

**Veblen and the Political Economy of Technocracy:  
*The Herald of Technological Revolution Developed  
 an Ideology of 'Scientific' Collectivism***

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ABSTRACT. In the early 1900s, *engineers* in the United States began developing their own analysis of the *economy*. *Thorstein Veblen*, in *The Engineers and the Price System*, gave a systematic treatment of that analysis. But Veblen's approach to political economy was broader than that of the engineers. His understanding of *social change* was based on a two-part research program: First, recognize the *institutional elements of social stability*; then identify an operative force with *technological values* that could foster change. When applied to the U.S. of his day, this research program resulted in Veblen's seeing a conflict between *pecuniary* and *industrial values*. Veblen believed that the triumph of industrial values was crucial for making society compatible with mass-production *technology*. These values were held to by both engineers and *industrial workers*. Veblen's earlier works emphasized workers as being agents for social change; later he shifted his focus to engineers. In both cases he reacted to the social activism of each group.

I

**Introduction**

IN THE EARLY YEARS of this century, American business underwent a transformation in terms of size, technology and organizational complexity. As part of that transformation, engineers were thrust into important positions as experts in the new technology the firms were employing. But this new position was troubling to many engineers, for business and technology often had different imperatives. To reconcile these differences in favor of the technological imperatives, engineering advocates developed an economic analysis that argued for the need of technical efficiency both in individual firms and for the economy as a whole.

This analysis ultimately evolved into a political economy of Technocracy, a call for national economic planning under the leadership of engineers.<sup>1</sup> To be sure, this program was scattered in many articles in the engineering press; the closest it came to systematic presentation was in Thorstein Veblen's *The Engineers and the Price System*. That book echoed many of the ideas of the engineers.

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Veblen and the engineers had been thinking in parallel for many years in terms of how the economy should be organized.

But Veblen added another socioeconomic element to the analysis. He had long been concerned with the motivation of social movements. His writings on engineers continued in this vein, so deserve first rank as a treatise on the political economy of Technocracy. How a person as reputedly radical as Veblen ended up the proponent of a group as conservative as engineers is the subject of the present study.

## II

### **Thorstein Veblen's Social Economics**

AS HE STATED many times, Thorstein Veblen considered himself to be a follower of Darwin. His version of social Darwinism, however, unlike that of conservative defenders of business, was aimed at determining what features of the social structure presented the potential for evolution into a socialist system. Veblen rarely discussed the ideas that had influenced him. But his wife thought that their joint reading of Edward Bellamy's socialist tract, *Looking Backward*, had greatly increased Veblen's interest in economic and social problems and awakened him to his life's work.<sup>2</sup> The whole of Veblen's writings can be interpreted, as Stephen Edgall has, as an effort to "recast Bellamy's indictment of capitalism in historical and evolutionary terms. . . ."<sup>3</sup>

In the early 1890s, Edward Bellamy had stirred up controversy by proposing a model of socialism for the U.S. As far as Bellamy was concerned, socialism would continue the centralization of industry started by trusts; the national government, backed by a vast majority of the population, would take over ownership of industry and operate it collectively for the public good. Under this system a national council of the best workers would be elected to plan the overall economy.<sup>4</sup>

The Bellamy system helped Veblen to raise an important question. How could members of U.S. society be motivated to such a system or any other system that improved the economic structure? To inform all his speculations about social behavior, Veblen relied on a theory of evolutionary change. This theory, with its roots in social Darwinism, was never fully articulated. Yet its thrust was clear.<sup>5</sup> In the theory Veblen devised, social behavior was determined through the multiple interplay of instincts, institutions and technology.

At the level of instinct, Veblen separated human action into two parts, a desire to perform productive work and a need to engage in aggressive activity. Human survival, the ultimate goal of human actions, required economic production.

Under the conditions of their "split personality", people satisfied this requirement through production or predation.<sup>6</sup>

The degree to which human behavior inclined toward production or predation depended on the institutions of society. Societies that rewarded aggressive behavior would be marked by predation. Yet production required knowledge and workmanship with materials and techniques, so was always necessary. That knowledge was incorporated in technology.

To be used productively, Veblen asserted, technology relied on factual information of means and materials. Yet that factual information could be contaminated by institutional thought, by custom, superstition, religion, and so forth.<sup>7</sup> This contamination set up a conflict of values in a society that formed the core of Veblen's analysis. In very broad terms, Veblen's theory of evolutionary change involved a two-part sequence: First recognize the institutional, predatory elements that dominated the structure of social stability; then identify an operative force with "technological" values that could reorient the social system toward production.

When he applied that theory to analyze American society, however, Veblen produced uneven results in terms of predicting social change. His great success was in his treatment of predatory force of American business and property values, what he termed pecuniary values, and the manner through which these principles trickled down through the non-business classes. As I have argued elsewhere, a main feature of *The Theory of the Leisure Class* was Veblen's demonstration of how the leisure class and its pecuniary values maintained a conservative hold over all society.<sup>8</sup>

This predatory hold over society was reinforced by the power this class held in its business activities. In great detail, Veblen laid out the following features of business in his day as related to his theory of social change: 1) Businessmen, to maintain the value of their capital, turned to the restriction of production and the deprivations of finance for their profits, hence they were no longer strictly productive; 2) in the process of restricting production, businessmen formed large combinations of capital, hence they centralized industry; 3) by concentrating their attention on business affairs, businessmen lost their competency as managers of production; 4) competition did compel the introduction of new technology, but only when businessmen thought it a propitious time; 5) the industrial workforce was not to be included in the business system as an active partner.<sup>9</sup> Points 1), 2), and 3) were Veblen's way of establishing how the pecuniary values of the businessmen rendered them unsuitable to control production. In all these endeavors, businessmen were primarily motivated to increase the value of their monetary capital, a predatory act which need not increase

the aggregate and efficiency of industrial capital. Parallels to the thinking of engineers are to be found here, although Veblen's analysis went much deeper than theirs. Moreover, Veblen continued with points 4) and 5) which indicated his view of from whence would come social change. The business system might be setting up its own downfall.

Throughout his career, Veblen astutely identified technology, and the industrial values attached to it, as a force for social change that had the potential to counter the pecuniary values of the leisure (*i.e.*, business) class; this identification gave life to Veblen's approach by setting up a possible social conflict between those persons in pecuniary employments (making money) and those persons in industrial occupations (producing goods).<sup>10</sup> While the business classes were in control and readily recognizable, Veblen's efforts to pinpoint human agents with the industrial values necessary to make them capable of freeing technology from business values remained problematic.

Because of his Darwinian premises, Veblen was unable to impute to any group an innate propensity to adhere to productive values. Instead, Veblen proposed the values of a scientific outlook as a paradigm capable of combating the predatory force of the business/leisure class; his task was to find out which groups in society developed this attitude and were capable of applying it to industrial production. Engineers would have seemed likely candidates for developing a scientific approach toward industry, but they were not the group Veblen stressed in his early work.

Under modern conditions industrial production took place under a system Veblen called the "machine process." Those persons most closely involved with the machine process developed empirical knowledge about machines and materials and how these devices and commodities fit into the total production process. The outcome of this training was a general change in their mental outlook. As Veblen described it, "The machine throws out anthropomorphic habits of thought. It compels the adaptation of the workman to his work, rather than the adaptation of the work to the workman. The machine process rests on knowledge of impersonal, material cause and effect, not on the dexterity, diligence, or personal force of the workman, still less on the habits and propensities of the workman's superiors."<sup>11</sup> In short, their work within systematic process manufacturing indoctrinated workers with a skeptical, scientific attitude toward production.

Veblen was not the only writer of his time who interpreted machines and factory work as creating a healthier frame of mind for workers. Alfred Marshall had previously argued, "The more delicate the machine's power, the greater is the judgement and carefulness which is called for from those who see after it." As a result, Marshall concluded, "the person who minds it must have an intel-

ligence and an energetic sense of responsibility, which go a long way towards making a fine character."<sup>12</sup> Carroll Wright, U.S. Commissioner of Labor at the turn of the century, had also written: "The factory means education, enlightenment, and an intellectual development utterly impossible without it,—I mean to a class of people who could not reach these things in any other way. It is an element in social life. By its educational influence it is constantly lifting people from a lower to a higher grade."<sup>13</sup>

Whether Veblen was influenced by these writers remains unclear.<sup>14</sup> But he had found an operative force for social change. In the U.S. there existed a conflict based on occupational values. The business classes and its supporters worked in a pecuniary system of making money. For Veblen, making money was a predatory activity which only loosely connected businessmen to the production of goods. Their entire mental outlook rendered them unfit for productive work. It is not necessary here to go into the specifics of which groups Veblen included in the predatory category, a job that Rick Tilman has admirably done.<sup>15</sup>

Rather, attention will be centered on the group with the most potential for productive values. When the groups on most intimate terms with the machine process scrutinized the business system and its methods with their empirical skepticism, Veblen asserted, they recognized its predatory nature. The predatory side of this group would be eroded by the machine process, along with its faith in business values. Thus the potential would be created for a transition to new social order, based on productive values.

When it came to identifying the specifics of this group, Veblen was rather vague. True, he referred to it as the industrial workforce. But his description of that workforce included a variety of skills.

The civil engineer, the mechanical engineer, the navigator, the mining expert, the industrial chemist and mineralogist, the electrician,—the work of all of these falls within the lines of the modern machine process as well as the work of the inventor who devises the process and that of the mechanic who puts the inventions into place and oversees their working.<sup>16</sup>

Since all the jobs mentioned require a high level of technical skills, Veblen's taxonomy of the workforce was much broader than Tilman's listing of "blue collar work."<sup>17</sup>

In referring to the impact of the machine process, Veblen maintained that it fell "more immediately on the workmen engaged in the mechanical industries."<sup>18</sup> Several pages later he clarifies this by asserting that its largest impact will be among those "who are required to comprehend and guide the process, rather than among those who serve merely as mechanical auxiliaries;" in other words, "among the higher ranks of skilled mechanics, and perhaps more decisively among those who stand in an *engineering* or supervisory relation to the process."<sup>19</sup> These groups also came less under sway of pecuniary logic in terms of

bargaining for wages, especially workmen and "what may be called the engineering force."<sup>20</sup>

### III

#### **Veblen and Socialism**

AT THIS POINT engineers would seem to have played an important part in Veblen's analysis. Instead, he leaves them aside in favor of using the machine process to explain the activities of trade-unionism and socialism. Trade-unionism represented an attempt by workers to bring their own conditions in line with the organizational form required by the machine process. As Veblen put it, "The classes who move in trade unions are . . . endeavoring to construct an institutional scheme on the lines imposed by the new exigencies given by the machine process."<sup>21</sup>

Much the same could be said for socialism, according to Veblen. While "there is little agreement among socialists as to a program for the future," in general they look "to the disappearance of property rights."<sup>22</sup> None of this was of concern to Veblen in this writing. He was interested in earmarking those groups likely to support socialism. Here he applied his occupational theory of consciousness to show that "the effective nucleus of the socialistic malcontents is made up of the more intelligent body of workmen in the highly organized and specialized industries."<sup>23</sup> Engineers were not mentioned specifically, as they had been earlier. At the same time, Veblen eliminated "the body of unskilled laborers." It would appear, then, that Veblen would predict the most likely adherents of a new social system would be unionized, skilled workers. This prediction conforms very well to the case studies of John Laslett who has noted that skilled workers were being converted to socialism at the time Veblen was writing. But contrary to Veblen, Laslett argued that skilled workers turned to socialism as a defense against the introduction of mechanized production.<sup>24</sup>

Although he left no blueprint for socialism, Veblen made some comments that clarify his position. A new social order must be compatible with the machine process. Both anarchism and socialism shared a negative attitude with regard to capitalism. But of the two, "the socialists are more widely out of touch with the established order." That was because anarchism was based on the same "natural rights grounds" as business, and "takes no account of mechanical exigencies." Whereas socialists agree that "the industrial system must decide what the social structure is to be."<sup>25</sup>

These statements imply support by Veblen for the standard version of socialism. This interpretation conforms to the notion earlier indicated that Veblen was greatly influenced by Edward Bellamy, for several historians of socialism in the

U.S. find a similar influence of Bellamy on native socialists.<sup>26</sup> Bellamy's version of socialism could be taken as elitist, though he felt it exemplified representative democracy. In a like fashion Veblen found that "the political bias of this unmitigated socialism is always radically democratic."<sup>27</sup> Probably, Veblen shared Bellamy's vision of a centralized industrial system organized and planned by a body of elected officials. Only these officials would be elected on a basis of their productive talents, not as a result of their predatory virtues. Even though he does not indicate them at the time, engineers surely would be prime candidates for any office based on production.

It should therefore not surprise us that Veblen eventually reoriented his research program by concentrating on engineering efforts at reform. Yet, although this reorientation now appears inevitable, it must be recalled that Veblen did not isolate engineers as a special group for nearly two decades; his new interest actually represented a shift in emphasis. He had categorized all labor, manual and scientific, as part of the industrial workforce potentially susceptible to socialist ideas. In his later work Veblen undertook the analysis of the function of the engineering branch of that productive workforce.

#### IV

#### **Veblen and the Engineers**

THE FIRST STEP down this path occurred when Veblen convinced himself that workers had reneged on their radicalism when they adopted the defensive strategy toward capitalism that Veblen's former student, Robert Hoxie, dubbed "business unionism." This conviction, that labor remained conservative, opened Veblen's mind to a positive reception of the engineers' attack on business discussed above. The introduction of these new trains of thought can be seen sooner than in *The Engineers and the Price System*.

In an earlier work, *The Instinct of Workmanship*, Veblen decided that the mental impact of the machine process had not produced the sweeping transformation of consciousness he had earlier supposed likely.<sup>28</sup> Workers adhered to business principles in their quest for more money through such unproductive activities as strikes and slowdowns. Workers had not developed the scientific, production-oriented outlook Veblen had expected.

At the same time, Veblen identified another trend: Businessmen overcame their lack of technological knowledge by hiring technical experts to assist them. In a brief passage Veblen gave the first indication of his shifting emphasis toward engineers.

The businessmen in control of large industrial enterprise are beginning to appreciate something of their own unfitness to direct or oversee, or even to control technological matters,

and so they have, in a tentative way, taken to employing experts to do the work for them. Such experts are known colloquially as "efficiency experts" and are presumed to combine the qualifications of technologist and accountant. In point of fact it is as accountants, capable of applying the tests of accountancy to a new field, that these experts commend themselves to the businessmen in control, and the efficiency to which they look is an efficiency in terms of net pecuniary gain.<sup>29</sup>

Veblen seems to be responding to the publicity campaign of the scientific management movement; he interpreted its claims as being oriented more toward increasing profits than production. Since this orientation precluded these engineers from being the agents for social change Veblen sought, he was probably not interested in providing an in-depth analysis of the activities of the new breed of scientific managers. Veblen did not jump on the scientific management bandwagon that marked the years 1911-1912.

Instead, the efficiency experts had to modify their attitude toward efficiency before Veblen designated them as a force for social unrest in *The Engineers and the Price System*. By the post World War I period, Veblen modified his interpretation of engineers as part of the industrial workforce. Now they moved to the forefront of his analysis as having attained a proper set of industrial values. This shift in emphasis has several explanations. As previously noted, Veblen thought labor had lost its potential to overcome its pecuniary values. In addition, socialist thinkers and progressive reformers were, by 1919, also expressing interest in engineers as a social force. The main point, in terms of this study, is that Veblen had been reading what the engineers had said about the economy. For once he left behind a clue to his interests. The "selected bibliography for Dr. Veblen's lectures on the industrial transition from the eighteenth to the twentieth century given at the New School for Social Research, Feb.-May 1919," a time when Veblen's thoughts on engineers congealed, includes the following references:

- L. P. Alford, "Importance of Machine-tools in Industrial Preparedness"
- J. M. Rae, "History of Machine-Tools"
- H. B. Drury, "Democracy as a Factor in Industrial Efficiency"
- H. L. Gant, *Industrial Leadership*
- C. B. Going, *Principles of Industrial Engineering*
- C. A. Hobbin, "The Investment Banker and the Engineer"
- G. L. Hoxie, "Political Economy and the Engineer"<sup>30</sup>

These authors of books and articles were in the forefront of the engineering movement discussed above; indeed, they were the movement.

In the ears of Veblen their plea for economic reorganization received a favorable hearing; his analysis of engineers repeated what the upstart engineers reported of themselves and their activities. Furthermore, for a short time Veblen,



as has been well established, collaborated with a small group of engineering radicals known as the Technical Alliance in an attempt to provide engineers some direction in the application of their industrial values. *The Engineers and the Price System* was a part of that attempt.

Veblen learned nothing new about the economy from these engineers; primarily he heard an echo of his own arguments. As part of the continual growth of firm size and the concomitant further division of labor between shop and office, Veblen observed, the work of the business leader was reduced to routine tasks. Veblen had recognized this trend earlier, especially in the area of corporate finance. But now business functionaries no longer handled the routinized industrial affairs of the corporation. Instead, Veblen proclaimed, "industrial experts, engineers, chemists, mineralogists, technicians of all kinds have been drifting into more responsible positions in the industrial system . . . because the system will no longer work at all without them."<sup>31</sup>

Veblen admitted that these production experts descended from the scientific management of efficiency experts, whose work, because it emphasized increasing the profits of the firm, retained business principles. But the younger generation of engineers were not in business for themselves. They were hired workers, and so—because of their training, which exerted a more powerful influence than did their economic interest—they thought in terms of maintaining high levels of output.<sup>31</sup> Their scientific outlook dominated the economic considerations of profits which their bosses thought important. Veblen was encouraged by the action of radical engineers. He announced:

Right lately these technologists have begun to become uneasily "class conscious" and to reflect that they together constitute the indispensable General Staff of the industrial system. Their class consciousness has taken the immediate form of a growing sense of waste and confusion in the management of industry by the financial agents of the absentee owners.<sup>32</sup>

Although he here proclaimed the revolutionary potential of the engineers, Veblen remained skeptical of a successful overthrow of capitalism by that profession. Throughout the book Veblen reiterated that the engineers would not take for themselves the task of overthrowing the business system.<sup>33</sup> Although they might, if they read Veblen's book.

Moreover, Veblen determined that engineers needed help from labor; a first move toward an overthrow of business required the alliance of engineers and workers. This strategy indicated only a slight shift from Veblen's earlier view that a revolution could be made by the industrial workforce. He simply thought that the division of labor had split that workforce into two groups, both essential for any reorganization of industry. As he put it,

By themselves alone, the technicians can, in a few weeks, effectively incapacitate the country's production sufficiently for the purpose of overthrowing the business system. No one who

will dispassionately consider the technical character of the industrial system will fail to recognize that fact. But so long as they have not, at least, the tolerant consent of the population backed by *the aggressive support of the trained workforce* engaged in transportation and in the greater primary industries, they will be substantially helpless to set up a practical working organization on a new footing.<sup>34</sup>

The point underscored has often been missed by Veblen's critics, such as Bell. To succeed in achieving their reforms the engineers must ally with the industrial workers.

When it came time for more detailed plans, Veblen again remained vague. Although he discussed syndicalism early in the book, he dismissed, rather cavalierly, its possible proponents, the A.F. of L. and the I.W.W.: "this flotsam of industry is not organized to take over the highly technical duties involved in the administration of the industrial system." The attitude of these groups was of making gains by sabotaging the industrial system at its weak points. "But," Veblen continues, "sabotage is not revolution." If it were, then the "A.F. of L., the I.W.W., the Chicago Packers, and the U.S. Senate would be counted among the revolutionists."<sup>35</sup> Veblen might have been indulging in his usual irony, but his later statements on the change to a new system would not support this supposition.

Veblen was emphatic that any social change had to be patterned and organized on the basis of the industrial system. Since the industrial system had reached a state of highly complicated interconnections, its continual operation required a detailed attention to organization. This organizational work would come under the aegis of a "central directorate of a loosely tripartite executive council, with power to act in matters of industrial administration." Of course, Veblen concurred, this council would include technical experts in resources, transportation and production. The council itself would be small, but it would have a large staff of advisors and would "be guided by current consultation with the accredited spokesmen" of industry, transport, and distribution.<sup>36</sup>

Veblen did not provide further details of this system of scientific collectivism. Its main features would be a continuation of the trend toward collective ownership begun by corporations; only individual ownership would be eliminated. In its place, there would be a system run by an executive council, with the advice and consent of a staff and body of spokesmen. Seemingly this would be modelled on our political system of executive and legislative bodies. At this point Veblen was hopeful that the population would elect engineers to leadership positions in this system.

To be sure, engineers could precipitate a change by instituting a general strike. But they would not succeed without "the tolerant consent of the population at large, backed by the aggressive support of the trained working

force. . . ." Veblen can not be seen as promoting a *coup d'état* by an elite of engineers. Not when he insists that engineers take efforts "such as will bring the underlying population to a reasonable understanding of what it is all about."<sup>37</sup>

Veblen's writings on engineering elicited a very weak response from engineers themselves. An editorial in the *Bulletin of the Taylor Society*, commenting on a review of *The Engineers and the Price System* in that same issue, thought the readers should test Veblen's arguments against their own experience.

They will be startled by the concluding suggestion. To the statement that the dominant influence of the Captains of finance is now held on the sufferance of the engineers they may give reserved assent; but to the suggestion that the engineers permit nascent class-consciousness to develop into an organized guild for the purpose of exercising a balance of power in the struggle of industrial classes and of compelling a return to the motive of livelihood and of productive efficiency—we wonder if *that* suggestion may not provoke a few letters which will make interesting reading in the *Bulletin*.<sup>38</sup>

This engineering advocate recognized that Veblen wanted the engineers to ally with the workers in the struggle against business. This recognition was in keeping with the scientific management movement's own belated efforts to win labor to its side. The review, which outlined Veblen's major statements about the new role of the engineers, evoked no letters or comments in subsequent issues of the *Bulletin*. The engineers remained, as Veblen put it, "consistently loyal, with something more than a hired man's loyalty, to the established order of commercial profit and absentee ownership."<sup>39</sup>

## V

### Conclusion

AT THE HEIGHT of the movement for enlargement of the engineer's role in society, the editors of *Industrial Management* issued a warning challenge to engineers. Noting the changes then taking place in the political economy, they blasted, "Is the engineer to stand idly by with folded hands and let these great movements sweep by him? If he does he deserves to be a 'hired man' for evermore."<sup>40</sup> But after two decades of working and fighting with organized labor and organized capital, after twenty years of planning and scheming for ways to reorganize industry and society, the engineers failed to attain strong public backing for their idea of a technocracy. But they did succeed in alerting Veblen to a stronger appreciation of their cause.

Due to his Darwinian theory of societal development, Thorstein Veblen took as his starting point the stable environment represented by the institutional force of the predatory values of business. In order to argue for the possibility of social change, he then had to identify human agents capable of attaining a set of new ideas to counter the accepted values. Since work and productive-

oriented values were always necessary, Veblen directed his attention to technology as a disturbing influence.

In modern industry, technology took the form of the machine process, what might be termed scientific collectivism. The industrial workforce in close contact with machine-work would thus gain a set of values contrary to those of business. Yet business values could infiltrate them and offset the discipline of the machine, so Veblen did not see the ultimate triumph of productive values as inevitable. Rather, he investigated only those groups who themselves showed signs of taking the side of production over predation. At first he anticipated a change coming from the efforts of skilled, unionized workers; later he remained hopeful that engineers' restlessness with business methods would be channelled into a better industrial system. But in imputing a set of productive values first to labor and then to engineers, Veblen really shifted his emphasis to two parts of an industrial workforce that, in his taxonomy, included both.

By including both parts of the industrial workforce, Veblen also indicated that he expected to find mass support for his system of scientific collectivism. Even in its later stages of engineering leadership, the system required support from workers and understanding by the general population. Veblen was neither elitist nor anarchist. The statements he did make on the nature of scientific collectivism indicate that it would be organized but representative.

Just as our political system relies heavily for its leadership on those with legal training, so an industrial system must rely on those with industrial (*i.e.*, technical) training. But those persons with industrial training would hold a set of scientific values that were shared by all, as the influence of productive values, given sway by deposing of the predatory values of business, came to dominate society. *The Engineers and the Price System* has often been called the *Communist Manifesto* for engineers. A more apt analogy, based on Veblen's sharing in the hopes and dreams of Edward Bellamy, of socialists in the U.S., and of a small band of thoughtful engineers, would be to construe it as a technocratic version of *The Federalist Papers*.

#### Notes

1. Don R. Stabile, "Veblen and the Political Economy of the Engineer: The Radical Thinker and Engineering Leaders Came to Technocratic Ideas at the Same Time," *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, Vol. 45, No. 1 (January, 1986), pp. 41-52.

2. Joseph Dorfman, *Thorstein Veblen and His America* (Clifton, N.Y.: Augustus Kelley Publisher, 1972), p. 68.

3. Stephen Edgell, "Thorstein Veblen's Theory of Evolutionary Change," *American Journal of Economics and Sociology* (July 1975).

4. Arthur E. Morgan, *Edward Bellamy* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1944). For a more recent appreciation of Bellamy's thinking and its influence on Veblen see: Warren J. Samuels,

"A Centenary Reconsideration of Bellamy's *Looking Backward*," *American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, 43 (April 1984).

5. For a description of that theory in terms of its implications for socialism and socialist thinkers in the United States, see Donald R. Stabile, "Thorstein Veblen and His Socialist Contemporaries: A Critical Comparison," *Journal of Economic Issues*, 15 (March 1982), pp. 11-15.

6. This discussion relies heavily on Edgall, *op. cit.* pp. 269-71, and Rick Tilman, "Thorstein Veblen: Incrementalist and Utopian," *American Journal of Economics and Sociology* 32 (April 1973), pp. 156-59.

7. Thorstein Veblen, *The Instinct of Workmanship* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1914), p. 40.

8. Stabile, *op. cit.*, pp. 16-17. The key passages are in *The Theory of the Leisure Class* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1973), pp. 138-41.

9. T. Veblen, *The Theory of Business Enterprise* (New York: Mentor Books, no date). See also Dorfman, *op. cit.*, pp. 223-29; Douglas Dowd, *Thorstein Veblen* (New York: Washington Square Press, 1964), and Ben B. Seligman, *Main Currents in Modern Economics* (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1962), pp. 129-59.

10. This distinction can be found in an early essay, "Industrial and Pecuniary Employments," in *The Place of Science in Modern Civilization and Other Essays* (New York: Capricorn Books, 1969), pp. 279-323. It also forms a central theme of *The Theory of Business Enterprise*, Ch. IX.

11. *Ibid.*, pp. 146-48.

12. Alfred Marshall, *Principles of Economics*, Vol. I, 3d ed., (London and New York: Macmillan and Co., 1895), pp. 338-39.

13. Carroll D. Wright, *Some Ethical Phases of the Labor Question* (Boston: American Unitarian Association, 1902), p. 87.

14. He does cite Marshall's third edition as a reference; *Business Enterprise*, note 1, p. 191.

15. *Op. cit.*, pp. 157-62, especially the charts on p. 158 and p. 160.

16. *Business Enterprise*, p. 9.

17. *Op. cit.*, p. 162.

18. *Business Enterprise*, p. 146.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 149; emphasis added.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 150.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 156-60.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 158.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 166.

24. John Laslett, *Labor and the Left* (New York: Basic Books, 1970), pp. 151-53, 178 and 29.

25. *Business Enterprise*, note 18, p. 219.

26. Howard H. Quint, *The Forging of American Socialism* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964), p. vii. See also David A. Shannon, *The Socialist Party of America* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1967), p. 3; and Milton Cantor, *The Divided Left* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1978), p. 23.

27. *Business Enterprise*, p. 168. But compare with: "It is difficult to see how any scheme of civil rights, much or little, can find a place in a socialist reorganization," note 18, p. 219.

28. Thorstein Veblen, *The Instincts of Workmanship* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1914), pp. 316-20.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 345.

30. Veblen File, Wisconsin State Historical Society, Madison, Wis.

31. Thorstein Veblen, *The Engineers*, pp. 44-45. Compare with the quote above from *Business Enterprise* (note 15)—workers have vanished.

32. *Ibid.*

33. *Ibid.*, p. 71.

34. *Ibid.*, pp. 167-68.
35. *Ibid.*, pp. 90-91.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 143.
37. *Ibid.*, pp. 167-68.
38. *Bulletin of the Taylor Society*, 4 (August 1919), pp. 2 and 4-7.
39. *Engineers*, p. 136. The same point is made on pages 86, 134, and 137.
40. "Engineers on the Side-Lines," *Industrial Management* 57 (March 1919), p. 247.

### ***The Comparative Study of Civilization***

THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY for the comparative study of Civilization has invited papers for its 16th annual meeting, to be held at Ohio University, Athens, Ohio, on May 29-30, 1987.

Some themes it hopes will be covered are civilizational encounters and the transformation of ideologies; Marxism as a methodology; feminist issues; comparative literature; violence, terrorism and civilization.

Also the civilization theory of Max Weber; global civilization—what is materializing; the family and civilization; myth and reality—cosmogonic and eschatological theories; and time—comparative perspectives in civilization.

The program chair is Wayne Bledsoe, department of history/political science, University of Missouri-Rolla, Rolla, MO 65401.

### ***New Working Paper Series***

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO Graduate School of Business, the Department of Economics and the H. G. B. Alexander Research Foundation are the joint sponsors of a new working paper series in economics and econometrics, available for \$1 each. For a list, write the foundation, 1101 East 58th Street, Chicago, IL 60637.

### ***Trespassers on the People's Land***

DISQUIETING NEWS from Washington: western farmers are trespassing on 31,000 acres of the people's land (inaccurately called federal land; it's federally administered land owned by the public), and cheating the U.S. Treasury of millions in lease fees.

W.L.