



Center for
Black
Studies
Research

Capture Land: Jamaica, Haiti, and the United States Occupation

Author(s): Matthew J. Smith

Source: *Journal of Haitian Studies*, Fall 2015, Vol. 21, No. 2, Special Issue on the US Occupation of Haiti, 1915–1934 (Fall 2015), pp. 181–206

Published by: Center for Black Studies Research

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/43741126>

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at <https://about.jstor.org/terms>



Center for Black Studies Research is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Journal of Haitian Studies*

JSTOR

**CAPTURE LAND:
JAMAICA, HAITI, AND THE UNITED STATES OCCUPATION**

Matthew J. Smith
University of the West Indies, Mona

Hayti is doomed. Her independence will die away and she will pass into the hands of the United States as a possession or protectorate. . . . No one outside Hayti writes of the country with more sincere sympathy than do we. . . . She is doomed and her doom has been wrought by her own children.

—*Jamaica Times*, 1915

Reasonably or otherwise the whole principle of occupation is repugnant to a people with ideas of independence.

—*West Indian Review*, 1934

A fierce heat comes with July. To live in the Caribbean is to accept this reality: the best-laid plans and noblest intent can be crushed into dust under the oppression of the summer sun. The Haitian general who debarked in Kingston midway through the summer of 1915 understood this in a visceral way. He came directly from the north. For friends and family he brought news of the baleful situation in their homeland. Cap-Haïtien had been a significant redoubt for presidential aspirant Dr. Rosalvo Bobo, and the general was one of his trusted confederates. The news was grim. The troops under President Vilbrun Guillaume-Sam—in power a mere four months—were gaining the upper hand in an escalating conflict. Almost out of habit, the general offered a declaration that all would be better once Bobo was installed. The general, who spoke with a Jamaican reporter on arrival, supposed that the success of the president's troops in the north was a temporary setback; victory for Bobo would be assured by the end of July. Even in such optimism there was a thinly concealed fear. In Cap-Haïtien, he reported, the prisons were overflowing with Guillaume-Sam's rivals and their family members. The general chose not to reveal his name to the Jamaican press out of concern for the welfare of his own family. He had

escaped the worst and made his way to Kingston by chance, a defeated warrior of a last revolution.¹

Jamaicans had grown accustomed to tales such as the one told by the general at Kingston's pier. For more than half a century, Kingston had been a refuge for scores of Haitians who faced similar fates.² The two countries were tied by these experiences. Jamaicans followed the stories of Haitian events closely as they appeared on the front pages of local papers, in personal letters from intimates in Port-au-Prince, in exchanges on the dusty streets of the capital, and in the lingering conversations of the Haitians who lived peacefully among them. But it was the story that reached their ears on July 28, a week after the general's visit, that disturbed them more than any other.

Bobo's party in Port-au-Prince had hatched a carefully constructed plot that succeeded in driving the president out of the palace. From the French legation where he and his family hid, the president sent out one message: to Charles Oscar Etienne, the general of the arrondissement of Port-au-Prince. The message was kept secret. Etienne had been repulsing Bobo's rebels, fighting to defend the prison that was adjacent to his headquarters. The president's message was believed to have been instructions to surrender. It appeared that the unknown general's prediction would be correct—Bobo would be the next president. Etienne took refuge in the Dominican legation. The choked prisons of Cap-Haïtien were mirrored in the capital. On Etienne's flight, the relatives of the incarcerated marched, exultant, to the prison. On entering the building, the flush of joy chilled, overpowered by the atrocity laid before them. Blood-smearred walls encased small pyramids of lifeless bodies spilling out into the yard—168 in total, all murdered by Etienne on his commander's order. There followed in quick transition the painful stages of a cycle of grief—rage, anguish, disequilibrium, and then, a surging current of revenge. The crowd embodied this in volumes, shrieking in peals as it disgorged itself into the streets. Etienne was the first to face retribution, taken from his refuge and attacked in the city center. The president was next. The following morning, after the mass funeral service for the victims, he was dragged from the French legation and for two hours hacked, mutilated, quartered, and decapitated. All order seemed to be lost. By midnight nearly four hundred US marines had come ashore from a waiting ship and taken control of Port-au-Prince.³

In Jamaica it was this story of extreme violence that depleted hope in Haiti's renewal. The possibility of United States intervention had hovered over Haitian politics for several years prior. But Haiti's allies in Jamaica had reasoned that with the right sort of leadership it could be averted. The

question above all others at the end of July was what the US military troops would do in Haiti. A *Jamaica Times* editorial sounded a dismal warning that under US control “it will be very hard for Hayti ever again to emerge as an independent state.” Yet even if this was so, the paper argued, the results would be to Haiti’s benefit: “Hayti must become a very different country to that which is at present breaking the heart of all those who really love her, shocking and disgusting the sensibility of the civilized world.”⁴

The “civilized world” had never been kind to Haiti. The *Jamaica Times* journalist quoted in the epigraph was correct in stating that Haiti had fared better at the hands of sympathetic Jamaican reporters than at those of writers outside the Caribbean. This was in large measure a result of the frequency of exile of prominent Haitians in the island, which facilitated enduring associations. But the events of July 1915 presented a new circumstance unlike anything that had prevailed before. Some Jamaicans had previously advocated some form of foreign control to take Haiti out of its quagmire of short-term governments. Where Haiti would go, now that US marines were on the ground, was undeterminable. Over the next two decades Jamaican observances and commentaries on the US Occupation of Haiti reflected a particular British West Indian view. While some US commentators—especially within the African American community—would grow increasingly oppositional to their government’s military control of the republic, the response of Jamaicans was less consistent. They were guided in various ways by racial and regional solidarity but their public statements about occupied Haiti also implied their own conflicted perceptions of empire. Over the nineteen years of US rule in Haiti, Jamaican elites would reflect some of the contradictions of their Haitian counterparts as they contemplated the marine presence, Haiti’s future, and the role of US imperialism in the Caribbean.

THE INVASION

Haitian events were no longer found on the front pages of Jamaican papers by 1915. When they appeared they were often found several pages past the lead. It was the “Story of the Great War” that dominated island news. The First World War had tangible import for British West Indians. Over fifteen thousand servicemen from the empire’s Caribbean colonies traveled to fight on the frontlines of Europe. More than ten thousand were Jamaicans.⁵ The war was a powerful demonstration of West Indian loyalty to England, and the effect of this participation was profound and lasting.⁶

The Great War was also of importance to the US occupation of Haiti. The marines invaded in the context of a major North Atlantic struggle that had thrust the world into a new era. As the literature shows clearly,

longstanding US concerns over ingrained German interests in Haiti were the principal motive for intervention, more than the death of the president.⁷ Contemporaries in Jamaica held that it was preoccupation with the war that made intervention possible in the first place; that Great Britain would have protested US marine control of a sovereign nation so close to Jamaica. At a public lecture on Haitian history held in Kingston in March 1916, the lecturer asserted that after a “great experiment” of over a century of independence, “Haiti has practically become a protectorate of the United States. It is doubtful whether this change could have been accomplished so quietly and so easily if the European Powers had not been engaged in the greatest struggle the world has ever seen.”⁸

The extent to which Great Britain would have blocked the 1915 invasion given the power of US influence in Haiti in the preceding years is debatable. More definite was the context the Great War provided for the unfolding of the first years of the occupation. A sheen of paternal benevolence marked US policy statements regarding Haiti. This suited then-current platitudes of international peace building. The United States was in the country to improve conditions and not to claim the republic. The US Treaty with Haiti, signed in September 1915, laid this out plainly in its preamble. The aim was “the strengthening of amity existing between the two countries”; “the remedying of the present conditions of the revenues and finances of Haiti”; “the maintenance of the tranquility”; the “carrying out of plans for its economic development and prosperity.”⁹ Some Haitians took these promises *prima facie*. The distinct hope was not so much in the proposals to put Haiti on a path to prosperity. Rather it was the belief that temporary US military intervention would end the disorder and instability so long experienced. The depredations of recent years were most frightening to early commenters.¹⁰

The message of the restorative power of US military control traveled with Haitians to Jamaica. T. A. Vilmenay, journalist and the Haitian Consul-General to Jamaica under the government of new president Sudre Dartiguenave, called the Treaty a “triumph of civilization over barbarity, triumph of order, peace and justice over plundering, incendiarism, and murder.” “The American government,” he ventured, “having charge of keeping peace in the country will not fail to do its duty.”¹¹ Vilmenay’s comments accord with the mixed reception Haitians gave to the occupation at its outset. While some like Rosalvo Bobo—by 1916 a Kingston resident who severely criticized the occupation as “imported” rule—lamented the loss of Haitian control, others embraced the end of the cycle of revolutions.¹² There were Jamaicans who prevaricated on their early impressions of the occupation and also shared this view. Since the overthrow of President

Jean-Pierre Boyer in 1843, “[Haiti] became the victim of recurring revolutions, culminating in the massacres of July 1915,” concluded an essayist in the *Jamaica Times*.¹³ A *Daily Gleaner* commentary was even more pointed on the “stupendous change” the United States brought to Haiti by lifting it out of its “anarchy.” In a response to Haitians who may have expected the occupation to be “temporary only,” the paper argued that their hopes were “nothing but a dream. . . . This time America means business.”¹⁴

But in the context of the Great War, the invasion was, for other elite Jamaicans, an opportunity for Haiti to surpass its neighbors. Jamaica had a strained relationship with its metropolitan colonizer before the war. The war may have drawn local energy in support of the crown, but it did not entirely paper over the reality of economic hardship in the island. Viewed from this angle, the occupation of Haiti appeared almost enviable to naïve Jamaican observers. Others suspected that the US occupation was part of a grand design to annex all of the West Indies to the United States. The British islands, some argued, would eventually be obtained by “peaceful penetration.”¹⁵ The prevailing sentiment in Jamaica, however, was that the metropole would not surrender its Caribbean colonies, especially after the support given during the war: “Great Britain has no intention of passing any of the British West Indies over to a foreign power.”¹⁶ Nonetheless, the question of whether Jamaica would be better off as a US protectorate lingered in some quarters. Louis Meikle, a Jamaican writer, expounded on the subject in a book denouncing the “danger” of West Indian annexation to the United States, which he described as a “poor colonizer” with a widely known “antipathy for alien races and more especially the negro.” Writing prior to the occupation, Meikle identified Haiti as an example for the British islands to take heed of. If “suspicious” Haiti, which had “always been so outspoken against the Yankees, and their aggressive policy towards the West Indies,” could not defend the “irresistible advance” of the United States, then the British islands had to be vigilant in preventing “all such influence.”¹⁷

This position was not entirely based on fealty to Great Britain. Indeed, Meikle advocated a confederation of the islands as the surest safeguard against US imperialism. What was of graver concern for Jamaican opponents of US annexation was US racism. Jamaicans, like Haitians, knew of the horrors of Jim Crow segregation in the US South and had through the example of US occupation in neighboring Cuba and elsewhere come to appreciate the threat of US racism as an inevitable accompaniment to intervention. There were strong misgivings in Haiti about this. For decades, Haitian leaders had claimed that US intervention

would be a return to slavery.¹⁸ The *Daily Gleaner*'s editor perceptively noted that this reality presented strong challenges for the occupiers: "America will have to do something she has never done before. She will have to try and govern, or help govern, a Negro population on humane and decent lines."¹⁹

The economic consequences were also paramount concerns in Jamaican impressions of the occupation's early days. The *Daily Gleaner* editorial imagined that US investments would lead to major advancements in Haiti. This was an issue the paper's editor, H. G. DeLisser, took up in an editorial on Haiti titled "Jamaica's Future Rival," published just weeks after the marine landing: "In a few years time [Haiti] should have strikingly developed. We believe that it will be one of our rivals in the banana trade. . . . Give it roads, and abolish the oppressive export duties, and Hayti will begin to forge ahead . . . and ten years hence the Black Republic may be counted as a prosperous and fairly progressive country."²⁰ The contrast between this position and that of the *Jamaica Times* in the weeks prior to the occupation is striking. Taken together they belie a strong view that in spite of the potential racial challenges, Haiti could only emerge more prosperous from the occupation.

Two years into the occupation this perspective endured. After the victory of the Allies in Europe, Jamaican commentators expected Haiti to be showing signs of major improvement. According to one report, "Hayti has since the war passed under American tutelage, and the Hayti of today is already unlike the Hayti of yesterday."²¹ The papers also mirrored Haitian faith in US benevolence. When a *Le Nouvelliste* editorial praised the appointment of US officials to Haitian government posts in 1916, their Jamaican counterpart reprinted the article and its wish that such changes would be "made permanent."²²

It should be apparent from these comments that much of Jamaican regard for occupied Haiti was in relation to the context in which the colony found itself by war's end. Haiti's potential success was always measured against the state of Jamaica's relationship with England. But it was also a result of changes in Jamaica's relationship with Haiti itself. Fewer Haitians arrived in Kingston in these years as the frequency of Haitian exile to Jamaica subsided greatly. This contributed to a low public awareness of Haitian events. Much of what Jamaicans knew of Haiti in this period was vague. Popular knowledge of Haiti under the marines derived from facile reports of US-engineered transformations and Haitian possibilities. Another *Daily Gleaner* editorial proclaimed, "In these days we hardly give a thought to Hayti, though that island is but next door to us. We know exactly that it is now in the control of America and that for some little

time we have heard of no revolutions there: that is about the sum of our knowledge.”²³

The absence of Haitian exiles in Kingston was one reason cited for the neglect. The focus on the war also accounted for the incuriosity about Haiti. This was explained in a 1920 *Daily Gleaner* discussion on the subject:

In pre-war days Jamaicans were always interested in Haytian affairs. The proximity of the island of Hispaniola to ours, the frequent appearance here of ex-presidents and fugitive revolutionists, the feeling that some day the United States would intervene to put an end to the chaotic conditions obtaining in the neighbouring republic—all this maintained our interest, kept it alive, and then the War broke out and for nonce we forgot that such a country as Hayti existed.²⁴

In Haiti, of course, the reality of the occupation was quite different from outside perceptions of US beneficence. The marines, in their effort to maintain “order,” adopted perverse, even cruel measures to suppress dissent. Martial law was imposed early on and would last for much of the occupation. *Caco* rebels began to organize against these abuses almost immediately after the invasion. Their struggle intensified when the marines reinstated the *corvée*, an ancient forced-labor system that conscripted Haitian peasants. Much of this was the doing of US officials in Haiti. Initially the press in the United States and officials in Washington paid limited attention to the occupation and by so doing gave the US officers *carte blanche* to run operations as they pleased.²⁵ What they did with it was monstrous. A tide of evidence later brought to light documented extreme sexual abuse, wanton murders, and an inhumane disregard for Haitian life. Official US reports estimate that two thousand Haitians were killed but, as historians have argued, the actual numbers are far greater than that.²⁶ For much of the occupation Haitian papers were barred from running articles or speeches “that reflect adversely upon the United States forces in Haiti.”²⁷ The consequence of violating this order would be trial and imprisonment.

Journalists from the United States who visited Haiti began to pen alarming exposés of what they witnessed. Eventually these stories would come to the attention of the Jamaican papers. The welcome of the occupation abruptly turned to dismay over the violence of its methods. In 1917 the *Daily Gleaner* noted,

We are rather surprised to read as a preliminary to . . . change about one thousand Haytians had to be killed—not

executed of course, but shot while fighting. We had no idea that the Americans had met with much resistance, we did not know that nearly two thousand men had been landed in the Black Republic, had swept through the island, had put down the rebel bands by force.²⁸

Despite the recoil, the *Caco* struggle against the marines and their agents did not draw extensive coverage in the Jamaican press. In fact, Haiti continued to hold marginal interest in mainstream Jamaican venues concerned more with the aftermath of the Great War and its impact on the colonies. As the *Caco* wars blazed in Haiti in the turbulent year of 1919, Jamaicans prepared to receive the returning soldiers from Europe. In Haiti there was rural war and destructive marine and gendarmerie campaigns in the towns and villages; in Jamaica there were island-wide Peace Day festivals to mark the return of the troops.²⁹ The distance in these two contemporaneous events could not be more affecting. The murder of *Caco* leader Charlemagne Peralte in October produced no great comment in the Jamaican press. Instead, Jamaicans were possessed with the search for new meaning in their status as colonials in an era US president Woodrow Wilson defined as “peace without victory.”

THE BREAKDOWN

What began as a promise to build a democratic political culture in Haiti had, by 1920, turned into a disgraced neocolonialism. Violence was its most recognizable aspect. The extremity of its use during and after the *Caco* wars intensified Haitian resentment of the United States. Investigators from leading New York papers and the NAACP visited Haiti and wrote cutting exposés of the treatment of Haitians, the imposition of martial law, and the severe abuses of the occupiers.³⁰ What emerged from these reports was a picture of unmitigated brutishness. The NAACP’s report in particular was a damning appraisal of the work of the marines, emphasizing a dangerous transplantation of “American prejudice.”³¹

Haitians found further support from some foreigners who lived there and knew the country well, such as Reverend L. Ton Evans, a Welsh-born US Baptist missionary. In letters and testimonies he offered a sustained denunciation of the effects of marine control on Haiti:

Is it not sad indeed to have a state that after nearly five years of the “American occupation” operations in Haiti, under our Democratic administration the people of the little black republic sincerely and firmly believe that the real mission of the United States Government and the American people

there is to reestablish slavery in their midst once more; abrogate and annul the work of Toussaint Louverture (their Washington and Lincoln).³²

Evans's position was marginal but important given his Caribbean experience. Although better known for his work in Haiti—where he lived intermittently between 1892 and 1910—Evans also briefly served in Jamaica. In the British colony he frequently gave lectures on Haiti to local audiences, drawing comparative references to both places and the circumstances that shaped them.³³ Earlier he wrote to Washington on the state of affairs in the republic. In a 1902 letter to President Theodore Roosevelt he pointed out that Haiti “constitutes a serious menace to the best interests of England and the States, which, if continued must reflect discreditably upon these two great powers so immediately concerned in the Caribbean Sea.” His letter—which he signed “in behalf of hundreds of thousands of neglected and downtrodden negroes of Haiti”—was written during the 1902 revolution, the beginning of a long cycle of political conflict that would end with the occupation.³⁴

Not unlike some Jamaican observers, Evans seemed to have trusted the claims of US altruism. He recognized then, and later, that a “psychological moment” had arrived when the United States should “help and rescue” Haiti since “the uplift of Haiti means actually the lifting up of the whole Negro Race.”³⁵ In his estimation the United States should have rescued Haiti long before the tumult that led to the overthrow of Guillaume-Sam, and then “assume a friendly mandate and act the big brother.”³⁶ After some years in the United States, Evans returned to Haiti in 1917 and was distressed by what he found. He was indignant in his protest against the atrocities of the marines and gendarmerie in the countryside. The stunning impact of what he saw led him to conclude that Haitian hopes of improvement had evaporated. Haitians were left “terror-stricken and almost hysteric . . . without confidence of any kind in the American people, through the fundamental understanding of them by the cruel conduct of the American occupation.”³⁷ Evans was jailed for his protests; upon returning to the United States in 1919, he continued to petition for an investigation into the violations of the marines.

The accrued stories of marine abuse that instigated the 1921–1922 Senate investigation were a revelation to Jamaicans as much as they were to the US public. To be sure, some Jamaicans were aware of what occurred in Haiti, getting spare details from visitors, family, and colleagues. A Jamaican planter reported after a visit to Haiti in 1919 that “the Haytians are slaves” to the United States.³⁸ Notwithstanding, awareness of these

conditions was likely not widespread given the already mentioned low interest of Jamaicans in Haitian events. However, newspapers, particularly the *Daily Gleaner*, became increasingly critical of the occupation following US news reports of the Senate investigations, some of which the *Daily Gleaner* republished. These reports led *Daily Gleaner* editor H. G. DeLisser to shed the admiration for the potential of US imperialism in Haiti that he had expressed fully in his editorials of the previous decade.

DeLisser's views on Haiti in this period were highly important if for no other reason than the weight they carried. As one scholar has noted, DeLisser was a "cultural and political doyen," and "probably the single most influential public figure in Jamaican affairs between the two world wars."³⁹ In the 1920s his paper's editorials were noticeably more critical of the occupation and defensive of Haitian interests. In its assessment of the Senate investigations, one editorial noted: "For it is more than the rights of the Haytians, dead and living, that are now at stake. It is the reputation of the United States of America as a colonising power."⁴⁰ Later, when the menaces of the marines during the *Caco* war were more widely publicized, the paper was more direct on the harsh tragedy of the occupation. Of the *Caco* war, an editorial comment on US actions concluded that it was "rather hard on the bystanders, extremely hard on the villages that were wiped out, but perhaps extremely effective as a means of producing enduring terror."⁴¹

This evidence induced DeLisser to raise questions about the real value of the occupation: "What is the truth about American administration in Hayti during the last four years?" He objected to press censorship that, he claimed, accounted for the trickle of news from Haiti that arrived in Jamaica. "The suppressing of the Haytian press, the censorship of news leaving the country, the intimidation of prominent Haytians—that sort of thing suggests a reign of tyranny and not good government."⁴² It was because the New York papers had picked up the stories that people in Jamaica learned details of the occupation: "Obviously it is essential that what happens in Hayti should be known in the United States and elsewhere. . . . It is not merely the American government but the American people that must keep an eye on Hayti; it is the people of every democratic country that must regard itself as responsible for what is done elsewhere in its name."⁴³ He drew further comparisons between Jamaican history and marine violence in the *Caco* war: "Why, even when Jamaica was threatened by Maroon rebellions, we never found it necessary to kill so many Maroon 'bandits' in four or fifteen years. It is to be feared that there has been far too free a use of the rifle in Hayti."⁴⁴

A potent feature of the *Daily Gleaner's* attempt to inform the Jamaican public about the iniquity of the occupation was its publication of the views

of Haitians themselves. A story that a “Haiti-Santo Domingo Independence Society” had formed in 1922 and waged a “passive” war against the occupation, modeled on Gandhi’s philosophy of civil disobedience, found a space on the *Daily Gleaner*’s front page.⁴⁵ More important were statements from Haitians in Jamaica. Haitian visitors to the island, mostly officials and journalists, made use of the freedom of the Jamaican press to enlighten the public about Haitian realities. Some noted the improvements. Charles Moravia, poet and editor of Haitian paper *Le Temps*, commented in a 1920 interview with the *Daily Gleaner* that the occupation had resulted in better roads in Port-au-Prince, electric streetlights, an automatic telephone system, and radio broadcasts, none of which existed in Kingston. Like many other Haitians of his station he had spent time in Kingston, visiting in 1906 before the great Kingston earthquake in January of the following year. He observed that although there had been significant improvements since then, the occupation had brought more advanced technological changes to Port-au-Prince. Nonetheless, he looked beyond these surface improvements and proclaimed Jamaica ahead of Haiti “in all respects.” Most important was the freedom of the press. Moravia had opposed the government of Louis Borno and was locked up three times, without trial, for views expressed in *Le Temps*.⁴⁶

Other Haitian views that were published in the Jamaican paper took issue with negative representations of Haiti in the mainstream US media, popular magazines, and books then gaining wider circulation. In a letter published in the *Daily Gleaner*, Paul Oriole Pierre-Louis stated that “chiefly since American occupation of 1915, the American way is to sneer systematically at Haiti and Haitians.”⁴⁷ François Dalencour similarly noted that these “so-called American learned men” were “demonstrating by this way to the civilized world how many Americans are low and shabby.”⁴⁸

A most perceptive comment on the occupation, a decade after it began, was written by François Lamothe with a Jamaican audience specifically in mind. Lamothe’s views against US sensationalism and hypocrisy were strong. “I find that instead of speaking of the so-called Haytian voodooism, the Americans should be interested in wiping out their diabolical Ku Klux Klan which is . . . a shame in the eyes of the world at large.” In explaining the true reasons for the occupation, he expressed a position already familiar to Jamaican readers of the paper:

I say, the revolution of 1915 is not the cause of the occupation of Hayti. If so, why is it that the Americans do not occupy Mexico? No foreigners . . . have ever been molested in Hayti; it is a well known fact that Hayti, on account of its

geographical situation, has always been coveted. . . . My opinion is the opinion of all sensible people that the great war gave to the Americans the best opportunity to occupy Hayti and take by force what the Haytians have been doing twenty five years refusing to grant, what no American money, no American diplomacy could achieve. This opportunity was not lost. They were to interfere in our political affairs at that moment whether the revolution of 1915 took place or not.⁴⁹

An important theme in the *Daily Gleaner's* devalorization of the occupation was the larger circumstance of US hegemony in the Caribbean. Colonial enthusiasm for the Allies in World War I was embittered by the harsh experiences of racism that Jamaican veterans faced in England. There was also a diminishment of opportunities at home. This caused migration from the island—already quite high—to increase significantly. In the United States, for example, there were over ten thousand Jamaican residents by 1920.⁵⁰ The longstanding view that US imperialism would bring positive changes to Jamaica and improve the economic conditions of the island reared once again. It was for some writers a debate over the virtues of two types of imperialism. Lamothe gave consideration to this point in his article: “I shiver when I hear some Jamaicans express their desire to see Jamaica become an American possession; they believe that Jamaica would be transformed into vast industrial fields in a short time. . . . Poor things! I would like them to witness what Americans are doing in Hayti”—which, he argued, “has been plunged into the greatest depths of misery and despair.”⁵¹

In his judgment, Lamothe seized upon the fundamental concerns of Haitian elite opposition to marine rule. His views also capture the skewed position of Jamaican elites regarding the United States as an imperial power. Jamaican sympathy with Haiti's plight in the 1920s—founded in part on the tight bonds of the pre-occupation years—cannot be discounted. But Jamaican elites were also concerned with defending British imperialism against charges of abandonment and the perceived benefits of US control. Indeed, DeLisser's editorials on Haiti often included explicit reference to this. Like others of his social group who followed Caribbean events, his faith in US goodwill had faded considerably. Instead, the United States appeared a hostile, prejudiced colonizer in contrast to a more sensible and experienced British imperialism: “When some persons in this island talk about the wonders that the United States would do for the British West Indies, we immediately want to know something of the wonders that the United States has accomplished in Porto Rico and Hayti.”⁵² To emphasize

the point he quoted an unidentified writer who argued that given what people in the Caribbean now knew of US imperialism, it was clear that “under the stars and stripes they see the stars and feel the stripes.” “We do not enjoy those blessings here,” he insisted, “nor are we grateful to those who would have them bestowed upon us.”⁵³

DeLisser acknowledged US improvements in Haiti in areas such as education, public works, and sanitation, that, he argued, were a major advancement for the republic. But he was ever at pains to point to the high cost of belligerent imperialism: “It is certain that the freedom of expression which is now so established in a colony like this that no one ever thinks of dwelling upon it does not exist in Hayti.” More damaging was that US officials “interfere in the elections in a manner which would simply be unbelievable in a British country.”⁵⁴ Jamaica was a crown colony, ruled directly from England with precious little franchise offered to its population. Conservatives like DeLisser believed that Jamaica was not ready for self-government, which, they thought, could make the island vulnerable to US control. DeLisser would remain a loyal defender of British imperialism; to him, the horrors of the US Occupation of Haiti, made plain by the 1920s, furnished further evidence that Jamaica should avoid US imperialism and self-government. “England has often been denounced as the tyrant of subject peoples . . . but we do desire to ask the attention of some of the critics of British administration the difference between the neighbouring islands and ourselves.”⁵⁵

For all this criticism of the occupation and sympathy for Haitians, few commentators outside of Haiti were willing to envision a Haitian future without the United States. The events of July 1915 were not easily forgotten. Guillaume-Sam’s murder became shorthand for Haitian incapacity to rule and the dangers of what could happen without foreign control. L. Ton Evans was challenged during the Senate inquiry to present an alternative scenario to occupation. He could not offer one. What he wished was that the United States should remain in Haiti for “ten or twenty-five years” and the brutal marine occupation should transition to a “civil occupation” with reduced US forces and more Haitian control of the state apparatus. This was crucial, he believed, because Haitians “in many respects are children,” and without the US presence, they “would gradually go back to their former position.”⁵⁶

The Jamaican papers in the 1920s were even more reluctant to consider a Haiti without the United States. As late as 1927, after the occupation was extended by agreement for another ten years, the *Daily Gleaner* concluded that the United States would not leave Haiti “in our day and generation.”⁵⁷

In another comment the paper expressed difficulty in conceiving a time to come when Haiti would not be “under the permanent tutelage of the United States.”⁵⁸

But Haiti was not an official colony, and the ambiguity of its status with the United States placed it in an unusual position. This was most evident in August 1928, when the republic was struck by a powerful hurricane that killed farm animals and destroyed crops in the southern districts. With a population faced with starvation, President Borno issued an appeal to Haiti’s neighbors for relief assistance, a first for the Haitian state. Jamaica responded readily. The governor, Reginald Stubbs, pledged £1,000 to the Haiti effort. The *Daily Gleaner* went further by organizing a “Hayti Relief Fund.” In its appeal for subscriptions, the paper drew reference to the contrasting positions of Haiti and Jamaica. Unlike Jamaica, Haiti “has no mother country” though it was a “protectorate of the United States”; hence it was up to Haiti to provide relief with its limited resources. A combination of history, geography, and fate made it imperative for Jamaica to assist. In making this point, the paper reminded its readers of Haiti’s response to the Kingston earthquake of 1907: “When Kingston was shaken to the dust and her people were camped in the open on the quaking earth, the Haytian Government sent for our relief and succor and shipped off supplies and a number of doctors—we cannot forget that now.”⁵⁹ The paper further implored Jamaicans to bear in mind that Haitians were West Indians like themselves: “One thing that we ought to remember is that we are West Indians and that Haytians are West Indians also: as much so as Jamaicans. . . . The thought that some thousands of West Indians, our neighbours, may thus die cannot be a pleasant one for us to entertain: it is indeed a horrible thought.”⁶⁰

Jamaican knowledge of the situation in Haiti improved in other ways in the 1920s. Parallel to political concerns was an expanding interest in cultural relations. In that decade football teams from both countries met in friendly competitions in Haiti and Jamaica. Much more than sporting events, the football tours were major exchanges of goodwill. Along with young athletes from leading schools, the tours included musicians and government representatives, and they attracted significant press coverage. Letters from Jamaican members of the team in Port-au-Prince were printed in full in the Kingston papers, bringing details about life in Haiti to the Jamaican reading public. In 1925 President Borno received the Jamaican team at the National Palace. Borno expressed the importance of these exchanges in enhancing relations between his country and Jamaica, a colony “dear to the hearts of many distinguished Haytiens, because it

was the land they adopted when in the old days their country had been in the throes of revolution.”⁶¹

Jamaican literary journals and magazines also took a more pronounced interest in Haiti in the late occupation years. Travelogues, poetry, magazine novels, and short stories that included Haitian themes were frequently found in these publications. Jamaican writers were most likely inspired by the advancements in Haitian literature and the Harlem Renaissance during the same period. Journals of the twenties and thirties such as *West Indian Review* and *Planter's Punch* regularly published short stories that centered on Haiti, written by Jamaicans, foreigners, and Haitians. Many took place in nineteenth-century Haiti but others were set during the occupation and often disparaged it. Esther Hyman's story "A Modern Young Woman" focused mainly on the occupation from the perspective of the wives of US marines. It offered an altogether unfavorable depiction of the world of the marine elite and the moral corruption that resulted from their status. Hyman was generally sympathetic to Haiti, having visited the country and seen the occupation firsthand.⁶²

Daily Gleaner editor DeLisser had visited Haiti in 1911 and maintained professional connections with Haitian counterparts over the years.⁶³ His prolificacy as a fiction writer earned him great renown in Jamaica. And as his editorials attest, he had strong views of the injustices of the occupation. Yet his work shows misconceptions of Haitian culture that many foreign writers shared. A prime example is a magazine novel he published in *Planter's Punch*, a literary journal he edited. "Zombies"—which bore the tagline "A Jamaican story of Black Art practiced by an educated man"—illustrates the way that this duality functioned in the imagination of Jamaica's elite writers.⁶⁴

The story's protagonist, Alexis Sam, is an amalgam of the worst of pre-occupation Haitian leaders—his name is an obvious reference to presidents Nord Alexis and Vilbrun Guillaume-Sam. DeLisser's Sam was born into a powerful family, spent years in exile in Jamaica, and returned to Haiti not long before the events of 1915. Sam's course is therefore much in keeping with Haitian politicians of the era. In "Zombies," Sam's career also echoes that of Charles Oscar Etienne. Sam was chief of the prison guard. On the orders of the president he arranged the execution of all the prisoners. Where the president—unnamed in the story—suffered his execution at the hands of the mob, Sam escaped to Kingston and became an "unfortunate refugee."⁶⁵ He would briefly return to Haiti during the occupation, where the marines never failed to remind him he was "not their equal."⁶⁶ He continued in politics and was eventually exiled permanently to Jamaica shortly after the occupation ended.

Sam's frequent movements between Jamaica and Haiti represented, in many ways, DeLisser's comment on the circularity of Haitian exile to Jamaica. The story is also DeLisser's attempt to forge a link between the pre- and post-occupation periods. More than a remnant of an earlier period, Sam is a reminder that the occupation had left Haitian politics unreformed. Sam is the epitome of evil; his bloodletting against the prisoners represents a venomous streak that DeLisser's fiction takes to extremes. In Haiti, and later from his refuge in Jamaica, he was the leader of the "cult of the Dead," a "terrible" man "who plagues the lives of the superstitious peasantry."⁶⁷ His purpose was to cause quiet terror in Jamaica by creating an army of zombies in the colony. He kidnaps children and keeps them hidden in his estate in the parish of St. Ann, managed by Haitian zombie henchmen. In the end, his plans are thwarted by the combined efforts of a valiant father of a missing girl, police officers, and defectors from his ranks.

When contrasted with his sharp editorials on the contemptibility of the occupation, DeLisser's unflattering picture of Haiti in "Zombies" is unexpected. Considered from another perspective, the story reveals the ambivalence Jamaican elites had about Haiti in these years. In some ways it is an exaggerated comment on their unresolved misgivings about their neighbor, which were fed by a burst of sensationalist literature that made its way to the colony. This material had some effect on shaping Jamaican views of Haitian culture. For them Jamaica's "sister island," as Haiti was often called, was burdened by the diabolism of its past and an ineffective occupation that had achieved little real transformation.

THE END

The contention between past and present in Jamaican fiction about Haiti was made real for Haitians as the decade turned. The occupation, fifteen years on, was *both* past and present. A restive generation raised under marine control began to test its strength. The student strike of October 1929 at the agricultural college in Damien morphed into a national protest that widened by December. The strikes ended violently when marines fired into a group of protestors, killing twelve and wounding twenty-three.⁶⁸ These events fixed attention on Haiti once more. In the United States the occupation was more closely scrutinized, and the media's verdict was that it was a great abuse of Haiti that was getting worse.

Jamaican papers had a common response. Days after the massacre in Les Cayes, the *Daily Gleaner* ran an editorial, "Trouble in Hayti," that compared pre-1915 Haiti with what then prevailed: "For over a hundred years the Haytians ruled themselves, and though their Governments were

really tyrannies, they were native tyrannies.” “Real peace,” the paper added, could not be achievable “when airplanes have to be sweeping over a country to overawe the peasant people.”⁶⁹ A week later, in another editorial devoted to Haitian events, the paper repeated its position of the previous decade that the United States had treated Haiti “as though it was a conquered country,” displaying “too much of the iron hand.”⁷⁰ This had been the root of popular dissatisfaction and protest. A positive outcome of 1929 was the lifting of the “veil of secrecy” of the United States presence in Haiti.⁷¹ No longer could the United States hide behind its propaganda; the world had now realized just how traumatic the experience was for Haitians. The paper suggested that a commission would follow, and that finally the full details of United States control would be known.

It thus appeared quite clear that Jamaican elites saw the protest and the attention it brought to Haiti as an opening for major change in the order of things. This unity of thought was deepened by Haitian elites’ rejection of United States dominance, as well as a flourishing cross-class nationalist movement that would gain steam over the next five years. All of this reinforced the skepticism Jamaican elites carried toward US imperialism. Stories of the failings of US Caribbean policy were more regularly featured in Jamaican papers during this period.⁷² Also common were reports from US papers such as the *Nation*, which were highly critical of the occupation.

Jamaican sympathy, however, did not alter the view that a fundamental rot still existed in the Haitian political system. In spite of their solidarity regarding the possibility of change in the occupation, Jamaican writers inserted recollections of the caprices of pre-occupation Haitian politics into their discussions about Haiti’s future. The next stage of Haiti’s fate at the beginning of the 1930s was therefore closely followed. When the Forbes Commission arrived in Haiti early in 1930, reports of its activities appeared regularly in the Jamaican dailies. Based on the Commission’s findings, President Herbert Hoover agreed to a gradual six-year withdrawal of US marines from Haiti.

The *Daily Gleaner*, sobered after the outpouring of support for Haiti during the protests, published a long editorial on the decision. The paper expressed a staunch view that US withdrawal was not a good idea—it was too drastic a solution to Haiti’s problems. Not unlike L. Ton Evans and others in the 1920s, the paper feared that Haiti would retreat to a bitter factional struggle for power, that Haitian leaders could not be trusted to maintain a fair political system. The paper went further, suggesting marine withdrawal would be insulting to Haiti as it would only prove to the world how utterly ungovernable Haiti was.⁷³

The writer of the editorial “The Case of Hayti”—most likely DeLisser—used it as an opportunity to issue one of the paper’s stronger pronouncements of the superiority of British colonialism over US occupation. The approach of the United States was inherently flawed, he argued, because it had no long history of imperialism. The difficulties in the occupation of Haiti were a result of inexperience. The United States always hoped to resolve problems rapidly; the British, by contrast, appreciated the importance of gradualism. Haiti would have been far better improved and less resistant by 1930 had Great Britain invaded. US imperialism was duplicitous. The United States had maintained that it was going to transform Haiti in twenty years, yet had no intention to ever loosen its grip on the country. Even with the proposed changes, according to the writer, “Hayti as an absolutely free country has become a thing of the past.” Had the British been the invading power in 1915, Haiti would have become a protectorate or colony; a “sound” police force commanded by experienced British officers would have been formed; a “sympathetic” governor would have been dispatched to Haiti; local independence would have been slowly widened; a civil service run by Haitians would have been instituted; most of all there would be no time limits. Such a colonial model—unsurprisingly the same one that existed in Jamaica, which DeLisser vigorously defended—would have minimized friction and allowed developments to happen naturally. In Jamaica, crown colony government was instituted after the Morant Bay Rebellion of 1865. The outcome of that violent event was to some degree influenced by a fear that self-government in Jamaica would lead to abuse of power. Haiti was frequently invoked by defenders of crown colony in Jamaica as the unfavorable outcome of Black self-rule.

The *Daily Gleaner*’s comments on Haiti in 1930 held a peripheral yet consistent older view that Haiti would have fared better as a British colony like Jamaica. The presumed thoughtfulness of British administrators who could rely on centuries of experience in the British West Indian islands—which like Haiti were considered Black and underdeveloped—would allow future Haitians to “feel themselves attached to Great Britain.” By comparison, after a decade and a half Haitians had no attachment whatsoever to the United States.⁷⁴

This perception was not unanimous. There were Jamaicans living in Haiti who appreciated the benefits they could derive from the present system, benefits that were not available to them in Jamaica. Although many were from the popular classes, several were well-known elites. The most prominent example was O. J. Brandt, a Jamaican national who had been living in Haiti since 1910. By 1928 Brandt had left a position with

the Royal Bank of Canada to develop one of Haiti's largest industries.⁷⁵ Another Jamaican who made the most of the opportunities he found in Haiti was O. T. Fairclough. Fairclough moved to Haiti at the age of twenty to work with the Banque Nationale in Port-au-Prince, where he would live for eight years. Fairclough—who was a personal friend of leading Haitian nationalists such as Jacques Roumain and Jean Briere, and who would later be instrumental in the founding of Jamaica's People's National Party (PNP)—believed that Haiti had a lot to be proud of. He found Haitians to be “more dignified” than Jamaicans.⁷⁶

Brandt and Fairclough were exceptions, however. They were also associated with foreign companies that drew criticism from Haitian nationalists frustrated with the positions of influence held by foreigners in the country after 1930. A Jamaican visitor to Haiti in 1931 wrote that “Jamaicans were not wanted” in Haiti. This was an overstatement, but it got at the unease over foreign control that some Haitians registered during the transitional period.⁷⁷ The Jamaican presence in Haiti during the occupation also included Marcus Garvey's Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA), which had long praised the Haitian Revolution and its leaders. The movement had a branch in Haiti. UNIA membership there appears to have been small, although its ideas of pan-Africanism and Black self-empowerment were added to the mix of Black consciousness movements—which also included the NAACP—that swirled in Port-au-Prince against the occupation in this period.⁷⁸

More substantive was the explicit support in Jamaica for Haiti in the final years of occupation. This was usually directed to Haiti's new leadership and its president, Sténio Vincent, who had been elected on November 18, 1930. With nationalist credentials affirmed through his membership in the Union Patriotique, Vincent's political position was clearly aligned with supporting the full restoration of Haitian control. In October 1932 he rejected a proposal for a new treaty with the United States since it would not bring an end to the military occupation, a move that was met with vibrant applause in Haiti and inspired a banner headline in the Jamaican press.⁷⁹ The Haitian papers praised Vincent, likening him to a “second liberator” of Haiti.⁸⁰

Although radical opposition against the state began to emerge, the popular response after Vincent's election was that he was a positive force in Haiti. Jamaican elites apparently had confidence in his ability to lead Haiti. The Kingston papers started to issue reports of far-reaching changes in Haitian agriculture and that the country under Vincent was, in the words of a Jamaican visitor, “in a prosperous state.”⁸¹ Even DeLisser began

to support the view that Haiti would be better off without the United States: “Now that America has recognized the error of its intervention in the first place, she ought to leave Haiti without standing upon formality or ceremony.”⁸²

When Vincent visited Jamaica in September 1933, he was the first sitting Haitian president to do so. It was a short though highly significant visit. Jamaica’s elite honored him at the famous Myrtle Bank Hotel in Kingston. The visit endeared him to Jamaicans, who became more committed to siding with the president in the creation of a “free” Haiti after the occupation.⁸³ A few years later, on Vincent’s birthday, the *Daily Gleaner* published a supplement devoted to the man it regarded as the “benefactor and patriot” of Haiti, “responsible for the rehabilitating of his strife-torn country.”⁸⁴

On the first day of January 1934, Haiti celebrated its 130th anniversary as an independent nation. As Haitians across the republic reveled in the event—all the more meaningful in the final year of occupation—a large group of mostly elite Jamaicans gathered at the Constant Spring Hotel in Kingston to mark the occasion. The function was organized by C. L. Martin, Haiti’s Consul-General to Jamaica, by then resident in the island for twelve years. Martin opened the informal afternoon speeches with a stirring account of Haiti’s struggle for freedom and independence in 1804. He praised the republic’s early leaders and was careful to point out Haiti’s contributions to the region. Other diplomats followed Martin’s toast to Haiti, including the US Consul to Jamaica, who also praised Haiti’s long independence.

When it was his turn, George Seymour-Seymour, the mayor of Kingston, made clear that Jamaica could not be impartial to events in Haiti given the “intimate connection” between the two countries forged by a long history of migration, exile, and friendship. Since those days, both countries had to confront the enormous influence of the United States. He mused that the United States “would love to call [Jamaica] American,” but “there was no necessity for any conquest; peaceful penetration would do all that was necessary.” Haiti on the other hand, had had a US occupation and that period had now come to its conclusion. In the presence of the US Consul he stated, to rapturous cheers, that “there could be no question now that what the [Americans] had started could be ably continued by the Haitians themselves.”⁸⁵

Seven months later, on August 1, Jamaicans celebrated their own milestone, Emancipation Day, commemorating the document that initiated

the end of slavery in the British colonies. Emancipation Day 1934 was all the more important as it marked the centenary of the Emancipation Act. And as with Haitian Independence Day, their joy was shared with their neighbors as Haitians celebrated a different type of liberation on that date—the formal transfer of control from the US military to the Garde d'Haïti, the official beginning of Haiti's "second independence."

The US occupation was for Haiti a test of its long independence and all that had followed 1804. It brought to dramatic end the dire political circumstances that had helped establish Haitian and Jamaican interconnections over a century. But it also forced people in both countries to question their place in a region that had become dominated by the United States. Their conclusions were largely negative. As historian Brenda Gayle Plummer has argued, two decades of US control "had neither changed nor reformed Haitian politics but inadvertently strengthened and assured the survival of many of its worst features."⁸⁶ This situation engendered mixed views. The occupation was both loved and loathed by elites in both countries. Jamaicans, like other British West Indians, never had to confront it directly. As we have seen, those who commented did so from the vantage point of a colony with a tense yet durable bond to empire. This bond was always a point of pride for them. The inconsistency with which they treated occupied Haiti was a projection of their own uncertainty of where the Caribbean was heading under the shadow of US hegemony. What destiny was possible in the years of the Great Depression was still a point of conjecture in 1934. What was more apparent was that a new generation was grafting its own vision of the region on recent history. After 1934 Jamaica began its long push toward self-government and independence. Haiti's progress—its freedom first from France and then from the United States—would never be far from their thoughts. For Haiti the ending of the occupation brought mixed blessings.⁸⁷ The period after 1934 would give Haiti new possibilities and, in equal measure, disappointments.

Notes

- ¹ The interview appeared in "Present Revolution in Hayti," *Daily Gleaner*, July 19, 1915, 13.
- ² Smith, *Liberty, Fraternity, Exile*.
- ³ Information in this paragraph taken from "Debarquement de Marins américains—Triste fin du Président Vilburn Guillaume," *Le Matin*, July 29, 1915, 1; R. M. Kohan to Edward Grey, Port-au-Prince, August 6, 1915, The National Archives, UK, FO 371/2370.

- ⁴ “Hayti,” *Jamaica Times*, August 14, 1915, 5.
- ⁵ Cundall, *Jamaica’s Part in the Great War*.
- ⁶ Jamaican support for imperial Britain was especially strong during the middle of the decade when, simultaneously, political events in Haiti were unraveling in the years leading to the occupation. See, for example, a description of a meeting in Manchester in “Jamaica’s Rally to King and Flag,” *Jamaica Times*, July 6, 1915, 7. The *Jamaica Times* also carried a regular feature titled “Story of the Great War,” which covered events on the frontline and details from West Indian servicemen. Haitian events seldom featured in this period.
- ⁷ Schmidt, *The United States Occupation of Haiti*, 60.
- ⁸ J. L. Pieteresz, “Haiti—The First Phase,” public lecture reprinted in *Jamaica Times*, April 15, 1916, 2.
- ⁹ “The United States Demands Real Protectorate in Hayti,” *Daily Gleaner*, August 31, 1915, 10.
- ¹⁰ See, for example, “L’Infiltration yankee,” *Le Matin*, September 13, 1915, 1.
- ¹¹ Vilmenay’s comments were part of an interview that appeared in the article “Hayti Turns from a Dark Past towards a Brightening Future,” *Jamaica Times*, February 26, 1916, 7.
- ¹² “Dr. Bobo Protests to the American President,” *Daily Gleaner*, October 11, 1915, 11.
- ¹³ J. L. Pieteresz, “Haiti—The First Phase,” public lecture reprinted in *Jamaica Times*, April 15, 1916, 2.
- ¹⁴ “America in Haiti,” *Daily Gleaner*, August 16, 1915, 8.
- ¹⁵ “The United States and the British West Indies,” *Jamaica Times*, December 13, 1919, 20.
- ¹⁶ Ibid. See also, “Intervention américaine et la politique mondiale,” *Le Matin*, September 8, 1915, 1.
- ¹⁷ Meikle, *British West Indies*, 9, ix, 10.
- ¹⁸ The same sentiment about US occupation was held in the Dominican Republic. I thank Patrick Bryan for making this point to me.
- ¹⁹ “The Cry of Slavery,” *Daily Gleaner*, September 4, 1915, 8.
- ²⁰ “Jamaica’s Future Rival,” *Daily Gleaner*, August 27, 1915, 8.
- ²¹ “The Sugar Situation,” *Daily Gleaner*, September 12, 1917, 8.
- ²² “Americans and Haytian Posts,” *Daily Gleaner*, July 11, 1916, 1.
- ²³ “Hayti,” *Daily Gleaner*, June 7, 1917, 8.
- ²⁴ “What Has Happened?,” *Daily Gleaner*, November 3, 1920, 8.
- ²⁵ Schmidt, *The United States Occupation of Haiti*, 109.

- ²⁶ Renda, *Taking Haiti*, 151, 32–33. On the resistance to the US marines, there are many good works. See, for example, Roger Gaillard’s classic, *Charlemagne Péralte, le caco*, and Alan McPherson’s recent study *The Invaded: How Latin Americans and Their Allies Fought and Ended U.S. Occupations*, 59–67.
- ²⁷ “Proclamation,” *Le Nouvelliste*, December 5, 1929, 1.
- ²⁸ “Hayti,” *Daily Gleaner*, June 7, 1917, 8.
- ²⁹ See, for example, “Programmes for Celebration on Peace Day: The City’s Plans,” *Daily Gleaner*, July 17, 1919, 13; “Back from the War,” *Jamaica Times*, August 30, 1919, 13.
- ³⁰ On this point, see Suggs, “The Response of the African American Press,” 70–82.
- ³¹ Johnson, “The Truth about Haiti,” 217–224.
- ³² *Inquiry into Occupation and Administration*, 1:146.
- ³³ On Evans’s time in Jamaica, see an article on one of his lectures, “Mission Work in the Haytian Republic,” *Daily Telegraph and Anglo-American Guardian*, July 24, 1908, 11; and *Inquiry into Occupation and Administration*, 130. For a thoughtful analysis of Evans’s opposition to the occupation, see Olsen, “Reverend L. Ton Evans,” 23–48, and Renda, *Taking Haiti*, 162–163.
- ³⁴ *Inquiry into Occupation and Administration*, 155.
- ³⁵ *Ibid.*, 158.
- ³⁶ *Ibid.*, 180.
- ³⁷ *Ibid.*, 233.
- ³⁸ “What Has Happened?,” *Daily Gleaner*, November 3, 1920, 8.
- ³⁹ Cobham, “The Literary Side of H. G. de Lissier,” 6. For more on DeLissier’s important role in Jamaican public life, see also Rosenberg, *Nationalism and the Formation of Caribbean Literature*.
- ⁴⁰ “What Has Happened?,” *Daily Gleaner*, November 3, 1920, 8.
- ⁴¹ “Why Not?,” *Daily Gleaner*, July 24, 1922, 8.
- ⁴² “America and Hayti,” *Daily Gleaner*, November 24, 1920, 6.
- ⁴³ *Ibid.*
- ⁴⁴ *Ibid.*
- ⁴⁵ “Hayti to Wage Passive War against the U.S.,” *Daily Gleaner*, May 27, 1922, 1.
- ⁴⁶ “Interview with Mr. C. Moravia Journalist,” *Daily Gleaner*, October 29, 1926, 13.
- ⁴⁷ Pierre-Louis’s letter appeared in the letters-to-the-editor section of the *Daily Gleaner*, January 27, 1927, 8.
- ⁴⁸ “America in Haiti,” *Daily Gleaner*, March 1, 1927, 10.

- ⁴⁹ “American Occupation of Hayti—Views of a Haytian,” *Daily Gleaner*, April 17, 1925, 8.
- ⁵⁰ “West Indian Emigrants in the U.S.,” 789.
- ⁵¹ “American Occupation of Hayti—Views of a Haytian,” *Daily Gleaner*, April 17, 1925, 8.
- ⁵² “Look at This Picture,” *Daily Gleaner*, June 27, 1924, 8.
- ⁵³ Ibid.
- ⁵⁴ “The New Hayti,” *Daily Gleaner*, February 17, 1927, 10.
- ⁵⁵ “Some Difference,” *Daily Gleaner*, July 24, 1922, 8.
- ⁵⁶ *Inquiry into Occupation and Administration*, 198.
- ⁵⁷ “The New Hayti,” *Daily Gleaner*, June 27, 1924, 8.
- ⁵⁸ “What Is Their Fate?,” *Daily Gleaner*, August 3, 1925, 8.
- ⁵⁹ “Hayti’s Plight,” *Daily Gleaner*, August 21, 1928, 10. A similar point was made by the editor of the *Jamaica Times*. See “Haiti’s Appeal,” *Jamaica Times*, September 8, 1928, 14.
- ⁶⁰ “The Haytian Fund,” *Daily Gleaner*, September 13, 1928, 10.
- ⁶¹ “The Recent Tour of Our Footballers in Hayti,” *Daily Gleaner*, April 9, 1925, 6.
- ⁶² Hyman, “A Modern Young Woman,” 25–31. As editor of the journal, Hyman insisted on publishing Haitian writers including Leon Laleau and Pierre Morpeau. The journal also offered lengthy reviews of Haitian novels.
- ⁶³ On DeLisser’s visit and earlier writing on Haiti, see Smith, “H. G. and Haiti,” 1–18.
- ⁶⁴ H. G. DeLisser, “Zombies,” in *Planter’s Punch* (1936–1937).
- ⁶⁵ Ibid., 63.
- ⁶⁶ Ibid., 62.
- ⁶⁷ Ibid., 37.
- ⁶⁸ Renda, *Taking Haiti*, 34; Schmidt, *The U.S. Occupation of Haiti*, 200.
- ⁶⁹ “Trouble in Hayti,” *Daily Gleaner*, December 9, 1929, 12.
- ⁷⁰ “Conditions in Hayti,” *Daily Gleaner*, December 14, 1929, 12.
- ⁷¹ “America and Haiti,” *Daily Gleaner*, January 2, 1930, 12.
- ⁷² “America’s Caribbean Policy Again under Scrutiny,” *Daily Gleaner*, May 8, 1931, 10.
- ⁷³ “The Case of Hayti,” *Daily Gleaner*, February 13, 1930, 12.
- ⁷⁴ Ibid.

- ⁷⁵ “West Indian Personalities—Oswald J. Brandt,” *West Indian Review*, August 1936, 25.
- ⁷⁶ Post, *Arise Ye Starvelings*, 215; *PNP 25th Anniversary 1938–1963*, pamphlet, National Library of Jamaica. I thank Khitanya Petgrave for drawing my attention to these sources.
- ⁷⁷ Plummer, “Haiti,” ccxx.
- ⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, ccxxi.
- ⁷⁹ “Proud Haiti Demands Her Old Freedom,” *Daily Gleaner*, October 29, 1932, 1; Schmidt, *The United States Occupation of Haiti*, 225–226.
- ⁸⁰ See, for example, the special issue on Vincent of *La Relève*, March–May 1936.
- ⁸¹ “Impressions of Haiti and Santo Domingo,” *Daily Gleaner*, June 19, 1934, 18.
- ⁸² “Still a Problem,” *Daily Gleaner*, August 18, 1931, 12.
- ⁸³ See, for example, “President of Haiti Says Thanks to Jamaica,” *Daily Gleaner*, September 15, 1933, 1.
- ⁸⁴ “Happy Birthday,” *Daily Gleaner*, February 22, 1940, 17. See also “Haiti Is Now Developing Agriculture,” *Daily Gleaner*, March 7, 1933, 23.
- ⁸⁵ “131st Anniversary of the Independence of the Haitian Republic Celebrated at Big Luncheon at the Constant Spring Hotel,” *Daily Gleaner*, January 2, 1934, 16.
- ⁸⁶ Plummer, *Haiti and the United States*, 120.
- ⁸⁷ Smith, *Red and Black in Haiti*.

Bibliography

- Cobham, Rhonda. “The Literary Side of H. G. de Lissier, 1878–1944.” *Jamaica Journal* 17, no. 4 (November 1984–January 1985): 2–9.
- Cundall, Frank. *Jamaica’s Part in the Great War, 1914–1918*. Kingston: Institute of Jamaica, 1925.
- Gaillard, Roger. *Charlemagne Péralte, le caco*. Port-au-Prince: Imprimerie Henri Deschamps, 1982.
- Hyman, Esther. “A Modern Young Woman.” *West Indian Review* (June 1935): 25–31.
- Inquiry into Occupation and Administration of Haiti and Santo Domingo: Hearings before a Select Committee on Haiti and Santo Domingo; United States Senate*. Vol. 1. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1922.
- Johnson, James Weldon. “The Truth about Haiti: An NAACP Investigation.” *Crisis* 5 (September 1920): 217–224.
- McPherson, Alan. *The Invaded: How Latin Americans and Their Allies Fought and Ended U.S. Occupations*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.

- Meikle, Louis. *British West Indies: Confederation v. Annexation to the United States—A Political Discourse on the West Indies*. London: Sampson, Low, Marston, 1912.
- Olsen, Scott H. "Reverend L. Ton Evans and the United States Occupation of Haiti." *Caribbean Studies* 26, no. 1/2 (1993): 23–48.
- Plummer, Brenda Gayle. "Haiti." In *The Marcus Garvey and Universal Negro Improvement Association Papers: The Caribbean Diaspora, 1910–1920*, vol. XI, edited by Robert A. Hill, ccxix–ccxxi. Durham: Duke University Press, 2011.
- . *Haiti and the United States: The Psychological Moment*. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1992.
- Post, Ken. *Arise Ye Starvelings: The Jamaica Labor Rebellion of 1938 and Its Aftermath*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978.
- Renda, Mary A. *Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and the Culture of U.S. Imperialism*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001.
- Rosenberg, Leah. *Nationalism and the Formation of Caribbean Literature*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.
- Schmidt, Hans. *The United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915–1934*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1995.
- Smith, Matthew J. "H. G. and Haiti: An Analysis of Herbert G. DeLisser's 'Land of Revolutions.'" *Journal of Caribbean History* 44, no. 2 (2010): 1–18.
- . *Liberty, Fraternity, Exile: Haiti and Jamaica after Emancipation*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2014.
- . *Red and Black in Haiti: Radicalism, Conflict, and Political Change, 1934–1957*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009.
- Suggs, Henry Lewis. "The Response of the African American Press to the United States Occupation of Haiti, 1915–1934." *Journal of African American History* 87 (winter 2002): 70–82.
- "West Indian Emigrants in the U.S., 1900–1930." In *The Marcus Garvey and Universal Negro Improvement Association Papers: The Caribbean Diaspora, 1910–1920*, vol. XI, edited by Robert A. Hill, 789. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011.