
Arnold Toynbee's "Study of History"

Author(s): Francis Neilson

Source: *The American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, Apr., 1955, Vol. 14, Supplement (Apr., 1955), pp. 1-77

Published by: American Journal of Economics and Sociology, Inc.

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/3484491>

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at <https://about.jstor.org/terms>



is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *The American Journal of Economics and Sociology*

JSTOR

Arnold J. Toynbee

A STUDY OF HISTORY

A Review

by

FRANCIS NEILSON

Supplement to

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS & SOCIOLOGY

April 1955

Printed in the United States of America. Copyright, 1955
American Journal of Economics & Sociology, Inc.
50 East Sixty-ninth Street
New York 21, N. Y.

Arnold Toynbee's *Study of History*

Volume VII

By FRANCIS NEILSON

THE CRITIC WHO ATTEMPTS the hazardous adventure of reviewing the monumental work of Arnold Toynbee, *A Study of History*, should have the quality of erudition of the author himself. The first six volumes that appeared called for a reader familiar with Greek and Latin, perhaps Hebrew, and several European languages. But that was not the only qualification required of the critic who undertook the task of writing an understandable story of what he had read.

In Toynbee's works so many subjects are treated that an accomplished theologian, philosopher, historian, economist and politician are called upon to follow the innumerable trends of his thought and interpretations of the rise and fall of civilizations. Indeed, few pages are easy reading for the student of our time, for the all-round man is far to seek in these days of specialization.

It is unfortunate that our system of education does not fit graduates for the task of studying such tomes. It may be said that thought today runs in other channels. Since the classics have been considered superfluous works, our youth have been trained to cope chiefly with the ponderables of science and social affairs. Moreover, the economic pressure of existence is felt so sternly that ninety per cent of those who take university courses attend for the purpose of learning how to make a living. And it is not surprising that educators complain of the illiteracy of their students.

Where, then, shall we look for an audience culturally and intellectually capable of reading these invaluable works? This question makes me conscious of my deficiencies in learning and leads me to wonder who will benefit from the achievements of Toynbee's labor.

The first six volumes were best sellers. But how many people who purchased them read them? I have only one way of making an estimate. My library contains works on all the subjects to be found in these volumes. I know not Greek; only a little Latin; but I have read the classics in the best translations that I could find. I read French, but I know no other continental language. Yet I found little difficulty in studying the first six volumes, although I was conscious of what I lacked linguistically.

My review of them was published in the *American Journal of Economics and Sociology* (July, 1947, pp. 451-72). It was easy for me to turn to the sources from which Toynbee took his texts, for my layman's library is varied and large. Most of the works he refers to I have within arm's reach. And if I may say so humbly, I have pondered for over fifty years the studies that have engaged his mind.

The Destiny of the Universal Church

GLANCING AT THE REVIEW that I wrote upon the first six volumes, I am surprised to find that I challenged many of his findings which were, in some cases, rather dogmatically pronounced. To mention two among many: I questioned the inertia of early man and Toynbee's lack of interest in the part played by natural law in the pagan and early Christian philosophies. To be sure, he says at the end of the sixth volume, "Our study is not at an end; but we have arrived at the verge of the last of our fields of inquiry."

Did he realize, when he wrote this, that the fields would extend to four more volumes, covering ground of greater area than the first six?¹ Indeed, the seventh volume in itself is one of the most ponderous I have searched for enlightenment. The quest, as he laid it down eight or nine years ago, is: "the destiny of the universal church, in which every higher religion seeks to embody itself."

This is a quasi religious-philosophical one that embraces an inquiry into the theological character of all cults. A mighty task for an erudite Hercules! A universal church is a dream so lofty, even in these times of trouble, that for practical considerations one would be satisfied, if it were possible, to bring toleration and harmony among the Christian sects. All efforts to do this have failed disastrously.

There was a time, some forty years ago, when not a few outstanding leaders in Protestant and Catholic circles thought there was a chance of union, but that was dissipated by the First World War. And now the lone voice of His Holiness the Pope calling for the essentials of a religious life makes little or no impression upon the masses of Europe and America. Neither do the prelates seem to heed the spirit of his message.

Yet, Toynbee is not disheartened. He has set the course of his voyage, and it is for us to read the log as he sets it down in these mighty tomes.

I would not spare the time in my eighty-seventh year to go through

¹ *A Study of History*. By Arnold J. Toynbee. Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1954; Vol. VII, 722 pp.; Vol. VIII, 732 pp.; Vol. IX, 759 pp.; Vol. X, 422 pp.; index, \$35.

these volumes, page by page, if it were not for the advertising furore in which they make their appearance. All this fanfare about their value to the earnest student of history tends to be misleading, and gives to Toynbee's great work a practical importance which is not revealed in an examination. As history, it is a *mélange* of astonishing erudition, a stupendous encyclopedia of political and religious comparisons, which lack, however, the economic fundamentals Socrates used in the *Republic*. Upon those fundamentals the State (history) took root and ushered in the beginnings of a civilization, which always contained the political elements of decay.

Any intelligent student who has read *The Decline of the West* must have gathered from it that, when a culture ends and a civilization is imposed, the height of achievement in religious philosophy and art has been reached and the slow process of disintegration has set in.

If there be one merit among many others in Spengler's work, it is his skill in showing clearly how the cultural stage of a people gives way to the creeping paralysis of a civilization in its first stage. This has been unnoticed by many. To take one example closer to us than the pagan or medieval ones, we might consider the state of English society after the dissolution of the monasteries and the effect of filling the highways with cutthroats and thieves, as More pointed out in *Utopia*. Of course, restrictive measures were passed by the Tudors to bring order in the realm, but notwithstanding the severity of these proscriptions, peasant risings for the next two hundred and fifty years indicated that a worse slavery than medieval serfdom had been brought about by the change.

Furthermore, the enclosure of commons by statute during the eighteenth century depopulated the countryside and drove the people into the towns. This example might be extended, but let these two features suffice, for the present, to mark the effect of economic injustice upon a people.

It might be pointed out, before we proceed to consider the multifarious problems of the seventh volume, that Toynbee has had to modify and, in some cases, reinterpret his findings, as they are expressed in the earlier books. All this is to the good, and he is an exceptional author in this respect, for in footnotes and in an extraordinary annex he gives us the opinions of his critics.

Universal States as Ends

NOW, IN DISCUSSING UNIVERSAL STATES, he revives the theme of his earlier volume: "A Dominant Minority, an Internal Proletariat, and an

External Proletariat" (VII, p. 1). From the foregoing inquiry, he tells us:

. . . It appeared that dominant minorities produced philosophies which sometimes gave inspirations to universal states, that internal proletariats produced higher religions which sought to embody themselves in universal churches, and that external proletariats produced heroic ages which were the tragedies of barbarian war-bands. (VII, p. 1)

Such a conclusion is formed by an investigation of the last stages of the Greek and Roman empires. But he does not pause here to inform us how this stage has been reached. We have to wait long before we come upon the necessary explanation of the conditions which produced the minorities and proletariats.

We look in vain through many pages of the long chapter on "The Mirage of Immortality." After excursions in Chinese, Turkish, Mongol, Greek and Roman systems of politics and religion, he gathers what evidence he can to enlighten us and concludes:

We have perhaps now sufficiently established the fact that the belief in the immortality of universal states survives for centuries and millennia after it has been decisively confuted by plain hard facts. What are the causes of a phenomenon that looks strange at first sight?

One manifest cause is the potency of the personal impression made by the founders of universal states and by their successors who enter into the fruits of their labours—an impression that their contemporaries, who receive it at first hand as the direct beneficiaries of these great men's achievements, hand on to a receptive Posterity with an emphasis which, by the cumulative effect of transmission, exaggerates an imposing truth into an overwhelming legend. From among the many famous testimonies to the impression made by the Emperor Augustus, we have singled out already, in another context, the almost lyrical tribute paid by Philo, who, as a Jew, a Hellenist, an Alexandrian, and a philosopher, can hardly be suspected of having gone to exceptional lengths in his enthusiasm for the Roman founder of an Hellenic universal state. . . . (VII, pp. 41-2)

It might be asked here if Toynbee is thinking of a State in the geographic or ethnic sense. It would be difficult to consider the expansion of the first city-States of Greece as bearing any likeness to the empire which spread out to the west; and as for the State of Rome before the greed of empire reached all points of the compass, the founders of States, politically governed communities, in the early stage, particularly of Greece and Rome, could not in their wildest flights of fancy dream of the expansion of imperialistic armies marching in Spain, Gaul, and Britain, to mention only a few that fell under the sway of invaders.

It is not clear what Toynbee means by the universal State. The impression that I get from the phrase is something that is stabilized politically. But no State in the past that I can think of was at any time after the cultural stage was passed impervious to change and expansion. Think of the changes that have taken place in the Western Hemisphere since Amerigo Vespucci and Christopher Columbus touched its shores! The growth of the United States, from the time when Virginia was settled by English planters, surely reveals the fact that change and decay are ever at work, no matter by what political name the community labels itself. What has become of the republic of Jefferson and Paine?

The flow of ideas from the mind of Toynbee gushes like a mountain torrent, and the similes that he incorporates in his sentences are sometimes so far fetched that one is amazed at the prodigality of his fluency. Take the following as an instance:

A universal state has indeed as little to fear from outer barbarians as the Universe has from stray star clusters that are *ex hypothesi* non-existent; yet the argument is a fallacy nevertheless, for, as we have seen in an earlier context, "things rot through evils native to their selves". . . . (VII, p. 46)

This quotation from Menander, to whom he gives credit, goes straight to the point. It is the things that rot which cause the changes that at length destroy empires.

One of the great difficulties in this task that Toynbee has undertaken is the conflict that ensues when the modern mind desires to interpret the history of the past in terms of present conditions. On page after page we meet examples of this, which tend to divert the reader's consideration away from the main point at issue. It is one of the most perplexing problems the historian has to contend with.

No recorder so far has been able to place himself at a vantage point in the past. Perhaps Acton was the only one who succeeded in ridding himself of the garments of his time so that he might metaphorically don the robe of a monk or the ruff of a courtier. Ranke was another who succeeded in removing himself from his environment and, for the time being, camped at Rome.

Universal States as Means

AFTER CONSIDERING UNIVERSAL STATES as ends, Toynbee proceeds to discuss them as means. Entering upon a bypath, "The Price of Euthanasia," he says, "The attempt to secure immortality in This World is a vain effort, whether blind or deliberate, to thwart the economy of Nature,"

and he warns us of the fate of the son of Eos. As for the destinies of universal States, he concludes that they are paradoxical. And he tells us that their conscious purpose is a selfish desire to conserve "the wasting energies of the society with whose fortunes their own are bound up."

. . . This intention, however, is never fulfilled. A universal state, however long its life may be drawn out, always proves to have been the last phase of a society before its extinction, and the pursuit of the mirage of immortality, into which a dominant minority is misled through mistaking its ephemeral universal state for the goal of human endeavours, leads the deluded pursuer towards the unsuspected and uninviting goal of petrification, from which the only means of release is the ignominious fate of eventually being swallowed up and assimilated by an alien civilization. . . . (VII, pp. 54-5)

It seems sometimes as if he enjoyed the recreation of setting up the ninepins so that he could display his skill in knocking them all down. Undoubtedly no scholar would deprive him of this method of revealing his erudition, for the interest is maintained and the reader fascinated by his dexterity.

I wonder how many people will detect the change that has taken place regarding Spengler. In the first six volumes, we gathered the impression that he was not deeply impressed by *The Decline of the West*. He quotes one of its author's stinging passages concerning imperial Rome, which took "possession of something that was lying about for anyone to pick up." So it was in India with Clive. Spengler's comment upon this is as follows:

The petrified remains of Imperialism are to be seen in empires like the Egyptian, the Chinese and the Roman and in societies like the Indian World and the World of Islam, which remain in existence for hundreds and thousands of years and may pass from one conqueror's hand to another's: dead bodies, shapeless masses of humanity from which the soul has departed, the used-up material of a great historical past. The imperialism that leaves such debris is the typical symptom of social dissolution. (VII, p. 56)

One of the disintegrating factors of the great State is the fiscal system, and it is welcome and refreshing to find in this volume that Toynbee gives it the prominence it deserves. Referring to the friendship of the Emperor Trajan for Pliny the Younger, we learn that

the whole administration of the Roman Empire, from top to bottom, had passed into the hands of a hierarchically organized bureaucracy, while the self-complacent local magistrates and town councillors of the once self-governing city-states had been degraded into becoming the unwilling

instruments of the central exchequer for extracting ruinously heavy taxes from the local notables. (VII, pp. 59–60)

It was not only the nobles that suffered from iniquitous impositions; the producers themselves were crushed by severe penalties upon their labors. Indeed, at one time men were tortured by the tax gatherers, and now that Toynbee has introduced this evidence of fiscal tyranny and waste, it is to be hoped that he will pursue the matter and convince himself that the taxation of wealth, whether it be produced by a peasant or a farmer of wide acres, is one of the chief factors in destroying a State.

In the *Bulletin* of The John Rylands Library (September, 1954) I find an essay by Toynbee entitled "Economic and Social Consequences of the Hannibalic War." In this he goes to the very heart of the problem. He shows how the public lands of Rome were placed at the disposal of capitalists who could afford to exploit them. But "both the new plantations and the new cattle runs were operated with slave labor." He also shows what happened to recruits for the army:

This long-term military service overseas uprooted the peasant-proprietor from his farm and so deprived his family of their means of subsistence. The sacrifice now demanded from this class of Roman citizens by the growing military requirements of the Roman state was as disastrous as it was unprecedented, and it was not brought to an end by the ending of the Hannibalic War itself in 201 B.C. for this awful scourge, which had already devastated southern Italy, went on posthumously ruining central Italy by leaving behind it, as its dire legacy, a crop of supplementary wars in an increasing number of ever more distant theatres. (*Bulletin*, pp. 277–8)

There are long chapters on the services of universal States, and in these he deals with such different branches as Conductivity, The Psychology of Peace, Communications, Garrisons and Colonies (which is a deeply interesting contribution to the survey); indeed, he does not overlook any of the departments of a bureaucracy at work. The imperial flag of glorious Rome becomes a tattered rag after suffering the blasts of Toynbee's criticism. The chapter on the provinces and their administration reveals this fact: that a creeping paralysis inheres in imperial expansion, and that it carries with it the inevitable rot that brings destruction.

Universal States and Disintegration

IT IS NO EASY TASK for the most attentive reader to keep in mind the reason for these minute investigations. Indeed, it is quite possible for the student to read some three hundred and fifty pages in Volume VII, and

then ask himself why all this meticulous work has been undertaken. He may have to turn back to the opening chapter, "Ends or Means?" and once again fix in his mind the object of Toynbee's quest. Here perhaps it would be well for us to take a glance at some of his statements concerning universal States and universal churches. He says:

Universal states, universal churches, and heroic ages thus link together contemporary, as well as non-contemporary, civilizations in relations that are closer and more individual than an affinity consisting in the bare fact of their being representatives of the same species of society. . . . (VII, p. 2)

Surely the form and constitution of a government, no matter by what political label it is known, is no indication of a universality of the mass. Was there ever a State or an empire that was universal in that sense? I cannot think of one. Therefore, it seems to me that we must look more deeply into the body of the community than the political strata, and delve down to the economic conditions under which the people lived. How can there be anything in the sense of universal, when the officials are parasites and live upon the taxes that they extract from the producers of wealth, whether they be capitalists or laborers? It will be seen later that Toynbee seems conscious of this vast difference between the governors and the proletariat.

In another place he says:

. . . In the first place, universal states arise after, and not before, the breakdowns of the civilizations to whose bodies social they bring political unity. They are not summers but "Indian Summers," masking autumn and pre-saging winter. In the second place, they are the products of dominant minorities: that is, of once creative minorities that have lost their creative power. . . . (VII, p. 3)

Despite the echo of Spengler's calendar of a culture and civilization, it may be asked when, once the breakdown has taken place, political unity was brought to the social body. Is the critic justified in interpreting this assertion as a climb to the zenith of bureaucratic power? Unity there may be in name, but disunity is ever present in the community. We now know, after the experiences of Russia and Germany (to mention only two tyrannies) that politically the names Russia and Germany may stand for unity, but in neither case was there unity even within the government. The officials of both States quarreled among themselves, and some were accused of attempting the assassination of the leader.

Further on, Toynbee seems to be conscious of this. He says:

Taken together, these features present a picture of universal states that, at first sight, looks ambiguous. Universal states are symptoms of social disintegration, yet at the same time they are attempts to check this disintegration and to defy it. (VII, p. 4)

Now we understand where we are. A universal State is one in decay. But perhaps it would be much clearer if Toynbee had decided on the definition: a universal State suffers from civilization.

One cannot help but be astonished at the intellectual scrutiny that has been expended upon such sections as Capital Cities, Official Languages and Scripts, Law, Calendars, Standing Armies, Civil Services, and Citizenships.

In the section on Capital Cities, Toynbee's parallels are not always analogous. The location of a capital is not always the selection of the so-called founder who, perhaps, may be a conqueror, such as Caesar was in Gaul. But all this depends upon the datum line that is taken. The archaeologist is now busy uncovering the sites of many places which formerly were regarded as sheer myths. Think of what has happened in London recently by the discovery of a temple devoted to Mithras. Some day we might find that the Beakermen laid the foundations of towns, buried under Celtic marts and Roman-built cities.

Conquerors usually take what they can find. After the strife, it is a matter of the line of least resistance. It was so with Pizarro in Peru. Toynbee says of them:

The Spanish *conquistadores* who established a universal state in Central America and took possession of a universal state in the Andean World were alien intruders from overseas like the British conquerors of India, but, in the location of their seats of government, the Spaniards did not make the move from an original capital on the coast to a subsequent capital in the interior; in this matter they went to opposite extremes in the two new worlds of which they made themselves masters. In the Andean World they laid out a maritime capital at Lima which they never abandoned in favour of the inland capital at Cuzco from which the Andean Realm of the Four Quarters had previously been ruled by the Incas. . . . (VII, pp. 195-6)

Cuzco is 11,000 feet above sea level—a hazardous climb for the invader! Lima was only a few miles from the coast and was a convenient place for receiving supplies. Perhaps one of the reasons why the invaders did not reach Machu-Picchu was that the difficulties of reaching Cuzco were too severe to be repeated.

It is commendable that Toynbee deals with history with the gloves off. A bare-knuckle fight in the interest of Clio is timely. We have had far

too much guilt put on the gingerbread of high-school histories to be read by "good little boys who will make good little voters."

An instance of the forthright manner adopted by Toynbee in presenting history to us may be found in his section on Capital Cities:

Having now cursorily surveyed the histories of the capitals of universal states, we may go on to inquire who were the beneficiaries of the insight and will-power that called these capitals into existence. These seats of imperial governments served the divers purposes of both violent and gentle interlopers. Barbarians swooped down on them in quest of mere plunder. Conquerors bred in an alien culture occupied them as a step towards reigning in the stead of a legitimate régime whose inheritance they aspired to usurp. . . . (VII, p. 228)

Here we get to the kernel of the imperial nut. Barbarians most of the invaders were, no matter the color of their skins or the cut of their clothes. What they did to the natives is a tale of horror so terrible that the exploits of Tamerlane seem mild by comparison. General Chinese Gordon said, "The English pioneers in Africa need civilizing more than the Blacks," and Herman Merivale exposed "the wretched details of the ferocity and treachery which have marked the conduct of civilized men, too often of civilized governments, in their relations with savages."

Many British administrators have told in their memoirs the stories of what members of Christian civilizations do to subjugate the far-away tribes to whom we send missionaries. Sir George Campbell, one of the most distinguished of Indian administrators, said: "The abuses of the Polynesian labour traffic are beyond doubt; there is nothing in modern times more shocking."

Who can wonder, after all these crimes of imperialism, that the people of the eastern world are now in revolt?

Toynbee gives us a glimpse of what has been done by ancient and modern barbarians:

The barbarian's appetite for plunder was sated in the looting of Delhi by the Mārathās; of Tenochtitlan and Cuzco by the Spaniards; of Susa, Persepolis, and Ecbatana by the Macedonians; of Ctesiphon by the Primitive Muslim Arabs; of Baghdad by the Mongols; of Loyang by the Hiongnu; of Kaifêng by the Kin; of Thebes by the Assyrians; of Rome by the Visigoths and Vandals; of Babylon by the Hittites; of Cnossos by her Micenaean marchmen; and of Mycenae, in her turn, by her continental backwoodsmen. . . . (VII, p. 229)

Universal Churches and Civilization

IT IS THE SECOND PART of Volume VII, "Universal Churches" and their relation to civilization, that will attract the attention of the thinking man

who ponders the meaning of the turmoil of the world and wonders how order is to be restored. Notwithstanding the breadth and depth of the early part of this book, which is far superior to the excursive investigations in the first six volumes, the part played by the churches in the waning days of a civilization plunges us into the vortex of what may be the bitterest controversies of a dying age. No matter what encomiums Toynbee may gather concerning the work up to this point, serious students of world affairs will undoubtedly consider all these sections on cults, ancient and modern, as the work of a critical analyst of the highest degree.

We shall now try to digest his presentation of the case for what he calls religion. We shall reflect upon the fortunes and misfortunes of the mission of Paul, and try to understand how far they have been affected by the policies and actions of the State under which they have been allied. Toynbee says, "The achievements of universal states have borne fruit that will not be reaped by the sowers but by alien hands." He tells us that the study, so far

has shown that the principal beneficiaries of universal states are universal churches; and it is therefore not surprising that the champions of a universal state, at a stage in its history at which its own fortunes are manifestly on the wane, should dislike the spectacle of a universal church within its bosom profiting by services that the universal state is continuing to render without any longer being able to turn them to its own benefit. The church is therefore likely at first sight to wear the appearance of a social cancer; for in this situation and state of mind the universal state's devotees are apt, not merely to observe and resent the fact that the church is increasing while the state decreases, but to take it for granted that the beneficiary is also a parasite, and that the patent profit which it draws from its host is the cause of the host's malady. This diagnosis is as attractive as it is exacerbating; for it is always easier, both intellectually and morally, to debit one's ills to the account of some outside agency than to ascribe the responsibility to oneself. (VII, p. 381)

Perhaps it would be well, before we begin an analysis of this section of the work, to ask ourselves: From what in man does the craving for religion arise? We might inquire what his conception of religion is, for we must admit that man was religious before there were priests and a church. Many years ago I suggested that when man realized that his well-being (sowing and reaping a crop) depended upon Mother Earth, sun and cloud, his first impulse was to give thanks for these things. If that be so, the first religious act was one of thanksgiving, and he knelt before an altar of his own making. Lactantius has told us, "Religion is that which binds man to an invisible Creator."

If we take this as a starting point, we shall be ready to meet the divergence of opinion that has caused armed conflict through the ages, and understand the drift of Toynbee's interpretation. It would be idle to blink the fact that skepticism of the claims of the cults was never more pronounced than it is today. Moreover, men of the highest culture have questioned the value of the work of the churches since the reign of Elizabeth Tudor. Toynbee fairly presents the case as it was done by Gibbon in the *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, and he does not hesitate to bring the criticism nearer our time by quoting from Sir James Frazer, who in a footnote in his work, *The Golden Bough*, states:

To prevent misapprehension I will add that the spread of Oriental religions was only one of many causes which contributed to the downfall of ancient civilisation. Among these contributory causes a friend, for whose judgment and learning I entertain the highest respect, counts bad government and a ruinous fiscal system, two of the most powerful agents to blast the prosperity of nations, as may be seen in our own day by the blight which has struck the Turkish Empire. (VII, p. 384*n*.)

In some respects, Frazer and Toynbee are not far apart, although we find Toynbee reverting to questions that he put in the earlier volumes and his own answers to them. Wondering whether Frazer may be right, "in his contention that the higher religions are essentially and incurably anti-social," he asks, "Are spiritual and social values antithetical and inimical to one another?"

This question will surely startle the reader for the modernity of it has the ring of the positivist and Fabian gongs. Anti-social! Surely the term suggests an urban value—something that concerns the mass, which Dostoievsky dealt with in *The Grand Inquisitor*, a kind of spiritual bread that was given with the material loaf, to keep the rabble quiet.

In this connection Toynbee asks: "Is the fabric of civilization undermined if the salvation of the individual soul is taken as being the supreme aim of life?" The reply is: "Frazer answers these questions in the affirmative; and, if his answer were right, it would mean that human life was a tragedy without a catharsis. . . ." (VII, p. 386)

He does not notice the extraordinary contradiction. If the supreme aim of life is the "salvation of the individual soul," how can this apply to the mass split-up into innumerable sects which cannot find a common ground for socializing Christian doctrine? One sect says, "I will save my soul in this way, not in the way that you prescribe." A hymn that

was sung long years ago in this country went:

I'd rather be a Baptist, and wear a shining face,
Than for to be a Methodist and always fall from grace.

Would it not be better for us to step apart from the bitterness of the controversies that have been raging since the Reformation (to go no further back), and try to understand what it is in man that craves something higher than himself or his neighbor to satisfy his spiritual desires? Neither the political nor the social world offers anything that he can accept in this respect. Acton says all great men are bad men, and the more we inquire into their motives and policies, the less we respect them. In other sections of the community, the larder is bare. One has only to know something of the life of the working classes, to have been one of them, to have endured their privations and anxieties, to know how they respond to an honest appeal to worship God, the Father of all—just and benevolent.

Surely the history of England all down the centuries is full of examples of this craving for spiritual enlightenment, which has gone by the name of revivals. Let the mind turn back upon the conditions when Paulinus came to Kent. The same hunger that possesses the people today was felt by the Saxon invader, and Green revives the story of the ealdormen who petitioned the king to hear the missionary:

So seems the life of man, O king, as a sparrow's flight through the hall when you were sitting at meat in winter-tide, with the warm fire lighted on the hearth, but the icy rain-storm without. The sparrow flies in at one door and tarries for a moment in the light and heat of the hearth-fire, and then flying forth from the other vanishes into the wintry darkness whence it came. So tarries for a moment the life of man in our sight, but what is before it, what after it, we know not. If this new teaching tells us aught certainly of these, let us follow it. (*Bede's Ecclesiastical History of the English Nation*, Bk. II, ch. XIII)

This may be legend, but it expresses the yearning for spiritual light, and who is to pierce the darkness of the skepticism of our time? What is to be expected from the disciples of Marx? What have the two World Wars done to Christian thought? And where were the churches when the youth of two generations were wiped out? May it not be said that the warmongers' business of saving civilization has done more to hasten its end than any other factor?

Churches as Chrysalises

TOYNBEE TELLS US that, by the year 1952, mankind had seen the number of the Great Powers of the world reduced to no more than two, through the cumulative effect of two World Wars in one lifetime. He points out:

Communism, now dominant by force over one of two political spheres between which the World had come to be partitioned, now appeared to be playing for the supreme stakes of world power or downfall; yet in essence its prospects were unchanged; for the compromising subservience to the Soviet Union, into which the Communist Movement had fallen during the inter-war years as a result of its brilliant politico-military success in seizing and holding the Russian Empire by force, had been confirmed and intensified by the outcome of the Second World War. . . (VII, p. 416)

After an inquiry into the uses of churches as chrysalises, Toynbee finds that they are not a necessity of life for the species of society known as civilization. His conclusion is most discouraging for those who imagined that a spiritual awakening of the people of the west might come, as Spengler suggested, in a Second Religiousness.

. . . While History testified that the four living churches had in fact performed this service on one occasion, it also indicated that this episode in the careers of these churches might have been incidental and perhaps even accidental. If this was the truth, it signified that the historic role of these churches as chrysalises for civilizations told a historian no more than their fabulous role as cancers told him about the essence of their nature, mission, and prospects. In our search for this ultimate objective of our inquiry, we have once again drawn blank. If we are to continue our investigation, we must make a fresh start from quite a different premise. (VII, p. 419)

Toynbee rejects the notion that the church "serves as egg, grub, and chrysalis between butterfly and butterfly." He was led to this idea by Burkitt's comment which reads:

The old civilisation was doomed, but this religious Nihilism puts nothing in its place. To the orthodox Christian, on the other hand, the Church stood, like Aaron, between the dead and the living, as a middle term between the things of the Next World and of This. It was the Body of Christ and therefore eternal; something worth living for and working for. Yet it was in the World as much as the Empire itself. The idea of the Church thus formed an invaluable fixed point, round which a new civilisation could slowly crystallise. (VII, p. 392)

So far as the western world was concerned, I can think of only one period when the butterfly stage was reached, say from the middle of the eleventh century to the end of the fourteenth. In that period monks were chancellors, and as John of Salisbury has pointed out, their office was to remind the king of the law of justice.

However, in considering the development of the chrysalis stage, it seems to me that there is one important matter that has been overlooked,

and that was when the political power realized that the church could be used for pragmatic purposes. After the conflicts came to a temporary end at the time of Constantine, the State having taken the church for wife, it realized its use for sedative purposes. There was less chance of economic dissension among the people who were taught to tolerate the turmoil of earthly affairs, with the prospect of passing into a heaven after death. This is merely the political view of things as I see it. But we must remember that the roots of our learning are embedded deeply in the institutions of schools that were the work of the eminent prelates of monasticism. If there were a butterfly that emerged from the chrysalis that is worth remembering, it is surely the school that formed the basis of a university. And oddly enough, it received the blessing of some of the kingly giants of the political world.

This story, from the time of Alfred to the end of the Plantagenet period, is one of the crowning glories of the church. It should not be forgotten in this controversy.

In the section on "Churches as a Higher Species of Society," we encounter the problems of evolution, and the anthropologist and the biologist enter the scene. Here Toynbee is confronted with the perplexing controversies that raged fifty years ago and are not yet settled. This is a field of inquiry that has engaged the minds of scientists and seems to me a subject entirely apart from the one that is the theme of this volume. It is dangerous ground for an advocate of Toynbee's position. In a footnote he presents the challenge made by Mr. Martin Wight, who says Toynbee is not clear about the specific differentiae of man:

At several places below you use traditional language in this connexion, saying that Man is "made in God's image," possesses a "moral faculty," and is the sole vehicle of "spiritual values." Such language suggests that Man was created by God, viz. that at some point in the evolutionary biological process (if we accept that hypothesis) God created a creature different in kind from what went before by endowing it with a soul. . . . (VII, p. 420*n*.)

The question raised by Mr. Wight is not easily answered. Indeed, it is an awkward one for the most erudite philosopher, and Toynbee shows that he is not inclined to meet the anthropologist upon his own ground. He says:

. . . After Man had become human, he continued to live in primitive societies for hundreds of thousands of years before the first civilizations made their appearance; and the first civilizations were considerably older than the first higher religions. Even the rudiments of higher religions

did not appear till some of the civilizations of the first generation were already disintegrating, while the rise of fully-fledged higher religions was subsequent to the breakdown of civilizations of the second generation. . . . (VII, pp. 420-1)

This statement does not carry us far. Indeed, it ignores the point that Mr. Wight has made. To my mind, we are back again in company with Lamarck, and his theory of the development of the species might help to elucidate the problem. "Sense of need" goes far to explain the development of all living creatures. But perhaps now we are too far removed from nature to dwell upon the proclamations that she makes to man season after season, day after day, emphasizing the difference between him and the fowl and the brute.

It was a simpler task that faced the ancients in thinking this matter out for themselves. Plato puts into the mouth of Socrates at least two mighty endowments of man denied to all the rest of living creatures. These are: speech and the knowledge that he can produce his own food.

When we observe the customs and habits of insects, birds, and animals, we are struck with their methods of seeking a living and breeding, which imposes upon us the thought that man was meant for something quite different. True, he is lord of all, and all is his to tame. Indeed, nature proclaims that he is God's gardener. If there be intention, purpose in creation, nature makes it plain to man that Providence bestowed upon him every essential for his well-being. If this be so, and I know not anyone who has tried to refute this idea, we may assume that in the long course of his evolution to the state when he was blessed with speech and the mind that helped him to solve the problems of his physical and appetitive needs, he discovered that the power which enabled him to subdue nature and care for the morrow came from the spark within him that we call soul. Whether he was made in God's image or was blessed with a soul in the first stage, neither anthropologist nor biologist can determine. Yet, if speech and mind were dormant from the first but inherent in the creature, there is no reason for denying that spark that in his development became what we call "soul."

There is only one Creator, and He who made a grain of sand and gave song to a bird is surely capable of endowing man with a spirit that gives order to the mind, knowledge of right and wrong, and speech to make it possible for him to love his neighbor as himself.

Much of this section on "Churches as a Higher Species of Society" is concerned with the differences of opinion among the many Christian sects,

in contradistinction to the other religions of the East. We have been over this ground many times since the days of Strauss and Renan, to say nothing of the Leckys and the Robertsons of the palmy days of rationalism. However, it is strange to find Toynbee, the champion of all that is best in the Christian creed, courageously presenting the cults and their myths that were adapted by Paul and his followers to establish the Christology of Jesus.

Notwithstanding so much repetition, one tolerates it because in the excursus he lights up so many dark byways which are not entered by Christian teachers. His dissertation upon "God is love" is welcome, for there are few in our time who realize that. What greater love can be expressed for man than the bountiful source of his well-being, coupled with the spirit and mind-power to use it for the production of his food? To think of what these miraculous attributes have done for man since he grubbed the earth with his hands and went in search of natural foods is to appreciate, to say the least, the bounty of the Creator and treasure the work of His hands.

Religion, in the sense expressed by Lactantius, must be the true end of man. But Toynbee poses a problem that has its catastrophic tendency. He says:

. . . If the truth was that Religion is the true end of Man, and that civilizations have their *raison d'être* in ministering to spiritual progress, then, once again, a civilization might break down, but the replacement of one higher religion by another need not be a necessary consequence. So far from that, it might be augured that, if a secularized Western Civilization were to break down in its turn after having swept all its contemporaries into its net, the living higher religions would not only survive but would grow in wisdom and stature as the result of a fresh experience of secular catastrophe. The spiritual insight that they might gain through further suffering might lead them, as we have suggested, to a mutual recognition of their own essential unity in diversity. . . . (VII, p. 448)

The dark shadows of the pauperization of the masses are spread all over the western world. Political patriarchy, pay without work, sops and doles to keep the unions quiet are working like slow poison undermining the spiritual stamina of the people. How a new religion, or the revival of an old one, is to resolve this problem is not yet touched upon by our author. Yet, he knows the fate that overtook Greece and Rome. Once a man loses all sense of his own dignity and has no respect for his own possible attainment, he becomes a pariah. Parasites cultivate parasites.

It may be too late to interpret anew the mission of Jesus. Since the

coalition of church and State, it has been considered by some critics a dangerous adventure for anyone but a philosopher to enlighten the public on this essential matter. Toynbee quotes Sir James Frazer, who draws a parallel between the history of Christianity and the history of Buddhism:

. . . Both systems were in their origin essentially ethical reforms born of the generous ardour, the lofty aspirations, the tender compassion of their noble Founders, two of those beautiful spirits who appear at rare intervals on Earth like beings come from a better world to support and guide our weak and erring nature. . . . (VII, p. 451)

The key word of the mission of Jesus was *Justice*, and the imperative in which he pronounced it was, "Seek ye therefore first the kingdom of God and his justice, and all these things shall be added unto you." This was the ethical pronouncement, and not until the masses of communicants who use the churches understand the ethical purpose of the Man of Nazareth will there be order in the world.

"Render therefore to Caesar the things that are Caesar's; and to God, the things that are God's" was the offense against Rome that brought Him to the Cross. He did not suffer because He was called the King of the Jews; He died because He was a danger to the empire. Frazer was quite right when he said the mission was an ethical one.

In conclusion, I would recommend to the reader a close reading of the last part of the section I am here dealing with. From page 476 onwards, Toynbee treats of the war between science and religion, as it rages in the soul of western man, and he shows how science has undermined the tenets of Christian life. The last war with its explosion of the atom bomb brought no peace to the mind of the combatants. The chaos that reigns today is not only spiritual; it is intellectual. As for the culture brought to birth in the Dark Ages, and developed by the giants of learning of the monastic system, with its glories of the Gothic in architecture, literature, music, painting and sculpture, it is gone—blasted out of the era by politicians and scientists.

The reader should not miss the critique of Mr. Martin Wight, which is in Annex III. Its title is: "The Crux for an Historian brought up in the Christian Tradition." In this he takes issue with Toynbee and points out some discrepancies in his reasoning and interpretations. It is a weighty review of the main points of Volume VII, and underlines the changes that have taken place in the mind of the author since he wrote the first six volumes.

Arnold Toynbee's *Study of History*

Volume VIII

AFTER WRITING MY REVIEW of the seventh volume, a period of reflection set in, and my mind was filled with many doubting questions about the efficacy of the elaborate descriptions of antagonisms that arose within States and religious bodies before the days of Constantine. I have already remarked that it is difficult to divest oneself of the religious and social environment of one's youth. And Toynbee is conscious that what has been inculcated in the early days tinctures the viewpoint of mature age and is a handicap imposed upon the historian.

There were times, in reading the former volume, when I felt that he was dealing with a Christianity that was absolutely unknown in the Middle Ages. Since the fatal schism and Trent—a calamity for a united Christendom—the materialism of Christian life has altered so much that was vital to the higher men of the monastic period, that one cannot help but think, if they came again, they would not know what we are about.

The true mission and sole aim of Jesus has disappeared from the thought of churchmen. Perhaps owing to the complexity of life today—the growth of bureaucracies, the urbanization of the masses, the industrial grind, and the tawdry attractions, in the shape of time-wasting gadgets—the possibility of meditation or communion with one's soul is precluded. Religion, as Toynbee describes it, is now in the wholesale category—a communal matter, something for the mob. Yet, what else can be done by our prelates? Surely they of all people know that, as the town expands to a city, and a city to a megalopolitan metropolis, the work of true religion becomes more and more difficult to accomplish. And keen observers realize it is losing its power as a gospel of good tidings. I feel strongly that even Spengler's idea of a Second Religiousness is fading away and will soon disappear altogether.

Mission of Jesus

I AM OFTEN ASKED by the troubled what I think of the condition and how it might be remedied. For over fifty years I have told clerics and laymen who have appealed to me that I have only one thought of what might be done, and that is to preach the mission of Jesus. Some have been shrewd enough to remark that that means an abandonment of the Christology of Paul. I am not so sure, however, that it would mean all

that, for I have heard well-known dignitaries of the Episcopal Church deliver sermons from texts taken from the epistles, and never mention the term Christ or Paul, but in place of Christ, use the term Jesus. I well remember a sermon on a text from Romans, delivered by Canon Raven in Liverpool Cathedral, which astonished me so much that afterwards I spoke to the Bishop and the Dean. To my surprise, they did not think it was strange.

Why has the modern church—Catholic and Protestant—ignored the declaration of the mission, as it is given in Matthew 3:15: "Suffer it to be so now. For so it becometh us to fulfil all justice." (Douay Version)

This was the reply to the Baptist at Jordan. Maybe it has been overlooked, because in the Revised Version the word "righteousness" is substituted for justice. The terms are not synonymous—not by any means. Indeed, I know from my experience in the Brotherhood Movement that to tens of thousands of men before the First World War, the term righteousness was regarded as mere Sabbatarianism—church-going, for appearance's sake. The drift from the churches into the Brotherhood Movement after the Boer War was an indication of the spiritual revolution that was taking place in the minds of men who found little hope for a happier condition of affairs.

There has been a constant stream of learned works from the higher critics pouring from the presses of Europe for over fifty years. So great is the volume that it is impossible to keep track of them all. The range from Loisy and Streeter to the Schweich lectures of Zuntz, *The Text of the Epistles*, covers the whole controversy concerning the interpretation of the Scriptures. To what extent these are read by those who minister to their flocks is unknown. How the busy parson could find time to delve into them and extract the treasures of their reasoning is a conundrum. Take, for example, Rudolf Bultmann's *Theology of the New Testament*. He begins with the startling statement:

The message of Jesus is a presupposition for the theology of the New Testament rather than a part of that theology itself. For New Testament theology consists in the unfolding of those ideas by means of which Christian faith makes sure of its own object, basis, and consequences. But Christian faith did not exist until there was a Christian kerygma; i.e., a kerygma proclaiming Jesus Christ—specifically Jesus Christ the Crucified and Risen One—to be God's eschatological act of salvation. . . . (p. 3)

Already there are repercussions which indicate disagreement among the higher critics, and this is not surprising, for Bultmann says:

[Paul's] conversion brought him into the Hellenistic Church; it was in Hellenistic territory that he was soon working as a missionary in company with another Hellenistic missionary, Barnabas, who had sought him out and taken him to Antioch to collaborate with him. . . .

After his conversion he made no effort toward contact with Jesus' disciples or the Jerusalem Church for instruction concerning Jesus and his ministry. On the contrary, he vehemently protests his independence from them in Gal. 1-2. And, in fact, his letters barely show traces of the influence of Palestinian tradition concerning the history and preaching of Jesus. . . . (p. 188)

Notwithstanding this differentiation made by Bultmann, found also in Loisy's work, I fail to trace in any of these volumes a clear understanding of the object of Jesus' mission. These authors do not seem to realize the intense significance of the ethico-economic meaning of Justice, as it is used by Jesus.

I may be wrong, but for years I have believed that the basis of his mission was to expound the difference between those things created and those produced. And to him Justice was firmly rooted in the use of created things. What is created cannot be owned. If Toynbee had given a little attention to the work of the higher critics, he might have saved himself the trouble of drawing blanks when he was engaged upon the elaborate treatises devoted to the work of conquerors and missionaries.

It is just here that I find the great difference in Christian thought that has taken place since the days of Henry Tudor and Thomas Cromwell. I do not overlook the dissolute condition of some of the monasteries and nunneries. In many of them drastic reform was called for, undoubtedly; and I am not thinking of the doctrine or ritual of the church. What seems to me more important in this issue is the philosophy of existence that was freely expressed by learned men within and outside of the church; and this philosophy was founded upon natural law, the basis of divine justice.

One of the main stumbling blocks to a proper understanding of the motive of Toynbee's desire for a universal church, in the truly catholic sense of the term, is the sectarian prejudice of the separate Christian cults. Much is rejected because it comes from the mind of a prelate of another order. Even *The Analogy of Religion*, the very flower of wisdom of that shining mind of Joseph Butler—unanswerable though Sir James Mackintosh said it was—failed to lighten the dark souls of his critical opponents. If ever there was a non-sectarian work penned by a theologian, Butler's masterpiece was the one.

During World War II the man, whom I dare to compare with Joseph Butler, exhorted all men—not some men, but men of all nations, east and west—to turn their minds to a new moral order. He said:

[it] must be founded on that immovable and unshakable rock, the moral law which the Creator Himself has manifested by means of the natural order and which He has engraved with indelible characters in the hearts of men. (Christmas 1941)

Alas, though this was a Christmas oration, it fell on deaf ears, for each of the leaders in the war was calling upon his own deistic power for greater strength to annihilate the foe. This proclamation of Pope Pius XII has no sectarian tinge.

A year later, undismayed by the ferocity of the warring battalions, political, naval, military and aerial, His Holiness laid down five fundamental points for the order and pacification of human society:

- (1) dignity and rights of the human person;
- (2) defense of social unity and especially of the family;
- (3) dignity and prerogatives of labor;
- (4) the rehabilitation of juridic order;
- (5) conception of the State according to the Christian spirit.

From the juridic order, as willed by God, flows man's inalienable right to juridic security, and by this very fact to a definite sphere of rights immune from all arbitrary attack. (December 1942)

Is there anything sectarian in this declaration that an honest, intelligent man can object to? Surely the appeal is universal and is as applicable to one sect as it is to another. The difference lies here—that His Holiness meant what he said, for that means everything to the common man who wants balm for his sorrowing soul. Therefore, I contend that Pope Pius XII has given a lead to all prelates of all denominations. Moreover, the epoch-making statement that he made upon the affinities of religion and science blew the miasmas of rationalistic controversy away from the miry pastures and let the sun of comprehension purify the air and give warmth to the nourishing grass.

To me it seems as if an echo has come from the hills about Nazareth, and the speaker of our day is imbued with the same sense of justice and the operation of God's law that prompted the saying, "Oh, ye of little faith. . . . Your Father knoweth that you have need of all these things."

There will be no peace, either in universal State or in universal religion, until religious truth is expressed clearly by those who minister to God's flocks—sinners and saints alike—and nourishes them upon spiritual food.

The Law of Justice

IN AN ESSAY of superlative value to us who ponder the inwardness of the great problems Toynbee deals with, Professor W. H. V. Reade, the Subwarden of Keble College, Oxford, puts the essential in words any intelligent man can understand:

. . . And here once more there was a broad agreement in principle between the sacred and the secular tradition. The Church looked back to a Law of God which the Saviour had come not to destroy but to fulfil. The *lex nova* had abolished the ceremonial parts of the *lex vetus*, but had preserved the moral precepts as a necessary preface to the more spiritual teaching of the Gospel. In course of time the Scriptures had been supplemented by the decisions of Councils and Popes and by the growth of a body of custom, authoritative, not because it was human convention, but because it was believed to represent the inspiration of the Church. The *Corpus Iuris* could not, indeed, lay claim to so exalted a sanction as this, but it was permeated by the belief that Justice was an external fact, and that human law owed its moral validity to its derivation from a Law of Nature binding, as Kant would say, on all rational beings. Whatever differences of opinion there were about the meaning of *ius naturale*, it certainly pointed to the existence of a Justice neither made by man nor alterable by his arbitrary will. . . . (*Cambridge Medieval History*, VI, pp. 616-7)

Here we have a brilliant statement of the justice that Jesus came to fulfill. And it was not one for a state beyond the skies; it was to be right here where men strive to live and have their being. "Thy kingdom come on earth." And when he said, *regnum meum non est de hoc mundo*, he meant that there was no hope for it under the political tyranny of Rome. This interpretation was called the "milk" of the gospel by men in the Brotherhood Movement. And it drew them to the meetings in hundreds of thousands for eight years before August, 1914.

It is this reading of the mission of Jesus that is missing in Toynbee's analysis. Had it been applied to an understanding of the conflicts within the pagan dynasties, which he describes so vividly and powerfully, the reader would gain a clearer appreciation of the underlying reason for the fierce antagonisms, which resulted in wars of conquest and the enslavement of the conquered.

I will take no second place to anyone in my admiration of the task Toynbee has undertaken to bring enlightenment to our scholars. Indeed, it may be said that the people who need to read, digest and meditate upon his work are those who go by the name of modern philosophers and scientists.

His denunciation, in the seventh volume, of scientists becoming servants of the State for the purposes of destruction is none too severe. Yet, some of them, such as Schrödinger and Heisenberg, stand aloof from their bomb colleagues, and find few benefits accruing to men from the use of the atom since it was split by Rutherford.

Loose Usage of Terms

A THOROUGH, CONSCIENTIOUS REVIEW of the early chapters of Volume VIII is not possible within the strictly limited space of a quarterly magazine. Such a work would call for a volume of three or four hundred pages. Apart from the historical detail of all the States Toynbee surveys, I find in his methods of analogy and comparison many terms used loosely. And these should be clearly understood. But a reviewer is obliged to select only a few that seem to cloud the reasoning of the author. Some of them are: liberalism, capitalism, and barbarism. He seems to give the first a Fabianesque twist. For instance, he says, "The breaches blown by the blast of a Modern Western technology had opened a passage for the spirit of a Modern Western Liberalism." (VIII, p. 134)

Again on the next page he uses the same term. Is there such a political doctrine as modern liberalism, as the English understood the creed of Cobden and Gladstone? The technology of iron steamships and railways did not change in any particular the political creed of the Radicals which had passed down from the Whigs of Queen Anne's days to George Grote and James Mill. The infiltration of Fabians at the election of 1906 was looked upon by the remnant of the Radicals, the Gladstonian Liberals, as a dangerous element which would lead to the pandering of sops and doles by a bureaucracy.

As for the term capitalism, it was the Radical section of the Liberal party that took the proposals and conceptions elaborated after the publication of *Das Kapital* and proved that Marx had built his work upon an economic fallacy. So thorough was their analysis of the theories laid down by Marx in the early chapters of his book, that the Fabians, particularly Sidney Webb, were forced to discard Marx's theories of surplus value and labor time.

The term barbarism, or barbarians, cannot be applied exclusively to tribes beyond the pale of pagan or Christian civilization. So far as we can gather from the investigations of anthropologists and sociologists, they were not very much different in their native condition from the invaders who desired to subject them to their will. Yet, strange as it might

seem, no record has been found in the archives of ancient or modern foreign offices of a barbarian ruler asking a civilized State to come in and slaughter the natives and exploit the resources of the country. Caesar's trans-Alpine adventure is typical of civilized methods employed to take what can be picked up, as Spengler put it.

But no barbarism in the past can be compared with that we have experienced since the Boer War. To read the records of Smuts and DeWet concerning the avowed policy (as expressed by Milner) of extirpating the Boer people is so revolting that it was necessary to impose a hush-hush policy upon historians of that war, and keep it from the knowledge of the British masses. The concentration camps of South Africa were, in proportion to the population of the Boer people, as shocking as anything that has taken place since. No State has a monopoly on atrocities in dealing with the enemy.

The barbarism of the last war was so terrible that when one knew the facts, it was possible to think that the people would rise against militarism in any shape or form. But the way in which the story of the horror was served up by the press made it merely a one-sided matter and thwarted our common-sense judgment of the horrible business.

Heroic Ages

IN "THE ACCUMULATION OF PRESSURE," a brilliant review of the organized forces of the civilized State versus tribal regions that have been invaded, Toynbee reveals the advantages of the defenders against great odds, drilled and equipped for warfare against like battalions. He compares the action of the Rifi highlanders of Morocco against the Spanish and the French legions with the Teutobergerwald in 9 A.D., when disaster fell upon the legions of Varus. (VIII, p. 20)

He gives us many instances of what the few determined defenders can do to cause havoc to their enemies. The story of Morocco, since the Act of Algeciras was signed, should be told in full if we are to understand why the First World War took place. But that, perhaps, is no part of Professor Toynbee's job. Still, he does emphasize the fact that for both victor and conquered, time exposed the futility of it all.

Think of India as it was at the time of Victoria's Diamond Jubilee, and what it is now. Let your mind brood upon Africa—from Oran and Alexandria to the Cape of Good Hope—and count the wars since the days of Gordon's murder, and pronounce a judgment upon those who imagined that the dream of Rhodes of a Cape-to-Cairo railroad would be

a blessing to the British Empire. What nightmares of shortsighted politicians have been responsible for the destruction of their fellows!

The marvel of it is that it has lasted so long. Perhaps the reason for its continuance is that all politicians are tarred with the same brush. They think the deeds of their lifetime have an eternal value and that the fame and glory acquired by war will endure long after they are dead. Toynbee's examples in this eighth volume should teach them, if they are capable of reading it, that Acton was right when he said that all great men are bad men.

In "Dichtung und Wahrheit," Toynbee says:

In social terms the Heroic Age is a great folly, and an even greater crime; but in emotional terms it is a great experience; the thrilling experience of breaking through a barrier which has baffled the barbarian invaders' forebears for many generations past, and bursting out into an apparently boundless world that offers what seem to be infinite possibilities. . . . (VIII, p. 78)

This chapter upon Heroic Ages may be overlooked by the student who reads in a hurry to find out what all the elaborate detail concerning the actions of the barbarians leads to. However, it will be a pity to skip it, for the information in it is necessary for a proper understanding of the analysis that follows. Toynbee says:

In the three immediately preceding parts of this book we have followed up our general study of the problem, nature, and process of the disintegrations of civilizations by making particular studies of the institutions created by each of the three factions into which the body social of a disintegrating civilization splits up. We have studied successively the universal states, the universal churches, and the barbarian war-bands that are the characteristic creations of the dominant minorities and the internal and external proletariats of societies that have convicted themselves of having broken down by falling into schism; and the conclusion of these three supplementary historical inquiries would have brought us to the end of our study of History itself if our initial working hypothesis that civilizations are intelligible fields of study had proved to hold good for a study of all phases of their histories. (VIII, p. 88)

This rather negative conclusion must not discourage the reader. The ninepins set up by Toynbee had to be knocked down by Toynbee.

Cults

WHAT SPIRITUAL AND MENTAL TURMOILS are brought to our notice by Toynbee's minute investigations of universal States and universal churches! We cannot help but reach the decision that, whether they be eastern or

western political organizations, there is a sameness of sheer wickedness rife in all of them. As for the pagan cults and the Christian sects, no matter whether they be universal religions or parochial rites to a Cybele or an Isis, they are prone to change and decay. And, yet, the primitive ideas expressed in the myths survive under other forms of worship. No record shows this so clearly as Hadrian's letter to his brother-in-law, which Renan gives us in *L'Église Chrétienne* (p. 189).

We learn from it that the patriarch himself, when he visited Egypt, was forced to adore Serapis. Further, not a president of a Jewish synagogue, nor a Samaritan, nor a Christian priest escapes the astrological rites of the charlatan. In connection with this, it should be remembered that the emperor Antoninus Pius introduced the worship of Serapis at Rome A.D. 146 (the middle of the second century).

Our gods today are Mammon, Progress, and Nuclear Science. And crystal-grazing increases with the output of gadgets. What we are to make of all this, Toynbee is not yet prepared to tell us. His job at present is to let us see the past as he sees it. His recommendations may come later. Nevertheless, we must appreciate fully the pains that he has taken to make it clear that universal States and universal churches, pagan and otherwise, have traveled a very rough road since Abraham left Ur.

What is to be done to better the lot of Aristotle's political animal is a puzzle of cross currents in policies that now emanate from foreign ministers and lay leaders of thought, who imagine the brute will turn over a new leaf if another war is waged against a State that is suffering from the same complaints. The wretched political animal who has tumbled so often from the tightrope of one clear direction seems to have lost his acrobatic nerve, and suspects the capacity of our ringmasters to give him advice about foolproof adventures.

Contemporary Civilizations

THE SECTIONS DEVOTED to the Modern West and the Hindu World, Islam, the Jews, and the Far East, will be required reading for the students of modern history. After what has taken place since the end of the First World War in the disturbance of boundaries, the political changes of government and the shifting of populations, they will learn much history of a period that extended from the days of Clive and Warren Hastings to the work of concessionaires in Africa and the Near East. It is, to some extent, a story of exploitation by concessionaires, but only in part, for Toynbee has not yet reached the stage when France and Spain were per-

mitted by Great Britain to go into Morocco to fulfill the plans of the Comité du Maroc and its kindred association in Spain.

In one of the sections, however, he does deal with the campaigns of General Lyautey against the Moroccan natives of the hills. There he shows that the ideas of modern warfare, developed by the British and the French militarists, suffered considerably at the hands of much smaller forces, less powerfully armed, bands of guerillas who were able to take cover in natural defenses.

There is a passage in the section on the Hindus, which reveals that no one State had a monopoly on methods of genocide. Toynbee says:

The traditional cure for "over-population," not only in the Hindu World but in the economy of other civilizations too in a pre-democratic age, was to allow famine, pestilence, civil disorder, and war to reduce the population again to a figure at which the survivors would once more find themselves able to lead their traditional life on their customary low standard; and horrifying instances of drastic reductions of population by methods of barbarism were indeed on record. . . . (VIII, pp. 214-5)

A civilization is born of war, nourished and maintained by slaves who undermine the economic and political fabric, and eventually bring it to its fall. There is highly seasoned meat in these sections, and Toynbee's courage in dealing with it realistically is unusual for a modern historian.

The story of British rule in India is extant, and apart from the wondrous work of the empire's administrators, it is one of horror. In many respects, the home government at London could teach the Turks a few tricks in the art of genocide. However, it must be admitted that the men at the head of affairs in the eighteenth century and the first half of the next one treated their fellow compatriots in much the same way they treated the heathen. The Corn Law rhymes are indicative of what the people suffered in England, and Byron's *The Age of Bronze* stamps the iniquities of rulers with shame.

I welcome Toynbee's appreciation of Clot Bey, the French physician whom Mehmed Ali took into his service. Clot wrote:

Ce ne sont jamais les peuples qui font les civilisations, ce sont de grandes individualités qui les imposent presque toujours par la lutte et par la violence. (VIII, p. 234) [It is never peoples who build civilizations; great individuals almost always force them upon them by strife and by violence.—F.N.]

His pronouncement goes to the very core of the matter of the rise and formation of the universal State. All these have been born in the womb

of conquest. The myopia of modern statesmen—those responsible for the so-called unnecessary wars of this century—was as bad as their ignorance of the feverish unrest of eastern peoples. Historians of another generation will say our politicians were famous for their lack of political sagacity. Those who thought there would be no liquidation of empires were living in an unreal world.

Toynbee's review of Palestinian problems leaves much to be added. In this volume he does not refer to the magnet of the Dead Sea chemical areas, which attracted Dr. Weizmann and Alfred Mond. He may deal with this important issue later on, but I think that he does see clearly that the murder of a Jew by a Nazi does not differ morally from the murder of an Arab by a Jew. Whether the atrocities were committed upon millions or thousands does not alter the fact that wrong was done, and we have yet to have the whole matter thrashed out (in a spirit free of animus and race hatred) of the treatment of minorities at home and abroad.

Genocide is no new thing. The student of the Old Testament is familiar with the depravities of the Deuteronomic period. Indeed, the curse chapter of Deuteronomy (28th) exceeds in ferocious penalty what has been done in recent years. But murder is murder, no matter when or how it is done.

As an instance of the pot calling the kettle black, there is a passage in the section, "The Modern West and the Jews," that will cause not a little controversy among Jews and Gentiles. Toynbee writes:

An historian, observing this deadly recoil on Jewish heads of the shedding of Jesus' blood, might come to the cynical conclusion that, in gently submitting to be put to death, at his Jewish fellow countrymen's instigation, by the Roman authorities, Jesus had involuntarily done his own people immeasurably greater harm than they had subsequently suffered at Muhammad's Gentile hands when this militant prophet had provided for his landless Meccan followers at Medina by instigating the massacre and spoliation of the Jewish husbandmen in the Medinese oasis. . . . (VIII, p. 283)

The sections concerning British interests in the future of Palestine, as a home for the Jews, is of peculiar interest to us in this country, for it deals with matters of policy and the underlying reasons of British leaders in both wars, which prompted them to make commitments that were not given due consideration as to their consequences. Toynbee holds Britain responsible for much of the muddle:

From first to last, there was never a practicable plan in British minds for peacefully stabilizing the explosively unstable situation in Palestine which Britain had deliberately created. The British Government did not attempt to stabilize even the respective numbers of the Arab and Jewish elements in the population until the Jewish minority had been allowed to become so large—"approaching a third of the entire population of the country"—that there was no longer any chance of its being willing to remain a minority in a bi-national state and no longer any possibility of such a state, if ever constituted on paper, finding it possible to govern itself through the Western institution of majority rule. (VIII, p. 304)

Maybe he has not yet reached the place where it is necessary to tell the story of the mandate. There is much more to it than we learn in his pages so far. Lloyd George's thoughtless commitment to Dr. Weizmann will be found in the Welsh statesman's *War Memoirs*. And in this connection it should not be overlooked that Churchill was Colonial Secretary when the Dead Sea chemical areas were handed over to the Jews for exploitation. All this is essential if we are to understand what took place.

Toynbee on Communism

I SHOULD LIKE far more space to deal with Toynbee's use of the word "Communism." He seems to be under the impression that it is practiced in Soviet Russia. It was never attempted either by Lenin or, much less by Stalin, who had not been in power three years before I called the system Stalinism, *i.e.*, iron-clad bureaucratic rule. Many times I have pointed out to the readers of my articles in the *American Journal of Economics and Sociology* that the proposals and conceptions of Socialism (Communism) are as follows:

The State shall control all the means of production, distribution and exchange for the equal benefit of all; the State has power over persons, their faculties and their possessions.

After many controversies following the publication of the *Communist Manifesto* and the first volume of *Das Kapital*, Socialists themselves set to work to analyze the practical meaning of this ideal. Liberals and Socialists alike agreed that wealth was unequally distributed. But the distributive proposals of Communism for the equal benefit of all caused profound disagreement among them. Hence, the many searching inquiries made during the last half of the nineteenth century into the methods by which the wealth of the producers could be equally divided.

Professor Robert Flint, of Edinburgh University, in his book *Socialism*, discussed the matter profoundly and came to the conclusion that it was

practically impossible to put the distributive proposals into operation. Max Hirsch, in *Democracy versus Socialism*, came to the same conclusion.

I doubt very much whether Lenin or Trotsky thought such a scheme was possible. It was a shock to Lenin when he found that his idea of socializing agricultural workers was far more difficult than controlling the laborers of a factory or a shipyard. And when he passed away, Stalin adopted the most brutal, tyrannical methods to bring all producers of wealth to heel. The system that prevails at present in the soviets can no more be called Marxism than Leninism.

Toynbee, however, puts the whole matter on another plane. He raises it to a conflict between Communism and Christianity. And his notions of this struggle are surprisingly novel. He says:

. . . Stalin's appropriation of the international flag of Marxism to serve as a new banner for Russian nationalism was a paradox because it was as illogical as it was statesmanlike. In logic the question was not an open one at all. The one faith that a militant Russia could logically pit against a Modern Western Liberalism was the traditional Russian version of Orthodox Christianity, since Russia's claim to be the sole surviving repository of a perfect Christian Orthodoxy constituted her title to be "the Third Rome" who was "the Heir of the Promise." To throw over Orthodox Christianity was to throw away the credentials on which the whole of her pre-tension to uniqueness rested. . . . (VIII, pp. 134-5)

What chance was there for Russian Orthodox Christianity to work an economic miracle when western Christianity had failed signally to serve this object?

In another place, Toynbee refers to Marxism as an "ideological weapon for a militant Russia to adopt for use on a world-wide arena." It seems to me the only weapon that can be of service in changing the economic condition is that of equality of opportunity; one that statesmen talk about when they are after votes, but have not the slightest intention of furthering by statute, in order to bring about a better system of the production and distribution of wealth.

Whether we call the systems in vogue Socialism, Communism, Fabianism, Fascism, Bolshevism, Totalitarianism, or any other bureaucratic "isms," man remains a land animal, and all his sustenance is drawn from Mother Earth. Whether he be a butcher, a baker, a candlestick maker, or a member of any other trade, the essentials of his material well-being are just the same today as they were at the time when Joseph was in Egypt—food, fuel, clothing, and shelter, which are wealth. So long as the pro-

ducer is handicapped by monopoly and heavy taxes upon his output, there will be poverty; and so long as there is poverty, there will be men who will promise a loaf so that they may steal a cake.

Politicians and sociologists may go on changing the names of their party labels, repainting the letters when they become weather-beaten, giving them another tint—such as red, the color of the Seraphim, the highest order of angels. All these shifts they will resort to, until man is led by a thin string, but they will never efface the original law of economic pressure, the mainspring of man's material salvation.

The Soul

ONE OF THE MANY DIFFICULT TRENDS of thought is that concerning the Psyche, and Toynbee has scattered his reflections upon it, and its hunger, in so many different places that it would be worth the while of an assiduous student of spiritual concerns to gather them together so that they may be read with the wholeness of an essay. In the eighth volume we learn:

Spiritual intercourse has a *modus operandi* of its own. When one civilization does succeed in exerting a cultural influence on the life of a contemporary society, this spiritual event is accomplished through a process of give and take which may be called "cultural radiation" on the agent's part and "cultural reception" on the reagent's in terms borrowed from the language of the Modern Western science of Physics. In the language used in this Study for conveying the Soul's obscure intuition of the mysteries of Life, "cultural radiation" may be described as being a challenge presented to a civilization by one of its neighbours, and "cultural reception" as being a particular orientation of the challenged party's faculty of mimesis. . . . (VIII, p. 481)

(Mimesis means imitation, mimicry.)

Now harking back, with the intention of discovering what he really is driving at, we have to turn to the seventh volume, wherein the sections on "Higher Religions and Psychological Types" are treated. There we gather that each of the living higher religions had been attuned to some particular psychological type or sub-type serving the impossible task of ministering to the Psyche's whole elemental needs for expression. In this it failed because there was no "spiritual organ capable of playing a psychic diapason." Hence, universal religion was doomed to disappointment. But he adds:

. . . The heavenly music that would satisfy every need of the Soul was not inaudible on Earth, but it was never audible in a solo; it could be heard only in a symphony. The divers higher religions must resign themselves to playing limited parts, and must school themselves to playing these parts

in harmony, in order, between them, to fulfil their common purpose of enabling every human being of every psychological type to enter into communion with God the Ultimate Reality. (VII, p. 734)

This is not quite clear, and I am afraid the uneducated, if it were put to them, would confuse this problem with the researches of the Psyche undertaken by Freud and Jung. The term Psyche does not convey by any means what soul meant to the medieval *religieux*. Like so many other leading terms, it has lost the old significance, and it would be regrettable if Toynbee's pronouncements were confused with the nonsense which distorts the modern mind.

When we read St. Bernard's *Steps of Humility*, we are conscious of the soul in a divine sense. It is the same when we turn to Meister Eckhart and all those who graduated from the schools of Chartres and Deventer.

The popularization of the libido of the Psyche has brought forth a literature on sex life that is so deleterious that, according to the admissions of teachers in children's schools, it has sunk into the minds of their pupils, who use sex expressions that alarm them.

Surely the time has come when all should realize the necessity of purging the mind of such dross. It is a sad commentary upon the work of our churches, whether they be universal or not, when school teachers have to protest against books that are not even understood by parents. A survey of the horizons of progressive thought, new ideas, other methods of living gives us no hope whatever. Therefore, we must fall back upon the tested values of the past and try to splice the broken threads that attach us to a tradition of spiritual meditation which survived for many centuries the conflicts of universal States.

May there not be a science of the spirit yet to be discovered by philosophers, who will free their minds of the dross of modern discoveries? The psychologist has not yet touched the borderland of what I have in mind. It is intuitive and abstract and cannot be tested in a crucible. It eludes the diligent investigator, such as William James and all the psychoanalysts. None of the methods of the physicist employed in the business of solving the problem of the Uraniums can be of use in this quest.

Perhaps it may be a problem to be determined by the individual, in communing with the self. The problem of the soul is so ancient that one wonders how it is still with us. It is so old that, when you think of it, you wonder it has not been forgotten. The only one who, in recent years, has attempted to deal with it is Gustaf Strömberg in *The Soul of the Universe*.

The mystery of the spirit baffles us, and yet if we pick up a stray seed late in autumn days and examine it, it gives us no information of what it

contains. Enclosed in that dry shell are the elements of growth, stem, leaf, color, and fragrance. After the process of gestation and development, it becomes a thing of beauty. But who can tell us in technical terms what beauty is, and who can resolve fragrance to mere chemical symbols? Yet, botany and horticulture are sciences. If this reasoning is along the right lines, then why scoff at a science of the spirit? If the plant seed contains all these wondrous things, what did the human seed contain at the beginning? Let us remember that a speck of the jelly of Thales has produced a Socrates and a Jesus.

The philosophical meditations of some of the physicists impress me with the notion that they may take the lead in investigating this spiritual problem. Both Schrödinger and Heisenberg indicate in their writings that they are conscious of realms beyond the popular notion of matter. Even Einstein's agnosticism is permeated with wonderment about the mysteries, and indeed none of his colleagues exceeds his admiration of the insoluble, untestable subtleties of the universe as he does. He thinks the man is dead who does not stand awed before the mysteries.

To my mind, our physicists have the right training for this new work, which will bring more happiness to the people than the effect of cosmic rays upon the fleeting particles, which are now called pi mesons.

The picture is too immense to be seen as a whole. The canvas is so enormous in breadth and depth that the groups of peoples, systems, cults, and their conflicts can only be seen to advantage by examining each in turn, as if it were no part of the general scheme. In some ways the picture of the civilizations reminds me of a Pieter Breughel, but on a gigantic scale. This comparison is made only to give the reader an idea of a painter's masterpiece that may be examined feature by feature, and yet taken in, as a whole, from a distance of three or four feet.

Toynbee's panorama bewilders the senses, and how a student of the era of specialization is to take it in puzzles me mightily. Section after section might be extracted from these volumes for one set study. But who will find the time to read them and follow the author's object in writing them? There are far too many jewels of knowledge for us to appreciate the luster of the parallels and comparisons, the likenesses and the transformations, which crowd these pages. And, yet, there is revealed in all the histories the persistence of man in perpetuating his stupidities.

In closing the eighth volume, I am reminded of a remark of Montaigne, "Man is certainly stark mad; he cannot make a worm, and yet he will be making gods by dozens."

Arnold Toynbee's *Study of History*

Volume IX

IT HAS BEEN A WORTHWHILE LABOR to examine the seventh and eighth volumes and wonder at the many varied fruits of a ripe mind. Tribute must be paid to the appearance in this age of an all-round man, a scholar who, with a universal grasp, presents a picture of the actions of men in the world at large. Parallels of the rise and fall of States are drawn from east and west. There is no limit to the comparisons and contrasts that crowd the pages of these tomes.

The Renaissance

THE BEGINNING of the ninth volume leads us to territory which, in our lifetime, has been thoroughly explored by scholars from many different viewpoints. There has been such a conflict of opinion about the so-called Renaissance that those who have doubted the findings of over-zealous recorders will give a hearty welcome to the new lights that are thrown upon the revivals of learning by Toynbee. It will seem strange to those who give this section their consideration that not a few well-known scholars have imagined there was only one Renaissance and that it began at the time of Petrarch and Boccaccio.

Why this period has been designated by the term "re-birth" has never been adequately explained, for it was not by any means the first time men devoted themselves to the collection of pagan literature. As for anyone thinking it was the inauguration of a period when special attention was given to the fate of man and his religious and cultural activities, that idea is not borne out by the findings in this section of Toynbee's work.

As early as the sixth century, Cassiodorus collected the works which became the basis of the learning of the Middle Ages. Montague James says he was "the greatest individual contributor to the preservation of learning in the West." Alfred lamented the destruction of books in the Danish wars.

When we think of Erigena in Ireland, we wonder at the library he used when he wrote *The Division of Nature*. Another example of gathering the works of ancient writers is told in the story of Wilfrid and Biscop and what they did at Ripon and Wearmouth. Then there was Alcuin who went to the court of Charlemagne. Dr. R. H. Hodgkin says that Alcuin, in his poem, *Carmen de Pontificibus*,

makes it clear that the students were led through the subjects of the *trivium* (grammar, rhetoric, and logic) to those of the *quadrivium* (arithmetic, geometry, music, and astronomy). Works of Aristotle, Cicero, Virgil, and Pliny, as well as those of the Christian Fathers were in the library at York. The boys not only read Virgil, but they were encouraged to write Latin verses themselves.

Burke called Bede "the father of English learning." And who can read *The Ecclesiastical History* and doubt the quality of the records and documents, which were the sources of his knowledge? It seems to me the men who crossed the bridge from the Dark to the Middle Ages were every bit as keen to provide themselves with libraries as those of Petrarch's time. Indeed, after the period of Alfred, learning had been raised to so high a plane that the notion of its value in making a complete man was appreciated profoundly by the scholars of the day. It was summed up in this statement by Alfred:

Enjoy the wisdom which thou hast, and have joy in the part which thou canst. I would know whether after the parting of the body and the soul I shall ever know more than I now know of all that which I have long wished to know; for I cannot find anything better in man than that he know, and nothing worse than that he be ignorant.

Toynbee's work in submitting this subject to a deeper consideration than has been given to it by those who have imagined it a unique event, which took place only in one part of Europe, opens up an inquiry which he undertakes with enthusiasm, and reveals the hollowness of the claim that the Italian Renaissance stands alone.

Toynbee says:

As soon as we have thus brought all the relevant phenomena into view, we become aware that, in using the word renaissance as a proper name, we have been allowing ourselves to fall into the error of seeing a unique occurrence in an event which in reality was no more than one particular instance of a recurrent historical phenomenon. The evocation of a dead culture by the living representatives of a civilization that is still a going concern proves to be a species of historical event for which the proper label is, not "the Renaissance," but "renaissances"; and, in an earlier context, we have already identified the genus to which this species belongs. . . . (IX, p. 4)

Ghosts and Ithaca

AFTER RAISING THE GHOST (misnamed re-births) of past civilizations east and west—for Toynbee circles the world in his quest—we might conclude that history is a revelation of man's stupidity. So far as we have followed his pursuit, we are not encouraged in the hope of a redemption

of an enduring nature. Man, as he is pictured to us in these vivid descriptions of his activities, seems to be a purposeless creature. It is well that our historian reminds us of Circe—that sorceress who turned the sailors of Ulysses into swine. Yet, Homer gives no valid reason for the act, and what she enjoyed in committing it is not revealed.

The anthropophagi ate their prey, but civilized men merely destroy the victims of their wrath, and the wars of this century must be regarded as sheer wastefulness of human life and wealth. Wisdom is still a monopoly of the sages of yore. Modern statesmen have learned nothing; they seem to revel in their lack of historical knowledge. Oh, Puck! Was it in a dream you said, "What fools these mortals be"? Surely if you visited the capitals of the world today, there would be nothing dream-like if you made the same remark. You would find ass-headed Bottoms a-plenty but few Oberons and Titanias.

In connection with this idea of raising ghosts, Toynbee selects as an example of the practice that of Ulysses meeting Achilles in Hades. Achilles asks why he has descended to talk to "the phantoms of men out-worn." There are many ways of going to hell, but moderns have not far to go; indeed, millions carry hell within themselves, and the dead that they conjure up are, in the main, the thwarted desires of their lives. They brood upon the failures of their works. This is the condition of the morbid mind, but as for asking the ghosts they raise the way to Ithaca, they know the reply will call for the courage that has departed from them.

It was Circe who advised Ulysses to go down to Hades "to seek soothing of the spirit of Theban Teiresias, the blind seer, whose mind abides steadfast." She informs him about the advice the seer will tender, concerning the voyage to Ithaca. "He will tell thee thy way and the measures of thy path, and of thy return, how thou mayest go over the teeming deep."

This was the reason for the son of Laertes going to hell, and it was Circe, who would have made a pig of Ulysses, who instructed him. He had no desire to mix with ghosts.

In raising ghosts of past civilizations, the men of the so-called Renaissance were engaged in a literary adventure, but they did not seem to realize there had been predecessors of theirs who made it possible for them to know the name of the shades they would invoke. The ancients, however, had quite another purpose in raising the dead, and I think that Toynbee uses the incident of the descent of Ulysses into hell without impressing us with the purpose of his mission. It was not the desire to mingle with

the dead or to learn their histories that prompted him to go below; his set purpose was to learn how he could reach Ithaca.

Flesh-eating Rites

WHILE DIPPING into the *Odyssey*, we might reflect upon the fate of some of Ulysses' crew, when they were taken captive by Polyphemus in his cave. It is the ancient story of eating human flesh. Whether or not Cyclops is to be classed with the anthropophagi, he is the first on record to indulge in eating men. Later on, this became a ceremonial practice by some of the early cults mentioned by Toynbee.

However, he does not give us a historical survey of the rites in vogue when Paul appeared upon the scene. He mentions several, here and there, but he does not tell us what their form of worship was. Nor does he enlighten us about the rites they practiced. In Volume VI, in a remarkable section called "Schism in the Soul," he gives the names of some of these cults, and he quotes a long passage of nearly three pages from a work by Eduard Meyer on the subject. But we are not informed by either Meyer or Toynbee of the nature of their ceremonials.

The taste for human flesh was not peculiar to the one-eyed giant of the pagan myth. It is a religious ceremony of long lineage, enacted in many different rites. It might have originated in Egypt, and perhaps was introduced to the people of the Near East by the Israelites, after they settled in Canaan. The Osiris myth is very ancient. One of the early religious works of Egypt is *The Lamentations of Isis and Nephthys*. One version of the drama is that the body of Osiris was cut into twenty-six pieces by Seth, his brother. But Osiris must have escaped the eating ceremony, for Isis collected the pieces and put them together again. The fate of Zagreus, in the Orphic mysteries, is along the same line of drama as the Osiris tale. In the omophagic rites, a man was dismembered and the devotees tore his flesh and ate it, and thus participated in the divine nature of Zagreus.

In the Mystery-Play of Tibet the same plot is found. Here, a man is cut to pieces and the crowd eat morsels or treasure them as sacred relics. Dr. Evans-Wentz describes all this in his wonderful book, *Tibetan Yoga and Secret Doctrines*, a work that should be better known, for it is essential for a clear understanding of the kinship of the mysteries of Osiris and Zagreus.

In connection with the law which banished the Mysteries from Italy, the *De Bacchanalibus Edict*, Pliny said, "It was regarded as a supreme act of religion to slay a man and as a most salutary act to eat his body."

Toynbee does not deal with the rites of any of these strange cults that flourished from the Nile to the Po, and from Etna to Babylon, for centuries before the Christian Era began. What ghosts of the pagan cults are with us yet! When I was a child, my grandmother took me to a Sin-eaters' service.

It seems to me, in pondering this study of the Mysteries, a historian should give us all the information about their development which has been gathered, for we ought to know what man has worshiped and the nature of the rites of his early religion, if we are to look forward to the millennium of an amalgam of the four principal religions, which Toynbee has in view for us.

What man has done, man will do. He has worshiped strange gods, male and female, and both Moses and Aaron knew he was prone to go a-whoring after them. He has not yet given up the habit. In this respect, think of the backsliding that took place even so late as the apex of the Gothic period. Devil worship was dealt with in many tomes, while the witch cults thrived, and the belief in them became so widespread that James I of England wrote *Dæmonologie*, a textbook on witchcraft. In 1598 he ordered six hundred old women to be burned. It should be remembered that it was two Dominican monks who wrote the famous work on Witches, called *Malleus Maleficarum*.

It is a long stretch in nature cults from Cybele and Isis to witch rites of the sixteenth century. Spengler gives us a record of this lore in his brilliant Chapter IX (Vol. II) of *The Decline of the West*. The whole of this exposition should be studied by those who look for Toynbee's universal religion of the four chief faiths.

Some Literary Ghosts

WE MUST CONCEDE that the raising of all the pagan 'ghosts' for literary purposes has served us well. Toynbee lets us know that we are not to think, in reading his enlightening passages, that he is doubtful of the purpose they serve. In a footnote he tells us:

The writer of this Study would be guilty of odious ingratitude to Hellenism itself, as well as to the Late Medieval Italian Humanists who raised its ghost to haunt a Modern Western World, if at this point he forbore to acknowledge and confess how thankful he was that one of "those surprising overlaps and time-lags which so often disguise the direction things are taking" (to quote Butterfield) had inhibited the arbiters of educational fashions in his own country from laying sacrilegious hands on the humane study of Greek and Latin letters for more than two centuries

after this once sacrosanct curriculum had been implicitly condemned, as a logical consequence of the defeat that had overtaken "the Ancients" in their seventeenth-century contest with "the Moderns". Whatever might be the verdict, from other points of view, on the "classical" education instituted by the fifteenth-century Western Humanists, this was unquestionably the best education conceivable for a Westerner who wanted to be an historian; for a study of *Litterae Humaniores* was the one school of education open to a Westerner in the Modern Age in which he could learn to look at the society into which he happened to have been born with the alien eyes of an outsider whose spiritual home was Hellas, not Hesperia; and, for an historian, no training could be more valuable than this, since the first accomplishment that is required of an historian is an ability to jump clear of his own fortuitous Here and Now. (IX, p. 68*n*.)

This statement was necessary, for a carping critic would say that he had been guilty of levity in his description of this period. Indeed, there are passages that are far too modern to be in keeping with the matter under discussion. Still, the desire to lighten some of the erudition may be excused even by a purist.

We may ask ourselves, "Is it possible intellectually and artistically to part company with the past?" It certainly cannot be done in economics and jurisprudence, and it is impossible to imagine what our literature would be like if the myths of the Greeks had been a sealed book when our schools opened their doors. To me it is strange that the men of Petrarch's time did not raise the ghosts of their own era, who would gladly have given the catalogues of the collections they had made. Think of what had been done before the thirteenth century. Professor W. P. Ker, in *The Dark Ages*, writes:

. . . The history of Latin is the history of education, and follows the great schools. There is a line from Ireland and Iona to Jarrow and York, and from there to the Court of Charles. Alcuin's school at Tours is the parent of the school at Fulda where Hraban carried on the same work. Different lines of descent are united at Reichenau and St Gall, which are in relation with the newer school at Fulda on the one hand, and with the Irish on the other. Bede (Jarrow) taught Egbert (York), who taught Alcuin (Tours), who taught Hraban (Fulda), who taught Walafrid Strabo (Reichenau): that pedigree roughly indicates one of the chief lines along which literary studies were carried. . . . (pp. 20-1)

Ker's book, which was published fifty ago, deserves a revival, and I am glad Toynbee has brought it to our notice again, for it is an indispensable ghost. It should be made accessible to our students studying literature. There are startling statements in it about the past, which will take a good deal of the false pride from some of our mentors. Professor Ker

says, "The genius of Bede is perhaps the clearest demonstration in the whole world of the independence of genius; the sanity and dignity of his mind are his own, and transcend the limitations of his time." He points out Boethius and Orosius as authorities used by King Alfred and Dante. The former he considers as the interpreter of the ancient world and its wisdom. *The Consolation of Philosophy* can be traced in English literature from Beowulf to Hamlet and Lycidas.

It is well the ghosts were raised, and our regret today is that so few know they were ever disinterred. Surely our cultural tradition in literature and the arts dates from early Greece.

We may now ask the question that has come to mind so often in reading these volumes: the purpose of the quest, and the advantage to be gained for the mass of men from the findings. Who is to benefit from a study of this history? Let us say that it is essential and invaluable for the few who have had the training and now have the leisure to read and meditate upon this great achievement.

I had begun the study of fundamental economics the year Toynbee was born, and I still retain a lively recollection of the desire of roustabouts even, to better themselves industrially and to improve their minds. The Cooper Institute in New York was a school for old and young, and men went there, after working hours, to attend lectures, debates or classes of instruction. Then they were keen to know. I remember one cold night when I took refuge in a car barn on Sixth Avenue, a fellow as ill-off as myself sat reading an essay of Emerson. From what I know of the men of today, such a thing seems scarcely possible, even in the comfort of an arm-chair in a heated room. The change in education that has come about in the last half of my life is one of the gravest that has ever taken place in any generation. And the most amazing thing is that our leaders of thought—politicians, parsons, and publicists—pay little heed to it and what it entails.

The movie, radio and television have drawn men away from the means by which we gathered our knowledge before the two World Wars. An educator remarked, a few years ago, that the pupils who failed "had the radio going when they were studying."

After quoting a passage from the *Critias* on mythology and historical research, Toynbee says:

. . . There can be no renaissance of a dead culture except in the bosom of an affiliated society that has raised itself to the cultural level at which its predecessor was standing at the time when it was accomplishing these

achievements that have now become candidates for resuscitation. . . . (IX, p. 137)

This is a mighty poor lookout for us. And indeed, according to Ker, in *The Dark Ages*, the efforts of the men of the fourteenth century did not presage for the mass a happy future. The wars, political and religious, of that period reveal the fact that man was not ready to rid his mind of ferocious acts.

Law and Freedom

IN THE PASSAGES which relate to man-made law, Toynbee strikes a pessimistic note not only as to its validity, but as to its being effectively administered. He finds, "Human Nature is lamentably imperfect in morals, intelligence, and practice alike." And further on he declares:

. . . The perfect justice of a God who "is no respecter of persons," and "who, without respect of persons, judgeth according to every man's work," had never been exhibited by any human legislator. . . . (IX, p. 170)

This leads us to a dissertation upon the laws of nature. And, like other controversial sections of the study, it should raise stormy debate.

The story of the abandonment of theories concerning justice and the law of nature dates back to the time of the French Revolution. In the Forties of the last century these questions were discussed by such intellectual giants as Proudhon and Bakunin. Marx struck the first effective blow at the economic theory of Locke and Adam Smith. There ensued a bitter controversy, which is still being waged in many parts of the world. The scientific State Socialist, in formulating the proposals and conceptions of Socialism, decided that the age-long theory of eternal justice had to be discarded, for it stood in the way of the powers to be yielded to the bureaucratic State.

The chief protest against the fiscal system in vogue in the middle of the nineteenth century was against the unequal division of the products of labor. The *Communist Manifesto* lays it down: "Equal liability of all to labor. Establishment of industrial armies, especially for agriculture."

This was interpreted by some of the Socialist disputants to mean that the armies would operate for the same wage, and it forced many who disagreed with Marx and Engels to the conclusion that the products of labor would be equally distributed. Upon such a basis justice had to be abandoned, for there was no way of each producing the same quantity of the same value. Indeed, there was no way of estimating value, for

competition as an exchange method was jettisoned. Marx and Engels quote the accusation of a critic as follows:

There are, besides, eternal truths, such as Freedom, Justice, etc., that are common to all states of society. But Communism abolishes eternal truths, it abolishes all religion, and all morality, instead of constituting them on a new basis; it therefore acts in contradiction to all past historical experience.

They made no attempt to controvert this challenge.

The heralds of the new gospel of man believed the change to Socialism was inevitable. After more than one hundred years of trial and error, the many different forms of government have become more and more socialistic. The growth of the bureaucracies of the State, since the days when the *Manifesto* was penned, indicates quite clearly that the masses want more and more State interference, not only in their public lives but in their private lives also. It seems strange to think that there was a time when people believed that "the less government the better" and that the earnings of the workers "should fructify in their pockets."

How this amazing change has come about cannot be attributed only to the spread of the Socialist gospel or Fabian doctrine, for neither had much influence politically before the First World War. It is true there was a strong Socialist party in Germany and three divisions of Socialists in France. But there was no serious threat of supplanting the Liberal and Conservative parties in the chief countries of the West. The advent of Lenin in Russia during the First World War was an epoch-making event, which could not possibly have taken place in times of peace. From the period of the overthrow of the Czarist regime and the establishment of the Soviets, the gospel of Socialism spread rapidly in every European country, and the Second World War made it easier for Socialists to place the coping stone on the bureaucratic monument.

Surely it is conceding a lot to the tenets of this doctrine to call it a religion, and I am surprised that Toynbee does not explain the use of this term. How there can be a religion of man, as he has described him in these studies, is far beyond my comprehension. Even if we take the Pauline notion of what the term means, it cannot be applied to people who have waged two of the most costly wars—in life and wealth—that are recorded by our historian in these volumes.

It is so far removed from "that which binds man to an invisible Creator" that it would be better to substitute the term for another—atheism. It may surprise some readers to learn that, in England, nine

years before the publication of the *Communist Manifesto* there were men debating the ideas of a proletarian revolution, which stemmed from the French Socialists—Saint-Simon, Fourier, and others. Ebenezer Elliott, the writer of the famous hymn, "God Save the People," defined Communism in a verse that is worth reviving:

What is a Communist?
 One who hath yearnings
 For equal division of unequal earnings.
 Idler or bungler, or both, he is willing
 To fork out his copper
 and pocket your shilling.

What is significant about this verse is that it was written in the Eighteen Thirties, the decade that ushered in the Hungry Forties.

Even those of us who ponder the problems of the limitations of mind do not realize the vagaries of the creative imagination and how they affect religions and civilizations. It seems nonsensical to admit that the dullest intelligence, which would not accept a concrete fact, can day in and day out imagine Utopias and Elysiums that will never materialize. Take the ordinary man who has known the vicissitudes of unemployment and the deprivations of poverty. He can now imagine that there will always be a State to give him a loaf for a vote. The notion that the ruling power owes him a living has undermined his sense of his own power, in politics and also in religion.

It is not necessary to go to a lunatic asylum to discover people who imagine they are Napoleons. All one has to do in this matter is to understand the doctrine preached in the *Communist Manifesto*, to make a decision about the grave change that has taken place in the thought of ordinary men since medieval days. With the mass there is a danger (because of these nostrums) of its becoming a beggar mind; when, at one time, a robust person who took alms was looked upon with contempt.

How can we look forward to a universal church or religion, when one of the results of civilization is to convince robust men that there is no loss of dignity in being "on the parish"? Ten thousand years of wrong cannot be changed in a day. Economic injustice is the penalty paid for thoughtlessness.

It is a pity Toynbee has renewed his difference of opinion with Spengler over the conception of organisms. He repeats the misunderstanding of which he was guilty in his third volume. In Volume IX, Toynbee says, "we have already exposed the fallacy of Spengler's confusion of societies with organisms."

In my review of the first six volumes, I pointed out that these two champions differed about the two terms "culture" and "civilization." If the term organism can be applied to a community from its cultural stage to that of a civilization, there ought to be no doubt about Spengler's meaning. But Toynbee makes no such clear differentiation between culture and civilization as does the author of *The Decline of the West*. I think I have shown in my criticism that Toynbee was to blame for the misunderstanding.

So great a scholar as Eduard Meyer, "ranges himself frankly by the side of the younger thinker [Spengler] . . . on the question of there being an organic structure of the cultures, a morphology of History." This is to be found in the preface of the translator of Spengler's work.

I would advise the serious student to read Chapter III (Volume I) of *The Decline of the West*, for Spengler there makes his meaning clear:

Cultures are organisms, and world-history is their collective biography. . . .

I distinguish the *idea* of a Culture, which is the sum total of its inner possibilities, from its sensible *phenomenon* or appearance upon the canvas of history as a fulfilled actuality. . . . (I, p. 104)

Time has shown, in this span of a generation since Spengler was at work in Munich, that he was a prophet and that Human Social Life has been anything but a law of inevitable progress. The condition of the world when his work was published gave little hope to the serious thinkers of the time. But if they had had the slightest conception of the picture of the world presented to us today, they would have said it was a phantasmagoria of an imbecile. Whether it be necessity or accident that is to blame for the breakdown and dissolution, it cannot be said the signs of the time encourage the notion that there will be a change for the better. Still, Toynbee is under the impression that the question is still open.

The Law of Nature

ONCE THE GHOSTS of the past have been invoked, they soon show a desire to dwell with the living. I know of no effort, made by those who benefited by their visits, to send them back to the house of the dead—whether it were a pagan tomb or a Christian Hades. Plato and Aristotle, Leucippus and Lucretius are still with us, and we have them to thank for many of the interesting controversies that engage our attention today.

In recent years, however, there have been some historians who have been inclined to belittle the contributions they have made to our branches of learning. The snobs who have been writing history of the type con-

demned by Toynbee have, in the main, been devotees of the goddess of Progress. And some of their writings indicate that the people of this generation have no truck with the originators of the past, and so dispense summarily with their notions of what should be. It really is amusing to think of their cocksure notions and their estimates of themselves as splendid fellows who have produced the wonders of the machine shop and the laboratory.

About twenty years ago Einstein delivered the Herbert Spencer lecture at Oxford, when he said:

We reverence ancient Greece as the cradle of western science. Here for the first time the world witnessed the miracle of a logical system which proceeded from step to step with such precision that every single one of its propositions was absolutely indubitable—I refer to Euclid's geometry. This admirable triumph of reasoning gave the human intellect the necessary confidence in itself for its subsequent achievements. If Euclid failed to kindle your youthful enthusiasm, then you were not born to be a scientific thinker. (Quoted in *Ideas and Opinions* by Albert Einstein, N. Y., 1954, p. 271)

Toynbee also points out that their "repudiation of a belief in a law of God" indicated that they had been guilty of hybris, and he goes on to say:

. . . The Late Modern Western scientists who had kept the historians company in going the length of throwing over "the Law of God" had still clung to the skirts of Indic and Hellenic philosophers who had promulgated "laws of Nature" in the name of the goddess Reason; and the Late Modern Western historians had taken a solitary way when they had defiantly made a virtue of their former fellow-travellers' charge against them that they had denied the validity of "laws of Nature," as well as the validity of "the Law of God," in the realm of the affairs of Man in Process of Civilization. (IX, p. 217)

The scientists he refers to in this statement are not the leaders in the fields of mathematics and physics. They are the servants who follow at a distance. Most of them are engaged in the by-products—covered by the term "technology." Years ago I pointed out that these people, when they were at college, should have made themselves familiar with the writings of the scientific geniuses who have earned the Nobel Prize. I suggested the same course for those historians who have worshiped at the shrine of the goddess of Progress.

In 1934, Einstein said of the scientist:

. . . His religious feeling takes the form of a rapturous amazement at the harmony of natural law, which reveals an intelligence of such superiority that, compared with it, all the systematic thinking and acting of human

beings is an utterly insignificant reflection. This feeling is the guiding principle of his life and work, in so far as he succeeds in keeping himself from the shackles of selfish desire. It is beyond question closely akin to that which has possessed the religious geniuses of all ages. (*Ideas and Opinions, cit.*, p. 40)

The gap in understanding widens when we read the declarations of the most noted men of our time. It is recorded that Schrödinger, when asked about the relation of science to art and religion, looked bored and replied, "such a view altogether exaggerated the importance of science," and added that he was "amused at the logical incoherence of modern physics and at the highly experimental nature of its mathematics."

As for Max Planck, in his six essays, *Where is Science Going?* he utterly demolishes the notions of the historians referred to by Toynbee. The originator of the quantum theory said, "There can never be any real opposition between religion and science, for one is the complement of the other." (*Op. cit.*, N. Y., 1932, p. 168)

This was echoed by the Pope in his famous statement. It may startle these purblind snobs of this progressive age to learn that Planck also said:

. . . It would be a piece of stupid sacrilege on our part if we were to arrogate to ourselves the power of being able, on the basis of our own studies, to see as clearly as the Divine Spirit understands. (*Ibid.*, p. 103)

I think one trouble with the people that Toynbee criticizes so severely is that they have been raised in the wrong surroundings. They seem to me to be victims of bricks-and-mortar neighborhoods, where there are no green fields. If I were a dictator of education, I should prescribe gardening as the first course in the education of a scientist, for it is there that you can see the laws of Nature working day and night. And no matter how often you delve and hoe, and till and plant, no matter how many seasons you reap and harvest, you learn something new about her law.

Modern man, divorced from the primary industry and knowledge of the working of Nature's laws in the open, has lost much; the parting has been disastrous for soul and body. Everything suffers; no matter where we now look in the arts, we very seldom find the spirit inspired by a direct contact with Nature. The last quarter of the nineteenth century rang down the curtain upon those beauties in prose and poetry, in painting and sculpture, that elevated our minds and delighted our souls.

The sections of this chapter in *A Study of History* are among the

best contributions Toynbee has made. There are many points upon which there will be some difference of opinion. It cannot be said that he is always clear, for his sentences are overloaded and unduly long. He has so much to say that he clouds the chief motive he is discussing. He does not pretend to be a stylist, and of him it may be said what Heine said of Shakespeare: "He tries all styles but the simple."

Still, the meat is there, and it is good, nourishing stuff. He has filled the knowledge-larder with supplies for years. His section entitled "The Antinomianism of Late Modern Western Historians" is an exhilarating adventure, but the criticism after the analysis of the laws of Nature leaves the problem unanswered. He asks many questions concerning the operation of these laws upon human affairs in history; and wonders if "certain tracts of human affairs are genuinely exempt" from them, or "are they spiritual arenas for the interplay of Challenge and Response in encounters between personalities?" (IX, p. 219)

The case is non-proven, and in summing up for the present he says:

It will be seen that these last two supplementary questions carry us beyond the bounds of "laws of Nature" and bring us back face to face with "the Law of God." The riddle of the relation between God's Law and a human soul's freedom is the last, the most difficult, and the most crucial of all questions on our present agenda. (IX, p. 219)

I know no work by any historian—modern or ancient—which indicates that it is possible to change the laws of Nature. One reason for this is that there has been no fundamental inquiry since Socrates and Jesus. Furthermore, I know of nothing a scientist has done to change them. He could not observe a star or a molecule without the assistance of her law. He might—and does sometimes—succeed in adapting natural opportunities to serve his purpose, but so does a farmer in tilling the land for crops.

Great claims of their achievements have been made by technologists. One points out the building of dams, the piping of oil and gas, the electric power, and other urban utilities. But none of these affects the laws of Nature. Indeed, she contributes all the forces that have been used to make them. The placing of a dam to collect water does not alter the laws of precipitation in the least. The discovery of Uranium differs not at all from that of gold or diamonds. Destruction caused by bombs altered no law of Nature for, after the First World War, on spots where buildings had been destroyed, wild gardens sprang up and covered the debris.

Neither airplane nor submarine changes laws of Nature. Marconi used what was already there, and not one of the developments of his discovery has changed the nature of a single wave. Man is an artificer, his vocation is to adapt what is created. The turning of a stream in another direction, the making of a dam to collect water—all such works are in principle what farmers of yore did in draining, ditching, pooling streams and swamps for the purpose of fruitful tillage, and they set the example our engineers have amplified and developed.

Build a house on a fresh piece of land, far from the fume and smut of an industrial area, and there make a garden, if you would learn the lessons taught by the laws of Nature every hour of the day. She knows best, for she has had long experience. Still, snobs of history and technology run wild in a world of popular literature. The masses demand short-cuts to knowledge and nonstop expressways to wisdom. It is high time they were reminded by a great scholar that we owe the best of our learning to sages of the past. Those who imagine the future began with the discovery of Uranium are living in a fool's paradise.

"The Things that are God's"

I HAVE NOT THE SPACE to deal with the philosophic or practical value of the long chapters and sections concerning the effect of natural laws upon man, societies, or States. Yet, Toynbee has given deep consideration to their afflictions and wonders to what extent they are influenced by laws of Nature. It seems to me that most of the trouble may be attributed to the violation of them.

In a footnote he quotes St. Augustine, who says: "If justice is eliminated, what are States but gangs of robbers writ large?" It is a pity this pronouncement of the Bishop of Hippo did not find a prominent place in the context, for we are in danger of becoming inured to injustice and political crime; also, there is need of startling us to awareness of the portents of the two World Wars. Our pastors are not Augustines. The alliance of church and State is about as secure as one could be made. It was different years ago. The pagans were not afraid to tell what they thought about the conditions that then existed. Cato said: "Thieves committing private theft spend their lives in prison and in chains; public thieves, in gold and in purple."

The *Essays* of Locke, discovered in the Lovelace Collection, now in the Bodleian Library, contain many opinions on this matter, and it

would be worth the while of some of our pastors to read Section V: "*An lex naturae cognosci potest ex hominum consensu?*"

For those who are of Toynbee's mind, both as regards the State and the church, it would be well to consider what Locke has to say:

What are we to believe has been men's notion of justice, that chief law of nature and bond of every society, when we have learned from reliable authors that whole nations have professedly been pirates and robbers? . . . In what way, in fact, have even the Romans, who are alleged to present to the whole world examples of virtue, procured for themselves honours, triumphs, glory, and the memory of their immortal name, if not by the robbery and brigandage by means of which they devastated the whole earth? (*Essays on the Law of Nature*, ed. by W. von Leyden, Oxford Univ. Press, 1954, p. 169)

This goes to the very core of the trouble, and modern economists and philosophers would do well if they would leave the domain of the chart statisticians for a time, and return to the solution of this economic problem worked out by pagan thinkers and the Christian Fathers. They had a far better understanding of the cause of the trouble than men today who believe that waste is necessary for prosperity.

When Socrates began the task of finding a definition of justice, he did not go rummaging in the attics of megalopolitan chambers of commerce, nor did he call in chartered accountants and blueprint statisticians to assist him. He went straight to the source of the trouble:

Then a slice of our neighbors' land will be coveted by us for pasture and tillage, and they will want a slice of ours, if, like ourselves, they exceed the limit of necessity, and give themselves up to the unlimited accumulation of wealth.

That, Socrates, will be inevitable.

And so we shall go to war, Glaucon, shall we not?

Most certainly, he replied.

Then, without determining as yet whether war does good or harm, this much we may affirm, that now we have discovered war to be derived from causes which are also the causes of almost all the evils in states, private as well as public.

This, perhaps, weighed more with his accusers than any other charge that was brought against him. This is where injustice begins—to take what does not belong to you is an offense against natural law. Herbert Spencer made it plain in *Social Statics*: "To deprive others of their rights to the use of the earth, is to commit a crime inferior only in wickedness to the crime of taking away their lives or personal liberties." And he shocked the Tories of his time when he said, "Equity, therefore, does not permit property in land."

But all this was said in the *Republic* and also by the Christian Fathers. St. Cyprian declared: "God's footstool is not property." St. Ambrose: "The pagans hold earth as property. They do blaspheme God."

We shall never get anywhere near Toynbee's New Jerusalem until we clearly understand what is property and what is not. That which is created cannot be owned by anyone. The portions necessary for the maintenance of life may be used, and John Locke has made that quite clear. Hooker also had no doubts about the term justice and what it implied. The world today is composed mostly of landless men who are forced into the labor market, there to compete with one another for jobs and thus depress wage. It is strange to me that Toynbee should be familiar with writings and sayings of those who have left indelible pronouncements upon this matter, and yet pay so little heed to their significance.

When he refers to the reply of Jesus to the Herodians, when they showed him the coin, I expected to find a clear-cut statement of what was meant by the reply, "Render to Caesar the things which are Caesar's, and to God the things that are God's." In the following passage I thought there was a text that he would use for a thorough discourse upon its meaning.

. . . A wealth of experience had long since demonstrated beyond dispute that technically perfect institutions were of no avail to save froward souls from bringing themselves and one another to grief, whereas brethren who had attuned their wills to dwell together in unity would find no insuperable difficulty in making technically imperfect institutions work by short-circuiting a mimetic social drill through flashes of "light caught from a leaping flame" and by subordinating the things that are Caesar's to the things that are God's.

If the prospects of Man in Process of Civilization, on his arduous climb up a precipitous cliff-face towards an unattained and invisible ledge above, evidently depended above all on his ability to recover a lost control of the pitch, it was no less evident that this issue was going to be decided by the course of Man's relations, not just with his fellowmen and with himself, but, above all, with God his Saviour. (IX, p. 347) (*Italics mine*)

And there the chapter ends.

Arnold Toynbee's *Study of History*

Volume IX (Part II)

THE STUDY OF MAN as the Hamlet of the tragedy of history is an ancient one. It is necessary only to mention Plato and Aristotle as students of his vicissitudes. Perhaps Socrates knew more about his physical and mental ailments than anyone of yore. The description of him, as it appears in the Pentateuch, is the picture of a being raised in a slave State. Moses had his hands full; indeed, he had to legislate for a "stiff-necked people."

Moses and a Stiff-Necked People

THE LAWS that he laid down for them were good enough for the generations of all men. These were to be obeyed if they were to enjoy the blessings of Canaan. They were offered life or death. After a trial of ideal conditions, they wanted a change, and they picked Saul as their King. Haggai, Hosea and Amos give us a vivid description of the results of their political choice:

Ye have sown much, and bring in little; ye eat, but ye have not enough; ye drink, but ye are not filled with drink; ye clothe you, but there is none warm; and he that earneth wages earneth wages to put into a bag of holes.

The bag still has holes in it, and that is perhaps the chief economic reason why there has been so much history.

What happened before the Israelites left Egypt is an interesting problem for speculation. Anthropologists decided that the Peking Man was an agriculturist half a million years ago. So, from this we might infer that man has been suspended between life and death, according to the Mosaic offer (Deuteronomy 30:19), for a long time. The history of the gentleman tempts us to look farther back, and to wonder when he first learned to produce his own food.

Dr. Laurence Kulp, the geologist, and Harlow Shapley, the astronomer, inform us the earth's age should be held at four and a half billion years. If this be a scientific fact, it should make Dr. Julian Huxley ponder the question of how long it took to make a man. Still, no matter what man's anthropological age may be, it cannot be said that he has made a paradise of earth.

There are, however, people who are under the impression that he is not to blame for his distresses, whether they be economic, political, psychological, or sociological. A cruel fate seems to have pursued him and, indeed, some say it is impossible for him to escape.

The sections in which Toynbee deals with this age-long problem of the conflict between man and God are of unusual interest at this time, for the serious thinkers of the world fear that the man of our day may commit the same errors of judgment as those who brought about the First World War. The prospect of a third one haunts the mind of those who have not forgotten the causes of the other two. Toynbee goes to great lengths in his desire to show what this conflict is, and he asks, "When a human soul encounters God, what is the outcome of a meeting between wills of such immeasurably unequal potency?" (IX, p. 381)

He recognizes the recalcitrant spirit of the creature and its seeming determination to destroy itself. However, in these sections, Toynbee does not touch upon the assisting factors which distort man's common sense and block all chance of his thinking things out for himself. His political masters have been the goads, and man has not the courage to kick against these pricks, successfully.

The clash of wills is no new matter in history. Toynbee has revealed in these volumes that Moses was not the only leader who had to deal with a "stiff-necked people." It seems to be much easier to make a scapegoat of God and saddle the ills of men upon the Creator than it is to make one of a statesman who throws his people into an unnecessary war. The trouble here is that man must be a patriot for the duration of the struggle. During the piping times of peace, he hears little about his duty to the State. He then may be a defeatist, calling loudly for disarmament; a pacifist, supporting resolutions to fight no more; a demagogue on a soap box in Hyde Park, or a spellbinder, rallying humanity at a town hall meeting, to turn the rascals out who batten upon the wealth produced by labor.

To put a blunt question: What has God got to do with all this? Imagine another earth somewhere beyond the Milky Way, where there has never been a conflict of wills; no stiff-necked people. And ask, how comes it that the Creator can plant a people where there is harmony in one spot, and communities that are always at strife on another?

Is it not time that our pastors came down to brass tacks, quit sobbing over man's stupidities, and let him know that, if the Creator is respon-

sible for the distresses of His creatures, He is not to be loved? What an incongruity! Love the God who has inflicted pain and anguish upon those who are supposed to adore Him! The notion does not make sense.

Toynbee says:

. . . By adroitly steering the course of human affairs amid the play of non-human forces subject to rigid and therefore calculable and predictable laws, Man can prevent potentially adverse laws from hindering him and can constrain potentially favourable laws to help him in the execution of his plans. . . . (IX, p. 348)

Are we not impressed by the findings of Toynbee, up to this point, that he has uncovered in this study the intractability of the creature to choose a decent way of life? Further on he quotes Thomas Huxley:

That there is a "soul of good in things evil" is unquestionable; nor will any wise man deny the disciplinary value of pain and sorrow. But these considerations do not help us to see why the immense multitude of irresponsible sentient beings, which cannot profit by such discipline, should suffer; nor why, among the endless possibilities open to omnipotence—that of sinless, happy existence among the rest—the actuality in which sin and misery abound should be that selected. (IX, p. 398)

The misconception of modern scientists and philosophers is difficult to understand. The idea of a Creator making a fool-proof robot contradicts the fact that God has endowed man with mind. And this is becoming patent to the biologist. He sees clearly the difference between man and all the other creatures. What is required is a good dose of Sir Charles Sherrington's Gifford Lectures, *Man on his Nature*; there will be found enlightenment from one of the clearest minds of our period. On the other hand, so far as our spiritual understanding is concerned in this problem, there might be a re-publication of *The Analogy of Religion* by Joseph Butler, the inspired Bishop of Durham, who put the matter in a nutshell:

Now, in the present state, all which we enjoy, and a great part of what we suffer, is put in our own power. For pleasure and pain are the consequences of our actions; and we are endued by the Author of our Nature with capacities of foreseeing these consequences. . . . I know not that we have any one kind or degree of enjoyment, but by the means of our own actions. And by prudence and care we may, for the most part, pass our days in tolerable ease and quiet; or, on the contrary, we may, by rashness, ungoverned passion, wilfulness, or even by negligence, make ourselves as miserable as ever we please. And many do please to make themselves extremely miserable—i.e., to do what they know beforehand will render them so.

It is men who have chosen the way to make themselves miserable. God has placed everything at their disposal for a happy life. The Creator did not thrust them from the countryside and pack them into urban cubicles with a poisoned atmosphere of fume and soot, squalid neighborhoods reeking with nauseous garbage. He did not divorce man from nature and the wondrous opportunities there for developing his mind and spirit. And in this respect, we should realize that the epistles were meant for men in the towns: "Servants [slaves] obey your masters." The gospels were for men who could see the lilies grow, with no thought for the morrow, where they might find peace that passeth understanding. Paradise is here or nowhere. This writer has only to step into the garden at any season of the year to find all that is possible in the acre, which might make man believe there is a God of love Who has not forgotten His creatures.

Science and Bureaucracy

THE SYMBOL OF THE CURSE of Cain is the megalopolitan city, and ever since Enoch was built, it has been fated to grow bigger and bigger, and now it is the potential object of the hydrogen bomb. When we think of what happened to Coventry and Hamburg, to Liverpool and Dresden, Plymouth and Cologne, we cannot help but think that bombs may be the weapons of the curse.

Toynbee, in the section, "Unprecedented Western Experiences," says:

. . . The discovery of a "know-how" for tapping the titanic force of atomic energy and applying this to the destruction of human lives and works had brought home to the imagination of Mankind in the mass some inkling of a tragic lesion in the affairs of men. . . . Man's acquisition of this degree of command over non-human forces had made it impossible for him any longer to evade the challenge of two evils which Man himself had brought into the World in the act of providing himself with a new species of society. . . . The vast and swift further technological progress that had since been made by the sole survivor was now threatening to bring destruction, not just upon one more civilization, but upon this species of Society itself and upon the species of living creature that had created it. . . . (IX, pp. 467-8)

When the first experiments for the production of the atom bomb were begun in Chicago, I had a long talk with one of the chief scientists engaged in the work, and I gathered he had not the faintest notion that a weapon would be forged to cause destruction. He was a Nobel Prize winner, and had he imagined such a thing as the woe of Hiroshima, he would have been shocked to the marrow.

How is it, then, that these atom scientists have become subservient to demands they think they must obey? The reason they submit is because politicians put their patriotism to the test. They say the country is in danger and must be defended. Others ask, "Do you want the enemy to win the war?"

It is just as well we should understand the position the scientists were in when the first trial explosion took place. Once you submit, there is no end to your enslavement, for after the so-called Peace of Korea, the work on the hydrogen bomb continued from day to day. Why? Because Russia, through Communist spies in our midst, had learned the secrets of the know-how.

In the first book of *The Consolation of Philosophy*, Boethius gives us a verse that is peculiarly applicable to this surrender of the nuclear scientists to the exigencies of a war-like bureaucracy. He says:

Why do fierce tyrants us affright,
Whose rage is far beyond their might?
For nothing hope, nor fear thou harm,
So their weak wrath thou shalt disarm.
But he whom hope or terror takes,
Being a slave, his shield forsakes,
And leaves his place, and doth provide
A chain wherewith his hands are tied.

It would be well for our atom scientists to reflect upon the indictment contained in this verse.

Moses told his people, "The secret things belong unto the Lord our God." In Deuteronomy 30, he made the commandment clear enough for a child to understand:

I denounce unto you this day, that ye shall surely perish, and that ye shall not prolong your days upon the land, whither thou passest over Jordan to go to possess it.

I call heaven and earth to record this day against you, that I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing: therefore choose life, that both thou and thy seed may live.

History supports his prophecies to the full, but the men who manage our affairs today say, "Pooh! What did Moses know about technology?"

It is strange that no one seems to appreciate the fact that "the evil that men do lives after them." The great discovery we made to save ourselves from the foe is now a weapon in his hands that fills us with terror. How can anyone, whether he be a unique scholar or a member of a trade union, imagine for a moment that such people are eligible for one world blessed with one religion?

The chapter, "Technology, War and Government," is the most controversial of all to be found in these volumes. And I feel sure that most men who read it carefully will disagree with many of Toynbee's findings. Perhaps it was written too soon. Astonishing changes have taken place since it went to press. Indeed, there have been several works from the pens of American, French, and German thinkers who have thrown fresh light upon the political and diplomatic history since the close of the First World War. I know that Toynbee will be accused of basing many of his statements upon the propaganda used to make the people war minded. Some will say the picture that he presents has already been rejected by impartial historians.

The idea of one world under one authority could never at any time be considered as a possibility in practical politics. Nationalism today is more deep-seated than it ever was. In this respect, the spread of Communist propaganda and rule has not changed the notion of national independence. Malenkov is for Russia, as Stalin was. Mao is for China, as Sun Yat-sen was. The heads of the governments of Great Britain, France, the United States, Italy and Spain are nationalists pure and simple.

The one-worlders, so eloquent and persuasive during the war, curbed their enthusiasm after the Peace of Potsdam. After a while, they were not interested in one world governed by Stalin. In fact, their ideal of the different races of the globe uniting for an era of peace and good will, was American. The only one they could imagine was that of an English-speaking community dominating the lot.

In studying this chapter, the reader must keep in mind the economic, financial and commercial factors that have influenced the minds of American and European politicians for two generations, at least. The life stream of these communities is the constant flow of unmanufactured goods used in the production of consumable wealth, and anything in the shape of adverse competition, that is, the growing industrial power of another State, means a trade war. To check competition and gain supplies of raw material, ores and food, to sustain normal employment were the actuating motives which brought about the World Wars.

The acquisition of territory, *qua* territory, is a secondary consideration. The chief point is, what does the land contain? Are gold and diamonds to be found there? Is it rich in wolfram or hematite? Is there oil there? Is there tin in Morocco, rubber in Burma? The first world conflict was called a Holy War. During the latter part of Victoria's reign, wars against African tribes were condoned, for they offered splendid opportunities for civilizing the lazy natives.

If one wants to find the chief objects of making war, it is just as well to consider the natural opportunities of the land that is to be acquired. All wars against backward peoples are waged for the exploitation of their natural resources and the supply of cheap labor. There are other reasons, made manifest in the two World Wars, for the havoc. A great statesman said, "Germany is getting too strong; we must smash her." But he never thought that, in smashing the foe, he would smash his own country.

Now all this seems to have escaped the attention of Toynbee in this chapter, and I have not the slightest doubt that he will revise the whole of it when he considers the criticism it will engender. In a remarkable passage he says:

In this world, states of anything less than the highest calibre were not any longer either economically or militarily or politically "viable"; their presence on the map was an invitation to an aggressor, and the opportunity had been perceived by Hitler's intuitive genius and had been exploited by his criminal lust for power as a key that was to open for Germany her way to a world-wide domination. Hitler's strategy of aggression had been to equip Germany with the material resources for dominating the World by capturing the defenseless pawns that had taken the *ci-devant* Hapsburg and Romanov Empires' places on a Central and East European political chess-board. . . . (IX, p. 475)

I could name a dozen authors who hold quite different views. Neither in *Mein Kampf* nor in the public speeches of the *Führer*, up to the time he attacked Poland, is there anything about a desire for "world-wide domination." It is true that he desired the territory of the Ukrainians for food supply. What happened as the war became more and more complicated is quite another matter. During all wars the initial policies are lost and, owing to the nature of the struggle, others have to be devised.

A Unified State and a Universal Church

WHETHER OR NOT Hitler was the greatest criminal that ever ruled a State is beside the question. If that theory is to stand, the historian of the future will want to know how it was that Churchill hoped such a man would arise in England to help her to her feet, if she were ever in the state that Germany was. The time is gone for judging these affairs upon the propaganda used for war purposes, and I feel certain that historians of another generation will not single out one particular horror of these wars for condemnation, but will consider them all as a whole, working out according to a tradition of long lineage. If they are to be regarded

in a quantitative sense, we shall have to bear great responsibility for hundreds of years of carnage.

In 1852 Cobden said:

I wish to see a map on Mercator's projection published, with a red spot to mark the places on sea and land where bloody battles have been fought by Englishmen. It would be found that, unlike every other people, we have during seven centuries been fighting with foreign enemies everywhere excepting on our own soil. Need another word be said to prove us the most aggressive race under the sun? . . .

It is well to keep this in mind, for it was corroborated a generation afterwards by no less an authority than Lord Acton, who said, "No annals are so sanguinary as ours."

Therefore, when Toynbee refers to the British Empire as an example of confederation, we should remember how it was put together. He surely does not wish to imply that the promoters of his scheme for the universal State should adopt the methods of the London government. He says:

The voluntary, gradual, and pacific transformation of a once unitary empire into a free association between an ever-increasing number of fully self-governing states had been a triumph of good feeling and good sense which was perhaps almost unique in the political annals of Mankind in Process of Civilization up to date; and this political achievement reflected credit on the parties that had been willing to receive self-government in installments, as well as on the party that had been willing to make progressive cessions of political power on its own initiative without waiting to be compelled. . . . (IX, p. 477)

It was a great achievement, no doubt, but it must be remembered that ninety per cent of the parties were British and spoke English. A better example would have been the achievements of Frederick the Great and Bismarck. After the confederation, the peace of Europe was kept from major wars until 1914, and no less a person than Lord Salisbury thanked Bismarck for keeping the peace.

A United States of Europe is an old idea. Many famous men have thought *Europe should be one*. Some of them were: Victor Hugo, Nietzsche, Tolstoy, Ernest Renan, Richard Cobden, and many others who dreamed it was the only way to solve her problems and have her people live in harmony. So we must thank Toynbee, no matter how we may differ on details, for bringing this forward again in a new guise—that of coupling it with a religious revival.

The idea is sure to meet with severe criticism from the nationalists, but all the better for that. We have had enough of the hush-hush policy, and

what we in America call "soft-pedaling" on unpleasant themes. There is nothing like honest, informed debate for enlightening the people who, after all, have the choice of putting thumbs up or down on momentous problems. Toynbee sees this:

. . . Although the last word might lie with a hitherto submerged non-Western majority of Mankind, it nevertheless seemed probable that in the short run the decisive weight in the scales of a Russo-American balance would prove to be, not those three-quarters of the World's total present population, but that one-quarter of the World's total present industrial war-potential that in A.D. 1952 was still located in the Western Society's patrimony in Western Europe. . . . (IX, p. 489)

One of the gravest drawbacks to the realization of Toynbee's idea is the basic economic condition of the masses of European countries. It is almost trite to say that they are war-worn. But Central Europe seems to be an exception, and many American business men who have visited industrial centers from Frankfort and Hanover to Dresden and Vienna return with the most astonishing reports of recovery. Our principal newspapers, and the London *Times*, during the past few years have contained articles from observers on how "Germany is rising phoenix-like from the ashes." Is this demonstration of vigor to be taken as a threat, as it was before the last war, or is it a sign of the center of financial and industrial gravity shifting from Great Britain to America?

Does Germany begin again with a comparatively clean sheet? This is a question of vast importance, for there are still those who are ready to say again, "Germany is getting too strong; we must smash her." What she is doing now, while Russia controls one-third of her area, is regarded by close observers as an almost incredible achievement. To do this, while she has encamped upon her land in the west American, British and French armies, reveals a determination to survive in spite of all hindrances. Now consider the position of the victors, and compare the British and the French financial and commercial plight with that of Germany. Both of these countries, loaded with debt, that can never be paid, cannot survive without the assistance of the United States Treasury.

What hope is there, then, in such a complicated mess, for a universal State—let alone a united Europe? As for the religious problems confronting proposals for union, they are at present insoluble. Stalinism not only is a denationalizing creed; it is at the same time an irreligious one. And no matter what the spokesmen of the different sections of the Socialist party in England say about their differences, their electorates have the

bureaucratic bee in their bonnets and, as things are, work and wages are the Alpha and Omega of their interest.

Nationalism and War

MANY OF TOYNBEE'S PAGES about Germany and the Second World War need serious revision. There is a thread of war propaganda running through them, which is sometimes surprising. One of the most serious defects is that of picturing only one Hitler, the one who struck at Poland and who, afterwards, committed blunder after blunder and was held responsible for all the terrible atrocities. Historians will describe two distinct Hitlers: the man who became *Führer* in 1933 and performed the colossal achievements that won the praise of Churchill. This man strove in every possible way to bring about disarmament and inaugurate an era of peace. Later, he acquired people and territory, just as every other powerful political leader had done before him. But in his case, he took in people of the Teutonic race without firing a shot. That man must be explained as he was then. The other is the villain of a hundred books.

A missionary, setting out to preach the gospel of political unity of all people and a universal religion for them, cannot hope to win many adherents so long as he appears in the robe of a nationalist. He would soon become suspect, and hecklers would question his sincerity. It was different with Paul. He claimed to be a Roman Jew, raised in a city of Greek culture. And in the areas where he did his principal work, there was a babble of tongues which meant a polyglot population. It is quite different now. One does not hear much German spoken in London or Paris, nor is English heard frequently in the streets of Madrid. And so it goes in all the different capitals of Europe. Each one speaks its national tongue in business and social affairs. However, Toynbee is well equipped for the work because he is an exceptional linguist.

The great stumbling block to progress in this excellent endeavor is a ghastly one—the hydrogen bomb. And before starting out to preach the new gospel, Toynbee takes soundings of the attitude entrepreneurs and Stalinists might hold when they realize fully the prospects of another war:

What logic was there in asking a whole-hearted votary of either capitalism or Communism to sacrifice his life for the sake of maintaining or improving a material mundane standard of living—not, of course, for his own personal benefit, *quod esset absurdum*, but even for the benefit of his family, tribe, or species—if the hydrogen bomb that was to take the prospective sacrificial victim's life was known by him in advance to be certain

to extinguish in the self-same flash all possible beneficiaries of his proposed self-sacrifice? . . . (IX, p. 523)

There is the rub. What will happen to capitalist and Communist when the rumors of the next war start? There have already been many illustrated articles depicting the effect on a metropolitan area when a hydrogen bomb is dropped upon it. And already the subways bear the signs "To Shelter." Large buildings also provide cellar accommodations in case of a raid. But more startling, still, are the big boards now on the main highways warning motorists that they will be closed when war begins.

Still, there is no evidence that the probable victims are ready to protest against the use of the bomb. The apathy of the people is hard to understand. One of the chief scientists has already said that the rush from the cities to places of safety, whether in or out of towns, will be so terrible when war begins that more will be killed in the stampede in the first twenty-four hours than were slaughtered in the Second World War.

This information, unfortunately, was given only at a round-table conference, and nothing much was said of it in the press reports. Whether the government issued instructions to keep the information dark was not explained. Anyway, only very few knew such a statement had been made.

It is difficult to follow Toynbee's reasoning in the very long section on "Technology, War and Government." This reader is amazed at the many approaches he makes to find a way through the maze of complications to his goal. He does not take one aspect of the problem and deal with it decisively. He returns to it over and over again, throwing new light upon it. Yet, one would be unreasonable to protest against the thorough analysis of all the intricate hindrances that occur to his lively mind. I have looked through it carefully three times, and the deeper I go into his ferreting quest to examine all the problems, the farther off recedes the goal he is in search of.

Chances for Lasting Peace

HE HAS MANY STRANGE NOTIONS of what was possible in the last war, and at the cost of being criticized for exceeding the limit of quotation, I must, as an example of Toynbee's insistent search for light, give this in full:

In an age of atomic warfare there were no peoples for whom this was not a matter of life and death in a world whose unification was already an accomplished fact on the military plane, but there were three peoples that had also incurred a special measure of moral responsibility for seeing to it that an urgently needed world order should be established without

another catastrophe. In bringing about, between them, the defeat of Germany in the World War of A.D. 1939–45, the peoples of Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States had taken it upon themselves on behalf of Mankind to reject Hitler's offer of a lasting peace at Hitler's price. If in A.D. 1940–1 Hitler had been allowed by these three Powers to have his way, peace would have been imposed on the World by the establishment of a *Pax Germanica* that would have relieved Mankind from the fear of another world war for as far ahead into the future as any human eye could see. Hitler's price for this boon had been so exorbitant that the three victor Powers' decision to reject his offer was likely to win for them the blessings of Posterity supposing that they were now to succeed, between them, in bestowing the same boon on Mankind at an appreciably lower cost in the coin of standardization, regimentation, injustice, and tyranny. On the other hand, these same victors over Hitler would bring down upon their own heads Posterity's curses if they were to allow a third world war to rankle out of their victory. In denying to Mankind the opportunity of enjoying the substantial benefits of an odious *Pax Germanica*, the peoples of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain had taken upon themselves a binding moral obligation to provide Mankind with a better world order than Hitler's without inflicting on Mankind the third world war that a German victory would have spared them. (IX, p. 555)

The construction that is put upon Hitler's offer of peace after the fall of France will not stand. It was the second one that he made. After the fall of Poland, his offer of peace was considered by serious thinkers, who were not war-minded, as having a good chance of being accepted. Now the offer Toynbee refers to in this long passage was far more generous coming from a victor than the one he made at Danzig. All these notions of a peace at an exorbitant price must be revised. Still, the point that he makes in this long paragraph is that the victors have a "moral obligation to provide mankind with a better world order than Hitler's." This they are not prepared to do. Indeed, they don't know how to go about it, and it is to be hoped that, by raising these questions, Toynbee will make them reflect upon their responsibilities for keeping the world in a state of chaos.

However, we must look facts in the face. There can be no world order so long as the making of munitions is an essential industry for employing men. Unemployment would soon bring about conditions so dire that the masses might revolt. Certainly trade unions would rebel. Technology for war purposes is the tire-bursting snag on the road Irene's car must travel to Toynbee's goal.

I have selected the salient features of this extraordinary section. In closing this analysis he says:

. . . Under the aegis of Religion, Western Man might find himself able to handle with spiritual impunity the material power thrust into his hands by the mechanization of Western technology. A neo-pagan Frankenstein who had been enslaved by the monster that he had made might live to become this monstrous mechanism's once more Christian master. . . . (IX, p. 641)

If only men were conscious of the monster they raise, there might be some hope of a spiritual change. The first duty imposed upon us is to abandon the false notions held about Religion and Economics. What is called economics today are the superficialities of production and exchange. The requirements of man can be satisfied if he will learn to base his economics on the fundamentals of production.

The essentials are: food, fuel, clothing and shelter, or wealth. Creation provides the source of all these things. Despite the croakings of the disciples of Malthus, there is room enough in some of the sections of the world for all the people who subsist now on low wage. An explorer of the Amazon has told us that, exerting the same prowess of the pioneers who went west in this country, there is room enough for tens of millions to live and produce abundance for themselves and their heirs. There are places in America, enormous tracts of good land, where you can travel for miles and miles and count the people on the two hands. Why, then, are the cities congested and people merely existing in squalor?

In New York City a few nights ago, eight people sleeping in two rooms were asphyxiated as a result of a leak in a gas pipe. Such horrors we read about frequently. One of the chief reasons why people fight shy of going into the meagerly populated districts of Canada, the United States, and South America is that they have lost the sense of the soil. They prefer the lighted city with its garish, time-wasting attractions. The stamina has gone out of the race, and those who examine army draftees report that a very large percentage are not only illiterate but are physically feeble.

Perhaps the same advice as that which was given in Galilee is the only counsel that people will heed, if they are given the chance to hear it from their pastors. There, to the wretches of the villages, under Roman sway, Jesus laid down the imperative of imperatives for all time and all people: "Seek ye first the reign of God and his justice, and all these things will be added unto you." Obey this command and perhaps once it is thoroughly understood, man will realize the truth—"The Kingdom of God is within you."

Technology and Economics

TOYNBEE REALIZES that every gain made in the development of inventions has been accompanied by a loss. This is realized by shrewd observers of the growth of Leviathan, and from time to time we are warned that there might be a crash. This was noticed a few years ago when we were threatened by a slump in trade. To avoid one, the country was thrown into the Korean War, and recently we were threatened with another. But luckily before the crisis took place, there was a change for the better in trade and employment.

Toynbee quotes a passage from Sir Alfred Ewing's presidential address, delivered to the British Association for the Advancement of Science in 1932:

We invent the machinery of mass-production, and, for the sake of cheapening the unit, we develop output on a gigantic scale. Almost automatically the machine delivers a stream of articles in the creation of which the workman has had little part. He has lost the joy of craftsmanship, the old satisfaction in something accomplished through the conscientious exercise of care and skill. (IX, p. 567)

Where this is to stop, no one knows. Ninety per cent of the men engaged in turning out inventions today are mere cogs in the industrial machine. But technology is no new thing. Arkwright and Hargreaves sealed the doom of village industries. Stephenson with the locomotive displaced the coach and four. Fulton and his colleagues in inventing the steam paddle boat, inaugurated the period when the sailing vessel disappeared from the ocean. And so it goes. There is no gain without a loss. When you think of motor cars and what has taken place on our roads, the loss is almost incalculable. A traffic policeman on a motorcycle, going at the rate of eighty miles an hour, sped round a bend on his way to an automobile accident. He knocked down a foot passenger and when, afterwards, he returned to the scene of the calamity, he was heard to remark, "Too bad! It's all wheels today; legs don't count."

Footpaths have disappeared from the parkways, and one can travel hundreds of miles in areas outside New York and never see a sidewalk.

But the greatest loss is spiritual. The old love of a walk into the country on a fine day has gone. People rush at fifty and sixty miles an hour to a resort for a holiday. Ask them about the condition of the fields and whether they saw any wildflowers, and they would reply they had to keep their eyes on the road. Are these the people who will be eligible for

the kingdom of a universal religion? Surely, technology is Leviathan, and as soul-destroying as the bureaucratic State.

Toynbee's use of the term "economics" needs much deeper consideration. It has lost its old meaning and is now applied to the multifarious complications of technical production, trade and finance. The basic meaning of the term was "the art of household management." In fact, it was larger business, and we have only to turn to the *Republic* and read how it was used by Socrates when he initiated the search for justice. Yet, the moderns seem to forget that we today are producing only the same essentials of well-being that the Greeks of the fourth century desired, namely, food, fuel, clothing and shelter. The additional luxuries, and gadgets for communication of all kinds, seem to befog the minds of our economists. With them it is a matter of what a man is working *at*, not what he is working *for*. They do not seem to realize that the pilot of an airplane and the engineer of a submarine are land animals.

It is necessary to keep these factors in mind because, as Spengler points out, the world of technology may be blown up and the survivors reduced to the conditions of the fellaheen and have to begin all over again. The hydrogen bomb, which is the last thing in the wonders achieved by the scientists and technicians, may be the very invention to disrupt the universal States.

Field-Marshal Montgomery has said:

... We at Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe, are basing all our operational planning on using atomic and thermo-nuclear weapons in our defense. With us it is no longer a question of "They may possibly be used." It is very definitely "They will be used, if we are attacked."

This statement needs clarifying, because Great Britain was not attacked when war was declared in 1914, nor was she threatened with violence in September, 1939. A pretext had to be found in each case: the one was the invasion of Belgium; and the other was the safety of Poland. I have not the slightest doubt that, if a third war comes to scourge us and wipe us out, Great Britain will enter it on a pretext.

Communism and Christianity

TOYNBEE HAS ALREADY MET with severe criticism for his presentation of likenesses between Christianity and Communism. He has fallen foul of Douglas Jerrold and other devout members of the Episcopal Church. A long controversy on this subject took place in *The Times*, and Toynbee in reply to his critics did not shine as a controversialist. The mistake that he

makes is in taking a system of rule, which goes by the name of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and comparing its political development with the forms of Christian government in free communities. This is the most serious defect to be found in these volumes. It has not been well thought out.

Perhaps the growth of the bureaucracies of the free States has given him the idea that it will all end in making the producers slaves of the government. They are not far from that now, but to find any likeness in Communism as a doctrine with that of Christianity is so far fetched that critics may well ask how Toynbee defines the term. This is a shock to the devotional Christian, for if you eliminate the idea that religion means the worship of a beneficent Creator who has provided the source of our well-being, the term cannot be applied to Soviet Russia.

After further consideration, Toynbee may clear up this conflict of notions and realize that he can have neither his universal State nor his universal religion unless a spiritual revolution takes place in the mind of man. How this is to come about while man is a victim of the machine, no one is prepared to say. One of the best-known soldiers told me a few years ago that he was convinced that nothing but a world catastrophe would mend matters. He did not say what the nature of it would be—whether it would be war to a finish, or a pestilence like the Black Death visiting all communities at once.

The silence of our churches, of all denominations, about world conditions, policies of governments, diplomatic trickery and all the other menaces to unity, is perhaps the gravest of all drawbacks to a reformation.

Arnold Toynbee's *Study of History*

Volume X

AND NOW, after reaching the end of the ninth volume, the reader may relax and meditate upon the stores of knowledge he has surveyed. He will ponder the many complex questions he has not had time to resolve, but only to take note of in passing. The end is inconclusive. There is no recapitulation, no gathering of the many broken strands of thought that might be woven into a rope to which he could cling and pull himself out of the erudite abyss toward a haven where hopeful lights gleam. The major purpose of the work seems to have been forgotten, or perhaps Toynbee is content to think that the reader will work out for himself the problem of how the four great religions are to coalesce and organize in one universal church.

He counsels the pilgrim who may be discouraged to recover his initiative, "by taking his oracle from Paul's first epistle to the Corinthians":

Covet earnestly the best gifts; and yet show I unto you a more excellent way.

The wayfarer must have "an indomitable endurance," and "trust in the grace of God." If he succeeds in this perilous passage,

he would find the bodhisattva psycho-pompus whom he was seeking in a Francesco Bernardone of Assisi, who was the most god-like soul that had been born into the Western World so far. A disciple of Saint Francis who followed faithfully enough in the saint's footsteps to participate in the saint's gift of receiving Christ's stigmata would know, with the knowledge that comes only through suffering, that his sacrifice had been accepted by the Lord. *Asperges me byssopo et mundabor.* [Purge me with hyssop and I shall be clean—Psalm LI, in the Authorized Version.] (IX, p. 644)

How far a purge of this order will purify the western soul no one knows.

The Position of the State

THERE ARE MANY QUESTIONS that come to mind on reflection which are pertinent to the chief problem presented by this study. There is the question of what the position of the State will be, when the four great religions unite. Toynbee has a poor opinion of it as an influence for good. Indeed, his revelations of the iniquities of politicians are as severe

as any I have read, because he gives the facts and details. Some of his pronouncements remind me of *Zarathustra*, in which Nietzsche says:

The State is called the coldest of all cold monsters. And coldly it lieth; and this lie creepeth out of its mouth: "I, the State, am the people."

It is a lie! Creators they were who created the peoples and hung one belief and one love over them; thus they served life. (*Thus Spake Zarathustra*)

The State is for the "much-too-many." There is a sonnet by Campa-
nella, which begins,

The people is a beast of muddy brain
 . . . With its own hand it ties
 And gags itself—gives itself death and war
 For pence doled out by kings from its own store.
 Its own are all things between earth and heaven;
 But this it knows not; and if one arise
 To tell this truth, it kills him unforgiven.

(Trans. by John Addington Symonds)

I could quote many of the early fathers to the same effect. Toynbee himself has given us the opinion of Augustine. Is it reasonable to imagine that there will be a political State when the four great religions are bound together in one purpose? It seems to me the answer to this is adumbrated by Toynbee, although he does not pronounce a judgment upon the matter. He leaves it in the air. It is for the reader to work the problem out alone.

Another question that will disturb the reader will be the position in which he would place Toynbee as an exhorter of a universal church. He might ask, "Is he a theist or a deist?" and decide to let the Rationalists split hairs about the difference. This will be difficult to determine. Perhaps he will come to the conclusion that Toynbee may be classed with the English Platonists of the seventeenth century—with such men as More, Cudworth, and Whichcote, for passages of Toynbee's thought remind me of the followers of Colet and Erasmus. "I would rather read a page of Origen than ten of Augustine," Colet said.

We may not be doing Toynbee an injustice by likening some of his statements to one of Benjamin Whichcote: "*Non sum Christianus alicuius nominis*" (I am not a Christian of any denomination.) His favorite maxim was: "The spirit of a man is the candle of the Lord." This will be found in that admirable work of Ernst Cassirer, *The Platonic Renaissance in England*, a study of which will help the student to elucidate many of the strange ideas expounded in Toynbee's sections devoted to religions.

There is no doubt about his view of church and State. He says:

. . . It would have been happier for the Church to have been disestablished than to be kept in harness, as she was, as the handmaiden instead of the Egeria of a ghost of the Roman Empire; for, in her new official status of subjection to the East Roman state, the Church brought, not peace, but a sword into the international life of an expanding Orthodox Christendom. (VII, p. 405)

Yet, there were periods when the fountain nymph of a pure-water spring was adviser to kings who, without her, would have departed far from the law of justice and prudence. When the chancellors of England were monks, who wished nothing for themselves, the kings were often guided by them, to the advantage of the subjects of the realm. But Egeria was discharged by the Tudors, and lay chancellors—mere politicians—took her place.

The Four Higher Religions

IT IS NOT SURPRISING that Toynbee sometimes realizes his position is a difficult one, and that the reader might think his own predilections color many of his pronouncements. He recognizes the influence of the faith of a historian's father upon the religious opinions of a son. Of this he says:

. . . If he turns savage against it and tries to break out of its confines by force, the faith of his fathers revenges itself upon him by becoming a veritable prison-house whose magic walls pen the ex-Christian atheist and the still Christian believer together in a common mental captivity which is palpable to a non-Christian looker-on. With this warning to himself and his readers, the writer of this Study will venture to express his personal belief that the four higher religions that were alive in the age in which he was living were four variations on a single theme, and that, if all the four components of this heavenly music of the spheres could be audible on Earth simultaneously, and with equal clarity, to one pair of human ears, the happy hearer would find himself listening, not to a discord, but to a harmony. (VII, p. 428)

This extraordinary passage may mystify students of this generation, who know little or nothing about the grave controversies rife in England from the time of the Stuarts to the end of Victoria's reign. And so conscious is Toynbee of the startling effect it might have upon his reader that, in a long footnote, he is forced to explain where he stands upon this matter. Mr. Martin Wight submitted Toynbee's thesis to searching criticism, which forced him to make the following declaration:

. . . If the writer were to be asked: "Do you believe or disbelieve that Christianity or any other higher religion is an exclusive and definitive revelation of Spiritual Truth?" his answer would be: "I do not believe

this. I believe that any such claim is an error which is at the same time a sin. In claiming to possess a monopoly of the Divine Light, a church seems to me to be guilty of hybris. In denying that other religions may be God's chosen and sufficient channels for revealing Himself to some human souls, it seems to me to be guilty of blasphemy. If it is inadmissible to call oneself a Christian without holding these tenets, then I am not entitled to call myself a Christian; I must call myself a Symmachan. Symmachus's confession of faith—"The heart of so great a mystery can never be reached by following one road only"—is an article in my creed which neither my head nor my heart will allow me to abandon." (VII, pp. 428-9n.)

It is to be hoped this important statement will not be skipped by the reader, for it explains far better than any of the passages in the context, Toynbee's viewpoint about the three other great religions he hopes will be unified in one last universal church. There is no reason to be shocked at this candor, for it is quite in line with that of the English Platonists.

I do not think that a devoted communicant of the Catholic or the Protestant Church would have dared to associate the chief of the pagan cults with the organization of the early church, as essential elements in bringing together their worshippers as members of one harmonious ecclesia. Toynbee says, "The victorious religions had found themselves constrained to purchase their victory at the price of adopting from their discomfited rivals all elements—important or trivial, good or bad." And he says:

. . . In the pantheon of a triumphant Christianity, the figures of Cybele and Isis reasserted their power in the transfiguration of Mary the mother of Jesus into the Great Mother of God, and the lineaments of Mithras and Sol Invictus were visible in a militant presentation of Christ. . . . (VII, p. 437)

Still, it is well in such a work to be frank about the religion of Paul of Tarsus, for many works now by brilliant Bible scholars show clearly that, had there been no Paul, there would have been no Christianity.

Christians of the many sects will read with amazement the chapter in Volume X on "The Quest for a Meaning Behind the Facts of History." *Ora pro nobis!* Toynbee groups many of the known Christs of the pagan and Christian religions in an intercessional litany which includes Tammuz, Jesus Christ, Cybele, John the Baptist, Lucretius, Zarathustra, Wesley, and other founders of cults. They are to intercede for us! Is this not asking too much, no matter what our sins may be, or our ignorance even of the Lord's Prayer? Is it not an indication of our utter helplessness to save ourselves?

Surely if you yourself do not pray for yourself, your prayers will not help others. A contrite heart is the perfect center from which love for one's neighbor emanates. Meister Eckhart assures us of this essential in his Sermons. To "Ask and you will receive," he replies "*if you are ready to receive.*"

"Know yourself" means "Save yourself." God is just, and the endowment which He has richly bequeathed to man is to be used for his own soul's sake. How can it be otherwise?

Where, then, are we to look for the religion that is without sect, one which appeals to the people of all races? Certainly not in Tarsus or Jerusalem! But in the hills of Galilee, where there was born One who saw clearly God's justice and sought to fulfill the divine law, which led to eternal life. How strange it is that today, in this world of political and religious conflict, the One who brought good tidings is scarcely referred to. And, yet, the worthiest scholars of my youth realized the grandeur of His thought and counsel. Ranke says of Him:

How obscure and unpretending was his life! His occupation was to heal the sick and to discourse of God in parables with a few fishermen, who did not always understand his words. He had not where to lay his head. Yet, even from the worldly point of view whence we consider it, we may safely assert, that nothing more guileless or more impressive, more exalted or more holy, has ever been seen on earth than were his life, his whole conversation, and his death. In his every word there breathes the pure spirit of God. They are words, as St. Peter had expressed it, of eternal life. The records of humanity present nothing that can be compared, however remotely, with the life of Jesus. (*History of the Popes*, I, pp. 2-3)

Of this we get little from Toynbee. Indeed, in looking at the index, we read under the name Jesus that the references to him are to be found under Jesus Christ.

We might ask ourselves, "Who are the Christian people who are to fraternize with those of the other religions to make Toynbee's universal church?" I will give the opinion of a man who held the position of Dean of St. Paul's, London. Here he served long, at a center about which all elements in the life of the English were active day and night. The City with its great financial and commercial marts; Fleet Street with editors and journalists, the squalid East End of London; the river and the docks, where rich and poor rubbed shoulders day in and day out. From this vantage point he was able to form an estimate of the spiritual worth of those he saw at work and those he came in contact with. And this is what he said, shortly after the First World War:

. . . For the second time in the history of Western Europe, continuity is in danger of being lost. A generation is growing up, not uneducated, but educated in a system which has little connexion with European culture in its historical development. The Classics are not taught; the Bible is not taught; history is not taught to any effect. What is even more serious, there are no social traditions. The modern townsman is *déraciné*: he has forgotten the habits and sentiments of the village from which his forefathers came. An unnatural and unhealthy mode of life, cut off from the sweet and humanizing influences of nature, has produced an unnatural and unhealthy mentality, to which we shall find no parallels in the past. Its chief characteristic is profound secularity or materialism. The typical town artisan has no religion and no superstitions; he has no ideals beyond the visible and tangible world of the senses. . . . (Quoted in *The Legacy of Greece*, ed. by R. W. Livingstone, Oxford Univ. Press, 1928, p. 38)

Since that was written, we have had another war, and Dean Inge's estimate of the people he knew was confirmed by it. What chance, then, is there for Toynbee's universal church, the union of the four great religions, to take possession of the intellect and soul of man? From reading these volumes, it seems to me that our first task is to teach religion to the Christian.

The Curiosity of the Historian

AS AN INSTANCE of the eclipse of glory, Toynbee quotes a few lines from Volney, in the tenth volume. The latter reminds us that the poor peasant Arabs built their houses upon the foundations of a temple at Palmyra, dedicated to the sun. It makes me wonder who will find a habitation upon the ruins of our monuments of technology. Of course, it cannot happen to us. The people who built the temple at Palmyra were pagans; we are Christians and possess the know-how of running civilization, for the time being.

It might be said that the Egyptians, the Greeks and the Romans thought as we do. Those who built the Zoser Pyramid at Sakkara thought it would never lose its marble casing. No Greek of the time of Phidias ever imagined some of his sculptures would be taken to the British Museum. And most assuredly, the Romans who built aqueducts and temples thought they were secure, and Rome would endure forever.

There were cocksure people in all the civilizations, but history is a record of flimsy hopes. Toynbee asks:

Why do people study History? Why, to put the question *ad hominem*, had the writer of the present work been studying History since he was a child and been spending thirty years on this book which he was now finishing? Is an historian born or made? Every historian will have his own answer to this question, because he will be speaking from his own

experience. *Quot homines, tot sententiae*: each must speak for himself. The present writer's personal answer was that an historian, like anyone else who has had the happiness of having an aim in life, has found his vocation in a call from God to "feel after Him and find Him." (X, p. 1)

This is well enough, and few will dispute the wisdom of the statement. Further on, he has some instructive passages on the curiosities of the historian. He asserts:

Without this creative stirring of curiosity, the most familiar, impressive, and numerous monuments of History will perform their eloquent dumb-show to no effect, because the eyes to which they will be addressing themselves will be eyes that see not. . . . (X, p. 7)

This section, "Curiosity," and the one that follows it, "The Will-o'-the-Wisp of Omniscience," will be of deep interest to archaeologists who serve the muse of history with lore that makes the past live again. There is an abundance of precious consideration to be found in Toynbee's lofty ideas of the historian's calling and the processes of his workmanship. These sections should be read by students of both ancient and modern history, for they contain the methods of plan and execution of an accomplished workman. Here is his counsel:

. . . With these pertinent hard facts of human life ever present in mind, he must take the brevity of life, and not the *longueurs* of intellectual dissipation, as the measure for his intellectual enterprises; he must keep his plans within human compass and must put these feasible plans into execution here and now; for, in real life, no miracle will intervene to enable Psyche to acquit herself of an impracticable task imposed upon her by an overweening Intellect, since it is one of the fundamental laws of Human Nature than an undertaking which is manifestly beyond the compass of a mortal man's or woman's maximum expectation of working time and energy is *ipso facto* convicted of being an undertaking that is inherently unsound. . . . (X, p. 40)

Whether the historian has the same aim in life as Toynbee or not, he sets the seal of his eligibility for the task upon the interpretation of the events he has under review. In the first book of the *Histories*, Polybius tells us:

. . . He who assumes the character of a historian must ignore everything of the sort [favouritism], and often, if their actions demand this, speak good of his enemies and honour them with the highest praises while criticizing and even reproaching roundly his closest friends, should the errors of their conduct impose this duty on him. . . . (Bk. I, p. 35)

In the days to come, Toynbee will not escape the charge of patriotic prejudice and the taint of national outlook. Nevertheless, the most carp-

ing critic of some of the controversial points of these volumes will have to admit their author has performed a necessary work in opening up subjects for debate that have been kept in the background by censors and other restrictive influences.

In the tenth volume there are short essays the student will readily enjoy. The one on "Poetry in the Facts of History" is a delightful contribution, and that called "Meaning Behind the Facts of History" might be read to advantage before the student begins the study of the seventh volume.

About half of this book is taken up with acknowledgments and thanks, and an exceptionally fine index. However, it lacks a bibliography. I have already suggested that it would be a fine piece of work for a student to take these volumes, context and footnotes, and give us the sources from which Toynbee has drawn his information.

Now, in nearing the conclusion, I should like to refer to the critique of Professor W. H. Walsh, Fellow and Tutor of Merton College, Oxford, which appeared in *The Times*. Here Toynbee is taken to task for the claims he has made as a historian. Professor Walsh says:

. . . It is surely clear that in this he has travelled far, not only from his own original project for a comparative study of civilizations, but also from what any normal historian would recognize as history proper. (*Times* [London], Oct. 14, 1954, p. 9)

Walsh considers it a remarkable work, as a whole, and yet says, "The book has been, and promises to remain an object of controversy as well as of admiration." The most crushing indictment that Walsh places upon it refers to the difference between Toynbee and the author of the *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*. Professor Walsh says:

. . . Mr. Toynbee seems to be suggesting that he should himself be thought of as a latter-day Gibbon. . . .

On this two comments may be made. First, if it is true that Mr. Toynbee has tried to generalize Gibbon's inquiry, he has failed to notice that in so doing he has ceased to be an historian, except incidentally. This point is, indeed, very obvious. . . . (*Ibid.*)

Whether he be a historian pure and simple or not, we must admit that he has opened the field for innumerable tilts. And scholars and students of culture and civilization, in the Spenglerian sense, will look forward to these tourneys with minds exhilarated, in the hope that our doubts may be cleared away and our dreary souls purified by a spiritual awakening.

Business Men and Intellectual Pursuits

THERE IS AN ESSAY in the tenth volume, Annex XIII B, entitled "A Business School of Intellectual Action," which should not be missed by any reader. It is a contribution quite apart from the main subject of the study, but it is an invaluable one for the busy industrialists of our time, for in it they will learn that men of great financial and commercial affairs found leisure to make famous contributions to literature, archaeology, and natural science.

Toynbee tells us of the lives of George Grote, who wrote *The History of Greece*; Walter Leaf, who translated the first nine books of the *Iliad* into English prose; and Henry Schliemann, whose work in the Troad and the Greek Peninsula revealed to us the scenes of the Trojan War. George Grote was a banker of high esteem, who attended to the financial duties of his father's firm, and his wife, a woman of great culture, has left to us the record of his labors.

Walter Leaf was also a banker, who did not neglect his duties, but found time to translate the beginning of the *Iliad* into perfect Saxon prose.

The story of Henry Schliemann is one of the most wonderful romances in the rise to eminence that is recorded. There are others Toynbee mentions in this essay, who practiced avocations in literature and other arts, who have left memorials that should not be forgotten. However, he has overlooked that extraordinary man, Sir John Lubbock, who became Lord Avebury. It was he who selected the hundred best books, which became the nucleus of my library that Hilaire Belloc called "the most unusual collection" he had ever seen in a layman's house.

Lubbock wrote on anthropology, natural science, botany, and other branches of learning. He, too, was a banker and lived a busy life of a City man of great affairs. He was president of many renowned societies, sat for Maidstone in the House of Commons, and yet with all the weight of carrying the many financial and commercial affairs with which he was connected, he spent an entirely separate life in giving us enlightenment.

This is rather a sad commentary on the men of this generation. We have no Grotes, Schliemanns, Leafs, or Lubbocks today. Many years ago I asked the president of an overgrown university why our men who became trustees of institutions of learning contributed little or nothing to the cultural and intellectual enlightenment of people of their time. And he said it was because they were not grounded in the classics and the liberal arts.

This essay, which Toynbee has given to us, should act as a stimulant by reminding our powerful magnates of technology that they owe their leisure hours to the prosecution of pursuits which will not only make them informed, but aid them in seeking avocations that will inspire them to contribute to the enlightenment of the world something far more valuable to posterity than the commodities they produce.

If the student is to grasp the significance of Toynbee's idea of a universal church and comprehend some of the great difficulties of reaching such a goal, he should read in the *Cambridge Medieval History* some of the essays upon the position of church and State in the Middle Ages. Professor Reade's essay in the sixth volume is an invaluable statement of how the State was regarded by the most eminent thinkers of that period. There is also a brilliant book on this subject by Frank Gavin, which should not be overlooked, *Seven Centuries of Church and State*. There is, besides, Ernst Cassirer's work called *The Myth of the State*, which contains the thought of an eminent scholar.

To understand Toynbee's aim, and appreciate the difficulties of fulfilling it, the reader who is profoundly interested in this subject should prepare himself with a deep background of knowledge, and the three works that I have mentioned will help him to fill in the gaps of Toynbee's study. He takes too much for granted. The man of this generation has not been educated in the classics nor in the precious thought of the medieval writers, for understanding clearly the drift of Toynbee's purpose.

I presume we shall have to wait for the monthly and quarterly reviews before we learn much in the way of criticism of this study. The daily and weekly periodicals have not the space to deal with it *in extenso*. The higher critics will be better able to deal with the myths, pagan and Christian, than this reviewer, who does not pretend to enter into all the labyrinths of Toynbee's thought. It seems to me that he has chosen a splendid theme for review, but the variations of it are so complex that the motif becomes subsidiary.

No matter what defects may be pointed out by the higher critics, there is a warrant for the study. The chaos of the world calls for it, for the present can only be understood by a knowledge of the past, and I know no other work that reveals so vividly the fate of religions and States as this does. If it acts only as a purge, with or without hyssop, of the modern scholar's mind, it will serve a worthy purpose.

December 1, 1954