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YUGOSLAVIA IN THE BALKANS AND CENTRAL EUROPE¹

STOYAN PRIBICHEVICH

THIS paper deals with the region south of the Carpathians, embracing Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Albania, Roumania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Austria; it excludes Greece and Poland.

Five essential points are common to the whole area. (1) The internal régimes are characterized by a strong trend to the Left, but they represent neither the Soviet system nor Western democracy; they oscillate somewhere between the two. (2) The foreign policies of these various countries will very probably lean on that of Soviet Russia, for one fundamental reason: Soviet Russia is the only Great Power in a position to give these countries immediate and effective military assistance against aggression. (3) A Regional Bloc seems to be in formation in Central Europe and the Balkans based not on any confederation, but on individual alliances between Soviet Russia and the separate countries. (4) According to all evidence so far, the region will not have a communist system of economy but will adopt certain State control over capital and a number of co-operative activities. It will probably, some time in the future, be organized as one trade unit and will need an outlet to the Mediterranean. (5) In that area, Yugoslavia is at present the strongest single military Power, with the most stable Government, and to a large degree represents to the outside world the common interests of the 60 to 70 million people of the whole region.

From the Western point of view, it has often been said that Yugoslavia has a totalitarian régime, or at least that she is not a democracy in our sense, since there is as yet no legal opposition in that country. However, Yugoslavia is not a totalitarian country—nor a Tito-talitarian country either—because the Government is composed of leaders, or at least of representatives, of all the eight pre-war political parties but one. This shows that in our political thinking we still use old *clichés* which cannot accurately describe certain events on the Continent.

Like all the countries of Central Europe and the Balkans, Yugoslavia emerged, after the last war, with the most modern Western democratic institutions, with Parliament, free press and free competition of parties. In 1920 the only free elections in the history of Yugoslavia were held. In these elections the Communist Party obtained the third largest number of seats. In the following year, 1921, the Law of Defence of State banned the Communist Party, whose popular strength has never again been tested by legal means. The Law of Defence of State expanded with the years. It embraced first the Leftists next to the Communists, then the Liberals,

¹Address given at Chatham House on May 17, 1945.

then the Centre, then anybody who was against the Government, until, if I may mention this incident, my late father, who introduced the Bill in the Parliament as an Emergency Measure, found himself, in 1929, arrested on the basis of the same inflated law for opposing the late King Alexander's abolition of the Constitution.

In 1931, King Alexander decreed a new Constitution which concentrated supreme power in Royal hands. The Laws accompanying that Constitution introduced a public ballot for some kind of sham Parliament. The Royal Government in London drew authority from that decree. In 1943, Tito, who had lived as an outlaw and spent some time in prison before the war, was proclaimed Marshal in Yugoslavia, and in the same year the Royal Yugoslav Government in Cairo lifted the ban on the Communist Party. The present Yugoslav Government is a coalition Government under Tito and the Regency, and it is formally recognized by the Allies. General elections for a new Constituent Assembly are proposed for some time in the near future, to decide on a new Constitution and between a Monarchy or a Republic.

At the present time, party differentiation, discussion and opposition are allowed in Yugoslavia within what is called the National Liberation Front, but not outside it. A legitimate question is "Why?" This is the answer you will get from Yugoslavia: the war is over militarily but not yet politically; consequently collaborators, Quislings and pro-fascists of all kinds would, quite naturally, crowd the Opposition ranks and thus obtain legal recognition after military defeat. This answer brings us directly to the new concept of so-called anti-fascist democracy in Central Europe and the Balkans, which is inseparable from the so-called "purge" problem.

On the European Continent—unlike the United States and Great Britain—and especially in the Balkans and Central Europe, this war has also been a civil war. There are victors and defeated within every country on the Continent and the present trend of events shows the Left on the march. Even the French and Finnish elections have demonstrated this. Again, unlike in the United States and Great Britain where the upper classes and big business have played an important, not to say decisive, part in war production and winning the war, the upper classes and business classes of Central Europe and the Balkans have been more ready than the lower classes to make accommodations with the enemy; so that, while it is not true to say that every Rightist in the region is a pro-fascist, it is true to say that every pro-fascist comes from the Rightist ranks.

Thus we can formulate three principles of this so-called anti-fascist democracy, as it is called in the Balkans and Central Europe. The first principle is the new militant concept of who is a democrat. You will very often read in the Balkan papers that a true democrat is the man who fights fascism; this is a concept incomprehensible in the West. The second principle is that limitless acceptance of opposition parties offers legal loopholes for fascist infiltration, or results in anarchy, which is apt to undermine

democracy and facilitate fascism's rise to power; for this the example of pre-war France is often quoted. Therefore the ruling combinations throughout the Balkans and Central Europe are more or less limited to political parties between the Centre and the Extreme Left. The third principle is that the enormous masses of long-oppressed and exploited lower classes, especially peasantry, which have fought best in this war, must, through radical economic and social reforms, be given preponderant influence in the Government.

Thus while we in the West insist that free competition of parties is an essential element of democracy, in Central Europe and the Balkans people insist that economic security of the lower classes is the essential element in the definition of democracy. Many people there will also point out that democracy is a changing phenomenon: that in Athens it meant democracy of the upper classes based on slave labour, and in the West today it means democracy of all classes; but that in the East it means democracy of the lower classes who form the vast majority of the population.

I would repeat that the party combinations now in power in the Balkans and Central Europe are combinations of parties between the Centre, or slightly Right of the Centre, and the extreme Left. It is perhaps of interest to quote what an Hungarian Social Democrat Party resolution says in this context. Last March, in Debrecen, the Party resolution said: "We do not want to see Democracy constantly tumbling toward its grave. We want our Democracy to have a fist which will destroy every vestige of Fascism. Democracy is not the green light for all kinds of reactionaries to try to infiltrate the Opposition." Such language would not be used in Great Britain or in the United States, where I think there is no danger that fascists would infiltrate to a large extent into the Opposition.

There is another difference between our concept of democracy and theirs which very often comes to the fore over practical issues. We are apt to identify democracy with legal court procedure which gives the defendant the best possible chance. People over there point out that it is for this reason that German generals and soldiers and all kinds of Quislings and war criminals flocked to surrender to us. Also we are apt to identify democracy with a legalistic *status quo*. I have often been told: "You see, you recognize the Spanish and the Portuguese totalitarian Governments, yet you question, for instance, the representative character of the Bulgarian Liberation Front Government." So I get the impression that these inconsistencies of our behaviour—as they consider them—are apt to confuse millions of people in Central Europe and the Balkans and have prompted them to start thinking, in the eternal search for the true meaning of democracy.

Coming now to more practical problems, I should say that some of our American and British Intelligence experts have made the mistake in that area, throughout the war, of sticking too much to old pre-war acquaintances, to old political friends, to old business contacts, under the legalistic

assumption that historical parties and their leaders are immutable. But, in fact, enemy invasion, enemy occupation, resistance movements, have stirred these countries like so many ploughs, turning them up like furrows and bringing forth new leaders, new political forces and new Governments. Only in the case of Yugoslavia did we make a timely effort to get in touch with the rising forces and make some kind of arrangement with them. In the other countries most of the people who are now in power and who may stay in power for a long time are men of whom we have hardly heard. This may partly account for a certain loss of British and American influence in the Balkans and in Central European countries outside Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia.

In Yugoslavia, the country I know best, there had been, even before Tito's rise, a leadership crisis in all non-Communist Yugoslav political parties. In practically every party some leaders joined the Partisans, some joined Mihailovich, some joined Pavelich (the Croatian Quisling), some joined Nedich (the Serbian Quisling), some remained passive at home, some fled abroad. So that a return to the old party *status quo* appears very difficult. And not unnaturally so, for the *status quo* has exploded by itself without Communist pressure: the Communists merely took advantage of an inexorable, spontaneous process. Looking back, one can see that new groups, new parties have branched off from the old ones, because the old-time leaders of almost all Central Europe and the Balkans were, with a few exceptions, incapable of foreseeing and meeting the new situation, that is, the turn to the Left and the necessity of adjustment to Soviet Russia. Maniu, Machek, Mushanov and so on all seemed to fit into the same general pattern—of the old-time politicians who thought they could be both pro-Ally and anti-Russian, who may not have collaborated with the enemy but who opposed the resistance movement because of its Leftism, and thus got themselves into a fatal impasse.

The most interesting feature of this process is the splitting up of the old Peasant Parties into Right and Left wings, with the Left wings usually joining the Liberation Governments and the Right wings staying outside. Sometimes the Right wings are headed by the old party leaders and sometimes not. This is a common situation in Czechoslovakia, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.

Originally, Peasant Parties, in the Balkans especially, were, alongside the Communists, the chief standard-bearers of opposition to autocratic régimes. Their original leaders like Radich and Stambuliski were mass leaders in the true sense of the word, tribunes on a grand scale, with a tremendous, enthusiastic popular following. Both of these men were murdered by the political and military cliques then in power. The original Peasant Parties had extremely radical programmes, rather more radical than the programmes of the present Liberation Governments. There was plenty of propaganda against the monopoly of political power by the *gospoda*, the bourgeoisie, and propaganda for a Co-operative Peasant State, where big business, banks and industries would be controlled by the State

in peasant interest. In countries such as Bulgaria, Roumania, Yugoslavia, where the peasants formed up to 80 per cent of the population, this seemed natural enough. Radich once said, replying to the charge of propagating class struggle: "Sir, the peasant is not a class: the peasant is *the* nation."

But the peasants of olden times repeatedly failed to attain or to keep power; if they did they were invariably overthrown by military and police terror. Subsequently there was a large influx of the urban element into the cowed, opportunistic peasant leadership, especially in Croatia and Roumania, and this resulted in more emphasis being laid in the Party programmes on nationalism and less on social radicalism. The leader of the Hungarian Small Farmers Party, Dr. Tibor Eckhart, was until recently the chief exponent of Hungarian Revisionism. The Croatian Peasant Party became more and more a *Croatian* Peasant Party instead of a *Croatian Peasant* Party. In the fight for autonomy before this war, the Party strove to embrace *all* Croats, so as to be able to say it represented 99 per cent of all the Croatian nation. Thus it adopted a good many urban Rightist elements into leadership, and many of these men during the war collaborated with Pavelich. Again, in the Serbian Agrarian Party, the leadership of the Right Wing Serbian Party was instrumental during this war in promoting ideas of a Serbian separation from Croatia, or at least of keeping a very firm hand on the Croats. Similar developments toward increased nationalism in the leadership of the old Peasant Parties can be observed in Roumania; the chief objection of the Left-wing elements to Maniu is that he approved, or was in favour of, war on Russia to recover Bessarabia, or that his Guards treated the Transylvanian Hungarians rather unpleasantly.

It is unrealistic to pooh-pooh the present Liberation Front Governments in the Balkans and Central Europe as totally unrepresentative, as democratic façades to deceive Western public opinion. It is true that some parties are not represented in these Governments. It is true also that some parties are represented only by fractions. It is also true that Russian prestige and influence account for a lot. But it also remains true that the new trend is definitely towards the Left, and every realist should assume that these Governments enjoy a rather important popular support. It certainly would be extremely difficult to dispute the representative character of the Czechoslovak or Austrian Governments, despite the manner in which they were established and, as for Yugoslavia, it is my own considered opinion after a long stay and many travels there, that the present Government would obtain a substantial majority of the votes in any free elections held even under the supervision of an Inter-Allied Commission. Furthermore, I think that the present Government would obtain a majority within each of the Yugoslav nationalities, including the Serbs of Serbia proper.

So that it would be wise to assume that the new Coalitions and Liberation Fronts in Central Europe and the Balkans are, after all, genuine creations; for instance, the Yugoslav National Liberation Movement was

formed spontaneously, long before the Red Army reached the Dnieper. Nor would it be realistic to assume that the Communist Parties seized leadership of these National Liberation Movements by sheer force of arms or by political stratagems. I do not think the fact is very well known in Great Britain, but Communist Parties have always been strong among the Balkan peasantry, especially in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria; the reason being partly that there are almost no Socialist Parties. A socialist in the Balkans is just a plain communist. Another reason for this is racial sympathy with Russia, regardless of the régime; if Russia is communist, more people will work for a Communist Party. At any rate the Balkan Communist Parties showed strength in those few free elections before the war. In this war it is undeniable that the Communist Parties led the resistance movements in the Balkans, or in the guerrilla war in Yugoslavia, with great sacrifice, great ability and great valour. One of the worst mistakes that we in the West can make is to compare the Balkan Communist Parties, banned and persecuted for years, trained and steeled in underground life, parties that have performed some heroic deeds, with the rather comfortably-living Communist Parties in Great Britain and the United States.

The general pattern, therefore, in the Balkans and Central Europe shows this picture: the Communists have no monopoly of power, as in Soviet Russia, nor are other groups in the Governments mere Communist puppets, but no Government in the Balkans or Central Europe is conceivable today without Communist participation or even leadership. That is true of Roumania, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and throughout the area.

Whatever one may think of the present Yugoslav Government, whatever our judgment on Tito's internal or international policies, there is one outstanding achievement of his movement which I think will remain historic: it has achieved the national unity of Yugoslavia in a federal equality of nationalities which bitterly opposed each other for twenty years and massacred each other during the early stages of this war. It was this particular achievement which the Prime Minister praised in his speech of February 1944.

This brings us to the new and revolutionary policies of the new Governments in Central Europe and the Balkans toward nationalism and the nationalities. It has been proved in that European region above all that democracy, even when established, cannot work without a federal reorganization of a nationally composite country. The Yugoslav case is the most significant. Parliamentary democracy after the last war gradually lapsed into sham parliamentarism and then into dictatorship, simply because it was grounded on a centralized State composed of many nationalities, a State where a small group of Serbs ruled over other Serbs and monopolized power over other nationalities. The inevitable consequence was internal strife and the development of dictatorship to maintain a centralist concept of Government which could not be maintained by parliamentary methods.

During the occupation the Germans played on the passions of local nationalisms in Central Europe and the Balkans for all they were worth. They incited the Slovaks against the Czechs, the Bulgars against the Serbs, the Roumanians against the Hungarians; they prompted Ustashis to massacre Serbs and Chetniks to take revenge on Croats. Thus the Gestapo operated a ghoulish system of checks and balances in Central Europe and the Balkans, combining mutually embattled nationalists in their common hatred of Leftism. Such was the situation which Tito met in 1941. He did not make speeches about Marxist slogans, but threw appeal after appeal among Yugoslavs to bury their hatchets and band together against the invader and not to let themselves be led astray by fanatics into the Gestapo strategy of mutual extermination. This policy succeeded, so that today there is no fear that the Serbian people may take wholesale revenge on the Croatian people for the ghastly massacres of the Serbs in 1941 and afterwards.

What is going on now in Yugoslavia, in Central Europe and the Balkans is a Federalist Revolution, that is, the granting of federal status—or at least equal treatment—to every nationality. Czechoslovakia will be a Federal State; one speaks of nationalities even in Roumania today. There are two Departments in the University of Cluj, Hungarian and Roumanian. The Macedonian question seems to be on the way to solution; that region which for seventy years has been disputed by Serbs and Bulgars, who went four times to war over it, has become a federal unit in Yugoslavia, and possibly Bulgarian Macedonia will join it some time in the future. In Yugoslavia we have today a federal status for five recognized nationalities: Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, Montenegrins. The sixth State is Bosnia, so hopelessly mixed of Moslems, Serbs and Croats that it was made a separate State which is neither Serb nor Croat.

Federalism appears now in Central Europe and the Balkans as an integral part of democracy; at least it is the basis of democracy, since the freedom of the citizen cannot be conceived without freedom of the nationalities to which they belong, and the most perfect democratic machinery will fail to function if one nationality is to play the top dog over the other. At the same time it is a basis for future confederations. All past schemes have envisaged confederations based on centralist States and have tried to build the house from the roof. The idea today is that federalism begins at home; that first Yugoslavia or Czechoslovakia must be a federal country, in order to be ready to join some larger federal group. The rise of federalism in the Balkans and Central Europe is the most significant phenomenon of the present day. That region, proverbial for nationalistic bickerings and squabbles, may soon prove capable of introducing elements of stability and security into European life.

So far as the economic system in the region is concerned, it has been officially proclaimed that private ownership is to remain, and I have seen it in practice, but there will be a good deal of co-operativism. There will be State control over big business and there will be a certain amount of

State ownership. The system will not be clean-cut, however, but private ownership and initiative will nevertheless be prevalent and basic. There is no evidence that a communist system of economy will prevail as in Soviet Russia.

The pre-war economic and social structure of the region is important for future developments. It was, and is, a predominantly peasant region where, as I mentioned earlier, the peasant often forms up to 80 per cent of the population. In Hungary there reigned a feudal system where 3 million peasants out of a population of $4\frac{1}{2}$ million were nothing but an agrarian proletariat. Elsewhere in the Balkans there was a sort of pre-capitalistic system of economy, something on the South American pattern: a vast, impoverished and largely illiterate peasantry with no political power, a huge Government and bureaucracy, no independent capitalist or business class but only a few capitalistic families, a very thin and poor middle class, a lot of foreign capital and extraordinarily cheap labour. The exceptions were Austria and Czechoslovakia, which had a more balanced class composition, more industrialists, and enjoyed a much higher standard of living.

Agrarian reforms are on the way in Roumania and in Hungary; the expert criticism often heard is that inefficiency, the splitting up of large estates, and lack of agricultural machinery will result in a decline of production. The point is that agrarian reforms are never purely economic measures: in that part of Europe agrarian reform represents an irresistible political demand. In fact, since Roman times there has never been an agrarian reform which has not at least temporarily resulted in a decline of production. Politically, however, an agrarian reform releases tremendous human energies which cannot be expressed in statistical figures but the influence of which appears afterwards. It is something like a long-range investment. The policy of delaying agrarian reforms has shown that if you want to avoid an economic shock, you delay the agrarian reform, one delay leads to more delays and finally to no agrarian reform. Except in Hungary, a wave of agrarian reforms swept the Balkans and Central Europe after the last war, and only in Czechoslovakia did they work out satisfactorily because there the agrarian credit was properly organized. In other countries the peasants got land but no equipment or money to buy it, and the subsequent fall of agricultural prices initiated the biggest peasant indebtedness in the world; in Roumania it was \$26.00 per capita in 1932. Thus feudalism was reinstalled in a modern form: instead of working for a feudal baron, the Balkan peasant worked so many days a week for the local bank or merchant, and owned his mortgaged property only nominally.

Machinery is a problem also, because the Germans have taken it away where it previously existed.

Another thing to be considered is the labour force. Occasionally during the Yugoslav guerrilla war I have seen agricultural labour mobilized. If the peasants had not much to do on their own bit of land they were requested to go and work on someone else's where the labour force had been mobilized

into the army. Not an inch of land was to be left unproductive in liberated territories. But this method will probably not be continued after the war. Instead there will be a co-operative system which will not be limited to buying and selling, as in the West, but will also extend into collective work. This kind of co-operation for common work will not be a great departure from normal traditional Balkan-Slav forms of family or village communal labour. Croatian Peasant Party and Slovenian Co-operatives were engaged in collective work before the war and, for instance, built roads or drained malarial marshes. The Slovenes went so far as to have even a few co-operative factories with workers as owners. However, the individual ownership of land is officially proclaimed and, so far as I know, will stay. The sense of individual ownership is deeply rooted in the Balkan peasant, so that experiments with State Farms in Yugoslavia are being made only in the provinces of Srem and Vojvodina—extremely rich, flat, agricultural land, on the farms which were abandoned by the fleeing German minorities.

However, even in peace-time one-fifth of the Balkan peasantry, that is, about 6 million peasants, could not wrest an existence from the soil, and they will not be able to do so, regardless of the most intensive farming, the best methods and the best machinery. The only way out is industrialization based on domestic materials and domestic resources. Here again capital and equipment may have to come, at least partly from the West.

Because of lack of domestic capital, the Balkan Governments controlled large areas of industrial activities even before the war. The Balkan Governments, which certainly were not Leftist, owned and operated railroads, telephones, telegraph, radio; they monopolized the production of tobacco, or of vital necessities like soap, sugar, petroleum; they participated heavily in banking, mining and lumber industries. So that a good deal of State ownership of industrial enterprises will simply have been inherited by new Governments from the old ones.

Apart from large State ownership of industry in Yugoslavia before the war, there was a vast infiltration of foreign capital. Forty-six per cent of all industrial investment in Yugoslavia before the war was foreign, French capital holding first place and British second; in Roumania 36 per cent of oil resources were owned by British companies; in Bulgaria 43 per cent of industrial investment was foreign. Now foreign capital and foreign experts will be needed again and it has been said so officially. Yugoslavia is still rich in minerals, and in unexploited minerals, at that. There are vast resources to be tapped. Its bauxite and copper are well known. It is reasonable to assume that foreign capital will be admitted probably under new concession contracts, and whether these will be favourable enough to attract foreign capital is something to be seen. So far there is no development in that connection.

Another kind of help may come from UNRRA and Lend-Lease for emergencies caused by the ravages of war. The devastation suffered by Yugoslavia is on a scale I had seen nowhere else; it is unimaginable. The total loss of life from battle, concentration camps, massacres, diseases,

starvation, is estimated at 1,700,000 out of a total population of 15 million. That is the highest proportion among the United Nations. You can walk through certain parts of Bosnia for days on end without ever meeting man or beast; grass grows where there used to be villages; many villages have been twice burned, twice rebuilt, and burned for the third time. It is estimated that only 20 per cent of the arable area of Yugoslavia was sown last autumn; that up to 80 per cent of the cattle has been destroyed, eaten, or taken away by the enemy. Fifty per cent of the people went barefoot last winter. On mountain roads you will often meet women who will scramble off into the bushes at the approach of a stranger because they are only half-clad. I do not believe that, with the best of goodwill, even UNRRA and Lend-Lease can fully restore the normal conditions of life. The principal, if not the only, resource that will remain to the Yugoslavs for the reconstruction of their country is the vitality of the people. This may mean Government regimentation for a long time to come, because the country has simply got to be reconstructed, and if it cannot get sufficient help from abroad it must mobilize every ounce of human energy it possesses under Government control. Therefore it is my belief that if we want to hasten and ensure perfect liberalism in Yugoslavia, we must help to reconstruct the country; otherwise the country will have to continue to live, for some time to come, in a state of total economic mobilization.

There has been some talk of Soviet economic schemes for Central Europe and the Balkans, predicting that the entire area will form a kind of closed economy, leaning on Russia. It is as yet premature to prognosticate on these things. I think it all depends on whether Germany will be heavily de-industrialized, in which case Central Europe and the Balkans would have no other industrial neighbour to lean on but Soviet Russia. However, organization of some common regional economy can be expected at any rate some time in the near future, some reduction or even abolition of tariffs and some adjustment of the Czech and Austrian industries to complement the agriculture of the Danubian Basin. And the entire economic area of nearly 70 million people will definitely need an outlet to the Mediterranean.

There are three sea outlets for that region at present: Istanbul, Salonica and Trieste. The latter is the most logical and also the best connected with its hinterland. Trieste is particularly important for Yugoslavia, Austria, Hungary, Roumania and Czechoslovakia.

The question is eternally asked: What is the position of Russia in Central Europe and the Balkans? I always think of what a Russian general once said to me: "We don't want Communism in the Balkans, first because we don't need it, secondly because we cannot impose it; but we do not want régimes or Governments unfriendly to Soviet Russia."

Russia is following a policy of collective security parallel with a policy of regional security, fitting both together, but holding on to regional security in case the plan of world security should not work out. So she collaborates in San Francisco, but at the same time makes pacts and

alliances with the anti-Fascist Governments of the Balkans and Central Europe. No confederation scheme appears to be considered, but the Soviet Government has so far concluded defensive alliances with Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia; one with Bulgaria is expected. Soon we might see Soviet Russia linked with all Slavs through military alliances embracing some 240 million people.

For a century and a half Europe has been saved from a Continental tyrant by the only effective combination, which brushed all ideological differences aside, that between Great Britain and Russia. And in the new understanding for a lasting peace, regardless of all the local conflicts and difficulties, Central Europe and the Balkans play a key role. Throughout the nineteenth century that area has been disputed between Russia and Great Britain, but there is no need for the resumption of those disputes, for the Balkans could also be a meeting-ground between Russia and Great Britain: in fact that is the historic function of Central Europe and the Balkans. These States make no historic sense unless they are regarded as the bridge between the East and the West. Today, even ideologically, they can be made a bridge between Russia and the Anglo-Saxon world, for their new forms of Government, new political régimes, new economic systems are mixed creations with elements borrowed partly from Russia and partly from the West. In the entire area Yugoslavia especially is an ideal testing ground for permanent Anglo-American-Russian accord.