. Thus far, most of the trend data are from the United States. The studies from which these data come vary considerably in scope, methodology, and types of materials used. Nevertheless, *all show a striking stability in overall rates of mobility together with, in most cases, a gradual rise in the rate of upward mobility.*⁷⁰

In the case of international comparisons, a certain uniformity is also evident. In fact, on the basis of their pioneering study of this subject, Lipset and Bendix concluded that "our major finding . . . is that the countries involved are comparable in their high amounts of total vertical mobility."⁷¹ More recently S. M. Miller has criticized them for exaggerating the degree of similarity in mobility rates and patterns; but even he conceded that "there probably is more convergence in rates than most people had believed," adding that this "does not mean that the actual convergence is overwhelming."⁷² Miller's main concern was to establish the fact that there are differences of a magnitude deserving attention. On this point one cannot argue with him, especially since the publication in

⁷⁰ It is impossible to review all the evidence behind this statement, and a few examples will have to suffice. Warner and Abegglen's follow-up of Taussig and Joslyn's earlier study of the social origins of America's business leaders shows that the sons of farmers and workingmen had 28 per cent as much chance as the average American male of being a business leader in 1928, and 32 per cent as much chance in 1952 (these figures are calculated from data supplied by Warner and Abegglen in table 7, p. 46). A study of mobility in Indianapolis showed that the percentage of farmers' and workingmen's sons entering the professional, managerial, and entrepreneurial classes increased from 8 to 10 per cent in the period from 1910 to 1940. See Natalie Rogoff, *Recent Trends in Occupational Mobility* (New York: Free Press, 1953); the figures are calculated from tables 54-59. A study of a national sample interviewed in 1952 indicated an increase in the percentage of sons of farmers and workingmen entering nonmanual occupations from 17.4 per cent among men born from 1873 to 1892 to 22.9 per cent for those born from 1923 to 1932. See Gerhard Lenski, "Trends in Inter-Generational Mobility in the United States," *American Sociological Review*, 23 (1958), table 7. More recently Jackson and Crockett compared the results of several national samples interviewed in the period from 1947 to 1957 and concluded that "no striking changes have occurred in mobility patterns and rates since World War II." A careful inspection of table 4 of their article indicates that if the proportion of nonmanual workers interviewed in the 1947 and 1957 studies had been the same, there would have been a very slight increase in the percentage of farmers' and workingmen's sons entering the ranks of nonmanual workers. See Elton Jackson and Harry Crockett, "Occupational Mobility in the United States: A Point Estimate and Trend Comparison," *ibid.*, 29 (1964), pp. 5-15. Finally, in a recent study of the social origins of Japanese business leaders from 1880 to 1960, the authors concluded that "the overall impression is one of singular stability in the proportions of leadership contributed from these several backgrounds, despite the great changes taking place in the occupational structure of the society and in the national economy and polity" (Abegglen and Mannari, p. 38). This study also shows a slight increase in the percentage of business leaders coming from humble backgrounds.

⁷¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 27.

⁷² *Op. cit.*, p. 58.

1964 of the Census Bureau's study of vertical mobility in the United States, which showed higher, and more deviant, rates than indicated by earlier, less reliable studies.⁷³

Few attempts have been made thus far to account for these variations. Sometimes they are viewed as reflections of variations in the degree of industrialization and, therefore, the result of the same forces responsible for the differences between agrarian and industrial societies. (This thesis is consistent with the evidence cited earlier showing that the United States had the highest rate of mobility and Japan the lowest in the sample of industrial nations.) Closely related to this, variations are often attributed to changes in the occupational structure and the increasing proportion of more desirable occupations.⁷⁴ Since this is a direct consequence of industrialization, it, too, is linked with the historic shift from agrarian to industrial patterns of organization.

Other factors are probably also involved, but surprisingly little has been done to discover what they are. One would suppose, for example, that rates of mobility are influenced by the presence of status groups, and by their relative strength and importance. Where they are present, and especially where they exercise a powerful influence on educational and occupational opportunity, one would predict lowered rates of mobility. To take another example, it seems likely that private property would be a stabilizing force in societies because it tends to reduce intergenerational occupational mobility. If this is true, one would predict that, other things being equal, the rate of mobility would be greater in Communist than in non-Communist nations. Finally, if ability is not transmitted genetically with any great consistency, then it would seem that the rate of mobility would vary with the degree to which societies provide their youth with equality of educational opportunity. Unfortunately, however, as one begins to develop hypotheses of this type, the practical problems of testing quickly become evident. Given the limited number of cases, i.e., societies, together with the large number of relevant variables and the variety of techniques of measurement employed in the different national surveys, rigorous testing appears to be out of the question—at least for the present.

Before concluding this discussion, some comment is in order with respect to the almost totally neglected subject of *vertical mobility among women*. Most writers on mobility apparently assume either that this is unimportant, or that the topic is adequately covered by their discussions of male mobility. Clearly neither is the case.

⁷³ See footnote 63 above.

⁷⁴ See, for example, Jackson and Crockett, pp. 13-15, or Lenski, "Trends," p. 522.

For the great majority of women, the role of wife and mother is the major source of rewards in adult years. Unlike male occupational roles, however, this role is highly diversified, yielding rewards which vary almost as greatly as the total spectrum of male roles. This is only natural since the rewards accruing to a housewife are determined largely by her husband's role. Hence, for purposes of analysis in the field of stratification, it would be far more realistic if there were an explicit distinction between the role of *housewife married to a banker*, for example, and *housewife married to an unskilled worker*.

From the standpoint of the great majority of women who choose marriage rather than a career, the best opportunity for upward mobility occurs during the period of courtship. In the marriage market, the resources which are most relevant for women are quite different from those which are most relevant in the markets where men compete. Whereas educational success and the factors which contribute to it are crucial in the job market, they are not nearly so important for women in the marriage market. Physical appearance, on the other hand, is of considerable importance, though education, family background, interpersonal skills, and similar factors also play a role. Since physical appearance is, to a considerable degree, genetically determined (though in an era of cosmetics, foundation garments, and even cosmetic surgery this should not be exaggerated), it would seem that its relative importance introduces a certain randomizing element into the picture, thereby stimulating vertical mobility. At the present time, the evidence is too limited to say for certain whether mobility opportunities for women are greater or less than for men. However, such evidence as there is suggests the somewhat startling conclusion that they are, in fact, *somewhat greater*.⁷⁵

Class Struggles

When opportunities for individual mobility are insufficient, men often resort to collective action as a means of obtaining the rewards they seek, thus generating class struggles. These are much more common in industrial societies than in agrarian, and probably for the reason that Marx suggested more than a century ago: these new societies provide *unparal-*

⁷⁵ For a summary of much of the relevant data, see Lipset and Bendix, pp. 42-46. Data from the Detroit Area Study of 1958 revealed that 30 per cent of the males, and 34 per cent of the married females, were mobile across the nonmanual versus manual and farm line on an intergenerational basis (with the status of married females being based on their fathers' and husbands' occupational status). When the children of farmers were excluded, the figures rose to 31 and 37 per cent respectively. In both instances the differential was greater with respect to upward mobility than downward. For details on the sample, see Lenski, *Factor*, pp. 12-16.

leled opportunities for communication among the less powerful and less privileged segments of society.

In classical Marxian theory, class struggles always referred to struggles which either were violent or would become violent. On the basis of the historical record, Marx saw almost no alternative. While such a view has considerable justification when based on a study of preindustrial societies, it has little justification when applied to the more advanced industrial societies, it is not the only one. Class conflicts involve occupational classes, political classes, racial, ethnic, religious, and even sex and age classes. Furthermore, as we shall see, class conflicts flourish even in "classless" societies, i.e., societies in which the private ownership of the means of production has been eliminated, such as the Soviet Union. It is also important to note that these several forms of class conflict are often hopelessly entangled one with another.⁷⁶ When this happens, it frequently becomes difficult to determine which of the class systems is contributing what to the conflict.

A second departure from classical Marxian theory becomes necessary because of Marx's obsessive concern with the single resource of property. While it is true that property is a major source of class conflict in most industrial societies, it is not the only one. Class conflicts involve occupational classes, political classes, racial, ethnic, religious, and even sex and age classes. Furthermore, as we shall see, class conflicts flourish even in "classless" societies, i.e., societies in which the private ownership of the means of production has been eliminated, such as the Soviet Union. It is also important to note that these several forms of class conflict are often hopelessly entangled one with another.⁷⁶ When this happens, it frequently becomes difficult to determine which of the class systems is contributing what to the conflict.

Third, and finally, departure from Marxian theory is necessitated because class struggles are not nearly so pervasive a phenomenon in advanced industrial societies as Marxist theory would lead one to expect. Many persons respond to social inequality with an attitude of apathy and indifference. Others respond by emulating those above them, by individual striving, or by simple cooperation. To complicate matters further, all these patterns of response can be found in members of the same class, and often in the same individual. This is true not only in societies just making the transition from feudalism to capitalism, where Marx anticipated it, but even in the most advanced capitalist nations. In short, although the Marxian concept of class struggle continues to be a useful tool in stratification theory, its usefulness is greatly enhanced when one breaks with the narrow and unrealistic meaning given it in classical Marxian theory.

In modern industrial societies, class struggles involving *private property* are among the most important both because of the size of the stakes

⁷⁶ In Ralf Dahrendorf's terms one may speak of "superimposition." See *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1959), pp. 213-218.

involved and because of the frequency with which they serve as the focal point of political conflict. Struggles over the rights of property take various forms. Sometimes they take the form of illegal activities, chiefly crimes against property. While such actions are annoying to members of the propertied class, they pose a far less serious threat than certain of the legal alternatives. Two of these deserve particular attention, since both have resulted in definite gains for the nonpropertied class. These are (1) the struggles between labor and management and (2) the struggles between left- and right-wing political parties.

Though these two forms of class struggles are sometimes viewed as merely two aspects of the same thing, they are not. In the former instance the rights of property are challenged by the claims of *labor*, and more especially some specific segment of *organized labor*; in the latter instance they are challenged primarily by the claims of *citizenship*. While the groups which stand to benefit often include the same individuals, this is not invariably the case. It does not apply, for example, to *the unemployed*, nor frequently to *the unorganized*, i.e., workers who are not union members. When a particular union wins a pay raise or other new rights from an employer, only its own members benefit, at least directly. By contrast, gains won by liberal and socialist parties in the political arena usually have the effect of increasing the value of citizenship, a resource shared by the organized and unorganized, by the employed and unemployed, in fact, by all members of society.

This peculiar resource and its effects on the distributive process will be examined more closely in pages 428 to 430 of this chapter. Suffice it to say here that modern efforts to enhance its value represent one of the important consequences of the rise and spread of the democratic-egalitarian ideology.

Because of their identification with this ideology, liberal and socialist parties have been able to attract considerable support which they could not otherwise have won. Many individuals whose economic interests would normally lead them to support conservative parties have been won over by ideological appeals. This has been especially true of intellectuals, who are, by virtue of their vocation, vulnerable to such appeals. To a lesser degree, it has been true of persons who come under their influence in colleges and universities.

This has been a very important development for several reasons. To begin with, these ideological converts have often supplied much of the leadership for liberal and socialist parties. They are equipped with many of the skills essential for the complex maneuvering required by modern democratic politics—skills largely lacking or imperfectly developed in

most members of the working class. Without these converts, it is possible that left-wing parties would never have achieved any victories of note; and without such victories, it is possible that the majority of workers and other members of the nonpropertied class would have turned from peaceful, legal channels of action to violent, revolutionary ones.

This development is also important because the presence of these ideological converts in positions of leadership has probably led to some alteration in the goals of liberal and socialist parties. While ideological considerations proved stronger than economic class interests for these converts, it does not follow that self-interest has been completely extinguished in them. On the contrary, in most cases it has remained alive, with the result that left-wing parties have sometimes pursued goals which were not especially advantageous to the working and nonpropertied classes. For example, the policies of these parties have sometimes been subtly, though probably unintentionally, altered to promote the rise of meritocracy rather than socialism. Though both systems support the principle of equality of opportunity, the former is not especially favorable to most of the other forms of equality endorsed by the latter.

Though the new democratic-egalitarian ideology has won many converts to liberal and socialist parties, the older, capitalist ideology remains powerful and attracts many to conservative parties. In every nation where free elections are held, large numbers of working men support conservative or middle-of-the-road parties. In Britain, for example, public opinion polls show that the Conservative Party enjoys the support of a quarter to a third of the members of the working class.⁷⁷ In the United States the Republican Party is supported by a third to a half of the working class, at least in Presidential elections.⁷⁸ In West Germany in 1955 the working class was divided into three groups of almost equal size: (1) those supporting the Socialist, (2) those supporting center and right-wing parties, and (3) those without any party preference.^{78a} In the French election in 1951, 30 per cent of the working class voted for center or right-wing parties and 20 per cent failed to vote.^{78b}

Further evidence of the influence of capitalist ideology is found in studies of workers' views of management, private property, and similar matters. For example, in a study of workers in Norway, a country with a

⁷⁷ Robert Alford, *Party and Society: The Anglo-American Democracies* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963), table B-1.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, table B-3.

^{78a} Calculated on the basis of Morris Janowitz, "Social Stratification and Mobility in West Germany," in *American Journal of Sociology*, 64 (1958), table 16, p. 22.

^{78b} *Sondages, Étude des électeurs des différents partis d'après l'enquête sur les attitudes politiques des Français*. Institut français d'opinion publique, 1952, No. 3.

highly popular Socialist government, the question was asked "Do you think workers and top management have common or opposing interests?" No less than 44 per cent responded by saying that they had common interests, and an additional 29 per cent expressed the belief that the two groups held some interests in common and some opposed; only 27 per cent said the interests were opposed.⁷⁹ Similar results have been obtained in studies in the United States. For example, in a study of class relations in Paterson, New Jersey, a community noted for poor labor-management relations, a sample of production workers was asked "How do classes get along? In general, are they like enemies, or like equal partners, or like leaders and followers?" Nearly half saw the relationship as paternalistic or cooperative, and only a third saw it as involving enmity (the other fifth had no opinion or gave vague responses).⁸⁰ Finally, one might cite Purcell's study of packinghouse workers in three cities, which showed that the great majority were favorable both to their union and their company.⁸¹ This was true even of union leaders. Although undoubtedly there are companies and communities where unfavorable attitudes predominate, on the national level large numbers of workers apparently accept much of the traditional capitalist ideology.

The reasons for this are not hard to find. The schools and mass media are dominated by the propertied, entrepreneurial, and managerial classes, and while they permit a certain amount of criticism to be reported there, in the main these institutions are supportive of the system. Beyond this, however, these classes have proven willing to negotiate and make concessions, so that the conditions of life for the great majority of citizens have definitely improved. Finally, through the skillful manipulation of race, ethnicity, and religion, the propertied and managerial classes have often managed to divide the opposition and bind a portion of the working class to themselves by virtue of common status group ties. A classic example of this has been the use of race in parts of the United States, especially the South. By giving preference to white workers in hiring and promoting, thus protecting them against competition from Negro workers, managers and owners have created a major cleavage between the races within the working and nonpropertied classes, and have made effective cooperation

⁷⁹ J. A. Lauwerys, *Scandinavian Democracy* (Copenhagen: Danish Institute et al., 1958), p. 239. These figures are based on a study conducted by the Institute for Social Research in Oslo in thirty-four plants representing a sixth of that city's industrial workers employed in plants with joint consultation committees.

⁸⁰ Jerome Manis and Bernard Meltzer, "Attitudes of Textile Workers to Class Structure," *American Journal of Sociology*, 60 (1954), p. 33.

⁸¹ Theodore Purcell, *Blue Collar Man: Patterns of Dual Allegiance in Industry* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), especially table 38. See also his review of other studies showing similar results, pp. 248-252.

between them virtually impossible. In fairness, however, it must be added that this cleavage could have been created only with the aid and cooperation of the white workers themselves.

Unlike the struggles of the peasants in agrarian societies, those of the working class have yielded many substantial benefits. Some rights have been won at the bargaining table, others in the political arena. As a result, the standard of living for workers has risen to the point where the vast majority live well above the subsistence level. This is especially evident when one takes into account the many benefits now derived by virtue of citizenship. The net effect of these developments has been to reduce to a minimum support for violent revolutionary action. A good illustration of this is the inability of the Communist Party to obtain any substantial following except in France and Italy. Even in those countries, the majority of those who support the Party in elections apparently have little enthusiasm for violent revolutionary action; if they did, their great numbers would insure the success of any reasonably well organized effort.

In the Soviet Union and other Communist countries where the institution of private property has largely been abolished and where political democracy is forbidden, class conflicts along economic lines are not nearly so open and active. However, it would be a mistake to suppose that the Communist system has eliminated economic class antagonisms; at best, it has only suppressed them. One indication of this can be found in the interviews conducted by Harvard University's Russian Research Center among Russian refugees at the end of World War II. While there is good reason to believe that these people differed in a number of ways from those who stayed behind, available evidence indicates that these differences were not extreme.⁸² For example, almost 60 per cent of the refugees reported leaving the Soviet Union involuntarily, and the percentage of Communist Party members was twice as high in the sample as in the nation, despite the fact that admission of membership could have prevented immigration to the United States.⁸³ Furthermore, the refugees included individuals from all classes and groups within the population.

Some of the most interesting findings of this study emerged from responses to the following question: "Below is given a paired list of classes in Soviet society. We would like to know for each of these pairs . . . do their interests coincide with or contradict each other? Check the condition you think correct for each group." When the results were tabulated, it became clear that many respondents from all class levels saw the interests

⁸² For a thorough discussion of the nature of this sample and this problem, see Inkeles and Bauer, pp. 7-10 and 25-40.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, pp. 31-32.

of workers and peasants as opposed to those of the intelligentsia, i.e., the professional and managerial classes, and other white-collar employees. For example, while 80 per cent of the peasants felt that their interests and those of workers coincided, only 44 per cent felt that their interests coincided with those of the intelligentsia, and only 48 per cent with those of white-collar employees. In the case of manual workers, the figures were 88, 56, and 67 per cent respectively. In the case of the intelligentsia, 89 per cent saw their interests as coinciding with those of white-collar employees, but only 69 per cent thought this true in the case of peasants, and only 72 per cent in the case of workers.⁸⁴ Similar results emerged from a series of questions in which the refugees were asked to indicate the relative harmfulness of the different classes. In a summary measure constructed from all of their answers, the intelligentsia emerged as the most harmful class in Soviet society in the opinion of workers and peasants, while the working class emerged as the most harmful in the opinion of the intelligentsia and white-collar employees.⁸⁵ While the peculiar nature of the sample makes comparisons difficult, these data indicate that economic class antagonisms are probably as strong in the Soviet Union as in non-Communist countries, despite vigorous governmental efforts to suppress them, and despite the elimination of the system of private property. Apparently these antagonisms are destined to survive as long as the present occupational class system survives.

In all of the more advanced industrial nations, the key resources of property, occupation, education, and membership in the political class tend to be held by the same persons. As a result, it is often difficult, if not impossible, to disentangle one form of class struggle from the others. In the Soviet Union, for example, Party membership tends to be held by those who also have a university education and are members of the professional or managerial classes. In the United States and other non-Communist nations, membership in the professional and managerial classes is usually combined with higher education and membership in the propertied and political classes. To be sure, these relationships are far from perfect, and as suggested elsewhere, this leads to struggles among these privileged minorities, but these are of secondary importance compared to the more basic struggle between the "haves" and "have-nots."

Struggles between racial, ethnic, and religious status groups also tend to become entangled with the struggle between economic classes. As long as members of subordinate status groups are concentrated in the working and nonpropertied classes, it is difficult to determine to what extent their

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, table 85.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, table 89.

struggles are economic class struggles and to what extent they are status-group struggles. However, once some of these people begin to rise in the occupational and property class systems the influence of status-group membership becomes more evident.

There is now a growing body of evidence which shows that the influence of status groups on voting behavior, one of the best indicators of class conflict, is not too much less than that of occupational class. One of the most valuable studies of this was Alford's recent one on voting behavior in four of the five English-speaking democracies. He shows the results of a series of national surveys of voter preference, cross-tabulated by occupational class and religion. The essence of his findings is summarized in Table 1. To facilitate analysis, both religion and class are divided into two categories: religion into Catholics and Protestants, class into manual and nonmanual occupations.

Table 1 Mean Difference in Party Preference by Occupational Class with Religion Held Constant, Mean Difference in Party Preference by Religion with Occupational Class' Held Constant, and Percentage of Population Catholic, by Nation for Four English-speaking Democracies

NATION	MEAN DIFFERENCE BY CLASS WITH RELIGION HELD CONSTANT	MEAN DIFFERENCE BY RELIGION WITH CLASS HELD CONSTANT	PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION CATHOLIC	NO. OF SURVEYS
Britain	37	6	Under 10	3
Australia	33	16	20-25	7
United States	18	21	25	7
Canada	4	20	40	9
Mean of means	$\overline{23}$	$\overline{16}$		

Source: Calculated from Robert Alford, *Party and Society: The Anglo-American Democracies* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963), tables 6-3, 7-4, 8-4, and 9-5.

As this table makes clear, the pattern is quite variable in the four countries, with Britain and Canada representing the two extremes. In Britain, occupational class is a major determinant of voting behavior, and religious status group a rather minor factor; in Canada, the pattern is reversed. In three of the four countries, however, the struggle between religious status groups is important enough to serve as a major determinant of voting behavior. This table also suggests that *the importance of conflicts between religious status groups varies directly with the numerical strength of the chief minority group.*

One might suppose that differences in voting behavior between Protestants and Catholics simply reflect some basic difference in political philosophy and ideals and that they are unrelated to the distributive process. While philosophical differences are undoubtedly a factor to some extent, the evidence indicates that *this is also a distributive problem involving status groups vying for power, privilege, and prestige*. Moreover, these goals are sought for their secular value, and not merely because they are useful in the attainment of theologically based ideals.

It seems more than coincidental, for example, that in countries where Catholics have traditionally been the dominant group, as in Italy and France, they tend to support conservative parties, whereas in countries where they have been a minority group, as in Britain and the United States, they support liberal parties. This apparently contradictory pattern makes sense only if one takes into account the vested interests of dominant groups in the maintenance of the *status quo*, and the opposed interests of minorities in altering the *status quo*. It is also interesting to note that a recent study of Detroit showed that the probability of Catholics voting for the Democratic Party was highly correlated with the degree of their involvement in the Catholic subcommunity, i.e., the degree to which their close friends and relatives were also Catholic, but not at all with the frequency of their attendance at Mass.⁸⁶ On the contrary, there was a slight *negative* correlation between attendance at Mass and support for the Democratic Party. Finally, in a national survey study of the 1960 Presidential election it was found that, among Catholics a shift from Eisenhower (in 1956) to Kennedy was much more closely correlated with the individual's involvement in the Catholic community than with his involvement in the Catholic Church, as measured by attendance at Mass.⁸⁷

Much the same pattern can be found where other status groups are involved. The dominant group tends to support the conservative party or parties, while the minority groups tend to support parties advocating political change.⁸⁸ *Thus, what has sometimes been thought to be merely a struggle between economic classes proves, on closer inspection, to be a struggle between status groups as well.* In fact, as the experience of nations such as Canada and Holland indicate, the economic class struggle

⁸⁶ Lenski, *Factor*, pp. 174-175 and 181-184.

⁸⁷ Philip Converse, "Religion and Politics: the 1960 Elections," unpublished paper of the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan, 1961, pp. 32-33, especially table 4a.

⁸⁸ This means that in non-Communist, democratic nations, minorities tend to support Liberal, Socialist, and even Communist Parties. In Communist countries, where the Communist Party becomes in many ways a conservative party supporting the political *status quo*, minority status groups like the Ukrainians are more likely to be anti-Communist than the dominant ethnic group, the Great Russians.

can sometimes even be subordinated to the struggle between status groups.

Before concluding this discussion of status-group struggles, it should be emphasized that these, no less than economic class struggles, have a potential for revolutionary violence. This can be seen in the recurring pattern of race riots in this country, in the recent terrorist activities of certain French-Canadian groups, and in the recurring struggles of the Ukrainians.

Not too long ago, *sex status* was the basis for a unique kind of class struggle in most of the more advanced industrial societies. Women campaigned vigorously for equal rights with men. As a result of these efforts, women now have virtually equal rights before the law. However, they have not achieved full equality in the worlds of work and of politics, but despite this, the majority of women do not seem greatly concerned. The explanation for this apparent paradox lies in the family system which, as noted previously, makes it possible for most women to attain their goals through marriage as easily as most men can attain theirs through work and political activity. It is significant that the most serious charge militant feminists now make is that the role of housewife is intellectually stultifying, but most women seem to realize that this same charge could, with equal validity, be directed against most male occupations.⁸⁹ This probably explains why the feminist movement has lost most of its vigor: *for the vast majority of women, the battle for equality has been won.*

Of all the class struggles in modern societies, the most underrated may prove to be those between *age classes*, especially those between youth (in the sense of adolescents and young adults) and adults. The importance of this struggle is so underestimated, in fact, that its existence is typically overlooked altogether in discussions of class struggles, or confused with economic class struggles. Nevertheless, there is considerable evidence to indicate that the struggle between age classes is a distinctive class struggle in its own right and, furthermore, is one of the more serious and least tractable.

The basis for this struggle lies in the fact that the younger generation is subject to the authority of the older, while the older generation enjoys the lion's share of rewards. To be sure, this situation has always prevailed in politically stable and highly institutionalized societies. In two respects, however, the situation has changed, and these newer developments have tended to stimulate intergenerational conflict. In the first place, industrialization has meant a sharp increase in educational requirements, as well as

⁸⁹ See Betty Friedan, *The Feminine Mystique* (New York: Norton, 1963), for an example of the modern version of militant feminism.

declining opportunities for profitable employment by adolescents and young adults.⁹⁰ As a result, the period of economic dependence on the older generation, and hence of subordination, has been substantially lengthened. No longer can boys of twelve or fourteen earn their own livelihood and thereby secure their independence if they desire it. In the second place, because of these same developments, and especially because of the growth of mass education, adolescents and young adults are thrown into a world made up almost exclusively of their age peers, a world which few adults penetrate in more than a marginal way. Thus, opportunities for contact and communication are maximized in a class whose members have a common grievance. In short, ideal conditions for class conflict, as identified by Marx, have been created.

To complete the picture, two other elements should be added. First, because of their youth, the class with grievances is physically at the peak of vigor and vitality and relatively unencumbered by social responsibilities. Second, because of their youth, they have few opportunities to obtain redress through normal political channels; the great majority are too young to vote, and those who can, find that the major political parties are firmly in the control of a generation not especially interested in their kinds of problems. The net result is that struggles between the generations occur and, moreover, are likely to take violent and even revolutionary forms.

It is no coincidence that young people play a prominent role in the radical and revolutionary movements *on both sides of the Iron Curtain*. In non-Communist countries, Communist leaders often pride themselves on their Party's appeal to youth, thinking this demonstrates that it is the Party of the future.⁹¹ What they fail to appreciate is that in the countries where their Party rules, the younger generation is also in the forefront of the opposition. One need only remember the role youth played in the Hungarian revolution and the Polish uprisings of 1956, or the East German riots of 1953, to appreciate the extent of the hostility. Even in Russia the problem exists, and seems to be growing more serious. Young people in general, and students in particular, are playing a prominent role in the libertarian movement, which sprang up a decade ago when the extreme repression of the Stalinist era was relaxed.⁹²

⁹⁰ In 1962 the unemployment rate among persons aged fourteen to nineteen was 12.5 per cent, but only 5.1 per cent among persons aged twenty-five to forty-four. Calculated from *Statistical Abstract, 1962*, tables 281 and 283.

⁹¹ See, for example, Philip Williams, *Politics in Post-war France* (London: Longmans, 1954), pp. 52-53, on the Communist Party in France.

⁹² For a good discussion of this movement by a recent Russian refugee student, see Burg, pp. 89-99.

In this struggle between the generations it is often difficult to recognize the elements of self-interest which motivate both sides, because both sides tend to wage their battles in the name of abstract principles. Thus the younger generation fights for "freedom" and in opposition to "bureaucracy," while the older generation fights for "law and order" and for "leadership by men of experience." Frequently the struggle between age classes becomes hopelessly entangled with the economic class struggle in non-Communist countries, or the political class struggle in Communist nations. Under these circumstances, the only readily visible indication of the role which the struggle between the age classes is playing is the uneven representation of the generations in the two camps. However, the struggle is no less real simply because it is often obscured by clouds of misleading rhetoric and ideology.

The struggle between the generations, unlike that between the sexes, is not likely to be resolved in the near future. While certain current developments may ease the situation, others will undoubtedly exacerbate it. On the favorable side there is the trend by governmental bodies and other agencies to view higher education as a form of employment deserving support. This is especially evident in Communist countries, where student subsidies are the rule, but even in non-Communist countries there are a growing number of governmental and private fellowships and stipends. This, combined with a trend toward earlier marriage, a notoriously domesticating experience, may speed the entry of youth into the ranks of the adult class. On the other hand, the prolongation of education increases the number of those who are something less than full-fledged adults, as well as the number concentrated in segregated educational communities. Finally, as a stable element in the situation one must note the continued presence and importance of large-scale, bureaucratized organizations which, by their very nature, favor the principle of promotion by seniority, a principle which inevitably creates tensions between the generations. Thus, looking to the future, one can expect changes in the nature of the class struggles between the generations, but in all probability, the continuation of the struggle itself.

Citizenship and the Revival of the Redistributive Process

Of all the consequences of class struggles in the modern era, one stands out above the rest because of its profound importance. This is the transformation of the nature of the resource of citizenship.

To many it may seem strange to classify citizenship in the same category with property, occupation, education, and the other resources dealt

with earlier. However, it is precisely that.⁹³ In earlier times it was easier to recognize this aspect of citizenship because then it was the valued possession of the few. In agrarian societies, only members of the governing class were citizens in anything like the modern sense of the term, except in urban centers, where the resource was sometimes shared more widely. Today, however, virtually every member of industrial societies is a citizen and, as a result, enjoys a wide range of valuable benefits.

The rights afforded by citizenship vary somewhat from one nation to the next. However, in nearly all of the more advanced industrial nations, it entitles individuals to many years of free education, to the use of public roads and highways, public sanitary facilities and water supply, parks and other recreational facilities, to police and fire protection, and to certain forms of income when he is old, disabled, or unemployed. Also, by virtue of government regulation of private enterprise in non-Communist countries, citizenship protects individuals against economic exploitation by monopolies and oligopolies, with respect to the pricing of goods as well as the determination of wage rates. Finally, in a growing number of countries, citizenship also entitles individuals to a variety of medical services and, through state subsidies, to various kinds of cultural activities at prices below cost.

Probably the chief reason we have difficulty thinking of citizenship as a resource is because it tends to put men on an equal footing, while all the others tend to generate inequality. Though this fact makes citizenship a unique kind of resource, it makes it a resource nonetheless. As was true of all the other things we have treated as resources, citizenship facilitates the acquisition of rewards or benefits.

The changing character of citizenship in modern times—its extension to all segments of the population, and the addition of many new rights—has revived an ancient function of government which had largely disappeared in agrarian societies, namely, the redistributive function. By assigning increased rights to the role of citizen, a role shared by all, and by charging the costs of these rights disproportionately to those best able to pay, the state in an industrial society effects a transfer of rewards from those who have more to those who have less. At present, economists still disagree as to the magnitude of this transfer. A few even question whether any effective redistribution of income is, indeed, accomplished. The great majority, however, believe that the redistributive function is being performed, and on an ever-increasing scale, though certainly not on the drastic scale suggested by official tax rates and much of the polemical

⁹³ See T. H. Marshall, *Citizenship and Social Class* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1950), pp. 1-85.

literature on the subject. There is also general agreement that this function is performed in varying degrees in different nations, and that it is most pronounced in countries where the Swedish pattern of political control prevails. In view of the trend toward the Swedish pattern, however, there is good reason to believe that the importance of citizenship will increase in most industrial societies in the next several decades.

Prestige Stratification

In this volume, little attempt has been made to examine the third great reward men seek, namely, honor or prestige. This was partly because the analysis of power and privilege alone required a lengthy volume, and partly because it was assumed that prestige can be understood more readily as a function of power and privilege than the other way around. While not denying that there is a certain element of feedback, the major causal flow has been assumed to move from power and privilege to prestige.

However, since so much of what has been written on stratification in modern industrial societies, and especially in the United States, has been concerned with the distribution of prestige, some discussion of this third element in the classic triad is in order. At the very least, we should take cognizance of some of the evidence which is relevant to our assumption of the substantial dependence of prestige on power and privilege.

Prestige may be attached to any kind of social unit, individual, role, or group. For present purposes, we are chiefly concerned with studies of the prestige of individuals and roles. One of the most important landmarks in the study of the latter was North and Hatt's investigation of occupational prestige in the United States, conducted shortly after World War II.⁹⁴ This study provided a nationwide evaluation and ranking of ninety occupations. Recently these evaluations were subjected to further analysis by Dudley Duncan, who found a correlation of .91 between these evaluations and a combined measure of the educational attainments and income of each of forty-five occupations which could be matched with census designations.⁹⁵ In other words, *five-sixths of the variance in occupational prestige is accounted for, statistically, by a linear combination*

⁹⁴ National Opinion Research Center, "Jobs and Occupations: A Popular Evaluation," *Opinion News*, 9 (Sept. 1, 1947), pp. 3-13, reprinted in Bendix and Lipset, pp. 411-426.

⁹⁵ See O. D. Duncan, "A Socioeconomic Index for All Occupations," in Albert J. Reiss, *Occupation and Social Status* (New York: Free Press, 1961), p. 124.

of indicators of the income and educational levels of the occupations. If in keeping with the theoretical framework of our analysis, education is viewed as a resource, and hence a form of power, and if income is viewed as a measure of both power and privilege, *this means that most of the variance in the prestige of this sample of American occupations can be viewed as a reflection of occupational power and privilege.*

A third study suggests that this relationship is not peculiarly American. Inkeles and Rossi have shown that the American pattern of occupational prestige is very similar to those of Britain, Japan, New Zealand, the Soviet Union, and Germany.⁹⁶ In each instance a correlation of at least .90 was found; the average was .94. While the number of occupations compared was limited, and by necessity excluded those which were not comparable, e.g., no comparisons of Party secretary or entrepreneur were possible in the case of the United States and the U.S.S.R., and while we have no study like Duncan's to prove how closely occupational prestige in those countries is correlated with income and education, those pieces of the puzzle which are available to us fit the pattern, and unsystematic evidence strongly suggests that the pattern is essentially the same.

With respect to *individual* prestige, the evidence suggests much the same conclusion: individual prestige, too, seems largely a function of power and privilege. For example, in an oft-cited study of one Midwestern town, it was found that the prestige of individuals and families of Old American background, when judged by other members of the community, had a correlation of .93 with a combined measure of the occupation of the family head and the amount of his income, and .92 with a combined measure of occupation and education.⁹⁷ More recently, in a study of an Eastern city, Hollingshead found a correlation of .91 between judgments of class position on the one hand and educational and occupational rank on the other.⁹⁸ Other examples along this same line could also be cited. In short, *with respect to individual or family prestige, as with respect to occupational prestige, the chief determinants are variables which are normally subsumed under the categories of power and privilege.* It follows, therefore, that even though little attention has been given in this volume to the phenomenon of prestige, we have examined the factors which largely determine the distribution of prestige in modern industrial societies.

⁹⁶ Alex Inkeles and Peter Rossi, "National Comparisons of Occupational Prestige," *American Journal of Sociology*, 61 (1956), pp. 329-339.

⁹⁷ Warner et al., *Social Class*, table 14.

⁹⁸ A. B. Hollingshead and Frederick Redlich, *Social Class and Mental Illness: A Community Study* (New York: Wiley, 1958), p. 394.

Future Trends

In our analysis of modern industrial societies we have concentrated on current patterns of organization and distribution, and have deliberately avoided speculation about patterns of the more distant future. However, one cannot help being fascinated by questions about the future. Clearly industrial societies have not yet reached a stable equilibrium. In fact, the rate of change seems to be accelerating. This means that we have every reason to expect that the most advanced societies a century or two hence will differ as much from the most advanced societies of today as the latter differ from the first industrial societies of a century and half ago. In other words, the industrial societies described in this volume may prove to be only transitional forms, not stable types comparable to the types of societies described in earlier chapters.

From the standpoint of predicting future trends in the distributive process, six developments, all of which have been noted before, are particularly important. First, the new methods of contraception which are now appearing promise to give mankind a degree of control over human fertility that far surpasses anything known in the past or even the present. Second, the growth in human numbers, especially in the less developed countries, but also in the most advanced, is creating a set of conditions which may well lead to the acceptance of fertility planning at the national level. Third, technological advance is making possible fantastic increases in the production of goods and services and a drastic reduction in the need for human labor. Fourth, technological advance is also making possible substantial advances in techniques of social control. Fifth, technological advance in transportation and communication is making possible the creation of a single world state which could replace the present multi-state system. Finally, technological advance in the military area has already made possible the virtual destruction of humanity.

No one today can say with certainty how these potentialities will be utilized, or how they may combine and interact with one another to produce new patterns of social organization. However, one can identify several basic possibilities. First, there is clearly the possibility of the termination of human existence in an atomic holocaust, or possibly in a biochemical war. Second, there is the possibility that such a war might lead to a permanent regression to the agrarian level with no possibility of a restoration of industrial societies.⁹⁹ Third, there is the possibility that new tech-

⁹⁹ See Harrison Brown, *The Challenge of Man's Future* (New York: Viking Compass Books, 1956), pp. 222-225, for an excellent discussion of this possibility.

niques of social control will be monopolized by a small minority who will use them for their own benefit, perhaps along the lines envisioned by George Orwell in his book, *1984*. Fourth, there is the possibility that new techniques of production, employed in conjunction with a voluntary or involuntary program of fertility control, will create an era of abundance and relative equality for all, in a single world state (or perhaps in a series of militarily stalemated national states). Finally, there is the possibility that, despite all the technological innovations, men will choose to keep the social order more or less as it is. Which course of action men will adopt no one can predict, and, since they are so radically different, detailed speculation about their nature seems better left to the writers of science fiction—at least for the present.