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# Protection or Free Trade:

## *An Analysis of the Ideas of Henry George on International Commerce and Wages*

By THOMAS L. MARTIN\*

ABSTRACT. *Henry George*, the 19th century American economist and social philosopher, abandoned *protectionism* and became a free trader when he engaged in the great tariff debate of the last quarter of his century. In the controversy, a true follower of Adam Smith, he anticipated neoclassical positions on the *tariff* question, particularly the Stolper-Samuelson theory which predicts that free trade will increase the prices of the abundant factors of production relative to the prices of the scarce factors. George's concern in the great debate was labor; he was convinced that only certain interests representing capital or resource ownership would benefit from protection at the cost of labor and the enterprises in fields with more abundant resources. But the free trade effort failed and in 1894 the Wilson-Gorman tariff increased the exactions to the highest level yet. The protectionist tide, only slowed by the Woodrow Wilson Administration, was not reversed until after World War II.

THE PROTECTIVE TARIFF became a divisive national issue in the United States with the nullification movement in South Carolina in the early 1830s. Fifty years later, when import competition increased following the depression of 1873–1878, reform of the tariff again became a critical national issue. As imports increased in the early 1880s, so did the political pressure to provide more protection from the growing import competition. At the same time, the opposite pressure to reduce tariffs was created by a persistent federal budget surplus, tariffs having been introduced as the principal source of federal revenue. Reduction of revenues through lower tariffs became the Democratic solution, while the Republicans favored increased spending. This conflict of interests set the stage for the rise of the tariff issue to primary importance in national politics.

During this critical period, Henry George spoke out often and emphatically for free trade, although he was not a free trader from the beginning. As he explained,

I was educated a protectionist and continued to believe in protection until I came to think for myself and examine the question.<sup>1</sup>

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When he examined the question for himself, he concluded that tariff protection did not actually protect the workers of America because it failed to raise wages. In *Progress and Poverty*, George stated his position clearly. The fallacies of protectionism have “a tenacious hold, in spite of their evident inconsistencies and absurdities.”<sup>2</sup> The survival of the mistaken idea, according to George, was due to the inappropriate acceptance of the wages-fund theory.<sup>3</sup> This theory implied that since the total of all wages is fixed, the competition of foreign products or foreign labor would only further subdivide this fund and reduce wages. The answer, George came to believe, was not protection, but the replacement of all taxes, including taxes on imports, with the single tax on land values.

After the success of *Progress and Poverty* and his increased opportunities to speak on the issues of the day, George was eager to spread his ideas on import tariffs and the interests of labor. The protectionists in Congress had “so long held sway,” according to George, that for decades the protected industries had had things “all their own way.”<sup>4</sup> The time was right for popular education on the issue of taxation and tariffs, and with it, the means of bringing “the whole social question, into the fullest discussion.”<sup>5</sup>

To help promote such popular education, George published in 1886 his book *Protection or Free Trade: An Examination of the Tariff Question, With Especial Regard to the Interest of Labor*.<sup>6</sup> In addition to this book, he attacked what he called the “protectionist delusion” in a series of articles appearing in the *North American Review* in 1886 and 1887 entitled “Labor in Pennsylvania.”<sup>7</sup> Finally, he argued for free trade as the editor of the *Standard* from January 1887 until December 1890.<sup>8</sup>

This present paper demonstrates that George’s ideas on protection and wages contained in these works were fundamentally sound. Moreover since as Cord suggested, Henry George “received less mention than is his due” in the history of economic thought, it provides additional evidence for that position from the field of international trade theory by examining George’s analysis of the effects of free trade on relative wages.<sup>9</sup> Section I examines George’s thought on the trade issue within the setting of the political economy of the 1880s. Section II examines George’s two factor trade model and compares it with the modern theory. Finally, Section III offers conclusions on the effects of George’s work and the tariff reform efforts of the 1890s.

## I

### **The Political Economy of Protection in the Early 1880s**

NOT LONG AFTER *Progress and Poverty* appeared in 1879, interest in the tariff issue increased as the 1880 presidential campaign reached the party conventions.

Garfield and the Republicans reaffirmed previously established beliefs that the tariff “levied for the purpose of revenue should so discriminate as to favor American labor.”<sup>10</sup> George opposed this Republican doctrine because he believed it was not in the best interest of American labor. Instead, he would support the Democrats, who reaffirmed their belief in a tariff “for revenue only.” The Republicans under Garfield went on to keep both the White House in 1880 and their majority in the House of Representatives. As a result, they also kept the primary responsibility for the reform of the tariff.

Despite the strong support for the protective tariff on the part of domestic producers in many states, there appeared to be room for optimism concerning the possibility of a downward revision of the tariff. President Arthur appointed a Tariff Commission in 1882 to recommend a solution for the conflicts of interests involved in the reform of the tariff necessary to lower the budget surplus.<sup>11</sup> The commission members were all, according to Stanwood, favorable to the principle of protection, and as a result, the tariff reforms recommended did not seriously threaten the interests vested in the protective system.<sup>12</sup> The resulting Tariff Act of 1883 lowered slightly the average rate of the tariff, while the tariff was increased on selected imported products which had domestic competition.<sup>13</sup>

Despite the lack of true reform in the 1883 tariff, there remained room for optimism concerning genuine reform of the tariff system. After the new Congress was seated in the spring of 1883, the Democrats proposed a 20 percent across-the-board reduction in tariffs. This proposal was narrowly defeated.<sup>14</sup> With the arrival of the presidential election campaign in 1884, even the Republican platform proposed to “correct the irregularities of the tariff” and reduce the federal surplus. According to the Republicans, this was to happen, of course, without “injuring the laborer” who received protection from the tariff.<sup>15</sup>

The election of a Democrat, Grover Cleveland, to the Presidency in 1884 provided hope to Henry George and many others that protectionism might be reversed through a judicious reform of the tariff. George wrote from England that the election of Cleveland must ultimately bring back the reality of the tariff question into national politics. The political question, George hoped, would be forced on the politicians after capturing the attention of the masses.<sup>16</sup> It was during this optimistic time that Henry George began his work on *Protection or Free Trade*.

Unlike the Republican administrations, Cleveland appointed no protectionists to his first cabinet. In addition, Cleveland stated that a “certain reduction should be made in our customs revenue”<sup>17</sup> within limitations, such that the industries and interests which have been encouraged by such laws “should not be ruthlessly injured or destroyed.”<sup>18</sup> After one year in office, President Cleveland made it

clear that such limitations would be politically important. He stated his position clearly.

The question of free trade is not involved, nor is there now any occasion for a discussion of the wisdom of expediency of a protective system. . . .<sup>19</sup>

Henry George worked to encourage such discussion, and to that end, *Protection or Free Trade* was published in 1886.<sup>20</sup> With his book and his articles, George wanted to convince labor that his free trade philosophy was consistent with his previously held positions. George offered practical and philosophical arguments against the tariff in what Lissner calls a “weapon worth an armory full.”<sup>21</sup> The actual tendency of the protective tariff, argued George, was “to lessen aggregate wealth, and to foster monopolies at the expense of the masses of the people.”<sup>22</sup> This was, of course, the message of Adam Smith and many of his followers.

“What protection teaches us,” explained George, “is to do to ourselves in time of peace what enemies seek to do to us in time of war.”<sup>23</sup> George worked to prevent the protectionist war that was impending in the United States.

As the year 1886 progressed, President Cleveland changed his political involvement, much to the pleasure of Henry George. In January, Cleveland stated that he would not use his influence to help pass tariff reform bills in Congress.<sup>24</sup> In April 1886, Cleveland stated his belief that workingmen felt “discrimination in favor of capital as an object of government attention.”<sup>25</sup> By June, Cleveland was talking to Republicans to urge them to support tariff reform efforts. Later that month, however, the tariff reform bill and Cleveland’s position were rejected in the House of Representatives. Rather than ending the issue, however, this began the next great tariff struggles in American history. By December of 1886, Cleveland had threatened Congress with a special session to discuss tariff reform. In his December 1886 annual message, Cleveland declared that the popular demand for a lower tariff “should be recognized and obeyed.”<sup>26</sup> This was a “battle call” to Henry George, and the next section examines the tools of analysis George used to win the battle.<sup>27</sup>

## II

### **George’s Analysis of Free Trade and Relative Wages**

AS A SUPPORTER of both unionization and free trade, George tried to convince his readers that there was no inherent contradiction in his position. To his critics, one could not oppose import tariffs and monopolies in output and land markets while simultaneously supporting efforts to reduce competition in the case of unionization of labor markets. One critic suggested that George “betrayed

the direction from which he had come," and indicated the undesirable direction in which he was going.<sup>28</sup> Henry George, of course, thought otherwise.

After methodically exposing the logical fallacies of protection, George then asked why such exposures were of limited practical importance.<sup>29</sup> If the "protective theory is really so incongruous with the nature of things, and so inconsistent with itself," how does it survive and even thrive?<sup>30</sup>

George's answer was two-fold. First, the leading classical theory taught that free trade moved factors of production from less productive into more productive employment. To many laborers in the 1880s, as in the 1980s, this abstract idea about allocative efficiency translated into actual workers losing actual jobs in the short run, while job creation took longer to be felt by workers. According to the traditional labor view, trade destroyed jobs and did not raise wages. George understood the difficulty of his task.

The idea of tariff protection commends itself to the masses of workingmen, because to them it seems to have at least the merit of "keeping work in the country."<sup>31</sup>

In 1888, George would explain that the confusion between work and wealth was at the heart of the problem. The strength of protectionist ideas "lies in the habit of thought which regards the necessity of work, not the results of work, as desirable. . . ." <sup>32</sup> The damage of specific jobs lost was highly visible and influential even before the age of television advocacy. With this prevailing attitude toward trade, it is not surprising that free trade did not inspire the support of the masses of the working people.

The second reason for a lack of support for free trade, according to George, was the lack of a satisfying new theory to replace the embattled classical theory.

I do not think induction employed in such questions as the tariff is of any use. What the people want is theory, and until they get a correct theory into their heads, all citing of facts is useless.<sup>33</sup>

Then, as now, the effect of free trade in commodities on the distribution of income was one of the most important questions in economics. But the existing classical model could not give a satisfactory answer to the question of trade and the relative payments to different factors of production because it was based on the single factor of production, the labor theory of value. The marginalists were beginning to solve the problems of wage and interest determination during this time. The neoclassical trade model would take decades beyond George's death to provide a satisfactory theoretical explanation of the effects of protection on the relative wages of labor.

It was precisely this issue of the effects on wages that Henry George addressed in his 1880s writings. George, in fact, anticipated certain important aspects of the logic of the neoclassical theory on trade flows and relative factor payments.

Specifically, the important aspects were the relative factor endowments in the trading nations and the relative factor intensities in the production functions.

The neoclassical model explains that even with identical technologies, a country will have a comparative advantage in the product which uses intensively in production the country's relatively abundant resources. On the other hand, domestic production which competes with imports must use intensively the country's relatively scarce resources. Based on this reasoning, the Stolper-Samuelson theory predicts that in each country free trade will increase the prices of the abundant factors of production relative to the prices of the scarce factors. Protect some industries against import competition through tariffs or quotas, and a nation's relatively scarce, relatively expensive factors of production will benefit. In addition to consumers, those who pay the costs of "protection" are owners and providers of the relatively abundant, relatively inexpensive factors of production.<sup>34</sup>

In summary, Henry George's model assumed that the United States had a relatively scarce endowment of capital in the 1880s and 1890s relative to England, and was relatively abundantly endowed with land vis-a-vis labor when compared to the smaller, crowded England. Furthermore, the protected industries in the United States were capital intensive, not labor intensive. Labor was not gaining by protection. George's argument was consistent with the logic of the twentieth-century neoclassical theory when he examined the two critical issues of the nations' relative factor abundances and relative factor intensities in production as a part of his "satisfactory new theory."

George first considered relative factor abundance much in the spirit of the modern theory.

England is a little island on which nearly 40,000,000 people are begging for opportunities to work, while the United States, with its vast area of land, has but 60,000,000 people within its borders.<sup>35</sup>

He went on to compute relative factor endowments, stating that in England "there are but one and one-third acres to the individual, whereas in the United States there are thirty-two and one-fifth."<sup>36</sup> This fact, rather than the absence of a tariff in England, explained George, was the reason why labor in England was relatively less expensive than the relatively more scarce American labor.

That their condition is not so good, and as an average it is not, is due to our greater and cheaper opportunities for work, which we enjoy not as a result of protection but because of our more extensive area and varied natural resources relative to our population.<sup>37</sup>

England was relatively labor and capital abundant while land was scarce. The United States was relatively scarce in its endowment of labor and capital, while land was the abundant factor. A persistent flow of financial and physical capital

from England to the United States throughout the 1880s and 1890s, indicated ample opportunity for gain in America. As the 19th century moved toward a close, the American capital stock had expanded significantly, and became both wider and deeper than in the middle of the century. Capital intensive industries took longer to develop in the United States than in England, but they did develop.<sup>38</sup>

George would argue that the protected industries typically were capital intensive, and he concluded that the capitalists would be protected by an import tariff on capital intensive imports. Labor would be relatively worse off. Industries with small holdings of capital are not those which are protected, as it is the large stocks of capital that are granted tariffs. According to George, the industries the tariff aimed to protect were those "in which the mere workman, or even the workman with a small capital, is helpless."<sup>39</sup> The protected industries, those competing with the imports, used unskilled labor and large amounts of America's relatively scarce factors of production.

As for the great mass of those engaged in the protected industries, their labor can hardly be called skilled . . . but consists of the mere tending to machinery . . .<sup>40</sup>

The businesses which were helped were the "large establishments" using "costly machinery, great amounts of capital, or the ownership of natural opportunities which bear a high price."<sup>41</sup> These natural opportunities included the ownership of land and the rapidly developing transportation systems, including especially, the railroads. Therefore, according to George, American import tariffs benefited the landowners or the capitalists, depending on the industry, but not labor.

Could anything more clearly show that the real motive of protection is always the profit of the employing capitalist, never the benefit of labor?<sup>42</sup>

Tariffs on iron ore benefited the owners of the mine, but not the workers. Laborers were mistaken when they failed to support tariff reductions since

the whole aim and spirit of protection is not the protection of the sellers of labor but the protection of the buyers of labor, not the maintaining of wages but the maintaining of profits.<sup>43</sup>

Protection bid up the value of the scarce land and maintains profit, but did not help raise the wages of labor. Labor should not, therefore, support the protectionist plans developed in the Congress.

George analyzed the coal industry in Pennsylvania, which had received tariff protection for years. Based on the same logic as his iron ore example, George reached a similar conclusion. "Whomsoever the tariff may protect," stated George, "it does not protect the coal miners."<sup>44</sup> The benefits of the coal tariff

such as they are, certainly do not go to either the miners or to their immediate employers, the coal operators. If anyone at all is benefitted, it is the owners of coal land and the monopolists of transportation.<sup>45</sup>



Abundant labor was not helped by protectionism. In fact, those workers in unprotected industries were made relatively better off.

As a matter of fact, where no monopoly exists, wages and profits in the protected industries of Pennsylvania are not higher, but, I am inclined to think, rather lower than in the unprotected industries.<sup>46</sup>

The decrease in wages relative to the return to capital is exactly what the modern Stolper-Samuelson theory would predict. The reverse result for England is a true test for a grasp of the logic of the modern theory, and this, too, George had. Suggesting a false protection, George stated that the "condition of miners has for some time been growing worse in Pennsylvania" while the condition of the miners in Great Britain has gotten better. England's freedom of trade benefited its relatively abundant factor, labor, which was used intensively in its land-scarce methods of production for export. Calling them his "principles," George claimed that his results from the mining industry generalize to all other Pennsylvania industries.<sup>47</sup>

George argued that to protect the interests of labor, unionization rather than protectionism was the answer. Competition on the supply side of input markets, not import competition in output markets, was what kept wages from rising.

What American workmen have to fear is not the sale in our goods markets of the products of 'cheap foreign labor,' but the transference to our labor-market of that labor itself.<sup>48</sup>

International factor movements and the competitive nature of labor markets, according to George, kept wages from rising. The level of wages in any occupation can be increased above the general level only by "conditions, natural or artificial, which in them check the competition for employment."<sup>49</sup>

George recognized, however, that not all kinds of labor were abundant, and therefore that free trade may not always benefit all labor. Furthermore, labor might enjoy "such special skill or ability as make a particular demand for his services" that wages could be increased with protection but "only to a small extent and for a short time."<sup>50</sup> The increased domestic production resulting from a tariff "suddenly increases the demand for a certain kind of skilled labor" which temporarily increases the wage rate

to an extent and for a time determined by the difficulties of obtaining the skilled laborers from other countries or of the acquirement by new laborers of the needed skill.<sup>51</sup>

George argued that it would be much better for labor if the aspiring monopolists were paid directly, instead of indirectly through import tariffs. As if quoting from the modern theory of the second best, George suggests that it would be more efficient to "pay our protected infants directly from the public treasury what we now allow them to filch from the people."<sup>52</sup> By taxing all instead of just some people, that would be the "most economical and efficient way of 'protecting' those who are now protected."<sup>53</sup>

This analysis forms the heart of the income distribution implications of George's trade model. Here, in George's attempt to dissuade labor from supporting protectionism, is the heart of Stolper-Samuelson logic. Protectionism reverses the movement in relative factor prices, reducing the demand for the relatively abundant factor of production, the workingman. Enriched are the owners of capital, land, or other scarce resources.

### III

#### **Political Economy After Protection or Free Trade**

GEORGE THOUGHT that labor was losing on the tariff issue and the immigration issue, and he was right. The tariff would not be lowered, but would, in fact, be increased. By March of 1887, when Congress had adjourned, no reduction in the surplus and no tariff reform had been achieved. In December, Cleveland devoted his entire annual message to the issue of tariff reform. In this speech he stated that the surplus should be reduced by a reduction of import tariffs, not a reduction of internal taxes. Had Cleveland's message come sooner, perhaps his supporters may have had enough time to rebut the onslaught of attacks. Instead, Cleveland's message hurt his reelection effort and tariff reform more than it helped.<sup>54</sup>

In March of 1888, another tariff reduction bill was proposed which suggested a reduction on the tariffs on raw materials, on finished iron and steel products, and on sugar. The interests of labor were brought into the debate. Protectionists were sending their opinions to every iron mill to reach labor and increase their fear of the results of the passage of the tariff reduction bill.<sup>55</sup> Nevertheless, Henry George remained optimistic that labor would support free trade.

I know that they will respond to an aggressive attack on protection when they will turn away from a timid one. The only element of danger I see in the political situation is the half hearted and treacherous timidity of Democratic politicians manifest in the doubtful states.<sup>56</sup>

In June, he appealed to Cleveland to waste no time in putting tariff reform in the front of the national campaign. By September, George was declaring that Cleveland shared his belief that the "sweeping away of restrictions would be for the benefit of industrial enterprises and the benefit of labor."<sup>57</sup>

In the Presidential election of 1888, the positions of the two parties were firmly established and gave the voters a definite contrast. Cleveland wanted all tax reduction to come from reductions in the import tariff. The Republicans, on the other hand, reversed positions from their 1884 platform and now declared that they favored the "entire repeal of internal taxes," rather than surrender any part of the protective system.<sup>58</sup> Much to the dismay of Henry George, the protectionist Republicans were back in office with Harrison in 1888. The outgoing

President stated again his reform position in his annual December message, a message which contained some “remarkably sharp words on the inequalities of wealth in America,” which, according to one historian, were “so radical in tone that they might have been written by Henry George.”<sup>59</sup>

The Republicans wasted no time in further raising, not lowering, the tariff with the passage of the McKinley Tariff in 1890. By 1892, the Democrats were back in the White House with Cleveland and held a majority of seats in both houses of Congress. They tried to lower the tariff, but the effort was in vain. Henry George was disappointed that there had been no special session called to discuss and reform the tariff, as the silver issue had by then taken hold of the attention of President Cleveland.<sup>60</sup> By 1893 there were wage reductions and bread lines. By the spring of 1894 labor protests were blossoming.

With the passage of the Wilson-Gorman tariff in 1894, tariffs were increased to the highest level yet. As Cleveland summarized,

Every true Democrat and every sincere reformer knows that the bill in its present form. . . . falls far short of the consummation for which we have long labored.<sup>61</sup>

George and Cleveland had both labored long only to be disappointed at the outcome. The great tariff battle which had begun in 1885 was about to be finished, with George and the free traders coming out on the losing political side. The Democrats lost, too, as their party was now weakened and would remain out of the White House for almost two decades. The Republicans gained the Presidency and control of both houses of Congress in the elections of 1896.

Two days after his inauguration, McKinley called a special session of Congress to discuss increasing the tariff in order to raise revenues. The year 1897 would see the approval of the Dingley Tariff, which would raise nominal tariff rates to a still higher level. In that same year, Henry George would die. The protectionist tide would be slowed by the administration of Woodrow Wilson, but not reversed until after the Second World War.

In the turbulent decades of the 1880s and 1890s, Henry George anticipated key elements of the modern theory concerning the impact of trade on relative factor prices. In many significant ways, George understood that tariffs pitted the interests of the small, highly-interested group of producers and governing officials against the interests of the larger and only generally interested group of consumers and producers of non-import competing products.

Beyond anticipating elements of the modern theory, George’s writings added to the moral foundation of the free trade argument. George argued that protection is “repugnant to moral perceptions and inconsistent with the simplicity and harmony which we everywhere discover in natural law.”<sup>62</sup> Trade, on the other hand, has always been “the extinguisher of war, the eradicator of prejudice, the

diffuser of knowledge."<sup>63</sup> This was the result of trade because "prejudices are worn down, wits are sharpened, language enriched, habits and customs brought to the test of comparison and new ideas kindled."<sup>64</sup>

Above all, George believed in free trade because he believed that human freedom led to human progress. "When we consider the question from facts to principles," he asked, "do we not find the better condition where there is greater freedom?"<sup>65</sup> If we get over this "mean spirit which teaches us that foreigners are our enemies," and the zero-sum idea that "men can only benefit themselves at the expense of other people," he believed that a time would come when all people could enjoy leisure, luxury, and, perhaps most importantly of all, the "opportunities for developing the highest part of man's nature."<sup>66</sup>

In the preface to the 1980 edition of *Protection or Free Trade*, Lissner states that the book's unique contribution is in the way it shows how the campaign for free trade is "an essential element of the crusade for human freedom. . . . The campaign for justice and liberty cannot rest until these ideas prevail everywhere."<sup>67</sup> Henry George would, no doubt, be pleased with that assessment, as George believed in freedom and thought it should be practiced. He favored free trade

not merely that she shall be rich, not merely that she shall be great, but that she shall lead the world to freedom. . . . I am a free trader because I believe in freedom. . . .<sup>68</sup>

At this time in our history, an examination of George's thought can help discussion of these issues which remain highly divisive.

#### Notes

1. Henry George, *The Standard*, Vol. 4, No. 13, September 29, 1888, p. 1.
2. Henry George, *Progress and Poverty*, p. 18.
3. Henry George, *Progress and Poverty*, *ibid.*
4. Henry George, *Protection or Free Trade*, pp. 205, 214.
5. Henry George, *The Standard*, Vol. 3, No. 7, February 18, 1888, p. 1.
6. The book was published by the new firm of Henry George and Company, which included Henry George and his son.
7. "Labor in Pennsylvania," *North American Review*, 1886 Part I (pp. 165–182); Part II (pp. 268–277); Part III, pp. 360–370; Part IV, 1887, pp. 86–95.
8. Henry George, ed., *The Standard*, (New York, 1887–1890).
9. Cord, *Henry George: Dreamer or Realist?* p. 241.
10. Stanwood, *American Tariff Controversies of the Nineteenth Century*, Vol. 2, p. 199.
11. Stanwood, *ibid.*, p. 204.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 221.
13. Taussig, *The Tariff History of the United States*, pp. 249–50.
14. Stanwood, *op. cit.*, p. 221.
15. Stanwood, *ibid.*, p. 222.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 204.
17. Nevins, *Grover Cleveland: A Study in Courage*, p. 283.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 282.
19. Stanwood, *op. cit.*, pp. 224–25.
20. Barker, *Henry George*, p. 424, states that George was “bedeviled by obstacles and misfortunes” while writing the book. The half-completed manuscript was lost in 1883, but was completed by the presidential election season of 1884.
21. In the Preface to *Protection or Free Trade*, p. xi.
22. *Ibid.*, pp. 224–25.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 47.
24. Nevins, *op. cit.*, p. 287.
25. Richardson, *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, Volume VIII, pp. 394ff.
26. Richardson, *ibid.*, p. 510.
27. Anna George DeMille, “Haymarket and Tariff Reform,” *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, 1946, p. 545.
28. Rose, *Henry George*, p. 1170.
29. Henry George, *Protection or Free Trade*, p. 225.
30. Henry George, *ibid.*, p. 225.
31. Henry George, “Labor in Pennsylvania, Part IV,” *North American Review*, 1887, p. 92.
32. Henry George, ed., *The Standard*, Vol. 4, No. 17, October 27, 1888, p. 6.
33. Quoted in Barker, *Henry George*, p. 449.
34. Chacholaides, *Principles of International Economics*, p. 285.
35. Henry George, ed., *The Standard*, Vol. IV. No. 8, August 25, 1888, p. 1.
36. Henry George, *ibid.*
37. *Ibid.*
38. See Alexander Field, “Land Abundance, Interest/Profit Rates, and Nineteenth-Century American and British Technology,” *Journal of Economic History*, Vol. 43, no. 2 (June 1983), p. 425.
39. Henry George, *Protection or Free Trade*, pp. 204–05.
40. *Ibid.*, pp. 209–10.
41. *Ibid.*
42. *Ibid.*, p. 206.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 204.
44. George, “Labor in Pennsylvania, Part IV,” *North American Review*, 1887, p. 86.
45. *Ibid.*, pp. 89–90.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 91.
47. *Ibid.*
48. Henry George, *Protection or Free Trade*, p. 209.
49. Henry George, *Ibid.*, p. 201.
50. *Ibid.*, p. 90.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 94.
52. Henry George, Labor In Pennsylvania, Part IV,” *North American Review*, 1887, p. 91.
53. Henry George, ed., *The Standard*, Vol. 4, No. 11, September 15, 1888, p. 1.
54. Henry George, *ibid.*, Number 13, September 29, 1888, p. 2. for his speech delivered at Cooper Union on September 21, 1888.
55. Nevins, *Grover Cleveland: A Study in Courage*, p. 377.
56. *Ibid.*, p. 423.
57. *Ibid.*, pp. 416–417.
58. Henry George, ed., *The Standard*, Vol. 4, No. 11, September 15, 1888, p. 1.
59. Nevins, *Grover Cleveland: A Study in Courage*, p. 398.

60. *Ibid.*, p. 444.
61. Henry George, Jr., *The Life of Henry George*, p. 576.
62. Nevins, *Grover Cleveland: A Study in Courage*, p. 581.
63. Henry George, *Protection or Free Trade*, p. 52.
64. Henry George, *ibid.*
65. *Ibid.*, 54.
66. Henry George, ed., *The Standard*, Vol. 4, No. 12, September 22, 1888, p. 2.
67. Henry George, *ibid.*, Vol. 4, No. 13, September 29, 1888, p. 2.
68. In the Preface to *Protection or Free Trade*, pp. x–xi.
69. Henry George, ed., *The Standard*, Volume 4, Number 6, August 11, 1888, p. 3.
70. Henry George, ed., *The Standard*, Volume 4, Number 13, September 29, 1888, p. 2.

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### Community Chest

SUPPRESSION of the results of inquiry is a matter of apprehension for all scholars. Another technique for preventing the spread of information harmful to particular interests is the deliberate campaign to discredit a study by purchasing and disseminating unfavorable reviews. This apparently happened in the case of *Com-*