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# Islam and Politics in Saudi Arabia

Ghassan Salamé

It seems Saudi Arabia can hardly be mentioned today without immediately being typecast: either in the classical and now outdated role of an "oil-bonanza" state, or as "the Islamic country *par excellence*." Indeed, I have been no exception to this rule.[1] James Piscatori reminds us that Saudi Arabia evokes for most Westerners, though not for a great many Muslims, "an image of Islam itself."[2] Ronald McIntyre speaks up "upholding and maintaining the pristine purity of the Wahhabi faith" as one of the Saudi authorities' permanent concerns.[3] Ayman al-Yassini states: "More than any other country in the Muslim world, Saudi Arabia is identified with Islam."[4]

The arguments used to substantiate this assertion are by now well known. Saudi Arabia appears to be regulated by Islam. Her constitution, according to the late King Faysal, is the Holy Quran, and *shura* (consultation) is her decision-making process, if her rulers are to be believed. Her flag bears the *Shahada* ("There is no God but Allah and Muhammad is his prophet") written in Arabic on a green background — the Prophet's color. And since Mecca and Medina happen to be located within the kingdom's boundaries, the Government spends astronomical amounts of money to accommodate the pilgrims who travel yearly to "the very birthplace of the Islamic faith."[5] Non-Muslims are not allowed to enter this area, nor to apply for Saudi citizenship. Islam also permeates the Saudis' daily life: the fast is officially imposed during Ramadan, alcohol is prohibited, theaters are not allowed, women do not drive cars or mix publicly with non-relatives, thieves' hands may be cut off, *riba* (interest on money) is officially not practiced by Saudi banks, and so forth. In the fall of 1986, King Fahd lent additional strength to this impression when he requested that he be addressed no longer as "Majesty," but as *Khadim al-Haramayn* (custodian of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina).

In international relations, the Kingdom likes to be seen as part, or even the core, of the Muslim *umma*. The Saudi government was certainly the driving force behind the creation of the Islamic Conference. It organizes Islamic summits and provides most of the assets of the Islamic Fund. The government supports Muslim charitable associations in Lebanon, Egypt, Mauritania, and

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elsewhere, builds hundreds of mosques in Africa, Asia, and Europe, publicly supports Muslim fighters in Afghanistan as well as Muslim groups in Cyprus and the Philippines. It grants scholarships to Muslim students, and provides the funds for the Muslim World Youth Organization. These activities are duly recognized: Arab nationalists have always criticized the Kingdom for its clear preference of pan-Islamic institutions over pan-Arab organizations such as the Arab League. Christian missions in Africa have expressed their concern with Saudi proselytic activities on that continent.

In short, in her adoption of Islam as an official ideology, Saudi Arabia goes much further than Mubarak's Egypt, Hussein's Jordan, Hassan's Morocco, or even Zia ul-Haq's Pakistan. Islam is viewed as a state religion, the pivotal foundation of the Saudi political system and the exclusive regulator of Saudi daily life. It determines domestic legislation as well as foreign policy.

Is Islamic fundamentalism still possible within such a well established ideological framework? Is it possible to be more (or at least differently) Muslim than *the* Muslim regime? By occupying the Haram al-Sharif in Mecca at the dawn of a new Islamic century (November 1979), the group led by Juhayman al-'Utaybi answered these two questions in the affirmative, and in so doing encouraged a re-examination of the function and usefulness of the regime's religious legitimation.

Another militant critique of the Kingdom's Islam is expressed by the Iranian and Iranian-inspired pilgrims to Mecca who, since 1979, have demonstrated and distributed pamphlets against the regime. As far as we know, this critique has had, until now, only a marginal effect on Saudi society *per se*. It is a matter more of diplomatic rivalry and political conflicts than of theology. This activity is, however, becoming a regular feature of the annual *Hajj* (pilgrimage).

Some of the Kingdom's 300,000 or so Shi'a have participated in the demonstrations. Indeed, their community has a long history of feuds and rancor with the House of Sa'ud. The Wahhabi fighters were particularly harsh in their treatment of the Shi'a, and the Sa'uds have followed a policy of systematic ostracism against them. Shi'a protests are therefore not new. Until recently, they were expressed by notables and religious leaders as well as through the outlawed labor unions. These protests have recently taken on a clear religious tone. Ashura[6] is now chosen as the best occasion to express them. The Saudi Organization of the Islamic Revolution, which obviously receives some help from the revolutionary regime in Iran, was probably founded in 1980. This group's Shi'i identity is one important reason for its marginal influence, though its Islamic critique of the regime seeks to transcend the sectarian limits in which it is presently confined. For this group, "the Saudi regime is the most dangerous enemy of Islam because it uses the cover of religion to legitimate its non-Islamic rule."[7]

Leaving aside the sensitive, albeit marginal, issue of Saudi Arabia's Shi'a, this paper will be devoted to answering the question of how an Arab Sunni

Wahhabi like Juhayman could appear in a country like Saudi Arabia. Juhayman, in his simple and polemical way, provides us with his answer: He is personally concerned about the attitude of the ulema. If this is an Islamic country, what role should be played by those who are supposed to propagate the faith and control the application of the Shari'a (Islamic legislation)? In more general terms, one is struck by the dual foundation on which the Saudi state has been built from its very inception: a tribal *'asabiyya* (group solidarity) allied with a religious *da'wa* (call). Has not the first—and to what extent?—marginalized the second, transforming it into a mere tool to legitimize the regime internally and increase its prestige in the world? Is Saudi Arabia anything more than a *mulk* based, like so many other powers, on a mixture of *ghalaba* (subjugation) and *'umran* (civilization)? I will argue, in this paper, that analysis of the religious discourse is much less helpful than a clarification of the actual role played by the Wahhabi da'wa in the making of the Kingdom, and in its survival. Without such a clarification, very contradictory conclusions could be drawn from the study of the same phenomena.

THAT A RELIGIOUS CALL was an important foundation of the kingdom can hardly be disputed.[8] Indeed, total and regional dispersion characterized the history of the Arabian peninsula from the Prophet's death through the triumph of the Saudi/Wahhabi forces. The da'wa preached by Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab (1703–1792) basically carried a call for unity (*tawhid*). This meant the unity of God in the face of various idolatrous practices resorted to by the Najdis of his time. But the concept also implied the unity of true believers against the *rafida* (the standard Hanbali word for Shi'a), *mushrikin* (idolaters) and other *kuffar* (unbelievers). Gradually, all non-Wahhabis came to be seen as more or less dangerous and hostile kuffar (sing. *kafir*). *Jihad* (holy war) against them was therefore a duty. Wahhabism could consequently be spread as a true revivalist movement, the first of such magnitude in modern times.

This is, in any event, how the call was perceived at its very inception. As early as 1784, a British traveler could write:

> When I arrived in Basra, the Ottoman Wali of Baghdad, his delegate in Basra as well as other Turks were all worried by the activities of the leader of the Wahhabis. This is because they knew that Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab's strict interpretation of the Quranic text was the purest and most abiding by it."[9]

Wahhabi tawhid was soon adopted by Yemeni Sunni shaykhs such as Prince Muhammad Ibn Isma'il al-San'ani and Muhammad Ibn Ali al-Shawkani. Wahhabi ideas spread to India and influenced reformers like Ahmad Ibn 'Irfan al-Brelwi and Ahmad Khan. But Wahhabism remained almost completely unknown in Africa.

After decades of hostility (fueled by the successful Egyptian campaign against the first Saudi state), Egyptian religious reformers became more sensitive to Wahhabi fundamentalism. One can find traces of this in the writings of Muhammad 'Abduh (especially his belief in the freedom of *ijtihad*—Islamic jurisprudence). His disciple, the Lebanese-born Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865–1935) was more explicit in his support of Wahhabism, and wrote two books in its defense.[10] His journal, *Al-Manar*, published many articles praising the movement. Rida also published many of Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab's books. Later, a society called *Jam'iyyat Ansar al-Sunna al-Muhammadiyya* was founded as an Egyptian extension of the Wahhabi movement. Its monthly was, not surprisingly, entitled *Al-Tawhid*. Its president's writings were, in general, a pale reproduction of Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab's ideas.[11]

Arab and Muslim scholars today consider Wahhabism the first Sunni revivalist movement of modern times, later followed by more tolerant trends like al-Mahdiyya in Sudan, al-Sanussiyya in Libya and other reformist movements in Egypt and India. Wahhabism can be considered fundamentalist because of its strict rejection of all innovations which are not included in the Quran or the Sunna. Hence its exclusive adherence to the Book and the Traditions, and its condemnation of Sufism as well as of the absolutism of the four jurisprudence schools. Its support of free ijtihad (renewal of jurisprudence) explains its revivalism. Wahhabism therefore has been a source of inspiration for several modern fundamentalist thinkers (such as 'Abdallah al-Nafissi in Kuwait), militants (Shaykh Hafidh Salama in Cairo) and groups (Abna' al-Islam in Tripoli, Lebanon; 'Ulama' Najd* and Juhayman's Ikhwan in Saudi Arabia itself).

The Wahhabi call could not, of itself, create a kingdom. Islamic history is full of unsuccessful reformers and obscure prophets. One *hadith* (saying of the Prophet) states: "God sent no Prophet who did not enjoy the protection of his people." This is also a recurrent theme in Ibn Khaldun's *Muqaddima*. Those prophets or reformers who are not supported by a strong 'asabiyya (group solidarity) deserved to be ridiculed: "Many deluded individuals took it upon themselves to establish the truth. They did not know that they would need 'asabiyya for that." Ibn Khaldun has little interest in purely intellectual da'was and little confidence in God's practical help:

> Rulers and dynasties are strongly entrenched. Their foundations can be undermined and destroyed only through strong efforts backed by a group feeling of tribes and families. Similarly, prophets in their religious propaganda depended on groups and families, though they were the ones who could have been supported by God with anything in existence. If someone who is in the right path were to attempt religious reforms in this way, his isolation would keep him from gaining the support of group feeling and he would perish.[12]

* 'Ulama' Najd is a group of *salafi* ulema in Riyadh who insist on a literal application of the teachings of Ibn al-Wahhab.

Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab almost did perish. He was expelled from Basra, quar-
reled with his father, and was later dismissed by Muhammad Ibn Salman, the
amir of Hassa. The amir of his own tribe, ʿUthman Ibn Muʿammar, had little
respect for his views. He was then adopted and protected by the amir of Dirʿiyya,
Muhammad Ibn Saʿud, in 1744. This resulted in the renowned agreement
between the two ambitious men, one a tribal chief and the other a religious
reformer. The conditions implied in the agreement, if the Khaldunian lesson
is to be remembered, could not be very favorable to the one (the reformer)
who had to flee his own ʿasabiyya and oasis, and to work for another
tribe's leader.

    Hence the ambiguity, and actual imbalance, of this joint venture. Saudi
historians do not all relate it in the same way. Some are sensitive to the primacy
of the Word; others are impressed by the achievements of the Sword. Ibn Bishr
thinks that the reformer's power was equal to the amir's.[13] But few authors
agree with this point of view. All concede that the Shaykh's influence was strong
in judicial and taxation matters, and that this influence gradually waned. His
descendants' role has been confined to religious matters. They are consulted,
their *fatwas* often respected, but one can hardly speak of their leading role in
the administration of the Kingdom, or in its actual rebirth after two surgical
defeats. As accurately stated by Christine Moss Helms, "Although Muham-
mad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab himself was deeply involved in all aspects of religion,
war and politics, his descendants have become more generally renowned for
their involvement in religious affairs, while the Al-Saud have firmly established
their control in the political arena."[14]

    In any case, it was the Saudi prince who retained the title of imam and was
recognized as such by the Shaykh's descendants (*Aal al-Shaykh*). This was in
conformity with the Hanbali tradition, which inspired Wahhabism, and which
leaves a limited margin of maneuver for the *ʿalim* in his relationship with the
imam.[15] Helms quotes the famous letter that ʿAbd al-Latif, one of the Shaykh's
descendants, sent to the Ikhwan, concerning his own role at a time (late nine-
teenth century) when several princes were competing for power:

> We are few and weak. There is not in our town anyone who would reach forty
> fighters. I went to him (Prince Saʿud) and did my best and I defended the Muslims
> as far as I could. . . . Let God guard us from *fitna* (civil strife) and be kind to
> us. Saʿud entered the town after a pledge. He came in possession of the *wilaya*
> by conquest. His orders were valid. There had to be obedience to him. . . . An
> oppressive sultan is better than a continuous fitna.[16]

His own impotence, the Hanbali obsession with law and order, and the readiness
of the ulema to conform to a *fait accompli*, are all revealed by this letter, as well
as by Shaykh ʿAbd al-Latif's behavior during the civil war. As M.J. Crawford
has observed,

the shaikh showed keen awareness of what was possible and what was not. His influences as *qadi* (judge) and *mufti* (highest religious authority) was restricted because of the quietist stance he chose to adopt. . . . There is no evidence that he ever tried overtly to exploit the significance which candidates for power and other Najdis would naturally have attached to a grant of recognition by him.[17]

But fitna occurred despite the shaykh's hopes, and the *imara* (principality) disappeared, to be resurrected some thirty years later with 'Abd al-Aziz Ibn Sa'ud's recapture of Riyadh in 1902.

THE TRANSFORMATION OF THIS ARABIAN IMARA into a mere mulk could have been checked or even completely reversed in the twentieth century. After some ten years, during which he was able to re-establish his authority in central Najd, 'Abd al-'Aziz was compelled to enlist the Bedouins' support for his cause. In this, he was following a familiar pattern; as Christine Moss Helms observes, "Each period of Saudi rule had initially directed its proselytizing zeal against urban areas and only after some success to the *badu* tribes."[18] Only Bedouins would agree to fight far from Najdi and Qassimi urban centers. Only they could form an army strong enough to attack Najd's neighbors: the Rashids in Ha'il, the Hashemite Sharifs in the Hijaz, or even Banu Khalid in the Hassa. Saudi rule would have otherwise been confined in and around Riyadh, soon attacked and defeated by a larger tribal coalition, and threatened meanwhile by the Bedouins' disruptive attacks against cities and caravans.

The Ikhwan movement was consequently formed around 1913 in order to proselytize the Bedouins and to use them against the Sa'uds' rivals.[*] They proved to be fearless fighters and successful conquerors. Five or six years after the movement's creation, they formed most of 'Abd al-'Aziz's army. Thanks to them, four-fifths of the Arabian penisula was soon conquered, and Hashemite rule in Transjordan and Iraq was threatened.[19]

The Ikhwan also proved to be religious zealots. Their faith, as well as their military zeal, provided the cement which allowed their temporary reorganization along supra-tribal lines. As Amin al-Rihani — a Lebanese-American traveler who met them — put it, they were fighting "in the service of God and the Kingdom of Ibn Saud."[20] This dualism is not to be overlooked. Ideologically they were committed to the kingdom as long as it served God. Otherwise, there was no reason to put aside tribal traditions, whereby loyalty to a ruler is not given once and for all, where tribal coalitions are as easily broken as they are made, where rulerships are born and disappear in accordance with the well-known Khaldunian cycle.

* Even after these political rivals had embraced the Wahhabi da'wa, as was the case with the Ha'il population and some tribes in the Hassa; which clearly demonstrates the primacy of political leaders over religious divines.

The conflict between the Ikhwan's ideological view and 'Abd al-'Aziz's at-tempts to create a mulk was inevitable, from the first moment. Relations were often tense, but with the conquest of Hijaz they seriously deteriorated. The king had to deal with Najd's backwardness when compared with this cosmopolitan province, as well as his new duties as guardian — in the name of all Muslims and not only of his own followers — of the two holy cities, and the Hijazis' unavoidable rebellion if they were to be completely subjugated by Najd, its Ikhwan and its Wahhabism. Thus confronted, he chose to be tolerant. He recognized the province's semi-autonomy and followed a pattern of gradual integration. For this purpose, he ordered the Ikhwan not to reside in Medina and Jeddah. He also maintained the Ottoman-made laws which were applied in the province. Political and social integration was taking place outside the Wahhabi framework. In December 1930, a British consul noted:

A tendency was remarked to increase Najdi influence in the Hijaz. The use of Najdi headdress has now been imposed by Government order upon Hijazi officials. On the other hand, there has been no further attempt of late to impose strict Wahhabi prin-ciples. If anything, the tendency to compromise has been a little more in the ascendant.[21]

These lines were written a few months after 'Abd al-'Aziz's subjugation of the Ikhwan. In relating these troubled years, historians have generally failed to explain the multi-dimensional nature of this showdown. It was certainly a conflict between a secular mulk and religious zeal. It was also a battle pitting an urban-based, urban-supported rulership against mainly Bedouin troops. It was, third, a fight between two different coalitions of tribes, as was noted by 'Abd al-Aziz himself, who spoke of his fight against the 'Ajman or the 'Utayba. It was, finally, a confrontation between a self-centered military/religious force, and a mulk which was by then aware that its stability would depend more on the recognition and support of the dominant world forces than on its own poorly equipped Bedouin troops.

Hence, many similarities can be found between the 1929 rebellion and the 1979 uprising in Mecca. First, there was the name adopted by the rebels themselves, al-Ikhwan. Second, the 'Utayba tribe played similar roles in the rebellion under Ibn Humaid in 1929 and in the uprising led by Juhayman fifty years later. Third, the link between religious zeal and a rebellion against in-justice existed in each case. The 1929 rebels maintained that in the service of God and the king, they had sacrificed both their traditional diras and the huge amounts of maghanim (riches gained in combat) they would have accumulated after each of their successful military campaigns: the king had broken the tradi-tional Bedouin rules to his own benefit, without abiding by this new contract with the Ikhwan. The 1979 events unfolded amid a widespread feeling that tribal land has been unjustly appropriated by the royal family. This was ex-acerbated by the fact that in 1979, real estate transactions were reaching

astronomic heights in deals generally limited to a happy few.

Beyond these factual elements, one is struck by the recurrence of certain themes in the two cases. Faysal al-Duwaysh, the chief rebel in 1929, was fighting principally against a ruler who had withdrawn from the jihad and was now following a policy of exclusive power internally and of appeasement vis-à-vis the infidels. "If you wish to prevent us from fighting them," he wrote to the king, "and if when one of us commits an infraction you either imprison or kill him, this is an calamity and oppression of your subjects, who may desert you, doubt your belief and irrevocably decide that you are hindering them in their religion."

The king tried to answer with the help of fatwas from loyal ulema, but he also insisted: "We (al-Sa'ud) are your masters and descendants of your masters." The amir of Kuwait at the time provided a realistic summary of the whole process:

> When Bin Saud started his religious crusade, the Ikhwan were inflamed with the idea that the days of the Prophet had returned. . . . When the expansion of Bin Saud's power was checked [by Britain], he was compelled to check his Ikhwan and to renounce his jihad.[22]

The subjugation of the Ikhwan had tremendous effects on the kingdom. The chrysallis of a mere mulk unfolded, finally daring to call itself a *mamlaka* (kingdom), with defined boundaries, a flag, peaceful international relations, and a growing number of "infidels" working in oil prospecting and production. In Khaldunian terms, the *malik* was all the more acceptable outside Najd because he had shown his readiness to destroy the very tool of his domination, the Ikhwan. Slow integration into a unified kingdom could then take place. Legitimacy was now based less on religious precedence than on institutionalized mulk. Meanwhile, ulema, judges, mosque *khatibs* (preachers) and other *mutawwi'* (religious police) were integrated into the state bureaucracy. The representatives of religious authority slowly accepted their passive, secondary position, a development which was to alienate one of their students, Juhayman Ibn Muhammad Ibn Sayf al-'Utaybi.

In ADDITION TO HIS ROLE as military leader of the 1979 uprising, Juhayman tried to be the movement's ideologue, leaving to his friend and brother-in-law, Muhammad al-Qurayshi, the more ceremonial role of "Mahdi." His writings form a series he entitled *Majmu' al-Rasa'il wa-al-Tawhid wa Da'wat al-Ihkwan wa-al-Mizan li-Hayat al-Insan* (Letters on government, on the unity of god, the Ikhwan movement, and balance in human life).

These writings are characterized by a sincere adherence to a utopian vision, by the repetition of the same limited number of Quranic verses and hadiths, and by a clear reluctance to fall into mere polemics.

The third pamphlet in the series is devoted to the movement itself.[23] The

pamphlet indicates, first, that before their rebellion in 1979, the Ikhwan were already known, that their views had been already conveyed to the religious authorities, and that the Saudi government had already interfered with their activities. Juhayman summarizes the arguments used against them. They were accused of being *dhahiriyya*, sticking to the letter of the Quran against any logic. Their ignorance of the law was cited as well as their political ambitions. Others considered them *khawarij* (radical deviants from Islam), which would have made it legal to assassinate them.

According to Juhayman, the Ikhwan began as a movement in reaction to the kind of *ʿilm* (Islamic religious sciences) taught in colleges and universities. They found that while both the Quran and the Sunna can be easily understood, the ulema seemed hardly aware of them. Excepted from this judgment was the highest religious authority in the kingdom, Shaykh ʿAbd al-ʿAziz Ibn Baz, "who is knowledgeable in the Sunna but fails to criticize those who contradict it. And when he mentions the government's several failures to respect the Sunna, he often excuses it and supports it." Hence, Ibn Baz could not be trusted because of "attachment to this government." Juhayman thought, however, that the struggle against the government should not yet take the form of *takfir* (i.e., considering it kafir or no longer Muslim); a mere *iʿtizal* (avoidance) was sufficient.

Juhayman then turns to justifying his movement at a time when other, similar groups were already active in Saudi Arabia. Pointing to the existence of a diversified fundamentalist movement, he mentions four groups, including the Muslim Brothers movement (the Tabigh group), which he presents as a non-Saudi, basically Pakistani group. Two other groups, the Salafiyyun and ʿUlamaʾ Najd, are described as too moderate vis-à-vis the government. This position was shared by Shaykh Ibn Baz, who according to Juhayman, was presented with the first pamphlet in the series (*Rafʿ al-Iltibas*) and accepted it as well-founded, but criticized the group for specifying the Saudi government as a target for its criticism. Ibn Baz, thenceforth, was presented in a favorable light: a true ʿalim despite his sensitivity to government pressures. That these pamphlets were received with some understanding by certain establishment ulema was not surprising. The government, however, was not so lenient. Members of the group were jailed. Others, all foreigners, were expelled from the country.

By Saudi standards, however, the group certainly benefited from a degree of freedom in the years preceding the rebellion. The group was probably viewed as a devout group of *salafi* zealots. Moreover, Juhayman had pledged not to concentrate his hatred and takfir on the Saudi government, but rather to keep himself and his group at a distance from it through iʿtizal. In addition, the Department of Internal Security, which sent a shaykh to bring the group's members in Riyadh under control, could not have considered as a very serious threat a group that proclaimed its opposition to all forms of planning and organization.

In more general terms, the authorities failed to take seriously the group's incredibly utopian view of the world. Juhayman referred repeatedly to an event

which was supposed to occur on the first day of the month of Muharram in the first year of the fifteenth century: Repression and jail would have been the signs of the new era:

> The Mahdi will appear. His group will take refuge in the Haram. An army which is not Jewish, nor Christian, nor communist, but rather Muslim will attack them in the Haram. But Allah will order the earth to open and to engulf it, saving, by so doing, the Mahdi and his followers.

The other themes touched upon by Juhayman formed part of a more classical fundamentalist world view. Muslim governments and ulema were too close to the Christians. Without mentioning Americans or foreigners by name, Juhayman was sensitive to any sort of relationship with non-Muslims. "Is it possible?" he asked,

> to declare the Jihad on the *kifr* states while we maintain our ambassadors in their territory, and keep their diplomats, experts and professors in our countries? How can we preach Islam while we take Christians as professors? How can we accept to see Christian flags beside the Muslim ones?"

The fairly typical chauvinist attitude of all fundamentalist movements is, in Juhayman's writings, expressed in its most primary, unsophisticated form. It is Islam verses *kufr*, and the two cannot coexist. Juhayman seemed too pre-occupied with his millenarist utopia to look carefully into the forms and con-tent of the kuffar's penetration of his country. He did not care about AWACS, or about technology. His view came from the Prophet's time: One flag against, not beside, the other.

Juhayman's utopia was similar to other utopias. He was very precise about how the Mahdi would appear, how many brigades (eighty) would attack him, how many would fight and how many desert, and the role of Christ (after his conversion to Islam) in the scenario. Juhayman's utopia was a detailed one. His view of reality was, in contrast, gross and ideological. He believed that Constantinople would be the main battlefield, that the battle there would be fought on horses, and with swords; he even claimed to know the horses' names and colors!

Juhayman drew a bit closer to politics when he introduced the concept of *al-islam al-dawli* (state Islam), but again he defined it in theological terms: as the religion of those Muslims who accept to live under any state, including a kafir one. This concept is introduced in the context of another obsessive theme, the ulemas' resignation of their role. "If the Devil had a State," Juhayman wrote, "he would have ulema and preachers working for him as long as he gave them an academic degree, a scholarly title, and a salary." These ulema fight against communism, he said, which is a good thing, but marginal after all; their real duty is to defend the Quran and the Sunna. This they do not do. And he gave

the example of how the religious universities in the kingdom would not allow a student to register if he did not provide six photographs with his application. Juhayman was deeply shocked: Did they not know that photography is prohibited in Islam? Why did they allow the king's photographs to be printed, even on the kingdom's banknotes?

A MUCH MORE SOPHISTICATED VERSION of Arabian salafiyya, a version that is obviously favorable to the Ikhwan rebellion, is expressed by 'Abdallah Fahd al-Nafissi, a Cambridge-educated Kuwaiti, elected in February 1985 to his country's parliament. In 'Indama Yahkum al-Islam (when Islam governs),[24] al-Nafissi tries to translate into modern political vocabulary the salafi ideas prevalent in the Gulf societies. He frequently uses quotations from Ibn Taymiyya and Abu al-A'la' al-Mawdudi, which confirm his fundamentalist ideas.

The opening theme in his book is "the Muslims' right to control their rulers" (p. 5). To this end, God gave Muslims the right to form political parties. These can exist without any prior authorization from the rulers. Hence, the basic right to participate in politics, to elect the ruler, to depose him, "the Muslim regime being probably the only political system that can require anyone, including the Caliph himself, to stand before the tribunal" (p. 12).

But the book's central theme is not this rediscovered "Muslim democracy." It is dynastic rule, and this should not surprise those who follow Gulf politics. Al-Nafissi's main objective is to demonstrate that dynastic rule is organically non-Islamic. In view of the consistently dynastic nature of past Muslim regimes, the author is at great pains to prove this. Hence his condemnation of the Umayyads' qaysariyya and of the Abbassids' kisrawiyya as non-Islamic, and his acceptance of the Rashidins' "elections" as the only truly Islamic precedent. He rejects dynastic rule basically because it destroys equality among believers; it is generally dictatorial; it is based on biology, not on religious or intellectual qualities; it suppresses shura, and so forth.[25]

Dynastic rule leads to even more dangerous consequences. Since the time of the Umayyads, according to al-Nafissi, rulers have left moral and religious power to the ulema in order to concentrate military, political, and financial power in their own hands. Consequently, dynastic rule has led to a gradual separation between religion and state which is unacceptable in Islam. In an era of oil wealth, al-Nafissi is clearly sensitive to the fact that this eventual distinction led to the concentration of the state's revenues in the dynasty's hands, with no control from the believers whatsoever over the way these revenues were spent. Hence, family rule is the worst deviation which occurred in Muslim history. It transformed the caliphate into a mere secular mulk, it replaced the social contract on which the caliphate is based with an oppressive system, and eventually led to the revival of pre-Islamic tribal, family, and nationalistic affinities.

Al-Nafissi is careful not to cite by name any of the present Gulf dynasties. But his purpose is clear. He often refers to "the Omayyads, the Ottomans, and any other ruling family" (pp. 23 and 118). At the end of his book, he is more explicit when he writes, "Today's leaders did not come to power through legal means, but through the support of anti-Islamic kafir colonialism. If our legal duty is to fight these western kafir colonialist powers, it is as compelling to fight against these regimes" (p. 149).

This explicit condemnation is linked to a renaissance, the condition of which should be liberation from fear, readiness to undertake military training and actual fighting, followed by *khuruj* (rebellion) against the rulers (p. 145). Al-Nafissi is less explicit about the kind of regime to be established then. He only mentions in passing the individual's rights in a legally acceptable regime:   1) the right to elect the head of state;   2) the right to be consulted by the ruler; 3) the right to control the head of state; and 4) the right to depose him. Al-Nafissi holds that Islam allows either the direct election of the head of state, or his election by the parliament.

Juhayman al-'Utaybi died two or three years before al-Nafissi published his book. But Juhayman's own rejection of a hereditary kingship was no less clear. "In a hereditary rulership," he wrote, "the Caliph is not chosen by the Muslims, but it is he who imposes himself on them. They are obliged to offer him their *bay'a*. If they are unhappy with him he is not deposed. No! Because the whole thing is compulsory."[26]

Juhayman and al-Nafissi are radical in many ways: in their rejection of dynastic rule; in their readiness (proclaimed or proven) to take arms against it; in the former's naive belief in the Mahdi utopia, and the latter's more intellectual condemnation of 99 per cent of Muslim history as non-Islamic.

Less radical forms of fundamentalist attitudes are very common in Saudi Arabia. One can sense this in the day-to-day behavior of many princes, in the famous demonstration against the introduction of television (1966), as well as in the success of a number of very vocal shaykhs' programs on that same television. Sometimes this trend is organized into a movement like the one formed by 'Ulama' Najd. These movements are not necessarily opposition groups, since the government can still count on enough religious legitimacy to allow for the existence of ideological trends looking for a greater rigor in the application of the Shari'a, or a more fanatical attitude towards non-Muslim foreigners. The understanding these groups find in certain segments of the establishment explains the relative freedom enjoyed by many of them before the Mecca events. One of them is the local Saudi section of the Muslim Brothers.

This section could not be anti-government without endangering its existence in the kingdom and the financial help apparently given to the Muslim Brothers, in and outside the kingdom, by the Saudi authorities. There are certainly Muslim Brothers within the kingdom's many Arab expatriate communities (especially Sudanese and Egyptian). There are also Saudi Muslim Brothers,

and their magazine bears the same name as its Egyptian counterpart, *Al-Da'wa*.

During 1979, *Al-Da'wa* adopted a line of support for Ayatollah Khomeini's Iran. The magazine enthusiastically greeted the measures taken by the Islamic revolution in constitutional and economic affairs. News and photographs were published of a visit to Khomeini by the leaders of the *tanzim duwali* (world organization of Muslim Brothers).

In religious matters, the Saudi Brotherhood's line was one of clear tradition-alism (not dissimilar to that of the more influential Jam 'iyyat al-Islah al-Ijtima 'i in Kuwait). The Brotherhood (in communion with Ibn Baz, the chief religious authority in the Kingdom) fought the festivities which mark *al-mawlid al-Nawabi* (the birth of the Prophet) by maintaining that they are of pagan or Christian origin. The Brotherhood also opened a more politically sensitive dispute by asking, What, today, is the significance of jihad?

In order to justify the fact that the Wahhabis no longer make war against the infidels, the official establishment had maintained either that there are not sufficient means, or that there is a lack of coordination between Islamic countries, or again that the jihad is, after all, defensive in nature. This latter point was developed in particular by the head of the law courts in Qatar, himself a Wahhabi. *Al-Da'wa* launched a campaign against these views, reaffirming the offensive nature of jihad within Islam. One could observe that in taking as its target a non-Saudi Wahhabi religious figure, *Al-Da'wa* managed indirectly to criticize the Saudi religious establishment without drawing on itself the predic-table reaction of the authorities.

Late in 1979—it is difficult to say whether it was before or after the Mecca incidents—the authorities decided the magazine had gone too far in praising militant Islam of the Khomeini model. The director of the magazine was re-placed, and *Al-Da'wa* adopted a more moderate line. A year later, when the Iraq-Iran war broke out, the magazine merely called for a strong Muslim alliance, stating that "the United States, the Soviet Union and Israel are the real beneficiaries of the war."

The official Saudi line, more systematically expounded since 1979, is not absolutely different from the three examples we have already mentioned. In the Saudi media, religion is taking an ever larger place, but it is still confined to special journals (published by the Shari'a departments of Saudi universities or by the Muslim League) and special sections of the mass-circulation magazines and newspapers. While a clear distinction is made between religion and politics (different pages, different authors, different vocabulary), a content analysis would show a great many salafi concepts, even in "secular," government-financed publications. Saudi radio and television convey one of the most "fun-damentalist" interpretations of Islam in the Muslim's daily life. Literalism and conservatism are utterly dominant.

This is particularly the case of the religious section in the kingdom's daily newspapers, where ritualism, attachment to the Quranic letter, and xenophobia

are regular features. A weekly published in London by Saudi interests now conveys a condensed form of this view. *Al-Muslimun* has published articles in support of the Afghan *mujahidin* (with a clear preference for Ahmad Mas'ud), and the Islamicization of Africa. Traditionalist Egyptian shaykhs (al-Baquri, Muhammad al-Ghazali, Muhammad Mutawalli al-Sha'rawi) are regular contributors. The general tone is rather aggressive against non-Muslims, particularly Westerners. The fatwas and answers to the reader's questions are in general harsh in their reference to the letter of the Quran and the Sunna. As far as religious and foreign issues are concerned, the weekly could hardly be condemned by a Muslim zealot. The vocabulary used is an indication: the Thai army (fighting against a Muslim minority) is portrayed basically as Buddhist; Fillippino soldiers (fighting against another Muslim insurrection) are "Christian"; and Soviet troops occupying Afghanistan are "atheist," all this implying that international conflicts are, in essence, religious wars. No wonder, then, that Zionism is seen everywhere to combat Islam: with the South-Sudanese rebel troops, as well as behind the Reverend Syun Yung Moon.[27]

THESE FOUR EXAMPLES — Juhayman, al-Nafissi, the Muslim Brothers, the official line — point to the osmosis still working between state and religion, to the extent that certain themes can be found in the rebels' pamphlets and in official publications alike. Some segments in the establishment are more sensitive than others to a fundamentalist view; but the regime has always been harsh in its treatment of opponents, including religious zealots, without giving up what is left of its own religious legitimacy. This indisputable success has already been noticed by many authors. Michael Hudson, for example, writes that "the Saudi solution to the legitimacy problems posed by modernity has on the whole proved more successful than expected. Islamic and customary values have been harmonized with modern nationalism and secular values of progress and development."[28] Daniel Pipes echoes this optimistic view: "Only in Saudi Arabia did neo-orthodoxy succeed politically and maintain itself in full force until the present."[29] James Piscatori also thinks the "Saudis have been more successful than is commonly thought in adapting their ideology to desired changes."[30]

Many arguments can be marshalled to explain this "success": Sunni quietism as opposed to Shi'i rebellious traditions; Hanbali conformism, whereby fitna and other forms of civil strife are to be avoided at any price; external help offered to 'Abd al-'Aziz against his fanatical rivals by the British and to his descendants by the United States; oil revenues which permit a large integration of potential rebellious strata into the state bureaucracy and strengthen the society's dependence on the state. To this, one can add efficient intelligence, sparse population and, in the rebel camp, lack of organization and absence of external help.

One could also single out the attitude of the ulema as a key factor in this "success story." Muslim writers tend to emphasize that there is no clergy in Islam. This is probably true in principle. One must, however, concede that in Saudi Arabia, the body of ulema with its hierarchal order, its concentration within certain families, its extensive presence in the most ideological sectors of state activity (justice, education), largely fills this function. To play a role in public affairs, the religious establishment should apparently avoid two pitfalls. The first is to be too subservient to the authorities, and consequently to lose its credibility within the society. The second is to be too intimately linked to opposition groups, tempting the authorities to suppress the religious establishment and institutions.

The ulema corps has indeed offered generous backing to the government every time the latter has been seriously challenged. During the 1927–29 rebellion, the ulema mediated between the king and the rebels; they then issued several fatwas in support of the king, notably one which states that the king alone can declare the jihad against the infidels.

Again in 1979, the ulema, and particularly Shaykh Ibn Baz and the fifteen-member Higher Council of the Ulema, severely condemned the rebels. They issued a first fatwa in which they allowed the authorities to attack the Haram: "Duty impels you to call on them to yield and to lay down their arms. If they do this, they will be imprisoned and tried. If not, all means may be used to capture them." Later, a communiqué signed by a large number of ulema portrayed the insurgents as "aggressors acting in contradiction of the Book and the Sunna of the Prophet . . . . criminals." Several weeks later, the ulema issued a statement at the end of the fifteenth session of the Council of Senior Ulema (*Hay'at kibar al-'ulama'*—created in 1971 by King Faysal), which again condemned the uprising as a crime, and the rebels as "criminals who could not be considered salafiyyin" (fundamentalists—the word used here with a positive connotation).

This clear support has its limits. In peacetime, the ulema try to induce the authorities to maintain traditions. In times of crisis, they are reluctant to be completely identified with the authorities. In 1927, the ulema successfully opposed 'Abd al-'Aziz's program to codify the Shari'a. They have had less success in imposing Wahhabism on the Shi'a, and in rejecting secular education and the introduction of telephones. The ulema make discreet use of challenges (particularly religious) against the authorities to increase their own influence. Following the Mecca events in 1979, the king decided to hold a weekly meeting with them. Shaykh Ibn Baz (considered to be very traditionalist) became more outspoken in his demands for a systematic implementation of ritual rules. His fatwas were now widely publicized and included calls to impose the Ramadan fast on non-Muslims living in the country, to impose harsh sentences on foreigners manufacturing alcohol, to follow a policy of deep distrust with regard to foreign journalists working in Islamic countries, to consider "frequent travel to the countries of atheism as a serious threat to Islam," and so forth.

In 1981, Shaykh Ibn Baz gave in to a longstanding salafi demand by outlawing celebration of the Prophet's birthday. He also issued fatwas against women driving cars or employing foreign chauffeurs. In a country of two million square kilometers and almost two million cars, this last fatwa was not particularly well received. Ibn Baz maintained that driving a car would oblige women to remove their veil, while chauffeured cars would put them in contact with foreigners. This was also an opportunity to underline his well-known xenophobia: "There must not be two religions in the Arabian peninsula," he stated, "but one alone"; a sentence which could easily have been written by Juhayman.

These and similar measures demonstrate a certain amount of autonomy, and a strengthened influence, in an era when the kingdom is being led by a "modernizing" son of 'Abd al-'Aziz. More interestingly, this relative autonomy was manifested both in 1929 and in 1979. In 1929, the ulema refused to consider the Ikhwan as *khawarij* (outside Islam) and contented themselves with the word *ghulat* (extremists). They supported the Ikhwan in several matters, including the treatment of the Shi'a, the imposition of Wahhabism on the Hijazis, the rejection of all contacts with "infidels." However, they condemned the Ikhwan's rebellion against the king, whom they still considered a legitimate ruler.

In 1979, their condemnation of Juhayman's uprising differed from that of the authorities. Ibn Baz and the Council of Higher Ulema again refused to label the neo-Ikhwan as khawarij, whose death is permitted. In a communiqúe issued on December 30, 1979, the insurgents were accused of seven crimes: 1) violating the Haram and transforming it into a combat zone; 2) causing the deaths of dozens of Muslims; 3) fighting during Muharram, the month in which Muslims are prohibited from taking up arms; 4) rebelling against authorities to whom a bay'a (act of allegiance) had been made; 5) causing the interruption of prayers in the Haram for two weeks; 6) mobilizing simple men, women and children for criminal actions; 7) proclaiming as Mahdi a person who did not meet the required conditions.

The statement considers the insurgents criminals, but stops short of denying their Muslim faith: ghulat (extremists) or *bughat* (conspirators), but certainly not khawarij. Moreover, the ulema did not endorse Crown Prince Fahd's statement that the Mahdi concept was alien to Sunni Islam. The ulema certainly knew that Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab adhered to the concept. They contented themselves with a quiet discussion of the insufficient qualities of the self-proclaimed Mahdi and with the observation that Juhayman's pamphlets were tainted by many erroneous interpretations of the book.

IS A MORE SUBSERVIENT ulema corps possible? Is it in the authorities' interest to curb what is left of its influence? We would answer yes to the first question and no to the second. As long as there is a possibility of a religious challenge

to the authorities, the religious establishment remains, in spite of the traditionalist influence it exerts on the system, a precious asset. To a large extent, one could adopt Sadok Belaid's description of the Saudi case as one of "partnership" between the State and the religious institutions in contrast to the "split" that exists in the Maghreb and the "confrontation" in Egypt and Sudan.[31]

This "partnership," unbalanced as it may be, is strengthened by the fact that the royal family includes many religiously oriented princes, and comes from the same social and regional background as the ulema: the Najdi "noble" families. They also have a shared interest in law and order, as well as in the territorial integrity of the kingdom. Their conservatism could never induce them to think that an 'alim could survive without an amir to protect him.

Some observers go much further. A. Bligh suggests that "the religious elements in the Saudi population have disappeared," and that the "political power [of the ulema] has literally evaporated."[32] This vision is complemented by the analysis that a Saudi "new middle class" has grown sufficiently to form a "critical mass" and to destabilize a "traditional monarchy bent on maintaining the religious, cultural and political foundations."[33] This school is concerned primarily with "modernization," i.e., with a process that is, supposedly, replacing the sources of traditional opposition to the regime (tribal, religious, geographic) with the frustration of proto-bourgeois classes "created by the monarchy" and denied a political role.

A completely inverted analysis is provided by another school that insists on the Saudi monarchy as a "modernizing" one, injuring in the process the interests and sentiments of what Bligh terms "the religious elements." Al-Yassini, for example, argues that "a more immediate and serious threat to the stability of the regime is the fundamentalist faction. This faction includes state ulema and those fundamentalists who oppose both state ulema and al-Saud."[34] Along the same lines, another observer wonders "whether the ruling elite can protect its power base without promoting major political reforms which take into account the power base of the 'new Ikhwan.' "[35]

A third school tends to think that the traditional religious circles, and particularly the ulema, are not a challenge to the regime, but rather act as a sort of brake on its policies. This line is well illustrated by W.B. Quandt's conclusion that

> the ulama, at least in areas touching on security and foreign policy, have some role in setting limits on the regime's behavior, on influencing the style of public discourse, and on enforcing a strict Islamic interpretation of events in public. But the ulama as such are not a powerful force in influencing Saudi foreign policy, in determining strategies of development and oil production, or even in the direction of Saudi oil to Islamic countries.[36]

One is struck first by the wide distance separating these three conclusions.

This distance is, of course, to be related to the inherent difficulty of studying Saudi Arabia, a country not particularly hospitable to social scientists. But these different and somewhat contradictory conclusions also stem from the reluctance of many observers to place religion and politics in Saudi Arabia in their historical and cultural context. I have tried in this paper to show that there has always existed a considerable osmosis between these two domains, an osmosis that can still be verified today. This osmosis explains why it is difficult to find real, deep contradictions in the discourse on religion. Nuances are everywhere, but they are, to a large extent, just that: differences in emphasis on one aspect or another, on how faith is to be translated into facts, policies, institutions. I have noted these nuances where they occur, but it would be hazardous to conclude that major theological disputes are dividing the Saudi polity.

Religion is, then, more the language of politics than its substance. This substance, I have consistently argued, could be more accurately found in the tribal organization of Saudi society. What is the function of Wahhabism in such a polity? First, to make "an absolute demarcation between an expanding polity and all its surroundings."[37] Once this line has been drawn, Wahhabism becomes a legitimizing ideology that helps abrogate the old political (tribal) leaderships, to the benefit of one, unifying *ri'asa*; a tool to operate a gradual homogenization of the society, a new *iltiham* (coalescence) of the defeated tribes around one exclusive political center, largely and strongly held by the Sa'udi ruling family.

There is an inbuilt contradiction in this social and political process: "the fact that domination of the tributary type exercised by tribal polity based on the absolute monopoly of power by one particular clan requires the maintenance of tribal particularism and of the social stratification prevalent in the desert."[38] This contradiction provides the pivotal explanation for the relatively modest weight of the religious instance: how could it reconcile its systematic backing for one tribal clan, when its self-devised role is precisely to homogenize the society across tribal cleavages? Or as Aziz al-Azmeh has put it, "The ethos of Wahhabism, with its embeddedness in tribal society, militated against the very homogenization it prescribed and required for its total practical consummation."[39]

Everyone can refer to 'Abd al-Wahhab—both regime and opposition— because no one is really challenging the modest teachings of the founding father. But the ulema who sided with the triumphant prince against his challengers a century ago; those who lent support to 'Abd al-'Aziz against the Ikhwan in the twenties, and the Wahhabite divines who condemned the 1979 rebels to death, "are truer representatives of Wahhabism than the dead puritans."[40] They are indeed part of a polity that has named them its state ideologues. By defending it, they protect their functions, their positions, and "the Wahhabite-Saudi alliance that deprives social collectivities of a political constitution, but preserves them as social units."[41]

It is therefore hard to imagine that a rebellious line could stem from the very heart of this state ideology, transcend tribal and other traditional cleavages, and destroy the old alliance between the Sa'uds and their "house clerics." Whenever this dissident line has emerged, it has had to face a generally unified political and religious establishment as well as the hard facts of life. In the 1880s, those brandishing their "legitimacy" against the usurper had to face the reality of his military *fait accompli*. The Ikhwan, in the twenties, were also defeated, by their own failure to understand the depth of Western — primarily British — penetration of the region. Pushing this lack of realism to its extreme, Juhayman and his companions foolishly transformed a literally "fundamentalist," basically conservative state ideology into a revolutionary millenialist utopia. These three rebellious groups had to learn the limits of Wahhabism, indeed of most "fundamentalist" ideologies, as tools for real social and political change.

## NOTES

1. Ghassan Salamé, *Al-Siyasa al-kharijiyya al-sa 'udiyya mundhu 1945* (Beirut: Ma'had al-inma' al-'Arabi, 1980), and "L'Arabie Saoudite," *Pouvoirs* (Paris) 13 (1981), special issue on "Les régimes islamiques."

2. James P. Piscatori, "Ideological Politics in Saudi Arabia," in *Islam in the Political Process*, ed. James P. Piscatori (London: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 56.

3. Ronald R. McIntyre, "Saudi Arabia," in *The Politics of Islamic Reassertion*, ed. Mohammed Ayoob (London: Croom Helm, 1981), 9.

4. Ayman al-Yassini, *Religion and State in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985), xi.

5. William Ochsenwald, "Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Revival", *International Joural of Middle East Studies* 13, no. 3 (August 1981): 271–86.

6. The first ten days of the month of Muharram, when Shi'a around the world commemorate the murder of al-Husayn bin Ali as a symbol of their own ordeal. Historians agree with Aziz al-Azmeh's comment that "Shiite Muslims throughout the history of Wahhabism and until the establishment of Saudi Arabia have been a favored target of unremitting Wahhabi ferocity" ("Wahhabite Polity," in *Arabia in the Gulf: From Traditional Society to Modern States*, ed. I.R. Netton [London: Croom Helm, 1986].)

7. From a pamphlet distributed by the organization entitled *Kalimat al-Sha'b* (The word of the people) (n.d.). Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhab's writings are full of anti-Shi'i themes. A traditional Shi'i condemnation of Wahhabism can be found in Muhammad Jawad Mughniah, *Hadhihi hiya al-Wahhabiya* (This is Wahhabism) (Beirut: Al-Jawad, n.d.). For Iranian and Iranian-inspired views of the Saudi and other Gulf regimes, see magazines and journals published in Tehran such as *Al-Shahid* (The Martyr) and *Al-Amal al-Islami* (Islamic Action).

8. The idea that the kingdom was a mere *mulk* from the very beginning would be convincing only if its proponents could answer the basic question, Why the Sa'uds? Why not the much more influential Banu Khalid or more prestigious Sharifs of Mecca?

9. Quoted in G. Rentz, "Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia," in *The Arabian Peninsula*, ed. Derek Hopwood (London: Allen and Unwin, 1974).

10. Muhammad Rashid Rida, *Al-Wahhabiyyun wa-al-Hijaz* (Cairo, 1925) and *Al-Sunna wa-al-Shi'a wa-al-Wahhabiyya wa-al-Rafida* (Cairo, n.d.)

11. Muhammad Hamed al-Fiqi, *Athar al-Haraka al-Wahhabiyya fi al-Hayat al-Ijtima 'iyya wa-al-'Umraniyya* (Cairo, 1935).

12. Ibn Khaldun, *Al-Muqaddima* (Baghdad: Al-Muthanna, n.d.), 159.

13. 'Uthman Ibn Bishr, *'Unwan al-Hajd fi Tarikh Najd* (Beirut, n.d.), 15.

14. Christine Moss Helms, *The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia, Evolution of Political Identity* (London: Croom Helm, 1981), 102.

15. Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (780–855 A.D.) founded one of the four major Sunni schools. His ideas were adopted by the Wahhabis through Ibn Taymiyya, one of his disciples in Damascus.

16. Helms, *Cohesion*, 106.

17. M.J. Crawford, "Civil War, Foreign Intervention and the Question of Political Legitimacy: a Nineteenth-Century Sa'udi *Qadi's* Dilemma," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 14, no. 3 (August 1982): 244.

18. Helms, *Cohesion*, 113.

19. On the Ikhwan movement, see al-Yassini, *Religion and State*, Helms, *Cohesion*, and John Habib, *Ibn Saud's Warriors of Islam* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1978).

20. Amin al-Rihani, *Muluk al-'Arab* (Beirut, 1924), 87.

21. Quoted in Helms, *Cohesion*, 274.

22. The three quotations in ibid., ch. 8.

23. *Da'wat al-Ikhwan, Kayfa Bada'at wa ila 'ayna Tasir* (The Ikhwan movement: how it began, and where it is leading), 37 pages.

24. London: Taha, 1982.

25. Qaysariyya, in reference to the Byzantine emperor (al-Qaysar), and kisrawiyya in reference to Xerxes, the Persian ruler: in both cases, so-called Muslim regimes heavily influenced by non-Muslim and anti-Muslim models.

26. Juhayman al-'Utaybi, *Al-Imara wa-al-Bay'a wa-al-Ta'a* (n.d.), 11.

27. One 1985 issue devotes an article to demonstrating that associations for the protection of animals in Europe are "in fact racist organizations with no relation whatsoever to their public objective." This was occasioned by these organizations' protests against rituals followed by Muslims in Europe for the *Adha* holiday. For other examples see Ochsenwald, "Saudi Arabia," 280–84.

28. Michael Hudson, *Arab Politics, the Search for Legitimacy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 180.

29. *Orbis*, (1980/81), 11.

30. Piscatori, "Ideological Politics," 70.

31. Sadok Belaid, "The Role of the Religious Institutions in Support of the State," (unpublished paper).

32. A. Bligh, "The Saudi Religious Elite (Ulama) as Participants in the Political System of the Kingdom," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 17 (1985): 48–49.

33. M. Heller and N. Safran, *The New Middle Class and Regime Stability in Saudi Arabia*, Harvard Middle East Papers no. 3 (Cambridge: Harvard University Center for Middle Eastern Studies, 1985).

34. Al-Yassini, *Religion and State*, 136.

35. J.A. Kechichian, "Juhayman 'Utabi's 'Seven Letters' to the Saudi People" (Paper presented at the Convention of the Middle East Studies Association, Boston, Mass., 21 Nov. 1986, mimeographed).

36. W.B. Quandt, *Saudi Arabia in the 1980s: Foreign Policy, Security and Oil* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1981), 89.

37. Al-Azmeh, "Wahhabite Polity."

38. Ibid., 76.

39. Ibid., 81.

40. Ibid., 82.
41. Ibid., 85.