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# Henry George and Europe: *As Social Philosopher, He Was Seen as Synthesizing Jefferson, the Enlightenment and Mother Earth*

By MICHAEL SILAGI

Translated by SUSAN N. FAULKNER

ABSTRACT. In the eyes of European scholars, publicists and politicians who studied *Henry George's* work, he, as a *social philosopher*, had adopted the position of the *natural law* philosophers of the 18th century. The latter inspired the Declaration of Independence, the U.S. Constitution and its Bill of Rights, as well as the political philosophy of *Jeffersonian democracy*, the ethos of the 18th and 19th century *pioneer settlers*. George rejected *Social Darwinism*. He saw natural law as the only true and reliable basis for a just social order. Like *Karl Marx* he mastered *Ricardian economics*; unlike Marx, George made two factors the basis of his system, *labor* and *land*. George saw that each person had a *natural right*—and a natural imperative for *survival*—to apply his or her *productive capacity* to the *earth*—as *living space* and as *storehouse* of *nutrients* and *raw materials*. The *person-land relationship*, he discovered, lay at the basis of human *culture*. And so the land's *rent*, now monopolized by the few, had to be appropriated to meet the needs of *society*, most efficiently and justly by a *land value tax*.

## I

### George as a Natural Law Philosopher

IN HENRY GEORGE'S CONCEPT of natural law, we encounter the principle typical of the world view of the Enlightenment, especially in the America of the 18th century.<sup>1</sup> In contrast to the Social Darwinists of his time, George rejected the doctrine of the survival of the fittest; he interpreted the law of nature not as a law compelling the termination of individual and social development, but, on the contrary, through adaptation, offering a chance for progress.<sup>2</sup>

While George did not want to decide whether there are higher values in the area of morality than justice, he thought that natural law should be the foundation of any ethical hierarchy: "That justice is the highest quality in the moral hierarchy

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I do not say; but that it is the first. That which is above justice must be based on justice, and include justice, and be reached through justice."<sup>3</sup> George, a Puritan here, does not see even love of one's neighbor unconditionally as virtuous. That also must be built on justice: "Charity must be built on justice. It cannot supersede justice."<sup>4</sup>

It is for this reason that Henry George sees natural law as the only true and reliable basis for a proper social order. Ills in the socio-political sphere imply a transgression against, and ignorance of, natural human rights as surely as the poor functioning of a machine leads to the conclusion that the mechanic has disregarded the laws of mechanics in its construction.<sup>5</sup> Thus, prevalent poverty must be a symptom of an error in the foundation of the existing social order. As already discussed, there is no lack of productive capacities, since, after all, those available are not even wholly utilized. Yet, in fact, the actual production is quite sufficient for everyone. Therefore, George seeks a remedy that would eliminate the causes of industrial crises and poverty in the midst of wealth.

George also searches for the mechanisms which lead to the unjust distribution of wealth, unjust because it brings about poverty and misery.<sup>6</sup>

He designates as "wealth" all that which results when products of nature are grown, mined or developed, refined, transported, combined, separated, or changed in any other way by human labor in order to satisfy human needs.<sup>7</sup> Hence, wealth is matter which is mined with human exertion so that it stores up the wish-fulfilling power of labor as does coal the sun's energy.<sup>8</sup> George counts as wealth only "value from production,"<sup>9</sup> *i.e.* values produced by human exertion. Labor is one factor of production indispensable for the manufacture of goods; the other one is land, which for him means not only real estate, but in actuality the entire natural, still undeveloped environment of human beings. The unimproved, "naked" land belongs for this American philosopher not to "wealth," not to goods. It is, rather, the second prior condition indispensable, next to human exertion, for the production of wealth.<sup>10</sup>

To these two primary elements, George adds the derivative factor of production, capital; in this manner, he takes over the classical tripartite form of factors of production. He views that part of wealth as capital which is not used directly for the satisfaction of human needs, but rather for the production of more wealth. It is for him only a secondary factor, which serves to increase the productive capacity of labor. George defines the concepts "wealth" and "capital" as follows:

Wealth, in short, is labor, which is raised to a higher or second power, by being stored in concrete forms which give it a certain measure of permanence, and thus permit of its utilization to satisfy desires in other times or other places. Capital is stored up labor in the production of fresh wealth or of larger direct satisfaction of desire.<sup>11</sup>

For George, capital played only a subordinate, though useful role. It was for him, as Geiger puts it, “a product and not a fundamental determiner of man’s energies”<sup>12</sup>—quite a different conception from that of his older contemporary, Karl Marx, who placed capital in the center of his chief work. This assessment of capital by George can be explained by his non-historical, typically American,<sup>13</sup> thought processes: George abstracted from the conditions of production prevalent in his time; he proceeded from the observation that historical development, especially technical advances, had brought about no fundamental changes in the relationship to each other of the factors of production.

He saw the vast accumulations of capital in his century as basically not different from the stone hewn by primitive man: both were forms of capital, for both served the worker as a tool, thereby increasing his productivity. George was convinced that the economic laws which had been valid for the economic life of the most primitive society retained their validity through all times, and that even the most complicated processes within the economy of the modern State should be reducible to these simple laws.<sup>14</sup>

There could be no doubt for him, furthermore, concerning the just distribution of wealth. The point of departure, as he saw it, was man’s claim, based on natural law, to life and freedom. This freedom includes two rights which, if secured, would lead to a harmonic economic order—the right to work and the right to a due reward for labor.

The right to work, in George’s opinion, did not carry with it the duty of the State to find jobs or satisfy the worker’s right to employment. Rather, everyone had the natural right to apply his productive capacity to the inexhaustible storehouse with which God had supplied mankind. “The natural right which each man has, is . . . that of employing himself—that of applying his own labor to the inexhaustible storehouse which the Creator has, in the land, provided for all men.”<sup>15</sup> This “storehouse” is the passive factor of production, land, on which the capacity to work, as already discussed, necessarily depends. Only when man has access to this factor can he realize his right to work.

Each individual should be able to deal freely in all goods which are produced and which can be increased by human labor. That is why disposition over the natural environment—air, water, sunlight, and in general soil and land, *i. e.* the space on earth everyone needs to exist—should not be left in the hands of a few. These vital pre-conditions for labor cannot be made subject to exclusive rights of private ownership, for they are not products of human labor, but on the contrary gifts from God, not multipliable or reducible like wealth, and available only to a limited extent.<sup>16</sup>

In contrast to the value of the products of labor, that of land depends, in the

final analysis, on supply and demand. That amount which the landowner can ask for letting his land to another (land rent) is determined by the amount of demand for this relatively and ultimately inelastic factor of production—land. As long as land of equal value is obtainable without cost, the landowner cannot realize any land rent. But as soon as only that land is freely available, which, with the same expenditure of labor and capital, gives a smaller yield, whether due to lower quality of soil or unfavorable location or whatever, the surplus yield of the better land will flow to the landowner in the form of rent. In other words, according to George, who here adopts Ricardo's Law of Rent,<sup>17</sup> neither workers nor capitalists can receive more wages or interest than that derived from the poorest land—the marginal land—on which labor is performed. Whatever is produced above that minimum represents the land rent.<sup>18</sup>

## II

### **George's Fiscal Approach to Societal Reform**

IT FOLLOWS from the foregoing argument that land rent is a function of land value. But this value is not produced by the landowner, but by the community. For through the increase of population and through social advance, there is a growth of demand for land so that this relatively inelastic factor of production—land—constantly increases in value. But this is not a "value from production," as in the case of goods produced by labor; the value of land indicates, rather, that a landowner has the power to appropriate a part of the produced wealth as land rent. Consequently, land value is "value from obligation."<sup>19</sup>

Henry George graphically describes this process in *Progress and Poverty*.<sup>20</sup> He gives the example of a settler who once occupied a piece of worthless, free land on the Pacific Coast, fell asleep and, similar to Rip van Winkel,<sup>21</sup> woke up after many years. In the meantime, San Francisco had expanded so far that his parcel of land was now located in the business section of the city and was worth millions.

From his thesis that land is God's gift to all, and that its value increases and grows, not through individual effort, but through community progress, George draws the conclusion that land rent should go, not to individuals, but to the community. Similarly, all men are on this earth through God's mercy, and they have, therefore, the same right to those gifts which nature offers impartially to all.<sup>22</sup>

According to George's doctrine, the corollary to this right to work is the right to a due reward for labor: everyone has full claim to the entire fruits of his exertions, to a just wage. For just as man belongs to himself, his work must also

belong to him whenever it takes palpable form.<sup>23</sup> Thus, the only just foundation for private ownership is man's claim to the fruits of his labor, because only labor produces wealth—from the natural material which the Creator has made available—and only labor is rewarded by nature with wealth.<sup>24</sup> In contrast to Marx, George does not deduce from this formulation a rejection of income from capital. As George sees it, the capitalist is also entitled to a share of the product (interest), for capital is stored-up labor, and within the right to a reward for labor is included as well the right to the fruits of one's labor.<sup>25</sup>

Yet, in none of the social systems showing material progress does George find a realization of these two corollaries of the natural right to life and liberty. In his opinion, this disregard of the principles of natural rights derived from natural law, is the true source of social ills.

The basic evil of the prevalent economic order is the appropriation of the land rent by private persons.<sup>26</sup> This appropriation represents a violation of the right of the community to the land values it has produced. Furthermore, this appropriation brings about, in two ways, an infringement of the rights of productive man to the fruits of his labor, as George sees it.

Since the State does not rely upon land rent for its necessary expenditures, it must cover its budget through other revenues, namely the customary taxes and duties. George rejects, on the basis of natural rights, all taxes not imposed on land rent ("save, of course, where the motive of the tax is public safety, health or morals"<sup>27</sup>). Such taxes, after all, are aimed at labor and capital; in other words, that is taken from the individual which belongs to him by natural right, a portion of his work products. At the same time, such taxes are fines on diligence and thrift. For these reasons, George is convinced that they are unjust; he writes:

All these taxes violate the moral law. They take by force what belongs to the individual alone; they give to the unscrupulous an advantage over the scrupulous; they have the effect . . . to increase the price of what some have to sell and others must buy . . . ; they fine industry and thrift, and enrich some by empowering others.<sup>28</sup>

In addition, private ownership of land values bestows upon the owners a monopoly over this inelastic property. In this way, to the natural factors of increased value (growth of population and progress) another factor is now added: land speculation. In the expectation of ever-growing increases of land value, the owners hold back their land from optimal usage, or even withdraw it entirely from use; fallow acreage in the centers of large cities certainly attests to such practices. By this means, an artificial scarcity of supply is created in the market. Since the entire land is not utilized to its maximum, the workers are forced to switch over to less productive or unfavorably situated land than that which should be available to them under just conditions; or they may be obliged to pay a higher land rent, which already anticipates the owner's hoped-for increase in

value. Thereby, the landowner's income, in itself a violation of natural right, rises even further, while the worker's share of the goods produced sinks even more. The outcome is want and misery.<sup>29</sup>

From this premise George draws the conclusion that the existing system should be changed in such a way as to make land speculation impossible, and to ensure that a just share of the goods they produce goes to the workers. This would require establishing the equal right of all to the land values produced by the community. But in George's view, to accomplish this purpose it is neither requisite nor expedient to confiscate the land.<sup>30</sup> Taking away, through a tax on land value, the rent obtainable in each instance for the benefit of the community not only fully satisfies the demands of justice, but creates a practical and incorruptible tool for carrying out such demands: "It is not necessary to confiscate land; it is only necessary to confiscate rent."<sup>31</sup>

It is unimportant who the factual owner of the land is. Hence, there would be no formal change in the ownership conditions following a Georgian reform—only that "special gain" would be taken from the landowner which he had hitherto received by means of private monopoly. Such a land value tax could not be shifted—this, by the way, is recognized not only by George<sup>32</sup>—since such a tax would cause a rise in supply on the real estate market and thereby lower the price of land. A tax imposed on the value of all land would, after all, affect also those parcels of land which previously had been withheld from use, either in part or wholly, due to speculative expectation of a further advance in the price of land. In this way, the owner would find himself obliged either to use his land completely or to sell it, because his property would be taxed high whether it was used or lying fallow. After the land value tax has been introduced, the land rent would tend to become commensurate to that land value seen by George as natural, and would no longer receive a speculative addition.<sup>33</sup>

The land value tax would actually affect him who is assessed for it, the landowner, and until now the unauthorized usufructuary of the land rent. It is a practical tax, the amount of which can be determined readily—any appraisal can estimate the value of land—and it cannot be evaded, for land cannot be hidden.<sup>34</sup>

George believes, as already mentioned, that all other taxes are contrary to natural law. He proposes the abolition of all taxes and duties with the exception of one tax, the "Single Tax,"<sup>35</sup> which should be levied against the unimproved value of the land alone. He has no doubt that such a tax would be sufficient to cover all official expenditures.<sup>36</sup>

Furthermore, George rejects any compensation for landowners: Since the land belongs by right to the community, it would be as absurd to let these

owners continue to have the rent as it would be to compensate them for its future withdrawal. For the original appropriation of the land by its first owner was not the only transgression against the rights of the community. Private land-ownership signifies, in effect, a continual robbery of its property committed against the community. Should one indeed draw the conclusion from the fact that the community has been robbed throughout all these years that the robber has acquired the right to continue his depredations? Surely not, answers George:

It is not merely a robbery in the past; it is a robbery in the present—a robbery that deprives of their birthright the infants that are now coming into the world! Why should we hesitate about making short work of such a system? Because I was robbed yesterday, and the day before, and the day before that, is it any reason that I should suffer myself to be robbed today and tomorrow? any reason that I should conclude that the robber has acquired a vested right to rob me? If the land belongs to the people, why continue to permit land owners to take the rent, or compensate them in any manner for the loss of rent?<sup>37</sup>

What are Henry George's hopes for the introduction of the Single Tax? In his work *Social Problems* he explains his proposal as follows:

To appropriate ground-rent to public uses by means of taxation . . . would enormously increase the production of wealth by the removal of restrictions and by adding to the incentives to production. . . . It would at the same time make the distribution of wealth more equal. That great part of this fund which is now taken by the owners of land, not as a return for anything by which they add to the production, but because they have appropriated as their own the natural means and opportunities of production, and which as material progress goes on, and the value of land rises, is constantly becoming larger and larger, would be virtually divided among all, by being utilized for common purposes.<sup>38</sup>

The introduction of the Single Tax would mean the end of unemployment, an increase in wages, and the disappearance of poverty and, with it, of pauperization and crime. The abolition of all taxes except the land value tax would substantially simplify the administrative apparatus<sup>39</sup> as well. Finally, such a measure would elevate public morals:

We should get rid of the fraud and false swearing, of the bribery and subordination which now attend the collection of so much of our public revenues. We should get rid of the demoralization that proceeds from laws which prohibit actions in themselves harmless, punish men for crimes which the moral sense does not condemn, and offer a constant premium to evasion.<sup>40</sup>

### III

#### **The Intellectual Foundation of George's System**

HENRY GEORGE'S THEORY, here described, makes clear that he thought in terms of natural rights. His two most significant premises are, first, that an absolute right exists, and second, that its clauses must be observed unconditionally by



humanity; their disregard, on the contrary, will inevitably lead to want and misery. He counts among the most important clauses of this absolute right the equal claim of all, given people by nature, to the soil, to the gifts of nature. It was his principal aim to make his ideas ultimately prevail.

George's system is not a curriculum of economic instruction, his prescription for the elimination of poverty not merely a tax reform. In his works, George took the classical theories of political economy into consideration and accepted in the main Ricardo's Law of Rent. On the other hand, in *Progress and Poverty* as well as in other writings, he refuted at length the theories of economics designated by him as prevalent. In doing so, he made a contribution to this discipline which Franz Oppenheimer, in the already cited article, describes as "one of the most marvellous and brilliant systems developed since the origination of the science of economics."<sup>41</sup> Similarly, it led the American historian, Partridge, to call George "our most creative economist."<sup>42</sup>

For George himself, however, Ricardo's writings, as well as politico-economic theory on the whole, had only a serviceable function. They were for him solely the building blocks for a theoretical foundation of his Single Tax doctrine.

Basically, George saw in the social question a religious problem,<sup>43</sup> since even the political and social sciences could teach nothing which was not already contained in the simple truths of religion:

Political economy and social science cannot teach any lessons that are not embraced in the simple truths that were taught to poor fishermen and Jewish peasants by One who eighteen hundred years ago was crucified—the simple truths which, beneath the warpings of selfishness and the distortions of superstition, seem to underlie every religion that has ever striven to formulate the spiritual yearnings of man.<sup>44</sup>

The laws of economics and ethics are here identical in character.<sup>45</sup> If one wishes to solve economic problems, one must recognize the will of the Creator. For God, who created man and who gave him the capacity for higher civilized development, must have foreseen that with social progress would come the growth of the State's financial needs. Therefore, God also must have provided a way to cover these expenditures.<sup>46</sup> But this way, as George—here following entirely deistic teaching—sees it, is not disclosed to man either by revelation or by Holy Scripture. It is, rather, human reason alone which can fathom this means foreordained by God, and the intellect says that God has assigned the land values to cover the needs of the community.

The introduction of the land value tax is, thus, not a fiscal measure, but an adaptation of the most important social arrangements to natural law. So George believes, as set forth in his book *Social Problems*, and he continues:

To those who have never given thought to the matter, it may seem irreverently presumptuous to say that it is the evident intent of the Creator that land values should be subject to taxation; that rent should be utilized for the benefit of the entire community. Yet to whoever does think of it, to say this will appear no more presumptuous than to say that the Creator has intended men to walk on their feet, and not on their hands. Man in his social relations is as much included in the creative scheme as man in his physical relations. . . . Man is driven by his instincts and needs to form society. Society, thus formed, has certain needs and functions for which revenue is required. These needs and functions increase with social development. . . . Now, experience and analogy, if not the instinctive perceptions of the human mind, teach us that there is a natural way of satisfying every natural want. And if human society is included in nature, as it surely is, this must apply to social wants as well as to the wants of the individual, and there must be a natural or right method of taxation, as there is a natural or right method of walking. We know, beyond peradventure, that the natural or right way for a man to walk is on his feet. . . . In the same way we may know that the natural or right way of raising the revenues which are required by the needs of society is by taxation of land values. The value of land is in its nature and relations adapted to purposes of taxation, just as the feet in their nature and relations are adapted to the purposes of walking.<sup>47</sup>

To the concept of an all embracing natural law, seen as the moving force of human progress, is added a further element of the world view of the Enlightenment, the deistic belief in a religion of reason. That is why Geiger says aptly: "To natural law and natural rights was added deism, and the 18th century synthesis in George was almost complete."<sup>48</sup>

To be sure, we cannot follow Geiger in his differentiation of two levels in George's thinking. He feels that George's teachings contain an ethical and an economic level, and he divides his book about the American social philosopher accordingly.<sup>49</sup> It is only in the synthesis that, Geiger believes, the levels of the ethical and the economic become one.<sup>50</sup>

Such a separation of economics and ethics, when seen from George's standpoint, however, is impossible on the face of it. The components of natural law and economics or, as Edward J. Rose formulates it, the "religio-economic"<sup>51</sup> unity, is fundamental to his doctrine from its inception.<sup>52</sup>

The reason for this dualistic interpretation of George's teachings may well lie in the previously detailed manner of presentation of his thesis, especially in *Progress and Poverty*,<sup>53</sup> but it may also be found in a dualistic attitude of the interpreter, who wishes to see his perception confirmed by George.

George received the intellectual impulses which were to be decisive for his life's work in his childhood and early youth, thus at a time when he had not yet heard anything about economics. There were two influences which determined his development: First, the faith in which he grew up. His parental home was filled with an atmosphere of strong piety.<sup>54</sup> But though George, in his strivings for pure ethics and genuine Christianity, turned away already in his youth from

institutionalized religion, he was to remain faithful throughout his life to the fundamentals of the Judeo-Christian tradition.<sup>55</sup>

In addition, the ideas of the American Revolution had a no less significant effect on him. George was educated in the spirit of a belief in natural justice as it is manifested in the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights. In this connection, Rose states:

Nurtured by an environmental and national devotion to individual rights, expressed most powerfully in the Declaration of Independence and in the Constitution and Bill of Rights, Henry George's later social theories were deeply and continually influenced by the moral prerogatives of the Judaic-Christian consciousness.<sup>56</sup>

On these two cornerstones, an enlightened religious belief and an 18th century concept of natural law, George built, for the most part independently, his own social philosophy. One must, therefore, agree with Parrington when he writes about George as follows: "His major doctrines he arrived at largely independently. . . . His matured philosophy was the outcome of the meditations of a Jeffersonian idealist contemplating the divergence between the crude facts of exploitation all about him and the 18th century ideal of natural justice."<sup>57</sup>

When Parrington, however, describes the principals of the French Revolution as progenitors of George's doctrine, and George himself as the most original interpreter of these principles in America,<sup>58</sup> he probably mistakes the ideohistorical connections:<sup>59</sup> Just that which distinguishes the foundations of the French Revolution from their European forerunners—the strong accent on subjective-individualistic rights—is inspired by the ideological world of the American Revolution. It is true that the English settlers had already brought the concept of inalienable land rights from their homeland to the New World. But the transformation of these still historical, once conceded rights into rights which were supra-historical and grounded "only" in reason, and their sorting into a large number of claims due each individual was an independent outcome of the American Enlightenment. This era was the pioneer of the American Revolution, the schema of which may well be seen as the fertile soil for both the French Revolution and for the teachings of Henry George.<sup>60</sup>

### Notes

1. Cf. Stow Persons, *American Minds* (New York, 1958), p. 76.
2. On the differences between the conceptions of natural law in the 18th and 19th centuries in general, cf. Persons *op. cit.*, p. 222 ff.; on the rejection of the idea of evolution as a characteristic of Enlightenment thought, cf. Fritz Valjavec, *Geschichte der abendländischen Aufklärung* (Vienna, 1961), pp. 91, 361.
3. *Social Problems*, (New York, 1898), p. 86.
4. Henry George, *The Condition of Labor* (New York, 1898), p. 92.
5. *Social Problems*, pp. 92 ff.

6. *Progress and Poverty*, (New York, (1879), 1898), p. 153.
7. *Op. cit.*, p. 40.
8. *Loc. cit.*
9. *The Science of Political Economy*, pp. 260 ff
10. *Progress and Poverty*, p. 37.
11. *The Science of Political Economy*, p. 296.
12. George R. Geiger, *The Philosophy of Henry George* (New York, 1933), p. 259.
13. Cf. to this: Friedrich Georg Friedmann, "Amerika und das Problem der Geschichtlichkeit," *Speculum Historiale* (Freiburg, 1965), pp. 106–14, *passim*.
14. "The fundamental that in all economic reasoning must be firmly grasped, and never let go, is that society in its most highly developed form is but an elaboration of society in its rudest beginnings, and that principles obvious in the simpler relations of men are merely disguised and not abrogated or reversed by the more intricate relations that result from the division of labor and the use of complex tools and methods," *Progress and Poverty*, p. 26.
15. *The Condition of Labor*, p. 90.
16. *Progress and Poverty*, pp. 335ff.
17. On Ricardo's Law of Rent cf. Franz Oppenheimer, *David Ricardos Grundrententheorie*, 2nd ed. (Jena, 1927), pp. 32 ff.
18. *Progress and Poverty*, p. 168.
19. *The Science of Political Economy*, pp. 260 ff.
20. *Progress and Poverty*, pp. 333 ff.
21. Rip van Winkle is the leading character in a short story by the same title by Washington Irving.
22. *Progress and Poverty*, p. 336.
23. "As a man belongs to himself, so his labor when put in concrete forms belongs to him." *Progress and Poverty*, p. 332.
24. *Op. cit.*, pp. 335 ff.
25. *Op. cit.*, pp. 187 ff.
26. *Op. cit.*, pp. 261 ff.
27. Henry George, *Protection or Free Trade* (New York, 1966), p. 286.
28. *The Condition of Labor*, p. 11.
29. *Progress and Poverty*, p. 256.
30. *Op. cit.*, p. 403.
31. *Loc. cit.*
32. Geiger, *op. cit.*, p. 154.
33. Cf. Henry George, *Why the Landowner Cannot Shift the Tax on Land Values* (New York, n.d.), *passim*.
34. *Progress and Poverty*, pp. 414 ff.
35. Regarding the expression "Single Tax" for the tax proposed by George on land value see Henry George, "Concerning That Name 'Single Tax'," Land and Labor Library, Vol. 1, No. 39 (Endwell, N.Y., n.d.) (from a speech given in 1889 in Glasgow).
36. Henry George, *The Single Tax, What It Is and Why We Urge It*, (New York, n.d.), p. 3.
37. *Progress and Poverty*, p. 363; cf. also chapter "Compensation" in Henry George, *A Perplexed Philosopher* (New York, 1898), pp. 218 ff.
38. *Social Problems*, pp. 209 ff.
39. *Op. cit.*, pp. 210 ff.
40. *Op. cit.*, pp. 211 ff.
41. Oppenheimer, *Neue Freie Presse*, p. 10.

42. Parrington, *op. cit.*, p. 126: "He still remains our most original economist."
43. *The Condition of Labor*, p. 67.
44. *Progress and Poverty*, p. 523.
45. *Op. cit.*, p. 558.
46. *The Condition of Labor*, pp. 9 ff.
47. *Social Problems*, pp. 213–15.
48. Geiger, *op. cit.*, p. 375.
49. Thus, in Geiger, *op. cit.*, Chapter III is titled "George's Economic Solution," Chapter IX, "Economics and Ethics," and Chapter X, "George's Ethical Solution."
50. *Op. cit.*, p. 12 and *passim*.
51. Rose, *op. cit.*, p. 160.
52. In contrast, Barker, unlike Geiger, does not see two levels, but rather speaks of "two sequences of thought, distinct and separable" (*op. cit.*, p. 268). He believes that he can distinguish in *Progress and Poverty* a "moral sequence" consisting of Preface, Book X, and Conclusion, and an "economic syllogism" in Books III to IX (*op. cit.*, p. 269; Barker expresses the same view in his article "Henry George," in *The International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. VI [New York], 1968, p. 153.) This differentiation would be questionable even if one could describe as "economic" those parts of the book which are also open to an exclusively politico-economic interpretation. For in Book VII, thus in that part of *Progress and Poverty* which Barker characterizes as his "economic syllogism," George proves by argumentation based purely on natural law that the reform proposed by him is ethical. (*Cf.* above, p. 394.)
53. *Ibid.*
54. *Cf.* Barker, *op. cit.*, pp. 10–13, and Anna George de Mille, (George's youngest daughter), *Henry George, Citizen of the World: "Childhood and Early Youth," American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, Vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 284–87.
55. Geiger, *op. cit.*, p. 338.
56. Rose, *op. cit.*, p. 20.
57. Parrington, *op. cit.*, p. 126.
58. *Op. cit.*, p. 136.
59. On the effect of the American idea on the French Revolution, in general, *cf.* A. Aulard, *Histoire politique de la Révolution française*, (Paris, 1901), pp. 19 ff. (p. 20: "The French Revolution, although different from the American Revolution in some regards, was to be haunted by the remembrance of that revolution."); Bernard Fay, *L'esprit révolutionnaire en France et aux États-Unis* (Paris, 1925), *passim*; (p. 176: "All the parties recognized and then proclaimed that the Americans were the model which the revolutionary idealists of France wanted to follow in 1789. . . . They thought that it contained a great lesson, and they exhibited a sort of mysticism in wishing to imitate it, to find in it a prototype, a rule, a universal truth"); and Daniel Mornet, *Les origines intellectuelles de la Révolution Française* (Paris, 1933), pp. 389 ff. ("La Révolution américaine").
60. *Cf.* Christian Egbert Weber, *Die Integration eines Kontinentes als Problem: Amerika, Europa* (Berlin, 1971), pp. 18 ff.; regarding the American influence on the authors of the Declaration of Human and Civil Rights of 1789 see George Jellinek, *Die Erklärung der Menschen- und Bürgerrechte*, 4th ed. (Munich, 1927), *passim* and pp. 8 ff, as well as Crane Brinton, *A Decade of Revolution* (New York, 1934), p. 41: "The Assembly [i.e. the French National Assembly of 1789] could hardly avoid issuing some kind of Bill of Rights; English and American precedent worked here with overwhelming insistence."