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Source: *The British Journal of Sociology*, Sep., 1976, Vol. 27, No. 3, Special Issue.
History and Sociology (Sep., 1976), pp. 306-318

Published by: Wiley on behalf of The London School of Economics and Political Science

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/589618>

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Guenther Roth

History and sociology in the work of Max Weber

Max Weber began his academic career as an historian and ended it as a sociologist, but intellectually this move meant for him a division of labour, not an antagonistic relationship between the roles of historian and sociologist. His methodological position is not well suited for the defence of vested interests in disciplinary boundaries or for the preference of one academic field over the other. I would like to suggest that a re-examination of Weber's thought may be useful primarily for the sake of understanding some of the ways in which important questions about past and present can be dealt with irrespective of the narrow survival interests of the two disciplines.

In the course of his career Weber gradually came to champion a new sociology, which differed from the old evolutionary sociology, against detractors among historians and economists who failed to comprehend the difference. He expected to be recognized as 'a partisan in methodological matters, something I want to be', as he wrote to Heinrich Herkner in 1909. One important aspect of this partisanship involved the struggle against organicist and other reified concepts of social life, which had been basic to the old sociology and its followers among evolutionary historians.¹ When Weber took one of the first German chairs in sociology at the University of Munich after the end of World War I, he wrote (on 9 March 1920) to the economist Robert Liefmann, who had attacked sociology: 'I do understand your battle against sociology. But let me tell you: If I now happen to be a sociologist according to my appointment papers, then I became one in order to put an end to the mischievous enterprise which still operates with collectivist notions (*Kollektivbegriffe*). In other words, sociology, too, can only be practised by proceeding from the action of one or more, few or many, individuals, that means, by employing a strictly "individualist" method.'² This remark anticipated Weber's elaboration in the first chapter of *Economy and Society*, which was about to be published, albeit after his sudden death. In his introductory methodological observations he made it plain that with regard to this 'individualist' method, which only through a 'tremendous misunderstanding' could be equated with 'an individualist system of values', there was no difference between sociology and history, since 'both for sociology in the present sense and for history the object of cognition is the subjective meaning (*Sinnzusammenhang*) of action'.³ However, in the same

context Weber proposed a division of labour between history and sociology:

As we have taken for granted throughout this presentation, sociology formulates type concepts and searches for general uniformities (*Regeln*) within the stream of events, in contrast to history, which aims at the causal analysis and causal attribution of individual actions, structures and personalities that have cultural significance. Sociological concept formation takes its materials, as paradigms, essentially albeit not exclusively, from the realities of action that are also relevant from the perspectives of history. In particular, sociology proceeds according to considerations of the service it can render through its concept formation to the historically causal attribution of culturally significant phenomena.⁴

In 1920 statements such as these could be helpful in answering the often asked sceptical question as to the academic rationale of sociology, although they were unlikely to convince the determined doubters. In his brief distinction Weber did not go all the way in reducing sociology to clio's handmaiden, but the formulation of 'type concepts and general uniformities' in *Economy and Society* was indeed primarily an auxiliary operation for historical analysis proper. Sociology in this sense was part of the 'methodology' of history, basically a comparative and typological procedure, a logical precondition for causal analysis. Before World War I, when he considered publishing *Economy and Society* in its original form, Weber wrote to the medievalist Georg von Below, who remained one of the most vociferous opponents of sociology as an academic discipline in the 1920s:

We are absolutely in accord that history should establish what is specific to, say, the medieval city; but this is possible only if we first find what is missing in other cities (ancient, Chinese, Islamic). And so it is with everything else. It is the subsequent task of history to find a causal explanation for these specific traits. . . . Sociology, as I understand it, can perform this very modest preparatory work.⁵

If this distinction could legitimate an academic division of labour, it certainly did not prescribe that the individual researcher be either an historian or a sociologist. Methodologically, the important point was the recognition of the difference in levels of analysis irrespective of the labels given to them. In fact, in his earliest general methodological statement Weber wrote about these two levels as aspects of the work carried on in one and the same discipline. When he took over the *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik* in 1904 with Edgar Jaffé and Werner Sombart, a major event in the history of German social science and of the methodological controversies of the time, he made a programmatic statement about what he then called 'social economics' and not yet 'sociology':

▼

To the extent that our discipline (*Wissenschaft*) attempts to explain particular cultural phenomena of an economic nature by showing, through causal regress, that they originated in individual causes, be they economic or not, it seeks 'historical' knowledge. Insofar as it traces a particular element of cultural life, namely the economic one, through the most diverse cultural contexts, it aims at an historical *interpretation* from a specific point of view [i.e., the problematical relationship between economic and non-economic factors] and offers a partial picture, a *preliminary* step toward a complete historical analysis of culture (*volle historische Kulturserkenntnis*—Weber's emphasis).⁶

Of course, Weber did not believe in the existence of society as a quasi-organic entity, an objectively delimited structure, which would allow a complete analysis of culture and in this sense the discovery of 'the truth', as it was postulated by organicist theories and also by Marxism with its correspondence theory of object and concept. Rather, a complete analysis of culture meant investigating the manifold relationships among the major areas of social life, and for this reason *Economy and Society* elaborates sociologies of the 'particular elements of cultural life'—economy, law, domination and 'culture' (in the narrower sense of the term), especially music. Recently Wolfgang Mommsen pointed out, quite correctly, that Weber 'remained faithful throughout his life to the methodological position which he had taken up between 1903 and 1907. . . . It may well be said that [his] later work was essentially an elaborate attempt to knit a variety of "partial pictures" of culture into a general framework of "ideal types" in order to get as close as possible' to what I prefer to call here that 'complete historical analysis of culture' (rather than what he translates as 'a comprehensive perception of culture').⁷

In his methodological writings Weber took his stand on the scholarly disputes of his time among students of history, economics and jurisprudence, from the aftermath of the *Methodenstreit* of the 1880s to the later controversies in the *Verein für Socialpolitik*. These writings, most of which are now available in English (in sometimes unsatisfactory translation), are polemical or programmatic.⁸ They address themselves either to the work of other scholars or deal broadly with procedures which scholars use irrespective of the level of their own methodological awareness and sophistication. They do not *spell out* the ways in which he himself proceeded in his own empirical studies, although they do not conflict with his general position. It is true that Weber has occasionally been criticized for forgetting to practise his own methods, most recently by Bryan S. Turner,⁹ who has charged that Weber failed to apply the method of *Verstehen* in studying Islamic saints—mistakenly, in my opinion.¹⁰ But while I perceive no basic inconsistencies, I do consider Weber's methodological practice in need of explication. This should help us to perceive more clearly his research strategy, beyond his general

remarks and scattered pointers, and thus to get a better grasp of the relationship between history and sociology in his work.

LEVELS OF ANALYSIS: SOCIOLOGICAL, HISTORICAL,
SITUATIONAL

In the last few years a number of writings have appeared in England which have dealt with both Weber's historical concerns and his research strategy, rather than merely with his methodology on the level of the philosophy of science or with his advocacy of 'freedom from value judgment'. Stanislaw Andreski, David Beetham, Anthony Giddens, Wolfgang Mommsen, John Rex, Arun Sahay and Bryan S. Turner,¹¹ in particular, have made significant contributions to our understanding of Weber the practising sociologist and historian.¹² I would like to add to their methodological observations by focusing on the levels of analysis in Weber's works (and indirectly in historiographic logic). Recently I suggested that there are three levels, configurational, developmental and situational, and that in his scholarly writings Weber concerned himself mainly with the first two.¹³ Mommsen has now introduced another terminology for these two levels, and Beetham has shown in detail that in his political writings Weber undertook a situational analysis, an aspect I had neglected.¹⁴ I shall try once more to clarify the levels and comment briefly on Beetham and Mommsen.

Weber's levels of analysis resulted from his perception of the purposes of historiography, its contemporary possibilities and limitations, and this perception was influenced by the intellectual situation in which he found himself. He came to stand at a crucial juncture in modern historiography, the point at which disillusionment with the evolutionary views of the preceding three generations (whether Deist or naturalist) made a methodological reorientation strongly desirable. This disillusionment came about partly because of changes in intellectual climate (ongoing secularization, but also the incipient scepticism toward scientific laws as all-explanatory devices); partly it was the result of rapidly accumulating research that did not seem to support the various evolutionary stage theories. If there was no deterministic scheme of evolutionary development, the only empirical alternative seemed to be the construction of 'type concepts' (or socio-historical models, as I prefer to call them) and of developmental or secular theories of long-range historical transformation.¹⁵

This historiographic crisis occurred in the years before World War I when European hegemony reached its zenith. The capitalist world system was close to enveloping the whole globe, yet the future did not appear to Weber as certain and benign as it had to believers in progress among earlier European generations and contemporaries. This setting has been described by Beetham and Mommsen, and I will limit myself to the methodological observation that Weber began to ask the kind of

questions that are indicative of a reflective stance in a situation of reorientation: Who are we that we have come this far? How did we get here? Where are we likely to go? And where should we go from here? The answers to these questions seemed best given from the perspective of universal history. The question of our identity, of who we are, had previously been answered largely in terms of European legacies, especially the Judaeo-Christian tradition. Because of the world-wide impact of Western civilization, it seemed appropriate to answer this question, in addition, through research-oriented comparison with the other civilizations of past and present. The problem was one of configuration, the first level of historical analysis. The question of how we did get that far had to be answered on the second, the 'historical', level of analysis and was a causal problem; it was feasible only after identifying the phenomenon (configuration) to be explained. The answer to the first query was couched in terms of the distinctiveness of Western rationalism, a unique configuration; the answer to the second question was given in terms of historical concatenations that had brought it about. The question of where we stand and are likely to go is dealt with on the level of situational analysis and of extrapolating from perceived trends. In the absence of a belief in determinism and evolutionism, this is an open-ended trend analysis. Where should we go? The answer involves all three levels of empirical analysis, but it requires also a moral choice, either a reaffirmation or a modification of one's own commitments. For this last answer Weber did not claim the protective mantle of science and scholarship—since values cannot be legitimated by science—but a rational decision had to be based on as clear a grasp of universal history as possible.

The three levels are all historical in a general sense, but in Weber's terminology the first is that of sociology—of type or model construction and of rules of experience—whereas the second level, the causal explanation of past events, is labelled by him 'historical' in quotation marks or sometimes 'developmental' (*entwicklungsgeschichtlich*). On this level we find his secular or developmental theories. Occasionally he calls the third level, which we find in his political writings, an analysis of the 'general social and political situation', as when he disclaims in 'Russia's Transition to Pseudo-Constitutionalism' (1917) that he had intended to provide 'something like a "history" of the last half year'.¹⁶ (By 'history' Weber here meant 'chronicle' rather than causal explanation.) His own phrasing, then, may justify naming this third level 'situational analysis'.

Mommsen is right in saying that Weber became a sociologist by retreating from 'history', the level of causal analysis. But this was only a strategic retreat. Although *Economy and Society* was not meant to explain the uniqueness of Western rationalism, it offers a typological framework for its study; thus it is sociology strictly as a 'preliminary' and 'preparatory' exercise. Its typology consists of models such as bureaucracy,

patrimonialism, charismatic rulership and community, hierocracy, church, sect and others that are constructed from different times and places. But even in *Economy and Society* there are many historical explanations that amount to sketches of secular theories about the genesis and consequences of particular historical phenomena, from the Protestant ethic to the modern state.

Without specifically referring to Weber, but quite in agreement with him, Mommsen suggests a distinction similar to the one proposed here: he contrasts structural models (*Strukturmodelle*) with processual models (*Verlaufsmodelle*). The former are exemplified by 'epochal concepts' such as Feudalism, Renaissance, bourgeois society and Fascism. Thus he thinks of what in an older terminology were called 'individual ideal types' in contrast to the 'general ideal types', on which I focused. But the logic of their construction is the same in this respect: 'Such explanatory models are primarily static and accentuate the elements that are dominant in a social structure. However, they always contain implicitly a specific pattern of social change. This is evident from the simple fact that most of the time they constitute a contrast to older social formations or emphasize certain trends. . . . Processual models are rarely explicated to the same degree as structural models. As a rule, they serve as guidelines for narrations of a predominantly chronological kind.'¹⁷ Mommsen cites as examples de Tocqueville's theory of democratization and the marxist theory of historical stages.¹⁸

The socio-historical models as well as the secular theories are not intended to explain what is happening in a given situation. One model alone cannot adequately describe a given case; a battery of models or hyphenated types, such as patrimonial bureaucracy, can provide a better approximation. Their utility lies in serving as base lines for identifying the distinctiveness of a case. While secular theories attempt to trace a long line of causation, they too have limited usefulness with regard to a given situation. Theories such as those of democratization and industrialization diminish in explanatory value when we look at the relatively short time span of a few years or even two or three decades, because they are concerned with long-range structural changes, and radical changes rarely happen within a short period. Phenomena like the charismatic eruption of an ethic of ultimate ends during the 1960s cannot be sufficiently explained by recourse to the secular theory of corporate capitalism and the affluent society, since that theory covers the time span of 'the silent fifties' as well as the waning of charismatic mass excitement in the early seventies. Hence the need for situational analysis, which probes into the contemporary play of forces—apart from the necessary recourse to models such as the charismatic community.

The construction of models and secular theories can have ideological overtones, just as situational analysis can be relatively neutral in partisan struggles. However, situational analysis is also the vehicle for

political analysis proper, which is concerned with the assessment of a given distribution of power with a view towards changing or preserving it, not with secular change or differences between civilizations. In his many political writings on labour issues and constitutional reform Weber dealt explicitly with questions of how to bring about change—just like Marx. When David Beetham synthesized Weber's secular theory of modern politics from his political rather than his sociological writings, he also showed that the two kinds of writing differ in their analytical approach, not just their manifest intent. Much more is involved here than the difference between political evaluation and scholarly 'freedom from value judgment'. It is true that 'the point of [Weber's] political writings is to be sought in the political context, and that of his sociology, in the first instance at least, within a particular scientific tradition'.¹⁹ However, because the focus of political analysis is on how to bring about (or prevent) change, 'it is possible to find in Weber's political writings a sense of the interrelationship of forces in society which is frequently lacking in his academic work'.²⁰ In his political writings, then, the crucial issue is the relationship between a given state and society, the clash of the major social groupings in the political arena—in other words, for him too, political analysis must be class analysis in one way or another.

When Beetham claims that in *Economy and Society* 'there is little politics as Weber himself defined it',²¹ he seems to mean that the overall frame of analysis is not the struggle for power among the social classes in the society; this would be true especially of the *Sociology of Domination* which, after all, was an attempt to extend Georg Jellinek's social theory of the state, hence an undertaking within the 'particular scientific tradition' of comparative constitutional theory, which is not directly concerned with class struggles. Yet part of Weber's achievement lies in the fact that he treated empirically the 'validity' of modes of legitimation in relation to the perennial power struggles between rulers and staffs (and partly also the subjects).

There is, of course, a considerable thematic and analytical overlap between Weber's political and scholarly studies. *Economy and Society* contains elements of class analysis not only in the influential chapter on class, status and party in the political community, but also in the chapter on law and, even more so, in the chapter on the world religions, which generalizes about the affinities between religious ideas and all status groups. But Beetham is right in pointing to significant differences: in the scholarly writings modes of legitimation and the technical superiority of bureaucracy in relation to other forms of administration are given special attention; in the political writings with their situational focus the German and Russian bureaucracies appear as vested interests, if not as outright parasites, preventing needed social change and reflecting the class structure of the two societies. In the scholarly writings capitalism is treated as part of Western rationalism, whereas in

his political studies Weber stresses the ways in which capitalism creates class conflicts.

Most of Weber's extensive political writings dealt with Imperial Germany and Imperial Russia, especially with the difficulties of establishing liberal democracy in countries that lacked the historical preconditions for it. Beetham sees clearly that Weber's analyses were not merely institutional in spite of his great interest in the varieties and technicalities of constitutional reconstruction; Weber always looked for the social basis of a political movement. He recognized that the introduction of advanced capitalism into 'underdeveloped' countries such as Germany and Russia, in which the bourgeoisie had not played its Western historical role of promoting religious, political and economic liberties, militated against the growth of liberal democracy by re-enforcing traditionalist sentiments, such as archaic agrarian communism (in the Russian case), stimulating radical socialism and frightening the weak bourgeoisie into submitting to authoritarian rule.

Weber's political writings, then, contained a combination of situational analysis, elements of models (such as agrarian communism) and sketches of secular theories. They also dealt with the possible shapes of the future and offered a trend analysis. What is distinctive about Weber's historical vision is his insistence on keeping 'the future as history' open to human will and resolution in spite of powerful trends toward the reduction and elimination of freedom. Neither in theory nor in practice did he accept any 'iron laws' of history. Indeed, it was important to employ rules of experience, configurations, secular theories and situational analysis—the whole assembly of the lessons of history—exactly for the purpose of 'swimming against the stream'. Here we arrive at the last level of analysis, which transcends the purely empirical realm: What are we to do now and in the future? In 1906 Weber gave an eloquent answer in his essay 'On the Situation of Bourgeois Democracy in Russia', which I will quote at length, since it can give us a final illustration of the way in which he bound together the observation of a trend, a rule of historical experience, a model, a secular theory, and a declaration of political commitment in taking his stand on the issue of the conditions for liberal democracy.

Today the chances for democracy and individualism would be very poor indeed, if we relied for their 'development' upon the 'social laws' of the effects of material interests. . . . May those rest assured who live in continuous fear that in the future there could be too much democracy and individualism in the world, and not enough authority, aristocracy and office prestige and such things. As matters stand, the trees of democratic individualism will not grow skyhigh. According to all experience, history relentlessly recreates aristocracies and authorities, to whom can cling whoever finds it necessary for himself—or for the people. If the material conditions and the resultant

interest constellations were predominant, every sober analysis would have to draw the conclusion that all economic weather vanes point in the direction of increasing lack of freedom. It is utterly ridiculous to attribute elective affinity with democracy or even freedom (in any sense of the word) to today's advanced capitalism—that 'inevitability' of our economic development—as it is now imported into Russia and as it exists in the United States. Rather, the question can be phrased only in this way: How can democracy and freedom be maintained in the long run under the dominance of advanced capitalism? They can be maintained only if a nation is always determined not to be ruled like a herd of sheep. We individualists and partisans of democratic institutions are swimming against the stream of material constellations. Whoever desires to be the weather vane of a 'developmental tendency' may abandon those old-fashioned ideals as quickly as possible. The rise of modern freedom presupposed unique constellations which will never repeat themselves. Let us enumerate the most important ones: First, the overseas expansion. In Cromwell's armies, in the French Constituent Assembly, in our whole economic life, even today, there blows that wind from beyond the seas. But a new continent is no longer available. Just as in antiquity, the population centers of western culture are moving irresistibly to large inland areas, the North American continent and Russia with their monotonous plains which favor uniformity. The second constellation was the nature of the economic and social structure of the early capitalist epoch in Western Europe, and the third the rise of science. Finally, there were certain values that grew out of the concrete historical distinctiveness of a religious body of thought. These religious conceptions shaped the ethical quality and the 'higher culture' of modern man, in combination with several equally peculiar political constellations and with those material pre-conditions.²³

Since Weber did not claim the powers of scientific prophecy, the total course of events could not prove him wrong, but his vision and foresight could not help but be blurred in many particulars. He took it for granted that 'our weak eyes' cannot see far into 'the impenetrable mists of the future of human history'.²³ Inevitably, he did observe trends and make extrapolations that did not turn into historical reality because of counter-trends. Weber was certainly right in anticipating that the trees of democratic individualism would not grow skyhigh, when that hope had not yet diminished as much as it has by now. Since he wrote the passage, the rule of experience about the relentless renaissance of 'authorities' has been buttressed by the proliferation of authoritarian governments after both world wars. What may today strike us particularly about his assertion that advanced capitalism does not inherently or necessarily promote democracy is the observation

over the last seventy years that liberal democracy has survived mainly in its own heartlands, which also happen to be the centres of the capitalist world economy. Weber's hope that Germany would turn into a liberal democracy as a result of internal party struggles proved vain. Only Western Germany and Japan became liberal democracies by virtue of conquest. Weber did not foresee the defeat of advanced capitalism in Russia, but he anticipated that Marxism would grow stronger at the expense of populist romanticism. He understood that Marxism could not theoretically cope with the 'tremendous and fundamental agrarian problem'²⁴ in Russia, and he applied to the Russian revolutionaries the historical maxim that 'the mortal folly not only of every radical but of every ideologically oriented policy is its capacity to miss opportunities'.²⁵ But he did not anticipate that Lenin would be pragmatic enough to see his opportunity and take it. However, he did realize that a European war would spell the end of Tsarism, and he was aware that the feeble forces of Russian liberal democracy would have to face either bureaucratic or Jacobin centralism.²⁶ When he recognized that America and Russia tended towards an inland mentality, he could not foresee that Russia would indeed withdraw from the capitalist world system and that the United States would retreat into isolationism in the wake of one world war, before the next one would change all of that because of historical counter tendencies.

The survival of liberal democracy in recognizable forms and in spite of many counter-trends may be explained in terms of historical legacies. Each of the factors Weber enumerated as historical conditions of the rise of liberal democracy can be elaborated into a secular theory. Several of these theories can be synthesized into an overview of Western and universal history, but they cannot amount to a total theory of society, since the process of additions of secular theories is theoretically limitless. Insofar as Marxism, which is one of the targets of Weber's passage, has tried to offer a total theory of the course of Western history, its claims about the necessary relationships of all parts have been beyond the realm of historical verifiability, and many of its specific predictions have been proven wrong by the course of events over the last century.

To sum up: In Weber's practised methodology 'sociology' is the generalized aspect of the study of history and contrasts with the causal analysis of individual phenomena. It is true that his most general definition of interpretive sociology at the beginning of Part I of *Economy and Society* (1968), which was written years after the older and more descriptive Part II on historical typology, is that of 'a science concerning itself with the interpretive understanding of social action and thereby with the causal explanation of its course and consequences'.²⁷ But this was a polemical position, which was meant to affirm that in history only men act, not social organisms or collectivities. The construction of socio-historical models, such as patrimonialism or rule by notables, is

possible because, in principle, we can understand the intentions of men and causally explain the course and consequences of their actions. Of course, such structural types transcend the task of 'history' to causally explain a given event; model construction synthesizes the historical observation of many individual actors. The main point about interpretive sociology was simply that we should try to understand the ideas and intentions of historical actors rather than search for historical laws of social evolution, as Marx and other evolutionists had done. However, on both the level of model and of secular theory history provides many lessons in unintended consequences. Revolutionary charisma tends toward routinization; rule-oriented bureaucracy tends toward becoming a vested interest; and political patrimonialism, an effort at centralized control, tends toward decentralization. The paradoxes and ironies are built right into the models. The same is true of Weber's most famous secular theory, 'The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism', which is standard fare in the curriculum of contemporary academic sociology, although he properly described it to Heinrich Rickert as 'an essay in cultural history on Protestantism as the basis of the modern *Berufskultur*, a sort of "spiritualist" construction of the modern economy' (letter of 4/2/05). Thus, the transition from the Protestant ethic to the spirit of capitalism and from this spirit to the 'iron cage' of advanced capitalism was one of the secular developments, fateful for Western history, which poignantly demonstrated what Werner Stark once called Weber's recognition of the 'heterogony of purposes'.²⁸

Weber's philosophy of history was decisionist rather than pessimistic. Unless we save ourselves, nothing and nobody will save us. Historical knowledge, which comprises the three levels of analysis discussed here, is necessary for self-clarification, for deciding what we want and where we want to go. But that knowledge cannot lead to the kind of science of society that would unlock the secrets of history and provide a master key to the future.

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Notes

1. Cf., G. Roth, 'Value-Neutrality in Germany and the United States' in R. Bendix and G. Roth, *Scholarship and Partisanship*, Berkeley and London, University of California Press, 1971, pp. 37-42.

2. Cf., Bruun, H. H., *Science, Values and Politics in Max Weber's Methodology*, Copenhagen, 1972, p. 38.

3. Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, New York, Bedminster, 1968 (G. Roth and C. Wittich, eds.), p. 18 and p. 13.

4. Ibid., p. 19. Wolfgang Mommsen has criticized me for retaining in *Economy and Society* (1968) Parsons' wording of *Geschehen* (now rendered as 'stream of events') as 'empirical process', adding that this appeared to him 'a characteristic distortion due to the particular viewpoint of a predominantly empirical social scientist'. (W. Mommsen, *The Age of Bureaucracy: Perspectives on the Political Sociology of Max Weber*, Oxford, Blackwell, 1974, p. 17.) While I have tried to retain,

wherever feasible, Parsons' choice of terms, I do agree with Mommsen that many passages could be improved. In drawing on a given passage, the choice of terms in translating it often depends upon the issue with which the researcher tries to deal. A straight translation of a whole work is more concerned with general readability and consistency than with multiple meanings and nuances, which may become visible or relevant only in a particular context. I have retranslated the present passage.

5. M. Weber, op. cit., p. LVIII.

6. Max Weber, 'Die "Objektivität" sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Erkenntnis' in *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre*, Tübingen, Mohr, 1951 (J. Winckelmann, ed.), p. 153 f., and *Max Weber on the Methodology of the Social Sciences*, Glencoe, Free Press, 1949 (E. Shils, ed.), p. 66.

7. W. Mommsen, op. cit., p. 10f. Weber's approach to constructing 'partial pictures' is paralleled by the teaching practice of academic sociology, which presents its subject matter in segmentalized courses on stratification, organization, politics, religion, etc. No department attempts that 'complete analysis of culture' that Weber envisaged as an on-going effort at synthesis. Marxist-oriented courses claim to present a total theory of society, but frequently this boils down to little more than summaries of the theories of capitalism and imperialism, which put a premium on intellectual simplification rather than the study of the complex relationships among the 'partial pictures'.

8. See Weber, 'Marginal Utility Theory and the So-Called Fundamental Law of Psychophysics', Louis Schneider trans. and ed. *Social Science Quarterly*, 56:1, 1975; 'On Some Categories of Interpretive Sociology', Edith Graeber, trans. and ed. unpublished M.A. thesis Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1970; *Roscher and Knies*. The Logical Problems of Historical Economics, Guy Oakes trans. and ed. New York and London: Free Press (Macmillan), 1975; *The Methodology of the Social Sciences*, Edward Shils and H. A. Finch trans. and ed. Glencoe: Free Press, 1949. The only

essays from *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1951) presently unavailable in English are the two vigorous attacks on Rudolf Stammler and the critique of Wilhelm Ostwald, but the Stammler critique is summarized in *Economy and Society* (1968), 325-32.

9. B. S. Turner, *Weber and Islam*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974.

10. G. Roth, 'On Max Weber'. *Contemporary Sociology*, 4:4, July 1975, pp. 366-73.

11. S. Andreski, 'Method and Substantive Theory in Max Weber'. *Brit. J. Sociol.*, 15:1, March 1964, pp. 1-18; D. Beetham, *Max Weber and the Theory of Modern Politics*, London, Allen & Unwin, 1974; A. Giddens, *Politics and Sociology in the Thought of Max Weber*, London, Macmillan, 1972; W. Mommsen, op. cit.; J. Rex, 'Typology and Objectivity: A comment on Weber's Four Sociological Methods' in A. Sahay (ed.), *Max Weber and Modern Sociology*, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1971, pp. 17-36; A. Sahay, 'The Importance of Weber's Methodology in Sociological Explanation' in A. Sahay, op. cit., pp. 67-81; and B. S. Turner, op. cit.

12. Cf., G. Roth, *Contemporary Sociology*, op. cit.

13. G. Roth, 'Socio-Historical Model and Developmental Theory: Charismatic Community, Charisma of Reason and the Counterculture', *Amer. Sociol. Rev.*, 40:2, April 1975, pp. 148-57. For another exemplification of the first two levels, see my essay on 'Religion and Revolutionary Beliefs' in a special issue of *Social Forces*, 55:2, Dec. 1976 (forthcoming), edited by D. Chirot, on the relationship of history and sociology. I first tried to sketch the distinction in R. Bendix and G. Roth, *Scholarship and Partisanship*, Berkeley and London, University of California Press, 1971, ch. VI, 'Sociological Typology and Historical Explanation'. For a brief discussion of the logic of Weber's construction of models, which does not bring out this difference but views his conceptualization in the context of present-day uses of models in social science, see P. S. Cohen, 'Models'. *Brit. J. Sociol.*, 17, 1966, pp. 70-8.

14. W. Mommsen, op. cit., and D. Beetham, op. cit.
15. On the genesis of Weber's typological approach, see Bendix and Roth, op. cit., ch. XIII.
16. Max Weber, *Gesammelte Politische Schriften*, Tübingen, Mohr, 1971 (J. Winckelmann, ed.), p. 106.
17. W. Mommsen, 'Gesellschaftliche Bedingtheit und gesellschaftliche Relevanz historischer Aussagen' in E. Weymar and E. Jäckel, eds., *Die Funktion der Geschichte in unserer Zeit*, Stuttgart, Klett, 1975, p. 218.
18. The degree to which Marx was also a structural model builder in his comparative studies unpublished during his lifetime has been examined by R. S. Warner, 'The Methodology of Marx's Comparative Analysis of Modes of Production', in I. Vallier, ed., *Comparative Methods in Sociology*, Berkeley and London, University of California Press, 1971, pp. 49-74.
19. D. Beetham, op. cit., p. 30.
20. Ibid., p. 252.
21. Ibid., p. 15.
22. M. Weber, *Gesammelte Politische Schriften*, op. cit., p. 63 f.
23. Ibid., p. 65.
24. Ibid., p. 62.
25. Ibid., p. 59.
26. Ibid., p. 62.
27. *Economy and Society* (1968), op. cit., p. 4.
28. W. Stark, 'Max Weber and the Heterogony of Purposes', *Social Research*, 34:2, 1967, pp. 249-64.