

the five years 1924-1929, compared to a dozen or so in the five years 1919-1924. A codification of international law was begun in 1927 and continued for several years, but no portions of it ever came into force because of insufficient ratifications.

The outlawry of war and the establishment of peaceful procedures for settling disputes were relatively meaningless unless some sanctions could be established to compel the use of peaceful methods. Efforts in this direction were nullified by the reluctance of Britain to commit itself to the use of force against some unspecified country at some indefinite date or to allow the establishment of an international police force for this purpose. Even a modest step in this direction in the form of an international agreement providing financial assistance for any state which was a victim of aggression, a suggestion first made by Finland, was destroyed by a British amendment that it was not to go into effect until the achievement of a general disarmament agreement. This reluctance to use sanctions against aggression came to the forefront in the fall of 1931 at the time of the Japanese attack on Manchuria. As a result the "peace structure" based on Versailles, which had been extended by so many well-intended, if usually misdirected, efforts for twelve years, began a process of disintegration which destroyed it completely in eight years (1931-1939).

#### Chapter 17—Disarmament, 1919-1935

The failure to achieve a workable system of collective security in the period 1919-1935 prevented the achievement of any system of general disarmament in the same period. Obviously, countries which feel insecure are not going to disarm. This point, however obvious, was lost on the English-speaking countries, and the disarmament efforts of the whole period 1919-1935 were weakened by the failure of these countries to see this point and their insistence that disarmament must precede security rather than follow it. Thus disarmament efforts, while continuous in this period (in accordance with the promise made to the Germans in 1919), were stultified by disagreements between the "pacifists" and the "realists" on procedural matters. The "pacifists," including the English-speaking nations, argued that armaments cause wars and insecurity and that the proper way to disarm is simply to disarm. They advocated a "direct" or "technical" approach to the problem, and believed that armaments could be measured and reduced by direct international agreement. The "realists," on the other hand, including most of the countries in Europe, led by France and the Little Entente, argued that armaments are caused by war and the fear of war and that the proper way to disarm is to make nations secure. They advocated an "indirect" or "political" approach to the problem, and believed that once security had been achieved disarmament would present no problem..

The reasons for this difference of opinion are to be found in the fact that the nations which advocated the direct method, like Britain, the United States, and Japan, already had security and could proceed directly to the problem of disarmament, while the nations which felt insecure were bound to seek security before they would bind themselves to reduce the armaments they had. Since the nations with security were all naval powers, the use of the direct method proved to be fairly effective in regard to naval disarmament,

while the failure to obtain security for those who lacked it made most of the international efforts for disarmament on land or in the air relatively futile.

The history of naval disarmament is marked by four episodes in the period between the wars: (1) the Washington Conference of 1922; (2) the abortive Geneva Conference of 1927; (3) the London Conference of 1930; and (4) the London Conference of 1936.

The Washington Conference was the most successful disarmament conference of the inter-war period because such a variety of issues came together at that point that it was possible to bargain successfully. Britain wished (1) to avoid a naval race with the United States because of the financial burden, (2) to get rid of the Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902, which was no longer needed in view of the collapse of both Germany and Russia, and (3) to reduce the Japanese naval threat in the southwestern Pacific. The United States wished (1) to get Japan out of East Asia and restore the "open door" in China, (2) to prevent the Japanese from fortifying the German-mandated islands which stretched across the American communications from Hawaii to the Philippines, and (3) to reduce the Japanese naval threat to the Philippines. Japan wanted (1) to get out of eastern Siberia without appearing to retreat, (2) to prevent the United States from fortifying Wake Island and Guam, its two bases on the route from Pearl Harbor to Manila, and (3) to reduce American naval power in the extreme western Pacific. By bargaining one of these for another, all three Powers were able to obtain their wishes, although this was possible only because of the goodwill between Britain and the United States and, above all, because at that time, before the use of fleet-tankers and the present techniques of supplying a fleet at sea, the range of any battle fleet was limited by the position of its bases (to which it had to return for supplies at relatively short intervals).

Probably the key to the whole settlement rested in the relative positions of the British and American navies. At the end of 1918, the United States had in its battle line 16 capital ships with 168 guns of 12 to 14 inches; Britain had 42 capital ships with 376 guns of 12 to 15 inches, but the building programs of the two Powers would have given the United States practical equality by 1926. In order to avoid a naval race which would have made it impossible for Britain to balance its budget or get back on the prewar gold standard, that country gave the United States equality in capital ships (with 15 each), while Japan was given 60 percent as much (or 9 capital ships). This small Japanese fleet, however, provided the Japanese with naval supremacy in their home waters, because of an agreement not to build new fortifications or naval bases within striking distance of Japan. The same 10-10-6 ratio of capital ships was also applied to aircraft carriers. France and Italy were brought into the agreements by granting them one-third as much tonnage as the two greatest naval Powers in these two categories of vessels. The two categories themselves were strictly defined and thus limited. Capital ships were combat vessels of from 10,000 to 35,000 tons displacement with guns of not over 16 inches, while carriers were to be limited to 27,000 tons each with guns of no more than 6 inches. The five great naval Powers were to have capital ships and carriers as follows:

Tons of	Number of	Tons of
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Country	Ratio	Capital Ships	Capital Ships	Carriers
U.S.A.	5	525,000	15	135,000
Britain	5	525,000	15	135,000
Japan	3	315,000	9	81,000
France	1.67	175,000	not fixed	60,000
Italy	1.67	175,000	not fixed	60,000

These limits were to be achieved by 1931. This required that 76 capital ships, built or projected, be scrapped by that date. Of these the United States scrapped 15 built and 13 building, or 28; the British Empire scrapped 20 built and 4 building, or 24; and Japan scrapped 10 built and 14 building, or 24. The areas in which new fortifications in the Pacific were forbidden included (a) all United States possessions west of Hawaii, (b) all British possessions east of 110° East longitude except Canada, New Zealand, and Australia with its territories, and (c) all Japanese possessions except the "home islands" of Japan.

Among the six treaties and thirteen resolutions made at Washington during the six weeks of the conference (November 1921—February 1922) were a Nine-Power Treaty to maintain the integrity of China, an agreement between China and Japan over Shantung, another between the United States and Japan over the Mandated Pacific Islands, and an agreement regarding the Chinese customs. In consequence of these, the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1902 was ended, and Japan evacuated eastern Siberia.

Efforts to limit other categories of vessels at Washington failed because of France. This country had accepted equality with Italy in capital ships only on the understanding that its possession of lesser vessels would not be curtailed. France argued that it needed a larger navy than Italy because it had a world empire (while Italy did not) and required protection of its home coasts both in the Atlantic and in the Mediterranean (while Italy could concentrate its navy in the Mediterranean). The same objections led both of these Powers to refuse the American invitation to the Geneva Disarmament Conference of 1927.

The Geneva Conference of 1927 tried to limit other categories of vessels beyond capital ships and carriers. It failed because of a violent dispute between Britain and the United States regarding cruisers. The United States, with few offshore bases and a "high-seas" navy, wanted "heavy" cruisers of about 10,000 tons each, carrying 8-inch guns. The British, with many scattered naval bases, wanted many "light" cruisers of 7,500 tons each with 6-inch guns, and were eager to limit "heavy" cruisers in order to increase the naval importance of their million tons of fast merchant ships (which could be armed with 6-inch guns in an emergency). The United States accepted the British division of cruisers into two classes, but asked for limitation of both in accordance with the Washington

ratios and with the lowest possible maximum tonnage. Britain wished to limit only "heavy" cruisers, and fixed her own "absolute" cruiser needs at 70 vessels aggregating 562,000 tons, or twice the total suggested by the Americans. The British argued that their cruiser needs had nothing to do with the relative size of the American cruiser fleet, but depended on such "absolute" values as the size of the earth and the miles of shipping lanes to be patrolled. On this point Winston Churchill was adamant and was able to force the chief British delegate to the Geneva Conference (Lord Robert Cecil, who wanted to compromise) to resign from the Cabinet.

The conference broke up in a recriminatory atmosphere, to the great joy of the lobbyists of shipbuilding companies and "patriotic" societies. These had harassed the delegates throughout the conference. Three American shipbuilding companies stood to lost contracts worth almost \$54 million if the conference had been a success, and they did not hesitate to spend part of that sum to ensure that it would not be a success. Later they were sued for more money by their chief lobbyist at the conference, Mr. William B. Shearer. As a sequel to the conference, Britain signed a secret agreement with France by which France promised to support Britain against the United States on the cruiser and other issues, and Britain promised to support France in preventing limitation of trained infantry reserves at the approaching World Disarmament Conference. This agreement, signed in July 1928, was revealed by pro-American employees of the French Foreign Ministry to William Randolph Hearst and published in his newspapers within two months of its signature. France deported the Hearst reporter in Paris at once, deported Hearst himself on his next visit to France in 1930, and published the text of the agreement with Britain (October 1928).

The London Naval Conference of 1930 was able to reach the agreement which Geneva had failed to achieve. The publicity about Shearer's activities and about the Anglo-French agreement, as well as the arrival of the world depression and the advent of a more pacifist Labour government to office in London, contributed to this success. Cruisers, destroyers, and submarines were defined and limited for the three greatest naval Powers, and certain further limitations were set in the categories fixed at Washington. The agreements were as follows (in tons):

Typed	U. S.	Britain	Japan
Heavy cruisers			
with guns over			
6.1 inches	180,000	146,800	108,400
Light cruisers			
with guns below			
6.1 inches	143,500	192,200	100,450

Destroyers	150,000	150,000	105,500
Submarines	52,700	52,700	52,700

This allowed the United States to have 18 heavy cruisers, Britain 15, and Japan 12, while in light cruisers the three figures would allow about 25, 35, and 18. Destroyers were limited at 1,850 tons each with 5.1-inch guns, and submarines to 2,000 tons each with 5.1-inch guns. This settlement kept the Japanese fleet where it was, forced Britain to reduce, and allowed the United States to build (except in regard to submarines). Such a result could, probably, have been possible only at a time when Japan was in financial stringency and Britain was under a Labour government.

This treaty left unsolved the rivalry in the Mediterranean between Italy and France. Mussolini demanded that Italy have naval equality with France, although his financial straits made it necessary to limit the Italian navy. The claim to equality on such a small basis could not be accepted by France in view of the fact that it had two seacoasts, a worldwide empire, and Germany's new 10,000-ton "pocket battleships" to consider. The Italian demands were purely theoretical, as both Powers, for motives of economy, were under treaty limits and making no effort to catch up. France was willing to concede Italian equality in the Mediterranean only if it could get some kind of British support against the German Navy in the North Sea or could get a general nonaggression agreement in the Mediterranean. These were rejected by Britain. However, Britain succeeded in getting a French-Italian naval agreement as a supplement to the London agreement (March 1931). By this agreement Italy accepted a total strength of 428,000 tons, while France had a strength of 585,000 tons, the French fleet being less modern than the Italian. This agreement broke down, at the last moment, because of the Austro-German customs union and Germany's appropriation for a second pocket battleship (March 1931). No evil effects emerged from the breakdown, for both sides continued to act as if it were in force.

The London Naval Conference of 1936 was of no significance. In 1931 the Japanese invasion of Manchuria violated the Nine-Power Pacific Treaty of 1922. In 1933 the United States, which had fallen considerably below the level provided in the Washington agreement of 1922, authorized the construction of 132 vessels to bring its navy to treaty level by 1942. In 1934 Mussolini decided to abandon orthodox financial policies, and announced a building program to carry the Italian fleet to treaty level by 1939. This decision was justified by a recent French decision to build two battle cruisers to cope with Germany's three pocket battleships.

All these actions were within treaty limitations. In December 1934, however, Japan announced its refusal to renew the existing treaties when they expired in 1936. The Naval Conference called for that date met in a most unfavorable atmosphere. On June 18, 1935, Britain had signed a bilateral agreement with Hitler which allowed Germany to build a navy up to 35 percent of Britain's naval strength in each class and up to 100 percent in submarines. This was a terrible blow to France, which was limited to 33 percent of the

British Navy in capital ships and carriers and had to distribute this lesser fleet on two coasts (to deal with Italy as well as Germany) as well as around the world (to protect the French colonial empire). This blow to France was probably the British answer to the French alliance with the Soviet Union (May 2, 1935), the increased German threat on the French northwest coast being intended to deter France from honoring the alliance with the Soviet Union, if Germany struck eastward. Thus France was once again reduced to dependence on Britain. Germany took advantage of this situation to launch twenty-one submarines by October 1935, and two battleships in 1936.

Under these conditions the Naval Conference at London in 1936 achieved nothing of importance. Japan and Italy refused to sign. As a result, the three signers soon were compelled to use the various escape clauses designed to deal with any extensive building by non-signatory Powers. The maximum size of capital ships was raised to 45,000 tons in 1938, and the whole treaty was renounced in 1939.

The success achieved in naval disarmaments, limited as it was, was much greater than the success achieved in respect to other types of armaments, because these required that nations which felt politically insecure must be included in the negotiations. We have already indicated the controversy between the proponents of the "direct method" and the advocates of the "indirect method" in disarmament. This distinction was so important that the history of the disarmament of land and air forces can be divided into four periods: (a) a period of direct action, 1919-1922; (b) a period of indirect action, 1922-1926; (c) a new period of direct action, 1926-1934; and (d) a period of rearmament, 1934-1939.

The first period of direct action was based on the belief that the victories of 1918 and the ensuing peace treaties provided security for the victorious Powers. Accordingly, the task of reaching a disarmament agreement was turned over to a purely technical group, the Permanent Advisory Commission on Disarmament of the League of Nations. This group, which consisted exclusively of officers of the various armed services, was unable to reach agreement on any important issues: it could not find any method of measuring armaments or even of defining them; it could not distinguish actual from potential armaments or defensive from offensive. It gave answers to some of these questions, but they did not win general assent. For example, it decided that rifles in the possession of troops were war materials and so, also, were wood or steel capable of being used to make such rifles, but rifles already made and in storage were not war materials but "inoffensive objects of peace."

As a result of the failure of the Permanent Advisory Commission, the Assembly of the League set up a Temporary Mixed Commission on which only six of twenty-eight members were officers of the armed services. This body attacked the problem of disarmament by the indirect method, seeking to achieve security before asking anyone to disarm. The Draft Treaty of Mutual Guarantee (1922) and the Geneva Protocol (1924) emerged from this commission. Both of these were, as we have said, vetoed by Britain, so that the disarmament portions of the negotiations were never reached. The achievement of the Locarno Pacts, however, provided, in the minds of many, the necessary security to allow a return to the direct method. Accordingly, a Preparatory

Commission to the World Disarmament Conference was set up in 1926 to make a draft agreement which was to be completed at a World Disarmament Conference meeting at Geneva in 1932.

The Preparatory Commission had delegates from all the important countries of the world, including the defeated Powers and the chief nonmembers of the League. It held six sessions over three years and drew up three drafts. In general, it encountered the same difficulties as the Permanent Advisory Committee. This latter group, acting as a subcommittee of the Preparatory Commission, used up 3,750,000 sheets of paper in less than six months but still was not able to find answers to the same questions which had baffled it earlier. The chief problems arose from political disputes, chiefly between Britain and France. These two countries produced separate drafts which diverged on almost every point.

The French wanted war potential counted but wanted trained reserves of men excluded from limitation; the British wanted war potential excluded but wanted to count trained reserves; the French wanted supervision by a permanent commission to enforce fulfillment of any agreement, while the Anglo-Americans refused all supervision. Eventually a draft was prepared by including all divergences in parallel columns.

The Preparatory Commission lost more than one full session in denouncing the disarmament suggestions of Litvinoff, the Soviet representative. His first draft, providing for immediate and complete disarmament of every country, was denounced by all. A substitute draft, providing that the most heavily armed states would disarm by 50 percent, the less heavily armed by 33 percent, the lightly armed by 25 percent, and the "disarmed" by 0 percent, with all tanks, airplanes, gas, and heavy artillery completely prohibited, was also rejected without discussion, and Litvinoff was beseeched by the chairman of the commission to show a more "constructive spirit" in the future. After an impressive display of such constructive spirit by other countries, a Draft Convention was drawn up and accepted by a vote which found only Germany and the Soviet Union in the negative (December 1930).

The World Disarmament Conference which considered this draft was in preparation for six years (1926-1932) and was in session for three years (February 1932 to April 1935), yet it achieved nothing notable in the way of disarmament. It was supported by a tremendous wave of public opinion, but the attitudes of the various governments were becoming steadily less favorable. The Japanese were already attacking China; the French and Germans were deadlocked in a violent controversy, the former insisting on security and the latter on arms equality; and the world depression was growing steadily worse, with several governments coming to believe that only a policy of government spending (including spending on arms) could provide the purchasing power needed for economic revival. Once again, the French desire for an international police force was rebuffed, although supported by seventeen states; the British desire to outlaw certain "aggressive" armaments (like gas, submarines, and bombing planes) was rejected by the French, although accepted by thirty states (including the Soviet Union and Italy).

Discussion of these issues was made increasingly difficult by the growing demands of the Germans. When Hitler came to office in January 1933, he demanded immediate equality with France, at least in "defensive" arms. This was refused, and Germany left the conference.

Although Britain tried, for a time, to act as an intermediary between Germany and the Disarmament Conference, nothing came of this, and the conference eventually dispersed. France would make no concessions in regard to armaments unless she obtained increased security, and this was shown to be impossible when Britain, on February 3, 1933 (just four days after Hitler came to office), publicly refused to make any commitments to France beyond membership in the League and the Locarno Pacts. In view of the verbal ambiguities of these documents and the fact that Germany withdrew from both the League and the Disarmament Conference in October 1933, these offered little security to France. The German budget, released in March 1934, showed an appropriation of 210 million marks for the air force (which was forbidden entirely by Versailles) and an increase from 345 million to 574 million marks in the appropriation for the army. A majority of the delegates wished to shift the attention of the Disarmament Conference from disarmament to questions of security, but this was blocked by a group of seven states led by Britain. Disarmament ceased to be a practical issue after 1934, and attention should have been shifted to questions of security. Unfortunately, public opinion, especially in the democratic countries, remained favorable to disarmament and even to pacifism, in Britain until 1938 at least and in the United States until 1940. This gave the aggressor countries, like Japan, Italy, and Germany, an advantage out of all proportion to their real strength. The rearmament efforts of Italy and Germany were by no means great, and the successful aggressions of these countries after 1934 were a result of the lack of will rather than of the lack of strength of the democratic states.

The total failure of the disarmament efforts of 1919-1935 and the Anglo-American feeling that these efforts handicapped them later in their conflicts with Hitler and Japan have combined to make most people impatient with the history of disarmament. It seems a remote and mistaken topic. That it may well be; nevertheless, it has profound lessons today, especially on the relationships among the military, economic, political, and psychological aspects of our lives. It is perfectly clear today that the French and their allies (especially Czechoslovakia) were correct in their insistence that security must precede disarmament and that disarmament agreements must be enforced by inspection rather than by "good faith." That France was correct in these matters as well as in its insistence that the forces of aggression were still alive in Germany, although lying low, is now admitted by all and is supported by all the evidence. Moreover, the Anglo-Americans adopted French emphasis on the priority of security and the need for inspection in their own disarmament discussions with the Soviet Union in the early 1960's. The French idea that political questions (including military) are more fundamental than economic considerations is now also accepted, even in the United States, which opposed it most vigorously in the 1920's and early 1930's. The fact that the secure states could have made errors such as these in that earlier period reveals much about the nature of human thinking, especially its proclivity to regard necessities as



unimportant when they are present (like oxygen, food, or security), but to think of nothing else when they are lacking.

Closely related to all this, and another example of the blindness of experts (even in their own areas), is the disastrous influence which economic, and especially financial, considerations played in security, especially rearmament, in the Long Armistice of 1919-1939. This had a double aspect. On the one hand, balanced budgets were given priority over armaments; on the other hand, once it was recognized that security was in acute danger, financial considerations were ruthlessly subordinated to rearmament, giving rise to an economic boom which showed clearly what might have been achieved earlier if financial consideration had been subordinated to the world's economic and social needs earlier; such action would have provided prosperity and rising standards of living which might have made rearming unnecessary.

#### Chapter 18—Reparations, 1919-1932

No subject occupied a larger portion of statesmen's energies than reparations during the decade after the war. For this reason, and because of the impact which reparations had on other issues (such as financial or economic recovery and international amity), the history of reparations demands a certain portion of our attention. This history can be divided into six stages, as follows:

1. The preliminary payments, 1919-1921
2. The London Schedule, May 1921-September 1924
3. The Dawes Plan, September 1924-January 1930
4. The Young Plan, January 1930-June 1931
5. The Hoover Moratorium, June 1931-July 1932
6. The Lausanne Convention, July 1932

The preliminary payments were supposed to amount to a total of 20,000 million marks by May 1921. Although the Entente Powers contended that only about 8,000 million of this had been paid, and sent Germany numerous demands and ultimatums in regard to these payments, even going so far as to threaten to occupy the Ruhr in March 1921 in an effort to enforce payment, the whole matter was dropped in May when the Germans were presented with the total reparations bill of 132,000 million marks. Under pressure of another ultimatum, Germany accepted this bill and gave the victors bonds of indebtedness to this amount. Of these, 82 billions were set aside and forgotten. Germany was to pay on the other 50 billion at a rate of 2.5 billion a year in interest and 0.5 billion a year to reduce the total debt.