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Author(s): DONALD McINTOSH

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## THE DIMENSIONS OF ANARCHY

DONALD McINTOSH

## I. INTRODUCTORY

This essay is a critical, multidimensional analysis of anarchism.<sup>1</sup> It seeks to ascertain on what grounds anarchism can be advanced as a point of view which is coherent, internally consistent, and does not run blatantly against the facts, and to show the relationship of this point of view to individualism and to social and political authority. It is neither a defense of anarchy nor an attack on it, but rather an examination of what it is to be an anarchist who thinks straight.

By "anarchism" I mean the movement of thought and practice which runs (I think) from the Anabaptists in the sixteenth century down to some of the contemporary counterculture communes, and some of the student movements in Europe. The picture drawn here will be "ideal typical": a description which attempts to be, in Weber's phrase, "adequate at the level of meaning," and which actual anarchistic movements and theories resemble to a greater or lesser degree.

The approach will be interdisciplinary, attempting to utilize and integrate philosophical, psychological, sociological, and political perspectives in a rounded treatment. As such, it rests on the general theories which I have developed at length elsewhere.<sup>2</sup>

Since the line of argument is long and complex, a one paragraph

summary may help orient the reader. Definitionally, anarchy is not, as some have thought, lack of government, but a special form of government, resting on the principle of unanimity. (It is thus not to be identified with the "state of nature.") Anarchy takes its place alongside the traditional three of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, as a fourth basic form. Philosophically, one may distinguish between libertarianism (belief in subjective freedom) and individualism (primacy of the private will). Anarchism is not, as Hegel and others have supposed, a logical result of extreme libertarianism, for reasons which were already clear to Hobbes. An attempt to examine the relationship of individualism to anarchism, via a treatment of Hobbes, Rousseau, and Stirner, fails because the concept of individualism employed has been inadequate. A psychological investigation is needed. On the psychological level there are two types of authority: peer authority and parental authority. Individualism is the assertion of the independence of the "personal" (as against "private") will from both types. This area of independence is inherently limited, because freedom from all authority would destroy the basis on which individualism comes into being. Hence anarchism cannot successfully be argued on individualistic grounds, as freedom from all authority, as some have attempted. Rather, on the psychological level anarchism represents another polar type: acceptance of complete peer authority, coupled with rejection of all parental authority. On the sociological level the two types emerge as social authority (Durkheim's "collective conscience"), and political authority (Weber's "*legitime Herrschaft*"). Anarchism rejects all political authority. As a result, successful social organization requires an intense collectivistic equalitarianism (Durkheim's "mechanical solidarity"). Politically, anarchism is not opposed to the state itself, if the state is understood as a community of equals which possesses the authority to govern, but stands against political authority, political power, and any vestige of a state apparatus. Anarchy can thus be defined as "government without politics."

## II. DEFINITIONAL

### A. The Need for Government

The term “anarchy” is often taken to mean “lack of government,” but this is a mistake. Almost all anarchists believe and have believed in government, and for good reason. The need for government seems incontrovertible, and indeed the very starting point of political theory.

If humans are to have any better than an animal existence, living in caves and eating roots and berries, they must live in communities in which activity is organized and coordinated by both general rules and specific directives. Humanity itself requires cooperative social activity, and this in turn requires government. Just as atoms, solar systems, and galaxies have “laws” which govern their behavior, so must human communities. Otherwise they could not exist. Lack of government is not anarchy but chaos.

### B. Nondeliberate Government

By “government” is here meant primarily the deliberate or conscious regulation of social action: the formation of a decision by a person or persons as to how people are to behave, which is communicated and obeyed. However, in a more extended sense it is possible to speak of the nondeliberate “government” of social action. There are two types.

First, social groups are typically and characteristically “governed” by a set of informal social norms, which are not the product of deliberate decisions but instead arise spontaneously out of the interactions of the group members. These informal norms organize and regulate a great deal of the life of every social grouping, from the simplest tribe or street-corner gang to the most elaborate formal organization. The effectiveness of these rules depends first on their internalization—their inner acceptance by the group members—and second on the apparently universal tendency of the group members to enforce the rules on each other spontaneously, via various forms of coercion. I have elsewhere called this form of regulation “social control.”<sup>3</sup>

In the second form of nondeliberate regulation, which can be called “automatic government,” the regulation occurs as an unplanned aggregate result of the unilateral decisions of the actors. Classical economic theory envisions such a process. Each actor acts from personal motives (e.g., economic self-interest) without thought of the relation of the action to the overall pattern of the interaction. Given certain kinds of motives (e.g., a prudent desire to maximise profit) and a certain setting (e.g., a free market) the net resultant will be the regulation of economic interaction by certain “laws” (e.g., which set prices, allocate production and distribution, etc.).<sup>4</sup>

Many anarchists have been uneasy about any kind of deliberate government, and sought to rely as much as possible on some variation of the two nondeliberate forms. Almost without exception, however, they are forced to recognize that deliberate government cannot altogether be dispensed with. Even the most close-knit system of social control, as a small traditionally oriented tribe, where all social behavior is regulated by an elaborate normative system, finds itself faced from time to time with the need for deliberate governmental decisions, and, as I shall argue later, automatic government can exist only, if at all, within a framework of deliberate government.

### C. Anarchy and the State of Nature

Nozick has used “anarchy” as synonymous with the “state of nature,” as the idea was understood by a number of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century thinkers, especially Locke.<sup>5</sup> Locke defines the state of nature as “Men living together, according to reason, without a common superior on earth with authority to judge between them.”<sup>6</sup> It is true that a good deal of government occurs in Locke’s state of nature. The law of nature “governs” human behavior, not in a deliberate way, but through the force with which it operates within the minds of people. From the “self-evidence” of this law of nature, its divine origin, its universal acceptance, and the general willingness to enforce it spontaneously, a sociologist would likely conclude that Locke’s law of nature is a set of social norms. Operating through its acceptance, this normative system (or *jus gentium*) governs the state of nature, but, Locke feels, not very well. It needs to be reinforced by deliberate government.

There are two stages in Locke's theory of the establishment of such a government. First the members of society agree unanimously to form an association which has the authority to execute the law of nature. Second this association, by majority vote, establishes a system of government.<sup>7</sup> In these terms, anarchy lies, not in the state of nature, but precisely between these two stages.

An anarchic society is a group of people who have, by unanimous agreement, formed together into an authoritative body, but who have not established and do not intend to establish any "common superior on earth to judge between them." Instead, all governmental action must, like the original formative decision, be the outcome of the unanimous agreement of the undifferentiated whole.

#### D. A Definition of Government

In political theory, the term "government" usually refers to the deliberate kind, and that sense will henceforward be used here, unless otherwise qualified. A strict definition of "government" can be obtained by generalising the following special case: Let A and B be two actors, each with two options,  $a_1$  and  $a_2$ , and  $b_1$  and  $b_2$ , respectively. This generates a field of interaction containing four possible states:  $a_1b_1$ ,  $a_1b_2$ ,  $a_2b_1$ , and  $a_2b_2$ . If the interaction is ungoverned, the interaction occurs in one stage. A and B each choose unilaterally one of their options, and the result is one of the four possible interactions. If the interaction is governed, however, it occurs in two stages, and involves two levels of choice. First, someone chooses not an option but a state of the field (an option pair), thus prescribing an option for each actor. For example, someone chooses  $a_1b_2$ :  $a_1$  for A and  $b_2$  for B. This someone can be A, or B, or A and B jointly (by agreement), or a third party, C. Second, after this governmental decision A and B individually (unilaterally) choose the option prescribed by the governmental decision. If they do not so choose, the government is not "effective" (does not occur).

#### E. A Definition of "Anarchy"

In terms of the formulation above, anarchy can be defined by two characteristics: first, the governmental decision is the product of a

unanimous joint agreement among all the governed; second, the choice of the governed, whether to comply or not to comply with this governmental decision, is not compelled or even influenced by any political authority. The meaning of the second proviso, and its relation to the first, will emerge in the course of the discussion.

Anarchy thus takes its place alongside the traditional three forms of government: monarchy, aristocracy (or oligarchy), and democracy. If the nondeliberate forms are included, we have a sixfold typology of government, as follows:

	<i>Form of government</i>	<i>Who governs</i>
nondeliberate	Automatic Government	nobody <sup>8</sup>
	Social Control	social norms <sup>9</sup>
deliberate	Monarchy	one
	Aristocracy	a few
	Democracy	a majority
	Anarchy	everyone

In practice, anarchic government is by no means unknown. Many small informal groups make decisions via a rule of unanimity, and at the other extreme an alliance between two states fulfills the definition exactly, for the signatory parties unanimously decide how their relations are to be regulated, and then proceed individually and without compulsion from any common political authority to put (or not to put) the provisions of the treaty into effect. (This assumes that international law is not backed by any political authority.)

Anarchy is nevertheless a very difficult form to make work, especially if the regulation involved is at all extensive. Decisions are extremely hard to arrive at, and compliance is uncertain, precisely because of its two defining features. Where anarchy is most effective, in small informal groups (e.g., communes), is where it is most likely to be transmuted into less than unanimous and politically authoritative government. The question arises: What principles could possibly justify an attempt to adopt such a difficult, ineffective, and unstable form of government?

### III. PHILOSOPHICAL

#### A. Anarchy and Libertarianism

Anarchism has been interpreted by some as a particularly pure and uncompromising expression of the ideal of “subjective freedom,” to use Hegel’s term. This ideal, most closely associated with classical liberalism and utilitarianism, holds that freedom consists of lack of restraint, or the ability to do what we want. The belief that subjective freedom is the highest social and political value can be termed “libertarianism.” An examination of the issue, however, will reveal that anarchism is not the logical or natural outcome of libertarianism.

The case that libertarianism leads to anarchism was made with great clarity by Hegel, and I will begin by summarizing his argument.<sup>10</sup>

Subjective freedom is lack of effective restraint or prohibition against whatever the individual wishes to do. “From this principle follows as a matter of course that no law is valid except by agreement of all.” But in practice it is impossible to apply the principle of unanimity. Even in the unlikely event that everyone could agree to a set of rules, to put them into effect would require an administrative apparatus whose posts were occupied by a special group of people, who directed activity in accordance with these rules. “Thus the distinction between commanding and obeying seems necessary for the very function of the state. . . . Hence one recommends—as a matter of purely external necessity, which is in opposition to the nature of freedom in its abstract aspect—that the constitution should at least be so framed that the citizens have to obey as little as possible and the authorities are allowed to command as little as possible.”

On this interpretation, anarchism is the radical left of classical liberalism. What is best is the principle of unanimity and the absence of any state apparatus which possesses political authority. But in practice this is impossible. Hence one advocates liberal republicanism: a government of the most limited possible powers and functions. The anarchists are those who share these principles



but refuse to make any compromise, and who argue that given the proper conditions it is possible to establish a sufficient and effective government on purely anarchic principles.

Most anarchists, however, have not based their case on the principle of subjective freedom, but on different principles, and I think rightly so. A closer look at the principle of subjective freedom will show its inadequacy as a ground for anarchism.

Let us look at the matter from the standpoint of the doctrine of unanimous consent or agreement. It might be supposed that in consenting to something a person is acting freely (in the subjective sense), but such a supposition ignores the network of coercion in which all human action is embedded. To say that freedom is "doing what we wish" is too abstract to have any clear meaning. If most people could do as they wished, they would be immortal, be able to move instantly from one place to another, to become invisible at will, and so on—that is, they would immediately divest themselves of and transcend their human and mortal condition. But in practice those restrictions imposed by nature which are beyond one's control must perforce be accepted as given, and choice restricted to the alternatives actually open within this framework of necessity.

This point also holds true for the imperatives of the social environment, which presents us with a structure of opportunities and limitations (restrictions) only within which are we free to act as we wish. Hence a stipulation that governmental decisions must be unanimous would not at all guarantee "freedom from restraint" to the parties involved in the governmental process, even in the complete absence of any coercive state apparatus.

This point, that the principle of unanimity need not promote subjective freedom, is evident at a glance in international relations, for example. As I have pointed out, an alliance is an anarchic form of government. Yet a strong nation can use force or threat of force to compel a weak one to sign and respect an agreement with which it is very unhappy. The unanimity has been produced by coercion.

The doctrine of consent thus has at best limited bearing on the question of subjective freedom. This is Hobbes's point when he is discussing the difference between government by institution (established by the consent of all) and government by conquest (established by force of arms). It might seem that the first is the freer form of government. Not so, says Hobbes. The "free" consent of all the

citizens in establishing their own government, and the “coerced” consent produced by the point of the sword when a conqueror sets up a government, are at bottom the same. Both rest on fear, the difference being that in the first case it is fear of each other, and in the second fear of the conqueror that drives a people into obedience.<sup>11</sup>

Hegel is thus in error when he sees anarchism as the most logical (but an impractical) expression of the libertarian ideology, for Hobbes’s solution is equally logical. Hobbes’s point is that people have more to fear from each other in the absence of government than they have to fear from their rulers in the presence of government. They are freer with compulsory government than without it, and the firmer the rule the freer they are.

The consent wrung by the many from the few under anarchy may be just as unfree as the consent wrung from the many by the sword of the state. The point that “compulsory” government need not restrict subjective freedom any more than “voluntary” government, holds even if we confine ourselves to the question of violent coercion, for the subjects of Hobbes’s sovereign have nothing to fear from him on this score as long as they do what he says. Hence it makes no sense to oppose compulsory government *per se* simply on the basis of the principle of subjective freedom.

Faced with these considerations, the principle of subjective freedom assumes its most logical and coherent form when it adopts the idea of a government which is compulsory but limited, capable of acting strongly, but only within a circumscribed area, thus minimizing both the restraints which people can exercise on each other, and the restraints which government can exercise on them all. This in fact was the conclusion drawn by modern liberalism. Within this tradition we can distinguish political liberalism, which primarily fears the restrictions on freedom imposed by government and hence seeks to limit it, and social liberalism, which primarily fears limitations on freedom imposed by people on each other and seeks to use government to prevent this.

Anarchists have differed in their attitudes toward the various forms of restrictions on subjective freedom. Some have opposed any form of violence, while others have glorified it. None has been so utopian as to seek to eliminate all forms of coercion from human relations. What is anathema to all is not compulsion itself, but any

form of compulsion which proceeds from a position of supremacy—from a superior to a subordinate. In fact, the relation of superior to subordinate is opposed just as vehemently if no compulsion whatsoever is involved. Among the various kinds of government only anarchism does not involve the imposition of the will of the higher on the will of the lower. It is the passion for equality, not freedom, that lies behind the anarchistic temper of mind.

### B. Anarchism and Individualism

While the idea of freedom as the absence of restraint or possibility of doing what one wishes turns out not to be central to anarchism, there is another sense of the term whose bearing merits examination: freedom as individuality. Pending the analysis in the next section, I will here follow Kant and others in holding that the core of individualism is the moral autonomy of the individual. What is at issue is not the freedom from external restraints, but rather freedom to act as a responsible individual, on the basis of one's own standards. The central value of individualism, on this account, is the primacy of the private will of the individual. As with the case of libertarianism, I will first make the case that individualism leads logically to anarchism,<sup>12</sup> and then show why this view is in error.

As Max Weber put it, successful government by the state typically rests on a combination of external and internal means. The external means include various forms of coercion and also various services and benefits—that is, both sticks and carrots—which combine to induce compliance. The internal means is the sense of legitimacy: the belief on the part of the governed that what the state commands is rightful and hence should be obeyed. Among these legitimate rights, at least for the modern state, is the exclusive right to use force within its territory.<sup>13</sup> While the libertarian focuses on the external instrumentalities of state authority, the individualist is concerned with the internal instrumentalities.

To say that the command of the state is legitimate is to say that this command takes recognized precedence over the private will of the subject. The citizens believe that a command to do A ought to be obeyed, even if they wanted to do B, or had thought that B was right. Once the command has been issued, then A is right and B is not. It is the will of the state that determines whether A or B is right.

A legitimate command automatically takes precedence over the private will of the individual. For the individualist, to accept such a command is to violate the integrity and autonomy of the self. It is individualism, not libertarianism, which I think is mainly behind the intense, even passionate, distaste that the liberal temper of mind has always felt toward government authority.

It is not coercion itself, or even the coercive power of the state that is at issue, but rather the claim of the state to supersede the will of the individual in the individual's own mind. Unpleasant though it may, it is no disgrace to bow to superior power, whether of the state, another member of society, or simply the nexus of circumstance in which everyone is imbedded. What is ignoble and demeaning is to submit freely without external compulsion to a will and a judgment other than one's own. "Better to reign in Hell than serve in Heaven," asserts Milton's Satan, thereby defining himself as a true modern, and an authentic individual. While mortals cannot reign in hell, they can still maintain their integrity, and say, with Max Stirner, "Every moment the fetters of reality cut the sharpest welts in my flesh, but *my own* I remain."<sup>14</sup>

Civil disobedience is individualistic in meaning. Instead of complying voluntarily and hence acquiescing, one disobeys, which forces the state to bring its coercive apparatus into play. Faced with the bald threat or exercise of force, the individual can then comply without loss of integrity.

It is the value of individualism that explains the preoccupation of classical liberal thought with the ideas of consent and contract, and why the attacks on these ideas, successful as they may be, always seem to throw the baby out with the bathwater. Thus Hume's argument that it is not consent or contract, but whether or not political authority is useful to the individual that matters, logical though it is (as always with Hume), misses the point: useful according to whose judgment?<sup>15</sup> Individuality, as defined so far, consists in forming judgments about what is useful, or right, or moral, or expedient, or "my own," and then acting according to these judgments. Obedience cannot be justified (and hence rightly enforced) by establishing an "objective" standard of utility, to which the state can be shown to conform. Even God in heaven, according to Milton, does not enforce obedience to His law, because such obedience would be worthless. From the religious point of

view, God's will is done when the individual denies his or her own will and accepts God's. The true individualist, like Satan, cannot accept even God's will this way, much less that of the state.

Thus the real problem posed to political theory by modern individualism is not "freedom versus order," but whether the individual can accept political authority without violating his or her integrity and autonomy, and, if so, how and under what circumstances. It is instructive to examine two answers proposed to this question, by Hobbes and Rousseau.

For Hobbes, sovereign power is never "legitimate" in the sense used here, for he did not admit of any moral or ethical principle not reducible to utility or interest. The subjects obey only when they think it to be to their interest to do so, not from a sense of duty that is independent of considerations of interest. Hence the private will always takes precedence. People should consent and obey only when it is to their rational interest to do so. It is almost always to their interest to obey an effectively enforced political power, and if none exists they should set one up by mutual agreement, but, for example, they may rightly (rationally) resist the sovereign when their lives are at stake.<sup>16</sup>

To put the matter another way, radical individualism can find nothing inherently wrong with an absolute state ruled by purely external means (coercion and utility), as long as the citizen is presented with the *choice* between obedience and punishment. It must, however, object when the state punishes people not for what they do but for what they are, as with Nazi Germany. As long as the coercive power of the state is a threat that the individual can avoid by obedience, radical individualism has no grounds to object to the most absolute form of government, as long as such a government does not claim legitimacy. Hence individualism does not necessarily lead to anarchism.

A second attempted reconciliation of compulsory governmental power with the values of radical individualism is that of Rousseau. His solution appears to be straightforward and logical. If everyone wills the same thing, then authority is reconciled with individualism. If what rules is a truly general will, then its acceptance does not give precedence to anything over and above one's own will. With the establishment of such a general will, power and coercion disappear, for where there is no conflict there is no power, and coercion is not needed to compel what one has already willed.

Among political thinkers of the very first rank, Rousseau comes closest to anarchism, and his influence on anarchist thinkers, for example Proudhon, was very great. He passes the first test in favoring a rule of unanimity, at least in a sense, but fails the second in holding, somewhat regretfully it is true, that the general will should be executed and enforced by political authority.

Hobbes and Rousseau illustrate two ways in which radical individualism and effective government can be reconciled. The first is to establish a nonlegitimate government, whose effectiveness rests entirely on the external compulsions of force and utility, without using the integrity-violating inner compulsions of legitimacy. The second is to establish a rule of unanimity.

While both solutions are perfectly logical, they fail in practice. Taking Hobbes first, effective government almost always requires its acceptance as legitimate (in the sense used here) by at least a significant part of society, including especially those who do the enforcing. This holds even for the "rule by force" of a single individual. It is always a police or army which wields this force, and this armed group in turn must be bound to their leader by strong ties of loyalty over and above the external advantages of their position. The tyrant whose minions do not regard his rule as legitimate (as well as useful) will not stay in power for long.

Turning to Rousseau, the formation of a general will does not harmonize the particular wills of the members of society; it destroys them. Rousseau understood this perfectly. In joining the unanimity of the social contract, the individual merges his or her self into a cohesive social collectivity, in which total legitimacy now rests, and leaves entirely behind the private self, the private will, and its private rights. Any remnants of this private world, Rousseau felt, might legitimately be crushed. I will return to this question later.

In sum, the attempt to justify an effective government on the grounds of individualism (as defined so far) poses a dilemma, nicely pointed by Hobbes and Rousseau, which anarchism cannot resolve, and from which there is in fact no escape. Individualism is caught between the absolutism of Hobbes and the collectivism of Rousseau.

Individualism, defined as the precedence of the private will, assumed its most adequate political and social expression in Max Stirner's *The Ego and His Own*, first published in 1845.<sup>17</sup> The unique force of Stirner's work springs from his uncompromising acceptance of two facts that most individualists have had difficulty swallowing:

first that effective government requires internalized social controls, and second that true individualists (as defined) cannot achieve more than fleeting and partial unanimity.

Stirner has a clear grasp of the internalized controls on which much of the political power of the modern state rests. "Every Prussian," he said, "carries his gendarme in his breast."<sup>18</sup> "The master is a thing made by the servant. If submissiveness ceased, it would be all over with lordship."<sup>19</sup> The authority of the state is internalized and experienced by the citizen as a sense of duty. It is not only the motive of obedience to political authority, but the whole complex of morality, piety, civility, and self-restraint instilled by society within the individual as a conscience which forms the basis both of political power and of organized society itself. Hence the assertion of one's individuality pits one not only against the state but also against society and therefore against all rules of morality and civility, including those prohibiting murder and incest.<sup>20</sup> Anything that suits one's individuality should be done, provided only that it is possible to get away with it. The individualist opposes all established authority, not by revolution, for a revolution requires a movement and the subservience of the individual will to this movement, but by rebellion and evasion, legal and illegal. "A self possessive man cannot desist from being a criminal, for crime is his life."<sup>21</sup>

If everyone were an individualist, not only government but also society as we know it would not exist. The only organizing elements would be loose and shifting alliances and coalitions, based on mutual advantage, and existing only while all parties thought them to their interest, which, Stirner felt, would not usually be long. For the most part there would be unremitting conflict and struggle for supremacy.<sup>22</sup>

Stirner's society, a loose grouping of such "association(s) of egoists" strongly resembles Hobbes's state of nature, even to the use of the phrase, "the war of all against all," and indeed this is what Hobbes's theory leaves us with if we accept his individualistic premises but deny the possibility that stable government can be based on force and fear alone.

Although Stirner is usually considered to be an anarchist, the appellation has been challenged, and I think rightly so, for his views differ profoundly from those of any reasonable list of "major

anarchist thinkers.” R. W. K. Patterson has argued that Stirner is not an anarchist but a nihilist, and this seems to me a very appropriate term.<sup>23</sup> In Stirner’s own words, “I have founded what is my own on nothing.”<sup>24</sup>

Stirner wished to do away with all social ties and allegiances, all identifications with persons or groups outside the self, in order to unearth the true inner private self. When this is done, however—when we have peeled off all the layers of the self that derive from its participation in society—we will find at the center: nothing at all. To deny one’s social nature is thus nihilistic in the most literal sense: it does away not only with society but with the individual as well, of whom nothing is left but the abstract possibility of becoming a human—that is to say a social—being.

The case of Stirner reveals the inadequacy of treating the private will as something external to society. Such a view not only leads to the rejection of all social and political authority, it destroys individuality itself. It is necessary to redefine individualism and reexamine its bearing to authority before the relation of the two to anarchism can be understood.

#### IV. PSYCHOLOGICAL

We are here following the usual definition of authority as legitimate power: regulation whose effectiveness rests at least partly on its acceptance as rightful. Such acceptance of regulation as morally binding logically presupposes that the psyche is divided into two parts: that which binds and that which is bound. There is the part of the mind that accepts the authority and applies it on and even against the rest of the mind—the feelings, desires, interests, and so on, which would govern behavior in the absence of the authoritative principle, and which still may prevail despite the presence of that principle within the mind. This necessity of assuming that the psyche is structurally and dynamically differentiated was already evident to Plato, and forms the starting point of his psychological analysis.<sup>25</sup>

The argument cannot proceed without using a psychological theory, and the one employed here will be the Freudian—in my view, the most adequate. In Freudian terms the two selves involved in the operation of authority are ego and superego. Authority



operates through the regulation of behavior by superego values which arise via identification with an external authority figure.

However, it will not do to regard the superego as social and the ego as private, as many have done. The ego itself is formed in a process to which social relations are integral. For example, the idea of the self as male or female resides in the ego. What it means to the self to be masculine or feminine arises out of a complex set of identifications, and the cultural influence on this conception of self is evident from the fact that masculinity and femininity mean different things in different societies.

There are two phases or aspects of identification, projection and introjection.<sup>26</sup> In projection the other person is seen as an extension or externalization of the self. In introjection the other person—or more accurately the image of the other person—is incorporated as part of the self. These two phases explain the duality which is the essence of authority. On the one hand, via projection, the will of another person is taken as authoritative: one submits to the will of another. On the other hand, via introjection, the values and standards of the authority figure are incorporated within the self. The submission is only to one's own will, one's own standards of right and wrong. This duality solves Rousseau's problem: how to submit to the will of another, yet remain as free as before.

Authority falls into two broad types, depending on the dominant underlying identification. First there is authority as a hierarchical principle—the command of a superior to a subordinate. It is precisely this position of superiority which renders the command binding. The prototypical case is the authority of parent over child, and all other instances are displacements from the underlying identification of son or daughter with mother or father; hence I will use the term “parental authority.”

Secondly, there is authority that proceeds laterally, from a group of peers. Here what is authoritative is the standards of the group as a collective whole. The group does not define the standards; rather the standards define the group. Sociologically, we are dealing here with the authority of social norms, as they are transmitted by tradition or arise spontaneously out of group interaction. The relationship is one of equality; the norms apply equally to each, are accepted by each, and enforced by each on all. The underlying

psychological formation is the mutual identifications among siblings—brothers and sisters with a common identity and a common code. Hence the term “peer authority.”

Actual authority is regularly an admixture of these two types. The utility of the distinction will become clear in later sections of this essay. For the time being they will be lumped together as “authority.”

In psychological terms, individualism arises as a further stage in the development of authority (whether parental or peer). After the authority identifications have formed, the projective aspect is broken off, at least consciously, and the superego code becomes detached from its original link with the external authority figure, which still remains within the psyche, but only in its internalized, introjective aspect. Here we have “moral autonomy”: the force of a superego code which is autonomous with respect to existing parental and peer authority, and asserts itself independently of them. This moral autonomy, and its claim to be respected, are the defining characteristics of individualism. What seeks primacy is not a private will as against a social will, but what might be called a “personal will,” born of the will of another or others, but with the umbilical cord of projective identification cut.

Individualism thus has a dual relationship to authority. On the one hand it is the product of authority and cannot come into being without it. On the other hand, it asserts itself against this authority and denies the legitimacy of its governance. If individualism were carried through to the denial of all authority of one person over another, then the only legitimate form of government would be an individualistic anarchy: a rule of unanimity based, not on conformity, but on a harmonious agreement among personal wills. But this is impossible. Individualism first derives from then reacts against existing authority. If there were no such authority, individualism could not come into being. To carry individualism to the point of denying all authority is self-defeating.

The principle of individuality emerges from these considerations as a moral precept that does not stand against authority itself, but instead states what authority ought to be like, namely that it should define and protect an area of autonomy within which behavior is not authoritatively regulated. It stands for the self-limitation, not

the abolition, of authority. Its inherent tendency is thus not anarchic but liberal. I will support this point further in the next section.

### V. SOCIOLOGICAL

In the main, anarchistic thought has been collectivistic in its thrust. This is appropriate, for while anarchism cannot successfully be maintained on individualistic grounds, it fits in well with a collectivistic orientation. In his survey of anarchistic thought, Woodstock regretfully admits that there is, in Orwell's words, a

totalitarian tendency . . . implicit in the anarchist or pacifist vision of society. In a society where there is no law, and in theory no compulsion, the only arbiter of behavior is public opinion. But public opinion, because of the tremendous urge to conformity in gregarious animals, is less tolerant than any system of law. When human beings are governed by "thou shalt not," the individual can practice a certain amount of eccentricity; when they are supposedly governed by "love" and "reason," he is under continuous pressure to make him behave and think exactly the same way as everyone else does.<sup>27</sup>

Thus Godwin, whose anarchism is usually thought to be individualistic, advocates a community in which,

opinion would be all sufficient; the inspection of every man over the conduct of his neighbors, when unstained by caprice, would constitute a censorship of the most irresistible nature. But the force of this censorship would depend upon its freedom, not following the positive dictates of law, but the spontaneous decisions of the understanding.<sup>28</sup>

Proudhon, also usually placed in the individualistic wing, thought that in an anarchic society everyone should engage in productive labor. If anyone refuses, he says, "We owe it to ourselves to give him nothing, but, since he must live, to put him under supervision and compel him to labor." His point (and Godwin's) is that the "we" exercising supervision and compulsion should be the

community as an undifferentiated whole, not any specially constituted authority.<sup>29</sup>

The underlying collectivism of most of the individualistic wing of anarchism puts them much closer to the communalists, such as Tolstoy, Kropotkin, and Bakunin, than is usually thought. Only some of the American anarchists, such as Josiah Warren and Benjamin Tucker, seem to me truly individualistic in orientation. Nozick has been influenced by this tradition, but argues, as I do here on different grounds, that if individualism is thought through it arrives not at anarchy but at limited political authority.

In this section I will inquire into the nature of collectivism and how it fits into anarchism. Just as in the previous section it was necessary to understand the psychological meaning of individualism before its relation to anarchism could be found, so here the relation of anarchism to collectivism will emerge only after a sociological analysis of the latter term has been undertaken.

#### A. Social and Political Authority

On the sociological level one can distinguish two polar types of authority which have as their psychological basis the two types distinguished in the previous section. I will call these "social authority," which has peer authority as its psychological content, and "political authority," which has parental authority as its psychological content. By this I do not mean that social and political authority are simply peer and parental authority writ large. Such a reductionism seems to me untenable. Rather, social action always has a psychological meaning or content for the actors, and the psychological content of social and political authority are peer and parental authority, respectively.

By "social authority" I mean something very close to what Durkheim called the "collective conscience (consciousness)": the authority of a social group as a collective whole over its members. The most important part of the collective conscience is the system of social norms, which authoritatively regulates the behavior of the group members.

By "political authority" I mean exactly what Max Weber defined as "*legitime Herrschaft*." This term has had various translations in English, none of them wholly satisfactory. The term "authority" is

often used and serves to convey the duality which I have already mentioned, of compulsion and inner acceptance. Authority relations, however, can pertain among equals (as with social authority), and Weber insisted that *legitime Herrschaft* was always a hierarchical relation—a relation between ruler and ruled. The ensuing discussion will I hope justify my translation of Weber's term as "political authority." I thus follow Weber in understanding political authority to be authority possessed by particular persons or institutions to govern group activity, that is, as governmental authority possessed by a government.

### B. Authoritarianism and Collectivism

We are dealing here with polar types. In practice, actual systems of authority typically combine political and social authority. For example, Weber defined traditional authority in terms of two principles: the inviolability of traditional norms, which comprehensively dictate all social behavior (here we see social authority quietly entering Weber's theory, without any explicit treatment), and the absolute authority of the patriarchal ruler.<sup>30</sup> Theoretically the two principles stand opposed to each other, for if tradition dictates all behavior, then the area of discretion possessed by the ruler will vanish, while the unlimited discretion of the ruler must overthrow the traditional norms, but the latent contradiction usually does not emerge clearly in tribal organization. There the "absolute" discretion of the ruler is typically exercised only within boundaries defined by the traditional tribal law. He is supposed to uphold and enforce this law, and if he fails to do so or, worse, acts in violation of it, his authority will be undermined. Thus his political authority upholds the social authority of the law and the social authority of the law upholds his political authority. A similar integration is supposed to hold between social and political authority in the case of modern legal authority, where the acts of the political authorities must be pursuant to law, and the positive law is thought to rest on a broad normative consensus in society.

Psychologically speaking, such a relatively harmonious integration and mutual support between social and political authority rests on an integration of the two sets of identifications, parental and peer, within the superego. Within the mind, parents and children

are reconciled. On the one hand, the authority system is the externalization (projective aspect) of a relatively integrated set of such identifications. On the other hand, the superego code is the internalization (introjective aspect) of a system which integrates social and political authority.

The two types of authority may however come into conflict. To continue Weber's account, when traditional authority is vested in large-scale systems of imperial domination, there is a tendency to pull in one of two directions, either toward feudalism, where the traditional practices hedge the ruler in and deprive him of his power, or sultanism, where the ruler breaks through and destroys the fabric of tradition, and rules in a wholly unrestrained way.<sup>31</sup> In the same way, modern legal authority tends to move either toward legal formalism, which handcuffs the political authorities, or toward Caesarism: a dictatorial rule which conceals itself behind the facade of a legal system whose real substance has been destroyed.

In sum, social and political authority may be regarded as polar types which are sometimes approached in practice, but which usually exist together, partly integrated and partly in conflict with each other. I will call systems where authority approaches the political pole "authoritarian," and those which approach the social pole "collectivistic." Sultanism, Caesarism, Fascism, and Leninism are all authoritarian. Relatively pure types of collectivism are harder to find. Where such communities crop up, they are uniformly anarchic in character.

### C. Individualism, Collectivism, and Anarchism

We are at last in a position to state some of the major conclusions of this essay concerning the nature and interrelations of anarchism, collectivism, and individualism.

To reject all social and political authority is not anarchism or individualism; it is nihilism. The case of Stirner shows this clearly.

Individualism asserts that there ought to be an area of privacy where the individual is not regulated by social or political authority. This area itself must be defined and protected by social and especially political authority. Individualism stands for limited social and political authority, and its most appropriate ideology is therefore liberalism.

Modern (capitalistic) private property is an illustration. In capitalistic societies people (or at least the dominant classes) feel strongly that the use of one's property (especially one's capital) should not be interfered with or regulated by one's neighbors or one's government.

Now what is the basis of this individualistic right? Suppose that it has no existence in social or political authority, and is no more than a moral right, universally recognized as self-evident, or the dictate of reason. A number of arguments can be raised that this recognition would be an insufficient basis to define and support modern private property.

Psychologically, the situation cannot arise, as argued above. At the very least, the children in such a society would be no respecters of private property, since their parents would not have authoritatively advanced and enforced such rights.

Sociologically, a moral consensus always rests on and reflects the system of social norms. Even if such social norms did not exist, they would soon grow out of such a consensus. Therefore, if we say private property as a moral right we must also say private property as defined and defended by social authority. As we will see shortly, however, a system in which political authority is denied, and in which private property has a purely social basis, must by its own logic move away from individualism and private property, and toward collectivism and communal property.

Philosophically, if private property rests on moral principles, then these principles will also dictate the ways in which private property should and should not be used. Instead of being an area of free discretion, private property becomes hemmed in by the very principle which creates it. This point emerges with great clarity, for example, from an examination of the chapter on property in Locke's *Second Treatise*. Locke starts with private property as a natural (moral) right, but cannot get from there to capitalist private property. For example, he cannot justify accumulation of more property than one can personally use, or the right of inheritance, on the basis of natural law—two points which strike at the heart of capitalist accumulation. Hence Locke switches, and introduces modern private property as a convention: that is, as a positive, not a natural, right.

Modern private property is inherently a legal idea. It presupposes

a state apparatus: a juridical system which creates, defines, and protects private property. If modern private property is not positive, it is nothing.

It is this issue more than any other which separates libertarians from anarchists. Libertarians believe strongly in modern private property and hence, if they think straight, favor a strong though limited political authority, to establish and maintain private property, as well as other individualistic principles such as the sanctity of contract and a free market. Anarchists wish to sweep away the state apparatus and, as we shall see, all positive law. They recognize that in so doing they will also sweep away private property.<sup>32</sup>

#### D. The Social System of Anarchy

The core of anarchism is the rejection of all political authority whatsoever. A thoroughgoing application of this principle will lead to all of its other main features. This process leads not to individualism but to collectivism. Of course we are dealing here with a polar type, which both theory and experience indicate is impossible of achievement in practice, at least for long. The point remains that a serious attempt to eliminate all political authority must lead in the following directions:

1. *The principle of unanimity:* In the face of the need for effective governmental decisions if viable social organization is to be maintained, the elimination of political authority requires the adoption of the principle of unanimity. For suppose that all save one favor a given measure. To adopt this measure as binding is to place this dissenter in a position of subordination to the rest, and political authority has been introduced. Hence the group must make governmental decisions by meeting and discussing until unanimity has been reached. Furthermore, no special persons can be appointed to administer or enforce governmental decisions, for to do so would also be to violate the principle of equality. True, such a person could be regarded as the agent of the unanimity, acting for it, but by the same token so should everyone else. To single out any person or persons other than the whole group to perform this task is to introduce political authority. These provisos—unanimity of decision and lack of any governmental structure—obviously place



extraordinary constraints on the governmental process. We can imagine such a system only in a very special kind of community.

2. *The community must be very small in size.* As the size of the group increases, unanimity becomes harder and harder to reach, and the need for a specialized governmental apparatus simply to carry out the process of reaching a decision grows. One hundred members would seem to be near or even more than the maximum feasible number.

3. *Technology must be simple.* Technological advancement, especially in the process of production, requires a complex coordination of behavior which can be achieved only by a specialized governmental apparatus, as in a factory.

4. *The division of labor must be minimized.* The division of labor produces social stratification, and social strata are always ranked into higher and lower, superior and subordinate.

5. *Social cohesion must be high.* The lack of political authority and the principle of unanimity require a strongly imbedded and pervasive set of social norms, producing a high degree of uniformity and desire to conform.

5. *Individualism must be low.* It is important to note that individualism, as defined here, is not the opposite of social cohesion. It is not anomic; on the contrary, it is defined, expressed by, and imbedded in, a system of authority. However, the authority takes a special form, defining a right of individual choice within a certain area.

Within this area we must expect diversity. Genuine autonomy does not produce uniformity, for example, by unanimous adherence to a philosophical doctrine. Rather we must expect several philosophical doctrines, each with its own adherents. Uniformity can only be the product of authoritarian prescription, or, failing that, it will *become* authoritatively prescribed. Uniformity is both the product and the producer of social authority. A group of individualists will have views which are both diverse and strongly held. The wider the degree of latitude the more difficult will be the achievement of unanimity.

In sum, an anarchic community must tend toward smallness, lack of differentiation, uniformity, conformism, and social solidarity. Its collectivism will embody in a pure form what Durkheim has called "mechanical solidarity." Some of the anarchic counterculture communes closely approach such a polar type of antiauthoritarian collectivism.

### E. The Psychology of Anarchism

These sociological considerations put us in a position to understand the psychology of anarchism. At the psychological level, anarchism represents a revolt against, and rejection of, parental authority. This rejection is not that of the individualist, whose inner identifications with the parents, in an autonomous superego, form the basis of the (partial) rejection of external authority. The individualist frees himself or herself from the authority of the parents by becoming like them: that is, by growing up.

Above all, the anarchist does not want to be like his or her parents. The revolt against parental authority is expressed through peer solidarity: peer identifications which form the basis of a lateral peer authority which opposes the vertical parental authority. The psychological prototype of the anarchic community is an adolescent gang: equalitarian, leaderless (temporarily), rebellious, with its own fierce conformist code which it asserts on its members and against its elders.

## VI. POLITICAL

Anarchy is a form of government that springs from a basic hostility toward political authority. This leads anarchism to attempt to negate the whole realm of the political: the state apparatus, positive law, political power, and the political process. This conclusion emerges if we think through what is involved in attempting to establish a government based on the rule of unanimity and the absence of political authority.

Imagine the process of making governmental decisions as it will operate in the ideal-typical anarchic community described in the previous section. These decisions must emerge as a unanimous consensus in a discussion in which all group members participate. These meetings cannot occur as a result of anyone's direction, for that person would then have political authority. They must occur spontaneously, or in conformity to an informal custom, or (less likely) according to a general rule itself the product of a unanimous decision.

Decisions are reached via the formation of group consensus. When the community meets and starts discussing a problem, we

may perhaps find a wide divergence of views, beginning with differences as to what the problem actually under discussion is. We should expect the deliberations to be lengthy even over minor matters, while important decisions might take months or even years. Gradually the differences between the divergent views will lessen, and a consensus or "sense of the group" will begin to emerge. The remaining dissenting individuals now find themselves opposed not by a diversity of individual views, but by the will of the community as a collective whole. At this point the psychological and social pressures toward conformity acting both on and within the dissenters generally become irresistible, and unanimity is achieved with relative speed.

This idea of a group consensus as something over and above the sum of similar or identical views held by a set of discrete individuals, which has been formulated as "the general will" by Rousseau, and "the group mind" by Durkheim and Freud, has often been attacked as vague and metaphysical, philosophically and empirically untenable, but such a consensus is readily observable and its unique force easily felt by anyone who has participated in lengthy and informally structured group discussions around some question or problem.

The key to the process is the formation of this consensus. Once it appears, dissenting individuals, even if they form a relatively large minority, will quickly fall into line. When carried through successfully, this process has the effect of strongly reinforcing group unity and cohesion. The more bitter and heated the debate, the more aggression is discharged, and the more solid the final unity.

The process can fail in two ways. First the consensus may not emerge. In that case, no action can be taken, and the effect will be further to weaken group cohesion, which presumably has already become undermined. More commonly, failure will occur when consensus forms around more than one point of focus: that is, the group becomes split into two or more subgroups, each with its *own* consensus. In that event the governmental process has a divisive, not a unifying, effect. It serves to bring out and focus an underlying split which probably was already nascent. The community often then splits in two, with part of it leaving to form its own community. When the group has grown beyond a certain size, such a fission may be the only way of preserving the anarchic form.

Something close to this ideal-typical account may be observed in some of the present day anarchic communes. Melville has described the process as follows:

No action will be taken on a question until there is general agreement about it. And nearly all the larger communes have some sort of decision-making meeting in order to determine what the consensus is on important questions. Joined together in the first place by some common vision [indispensable, Melville feels, for the successful operation of such communities], most of the groups are able to resolve their problems in meetings and at the same time reinforce feelings of group unity. When this consensus-seeking process doesn't work, it often indicates lack of unity, and a sign that part of the group should leave to form another community.<sup>33</sup>

Rousseau's insight and vocabulary capture the inner nature of anarchic government. The emergent consensus is experienced as a general will—the will of the group as a moral unit and not as an aggregate of private wills. At first all that manifests itself in the consciousness of the participants is the interaction of private wills, expressing themselves, arguing, bargaining, maneuvering. As the consensus emerges, the underlying identifications are activated; the decision is felt to be the product of a collective will, and possesses therefore the same authority as the informal social norms which define the group character and identity.

At its inception this general will need not be unanimous. As Rousseau says, "what generalises the will is not so much the number of voices as the common interest which unites them."<sup>34</sup> Here we have Rousseau's distinction between the general will and the will of all.<sup>35</sup> Ideally, in the deliberative process each member advocates not his or her private will, but what it is thought the general will ought to be. If the consensus which actually emerges differs from this conception, then the individual is faced with a decision. If the general will is accepted as authoritative, then the original conception is abandoned as erroneous. The real general will is accorded precedence. In Rousseau's words,

When a law is proposed in the assembly of the people, what is

asked of them is not exactly whether they approve the proposition or reject it, but whether it is conformable or not to the general will. When, therefore, the opinion opposed to my own prevails, that simply shows that I was mistaken, and that what I considered to be the general will was not so. Had my private opinion prevailed, I should have done something other than I wished.<sup>36</sup>

Once formed, the general will pulls the dissenters into its fold. Those who continue to hold out and dissent are now in opposition, not just to the particular measure, but to the social authority of the group itself. They are outlaws, no longer group members, and may rightfully be deprived of their status, for example, by ostracism, or for Rousseau, even with death. Either way, by sucking divergent wills in or by spitting them out, the general will always produces unanimity.

Ideally the whole process must be without any specialization of role in the making of decisions, their execution, or their enforcement. A governmental enactment differs from the ordinary social norms only in two respects: first it is the product of a deliberate decision, and second it may be a decision in a particular instance, instead of taking the form of a general rule. Even positive law cannot be allowed. At a minimum, positive law requires someone to write it down and make it public—a governmental officer. Anarchic decisions, like the informal social norms in which they nestle, should be written only in the minds of the members of the community.

The governance of anarchy is sharply to be distinguished from that of voluntary associations. Government in voluntary associations is sometimes thought to be nonauthoritative, but, as I have argued at length elsewhere, all stable cooperative group relations require authority.<sup>37</sup> One of the special things about the authority of voluntary associations is its limited nature, both social and political. Thus a voluntary association typically has the political authority to expel members for nonpayment of dues, but not to use force on them (only the state may do that). So also, they typically have the social authority to impose certain standards of behavior among the members, but these standards concern only group interaction, not the life of the individual as a whole.

Voluntary associations always have a governmental apparatus,

and the persons who occupy the posts in this apparatus regularly find their authority to govern, though limited, an amply sufficient base on which to establish *de facto* control over the governmental process and the activity of the group. Being invested with political authority, the governmental apparatus gives rise to political power, which is unequally distributed. The governments of voluntary associations are thus far removed from anarchy.

Suppose, however, that the members of a voluntary association, out of a passion for equality, abolished the whole governmental apparatus and adopted the rule of unanimity. In order to render this viable, a substitute for the discarded political authority would have to be found. As I have argued earlier, this would have to be a strong and pervasive system of social authority. A voluntary association without political authority could survive only if it turned into an anarchy such as I have described.

Since anarchy lacks political authority, it also lacks political power. This is not to say that there would be no power at all, however. There will be differences in influence based on natural factors such as strength or intelligence, and social factors, such as esteem and affection. In addition, insofar as there is a division of labor, the different social roles will present different opportunities and limitations for the exercise of influence. The division of labor produces a division of social authority (rights and duties defined by status) and hence a division and inequality of power. However, compared with the amount and differences in power obtainable through political organization, these differences in power will pale into insignificance, especially because, as we have seen, the division of labor in an anarchy must be rudimentary.

We are now in a position to summarise the political credo of anarchism. Its central feature is radical opposition to the whole realm of the political—the state apparatus, positive law, political authority, political power, and the political process—because politics involves the acceptance of the principle that some people may tell other people what to do. What is anathema is not inequality itself (although anarchism is strongly egalitarian), but the inequality that comes into being when there is an inner acceptance of the right of some people to govern.

Anarchism is not opposed to the state itself, if one understands the state to be a community which possesses the authority to govern,

nor does it oppose the coercive enforcement of governmental decisions. What it does oppose is the state apparatus, in its most fundamental feature of the assignment of aspects of the governmental process (the making, execution, and enforcement of governmental decisions) to specific persons.

The principles of anarchic government are as follows:

1. To the extent possible, government should be minimized.
2. Governmental decisions must be unanimous.
3. Such decisions are authoritative (i.e., they are obligatory and may rightfully be enforced) not because each person has willed it, but because it is the will of the group as a collective whole.
4. There must be absolutely no role differentiation in the governmental process: in the making, execution, or enforcement of governmental decisions.

In short, anarchist political philosophy can be summed up in the phrase, "government without politics."

## VII. CONCLUDING

The assertion made earlier, that anarchism rests on and expresses a psychologically less mature level than liberalism, was not meant as a judgement of the comparative political and social worth of the two ideologies. Just as there have been mature scoundrels and immature saints, so psychological maturity and political and social worth are separate things, despite reams that have been written to the contrary.

In fact, it can be argued that on the social and political level the situation is reversed. The central political and social fact of our time, in my opinion, is the growing oppressiveness of the modern state. This institution is becoming more and more authoritarian, not because it does not possess social authority, but because its social authority is more and more manufactured by its political authority, and does not have any independent, balancing existence. The state is swallowing society up.

Liberals of course are worried about this development. They seek to limit and contain the social and political power of the state in

various ways and to various ends. However, they do not stand in opposition to the modern state itself. Liberalism has always believed in the modern state, as long as it is organized and run in certain ways. Accordingly, liberalism has by now become a conservative and even reactionary ideology. This has been true of political liberals for some time, and is now more and more true of social liberals. Both seek to turn the clock back without changing its nature; so even if they succeed, events will only march on again in the same direction as before.

In the main, political thought in the modern era has taken the modern state for granted. The debate has been over how its authority can be justified, how it should be organized and run, and to what ends. Only anarchism has consistently swum against this tide, opposing the modern state apparatus in all its forms and guises, as they have appeared one by one.<sup>38</sup> As the modern state begins to look worse and worse, anarchism begins to look better and better. If its psychological content is regressive, perhaps this represents what Kris has called "regression in the service of the ego."

Anarchism, however, is not for the individualist. It is inherently collectivistic. Those who have espoused anarchism on individualistic grounds are in error. Their views have not been internally coherent, or have rested on weak psychological or sociological grounds.

Modern individualism has found liberalism to be the most appropriate political expression of its underlying ethical and social views. With the bankruptcy of liberalism, it must look elsewhere. By its nature it must remain committed to authoritative political organization, but it would also do well to look elsewhere than to the modern state to supply such organization. It must ask: Are there alternative forms of political organization which can rest on and express the values of individualism? The fact that no such form seems to have appeared on the horizon may indicate that individualism itself must be rethought and reformulated, instead of being, as it usually is, the unexamined premise from which analysis proceeds.

The characteristic faults of anarchism are its tendencies toward factional squabbling and senseless violence. These tendencies cannot be wholly eliminated, because they spring from the nature of



anarchism, especially its psychological basis, but they can be mitigated.

Actually, the tendency toward factionalism is not too great a handicap. The anarchic group is naturally small, and the constant splintering will keep it that way. The proclivity for violence is more serious, but we should not forget that there has been an important pacifistic strain throughout much of the history of anarchism. One may divide anarchist groups into two camps: those who struggle against the state and seek to sweep it aside, and those who try to ignore it to the extent possible. It is in the former groups that one sometimes finds the stereotyped “wild-eyed zealot brandishing a bomb.”

The politically active anarchist would do well to avoid too romantic or grandiose a posture. By its nature and beliefs, anarchism is incapable of generating and employing any significant political power. As Michels said, “he who says organization says power,” and it is precisely this route which is closed to anarchists. At the most they can arouse and articulate for brief periods of time such opposition to the state as already exists. As long as the modern state is strong, nothing they do can weaken it significantly, and if it should become weak and fall, it will probably do so whether or not the anarchists are pushing. The overinstrumentalism so characteristic of modern politics—the direction of all activity toward the desired goal without any other considerations coming into play—is especially inappropriate for anarchists. They should instead concentrate on doing what they think is intrinsically right, without worrying too much about the political effectiveness or ineffectiveness of such action.

#### NOTES

1. My thanks to Gordon Schochet for his helpful comments on a previous draft.
2. Donald McIntosh, *The Foundations of Human Society* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970) [hereafter abbreviated as *Foundations*]; “Power and Social Control,” *American Political Science Review* 57 (September 1963), 619-31; “Weber and Freud: On the Nature and Sources of Authority,” *American Sociological Review* 35 (October 1970), 901-11.
3. McIntosh, *Foundations*, chs. 7,8. Although I have classified social control as nondeliberate here, in a more extended sense it can be regarded as

deliberate. One way of looking at social norms is to see them as the product of a general will or collective consciousness (Rousseau, Hegel, Durkheim) which is not the resultant of the interaction of many wills but the expression of a will or purpose which pertains to the group as a collective whole. On this view, the general will governs society in a way which is "deliberate" in a more than metaphorical sense. See McIntosh, *Foundations*, ch. 9.

4. This second form of nondeliberate government can also be regarded as deliberate in an extended or special sense. Thus in a famous passage Adam Smith speaks of the regulation of the economy by an "invisible hand." This phrase need not be taken metaphorically, for Smith was a convinced deist, and others since have viewed the laws of free enterprise as divinely ordained.
5. Robert Nozick, *Anarchy, State and Utopia* (New York: Basic Books, 1974).
6. John Locke, *Second Treatise of Civil Government*, par. 19.
7. Locke, chs. 7, 8.
8. Or, "deliberately," an invisible hand.
9. Or, "deliberately," the general will.
10. Hegel, *Reason in History (A General Introduction to the Philosophy of History)* (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1953), pp. 53-58. The quotes below are from pp. 56-58.
11. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ch. 30, pars. 2,3. See ch. 21 for Hobbes's discussion of freedom (liberty) and its relation to political power.
12. Such a case is made in Robert Paul Wolff, *In Defense of Anarchism* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Torch Books, 1970). Space prohibits a treatment of Wolff's book, but I have it in mind in much of the following discussion of the relation of individualism to anarchism. I am in agreement, but on different grounds, with the view of Nozick that individualism logically leads to limited political authority, not anarchism. Nozick, *Anarchy, State and Utopia*.
13. Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," in *From Max Weber*, ed., Gerth and Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 78. I have argued elsewhere that both carrots and sticks are coercive. Donald McIntosh, "Coercion and International Politics; A Theoretical Analysis," in *Coercion: NOMOS XIV* (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1972), pp. 243-71.
14. Max Stirner, *The Ego and His Own* (New York; Harper and Row, 1971), p. 112.
15. Hume, "Of the Original Contract," in *Hume's Moral and Political Philosophy* (New York: Haffner, 1941), pp. 356-72.
16. The other is, under certain circumstances, being asked to risk his life in battle. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ch. 21.
17. Stirner, *The Ego and His Own*.

18. Ibid., p. 66.
19. Ibid., p. 132.
20. Ibid., pp. 60-86.
21. Ibid., p. 236.
22. Ibid., pp. 211-12.
23. Ronald William Keith Patterson, *The Nihilistic Egoist: Max Stirner* (London: Oxford University Press, 1971). See also the comments of John Carrol in his Introduction to Stirner's work. Stirner, *The Ego and His Own*, pp. 32-33.
24. Ibid., p. 258.
25. Plato, *The Republic*, iv, 435-439.
26. For our purposes, Freud's most important treatment of identification is in *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego; Complete Psychological Works*, vol. 18 (London: Hogarth, 1955). My previous treatments of identification have not sufficiently emphasised the projective aspect.
27. George Woodcock, *Anarchism* (New York: World Publishing Co., 1962), p. 64.
28. Quoted in Woodcock, *ibid.*, pp. 83-84.
29. Pierre Joseph Proudhon, *What is Property?* (New York: Howard Fertig, 1966), p. 234.
30. Max Weber, *Economy and Society* (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), pp. 226-31.
31. Ibid., pp. 231-32, 271-75.
32. In the general case, libertarians sometimes argue the possibility of automatic government, based on general recognition of private property, the free contract, a free market, etc. But by extension of the above arguments, such an automatic government can exist only if its conditions are defined and protected by a system of positive law—as Adam Smith well knew.
33. Keith Melville, *Communes in the Counterculture* (New York: William Masson, 1972), p. 130.
34. Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, Bk. II, ch. 4, par. 7.
35. Ibid., bk. 2, ch.3.
36. Ibid., bk. IV, ch. 2, par. 8.
37. McIntosh, *Foundations*, esp. pp. 238-52.
38. Other movements have of course opposed the modern state. I am here emphasizing the duration, tenacity, consistency, and fundamental nature of the anarchistic opposition.