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STEPHEN SHULMAN

IN ALL NATION-STATES national identity has both a quantitative and a qualitative component. Quantitatively, one may speak of the strength of national identification. This refers to the degree to which people in a nation-state identify themselves as members of the national community and feel positively toward it. Qualitatively, one can analyse the reasons why people in a nation-state feel they form a community. In this sense the content of national identity refers to the traits that simultaneously unify people into a nation and distinguish them from other nations. On the basis of these traits, boundaries between the national in-group and out-groups are defined, thereby creating criteria for national membership.

Scholars of ethnic politics and nationalism have long identified two basic forms of this qualitative component of national identity—civic and ethnic. With civic nationalism, people in a nation-state think that what can, does or should unite and distinguish all or most members of the nation are such features as living on a common territory, belief in common political principles, possession of state citizenship, representation by a common set of political institutions and desire or consent to be part of the nation. With ethnic nationalism, the people think that what can, does or should unite and distinguish them are such features as common ancestry, culture, language, religion, traditions and race. All scholars recognise that national identities will be based on some combination of civic and ethnic elements, but they assert that the relative strength of the civic and ethnic components can vary from nation to nation. One widespread argument is that ethnic nationalism is dominant in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, while civic nationalism is dominant in Western Europe and the United States.

More than a decade after acquiring statehood, Ukraine is still struggling to define the qualitative content of its national identity. To what extent is the Ukrainian nation to be conceived in political and territorial terms? To what extent is the Ukrainian nation to be grounded in ethnicity and culture? These are central topics of debate in contemporary Ukraine. A related issue is obscured by the civic/ethnic dichotomy, which directs attention toward the contest between civic and ethnic identities, and away from the conflict over which type of civic or ethnic identity the nation should pursue. Indeed, in the Ukrainian case the question of which, or rather, whose, ethnicity and culture should be at the core of the Ukrainian nation is more salient than the one over the relative priority of civic and ethnic identity. This article proposes that two versions of ethnic

national identity are prominent today and compete for supremacy: an Ethnic Ukrainian national identity and an Eastern Slavic national identity.

The goal of this article is to discover the degree of support among the masses in Ukraine for a civic national identity and for these two variants of ethnic national identity. It argues that the two ethnic national identities are embedded in a broader set of beliefs and policy preferences, forming what are labeled here 'national identity complexes'. Using survey data, the article shows that civic national identity is stronger than ethnic national identity, and that on most measures the Eastern Slavic national identity complex is stronger than the Ethnic Ukrainian national identity complex.

The article is divided into three parts. First, it discusses the civic-West, ethnic-East stereotype, and arguments for and against strong civic nationalism in Ukraine. Next it describes the Ethnic Ukrainian and Eastern Slavic identities and the broad national identity complexes they form. Finally, it measures mass support for a civic national identity and the two ethnic national identity complexes.

Arguments on the civic/ethnic balance in Ukraine

The historian Hans Kohn popularised the civic/ethnic distinction in the study of nationalism.[1] Kohn argued that in the West, particularly England, France, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the United States, nationalism was primarily political. There ideas of the nation and nationalism arose within pre-existing state structures that encompassed populations with a relatively high degree of cultural homogeneity, or developed simultaneously with those structures. Western nationalism struggled against dynastic rule and equated citizenship with membership in the nation. Members of the nation were unified by their equal political status and their will as individuals to be part of the nation. Thus in the Western model the state temporally precedes (or coincides with) the development of the nation. In Central and Eastern Europe and Asia, on the other hand, nationalism arose in polities (e.g. the Russian, Austro – Hungarian and Ottoman empires) that coincided very poorly with cultural or ethnic boundaries. In these regions, Kohn argues, nationalism struggled 'to redraw the political boundaries in conformity with ethnographic demands'.[2] Thus in Kohn's Eastern model the nation precedes, and seeks to create, the state. Nations in the East consolidated around the common heritage of a people and the irrational idea of the *Volk*, instead of around the notion of citizenship, according to Kohn. Part of the stimulus for nationalism in the region was cultural contact with, and political threats from, the West. In reaction to French expansionism under Napoleon and Western ideology about the universality of its political institutions, Central and Eastern European nationalists stressed the virtue of their own heritage, and actively rejected the rationalism and liberalism of the West. In short, Kohn contrasted a highly rationalistic, voluntaristic and democratic Western nationalism to an irrational, deterministic and undemocratic Eastern nationalism.

Many scholars have continued to characterise Eastern European nationalism as heavily grounded on ethnicity and culture and weakly grounded on civic factors. For example, Beissinger argues that the practice of Soviet ethno-federalism has produced in the new states of the former USSR a legacy where 'the political nation remains an artificial category', and there is a 'widespread [ethnic] majority attitude that the state

is essentially an ethnic state'.[3] Brubaker also thinks that in the new states of post-communist Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union ethnocultural under-standings of the nation are dominant.[4] And Schöpflin writes that majority groups in this region tend to see the state as exclusively theirs.[5]

If the civic-West, ethnic-East argument is true, then two testable propositions flow from it. First, civic nationalism should be stronger in the West than it is in the East, while ethnic nationalism should be stronger in the East than it is in the West. Second, in the West civic nationalism should be stronger than ethnic nationalism, while in the East ethnic nationalism should be stronger than civic nationalism. This article seeks to evaluate the part of the second proposition dealing with the East by analysing public opinion survey data from the Ukrainian case.[6]

There has been little effort to theorise about the factors that determine the relative civic/ethnic balance in a nation-state. Similarly, scholars of Ukraine have done little to systematically sort out the competing pressures on civic and ethnic nationhood in that country. In an earlier study I analysed a wide range of factors that promote and impede mass conceptions of civic nationhood and two versions of ethnic nationhood (Ethnic Ukrainian and Eastern Slavic) in Ukraine.[7] As an analysis of ethnic nation-hood in Ukraine will be presented in the next section, here I briefly summarise my arguments on the pressures for and against civic nationalism.

On one hand, the development of the Ukrainian nation preceded the founding of the Ukrainian state, which is just over a decade old, a factor that should, according to Kohn, impede civic nationhood. In addition, the various regions of Ukraine have traveled quite different historical paths, and this regionalisation can be expected to weaken a sense of unity based on sharing a common territory. Furthermore, the economic crisis in independent Ukraine, for which the government is held responsible to a considerable degree, combined with rampant corruption and crime, should weaken civic notions of the nation by weakening trust in the political system.

On the other hand, the 70-year existence of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic gave Ukraine a quasi-state around which territorial and political conceptions of the nation could develop. Also, the official discourses of both the Kravchuk and Kuchma administrations has given priority to the building of an inclusive, civic nation rather than one based on ethnicity and culture. Likewise, these administrations have enacted policies that give citizens of all ethnic backgrounds equal political and economic rights. And even ethnic Ukrainian nationalist discourse usually stresses an inclusive conception of nationhood and one that treats ethnic Ukrainians and Russians equally in the political and economic spheres.

In short, there are factors in Ukraine that both promote and hinder the building of a strong civic nation at the mass level, and thus empirical evidence must be brought to bear to determine what the actual strength of such nationhood is relative to ethnically-based conceptions.

Dueling ethnic national identities

Another important issue in the construction of national identity, but one usually neglected by theorists of nationalism, relates to which markers of ethnic national identity are considered important in a nation-state. In most Arab states debate has

centred on whether an Arabic or Muslim identity should be dominant. The United States has witnessed a shift from white race and Christianity to the English language as the primary ethnic marker of national identity. In Guatemala Mayan and Ladino cultures compete with one another in the conceptualisation of national identity.

In Ukraine the question of ethnic national identity is a particularly contentious one. The debate is broad-ranging in that it spans several issues dealing with the conceptualisation and construction of ethnic national identity. This section outlines two competing 'national identity complexes' in Ukraine that capture the range of the debate: Ethnic Ukrainian and Eastern Slavic. These complexes differ in their assessment of the unifying and distinguishing features of Ukrainian national identity, the compatibility of Ukrainian and Russian identities, and the appropriate domestic and foreign policies for the development of Ukrainian national identity.

Unifying features

As stated earlier, one facet of all national identities relates to what features do or should unite most of the members of the nation. The Ethnic Ukrainian national identity is based on the notion that Ukrainian ethnicity and/or ethnic Ukrainian culture and language should be the dominant integrating forces in the Ukrainian nation-state. Elites who propose this view contend that ethnic Ukrainians, as the numerically dominant and titular group, should hold a special status in Ukraine.[8] One set of authors points to three core beliefs—indigenousness, colonialism and Russification— that together 'form a classic nationalist argument for the privileged rights of the titular people'.[9] First, Ethnic Ukrainian nationalists stress that Ukrainians are the primary indigenous people (*korinnyi narod*) in Ukraine. Russians and other minorities (with the exception of the Tatars and Karaim in Crimea) do not have deep historical roots in Ukraine as do Ukrainians, whose sole homeland is the Ukrainian state. Second, these nationalists characterise the historical Ukrainian–Russian relationship as one of colonised and coloniser, to the detriment of ethnic Ukrainians, their culture and language. As a consequence, the presence of Russians in Ukraine is delegitimised by presenting it as the result of imperial Russian policy and not voluntary migration. As well, the exploitative colonial experience is said to justify the use of special corrective measures by the state to revive ethnic Ukrainian culture and language. Third, and related, Ethnic Ukrainian nationalists argue that Russification has resulted in an unnatural division in Ukraine, especially among ethnic Ukrainians, between Ukrainophones and Russophones. The spread of the Russian language was accomplished by force (by Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union), not by free choice. Consequently, 'Russian-speaking culture is not regarded by Ukrainophone nationalists as having a legitimate historical foundation in Ukraine'.[10] These elite views promote an identity for Ukraine giving ethnic Ukrainians, their culture and language a privileged place as the core around which the Ukrainian nation-state should be built.

In addition to the numerical predominance of ethnic Ukrainians in Ukraine and the elite discourse just described, another factor promoting the perspective of the Ethnic Ukrainian national identity regarding the key unifying features in Ukraine is the legacy of the Soviet codification of Ukraine as the homeland of ethnic Ukrainians. As

a result of Soviet ethno-federalism, current citizens may see independent Ukraine as a country where ethnic Ukrainians and their culture occupy an elevated status.

The main competitor to the Ethnic Ukrainian national identity is an Eastern Slavic one. This ethnic identity envisages the Ukrainian nation as founded on two primary ethnic groups, languages and cultures—Ukrainian and Russian—that are unified by their being embedded in a common historical and cultural space. Eastern Slavic nationalists make several arguments in support of this national vision. First, ethnic Russians and their language and culture are seen as fully native to Ukrainian society. Russians are argued to have been part of Ukraine for centuries, and thus they are no ordinary minority, and certainly not a diaspora. The pervasiveness of Russian culture and language in Ukraine is also seen as an important dimension of its 'rootedness'. A second key element of Eastern Slavic discourse flows from the first: Ukraine is conceptualised as a fundamentally bi-ethnic, bi-lingual and bi-cultural nation. The Eastern Slavic identity presents both Ukrainians and Russians and their cultures as forming the axis or core on which is built the Ukrainian nation-state, rejecting what advocates view as the monoethnic conception promoted by Ethnic Ukrainian national-ists. Finally, Eastern Slavic nationalists contend not just that two primary ethnic groups and cultures inhabit Ukraine but that they form a coherent cultural whole. This is because Ukrainian and Russian cultures and history are allegedly so similar. Eastern Slavic nationalists strongly support imperial Russian and Soviet historiogra-phy's interpretation of the common historical and cultural paths followed by the Russian, Ukrainian and Belorussian peoples. These nationalists frequently refer to 'brotherly relations' or 'Slavic unity' between Russians and Ukrainians within Ukraine, on one hand, and between Ukraine and Russia, on the other.

In short, the Eastern Slavic nationalist elites see Ukraine as united by two organically related and equally native ethnic groups that are historically and culturally very close. Moreover, the strong presence of Russian culture and language is portrayed as something to be valued, celebrated and preserved—in contrast to the views of most Ethnic Ukrainian nationalists. The fact that the great majority of citizens of Ukraine are Eastern Slavic and, to a lesser extent, Orthodox, assists the promotion of this identity.

Distinguishing features

National identity is based on an assessment not only of what features most members of a nation-state have in common but also of the features that distinguish them from other nations. Elites in Ukraine differ greatly on how the people of Ukraine compare culturally with other nations. First, they disagree about who is the primary 'Other' against which Ukrainian national identity is defined. But no less important, they disagree on who is the primary 'Our'—the people or peoples that are portrayed as culturally *similar* to the people of Ukraine and who thus also shape Ukrainian identity. Scholars of nationalism need to give greater attention to how the construction of national identities is not just a matter of exclusion and contrast but of cultural inclusion and comparison as well.

In the Ukrainian case the main candidates for the primary 'Other' and 'Our' are Europe and Russia. Ethnic Ukrainian nationalists among the elite argue that there are

large cultural differences between Ukrainians and Russians, and thus Russia serves as the primary 'Other'. In particular, these nationalists generally allege that Ukrainians tend to be more individualistic, freedom-loving, democratic and tolerant than Russians. They also contend that Ukrainian culture is part and parcel of European culture—the Ukrainian 'Our'. These nationalists underline how for many centuries, beginning with the ancient Kievan Rus' state, much of Ukrainian land had either maintained close economic, political and dynastic ties with Europe or been incorporated into Central European states, such as Poland and Austria–Hungary. As a result, the ideas of Western humanism, the Renaissance, Reformation and Counter-Reformation all allegedly permeated into the Ukrainian world-view. In contrast, Russia, which is alleged to have traveled a substantially different historical trajectory from Ukraine, is relegated to the Eurasian cultural sphere. Imperial Russian and then Soviet domination thereby served to distort, but not eliminate, the essentially Western and European nature of Ukrainian culture.[11]

For elite Eastern Slavic nationalists in Ukraine this pattern of 'Other' and 'Our' is reversed. As mentioned above, these nationalists adhere to the imperial Russian and then Soviet interpretation of Russian, Ukrainian and Belarussian history that stresses the very similar historical and cultural development of these three Eastern Slavic peoples, who developed from the 'common cradle' of Kievan Rus'. The exception to the common cultural space inhabited by these three peoples is seen to be the westernmost provinces of Ukraine, particularly Galicia. The culture of Europe, and the West more broadly, is contrasted with this Eastern Slavic culture as more materialistic, individualistic and impersonal, and less spiritual.

Compatibility of multiple ethnic/national identities

Another important issue in the construction of national identity hinges on the perceived degree of compatibility of different ethnic identities encompassed by the national identity, and the compatibility of the national identity with other national, cultural or ethnic identities. For example, much of the debate in Western countries over the creation of multicultural national identities flows from disagreement over whether one can have a strong, say, Muslim identity and a strong French identity simultaneously. In Romania people differ on whether the Hungarian minority can have strong feelings of attachment both to Hungary and to Romania. In Ukraine elites have debated since the late-nineteenth century whether ethnic and national Ukrainian and Russian identities and loyalties are compatible or competitive, multiple or mutually exclusive.

The Ethnic Ukrainian nationalist position is that there is an inherent tension in these two identities and loyalties.[12] In part this results from the perception of the large differences in philosophy and world-view between Ukrainian and Russian culture. And in part it is a consequence of the view that Russia has done its best to deny and suppress a separate Ukrainian identity and culture, to say nothing of Ukrainian political independence. Thus these nationalists believe that the adoption of Russian language, culture, identity and loyalties by ethnic Ukrainians comes at the expense of their 'Ukrainianness'. For this reason, Ethnic Ukrainian nationalists often brand Russified Ukrainians as unauthentic Ukrainians, or 'Little Russians'.

The Eastern Slavic nationalist view is that there are no trade-offs in the acquisition of Ukrainian and Russian identities. This compatibility flows from the perceived similarity in language, religion and world-view, and the close and harmonious historical relations between Ukraine and Russia. Additionally, these nationalists stress the deep roots ethnic Russians and Russian culture and language have in Ukraine, as a result of which Russianness in Ukraine is pervasive, natural and legitimate. In this environment the admixture of Ukrainian and Russian identities, cultures and loyalties in an individual psyche is easy and normal, according to this perspective.

Policy preferences

Finally, among elites, policy preferences in both the domestic and foreign sphere are intimately associated with support for one or the other version of ethnic national identity—Ethnic Ukrainian or Eastern Slavic. This is because policies are critical components of the national identity construction process.

Domestically, an Ethnic Ukrainian national identity requires that the state assign a special position to Ukrainians and their language and culture. This entails some degree of preference being given to Ukrainian language, history and culture by the government. Such preferences perform a symbolic role in elevating ethnic Ukrainians to a special place in the Ukrainian nation, but they also substantively increase the knowledge or use of Ukrainian culture and language by the population of the state, in particular Russophone Ukrainians and ethnic Russians. In the sphere of foreign policy Ethnic Ukrainian national identity requires an orientation placing priority on integration with Europe and the United States, as opposed to with Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States. Again, the reasons are both symbolic and substantive. Given that the Ethnic Ukrainian national identity posits that Ukrainian culture is closely related to European culture, the symbolic erosion of the boundary between Ukraine and Europe reinforces the European nature of Ukraine. Likewise, by symbolically reinforcing the boundary with Russia and the CIS by breaking ties, the alleged strong cultural distinction between Russia and Ukraine is strengthened. Substantively, a Western orientation accelerates the diffusion of Western culture into Ukraine—revitalising ethnic Ukrainian culture—and impedes the diffusion of Russian culture.[13]

Elites supporting an Eastern Slavic conception of national identity generally call for a domestic policy that grants equal support to both Ukrainian and Russian language and culture. Such a policy would symbolically reinforce the dual ethnic, linguistic and cultural core supported by the Eastern Slavic identity. Additionally, it would in fact maintain the strong position of Russian language and culture in Ukraine, and thus the bi-polar cultural and linguistic landscape. The Eastern Slavic national identity also calls for a foreign orientation that places priority on ties with Russia and the CIS, rather than with Europe and the United States. Symbolically, such an orientation underlines the alleged common history and culture of Ukraine and Russia. An Eastern orientation would also promote processes of cultural diffusion from Russia that can maintain the strong position of Russian language and culture in Ukraine.

Table 1 summarises the two ethnic national identity complexes just described. The elite debate in Ukraine nicely conforms to the positions described in the complexes.

TABLE 1
ALTERNATIVE ETHNIC NATIONAL IDENTITY COMPLEXES IN UKRAINE

Component	Ethnic Ukrainian national identity	Eastern Slavic national identity
Basic unifying features	Ethnic Ukrainians Ethnic Ukrainian culture, language	Eastern Slavs Eastern Slavic culture, heritage
Basic distinguishing features		
Ukrainian and Russian history	Basically dissimilar	Basically similar
Ukrainian and Russian culture	Basically dissimilar	Basically similar
Ukrainian and European culture	Basically similar	Basically dissimilar
Compatibility of multiple ethnic/national identities		
Ukrainian and Russian identities/loyalties	Competitive	Complementary
Domestic policy	Preference to Ukrainian language, culture, history, symbols	Equal treatment of Ukrainian and Russian language, culture, history, symbols
Foreign policy	Western orientation	Eastern orientation

In particular, among elites, those who on one component support the Ethnic Ukrainian national identity viewpoint tend to support this identity's viewpoint on other components as well. And the same applies to supporters of the Eastern Slavic identity. Thus the five components of each complex tend to cohere as a syndrome. The task now becomes one of determining the relative popularity of the two complexes among the masses.

Measuring strength and patterns of civic and ethnic national identification in Ukraine

To investigate the contours of national identity in Ukraine, a nationally representative survey carried out by the Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Studies in May–June 2001 will be analysed. The survey consisted of 1,500 face to face interviews of respondents in ten *oblasti* (provinces) of Ukraine plus the Republic of Crimea and city of Kyiv.[14]

Two questions in the survey sought to uncover how respondents conceptualise the unifying features of the Ukrainian nation. Both of these questions permit an assessment of the relative strength of civic versus ethno-cultural national identification in Ukraine. One question asked: 'In your opinion, which one of the four factors on this card most unites or could unite the people of Ukraine into a single community? Please choose only one answer.

(1) Knowledge and understanding of Ukrainian culture and language.
(2) Common Eastern Slavic cultural and historical heritage.
(3) Common political principles and ideas.
(4) Coexistence and equal rights in the framework of one state (Ukraine)'.

This question thus stakes two civic-based conceptions of Ukrainian national identity

TABLE 2

FACTORS THAT UNITE OR COULD UNITE THE PEOPLE OF UKRAINE INTO A SINGLE COMMUNITY (%)

	N	Ukrainian language and culture	Common Slavic heritage	Common political principles	Coexistence and equal rights in one state
All	1,358	15	15	14	57
Ethnicity					
Ukrainian	1,093	19	13	14	55
Ukrainian-Russian	124	2	20	17	61
Russian	236	3	23	13	62
Home language					
Ukrainian	637	25	12	13	50
Ukrainian-Russian	315	10	14	14	63
Russian	548	7	20	15	60
Region					
West	283	22	9	14	56
Centre	367	23	19	15	43
South-East	688	9	15	14	62
Kyiv	83	12	25	17	46
Crimea	79	4	14	7	76
Age					
18–29	338	15	13	15	58
30–50	596	14	16	12	58
>50	565	14	16	15	54

(answers 3 and 4) against two ethno-cultural-based conceptions (1 and 2). As can be seen at the top of Table 2, by far the most popular answer was 'coexistence and equal rights in the framework of one state', chosen by 57% of respondents. Together with the other civic option, 'common political principles and ideas', 71% of respondents place priority on civic national identity, compared with 29% on ethno-cultural identity. This suggests that the arguments of scholars like Beissinger, Schöpflin and Brubaker, asserting the dominance of ethno-cultural over civic identification in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, are incorrect in the Ukrainian context. The support expressed for the Eastern Slavic and Ethnic Ukrainian variants is about the same at 15% each. Unfortunately, one cannot draw the inference that the *absolute* level of support for these two ethno-cultural identities is equal, since the question does not pit these two options head to head. That is, this question can only show support for the Eastern Slavic versus Ethnic Ukrainian conception of national identity once those who prefer one of the civic conceptions are removed from consideration.

Table 2 also breaks down the results for the question by ethnicity, language, region and age.[15] What is most striking about the data here is the predominance of the civic national identity options over the ethno-cultural options for all of the sub-groups in the table. Despite the importance of ethnic, linguistic, regional and generational cleavages for virtually every other major political issue in Ukraine, the priority of civic over ethnic conceptions of national identity shows little variation. This demonstrates a robust refutation of the arguments of scholars asserting the dominance of ethnic nationalism in Ukraine. On the other hand, there is substantial disagreement over the relative support for the Ethnic Ukrainian and Eastern Slavic national identity according to ethnicity, language and region (but not age). Generally, those who are

TABLE 3

TRAITS THAT CONSTITUTE MEMBERSHIP IN UKRAINIAN SOCIETY (ON 5-POINT SCALE FROM COMPLETELY UNIMPORTANT TO VERY IMPORTANT)

Content of national identity	N	Average	% giving 1 or 2	% giving 4 or 5
Respect laws/political institutions	1,471	4.6	3	91
Be a citizen	1,481	4.4	8	83
Consider Ukraine homeland	1,483	4.3	10	81
Be able to speak Ukrainian	1,486	3.5	27	55
Use Ukrainian as main language	1,484	3.1	35	44
Be an ethnic Ukrainian	1,480	2.8	47	35
Be born in Ukraine	1,478	2.7	50	33
Be Orthodox	1,452	2.5	53	28
Be able to speak Russian	1,480	2.5	55	25

ethnic Russian, Russian-speaking and live in the South-East, Kyiv or Crimea give greater support to the Eastern Slavic national identity over the Ethnic Ukrainian one (again with the important caveat that this holds true only after removing from view those who prefer a civic conception of identity).

A second question that allows one to tap into mass orientations in the debate over civic versus ethnic national identity focuses on the criteria that determine who is a member of the Ukrainian nation and who is not. By ascertaining the characteristics that determine the boundaries of membership in the Ukrainian nation, we uncover the qualities that people in Ukraine deem most important in unifying these members. The survey question read:

> Please tell me which of the following qualities are most important for considering a person to be a real member of Ukrainian society. Use the scale where '1' means that these qualities are not important and '5' means that they are very important.

Completely   Very
Unimportant   Important
     1————————2————————3————————4————————5

(a) Be born in Ukraine
(b) Consider Ukraine one's homeland
(c) Be able to speak Ukrainian
(d) Use Ukrainian as one's basic language of communication
(e) Be able to speak Russian
(f) Be Orthodox
(g) Respect the laws and political institutions of Ukraine
(h) Be Ukrainian by nationality [ethnicity]
(i) Be a citizen of Ukraine

The five questions regarding language, nationality and religion are designed to measure the strength of ethno-cultural nationalism, while the four questions on citizenship, respect for laws and political institutions, place of birth and choice of homeland tap into civic-territorial dimensions of nationalism. Table 3 ranks these factors according to the average score each one achieved on the five-point scale. The top three factors are all civic-territorial ones—'respect laws and political institutions

of Ukraine' (average = 4.6), 'be a citizen of Ukraine' (4.4) and 'consider Ukraine one's homeland' (4.3). Further, they beat by a considerable margin the remaining factors, the strongest of which has an average score of just 3.5. Only one civic-territorial factor, 'be born in Ukraine', is given relatively weak support as a basis of national identity—seventh place out of nine. Overall, the data here again support the predominance of civic national identification over ethnic national identification in Ukraine.

The results also permit a partial assessment of the relative balance of the Ethnic Ukrainian and Eastern Slavic ethnic national identities. For the most part, these identities are mutually exclusive. Either ethnic Ukrainians and Ukrainian language are given priority as a basis for national identity or they are given equal importance alongside ethnic Russians and/or Russian language. If a majority of respondents judges Ukrainian ethnicity or language important for one to be a real member of the nation, then this would constitute evidence of the greater popularity of the Ethnic Ukrainian identity relative to Eastern Slavic. However, if a majority says these factors are unimportant, we cannot deduce that the Eastern Slavic identity is stronger. Only a question asking about the importance for membership in the Ukrainian nation of knowing or speaking *either* Ukrainian or Russian, or being *either* Ukrainian or Russian, could assess the strength of this identity directly, and such a question was absent from the survey.

The data show that a minority of respondents thinks that being an ethnic Ukrainian is important—the average score is 2.8 (less than the midway point of 3.0). However, the questions on use of Ukrainian as a main language and ability to speak Ukrainian have average scores of 3.1 and 3.5 respectively, indicating that overall the factors are considered important rather than unimportant for national identity. Thus the appropriate inference is that for two of the three measures related to Ukrainian ethnicity and language the Ethnic Ukrainian identity is stronger than the Eastern Slavic identity.

Additional evidence of the greater strength of Ethnic Ukrainian identity using these membership questions comes from a comparison of views on the importance of the ability to speak Ukrainian and ability to speak Russian. If the Eastern Slavic identity were stronger, the importance of these two items should be approximately equal, and the scores for each item would have to be above 3.0. If the Ethnic Ukrainian identity were stronger, then more importance would be placed on ability to speak Ukrainian than Russian, as long as the score for knowledge of Ukrainian is above 3.0. Since the score for ability to speak Ukrainian (3.5) is higher than that for ability to speak Russian (2.5) and above 3.0, these data suggest the greater strength of the Ethnic Ukrainian national identity.

If a majority of respondents finds that Orthodoxy is important, this would constitute evidence in favour of the Eastern Slavic identity over the Ethnic Ukrainian one, especially since many ethnic Ukrainians are not Orthodox. But the average score of 2.5 indicates that most respondents deem it unimportant for national membership. Again this does not constitute evidence of greater strength of the Ethnic Ukrainian identity, however.

Table 4 gives respondents' views on the importance of four of the ethno-cultural factors when broken down by ethnicity, language, region and age. Large differences appear this time between the groups. Some of the most interesting findings here include the fact that ethnic Ukrainians, Ukrainian-speakers, Westerners and those

TABLE 4

ETHNO-CULTURAL TRAITS THAT CONSTITUTE MEMBERSHIP IN THE UKRAINIAN NATION, BY DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS (AVERAGES ON 5-POINT SCALE FROM COMPLETELY UNIMPORTANT TO VERY IMPORTANT)

	$N*$	Be an ethnic Ukrainian	Use Ukrainian as main language	Be able to speak Ukrainian	Be able to speak Russian
Ethnicity					
Ukrainian	1,078	3.1	3.5	3.7	2.4
Ukrainian-Russian	121	2.2	2.1	2.6	2.5
Russian	233	1.9	2.2	2.7	2.7
Home language					
Ukrainian	628	3.5	4.0	4.2	2.3
Ukrainian-Russian	310	2.6	3.0	3.4	2.5
Russian	532	2.1	2.1	2.6	2.6
Region					
West	280	3.6	4.3	4.4	2.0
Centre	359	3.2	3.5	3.7	2.4
South-East	680	2.4	2.5	3.0	2.7
Kyiv	81	2.7	3.2	3.9	2.5
Crimea	75	1.7	1.9	2.4	2.5
Age					
18–29	334	2.7	3.0	3.4	2.4
30–50	591	2.6	3.0	3.3	2.4
> 50	555	3.0	3.3	3.7	2.7

*Since sample size for each sub-group varies slightly for each of the four questions, the figures are for the question with the smallest sample size.

living in the Centre overall think that being an ethnic Ukrainian is important for being a real member of Ukrainian society. Also, ethnic Russians, ethnic Ukrainian-Russians, Russian-speakers and Crimeans consider being able to speak Russian approximately as important for membership in the Ukrainian nation as being able to speak Ukrainian. But since all of the averages here are below 3.0, we cannot interpret this as evidence of the dominance of the Eastern Slavic national identity—which would stipulate that partaking in either Ukrainian or Russian culture is important for being a member of the nation. Also of note is the fact that some ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers think that being ethnic Ukrainian or using Ukrainian as one's main language are important for being a real member of the nation. While their averages are low (ranging between 1.9 and 2.2), they are not 1.0.

To measure the extent to which mass views on the distinguishing features of the Ukrainian nation support the Ethnic Ukrainian or Eastern Slavic national identity, one survey question asked respondents:

People disagree about the degree of similarity or difference between the history of Ukraine and the history of Russia. Indicate on the given scale to what degree you think the historical experience of Ukraine and Russia is similar or different. '0' means that Ukraine and Russia developed along very different historical paths and '10' means that Ukraine and Russia developed along very similar historical paths.

Ukraine and Russia developed along **very different** historical paths
     0   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10
Ukraine and Russia developed along **very similar** historical paths

TABLE 5
HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL COMPARISONS (ON SCALE FROM 0 TO 10, WITH 0 = VERY DIFFERENT, 10 = VERY SIMILAR)

	N*	Similarity of Ukrainian and Russian historical paths	Similarity in Ukrainian and Russian culture	Similarity in Ukrainian and European culture
All	1,362	7.4	7.5	2.0
Ethnicity				
Ukrainian	999	7.2	7.2	2.1
Ukrainian-Russian	111	8.1	8.2	1.4
Russian	213	8.2	8.0	2.3
Home language				
Ukrainian	577	6.6	6.7	2.1
Ukrainian-Russian	292	8.0	8.0	2.1
Russian	485	8.0	8.1	1.9
Region				
West	259	5.9	5.5	2.2
Centre	341	7.1	7.4	2.3
South-East	613	8.1	8.2	1.8
Kyiv	76	7.0	7.7	2.3
Crimea	74	8.1	7.8	1.6
Age				
18–29	315	7.1	7.0	1.9
30–50	551	7.3	7.5	2.1
> 50	497	7.6	7.7	2.1

*Since sample size for each sub-group varies slightly for each of the three questions, the figures are for the question with the smallest sample size.

Another question sought to ascertain the degree of cultural distance people in Ukraine see between Ukrainians and Russians, on one hand, and Ukrainians and Europeans on the other. The survey asked:

> People disagree about the degree of similarity in culture, traditions and views between various groups. Please tell me how similar or different in culture, traditions and views you think the following groups are. Use a scale where '0' means you think that these groups are very different and '10' means that these groups are very similar.
>
> Ukrainians in Ukraine and Russians in Russia
>
> Ukrainians in Ukraine and Europeans in France, Germany and Great Britain.

Very different in culture,   Very similar in culture,
traditions and views   0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 traditions and views

Table 5 presents the results for the survey sample as a whole, and when broken down by ethnicity, language, region and age. Overall, the respondents see great historical commonalities between Russia and Ukraine, and great cultural commonalities between Russians and Ukrainians. The average score on the 0–10 scale for the historical comparison is 7.4, while that for the cultural comparison is 7.5. These results are evidence of the greater strength of the Eastern Slavic national identity relative to the

Ethnic Ukrainian national identity. Further, the respondents overall tend to see a relatively small degree of cultural similarity between Ukrainians and Europeans as represented by French, Germans and Britons, assigning an average score of just 2.0 on the dissimilarity–similarity scale. Again, this demonstrates the greater popularity of the Eastern Slavic national identity.

The data for the demographic sub-groups present a picture of a surprisingly high level of agreement on the issue of historical and cultural comparisons. All of the sub-groups deem Ukrainian and Russian culture and history basically similar, as all of the average scores exceed 5.0. With the exception of West Ukrainians, all of the sub-groups give a score ranging between 6.6 and 8.2 for these two questions. The largest differences are those between respondents in Western Ukraine, on one hand, and the South-East and Crimea on the other. But even here the differences are modest, with a maximum separation of 2.2 points on the historical comparison (West versus Crimea) and 2.7 points on the cultural comparison (West versus South-East). Given the 11-point scale, these are relatively minor disparities. In addition, the differences between sub-group attitudes on Ukrainian–European cultural distance are even smaller, with scores ranging from 1.4 to 2.3. Thus the greater strength of the Eastern Slavic identity on the issue of distinguishing traits applies across the demographic board.

The survey instrument also included two measures of the perceived complementarity versus competitiveness of Ukrainian and Russian identities. One question posed the statement: 'It is easy for a person to consider himself to be Russian and Ukrainian at the same time'. Respondents indicated their opinion of the statement on a scale with answers 'fully agree', 'more agree than disagree', 'more disagree than agree' and 'fully disagree'. This question directly assesses whether the respondent believes Ukrainian and Russian identities are complementary or competitive. Another question stated: 'If people in Ukraine feel close to Russia, then their devotion to Ukraine will weaken'. Again, the respondents could agree or disagree with the statement. This question indirectly measures the compatibility of identities by ascertaining perceived trade-offs between devotion or loyalty to the country of Russia and the country of Ukraine.

Table 6A gives the results for these two questions. Note that those who agree in some form with the first question evince a belief in the basic complementarity of Ukrainian and Russian identities, while those who agree in some form with the second question show a belief in the basic competitiveness of these identities. To simplify the interpretation of the data, Table 6B combines the 'fully agree' and 'more agree than disagree' answers, and the 'fully disagree' and 'more disagree than agree' answers, to calculate the percentage of the sample as a whole and the various demographic sub-groups who think Ukrainian and Russian identities (question 1) and loyalties (question 2) are basically complementary or competitive.

The top line of Table 6B shows that nearly two-thirds of respondents think that it is easy for a person to consider himself both Russian and Ukrainian simultaneously, and that three-quarters do not think that if people feel close to Russia their devotion to Ukraine will weaken. Thus both measures of the perceived complementarity versus competitiveness of Ukrainian and Russian identities demonstrate the greater strength of the Eastern Slavic national identity on this issue. Large differences are evident

TABLE 6A
COMPLEMENTARITY VERSUS COMPETITIVENESS OF UKRAINIAN AND RUSSIAN IDENTITIES AND LOYALTIES (%)

	Fully agree	More agree than disagree	More disagree than agree	Fully disagree
It is easy for a person to consider himself to be Russian and Ukrainian at the same time N = 1,275	39	24	20	17
If people in Ukraine feel close to Russia, then their devotion to Ukraine will weaken N = 1,258	9	17	30	44

TABLE 6B
COMPLEMENTARITY VERSUS COMPETITIVENESS OF UKRAINIAN AND RUSSIAN IDENTITIES AND LOYALTIES (%)

	N*	Ukrainian–Russian identities complementary	Ukrainian–Russian identities competitive	Ukrainian–Russian loyalties complementary	Ukrainian–Russian loyalties competitive
All	1,258	63	37	75	25
Ethnicity					
Ukrainian	879	55	45	69	32
Ukrainian–Russian	114	93	7	94	6
Russian	227	80	20	89	11
Home language					
Ukrainian	469	38	62	56	44
Ukrainian–Russian	279	76	24	86	14
Russian	499	81	19	86	14
Region					
West	201	34	66	48	52
Centre	284	51	49	62	38
South-East	607	77	23	89	12
Kyiv	72	61	39	64	36
Crimea	74	80	20	85	15
Age					
18–29	286	58	42	70	30
30–50	521	64	36	75	25
> 50	451	65	35	76	24

* Since sample size for each sub-group varies slightly for the two questions, the figures are for the question with the smallest sample size.

among different ethnic, linguistic and regional groups on both measures. While 56% of Ukrainian-speakers think Ukrainian and Russian loyalties are compatible, 86% of Russian-speakers do. Another huge difference on this question appears between those living in the West, where 48% perceive compatibility, compared with 89% in the South-East. Similarly, just 55% of ethnic Ukrainians think the identities are compatible, compared with 93% of Ukrainian-Russians. A whopping 43 percentage points separate both Ukrainian-speakers (38%) from Russian-speakers (81%) and Westerners (34%) from South-Easterners (77%) on this question. The only sub-groups that perceive greater competitiveness than complementarity (and whose views therefore support the Ethnic Ukrainian national identity) are Westerners (on both measures) and Ukrainian-speakers (on the first).

Another issue separating the Eastern Slavic from Ethnic Ukrainian national identity relates to domestic policies. As discussed above, the Ethnic Ukrainian identity entails some measure of preferential support for the language, culture, history, etc. of ethnic Ukrainians, while the Eastern Slavic identity calls for equal treatment. One survey question asked respondents their views on the controversial issue of language policy in Ukraine:

> Recently there has been debate over the status of the Russian language in Ukraine. What do you think should be the status of the Russian language in Ukraine:
>
> (1) Russian should not be an official language at any level.
> (2) Russian should be an official language only in those regions where most of the local population speaks Russian.
> (3) Russian should be a state language of Ukraine alongside Ukrainian.
> (4) Russian should be the only state language of Ukraine?

Another question taps into whether the respondent thinks that the state's education policy should favour the teaching of one ethnic group's history over another's:

> The two largest nationalities in Ukraine are Ukrainians and Russians. To what degree do you think schools in Ukraine should devote attention to teaching the history of each of these groups? Please use the given scale, where '1' means that schools should devote more attention to the history of Ukrainians, '5' means that schools should devote more attention to the history of Russians, and '3' means that the history of both groups should be given equal attention.

1	2	3	4	5
Schools should devote more attention to the history of Ukrainians		Schools should devote equal attention to the history of Ukrainians and Russians		Schools should devote more attention to the history of Russians

Table 7 presents the results of the survey for these questions. For the question on language, very few respondents (10) believe that Russian should be given the status of sole official language, so this response is excluded from the table. Likewise, very few respondents (12) gave answers 4 or 5 for the question on history teaching, and these also were excluded. Thus each question has three main responses, and before

TABLE 7
LANGUAGE AND EDUCATIONAL POLICY PREFERENCES (%)

	N*	Russian official at no level	Russian official in region	Russian co-state language	1 Stress history of Ukrainians	2	3 Equal stress
All	1465	33	25	42	22	10	68
Ethnicity							
Ukrainian	1065	42	26	31	27	12	61
Ukrainian–Russian	119	4	22	74	3	6	89
Russian	234	8	22	68	6	5	87
Home language							
Ukrainian	621	58	25	18	38	14	48
Ukrainian–Russian	302	19	26	54	14	7	79
Russian	531	11	24	63	8	6	85
Region							
West	283	62	31	7	48	16	36
Centre	354	48	21	31	28	11	61
South-East	677	16	23	61	10	7	83
Kyiv	82	39	34	27	18	11	71
Crimea	76	5	27	60	7	5	77
Age							
18–29	328	32	29	39	23	10	66
30–50	582	33	24	42	22	11	67
>50	555	33	23	43	20	9	70

*Since sample size for each sub-group varies slightly for both questions, the figures are for the question with the smallest sample size.

proceeding, it is necessary to interpret how these responses relate to the two ethnic national identities under analysis. For the language question, responses 1 and 2 are consistent with the Ethnic Ukrainian identity, as they leave Ukrainian as the sole state language, and thus in a privileged position vis-à-vis Russian. Response 3 (Russian as a state language of Ukraine alongside Ukrainian) supports the Eastern Slavic identity, which calls for equal state sponsorship. For the history question, responses 1 and 2 again follow from the Ethnic Ukrainian identity, while response 3 (Schools should devote equal attention to the history of Ukrainians and Russians) is consistent with the Eastern Slavic identity.

For the sample as a whole, 42% believe that Russian should share state-language status with Ukrainian, while 58% think that it should be in an inferior position (either official nowhere or just in regions where Russian-speakers predominate). Thus the Ethnic Ukrainian identity is stronger on this particular issue. However, 68% of the sample thinks that equal attention should be given to the teaching of the history of Ukrainians and Russians, compared with 32% who to some degree favour the teaching of the history of ethnic Ukrainians. Here the Eastern Slavic identity predominates. While differences among age groups are quite small, attitudes do vary widely among ethnic, linguistic and regional groups, especially for the question on language policy. The largest disparity among all the questions analysed in this article comes from the 7% of Westerners who support Russian as a co-state language compared with 60% of Crimeans. Also, 18% of Ukrainians versus 63% of Russians chose this option. Despite the ethnic, linguistic and regional variations with respect to educational policy, there are only two sub-groups that on average favour priority for the teaching of Ukrainians' history—the West (64%) and Ukrainian-speakers (52%).

Finally, the Ethnic Ukrainian and Eastern Slavic national identity complexes are distinguished by their approach to the foreign policy of Ukraine. The former favours a Western orientation, the latter an Eastern orientation. One question from the survey directly assesses the respondents' priorities for foreign policy ties with West versus East:

> In your opinion, is it more important for Ukraine to develop close and friendly relations with Western Europe or with Russia and Belarus?
>
> (1) Western Europe
> (2) Russia and Belarus.

The interviewer did not read out but did record two other responses if volunteered by respondents:

> (3) Both are equally important
> (4) Neither is important.

Since very few people chose answer 4 (just six), it is excluded from analysis and from Table 8, yielding a three-point ordinal scale when answer 3 is inserted between answers 1 and 2. As can be seen from the table, a sizable proportion of the sample, 38%, believes Ukraine should develop ties with both Western Europe and Russia/Belarus equally. Nevertheless, a plurality of 42% favours ties with Russia/Belarus. In fact over twice as many respondents favour an orientation toward Russia/Belarus than an orientation toward Western Europe. The average score on the three-point scale is

TABLE 8
FOREIGN ORIENTATION POLICY PREFERENCES (%)

	N	Western Europe	Both equally	Russia/ Belarus	Average score on 3-point scale
All	*1,441*	*20*	*38*	*42*	*2.2*
Ethnicity					
Ukrainian	1,040	24	38	38	2.1
Ukrainian-Russian	122	7	48	45	2.4
Russian	232	7	34	58	2.5
Home language					
Ukrainian	599	30	35	34	2.0
Ukrainian-Russian	308	12	41	47	2.3
Russian	523	11	41	48	2.4
Region					
West	274	50	33	16	1.7
Centre	345	18	38	44	2.3
South-East	661	9	40	51	2.4
Kyiv	82	27	51	22	2.0
Crimea	79	5	26	70	2.6
Age					
18–29	320	31	36	33	2.0
30–50	582	20	42	37	2.2
>50	539	12	35	53	2.4

2.2. Overall, then, foreign policy preferences in Ukraine reflect the Eastern Slavic national identity more than the Ethnic Ukrainian. Substantial differences among the demographic sub-groups are again present. Particularly noteworthy is the gap between the proportion of 18–29 year olds who prefer ties with Russia/Belarus (33%) and those over 50 years of age who do so (53%). Also, whereas 16% of Westerners prefer ties with Russia/Belarus, 70% of Crimeans do. Only one sub-group places greater stress on ties with Western Europe than with Russia/Belarus—the West, with an average score of 1.7

Conclusion

Having presented the results of the survey questions, we can draw some general conclusions. First, civic national identity in Ukraine seems to be substantially stronger than ethnic national identity, regardless of the variant. This was seen in the questions on the unifying features of the Ukrainian nation, where civic variants garnered by far the most support among respondents. To help determine which of the two ethnic identity complexes is most popular overall, Table 9 summarises the results for all the measures where a majority of respondents from the whole sample chose answers favouring one of the two complexes. Of the 12 measures of the five components of the national identity complexes, ten demonstrate majority mass support for one complex over another.[16] Of these ten, seven favour the Eastern Slavic national identity complex, while three favour the Ethnic Ukrainian variant. Interestingly, the three measures reflecting the greater strength of the Ethnic Ukrainian variant all deal with the Ukrainian language. Language is one if not the most important cultural marker separating Ukrainians from Russians, so perhaps it is not surprising that, to the extent

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TABLE 9
MEASURES ON WHICH MAJORITY FAVOURS ETHNIC UKRAINIAN AND EASTERN SLAVIC NATIONAL IDENTITY COMPLEXES

National identity complex components and measures	Ethnic Ukrainian national identity complex	Eastern Slavic national identity complex
Unifying features		
Able to speak Ukrainian	X	–
Ukrainian as main language	X	
Be Ukrainian	–	–
Be Orthodox	–	–
Distinguishing features		
Ukrainian vs. Russian history	–	X
Ukrainian vs. Russian culture	–	X
Ukrainian vs. European culture	–	X
Compatibility of multiple identities		
Ukrainian–Russian identities	–	X
Ukrainian–Russian loyalties	–	X
Domestic policy		
Official language	X	–
Teaching of history	–	X
Foreign policy		
Western vs. Eastern orientation	–	X

that the people of Ukraine believe that ethnic Ukrainians have a special relationship to the Ukrainian nation, they think it is their language specifically that should be given privileged consideration.

Another way of summarising the results of the study is to count the number of measures that support each of the national identity complexes according to demographic sub-group (Table 10). Here we see that just two groups—Western Ukrainians and Ukrainian-speakers—show more measures in support of the Ethnic Ukrainian identity than the Eastern Slavic, with ratios of 8:3 and 6:4 respectively. The 12 other sub-groups show more measures in favour of the Eastern Slavic identity, including five groups that show eight measures supporting that identity and zero supporting the Ethnic Ukrainian identity: ethnic Ukrainian-Russians, ethnic Russians, Russian-speakers, South-Easterners and Crimeans. Another notable finding is that the smallest variation in patterns of support for the identity complexes appears in the age sub-groups, while the greatest variation occurs in the regional sub-groups. Overall, though, the greater popularity of the Eastern Slavic identity complex is remarkably robust across the various demographic sub-groups in Ukraine.

One of the implications of this study is that those policy makers in Ukraine who favour the construction of what is called here an Ethnic Ukrainian national identity complex face substantial obstacles from mass political culture. On balance, this political culture favours the Eastern Slavic identity complex instead. The masses seemed to have internalised to a great extent Russian and Soviet discourse on the fundamentally similar historical and cultural space shared by Ukrainians and Russians. Likewise, they appear to have adopted a key component of the 'Little Russian' mentality, according to which having close affection for both Ukraine and Russia, and being both Ukrainian and Russian, are natural, easy and normal phenomena. In

TABLE 10
NUMBER OF MEASURES ON WHICH MAJORITY FAVOURS ETHNIC UKRAINIAN
AND EASTERN SLAVIC NATIONAL IDENTITY COMPLEXES, BY DEMOGRAPHIC
SUB-GROUP

	Ethnic Ukrainian national identity complex	Eastern Slavic national identity complex
Ethnicity		
Ukrainian	4	7
Ukrainian-Russian	0	8
Russian	0	8
Home language		
Ukrainian	6	4
Ukrainian-Russian	1	8
Russian	0	8
Region		
West	8	3
Centre	4	7
South-East	0	8
Kyiv	3	6
Crimea	0	8
Age		
18–29	2	6
30–50	2	7
> 50	3	7

general, many years of official presentation of Russians and Ukrainians as brotherly peoples, distinct from Europeans, has taken hold of the mass consciousness in Ukraine.

Empirically, then, we may conclude that the nature of mass public opinion makes the Eastern Slavic national identity complex an easier one for policy makers intent on nation building to construct. Whether normatively this is the proper course of action is another matter entirely, and beyond the scope of this analysis. For policy makers who do wish to pursue the Ethnic Ukrainian national identity complex, the study suggests that the greatest effort should be placed not on supporting and privileging the Ukrainian language, which already has majority support, but on such goals as emphasising the historical and cultural differences between Ukrainians and Russians, the competitive nature of Ukrainian and Russian identification and loyalties, and the need for a Western foreign orientation.

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[1] Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in its Origins and Background* (New York, Macmillan, 1946).

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 329.

[3] Mark R. Beissinger, 'State Building in the Shadow of an Empire-State: The Soviet Legacy in Post-Soviet Politics', in Karen Dawisha & Bruce Parrot (eds), *The End of Empire? The Transformation of the USSR in Comparative Perspective* (Armonk, NY, M.E. Sharpe, 1997), pp. 166–167.

[4] Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in Europe* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 105.

⁵ George Schöpflin, 'Nationalism and Ethnic Minorities in Post-Communist Europe', in Richard Caplan & John Feffer (eds), *Europe's New Nationalism* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 153.

⁶ For evaluation of the first proposition see Stephen Shulman, 'Challenging the "Civic"/"Ethnic" and "West"/"East" Dichotomies in the Study of Nationalism', *Comparative Political Studies*, 35, 5, 2002, pp. 554–585.

⁷ Stephen Shulman, 'Sources of Civic and Ethnic Nationalism in Ukraine', *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, 18, 4, 2002, pp. 1–30.

⁸ The following discussion is based on Shulman, 'Sources of Civic and Ethnic Nationalism in Ukraine'.

⁹ Graham Smith *et al.*, *Nation-building in the Post-Soviet Borderlands: The Politics of National Identities* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 122.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 127.

¹¹ For more discussion of elite perceptions of cultural similarity and distance between Ukraine, Russia and Europe, see Stephen Shulman, 'The Cultural Foundations of Ukrainian National Identity', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 22, 6, November 1999, pp. 1011–1036.

¹² The following discussion is based on Stephen Shulman, 'Competing versus Complementary Identities: Ukrainian–Russian Relations and the Loyalties of Russians in Ukraine', *Nationalities Papers*, 26, 4, 1998, pp. 615–632.

¹³ For details of the theoretical link between foreign orientation and national identity see Stephen Shulman, 'The Internal–External Nexus in the Formation of Ukrainian National Identity: The Case for Slavic Integration', in Taras Kuzio & Paul D'Anieri (eds), *Dilemmas of State-led Nation-building in Ukraine* (Westport, CT, Praeger, 2002), pp. 103–129.

¹⁴ The *oblasti* surveyed were Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Lviv, Odesa, Poltava, Rivne, Transcarpathia and Vynnytsya.

¹⁵ Respondents indicated their ethnicity as Ukrainian, Russian, both Ukrainian and Russian or other. Language use was ascertained by asking which language they used most at home: Ukrainian, Russian, both Ukrainian and Russian equally or other. Finally, five regions were identified in the sample: West (Rivne, Lviv and Transcarpathia), Centre (Kyiv *oblast*, Vynnytsya and Poltava); South-East (Donetsk, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk and Odesa), Kyiv City and Crimea.

¹⁶ As discussed earlier, the results of the questions on whether being an ethnic Ukrainian or an Orthodox believer is important to being a real member of the Ukrainian nation are inconclusive. Only a minority of respondents believes these traits are important, and thus we cannot say that the Ethnic Ukrainian identity (for the first question) or Eastern Slavic identity (for the second) is supported. At the same time, we cannot say that these results favour the *opposite* identity in each case.