

HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHICAL LANGUAGES

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HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHICAL LANGUAGES¹

Hegel's mature philosophy of language is notoriously difficult to discover in, and recover from, his writings;² his philosophy of *philosophical* language is even more so. In his widely-influential treatment of the latter issue, G. R. G. MURE argues that philosophy must seek to express itself in the language of the pre-philosophical world of sense and understanding. Philosophical thought, MURE points out, is for Hegel "as logic the synthesis of the thought which sustains sense-experience with the thought of the understanding"³; language whose meanings are derived from the senses, as well as from man's other pre-philosophical encounters with reality, is an indispensable medium for philosophical expression.

But it is also a less-than-adequate medium; for, as MURE puts it, even philosophical language "can never quite pass from meaning to truth, from reference to an object to utter self-identification with its object."⁴

¹ I am deeply indebted to Professors E. L. Fackenheim, H. S. Harris, and K. L. Schmitz for their comments on the dissertation from which this paper is taken. Its substance, as well as its defects, remain my own.

² Allusions to this difficulty pervade scholarship on the subject. Cf. *Theodor Bodammer: Hegels Deutung der Sprache*. Hamburg 1969. 1 f, 16 f; *Daniel Cook: Language in the philosophy of Hegel*. The Hague 1973. 12; *Guy Debrock: the Silence of Language in Hegel's Dialectic*. In: *Cultural Hermeneutics*. 1 (1973), 301; *Joseph Derbolav Hegel und die Sprache*. In: *Sprache: Schlüssel zur Welt*. Düsseldorf 1959. 70; *Jean Hyppolite: Logique et Existence*. Paris 1953. 7; *Alexandre Koyré: Note sur la langue et la terminologie hegelienne*. In: *Koyré: Etudes d'histoire de la pensée philosophique*. Paris 1961. 175 f; *Henri Lauener: Die Sprache in der Philosophie Hegels mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Ästhetik*. Bern 1962. 7; *Bruno Liebrucks: Zur Theorie des Weltgeistes in Th. Litts Hegelbuch*. In: *Kant-Studien*. 46 (1953–54), 240; *Jean Quillen: Langage et philosophie de langage chez Hegel*. In: *Les signes et leur interpretation*. Lille 117 ff; *Joseph Simon: Das Problem der Sprache bei Hegel*. Stuttgart 1966. 15.

³ G. R. G. Mure: *A Study of Hegel's Logic*. Oxford 1950. 19.

⁴ Mure, 22.

Language constituted through mind's confrontation with external reality remains infected with the residues of that dualism (e. g. it retains the particularity and fixity of representation and the contingency of sense); it can never completely capture the fluent universality of the necessary and systematic self-determination of Hegel's Concept.

With this double thesis of the indispensability and inadequacy of pre-philosophical language to philosophical thought, MURE established a view of philosophical language which moderated the Anglo-Saxon tendency towards glorification of ordinary language and fixed the parameters of further Hegelian studies such as those of CLARK, HYPOLITE, and SIMON.⁵

The work of MURE and his successors leans heavily on the "philosophy of language" presented in *Encyclopedia* §§ 451–460.⁶ The possibilities for philosophical language implicit in the paragraphs immediately following, and especially in the section on "Mechanical Memory" (§§ 463–464) were brought out by THEODOR BODAMMER.⁷ This section does not deal explicitly with "language," which Hegel is considering only as expressing representations (§ 459 Anm.). It instead presents "names as such", or "beings as names", which exist in the "interior externality" of the mechanical memory. As utterances, vocalised or subvocalised, these are produced by the intelligence and thus are "interior"; but, because they are perfectly meaningless, they lie in the most external type of relation to one another possible, that of space: the "space of names" (§ 463).

Because these names disappear as they are uttered, they carry the mind beyond themselves; but because they are meaningless, they do not carry it to universal meanings, as does language in the preceding paragraphs. A name in the mechanical memory "refers" the mind only to the next in the "succession of words in whose connection there

⁵ *Malcolm Clark: Logic and System*. The Hague 1971; *Hyppolite*, op. cit.; *Simon*, op. cit.

⁶ References to the text and "Anmerkungen" (hereinafter: Anm.) of the *Encyclopedia* are taken from *G. W. F. Hegel: Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1830)*. Hrsg. von F. Nicolin und O. Pöggeler. Hamburg 1969. References to "Zusätze" (hereinafter: Zus.) are from *Hegel: Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften*. Hrsg. von E. Moldenhauer und K. M. Michel. 3 vols. Frankfurt/Main 1970. The crucial paragraphs §§ 463 and 464 do not differ significantly in the two texts

⁷ *Bodammer*, 56 ff, 236 ff.

is no understanding" (§ 463 Anm.). The totality of these mechanical successions is then nothing other than the intelligence itself, the "empty band" which contains them and keeps them in order. In this peculiar sense, the intelligence itself is their sole universal referent or "meaning" (§ 464); and, as the productive process of their arising and disappearance, it is their "being" as well (§ 463). The meaning of names in the mechanical memory is thus identical with the kind of being that they have.

The function of the mechanical memory, Hegel says, is to overcome the dichotomy of objectivity and subjective interiority; it is practised by students: "um den Boden ihrer Innerlichkeit zum reinen Sein, zum reinen Raum zu ebnet, in welchem die Sache, der an sich seiende Inhalt ohne den Gegensatz gegen eine subjektive Innerlichkeit, gewähren und sich explizieren könne" (§ 464 Anm.).

Having lost all significance in any ordinary sense of the term, names in the mechanical memory are freed from the particularity and contingency proper to meanings worked up from "outside"; because they disappear as they arise, they are perfectly fluent. They can thus receive all their significance from, and express fully, philosophical thought itself.⁸

BODAMMER and MURE, approaching the question of Hegel's philosophical language through different texts, arrive thus at radically different views; and the Hegelian "philosophy of philosophical language" stands before a dilemma.⁹ For BODAMMER's view, if it answers MURE's inadequacy-thesis, does not really address his indispensability-thesis: how, if philosophical thought generates its own expression entirely from within itself can it retain any relation to the languages of the pre-philosophical world?¹⁰ It seems that Hegel's "philosophy of philosophical language" must either view this as an appropriation and reworking of pre-philosophical language, which cannot overcome the latter's defi-

⁸ Cf. *Bodammer*, 236 ff and especially the conclusion on 238.

⁹ I am indebted to conversation with Professor Jère Paul Surber for the general view of this dilemma, though my formulation of it differs from his.

¹⁰ Bodammer's opinion is that it is simply "uninteresting" for Hegel that philosophical language makes use of the sounds of pre-philosophical language: *Bodammer*, 236 ff. As against this we may advert to what Clark calls "Hegel's intense effort to draw gleams of reason from words" in ordinary German, an effort manifest on virtually every page of his writings (*Clark*, 12).

ciencies; or it must turn to names in the mechanical memory, in which case its relation to pre-philosophical language (and to the entire pre-philosophical world) becomes problematic.

The dilemma so reached is hardly trivial to Hegel. Indeed, it turns out to be a form of what FACKENHEIM has called the "central problem of the Hegelian system." That system must be "comprehensively systematic": it must be able to authenticate all real content systematically, and must show such content as developed through the self-determination of pure thought. But it must also be "totally open", able and willing to confront the partial truths of pre-philosophical reality on their own terms.¹¹ The classical Hegelian solution to such a dilemma would be to swing free of it by grasping both horns: by accepting the two types of expression in their mutual opposition and showing that true philosophical expression somehow consists in their reconciliation.

We can test the hypothesis of such a solution, I think, in the following way. Names in the mechanical memory are "found" there by the intelligence, and thus constitute a type of objectivity; in attaining determinate expression in such a name, philosophical thought thus attains objectivity — an objectivity which itself is the "simple identity of subjective and objective" (§§ 464, 465). We can thus look for the basic structures of such objectification in those sections of Hegel's *Logics* which present the self-objectification of a subjective Concept which itself has attained the full determinate dynamic of thought in judgment and syllogism (§§ 194–212; *Wissenschaft der Logik*. II 353–406).¹²

Further warrant for this approach comes from considering that, in the last section of Hegel's logic of the object, "teleology", the Concept completely subsumes the object under it (§ 212; *L* II. 402 F). This cannot happen in nature, which retains an external recalcitrance to the Concept, and is "impotent" to express it fully.¹³ The word, by contrast, can bring about "die unbeschränkte Freiheit und Versöhnung des Geistes mit sich selber" (§ 444 Zus.). Thus, for Hegel "das Vernünftige existiert nur als

¹¹ E. L. Fackenheim: *The Religious Dimension in Hegel's Thought*. Boston 1970. 16–24.

¹² The edition used of the *Wissenschaft der Logik* (hereinafter: *L*) is that of Georg Lasson. 2 vols. Hamburg 1971.

¹³ Cf. the contrast of nature with logic and natural language at § 24 Zus. 21; also cf. § 248, Anm., for the incapacity of nature, "as it is", to correspond to the Concept, and § 250 Anm. for the "impotence" of nature as setting limits to philosophy.

Sprache";¹⁴ and when, in "teleology", thought attains objective existence by complete subsumption of the object, the latter must be linguistic.

We have hypothesised that two types of expression, pre-philosophical language and names in the mechanical memory, must be reconciled if Hegel's philosophy is to achieve an adequate expression. It now appears that we can verify that hypothesis by seeing whether the basic structures of teleological objectification can apply to these types of expression and, if they can, whether a coherent account of philosophical language results.

At the beginning of such objectification, we have the Concept as subjective but (thanks to the processes of mechanism and chemism which it has undergone) with a drive to posit itself objectively: it is the "purpose" ("Zweck") (§ 204; *L II*. 391). The object to which it opposes itself has also passed through the stages of mechanism and chemism, and retains the objective character of each. As mechanical, it is composed of individual objects which stand to one another in the merely external relations of space and time. As chemical, it comprises individual objects which are intrinsically, if rigidly, related to one another as well — as acids, bases, and salt have, in addition to spatiotemporal relations, intrinsic and rigid unification in chemical combination (§§ 195, 200, 203; *WL II*. 361, 377, 393).

The realisation of the purpose in this two-fold object is both a positing and a presupposing. In the former, the purpose reaches an objectivity which, Hegel says, is "internal" (in that it is determined as posited by the purpose) and which nonetheless has, because of its indifference to the purpose, the form of externality (*L II*. 394). This "first objectivity" is the means; and, because of its externality to the Concept, it is for Hegel a mechanical object (*L II*. 395).

Hegel includes the mechanical memory as an instance of the logical category of „Mechanism" (§ 195 *Zus.*). It thus appears that teleological objectification does apply to the utterance of thought in names within that memory. Such names, as we have seen, are in an "internal externality" and, because they are meaningless in themselves, would be

¹⁴ Hegel: *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*. Hrsg. von E. Moldenhauer und K. M. Michel. Frankfurt/Main 1971. Vol. 1. 527.

"indifferent" to the expression of thought in them: such a name would be the same whether it was used for such expression or simply in rote recitation, and no one of them has any internal property which would make it more apt than the rest for the expression of philosophical thought.

This, presumably, would be the type of linguistic expression of the Concept argued for by BODAMMER, but it does not by itself achieve the purpose; it yields only the "means", not the realised end. The means retains its own externality, and through this presupposes further externality which is not yet "under the power" of the purpose: the material to be worked on by the means. This work proceeds via mechanical and chemical processes, which now go forward under the direction of the purpose (§ 209; *L II*, 395–397).

Hegel refers to this work as the "List der Vernunft" (§ 209; *L II*, 398). It constitutes the encounter of reason with reality it presupposes; and, if reason is philosophical, such reality would be pre-philosophical. Can it be interpreted as the pre-philosophical language presented in the *Encyclopedia* prior to "Mechanical Memory"?

It seems that it can if we pay attention to the "chemical" side of the second externality. Hegel associates language with chemical objects by saying that it functions, like water, as a universal medium in which chemical reactions take place (*L II*, 379). Since he does not, as we have mentioned, refer to names in the mechanical memory as "language", there is no reason to suppose that they are the kind of objectivity he is here referring to; and in fact the kind of language brought forth in the *Encyclopedia* prior to "mechanical memory" (§§ 462 and preceding) seems decidedly "chemical". Such language is purely representational: sign and signified constitute a single representation (§ 462); and a representation, for Hegel, is a fixed determinacy, like those in terms of which chemical objects relate to one another.

Further, a chemical process for Hegel consists in the demonstration by individual objects of the untenability of their own fixed determinacies and of their dependence on their opposites (§ 203; *L II*, 382). When such reactions take place in the "universal medium" of language, they would be the demonstration, by representational language, of the untenability of *its* own fixed determinacies. Such demonstration, proceeding under the direction of the purpose in teleological objectification, would correspond to what Hegel (at § 81) refers to as the "dialectical" moment of thought.

Pre-philosophical language thus finds a place in philosophical expression, along with names in the mechanical memory. If it is not (as MURE's view would have it) the sole vehicle of such expression, it is nonetheless indispensable to it. To see how Hegel views philosophical language as a whole, we must examine the relation of the two forms of expression.

On the basis of the texts we are considering, their connection is at first external, established through the externality in the means (*L II. 396*). "Externality" for Hegel can, of course, be viewed in two ways: as that of one thing to another, or as that of a thing to Spirit. In the first sense, we have seen, names in mechanical memory are "external" to one another: they are without meaning, the „Zusammenhang der Namen" (§ 463). It follows that none of them is to any degree privileged for the expression of a given moment of thought. As means, such a name remains "die formale Mitte eines formalen Schlusses", and others would be as apt (*L II. 394 f*). For the choice of means to become itself rational, one or another of them must show itself to be *peculiarly* apt; their mutual indifference must be overcome. This cannot be accomplished by the names themselves, or by thought (which must treat them all alike); so further externality is needed. The mutual indifference of names in mechanical memory, or their "externality" in one sense of the term, thus poses a demand for further externality.

This is satisfied, I suggest, by the "externality" of such names in the other sense. Names in mechanical memory, we have seen, get both their being and their "meaning" from within, from the intelligence. What they have from "without" is their concrete sounds (vocalised, subvocalised, or "mental"), which are taken over from pre-philosophical language when it is committed to memory (§§ 462–463). Their concrete sound is then that element in names in mechanical memory most "external" to thinking Spirit.¹⁵ Each such name, we may say,

¹⁵ In the *Encyclopedia* of 1817, Hegel refers to the „intuition made subjective" of names — what I call here their "concrete sound" as their externality: *Hegel: Enzyklopädie der Philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse*. Heidelberg 1817. In: G. W. F. Hegel: *Sämtliche Werke*. Hrsg. von K. Glockner. Stuttgart 1927–30. Vol. 6. 271 (§ 383); cf. as well Iring Fetscher: *Hegels Lehre vom Menschen*. Stuttgart 1970. 160 ff for a discussion of verbal memory as the intuition of the word.

remains "homonymous" with the name in pre-philosophical language from which it was memorised. Because each moment of his system is considered by Hegel to be the final truth of some aspect of the pre-philosophical world, the homonym (in mechanical memory) of the pre-philosophical name of that aspect is uniquely apt for expressing the moment of thought which is its final truth. By giving to a moment of his system the name in mechanical memory which is homonymous to the name of the representation of which that moment is the final truth, Hegel can establish a relation between the two whether or not their inner identity in content is immediately apparent.

The next phase in the process of realisation of an end is the internalisation of the merely external connection first established between means and material. The chemical and mechanical processes by which this takes place do not, here, continue *ad (malum) infinitum*, but have a definite goal: the establishment of identity in content between the first and second objectivities — between, on our reading, names in pre-philosophical language and their homonyms expressing systematic thought (§ 210; L II. 399). Linguistic "content" ("Inhalt") for Hegel often signifies meaning, as opposed to "sign" (§§ 461, 462); and it seems that representations not only demonstrate their own untenability as isolated, but in so doing grow and change in meaning until they are seen to be identical in meaning to some determination of pure thought.¹⁶

When, finally, the identity in content is fully established, the purpose, means, and material are reunited. The last, in being seen to be identical with the means, proves itself to be no more resistant to the Concept than was the means.¹⁷ With means and material identified, the activity by which the purpose originally appropriated the means is seen to be identical with that by which the means operated on the material. Since the activities are the same, their ends are identical: the original purpose is seen to be the identity of means and material, and the former — in our instance here, the concept in its meaningful yet free and fluent

¹⁶ Those who maintain that Hegel often arranges his dialectic to arrive, in different instances, at the systematic point he wants to make are thus often more accurate than critical.

¹⁷ At this point, then, the passage can no longer be taken as referring to the objectification of the Concept in nature, and must be dealing specifically with language.

linguistic expression — turns out to embrace the other two moments (§ 212; *L II*. 404).

We thus achieve a coherent account of Hegelian philosophical language by applying Hegel's logical texts on the teleological objectification of the Concept to the two forms of expression presented in the *Encyclopedia*. The final language of Hegel's system is not a static set of linguistic possibilities but is essentially dynamic: it is language "in use". The "use" consists in the reconciliation of the two forms of expression found in the *Encyclopedia*; Hegel's full view of philosophical language then embraces *two* different languages (pre-philosophical language and the final language of the system), as well as what we have termed a form of expression (names in mechanical memory).

The two languages are at first separated, because it is not necessarily obvious that their content is the same.¹⁸ As Hegel puts it with regard to the main pre-philosophical language with which his system must deal, religious language; "*der Gehalt ist derselbe, aber wie HOMER*

¹⁸ That the two languages — names in mechanical memory expressing philosophical thought and pre-philosophical language — are at first thoroughly distinct and are later reunited is a point missed by Werner Marx in *Absolute Reflexion und Sprache* (in: *Natur und Geschichte*. Festschrift für Karl Löwith. Hrsg. von H. Braun und M. Riedel. Stuttgart 1967). For Marx, names as such express only representations (op. cit. 247), but philosophical thought has the power to transform their meanings into its own (248). The problem arises when Marx seeks to explain the final degree of interiority in philosophical language: what about the demand for "expression" of thought at all? If language is representational and thus external to thought, is this not an external demand? Here, Marx brings in the names in mechanical memory, which as purely products of the intelligence are in no sense external to thought. — On this view, the mechanical memory can hardly be anything other than a *deus ex machina* (or, more properly, a *machina ex machina*) called upon by Hegel to solve the problem Marx uncovers. For, as the externalisation of names, it is for Marx an externalisation of the very same language whose meanings, in "Representation", were seen to be laboriously worked up by the intelligence from sense-givens. If those meanings can come entirely from thought, then that entire process was unnecessary for philosophical expression; it culminated in a set of names whose only function is to have their meanings transformed by thought. Marx thus arrives at what amount to two different sets of representational names, those with representational meaning and those with the meaning of thought; and the process which produces each is incomprehensible from the point of view of the other. The labors of the intelligence in "Representation" appear from the side of mechanical memory as unnecessary; while from the side of those labours, the mechanical memory appears to be merely ad hoc. Not having separated the two types of expression fully enough, Marx does not see their complementarity and cannot show their reunification.

von einigen Dingen sagt, daß sie zwei Namen haben, den einen in der Sprache der Götter, den andern in der Sprache der übertägigen Menschen, so gibt es für jenen Gehalt zwei Sprachen, die eine des Gefühls, der Vorstellung, und des verständigen, in endlichen Kategorien und einseitigen Abstraktionen nistenden Denkens, die andere des konkreten Begriffs." (Enz. 12). Taking up the HOMERIC allusion in his review of GOESCHEL, Hegel maintains that the human side of language is no more to remain outside the system than is religion, but is to receive its final validity within it: "Wie HOMER von einigen Gestirnen angibt, welchen Namen sie bei den unsterblichen Göttern, welchen anderen bei den sterblichen Menschen führen, so ist die Sprache der Vorstellung eine andere als die des Begriffs, und der Mensch erkennt die Sache nicht bloß zunächst an dem Namen der Vorstellung, sondern in diesem Namen ist er erst als lebendig bei ihr zu Haus, und die Wissenschaft hat nicht bloß in jene abstrakten Räume, und zwar abstraktere, als die sind, worin jene unsterblichen Götter — nicht der Wahrheit, sondern der Phantasie — wohnen, ihre Figurationen einzuschreiben, sondern deren Menschwerdung, und zwar einer jeden unmittelbar für sich selbst, die Existenz, die sie im wirklichen Geist erhalten — und diese ist die Vorstellung — nachzuweisen und zu verzeichnen."¹⁹

The "incarnation" of language is what we have described in terms of Hegel's logical category of teleology. It is possible because the „language of the gods", or of the Concept, is itself a memory of the language of men and retains its homonymity with it. When this homonymity is, via the appropriate dialectic of "chemical processes", worked into the identity of content between the two languages, we have an expression which consists, like names in mechanical memory, of fleeting posits of Spirit and is adequate to the fluency and universality of thought (the latter in the sense that anyone who can think systematically can understand it, since its meaning comes entirely from thought), but whose significances have been demonstrated to be the same as those of the pre-philosophical world.²⁰ The account of philosophical language at

¹⁹ Hegel: *Berliner Schriften*. Hrsg. von E. Moldenhauer und K. M. Michel. Frankfurt/Main 1970. 378.

²⁰ For philosophical language as a mediation of pre-philosophical and purely Conceptual language, cf. as well the discussions of "Verstehen" at Hegel: *Einleitung in die Geschichte der Philosophie*. Hrsg. von J. Hoffmeister und F. Nicolin. Hamburg 1959. 49 ff, and of "Bedeutung" at Hegel: *Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion*. Hrsg. von G. Lasson. Bd 1. 1925. 30 f.

which we have arrived is not merely congruent with Hegel's texts: it provides a classical Hegelian solution to the dilemma we sketched earlier. Moreover, on Hegel's terms it is a *valid* solution: given that the content of the pre-philosophical world is identical with that of philosophical thought (a claim coextensive, of course, with Hegelianism and beyond our scope here), the rest follows quite clearly.²¹

A concrete example enables us to see how the universal truths of philosophy can find expression through particular pre-philosophical languages. The first moment of the system was expressed by Hegel as "Sein" but any other name in mechanical memory homonymous with the pre-philosophical terms of which that moment gives the final truth would have done as well. German may contain no other such words — but they do exist: "being", "L'être", "esse", and "Tò ὄν" are examples. Insofar as different pre-philosophical languages express different sets of representations (as French has no equivalent for "mind", and English none for "Geist"), different "chemical processes" will be required to bring out the identity between system and world. For some languages — e. g. those which, like Hottentot, have no metaphysical tradition — these processes will be very difficult indeed, amounting to a revamping of the language. Nonetheless, because Hottentots are rational, it is in principle possible for a Hottentot to understand the system without totally abandoning his Hottentotness. The

²¹ Our belief that Hegel saw and solved this problem is enforced by the similarities of the solution here offered and that worked out independently (of Hegel) by Joseph Derbolav (*Hegel und die Sprache*, 56–86). Derbolav, attempting to think together the beginnings of the *Phenomenology* and the *Logic*, is able to uncover the linguistic significance of the latter: that Being, the immediate and indeterminate universal, must be considered as analogous to the immediacy and indeterminacy of the objects of opining ("meinen") — and must hence be viewed in terms of the immediate and utterly individual meanings of the "proper names" of sensuous consciousness. Being thus manifests itself, says Derbolav, in the "mere word" which has meaning only in the activity of opining and for itself is but an empty word-husk (op. cit. 84). Derbolav thus recognises that language as presented in *Encyclopedia* §§ 459–462 is overly formal and abstract; but, not seeing the importance of the mechanical memory, turns to the *Phenomenology* to find it. His approach, thus "independent" of Hegel, does not yield an adequate account of Hegelian philosophical language because the language of opining in the *Phenomenology's* opening pages is supposed to refer to what is other than it: to sense-givens. Philosophical language in order to express thought which is free and not determined from without, cannot be conditioned by what is external to it in this way — as names in mechanical memory, precisely, are not.

system cannot be translated from one language to another, but it can be written in each.

A number of consequences follow from this view of Hegelian philosophical language.

(1). The relation of philosophical language to philosophical thought is not, for Hegel, binary; it contains the four terms of thought, names in mechanical memory, pre-philosophical language, and final philosophical language.

(2). Philosophical language for Hegel is dynamic, not static, and can only be understood in the context of its use.

(3). This use requires a plurality of interlocutors: one for whom the identity of content between system and world is clear and who can therefore express each moment of thought in the homonym of the appropriate name in pre-philosophical language, and one who needs such an external adumbration of this identity, presumably because it is not clear to him. Without the former, the complicated dynamics of philosophical language are impossible. Without the latter, they are unnecessary; and Hegel's view of philosophical language is incomprehensible apart from the communicative context in which such language occurs.

(4). The question of the relation of philosophy to ordinary language was neither begged nor ignored by Hegel, but was a central concern of his thought — one with which he wrestled each time he named one of his categories. We can even say that his attempts to do justice to pre-philosophical meanings in such naming constitute an attempt — the major modern attempt — at a *systematic* analysis of language (one which, to be sure, is partially and rigorously revisionary).

(5). There is a major difference between the language of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* and that of the properly systematic works. In the *Phenomenology*, consciousness has not yet attained the point to which it is striving, absolute knowledge; and this means that (in contrast to the systematic works) the *telos* of the dialectic of the *Phenomenology* is not explicitly present at the beginning. It follows that names in mechanical memory cannot be used for the expression of the "ladder to the system"; everything in the *Phenomenology* must rather be phrased in the various levels of pre-philosophical language, from that of sense-certainty to that of religious representation. This may have

bearing on the ambiguous status of the *Phenomenology's* relation to the System,²² and in particular on the systematic reasons for the great length of the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, in comparison with the „Phenomenology“ of the *Encyclopedia*.

(6). In the mechanical memory, representational meaning constitutes the connections of terms and is destroyed: what remains, then, is just the random successions of words (e. g. lists of names) held together by the “empty band” of the intelligence. This means that grammatical form, a product of the understanding (§ 459 Anm.) is likewise absent from names in mechanical memory — and from the first objectification of philosophical thought as well.²³ That objectification is then free to receive, not merely its meaning from thought, but the forms of connection of its various names: those connections would be, in the system's final expression, purely logical (i. e. syllogistic) and not grammatical. The complex dialectic of grammatical form and philosophical content found in Hegel's discussions of the “speculative sentence”²⁴ would have a place only in the “chemical process” of dialectical working-up of representational content. While crucial to the *Phenomenology* (where pre-philosophical language must be used), the “speculative sentence” is supplementary in the system.

²² Cf. Otto Pöggeler: *Zur Deutung der Phänomenologie des Geistes*: In: Hegel-Studien. 1 (1961), 255–294. We can hardly discuss this complicated topic here; but we might note that since in the *Encyclopedia* “Phenomenology” Reason has gained “the simple identity of the subjectivity of the Concept and its objectivity and universality” (§ 438), it needs (and has) names in mechanical memory to express itself. Reason in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, however, has a language which is more like that of sense-certainty (cf. preceding note): “Sein erstes Aussprechen ist nur dieses abstrakte, leere Wort, daß alls *sein* ist. . . für die *Erfüllung* des leeren *Meins* bedarf seine Vernunft eines fremden Anstoßes, in welchem erst die *Mannigfaltigkeit* des Empfindens oder Vorstellens liege” (*Hegel: Phänomenologie des Geistes*. Hrsg. v. J. Hoffmeister. Hamburg 1952. 180 f). In the *Phenomenology*, the experience of each stage must be expressed in the language proper to that stage if the development is not to get ahead of itself and become “for us” rather than “for Consciousness”. The deficient language available to Reason in the *Phenomenology* may well contribute to the length of its journey to the absolute knowledge, and language, presupposed by the “Phenomenology” of the *Encyclopedia*.

²³ In saying that the only connection of terms in the mechanical memory is the abstract ego as “empty band”, Hegel presumably is completing, for the purpose of his system, the historical development towards simplification of grammar he refers to at § 459 Anm. and in “Die Vernunft in der Geschichte” (*Hegel: Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte*. 166).

²⁴ Cf. Marx, op. cit.; Jère Paul Surber: *Hegel's Speculative Sentence*. In: Hegel-Studien. 10 (1975), 211–229.

(7). The realisation of the Concept in language proceeds in three stages; each of these corresponds to one phase of the threefold mediation of philosophy referred to in the *Encyclopedia* (§§ 87 Zus.; 575–577).²⁵ The first mediation — that by nature — is on our view accomplished by the internalised sensations of names in the „space“ and time of the mechanical memory. The second mediation, in which Spirit raises nature „zu ihrem Wesen“, is accomplished for us in the „chemical processes“ which bring out the true significances of pre-philosophical terms. In the third mediation, logical thought reveals itself as „die absolute Substanz des Geistes wie der Natur, das Allgemeine, Alldurchdringende;“ this is accomplished in philosophical language when the means, or expressed Concept, reveals itself to include and animate the end and the material.²⁶

²⁵ Following Fackenheim, we will concentrate our discussion on the first of these passages: *Fackenheim*, 84 f.

²⁶ Our view of the three-fold mediation of philosophy thus corresponds in general to that of Théodore Geraets, for whom each syllogism expresses a reading of the system. In the first syllogism, says Geraets, the reader „forgets himself“ in the objective development of thought; on our view, in this syllogism the name in mechanical memory, which expresses thought purely in itself without regard to any externality (including a reader) is the middle. The second syllogism is for us the „chemical process“ in which thought encounters history and the thinker attempts, as Geraets puts it, to „comprendre — en assimilant le résultat du travail philosophique des générations précédentes — son propre temps.“ The third syllogism is then the unification of the other two; *Th. Geraets: Les trois lectures philosophiques de l'Encyclopedie ou la realisation du concept de la philosophie chez Hegel*. In: *Hegel-Studien*. 10 (1975), 231–254, esp. 245–250.