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Organizational Issues in Worker Ownership: *Problems of Organizational Order in Worker Control of Production in Plants Dropped as Obsolete*

By JOHN W. MURPHY*

ABSTRACT. In the United States the issue of *worker control* is currently receiving increased attention. Nevertheless, before this view of *work* and the *workplace* can be successfully implemented, the standard (hierarchical) image of *organizational order* must be rethought. *Communicative competence*, as discussed by Jürgen Habermas, is offered as a theoretical alternative to *social ontological realism* for developing a workplace that is compatible with worker control. This theoretical shift is necessary to avoid organizational domination of the worker and to develop a workplace that embodies, instead of restricts, *human action*. For if human action does not orient the workplace, worker control does not exist.

I

Introduction

CURRENTLY THE AMERICAN ECONOMY is undergoing one of its worst economic crises even as it struggles to emerge from depression. In several cities throughout the country plants are closing, while communities suffer as their major source of employment disappears. This problem, however, has not gone unnoticed, and various proposals have been advanced to promote economic recovery. One that is presently gaining currency is "worker ownership" of factories.¹ While the current owners of factories tell communities that they cannot invest in plants that are no longer productive, workers in several industrial areas are being encouraged to buy and operate these factories.² This maneuver is thought to offer companies new sources of revenue and a style of workplace organization that is considered to be very productive.³

From all indications this move to worker control of factories is not an aberration or the fantasy of a political minority. Instead, it has bipartisan support in Congress.⁴ Pressure to advance this type of workplace is not solely domestic, however, for countries such as Sweden, West Germany, and Japan have demonstrated

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that a participatory approach to designing a factory is beneficial. Accordingly, many companies in the U.S. are taking seriously the issue of worker control.⁵

Although the idea of workers participating in planning production schedules and other logistical matters is not new, this most recent push for workers to control factory operations is quite different from the past. Prior views which argued that workers are most productive when they control the work process were primarily psychological in orientation. This so-called humanistic management philosophy, which extends from the Human Relations school to writers such as Herzberg, Maslow, McGregor, and Likert, was fundamentally concerned with discovering how workers could be made to *feel* that their work is worthwhile, so that their performance might be improved.⁶ Nevertheless, the standard formal or bureaucratic organizational structure was not questioned, and an approach to changing the workplace was inaugurated that did not include the organizational alterations necessary to facilitate worker control.⁷

Worker control, however, is not a psychological theory, but is possible only if an appropriate organizational structure is developed.⁸ If the standard bureaucratic structure of the workplace is not changed, worker control cannot occur.⁹ Without this change workers cannot direct the work process, since they are not envisioned to be at the center of organizational planning.¹⁰ Therefore, worker control is not a psychological but a social-structural theory, which requires that a new concept of organization be developed so that workers can directly manage production.

II

Worker Control vs. the Traditional Image of the Organization

MANY WRITERS RECOGNIZE that the standard analogies used to describe an organization do not adequately depict the worker-controlled workplace.¹¹ Because they have a static perception of organizations, workers cannot influence the design of the workplace,¹² since an autonomous organizational edifice is encountered.

For instance, Frederick Taylor used the machine analogy,¹⁴ while both the machine and organic analogies were used by Fayol to describe the workplace.¹⁵ The Human Relations School's reliance on Pareto and Durkheim also resulted in a mechanical image of the workplace, although this vision was tempered by a concern for the "human quotient" of work.¹⁶ Functionalist theory eclipsed this rendition of organizational life, yet the uninhibited use of an organic analogy was still considered *de rigueur*. Parsons also introduced an image of society that would later enjoy immense popularity among the managers of the "corporate society," as Drucker called it, and this is the notion that society is a "system."

This conception gained increased importance upon the adoption of cybernetics by managers, for factories were considered to be self-equilibrating systems.¹⁷

These renditions of the workplace represent what social philosophers call social ontological realism.¹⁸ Social ontological realism, stated simply, declares that the “social” is categorically distinct from the individuals who inhabit the world. Accompanying this belief is another which says that order can only be provided by the “social,” as it is thought to be unaffected by personal contingencies. This dualism results in the “social” existing *sui generis*, as Durkheim says, while all individuals must depend upon this abstract, inviolable ground to maintain structure or order. The “social,” therefore, is the only reliable source of order, and is a force to which all rational individuals must submit.

The result of social ontological realism is that the standard (bureaucratic) image of the organization goes unquestioned, for it is assumed to be the only rational form of order.¹⁹ Usually it is maintained that managerial and worker roles are categorically distinct, thus guaranteeing the optimal functioning of the workplace. This was the belief of both Taylor and Fayol, while the researchers who were central to the Human Relations movement considered it to be inappropriate to challenge the traditional view of the workplace and to alter those social relationships.²⁰ Functionalism calls for a precise division of labor, with workers providing the energy needed to operate a factory and management the information required to successfully guide production. Specifically, Parsons’ cybernetic model conceives human action to be energy, or the force that drives the social system, while the system provides the form that molds this energy into a usable commodity.²¹

In more sociological terms, workers are the brawn necessary to operate the means of production, and management directs this process. Even the so-called humanistic management theorists believed that workers cannot operate an organization, but can merely fulfill an expanded version of their traditional role.²² In short, the traditional social ontological realists envision workers’ roles to be subservient to management, and sustain this view by stipulating that only the organization can adequately regulate interpersonal relations.²³

Like a component part of a machine or organism, workers must play roles that contribute to the maintenance of the workplace, as if it possesses an autonomous identity and destiny. This asymmetrical relationship between workers and the organization, as Argyris states, cannot facilitate worker control, since workers are understood to be facing a structure that is beyond their control.²⁴ Accordingly, workers adopt a passive image of themselves and believe that the organization has a legitimate right to dominate them and determine their views. Simply, workers become alienated from the workplace and feel they are in an adversary relationship with it and its representatives.²⁵

If workers are to be intimately related to the workplace, as required by worker control, a less rigid image of that organization must be developed. The workplace cannot be seen as a set of ossified roles that workers feel cannot be changed. Instead the workplace must be more intimately related to human action, thereby allowing norms and roles to be readily transformed. Understood this way, an organization is responsive to human demands and open for worker control.

III

A New Organizational Proposal for Worker Control: The Psychosocial Contract

THE NEED FOR A RENDITION of the organization that is commensurate with worker control has not gone unnoticed.²⁶ Recently a group of writers has conceptualized the workplace so that the antagonism between workers and the organization is reduced. To ensure that the workplace is responsive to its inhabitants it is understood to be a party to a psychosocial contract.²⁷ This view has a long and venerable revolutionary tradition, which stipulates that order is the product of individuals who negotiate a frame of reference which orients all subsequent interaction.²⁸ This theoretical gambit is considered radical because social order is not based on natural or Divine principles, but concrete human experience. Stated simply, direct *praxis* (action or experience in the sense that philosophers use the term) sustains this form of organizational structure.

Most important is that the workplace directly reflects the sentiments of workers. Because workers contract with each other to establish the structure and logic of the workplace, it cannot subsequently dominate them.²⁹ Nevertheless, an important question remains to be answered. Has this recent rendition of the social contract followed its radical heritage, by illustrating that organizational reality is interpersonally negotiated, or are the contracting parties assumed to operate *within* parameters that are never seriously questioned? If the workplace is thought to be negotiated within unquestioned boundaries, workers are only able to adjust to the authoritative demands of the organization and worker control is subverted.

Ostensibly the social contract avoids organizational domination, for it "suggests an implied agreement between an organization and [its] individual members which defines a variety of mutual expectations. . . ." ³⁰ Essential to the social contract is the continued presence of "mutual exchange and obligation between the individual and the organization," as "interdependence" characterizes the relationship between the worker (part) and the organization (whole).³¹ Accordingly, these writers are optimistic that a revival of the social contract will put an end to the structural domination of the worker.

Yet if the reader looks closely at this view of the organization, he or she will see at once that it is not clear that the part and the whole have a reciprocal existence.

This modern view of the psychosocial contract is indebted to Edgar Schein. Yet he makes a few classical theoretical moves which place his entire enterprise in jeopardy. For instance, he retains the traditional distinction between the individual and the organization, as if the latter is legitimized by an objective form of Reason.³² Schein also admits that organizations sustain themselves by the exercise of authority, which legitimately assumes the form of a hierarchy. Therefore, a participant in an organizational contract must be "willing to obey the *dictates* of some other person," and to "curb his own inclinations" (emphasis added).³³

No provisions are made for workers to shape the destiny of the workplace, since they can only withhold their consent to organizational policies. Therefore, Schein does not establish the conditions necessary to foster non-repressive or non-manipulative contractual relations, since he merely provides workers the latitude to conduct their affairs within narrowly defined parameters. The resulting picture of the organization contravenes both the letter and spirit of worker control, and is no better than the classic definition of bureaucracy offered by Max Weber. Actually Schein and his fellow travellers have not made a significant advance over social ontological realism, for the formal structure of the organization is still the primary progenitor of rational order.³⁴

Worker control, instead, demands that social ontological realism be subverted, or workers will only be able to participate in the workplace.³⁵ Therefore, organizations must be conceived differently than in the past. No longer can organizations be juxtaposed to individuals, with the former able to dominate the latter. Habermas refers to this as indirect order, simply because an abstract set of norms unites these disparate egos.³⁶ This results in organizational domination that is ontologically justified. A variety of works have recently appeared that envisage a more direct form of social order which is compatible with worker control. For example, Jean Gebser refers to rational order as a "systase,"³⁷ while Niklas Luhmann calls it a "centerless society."³⁸ And Stojanović states that a non-repressive organization represents an "integral" order.³⁹

Each of these authors is arguing that the standard abstract universal is not the only reliable source of order, and therefore organizational domination of the worker is not a structural necessity. Instead of the parts being dominated by the whole, they can embody the whole through mutual recognition and continuous integration. This directly engaged order is established on the concrete universal of intersubjectivity, or, as Landgrebe calls it, direct accessibility.⁴⁰ Accordingly, a non-repressive organizational order is possible.

Although this most recent rendition of the social contract does not view the workplace to be an encumbering structure, the social “whole” is still assumed to be the locus of all order. The “part” and the “whole” are not reciprocally related, and therefore the “part” is provided meaning only when recognized by the “whole” as contributing to the maintenance of the organization. At best, this represents technical communication, yet relative to former theories human action is present at the workplace.

However, technical communication only requires that jobs be expanded for an organization to be considered responsive to human needs. By opening all communication channels it is thought that an organization will promote worker actualization and a commitment to long-term productivity. It should be noted that this is a perfunctory solution to a problem that cannot be resolved without the workplace being viewed differently than as an autonomous system, albeit an open one. This technical approach to organizational design merely tinkers with *a priori* channels of communication, so that they are available for dialogue. Nevertheless, the conditions necessary for true dialogue are not established, since interpersonal relations are understood to be merely technical and not communicative in origin. And only an organizational structure based on communication is appropriate for worker control.⁴¹

IV

A New Ground for the Organization: Communicative Competence

THE KEY PROBLEM with the psychosocial contract proposed by Schein, Bruyn, and Nicolaou-Smokovitis is that the organizational networks regulating discourse are assumed to be fully “institutionalized.”⁴² This means that a rigidly defined set of interactional expectations specify the limits of rational discussion, and discourse represents a mere “subsystem” in a fully structured organization.⁴³ Habermas calls this “internalized” discourse, simply because the parameters of any resulting contract are determined before any serious discussion begins.⁴⁴

For Habermas, institutionalization does not mean that certain norms are valued over others and momentarily claim social dominance. More important is that institutionalized norms do not arise from competing claims to validity, but from rules of discourse that are considered to be unaffected by existential contingencies. This style of institutionalization generates an “affirmative culture,” where interaction is regulated by principles believed to be objective (ahistorical).⁴⁵ Any organization institutionalized in this manner is not susceptible to critique or flexible enough to enter into a dialogue with its members, and at

best can exhibit a “repressive toleration” of divergent views.⁴⁶ Therefore, organizational imperatives become synonymous with personal freedom.

A non-repressive contractual relationship must be based on “reflection” instead of internalization.⁴⁷ Reflection is the ability of individuals to suspend their belief that any so-called social reality determines their action, so that a human “play space” (Erwin Straus) exists between institutional demands and the personal responses they are designed to elicit. Self-reflection is a fundamental characteristic of the human condition, simply because language mediates the recognition of all social norms. Subsequently institutions cannot make demands, but merely offer tentative suggestions about how social relations might be conducted. Most important, however, is that even when particular norms are accepted they cannot be sustained by the “serious attitude” that Sartre derides, but interpersonal commitment.⁴⁸

When institutions are viewed to be throughly mediated by human action, a non-repressive contractual social organization can be developed. Stated simply, if it is recognized that all social phenomena, including the rules of social discourse, are imbued with existential contingency, then it is impossible for any particular institutional form to claim automatically a seignorial status. Accordingly institutions have no intrinsic meaning, but attain their unique position by being recognized by social actors. Institutions, therefore, cannot be thought of as objective and legitimately able to dominate the “parts” of society. Now all forms of social life reside on a similar ontological plane, the dimension inscribed by human action.⁴⁹

All organizations, to use a Marxian phrase, must be understood to exist “in-and-for themselves.” Most important is that institutions cannot control human action, since the latter is a precondition for the former. Simply, organizations represent human action that has a transhistorical status (not extrahistorical or objective), and therefore they retain their human ground without being idiosyncratic. As organizations emerge out of discourse they chart a direction for further interaction, yet these institutions can never claim an autonomous structure that dictates the rules of interaction.⁵⁰

When the ground of the workplace is comprehended to be coalesced human action, dialogue (as “communicative competence”) is central to the generation of a non-repressive organization.⁵¹ Because communicative competence is based on non-distorted discourse, interaction is not operationalized in the form of *a priori* organizational demands.⁵² This is the usual method of ensuring social competence among an organization’s members, and is substantiated by the previously mentioned part-whole dualism. Since human action is now cited as the ground of all social phenomena, social competence cannot be secured by

objective standards of interaction. Instead, interaction can only result from a fusion of action domains, or communicative competence. According to Habermas this ability to grasp the action or creative (sometimes called pragmatic) core of another's use of language can provide non-repressive order based on mutual understanding.

Worker control is promoted only by this activist style of communicative competence. The reason for this is that workers are not merely a subsystem of an organization and accordingly cannot be dominated by its regulatory structures. Therefore, workers are able to provide an organization with direction and feel that it is their creation. Nonetheless, for this type of organization to be developed, Schein's version of the psychosocial contract must be amended, so that the product of negotiation reflects human action and cannot constrain it. A social contract must not merely reiterate formal rules of discourse, but instead must *establish* the guidelines for assessing interactional competence. A contractual organization based on communicative competence embodies the existential fusion of different, yet communicable world-views.

As a base of social order communicative competence undercuts the possibility of organizational hegemony, since all interpersonal demands reflect pragmatic and not absolute claims.⁵³ This serves to coordinate diverse interests because pragmatic claims do not automatically have universal appeal, but instead their utility must be illustrated through discussion. Therefore, communicative competence establishes the conditions necessary for democratic social organization, since no claim can demand the type of consideration that automatically precludes the recognition of other options. Understood this way, organizational discourse is not only open, but capable of creating a pluralistic (democratic) order.⁵⁴

V

Conclusion

WORKER CONTROL cannot be treated like former types of humanistic management, which are psychological in nature and do not require that the traditional bureaucratic image of the organization be altered. Worker control, instead, demands that many organizational changes must be made for this style of management to be properly implemented, particularly the standard (crudely realistic) conception of social order. Order based on communicative competence is an appropriate substitute for social ontological realism.

Fundamental to communicative competence is that organizational control does not have to be coercive. For example, order can be established by force, as with Hobbes and Austin, or can be based on natural law as envisioned by

Locke. Or, like Durkheim, an ultimate ground of moral order can be fabricated to ensure that certain rules are followed. Order can also be conceived as a structure (Parsons), or, less obtrusively, Reason (Weber) or Science (Comte) can be used to legitimize rules. However, each of these versions of social control is sustained by dualistic thinking which implies that order cannot be generated from human action, but only an Archimedean point that is not influenced by existential contingencies. This form of social control is incompatible with workplace democratization and worker control.⁵⁵

Worker control, instead, is based on what Fromm calls "rational authority," a "principle never in conflict with the individual and his real . . . aims."⁵⁶ This type of authority provides order that emerges from human action and not coercion. To understand the importance of this distinction, it must be remembered that order can result not only from the internalization of external demands, but from "joint action,"⁵⁷ Communicative competence promotes unencumbered joint action, since ego and alter fuse their respective frames of reference through mutual recognition and negotiation. The resulting image of social life is considered rational because it does not require self-denial for order to be maintained, but the desire for social self-actualization. Sartre calls this "collective praxis."⁵⁸ Even if a political maneuver is made which decentralizes the work process, history has demonstrated that this is not sufficient to guarantee social democracy. For worker control to be actualized, a rational, democratic image of social order must also be promulgated.

Notes

1. Joseph R. Blasi and William Foote Whyte, "Worker Ownership and Public Policy," *Policy Studies Journal*, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1981, pp. 320–37; Sandra L. Albrecht, "Politics, Bureaucracy, and Worker Participation—the Swedish Case," *Journal of Applied Behavioral Science*, Vol. 16, No. 3, 1980, pp. 299–315; David J. Tascano, "Employee Ownership and Democracy in the Workplace," *Social Policy*, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1981, pp. 16–23; Daniel Zwerdling, *Workplace Democracy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1980); J. Bautz Bonnanno, "Employee Codetermination—Origins in Germany, Present Practice in Europe and Applicability to the U.S.," *Harvard Journal of Legislation*, Vol. 14, No. 4, 1977, pp. 947–1012; Bengt Abrahamsson, *Bureaucracy or Participation: The Logic of Organization* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1977), pp. 183–229.
2. Jack Metzgar, "Plant Shutdowns and Worker Response: The Case of Johnstown, Pa.," *Socialist Review*, Vol. 53, 1980, pp. 9–49.
3. Donald V. Nightingale, "Work, Formal Participation, and Employee Outcomes," *Sociology of Work and Occupations*, Vol. 8, No. 3, 1981, pp. 277–296; Edward S. Greenberg, "Participation in Industrial Decision-Making and Work Satisfaction," *Social Sciences Quarterly*, Vol. 60, No. 4, 1980, pp. 551–69; Godfrey Gardner, "Worker Participation—A Critical Evaluation of Coch and French," *Human Relations*, Vol. 30, No. 12, 1977, pp. 1071–78; Raymond Russel, Arthur Hochner, and Stewart E. Perry, "Participation, Influence, and Worker Ownership," *Industrial Relations*, Vol. 18, No. 3, 1979, pp. 330–441; Margaret Molinar Duckles, Robert Duckles, and

Michael Maccoby, "The Process of Change at Bolivar," *Journal of Applied Behavioral Science*, Vol. 13, No. 3, 1977, pp. 387-99; Joseph A. Alluto and James A. Belasco, "A Typology for Participation in Organizational Decision Making," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. 17, 1972, pp. 117-25; Jack W. Nickson and H. B. Karp, "An Application of Motivator-Hygiene Theory to Motivational Patterns and Economic Variables among Black, Working Poor," *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, Vol. 33, No. 2, 1974, pp. 113-25.

4. Blasi and Whyte, *op. cit.*, pp. 321-26.

5. Blasi and Whyte (*Ibid.*, p. 328) argue that there are approximately 100 worker controlled firms in the U.S., while a recent article in the newsletter *Employee Ownership*, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1983, p. 1, states there are 500.

6. Klaus Kerppola, "Participatory Administration and Teamwork in Labor-Management Co-operation," *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, Vol. 33, No. 1, 1974, pp. 19-31.

7. Paul Bernstein, "Necessary Elements for Effective Worker Participation in Decision Making," *Journal of Economic Issues*, Vol. 10, No. 2, 1979, pp. 450-522.

8. Steven A. Peterson, Thomas A. Leitkos, and Wilford G. Miles, "Worker Participation and the Spillover Effect: The Case of Labor-Management Committees," *Economic and Industrial Democracy*, 2, 1981, pp. 27-44.

9. Max Weber, *Social and Economic Organization* (New York: The Free Press, 1947), pp. 329-40.

10. Hem C. Jain, "Worker Participation versus Management Control," *Journal of Contemporary Business*, Vol. 8, No. 4, 1980, pp. 137-52; Gamji Parameshwara, "Levels of Worker Participation in Management: An Analytical Framework," *Indian Journal of Industrial Relations*, Vol. 12, No. 3, 1977, pp. 305-16; Josip Obradovic, "Workers Participation: Who Participates," *Industrial Relations*, Vol. 14, No. 1, 1975, pp. 32-44.

11. For an excellent survey of this work, consult: Paul Blumberg, *Industrial Democracy: The Sociology of Participation* (New York: Schocken Books, 1969); Jaroslav Vanek, ed., *Self-Management* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1975); Branko Horvat, Mihailo Marković, and Rudi Supek, eds., *Self-Governing Socialism* (White Plains, New York: International Arts and Sciences, 1975).

12. Usually the workplace is understood to be morphologically similar to a machine, living organism, or a self-contained system. Most important, however, is that each of these renditions advance metaphysical assumptions that promote a hierarchical system of authority, which does not allow workers to control the workplace. See Charles Perrow, *Complex Organizations*, 2nd edition (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1979), pp. 58-89.

13. Joyce Rothschild-Whitt, "Conditions Facilitating Participatory-Democratic Organizations," *Sociological Inquiry*, Vol. 46, No. 2, 1976, pp. 75-86.

14. As Taylor stated, workers must "do what they are told promptly without asking questions or making suggestions . . . it is absolutely necessary for every man in an organization to become one of a train of gear wheels." Frederick W. Taylor, "Why Manufacturers Dislike College Students," quoted in Samuel Haber, *Efficiency and Uplift: Scientific Management in the Progressive Era 1890-1920* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 24.

15. Fayol refers to social life as a "*corpus sociale*" and the workplace as an "administrative machine." Henri Fayol, *General and Industrial Management* (New York: Pitman Publishing Corporation, 1949), p. 20; pp. 57-59.

16. Elton Mayo, *The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1945), pp. 156-80; Fritz J. Roethlisberger, *Management and Morale* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 31-34; Fritz J. Roethlisberger and William J. Dickson, *Management and the Worker* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1942), pp. 555; 578.

17. Peter Drucker, *Concept of the Corporation* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), p. 27; p. 36; p. 115; Drucker, *Practice of Management* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954), p. 12; p. 19; p. 60.

18. Werner Stark, *The Fundamental Forms of Social Thought* (New York: Fordham Univ. Press, 1963), pp. 1–13.

19. Joyce Rothschild-Whitt, "Collectivist Organization—An Alternative to Rational-Bureaucratic Models," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 44, No. 4, 1979, pp. 509–527. The bureaucracy is regulated by formalized, fixed rules, that are legitimized, as Weber suggests, by the "system" and not human motives. Therefore, human action is not self-determining, but given direction by the strictures imposed by the workplace and management.

20. Roethlisberger and Dickson, *Management and the Worker*, p. 580; William J. Dickson and Fritz J. Roethlisberger, *Counseling in an Organization* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1966), p. 249; p. 263. Also, Georges Friedmann argues that the directors of the Hawthorne Studies were biased in favor of management. Georges Friedmann, *Industrial Society* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1955), pp. 291–350.

21. Talcott Parsons, *Societies: Evolutional and Comparative Perspectives* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), pp. 5–29. Ergonomics is similarly reductionistic by viewing job design to be primarily a biological problem, and not one that is existential in nature. This is clearly illustrated in its use of the Shannon-Weaver theory to describe how order can be maintained at the workplace. Elwyn Edwards, "Communication Theory," in *The Human Operator in Complex Systems*, W. T. Singleton, R. S. Easterly, and D. C. Whitfield, eds. (London: Taylor and Francis, Ltd., 1967), pp. 39–53. See also, O. G. Edholm, *The Biology of Work* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), pp. 227–241; E. R. Tichauer, *The Biomechanical Basis of Ergonomics* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1978), pp. 3 ff.

22. Frederick Herzberg, Bernard Mausner, and Barbara Snyderman, *The Motivation to Work* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1959), pp. 136–37; Abraham A. Maslow, *Eupsychian Management* (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1965), pp. 254–55; Douglas McGregor, *The Human Side of Enterprise* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1960), p. 55; pp. 65–69.

23. P. J. Van Strien, "Paradigms in Organizational Research and Practice," *Journal of Occupational Psychology*, Vol. 51, 1978, pp. 291–300.

24. Chris Argyris, *Personality and Organization* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957), pp. 76–122.

25. Malcolm Warner and Riccardo Peccei, "Problems of Management Autonomy and Worker Participation in Multinational Companies," *Personnel Review*, Vol. 6, No. 4, 1977, pp. 7–13.

26. Rothschild-Whitt, "Collectivistic Organization—An Alternative to Rational-Bureaucratic Models," p. 519.

27. Severyn T. Bruyn and Litzia Nicolaou-Smokovitis, "A Theoretical Framework for Studying Worker Participation: The Psychosocial Contract," *Review of Social Economy*, Vol. 37, No. 1, 1979, pp. 1–23; See also, Edgar F. Huse and James L. Bowditch, *Behavior in Organizations: A Systems Approach to Managing* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1973), pp. 73–77.

28. Franz Neumann, "Types of Natural Law," in *The Democratic and Authoritarian State* (New York: The Free Press, 1957), pp. 69–95.

29. John W. Murphy, "Critical Theory and Social Organization," *Diogenes*, 117, 1982, pp. 93–112. If the structure of the workplace is not an autonomous network of role relations, then it is possible for workers to direct this organization and not be dominated by its functional imperatives.

30. Bruyn and Nicolaou-Smokovitis, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

32. Edgar H. Schein, *Organizational Psychology* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), p. 11. See also, Max Horkheimer, *Eclipse of Reason* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1947), pp. 11–16.
33. Schein, *op. cit.*, p. 11.
34. This does not mean, as in “social ethical realism,” that the “social” is the primary value and all others are merely subordinate to it. Instead, when Schein indicates that behavioral options are valid only when they conform to organizational demands, self-determination becomes synonymous with identifying with traditionally prescribed roles. See, Pitirim A. Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, Vol. 2 (New York: American Book Co., 1937), pp. 262–266.
35. Participation presupposes the existence of organizational structures that are autonomous and cannot easily be altered. Worker control undercuts the traditional dualism (Cartesian) that substantiates social ontological realism, and organizations are viewed as embodied human action. Using the distinction made by Weber (*op. cit.*, p. 185), participation is based on formal reason, while substantive rationality is the basis of worker control.
36. Jürgen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975), p. 108; p. 121.
37. Jean Gebser, *Ursprung und Gegenwart* (Stuttgart: Deutsches Verlag-Anstalt, 1966), p. 331.
38. Niklas Luhmann, *The Differentiation of Society* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1982), p. 353.
39. Svetozar Stojanović, *Between Ideals and Reality* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1973), pp. 115–34. Stojanović is a key Yugoslav theorist in the “Praxis” tradition, and argues that this “integral” view of order is central to the success of self-management. See also, John W. Murphy, “Yugoslavian (Praxis) Marxism,” in *Current Perspectives in Sociological Theory*, Vol. 3, Scott G. McNall, ed. (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1982), pp. 189–205.
40. Ludwig Landgrebe, *Major Problems in Contemporary European Philosophy* (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1966), pp. 74 ff. The word “intersubjectivity” is used in the strict Husserlian sense, or as it is defined in phenomenology. It contains two fundamental elements. Each person is not a self-contained existence. Persons construct a world through their actions, one in which both ego and alter are implicated. This is the initial stage of developing a world held in common, a “we” relationship. Cf. Edmund Husserl, *Ideas: A General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology* (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1969), pp. 135–36. This openness allows for the formation of a concrete community of understanding. Each person can understand the meaning he or she attributes to the world and is capable of viewing the world from the perspective of another, generating “mutual understanding,” (*ibid.*, pp. 345–49, 387). (See also Husserl’s *Cartesian Meditations*, The Hague: Nijhoff, 1970, pp. 89–152.)
41. Bruyn and Nicolaou-Smokovitis, *op. cit.*, p. 5.
42. Jürgen Habermas, *Theory and Praxis* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1974), p. 25.
43. Bruyn and Nicolaou-Smokovitis, *op. cit.*, p. 5; p. 11.
44. Habermas, *Theory and Praxis*, p. 28.
45. *Ibid.*, p. 26. See also, Herbert Marcuse, “The Affirmative Character of Culture,” in *Negations* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1965), pp. 88–133.
46. Herbert Marcuse, “Repressive Tolerance,” in *Critique of Pure Tolerance*, by Robert Paul Wolff, Barrington Moore, Jr., and Herbert Marcuse (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), pp. 81–117.
47. Habermas, *Theory and Praxis*, p. 38.
48. Sartre describes the thinking of the person in the serious attitude as follows: “. . . the meaning which my freedom has given the world, I apprehend as coming from the world and constituting my obligations.” See Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), pp. 39–40.

49. John W. Murphy, *The Social Philosophy of Martin Buber* (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1982), Chap. 3.

50. This is not to suggest that certain interactional arrangements (or organizations) do not enforce a range of behavioral options, usually referred to as organizational control. Nevertheless, when the workplace is sustained by human action and not organizational imperatives, order is the outgrowth of self-determination and not structural demands. This is responsible social order: regularity without control. See, William M. Dugger, "Two Twists in Economic Methodology: Positivism and Subjectivism," *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, Vol. 42, No. 1, 1983, pp. 75-91.

51. Jürgen Habermas, "Toward a Theory of Communicative Competence," in *Recent Sociology*, No. 2, Hans Peter Dreitzel, ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1972), pp. 114-48.

52. Habermas, *Theory and Praxis*, p. 39.

53. Habermas, "Toward a Theory of Communicative Competence," pp. 139 ff.

54. Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1965), pp. 8-9; pp. 36-37.

55. Karel Kosic, *Dialectics of the Concrete* (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1976), pp. 61-66.

56. Erich Fromm, *Escape from Freedom* (New York: Rinehart and Company, 1941), p. 270.

57. Herbert Blumer, *Symbolic Interactionism* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969), pp. 70 ff.

58. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Critique of Dialectical Reason* (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1979), pp. 505-24.

Coping with Catastrophe

FOR SEVERAL MILLION YEARS the human race has been improving its control over what, in many respects, is a hostile environment. Mother Earth shelters, protects and nurtures us, but she also brutally kills and maims many of us. One of the ways by which we reduce those aberrations of our planet is by the application of science. In the case of earthquakes, this involves seismic prediction, geologic analysis, econometric forecasting and projection and institutional policy evaluation, among other things. These procedures are involved in what economists call risk analysis and hazard mitigation planning.

All this is well known to the readers of this *Journal*. One might well ask, 'But in the face of an earthquake, what can people do?' A positive answer to that is given in a book reporting the research of an interdisciplinary team headed by Professor Ben-chieh Liu, *Earthquake Risk and Damage Functions: Application to New Madrid*.¹ Of course people cannot control or even affect the movements in the earth's crust which are the immediate cause of most earthquakes, movements which occur thousands of times each year and which in the past 4,000 years have caused some 13 million deaths and catastrophic injuries and destruction. But the deaths, injuries and destruction can be reduced significantly.