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R. H. Tawney As Economist

David A. Martin

Upon the occasion of his eightieth birthday, the London *Times* noted that "no man alive has put more people into his spiritual and intellectual debt than has Richard Henry Tawney."¹ In 1960, Tawney was perhaps the premier economic historian, and the major works of his prodigious output were still widely read and admired for their erudition and brilliant exposition.² Two decades later, Tawney's visibility has faded and his work has gone without significant attention except for a few memorial articles and Ross Terrill's book, which casts him as a political theorist.³ Tawney's relative eclipse would seem to be due to the prevailing view that he was a genteel moralist, an evolutionary socialist, and a historical specialist in the English sixteenth century—all concerns that now seem *passé*. While Tawney's range of interests included all of these dimensions, it also extended to political economy (consideration of the proper form of economic organization for advanced industrial society) and to formal economics.⁴

Tawney's economic analysis was not presented in systematic form and is interspersed amongst his other concerns, usually in a critical manner. As a result, it must be synthesized from very disparate sources. When thus reconstructed, it is quite similar to neo-institutionalism, which considers economics to be a broadbased and patently normative study of changes in the forms of economic organization, which are in an evolutionary process of interaction between dynamic economic behavior, especially technological change, and the normally lagging institutional environment of

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society. The object of neo-institutionalist economics is to provide the means for social control of economic activity in order to promote a more “civilized” society.⁵ Because Tawney’s intellectual heritage was in religious idealism, Fabianism, and the English literary “romantic” tradition, the resemblance of much of his work to neo-institutionalism was not the result of any obvious direct linkage to his institutional contemporaries.⁶ His status therefore seems to be similar to other comprehensive scholars such as Adam Smith, J. M. Keynes, and Karl Polanyi, who recently have been reclassified as overlapping or compatible with the institutionalist tradition.⁷

Tawney's Relation to Economics

To some extent classification of any scholar like Tawney, whose efforts cut across narrowly defined academic disciplines, is ultimately arbitrary. While Tawney is listed as an economist in several standard sources, Terrill states that “Tawney was not an economist, though he is often referred to as one.”⁸ Unlike Adam Smith, who worked out his economics while he professed moral philosophy, Tawney began his career as a teacher of economics (also at Glasgow University, 1906–08) and subsequently delved into moral philosophy.⁹ Although he lacked formal training in economics, his situation was not unusual at the time.¹⁰

Tawney’s rise to prominence began in 1908 with his courses for artisans, which led to his lifelong formative role in adult education. In the early period, Tawney felt that the Workers Educational Association was “going to have a great deal to do with the education of the workers, especially in the teaching of economics and industrial history.”¹¹ But reflecting in 1953, he mused characteristically that while he had learned some economic history as a tutor, economic theory “I quickly discovered to be out of my depth.”¹² At the height of his career, while a Professor of Economic History at the London School of Economics, he identified himself as a “historian” and a “teacher.” But Tawney’s conception of the role of historian as social investigator combined many disciplines, including economics, in one effort.¹³ His decision to specialize in the new discipline of economic history reflected his view of the need for a broader approach in face of the controversy that culminated in Sir John Harold Clapham’s famous critique of deductive economists for proffering “empty economic boxes.”¹⁴ The extent of this schism was reflected in Tawney’s efforts to initiate a separate journal and professional organization for economic historians that did not attempt to include economists.¹⁵

Although the mature Tawney did not claim “to speak as an economist”

because he did not “study the works of economic theorists with the assiduity that they deserve,” and often referred to economists as “them” or “the economists,”¹⁶ he should be regarded as a humanistically oriented social scientist who knew a great deal about classical and neo-classical economics while rejecting most of it on both methodological and normative grounds. He opted to toil within the separate entity of economic history, in the British tradition, which allowed him to study the organization and operation of various economies in the past and present, with tools drawn from various social sciences, including economics as well as historical evidence of all types from statistics to literature.

Tawney was a careful student of economic doctrine, which was a substantive element of the pre-formalist economics that prevailed throughout most of his career.¹⁷ He identified “the objective analysis of the Political Arithmeticians” as the origin of economics as “a specialized object of concentrated and systematic effort.” During the Reformation, economics was “still a branch of ethics, and ethics of theology.” After the Restoration, a “naturalistic political arithmetic ‘displaced religion’ from the master interest of mankind into one department of life.” The method of the new “economic science” was patterned on “contemporary progress of mathematics and physics,” and treated social issues “in terms of mechanical causation,” in the manner of a scientist “applying a new calculus to impersonal economic forces.” It treated society as “a mechanism adjusting itself through the play of economic motives to the supply of economic needs,” premised upon the doctrine that “man’s self-love is God’s providence.” It became the product of “experts who wrote on agriculture, trade, and, above all, on currency and the foreign exchanges.”¹⁸ While Tawney certainly lamented “the change in standards which converted a natural frailty into a resounding virtue,” he ascribed the demise of “moral casuistry” not to the “undesigned” effects of Protestant individualism, but rather to the triumph of “the practical interests of the City.” Mercantilism replaced the “systematic treatment of economic questions” provided by the Canonists and delivered control over the economy from the Church to “civilians acting under the authority of the Crown.”¹⁹

Although Tawney painstakingly established the secular origin of the “disillusioning career” of English economics “a century before the philosophy of it was propounded by Adam Smith,” he was also concerned with the later economists who rationalized the triumph of capitalism by treating “soulless individualism” as “of self-evident and universal validity.” The Physiocrats were conservatives who resisted the new order, whereas Adam Smith, the “good bourgeois,” synthesized the grand design.²⁰ Thereafter, Tawney identified Jeremy Bentham, David Ricardo,

Nassau Senior, Stanley Jevons, Alfred Marshall, and J. M. Keynes as the mainstream lineage of the view that “well-being was a commodity which every prudent and enterprising person could purchase for himself.”²¹

Tawney’s writings show also that he was well acquainted with and sympathetic to the “underworld” of economics stretching from the French Socialists, Robert Owen, Thomas Hodgskin, Alexander Gray, John Francis Bray, the Chartists, Thomas Carlyle, John Ruskin, Matthew Arnold, William Morris, the later J. S. Mill, the German Historical School, John Hobson, and especially Karl Marx—who received the greatest continuous attention of all the historical figures.²² For Tawney, Marx was a “genius” and a “great man,” but most critically a “humanist . . . as saturated with ethics as a Hebrew Prophet.”²³ Marx the moralist, who “preferred to clothe his philosophy in the garb of history,” accepted the prevalent view of his era that progress was inevitable, but he was not a historicist. The Historical Materialism of “dogmatic” Marxism, which was an attempt to make “the processes of history do the work of a political philosophy,” would have “horrified” Marx. Tawney regarded “the servile cult of the inevitable” stated in a Post-Ricardian “unbending skeleton of bloodless formulae, neatly classified and labelled with exasperating finality” as a corruption that would have been repudiated by Marx.²⁴ While Tawney devoted much attention throughout his writings to Marx, he especially stressed that his division was with “pseudo-Marxism” and not with Karl Marx, who was “the last of the Schoolmen,” the “true descendant” of the medieval ethics that Tawney sought to restore.²⁵

From his knowledge of economic doctrine within the context of its development, Tawney both employed and disparaged orthodox economics, usually in eloquent prose, while dealing with other concerns. Consequently, Tawney’s economics must be coalesced and integrated into coherent conventional categories. This article will consider Tawney on method, value and price theory, production, and distribution.²⁶

Method in Economics

Tawney viewed deductive “economic science” as a “dogmatic” approach based upon the Ricardian tradition of “abstract speculation.” It was an effort “to find formulae of general application” from which specific conclusions could be anticipated rather than properly “seeking solutions which could be tested by an appeal to facts.”²⁷ He believed that neo-classical economics had become too narrowly focused.²⁸ A more complete science would be both “historical and analytic” in quest of “recurrent uniformities” within “particular places, particular decades, or within pecu-

liar environments.”²⁹ For Tawney, “the task of economists” was to insist that “the exact situation, in so far as is possible, shall be stated as it is.” If economics was to become useful to policy makers, it had to come down from “the rarefied atmosphere of economic generalizations” to “concrete” circumstances.³⁰ Tawney felt that meaningful economic inquiry must turn deliberately from speculation to glance at history in a comprehensive effort to gain perspective by looking at all factors involved. Reliance upon abstract methods would miss the “imponderables,” which Tawney included via forays into comparative studies and literature.³¹ As a consequence, Tawney’s writings were more often like literature than formalist economics.³²

Early in his career, he scoffed at Marshall’s efforts to establish a “science of economics” analogous to engineering mechanics.³³ While still teaching economics in the Worker’s Educational Association, he had already rejected the orthodox positive economics that characterized the department at Glasgow.³⁴ However, Tawney did not abandon completely the analytical approach. “His central concern . . . was to deepen the discussion of economic issues by reference to the ethical dilemmas which, he believed, have always accompanied the attempts men have made to organize the production of wealth.”³⁵ For Tawney, social science had to be both analytical *and* normative. Collection of data by “inductive study” was necessary but not sufficient because “the human mind demands not explanation only but justification.” Social research required purposefulness. Since “the past reveals to the present what the present is capable of seeing,” it would be better for social science not to pretend to keep “partialities out, but by bringing all partialities in.”³⁶ Tawney grasped what only a few economists today deny, that values, however covert, are built into social science and that it is desirable to make them overt.

Tawney’s proffered approach to economics was demonstrated in his critique of “the economic man” as the central core of orthodox economics—that “current presentations of economic theory” were “founded” on “pre-suppositions as to human motives.” He considered that economics (which reflected “the tension between human wants and the limited resources available for satisfying them”) rested on an “axiomatic” type of behavior based upon “economic incentives.” However, that “assumption” of a “stimulus of imminent personal want” as “either the only spur, or a sufficient spur” was a “crude psychology which has little warrant either in past history or in present experience.” It was, he thought, a “relic” of past speculations that “we ought radically to revise.” The “conventional assumptions” about behavior “popularized by the economics textbooks” should be abandoned as “unreal” and replaced by empirical studies of

the “real motive of work” and “the actual conditions under which the work of the world is carried on.” The orthodox idea that human motives are “simple and constant in character . . . identical throughout all ranges of economic activity” was dismissed by Tawney, who believed that while people do have natural frailties that are “inherited,” they are human beings whose nature is “better than the theories made about it,” and who can improve their characters by altering the “social inheritance” into which each generation is born.³⁷

Tawney regarded “Political Economy” as a product of a particular historical era; it was “the economics of profit-making capitalism.” It was “a system of ideas” that was part of “liberalism,” reaching its “zenith between 1850 and 1890,” and only surviving thereafter. At core, it was “rationalist, complacently unhistorical, (and) individualist.” Political Economy taught the “folly” of resisting its “laws,” which Tawney regarded as a rationalization for the pecuniary activity of those persons who could “compete successfully.”³⁸ In his view, economic laws did not require deference because they were not “scientific laws which state the invariable relations between phenomena.” They merely described “how, on the whole, under given historical and legal conditions, and when influenced by particular conventions and ideas, particular groups of men do, as a rule, tend to behave.” The use of “elaborate formulae” to justify “particular social arrangements” as the “product of uncontrollable forces, with which society can tamper only at its peril” made economics into a rationalization of “the values, preferences, interests, and ideals which rule at any moment in a given society.” Tawney argued that the character and circumstances of the existing economic organization were not determined by “immutable economic laws,” but by the prevailing ruling interests. Economics was thus part of the status quo, which justified “pecuniary standards of value” in support of those who were already in “control” of the existing system.³⁹

This underlying basic premise in Tawney’s understanding of economics, as well as of other social thought, followed from his mature philosophical materialist position that events move ideas, in not a unilinear, but a reciprocal manner. Tawney’s methodology underwent an evolution from the early private idealism expressed in his diary.⁴⁰ While a Christian, Tawney remained always a philosophical idealist; as a mature social scientist, he believed that “circumstances impose their own solutions, in defiance of sentiment.” His historical inquiries led him to the conclusion that “economic opinion, the docile servant of predominant economic interests,” after a lag, could be expected to invest any newly emerging “type of economic organization . . . with the respectability of a triumphant fact.” His

classic example was “the controversy on usury,” which was the result of the collision between “a long established body of religious and political doctrines” and “the discovery by considerable sections of the *bourgeoisie* that money lending was not less profitable than agriculture, industry, and commerce.” The appearance of a new economic doctrine “providing an ethical code not too inconsistent with the obvious facts of economic organization . . . was inevitable.”⁴¹

From his materialist perspective, Tawney derided orthodox economics as pretentiously claiming to be an ethically neutral science of the “impersonal forces which move by laws of their own” that provided the ruling interests with a justification for the status quo. It was wrong to accept “as the dispensation of Providence itself” the “placid assumption of the immutability of economic conditions . . . as though economic classes and institutions had stepped out of a kind of political Noah’s Ark, sharply defined, highly coloured, with an unalterable destiny graven upon each wooden feature.”⁴² The notion that human activity could not, or should not, “alter economic facts,” was to “believe in economic fundamentalism,” the equivalent of slavish belief in “the mysteries of ‘Mumbo-Jumbo.’”⁴³ In Tawney’s view, orthodox economics promoted a “mischievous habit of thought” that the economy “is a mechanism, moving by quasi-mechanical laws and adjusted by the play of non-moral forces,” which was an amoral rationalization for human debasement in the name of individual freedom to maximize advantage. It had taught people that “the right of each individual to be unfettered by authority” was “the only natural or conceivable system.” Anything less was an expedient or heresy for the economists who regard the competitive model as “the Arcadia of economic harmonies.”⁴⁴

Value and Price Theory

Having rejected the deductive, positivistic bases of orthodox economics as an apology for the status quo in favor of a broad, normative form of inquiry designed to reform society, Tawney went on to reject the basic principles of the neo-classical competitive model (“the theory and practice which assumes that the service of the public is best secured by the unrestricted pursuit on the part of rival traders of their pecuniary self-interest”⁴⁵) as a norm for social organization. While Terrill is correct in saying that Tawney did not esteem economics, his claim that Tawney “had little grasp of technical economics” is not supported by the evidence interspersed in Tawney’s work.⁴⁶ Tawney was unsympathetically well aware that the core argument for “competition” was based on the “not unfash-

ionable form of credulity” that expects the social good to come from the absence of “lofty principles” or even “from their opposite”: the notion that atomistic egoistic behavior within the competitive marketplace could “provide an automatic substitute for honesty.” Economics had denied that any “moral principles” could be adduced to govern “the transactions of economic life” and “the fact that a transaction is made is the justification of its being made.” The assertion that only “individual morality” was possible was an implicit ethics of expediency. It resulted in a “convenient dualism which exonerates the individual by representing his actions as the outcome of uncontrollable forces.”⁴⁷ For Tawney, the very philosophical core of orthodox economics was flawed.

But that was only part of the problem with the competitive model, for Tawney also rejected the claim that price was a true measure of value. Tawney’s belief that a “rule of right” did exist as a source of true values was incommensurate with the “central truth of existence” in economics that there is “no standard to maintain,” meaning that price measures value because there is no satisfactory independent way to know value except by price. As a result, all goods with the same price have equal value so that “pushpin may be as good as poetry.” “All production, however futile or frivolous, so long as it yields dividends is the same.”⁴⁸

Tawney recognized that while market price can measure quantities, he claimed that “there is no calculus” to measure relative qualities that elude “the measuring-rod of money.”⁴⁹ Tawney made a strong point that the professional classes, which “had defied free competition as the arbiter of commerce and industry” for others, never applied it to themselves. They did not consider professional activities as profit seeking, but retained the tradition of “service” as the proper measure of conduct. But the “standard of utility” was applied to all other activities as the basis of value with the result that a “steam roller” passed over all other values “in the name of material progress.” This “subordination” of economic activity “to the pursuit of private gain” lowered “the whole tone and quality” of industrial society by reducing the standard of value to market price, rather than employing deliberate human intervention to determine the “relative importance” of decisions.⁵⁰

Acceptance of “the view once fashionable . . . that decisions based on the self-interest—enlightened or otherwise—of entrepreneurs and investors should be the chief factor determining . . . the level of productive activity” was “a fatalistic acquiescence in the free play of economic forces” to achieve socially acceptable national economic goals.⁵¹ In Tawney’s view, “the mechanical play of economic forces” could not produce a socially beneficial outcome, because where the market makes decisions

given the “violent inequalities of income, effective demand is not an index of real needs.” Thus production responded to “effective demand” not of those who work usefully, “but of those who spend gaily” on “trivialities.” “Inequality . . . leads to the mis-direction of production” to “luxuries” and “waste” at the expense of pressing social needs and additional productive capacity.⁵²

Tawney also argued that the competitive norm could not deal effectively with the problem of externalities. His persistent example was education—“a spiritual activity”—which was not “commercially profitable” and, as a result, was extended “inferior importance.”⁵³ To the 1938 edition of *Equality*, Tawney added a discussion of the externality problem drawing upon the then-new welfare economics of his friend Evan Durbin. The market could not deal effectively with indivisible or social ends and therefore “no individual” could by “his isolated action” buy a healthy environment, an educational system, safety, or economic security. Yet, these conditions were fundamental to the quality of existence. They provided a “source of social income, received in the form, not of money, but of increased well-being,” which could not be obtained from the “competitive equilibrium” and had to be provided collectively by government.⁵⁴

Lastly, Tawney rejected the historic normative claim for the competitive model as the vehicle to deliver efficiency and progress via relentless innovation. According to Tawney, historically “the only intellectually respectable argument against the intervention of the State in the processes of economic life consisted in the statement that the public was protected against exploitation and secured the fruits of economic progress by the mutual rivalry of producers.” To each atomistic producer, the market price was “*datum*” and “if a rival introduced an improvement,” the other competitors “would be compelled to follow suit or to go out of business.” It was “assumed” that “unfettered individual enterprise” governed by “the unrestricted initiative of profit” would secure the most “effective utilisation of national resources,” protect the consumer from “exploitation,” “maximize production, adjust payments to services, and provide the surplus required to ensure its own growth, with the automatic regularity of a self-adjusting mechanism.” Whether such “a state of things” ever existed was problematic, but by the end of World War I it no longer described the conditions of modern industry and was “dead” as a meaningful theory, surviving “only in those mausoleums of economic antiquities, the economic textbooks.”⁵⁵ The claim that “the law of substitution” would require “the most economical process, machine, or type of organization” did not apply in practice in mature English industry because of the quasi-monopoly conditions, which thwarted “enterprise,” or even to early

Chinese capitalism where political circumstances resulted in the misallocation of investment.⁵⁶

Tawney understood from his early studies of Marshallian economics that even in the long run, some firms would earn more than “the competitive minimum” because of “superior sites.”⁵⁷ But his investigation of modern industry broadened his understanding of the bases of the “surplus” to include, in addition to locational advantages, “special opportunities and access to markets,” “superior machinery, management, and organization,” and, most importantly, “monopolistic combines” able to use “secrecy” to prevent “effective competition.”⁵⁸ “In the new industrial system” that had emerged by the 1920s, “monopoly” had superceded the “rivalry of competitive profit-makers” to which only “lip-service continued to be paid.” A “progressive concentration of the control of capital” had been achieved via “the new formula of combination” based upon “the gospel of rationalization.” According to Tawney, “the concentration of economic authority is the essence of the modern industrial system,” and “industrial America” was the “most instructive illustration of that tendency.” In accord with the earlier Fabian tradition, Tawney stressed in 1925 that the modern corporation was marked by “an increasing separation of ownership from management,” which had resulted in a loss of dynamism.⁵⁹

The “monopolist” was not “impelled by ‘an invisible hand’ to serve the public interest” and instead sought “to control output and prices.” It should be recognized that Tawney provided in *The Acquisitive Society* an early version of the emerging theory of Imperfect Competition where the self-interested behavior of the capitalist did not lead to the social optimum, because the separation of ownership and control allowed the owners to pursue the goal of profit at the expense of production. As proved by “the ingenuity” of the “economists,” there was an earlier time—“the classical era of the factory system”—when “the functions of manager, technician, and capitalist were combined . . . in the single person of ‘the employer,’ ” and as a result, “it was not unreasonable to assume that profits and productive efficiency ran similarly together.” But with “the separation of ‘business’ from ‘production’ the link which bound profits to productive efficiency” was “snapped.” It could be more profitable “to limit production rather than to augment it,” and “efficient production” became subordinate to “financial results.” Moreover, society’s resources were wasted in supplying goods “under conditions involving the expenses of advertisement and competitive distribution.” (“For the individual firm such expenses, which enable it to absorb part of a rival’s trade, may be an economy; to the consumer . . . they are pure loss.”⁶⁰ These insights, which predate the

inter-war emendations of the theory of the firm, are excellent examples of the depth of Tawney's microeconomic analysis.

Production

Tawney has often been pictured sympathetically as an ascetic, who eschewed material wealth even to the extent of using ersatz tobacco, who "had a keener eye for the vices than the achievements of the industrial system," and viewed "acquisitiveness" as the "main enemy."⁶¹ While true of Tawney as a private person, this view would seem overdone as an indication of Tawney's social prescription. He knew that historically capitalism, organized under the principles of orthodox economics, had raised significantly the level of output, and he faulted it in the 1920s for losing effectiveness in that capacity. However, Tawney's concern was that ending "scarcity economies," which had been "during the greater part of history, the normal condition of the world," by itself would not, as Marshall had argued, make possible "the distant goal where the opportunities of a noble life may be accessible to all."⁶²

The early Tawney had an especially suspicious view of the proffered socially liberating potential of production. Although Tawney did not repeat publicly in later years his early private pleas to "despise wealth," he continued occasionally to write of the "materialist devil" whose name is "legion." For the mature Tawney, the case against the orthodox contention "both bourgeois and Socialist" that increased output was the "automatic solvent" of all problems was "properly to be described as Utopian." Tawney wished to stress that while "other things being equal, an increase in wealth is doubtless in itself desirable" (1925), it would be "materialistic Utopianism" to believe that "the evil elements in human life can be publicly exorcised . . . by a mere acceleration of the tempo of economic progress" (1937).⁶³

While Tawney was consistently a critic of growth for its own sake, he was not an advocate of negative or zero growth. The mature Tawney wrote in *Equality* that "no one who has considered the dimensions of the national income as revealed by statisticians will question the importance of increasing it." It was "obvious" that redistribution could not "bring general affluence" and that "greater production" was "one means, among others, to a much-needed improvement in human relations."⁶⁴ Tawney's experiences in China in 1930 and 1931 convinced him that while traditional labor-intensive agriculture economized on the use of land (and capital), its success was "at the cost of exploiting the human beings who till it," and that greater capitalization of the production process was desirable

to raise output per worker and permit higher “standards of life.”⁶⁵ For the western countries as well, Tawney concluded that increased production was vital: “‘But increased production is important.’ Of course it is! That plenty is good and scarcity evil—it needs no ghost from the graves of the past . . . to tell us that.” Increased output was the fruit of industry, the purpose of which was “to supply man with things which are necessary, useful or beautiful, and thus to bring life to body or spirit.” Tawney viewed nature as a force to be conquered “for the service of man.” “What nature demands is work. . . . In society, as in the world of organic life, atrophy is but one stage removed from death.”⁶⁶

But Tawney was not very optimistic about the prospects for further British economic growth. He expected that Great Britain would soon run out of key raw materials, especially coal. Barring wasteful warfare, Tawney predicted that “the national output of wealth per head of population” would only double from 1920 to 2000, a growth rate of less than one percent per year.⁶⁷ Moreover, Tawney stressed that the most fundamental question remaining was qualitative: “Produce what? Food, clothing, house-room, art, knowledge? By all means.” The advanced capacity for production Tawney took, more or less, for granted. Most of it already existed and was “misapplied.” For economic growth to be socially beneficial, “economic activity” must become “the servant, not the master of society.” As long as the “surplus” was creamed off by “functionless owners,” the liberating potential of expanded production would be thwarted by the resulting inequality and the “whole apparatus of class institutions” it spawned. It was obvious to Tawney that very significant changes in economic organization were required before society could reap genuine benefits from continued economic growth.⁶⁸

From his earliest writings, Tawney believed that the way to establish more efficient production was to provide a social compact to encourage work wherein labor believed that it had a social role to play, and was not merely an input in an unfair contest over the spoils. As long as “the working classes believe, and believe rightly, that their mentors rob them,” they will be preoccupied with the “restoration of the booty” lost in a class war. They would resist efforts to increase production from which they did not receive a fair share and the process of economic growth would suffer as a result.⁶⁹ “The problem was to find some principle of justice upon which human association for the production of wealth can be founded.”

In the past, there were two main doctrines used to organize the economy: “prescription (traceable, ultimately, to force), which assigned economic privileges to different classes,” and “individual choice and consent.” The former was swept away in 1789 and the latter was “now on its trail”

because “it does not inquire under what conditions consent is a reality” when people are greatly unequal in “economic resources.”⁷⁰ Tawney had a very important insight that production and innovation will suffer in a system that places “the risk of unemployment” and the disruption of traditional values solely on workers, with most of the benefits going to the owners. In order to make “the bearing of risks worthwhile,” it would be necessary to protect “the worker against the risks of industrial life” and to insure that a fair share of the productivity gains went to labor. Without security and reward, both pecuniary and status, the result would be prolonged worker resistance to change. In Tawney’s view, a mature industrial society could only continue to grow if it was organized to insure that ordinary persons had adequate security, some control over their lives, and a sense that “justice” prevailed in the distributive process.⁷¹

The growth of productive efficiency was desirable, but “plenty depends upon co-operative effort.” Tawney viewed the function of industry to be “service” to the community and “its method” to be “association.” “The object of industry is to produce goods, and to produce them at the lowest cost in human effort.”⁷² But this object was thwarted and “the world ‘continues in scarcity’ ” because it continued to be organized by antagonistic competitive principles. It needed new “moral principles” to ensure a co-operative effort. Further productive growth would require “cultivating energies now depressed and neglected, and drawing leadership, not from a minority, but from talent wherever found, and removing some, at least, of the psychological impediments to co-operative effort.” Tawney realized that “efficiency” was not merely the result of “mechanical adjustments,” but depended most importantly upon “intelligent collaboration,” which resulted from the “mutual confidence” of the participants in the associative work process. The path to the attainment of efficiency lay less “than is commonly supposed in the region of machinery and organization, and to a greater degree in the attempt to create a more humane and flexible social system.”⁷³

Tawney was well aware that the orthodox view of production regarded it essentially as an engineering relationship of combining more capital with less labor—a problem in “the improvement of technique.” However, Tawney claimed that what Simon Kuznets later called “modern Economic Growth” depended upon the “qualities” of a “civilization”—“amenity and dignity and mutual appreciation” and especially upon human “brains.”⁷⁴

Tawney argued that “increased productivity” would follow from providing the necessary “qualities” through a social infrastructure supported by “collective expenditure.” By “pooling its surplus,” obtained by reducing inequality, society could achieve “results which would be unattainable,

were an identical sum distributed . . . in fractional additions to individual incomes." Tawney recognized that for post-World War I industrial Great Britain, "the age of easy affluence" was over. Further "economic progress" would require "a change of policy" to "conserve her natural resources, develop by improved education the capacities of all grades of her workers, cultivate science not only in coping with physical nature, but in organizing industry and social institutions, and take every possible step to ensure that production is carried on in an atmosphere of good will and coöperation."⁷⁵

"Economic efficiency," concluded Tawney, was "a necessary element in the life of any sane and vigorous society." Its significance could only be depreciated by the "incurable sentimentalist." But "the condition of effective action in a complex civilization is coöperation." The apparently "longest way" to the goal of productive efficiency was in reality "the shortest way home." The key was not to rely solely on "technique" but to achieve cooperation through community agreement "as to the ends to which effort should be applied."⁷⁶

Distribution

In 1912, early in his career, Tawney identified "two fundamental questions of economics which must be answered before one can undertake an intelligent inquiry into the distribution of wealth." The first was the extent to which "poverty" is due to "inadequate natural resources" relative to population, and the second was whether "poverty and social inequity" would "tend to correct themselves" merely through increased production. While not providing final answers to these queries, it is obvious that Tawney did not accept the marginal productivity functional shares ("the formula that earnings correspond to marginal productivity") answers provided by orthodox economics. He felt that "realistic investigation" of the "special problems of contemporary life" had shown that modern poverty was primarily an "industrial" problem "arising from the existence of economic inequality." It was a problem of "why the product of industry is distributed in such a way that, whether people fell into distress or not, large groups among them derive a meagre, laborious, and highly precarious living from industries from which smaller groups appear to derive considerable affluence." It was "in short the question of . . . economic status and opportunities."⁷⁷

Tawney's theory of distribution of "the fruits of economic progress" was characterized by a struggle in the marketplace between "a series of economic groups, holding different positions in the productive system." At any moment in time, "the income available for distribution is limited."

In the absence of a “principle upon which all remuneration, whether large or small, should be based,” distribution of the “surplus” was the result of class “contention.”

The “inevitable result . . . is that each individual or group has a right to what they can get.” The circumstances resulting from a situation that “what one group gains, another must lose” is “a disguised social war.” Moreover, the prevailing “fierce antagonisms” would continue even if output grew significantly because “the question is not of amounts, but of proportions.” To suit the self-interest of “those who own the property used in industry . . . capital should be dear and human beings cheap.” But in the self-interest of society, capital should be “cheap, and human beings dear.” Without a “common goal,” the interests of labor and capital would necessarily conflict with the result that the maxim of behavior “is that of grab, in which case there is no morality in the matter.”⁷⁸

Tawney’s theory of distribution is clearly Classical. It is in real, not market price terms and focused upon the transfer of the surplus from “those who work” to “those who own.” The market “wage system” was the means to abstract the “surplus” from the laborer by paying “the lowest price at which his labour can be got.” While the amount of total output “to be shared depends in the main on ‘nature,’ the terms on which it is shared depends upon human institutions,” which extended “property rights.” In Tawney’s view, the primary cause of inequality was the ownership of property, which provided a “toll” on the output of labor—what was called in economics an “economic rent.”⁷⁹

Tawney’s most continuous example of a “lien” on output was ground rent. The ownership of urban land was a functionless “sinecure” designed to collect profits as a “form of private taxation.” Property was “the sleeping partner who draws the dividends which the firm produces.” The flow of unearned income to a “class of pensioners upon industry, who levy toll upon its product, but contribute nothing to its increase” was due to “the overruling force of social arrangements,” especially “the institution of inheritance,” which was for its beneficiaries equivalent to “a right to travel in perpetuity in first-class coaches.”⁸⁰

Tawney believed that it was socially and economically desirable for society to “obtain its material equipment at the cheapest price possible” and after covering all necessary production costs, the net product should be distributed “to its working members and their dependents.” Valid allowances should be made for “depreciation and expansion” as well as opportunity cost payments to the owners of land and capital, such as “pure interest,” which was “a necessary economic cost, the equivalent of which must be borne, whatever the legal arrangements under which property is

held.” Tawney also recognized that even competitive profits included “the equivalent of salaries and payment for necessary risk.” But there was no justification for “economic rent” or “tribute” due to the “legal arrangements” that allowed monopoly “to control output and prices.” As a result, under typical conditions of industrial production, product prices “bore no relation to the cost of production.”⁸¹

But after payment of the economic costs of production, the net product should go to the workers who produced it. The early Tawney (1913) had rejected the Benthamite utilitarian “principle” for distribution—“the greatest happiness of the greatest number”—as “defective.”⁸² But by 1925, Tawney explained the goal of the Labor Party as being to distribute “the products in such a way to promote the greatest aggregate well-being,” or, alternatively, to establish “the material condition of a good life for the largest possible number of human beings.”⁸³ In the future, “labour, in conjunction with the community, would determine what part of the product of industry it was worthwhile to pay in order that sufficient capital might be hired.” The result would be that “it might be necessary to fix a minimum wage for Capital,” as well as “minimum standards of employment”—something long resisted due, in part, to “a prejudice slow to die among economists.” The state, through an “Industrial Department,” would “audit the accounts of all companies” to determine the “charges necessary to the supply” and channel the surplus to the community.⁸⁴ The state should also use “the further gradation of taxation by means of an extension of the death duties and of the supertax on large incomes, in such a way as to diminish economic inequality and to make available the resources needed to finance new social services,” as an alternative means to reduce inequality by using government expenditures as a redistributive mechanism. Taxation should also be used to promote “general consumption” by reducing excises. Tawney recommended measures to reduce the public debt in order to prevent the further “transference of wealth from small incomes to large.” (His case for a “capital levy” to redeem the World War I debt was presented with a review of the views of orthodox economists described as “antecedents of unimpeachable respectability,” an analysis of the real burden on investment during a deflationary period, and a discussion of the incidence of the interest transfer payment.)⁸⁵ Lastly, Tawney was a persistent and passionate advocate of increasing the inheritance tax to end the rule of “The Lion in the Path,” which had allowed a small minority “a right to free quarters at the expense of their fellow countrymen.”⁸⁶

Tawney believed that the struggle over distribution would not be ended by affluence because the “problem of modern society is a problem of pro-

portions, not of quantities.” It would end only “when everyone recognized that the material, objective, external arrangements of society are based on principles which they feel to correspond with their subjective ideas of justice.” Tawney was optimistic that when a “clear principle determining what they ought to take” was established, “industrial peace” could occur and as all men became producers, “the temptation for particular groups of workers to force their claims at the expense of the public” would be eliminated.⁸⁷

Conclusion

It is widely recognized that R. H. Tawney was a significant person who made many important contributions during his lengthy career. Although he was not a neo-classical economist, the claim that he had little grasp of orthodox economics is invalid. Tawney understood conventional economics all too well and rejected most of it as inadequate for analysis of an evolving economic process. While he did not display mastery of the most arcane techniques, he was fully conversant with the central categories and was well aware of normative values lurking beneath the formalist facade. As a result, Tawney was unwilling to depend exclusively upon economic analysis for his social prescriptions.⁸⁸

For Tawney, it was a “commonplace” that orthodox economics, which was based on “the tension between human wants and limited resources available for satisfying them,” was a product of “a specific cultural environment, by which the character both of the wants and of the resources is determined.” From his historical perspective, Tawney viewed orthodox economics as a rationalization of the interests of the advantaged groups in bourgeois society. Since economics was coincident with the institutional structure of the exchange economy, its conclusions, “if valid in that context, are less cogent outside it.” It was a “convention” that reflected the ideological triumph of the “practical interests” over “moral casuistry.” When the capitalist institutions were modified by “time and space,” the conventional economic principles would become outmoded. Only an evolutionary analysis of economic change, “which could be tested by an appeal to facts,” could succeed where orthodox economics would fail.⁸⁹ In these respects, Tawney’s methodology was in accord with the institutionalist tradition.

Tawney considered the evolving economic process as the proper object of primary concern. The economy was not a “mechanism moving by quasi-mechanical laws,” as depicted in the competitive model. It was governed by prevailing human action, not by “uncontrollable forces.” Tawney

would certainly have agreed with Ayres that “the economy is not regulated by the price system,” but rather by “the institutional structure of Western society, of which the market is at most only a manifestation.” Ayres designated “this way of thinking” about economic change “as ‘institutionalism,’” and by this definition Tawney was surely an institutionalist.⁹⁰

Tawney contended that the competitive norm of a voluntary exchange economy could not deliver equity, efficiency, technical progress, or deal with externalities, let alone provide for a “civilized community.” Only an economy purposefully directed could achieve a civilized society. Tawney rejected the orthodox maxim that “well-being was a commodity which every prudent and enterprising person could purchase for himself.” He shared the view of J. M. Clark that “markets can organize material interests only, and not all of these, and that this is not enough to constitute a society.”⁹¹ Tawney believed that since well-being was “indivisible,” it could be obtained only by “collective action” to provide the requisite “physical and moral” conditions. This would require conscious efforts of intelligent beings to gain effective control over the evolutionary process. In this respect also, Tawney’s views fit comfortably within the institutional tradition.

The means of production were reasonably well developed by the mid-twentieth century; Tawney thought that the historic restraint of scarcity upon human development could be eliminated. Removing scarcity was certainly necessary, but by itself it was not an “automatic” route to a “civilized community” because it would not thereby provide a “principle of justice” to govern distribution. Moreover, without such a principle the full productive potential could not be realized because modern economic growth required “an atmosphere of goodwill and cooperation.” Tawney’s thesis is nearly identical to Ayres’s dictum: “The human way of life is essentially cooperative. Mutual aid is a basic condition of the technological process.”⁹² Thus, Tawney’s theory of production (and growth) also falls within the institutionalist paradigm.

A new “principle of justice” required the realization by “common men” that “whatever the opportunities to rise, there cannot, in the nature of things, be room for everyone at the top.” This would make possible the next step “to interpret democracy as incompatible, not only with political, but with economic tyranny.” The legal right to “ascend and get on” insured only that a few fortunate tadpoles could become frogs while “most of them will live and die as tadpoles.” Tawney argued repeatedly that the “Tadpole Philosophy” described the ideal of the egoistic individual who was at the core of orthodox economics. Tawney derided it as a false ethic

that resulted in a perverse equality similar to that established “by turning an elephant loose in a crowd . . . [E]veryone, except the beast and his rider, (had) equal opportunities of being trampled to death.”

Genuine equality depended not on “abstract rights” but upon “practical powers,” not upon what people “*may* do, if they can, but upon what they *can* do, if they will.” It required “the deliberate acceptance of social restraints upon individual expansion.” This step toward a “better” society would necessitate greater political restraints, thereby outmoding both capitalism and orthodox economics.⁹³ Ayres once stated that “the message of institutionalism” was that in quest of the values “of human life and well-being . . . we will go beyond capitalism, as our forebearers went beyond the systems into which they were born.”⁹⁴ Tawney most certainly would have agreed, and is in this respect within the institutionalist camp.

Tawney’s quest for a purposive social science reflected his goal to replace the covert hedonistic ethics of orthodox economics with a patently normative effort to restore “the conception of society as an organism, requiring the maintenance of a due proportion between its different members, which was part of the medieval legacy.”⁹⁵ While Tawney’s “medieval ideal of equity” has not been widely appealing to others, his intention to provide a normative prescription to transcend market ethics is also clearly in the institutionalist tradition.

For all of these reasons, it seems appropriate to consider Tawney as an institutionalist economist. He offered a cogent critique of orthodox economics that is quite compatible with institutionalism. He also provided a prescription for a post-market economy suitable to an advanced industrial society in accord with the institutionalist tradition. While all of his concerns do not fit neatly into the institutionalist paradigm (which is itself often differently delineated), that is also true of many other economists. Certainly institutionalists should welcome to their ranks such an august scholar as R. H. Tawney, even if on the basis of independent collaborator.

Notes

1. *Times* (London), 28 November 1960, quoted in Ross Terrill, *R. H. Tawney and His Times* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973), p. 3.
2. The first bibliography of Tawney’s more than 700 works was published by J.M. Winter, “A Bibliography of the Published Writings of R. H. Tawney,” *Economic History Review* 25 (1972): 137–153; a more complete bibliography is provided in Terrill, *R. H. Tawney and His Times*, pp. 287–313. In addition, Tawney wrote most or all of many other documents that did not appear under his name.
3. J. D. Chambers, “The Tawney Tradition,” *Economic History Review* 24

- (1971): 355–69 (edited version of the first Tawney Memorial Lecture at the 1968 Annual Meeting of the Economic History Society). T. S. Ashton, “Richard Henry Tawney 1880–1962,” *Proceedings of the British Academy* 48 (1962): 461–82; J. M. Winter, “Introduction: Tawney the Historian,” in J. M. Winter, ed., *History and Society: Essays by R. H. Tawney* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), pp. 1–40. An exception is David A. Reisman, *State and Welfare* (London: Macmillan), which was in press when this paper was completed. While treating Tawney sympathetically, Terrill attempts to “set out the implicit framework of Tawney’s socialism” (p. 8). In doing so, Terrill analyzes some of Tawney’s ideas, such as fellowship, as if they were elements in the “history of political thought” (p. 197). Moreover, Terrill discounts Tawney as an economist, and gives little consideration to the core of Tawney’s ideas on reorganization of the economy. Terrill, *R. H. Tawney and His Times*, pp. 167–68, 279.
4. Tawney’s prescient understanding of the social requirements for continued economic progress in post-industrial society is considered in David A. Martin, “R. H. Tawney as Political Economist,” *Journal of Economic Issues* 16 (1982). The recent publication of two government reports written by Tawney demonstrate his full comprehension of how advanced market economies actually operated. See “The Abolition of Economic Controls, 1918–21” (1941) in Winter, *History and Society*, pp. 129–88; and “The American Labour Movement” (1942) in J. M. Winter, ed., *R. H. Tawney: The American Labour Movement and Other Essays* (N.Y.: St. Martin’s Press, 1979), pp. 1–110.
 5. This summary of neo-institutionalism is based on Allan G. Gruchy, *Contemporary Economic Thought: The Contribution of Neo-Institutional Economics* (Clifton, N. J.: Augustus M. Kelley, 1972), pp. 293–302; Wendell Gordon, *Economics From An Institutional Viewpoint* (Austin, Texas: University Stores, 1973), pp. 5–6, 14, 31, 40; R. A. Gordon, “Institutional Elements in Contemporary Economics,” in Benjamin Aaron, ed., *Institutional Economics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), pp. 124–5; Benjamin Ward, *What’s Wrong With Economics* (N.Y.: Basic Books, 1972), pp. 241–6; Adolph Lowe, *On Economic Science: Toward A Science of Political Economics* (N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1965), pp. 128–61; Marc R. Tool, *The Discretionary Economy* (Santa Monica: Goodyear, 1979), pp. 86–7.
 6. Although Tawney had met Veblen in the United States, and though some of his ideas seem loosely similar to Veblen’s, there are only a few apparent references to Veblen in Tawney’s major works and none to other institutionalists. See, for example, Tawney, “Historical Introduction” to Thomas Wilson, *A Discourse Upon Usury* (N.Y.: Augustus M. Kelley, 1965), p. 32; Winter, *History and Society*, p. 90. Tawney’s intellectual lineage is discussed in Adam B. Ulam, *Philosophical Foundations of English Socialism* (N.Y.: Octagon Books, 1964) and M. A. Lutz, “On the History of Social Economics: The British Contribution,” *International Journal of Social Economics* 7 (1980): 255–7.

7. Kenneth E. Boulding, *Adam Smith As An Institutional Economist* (Memphis: P. K. Seidman Foundation, 1976), p. 1; Wallace C. Peterson, "Institutionalism, Keynes, and the Real World," *Journal of Economic Issues* 11 (1977): 202; J. Ron Stanfield, "The Institutional Economics of Karl Polanyi," *Journal of Economic Issues* 14 (1980): 593-4.
8. George J. Stigler and Claire Friedland, "The Year of Economists, 1980-81," *Journal of Political Economy* 88 (1980); R. P. Sturges, *Economists' Papers 1750-1950, A Guide to Archive and Other Manuscript Sources for the History of British and Irish Economic Thought* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1975), pp. 111-12; William K. Hutchinson, *History of Economic Analysis: A Guide to Information Sources* (Detroit: Gale Research, 1976), pp. 61-2; Ludwig H. Mai, *Men and Ideas in Economics* (Totowa, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams, 1977), p. 220; Terrill, *R. H. Tawney and His Times*, p. 66. Terrill denotes Tawney as an economic historian and social philosopher (p. 6).
9. J. M. Winter, "R. H. Tawney's Early Political Thought," *Past and Present* 47 (1970): 73.
10. A. W. Coats and S. E. Coats, "The Social Composition of the Royal Economic Society and the Beginnings of the British Economics 'Profession,' 1890-1915," *British Journal of Sociology* 21 (1970): 80, 84; see also John Maloney, "Marshall, Cunningham, and the Emerging Economics Profession," *Economic History Review* 29 (1976): 450; John K. Whitaker, "Some Neglected Aspects of Marshall's Economic and Social Thought," *History of Political Economy* 9 (1977): 185.
11. J. H. Winter and D. M. Joslin, eds., *Tawney's Commonplace Book* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1972), p. 3; R. H. Tawney, *The Radical Tradition* (N.Y.: Pantheon Books, 1964), p. 78; the early history of the workers' educational movement is given in R. A. Lowe, "Some Fore-runners of R. H. Tawney's Longton Tutorial Class," *History of Education* 1 (1972): 43-5, 55.
12. Tawney, *The Radical Tradition*, p. 86.
13. R. H. Tawney, *The British Labor Movement* (N.Y.: Greenwood Press, 1968), p. 132; R. H. Tawney, *The Attack* (Freeport, N.Y.: Books for Libraries Press, 1971), p. 101; Winter, *History and Society*, pp. 54-63.
14. R. M. Hartwell, "Good Old Economic History," *Journal of Economic History* 33 (1973): 33. See also Arthur H. Cole, "Economic History in the United States: Formulative Years of a Discipline," *Journal of Economic History* 27 (1968): 374-5; Robert W. Fogel, "The Reunification of Economic History with Economic Theory," *American Economic Review* 56 (1965): 95.
15. T. C. Barker, "The Beginnings of the Economic History Society," *Economic History Review* 30 (1977): 6-16. Tawney was the editor of the *Economic History Review* from 1926 to 1934 (with E. Lipson), and President of the Society from 1946 to 1960 (as well as Vice-President 1960-1962).
16. See, for example, Tawney, *The Attack*, pp. 92, 94; R. H. Tawney, *Equality* (N.Y.: Harcourt Brace, 1931), p. 59.

17. Barker, "Beginnings," pp. 7–8; Warren J. Samuels, "Ashley's and Tausig's Lectures on the History of Economic Thought at Harvard, 1896–7," *History of Political Economy* 9 (1977): 385, 394–5.
18. Tawney, "Historical Introduction" to Wilson, *A Discourse*, pp. 17, 61, 106, 110; R. H. Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism* (N.Y.: Harcourt Brace, 1925), pp. 10–13, 158, 278; Winter, *History and Society*, pp. 49, 70.
19. Tawney, *Religion and Capitalism*, pp. 80, 159, 163, 177, 180, 191, 247, 250–1, 277; Winter, *History and Society*, pp. 78–81, 88–101, 204; Winter, *American Labour Movement*, pp. 139–40.
20. Winter and Joslin, *Tawney's Commonplace Book*, p. 59; Tawney, *Religion and Capitalism*, pp. 177, 180, 192, 253; Winter, *History and Society*, p. 49.
21. Tawney, *The Attack*, pp. 116, 133, 170; Tawney, *British Labor Movement*, pp. 58, 145; Tawney, *The Radical Tradition*, pp. 86, 144, 150; Winter and Joslin, *Tawney's Commonplace Book*, p. 72; Tawney, *Equality* (N.Y.: Capricorn Books, 1961), p. 137; Winter, *American Labour Movement*, p. 118.
22. Tawney, *British Labor Movement*, pp. 15, 20; Tawney, *Equality* (1931), p. 36; R. H. Tawney, "Introduction," to M. Beer, *A History of British Socialism*, vol. 1 (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1953), pp. viii–ix; Winter, *History and Society*, pp. 50–3, 203, 230, 245.
23. Tawney, *Equality* (1961), p. 125; Tawney, *British Labor Movement*, p. 153; Tawney, *The Attack*, p. 160; R. H. Tawney, "Foreword," in Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (N.Y.: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), p. 4.
24. Tawney, *British Labor Movement*, pp. 23–4; Tawney, *The Attack*, pp. 116, 141, 160, 161; Tawney, *Religion and Capitalism*, pp. 107, 112; Tawney, "Historical Introduction" to Wilson, *A Discourse*, p. 118.
25. Tawney, *Religion and Capitalism*, p. 36.
26. Tawney provided some macroeconomic and international economic analysis. His early writings accepted, although critically, Quantity Theory while he rejected Say's Law. After World War II Tawney advocated Keynesian full employment policies. See Tawney, "Historical Introduction" to Wilson, *A Discourse*, pp. viii, 70, 82, 144–5, 151, 177, 191; Tawney, *The Radical Tradition*, pp. 149–151; *British Labor Movement*, pp. 46–7, 55–6, 115–117; Winter, *History and Society*, pp. 151, 156; Tawney, *Equality* (1961), p. 161; R. H. Tawney, *Land and Labor in China* (N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1966), pp. 83–104, 110–29, 130–40, 141–50, 160, 166–74.
27. Tawney, *Religion and Capitalism*, p. 3; Tawney, *The Attack*, pp. 104–9, 116; Tawney, *British Labor Movement*, p. 61.
28. Tawney, *The Radical Tradition*, p. 78.
29. Tawney, *The Attack*, pp. 107–8.
30. Tawney, *British Labor Movement*, pp. 62–3; Winter, *American Labour Movement*, pp. 112, 238.
31. Tawney, *British Labor Movement*, pp. 14, 42, 94; Tawney, *The Attack*,

- p. 147; Tawney, *Land and Labor*, pp. 98, 128, 141; Chambers, "The Tawney Tradition," pp. 356–7, 368.
32. Chambers noted that Tawney "did more than write history; he also made literature." ("The Tawney Tradition," p. 364). Tawney was certainly a master of English prose with an extraordinary command of language and was capable of overpowering displays of erudition. (For example, see "The Attack," pp. 11–20 in Tawney, *The Attack*, and "Social History and Literature," especially pp. 194–209, in Tawney, *The Radical Tradition*.) J. L. Hammond said that Tawney made other writers "look awkward and bald, to themselves, and to others." (Ashton, "Richard Henry Tawney," p. 469). Nonetheless, Tawney often approached pedantry and allowed his message to become elusive. He also had a tendency to use the same phrases, sentences, and even paragraphs over again repeatedly in different contexts.
 33. Winter and Joslin, *Tawney's Commonplace Book* (1913), p. 72.
 34. Terrill, *R. H. Tawney and His Times*, p. 36.
 35. Winter, "Introduction" to Winter and Joslin, *Tawney's Commonplace Book*, p. xx.
 36. Winter and Joslin, *Tawney's Commonplace Book*, pp. 70, 79, 30–32; Winter, *History and Society*, pp. 11, 54–5; Winter, *American Labour Movement*, p. 113.
 37. Tawney, *The Acquisitive Society*, pp. 148, 155–9; Tawney, *Religion and Capitalism*, pp. 12–13, 253; Winter, *History and Society*, pp. 56, 61, 210; Winter, *American Labour Movement*, p. 67.
 38. Tawney, *The Attack*, p. 116; Tawney, *British Labor Movement*, pp. 19, 20, 23, 145.
 39. Tawney, *Equality* (1931), pp. 44–5; Tawney, *British Labor Movement*, p. 151.
 40. Winter and Joslin, *Tawney's Commonplace Book*, p. 76, also 32.
 41. Tawney, *Equality* (1961), p. 97; "Historical Introduction" to Wilson, *A Discourse*, pp. 60, 104, 105, 121; Winter, *American Labour Movement*, pp. 140, 198; Winter, *History and Society*, pp. 71–2, 208.
 42. Tawney, *The Attack*, p. 172; Tawney, *British Labor Movement*, pp. 45–6; Winter, *American Labour Movement*, p. 117.
 43. Tawney, *Equality* (1931), p. 46. This anthropological reference was based on Tawney's "Preface" to R. Firth, *Primitive Economics of the New Zealand Maori* (London: Routledge, 1929).
 44. Tawney, *The Radical Tradition*, pp. 101, 103, 107; Tawney, "Historical Introduction" to Wilson, *A Discourse*, p. 151.
 45. Tawney, *The Acquisitive Society*, p. 93.
 46. Terrill, *R. H. Tawney and His Times*, p. 66.
 47. Tawney, *Religion and Capitalism*, pp. 24, 25, 221; Winter and Joslin, *Tawney's Commonplace Book*, pp. 46–7.
 48. Tawney, *The Acquisitive Society*, pp. 95, 136; Winter, *History and Society*, pp. 12, 17.
 49. Tawney, *Equality* (1931), p. 170.
 50. Tawney, *The Acquisitive Society*, p. 93; Winter and Joslin, *Tawney's*

- Commonplace Book*, p. 14; Tawney, *The Radical Tradition*, pp. 121, 174.
51. Tawney, *The Radical Tradition*, p. 149; Tawney, *British Labor Movement*, p. 50.
 52. Tawney, *The Acquisitive Society*, pp. 37, 38, 77; Winter, *History and Society*, p. 180.
 53. Tawney, *The Attack*, p. 30.
 54. Tawney, *Equality* (1961), pp. 135–6.
 55. Tawney, *The Attack*, p. 88; Tawney, *British Labor Movement*, p. 156; Winter, *History and Society*, pp. 131, 144, 152, 155, 163–4.
 56. Tawney, *British Labor Movement*, pp. 75–77; Tawney, *Land and Labor*, p. 95.
 57. Winter and Joslin, *Tawney's Commonplace Book*, p. 39.
 58. Tawney, *The Attack*, p. 89; Tawney, *The Acquisitive Society*, pp. 78, 85, 98, 123; Tawney, *British Labor Movement*, pp. 50, 67–68.
 59. Tawney, *Equality* (1931), pp. 4, 5, 14, 71, 86, 252; Tawney, *British Labor Movement*, p. 156; Ulam, *Philosophical Foundations*, p. 75; Winter, *History and Society*, pp. 170, 180–1.
 60. Tawney, *The Acquisitive Society*, pp. 23, 69, 110, 118, 171–4.
 61. Ashton, "Richard Henry Tawney," pp. 467, 480.
 62. Winter, *History and Society*, pp. 160–1; Alfred Marshall, *Industry and Trade* (London: MacMillan, 1923), p. 665.
 63. Tawney, *British Labor Movement*, p. 153; Tawney, *The Attack*, pp. 174, 191.
 64. Tawney, *Equality* (1931), pp. 5, 33; Winter and Joslin, *Tawney's Commonplace Book*, p. 26.
 65. Tawney, *The Attack*, pp. 43–4; Tawney, *Land and Labor*, pp. 46–7.
 66. Tawney, *The Acquisitive Society*, pp. 5, 8, 31, 67; Winter, *History and Society*, pp. 160–1.
 67. Winter and Joslin, *Tawney's Commonplace Book*, p. 71; Tawney, *The Acquisitive Society*, p. 32. By comparison, for about the same time period Keynes predicted that society might be "on the average, eight times better off in the economic sense than we are today" (1930). "Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren," in J. M. Keynes, *Essays in Persuasion* (London: MacMillan & Co., 1933), p. 365.
 68. Tawney, *The Acquisitive Society*, pp. 39, 71, 183; Winter, *History and Society*, pp. 163, 182.
 69. Winter and Joslin, *Tawney's Commonplace Book*, pp. 40, 41, 61.
 70. Winter, *History and Society*, pp. 144, 145, 165.
 71. Winter and Joslin, *Tawney's Commonplace Book*, pp. 33, 34, 72, 74.
 72. Tawney, *The Acquisitive Society*, pp. 5, 6, 8, 142; see also Tawney, *The Radical Tradition*, p. 100.
 73. Tawney, *Equality* (1931), pp. 6, 269; Tawney, *Equality* (1961), p. 211.
 74. Tawney, *Equality* (1931), pp. 4–8.
 75. Tawney, *Equality* (1961), pp. 129–30; Tawney, *British Labor Movement*, p. 48; Winter, *History and Society*, p. 142.
 76. Tawney, *Religion and Capitalism*, p. 283; Tawney, *Equality* (1931), p. 10.
 77. Winter and Joslin, *Tawney's Commonplace Book*, pp. 8, 49; Winter, *History and Society*, p. 61; Winter, *American Labour Movement*, pp. 112–7.

78. Tawney, *Equality* (1931), p. 59; Tawney, *The Acquisitive Society*, pp. 40–3, 98–9, 133.
79. Winter and Joslin, *Tawney's Commonplace Book*, pp. 33, 37, 45, 75; Tawney, *The Acquisitive Society*, p. 79; Winter, *American Labour Movement*, p. 62.
80. Tawney, *The Acquisitive Society*, pp. 23, 33, 89; Tawney, *Equality* (1961), pp. 120, 124, 253.
81. Tawney, *The Acquisitive Society*, pp. 64, 68, 69, 78, 104.
82. Winter and Joslin, *Tawney's Commonplace Book*, pp. 62–4.
83. Tawney, *British Labor Movement*, pp. 49, 53.
84. Tawney, *The Radical Tradition*, pp. 110–14; Tawney, *The Attack*, p. 136.
85. Tawney, *British Labor Movement*, pp. 52, 57–60; Tawney, *Equality* (1961), pp. 141, 144; Tawney, *The Attack*, p. 65; Winter, *History and Society*, pp. 121–2.
86. Tawney, *The Acquisitive Society*, p. 90; Tawney, *Equality* (1961), pp. 13, 163, 253.
87. Winter and Joslin, *Tawney's Commonplace Book*, p. 70; Tawney, *The Acquisitive Society*, pp. 132–3.
88. This paragraph owes much to the comments of an anonymous reviewer and Gary W. White of Ithaca College.
89. From “The Study of Economic History,” Tawney’s 1933 Inaugural Professorship Lecture at the London School of Economics, in Winter, *History and Society*, pp. 60–1.
90. Clarence E. Ayres, *Toward A Reasonable Society: The Values of an Industrial Civilization* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1961), p. 28.
91. John Maurice Clark, *Alternative to Serfdom* (N.Y.: Vintage Books, 1948), p. 5.
92. Ayres, *Toward A Reasonable Society*, p. 169.
93. Tawney, *Equality* (1961), p. 182; Tawney, “Historical Introduction” to Wilson, *A Discourse*, p. 21; Tawney, *Religion and Capitalism*, p. 88; Winter, *American Labour Movement*, pp. 55, 116.
94. Quoted in David D. Martin, “Beyond Capitalism: A Role For Markets?” *Journal of Economic Issues* 8 (1974): 771.
95. Tawney, *The Acquisitive Society*, p. 61; Tawney, *The Radical Tradition*, pp. 194–9; Tawney, “Historical Introduction” to Wilson, *A Discourse*, pp. 15–18, 30, 103, 106, 135; Winter, *American Labour Movement*, pp. 132–3, 155–7, 234–9; Winter, *History and Society*, pp. 73–7, 88.