

as a form of Determinism. All science, both physical and psychological, builds on Determinism. Psychological Determinism is displayed not only in the laws of association and in our feelings, but also in the norms. The norms are not without their causes, but they are psychical forces which strive to realize themselves. The norms are such ideas of the future as are not hampered in their striving to fulfil themselves, or — which are more closely connected with my ego than the forces which hamper me.

Liberty consists of a recognized acceptance. If it is not through such acceptance that we become free, we are, in reality, getting less free. An acceptance is always an acceptance by reason. The things that are not founded on reason, lose their power on being proved to be without a purpose. The feeling of obligation disappears if it does not seem reasonable to the individual; no impulse is made reasonable by the sheer force of it. The impulse as such is created "pour moi", but not "par moi".¹⁾ It may, for instance, be possible for us to prove that we cannot live outside society. We may further prove that social life is productive of strong social instincts. But this is not a sufficient ground for our feeling of obligation towards society. The fact that one cannot exist by oneself (par soi) does not prove that one may not want to exist for one's own sake (pour soi). The power or strength of the bonds that tie us to society do not make it obligatory on us to live for society; the obligation should be an expression of free, moral adherence. Our obligations are not produced by an obsession (une obsession), but by a judgment and a feeling of preference; liberty consists not in acting by impulse (par hasard), but in acting according to reason. It is not the strength, but "les relations" that rule our consciousness.

According as our intelligence grows, our desire for activity will expand from the narrow sphere, that is poor in "relations", to more comprehensive spheres which are rich in "relations". But this growth in intelligence not only influences the object of our actions, but also the subjective basis of our actions, which is our own self. The ego is not a complex of psychological factors, but only that complex which is determined by their rational connection. When we determine the precedence of our motives by rational ex-

¹⁾ A. Fouillée, *La Liberté*. p. 291.

amination, we become independent of their psychological, causal strength. Thinking becomes unprejudiced. It sets aside all concrete, subjective feelings, and in this way it makes us free. Liberty becomes independence determined by reason, it becomes what Aristotle called "free necessity", it delivers us from the merciless pressure of "fatum". Thinking makes us the subject of abstract general decisions and in this way it gives our activity, our will a turn towards the universal. Only those ideas which can give this tendency a constantly growing expansion are "idées forces". Fatuity or ineffectual thinking are not ideas that strive for realization. Fatalism, the false form of Determinism, by which it is imagined that everything happens as it does without the contribution of the will, is not an "idée force". In reality, only two "idées forces" exist, the idea of the ego and the idea of the universal. It is those that create our obligation to live for society — society, far from restricting our activity, is in accord with the desire for growth which is the life of our intelligence.¹⁾

Fouillée rejects all existing ideas of the sovereign authority of State and Society. No society can make any claim on us in her own name. Every society that builds on power or interests, builds on an unsafe foundation. It is not sufficient to ascertain a certain solidarity between us and our fellow-men, this solidarity should be accepted (*apprécier*) before the relation to society can become an "idée force". It is this double relation that should be understood; in order to become an "idée force" the idea must be recognized as being worthy of being so. It is never solidarity that binds us or creates justice but, on the contrary, it is justice that creates solidarity; any solidarity founded on a different basis would only be a fraud which would lose all claim on loyalty when further revealed. We should regard society as the factor that makes the evolution of the individual possible. Solidarity should be individualized, and our personality grow in proportion as we feel ourselves determined by solidarity. But this only happens when our relations to other men are decided by a feeling, that places us on an equal footing and recognizes their right to unhampered evolution to be as great as our own. Individualism should be made the basis of all valuation;

¹⁾ A. Fouillée, *Liberté*. pp. 297, 301, 317. *Eléments sociol.* p. 314.

every idea that the centre of gravity lies elsewhere is irreconcilable with our idea of liberty. But there is a difference between that individualism that centres on the idea of the individual's power, on the individual as the centre of everything, and that kind of individualism that centres on the idea of the individual's perfectibility through increasing expansion. We may call this individualism love. Fouillée does not identify it with Christian charity or with Republican fraternity, but he regards it as an expression of a scientifically proved inter-relationship of mankind.¹⁾

Such solidarity becomes an "idée force". It is conditioned by the disappearance of the indifference that threatened French society. As the citizens of the society to which they belong, all should be animated by goodwill; the problem is how such goodwill is produced. The recognition of inter-relationship seems to lead to the recognition of equality.²⁾ The ego is the organized system of interests that determines the individual's actions. But there may be an innumerable number of different types of individuals, some richer and some poorer, and the question is, how solidarity stands in relation to those varieties, how the types arise; how they are grouped, how they differentiate themselves and how they consolidate. Modern sociology treats all these problems in detail and thus it goes far beyond the central problem in Fouillée's theory of "idées forces". Fouillée's doctrine has, to a great extent, influenced the social evolution which took place so rapidly in France, after the war of 1870, in order to do away with the old culture of the élite that threatened to ruin the nation and replace it by a democratic culture of equality, that ranked the nation's unity above all individual differences. But it is Fouillée's firm belief that liberty, which Proudhon and Cournot regarded as the basis of all solidarity, is conditioned by the variety and multitude of "relations". The unity entailed by solidarity does not lead to the effacement of differences. The political development of the age also re-acted on Fouillée's ideas and influenced his attempts to define solidarity as being more than an obsession — as being an acceptance, a "contractuel" solidarity; justice became "une justice réparative", an expression of the constantly creative work

¹⁾ A. Fouillée, *Eléments soc.* chap. VII & VIII.

²⁾ A. Fouillée, *Le Socialisme et la sociologie réformiste; La Démocratie politique et sociale en France.*

that cannot cease for a moment without causing society to collapse. In Fouillée's old age the attempts to find a reconciliation of the conflict between the liberal citizens and the social-democrats were manifold; Fouillée tried to find a way out by starting from his doctrine that the ideas are attitudes and germinating actions that are determined by the multiplicity of "relations"; and these do not depend only on external circumstances, but also on the inner riches.

Guyau (1854—1888).

Fouillée's philosophy was in many ways determined by the ideas which were set forth by his stepson. But Guyau's ideas were at first strongly influenced by his stepfather, who was his teacher. Jean Marie Guyau was in spite of his weak health (he suffered from tuberculosis and died young) filled with a romantic enthusiasm for life. All his teaching is a hymn to life; he was profoundly influenced by beauty and art, and considered these as the revelation of the forces of life. The growth and activity of life are for him, as is the intelligence to Fouillée, an evolution from the most simple organic processes to the highest and most composite, from unconscious desire through instinct and impulse to conscious thought and action.¹⁾ Guyau builds on this foundation. He was an enthusiastic adherent of the idea of evolution and admired Darwin and Spencer. Guyau turns decisively against the fatalism which is implied by Darwin and Spencer in their theory of evolution as a natural process, by emphasizing that evolution will only be possible in its highest forms where mankind itself desires it and recognizes the idea of evolution as its moral standard; for this to happen the idea of evolution must be accepted by reason. In so far as reason approaches the instinct and makes it the object of reflection, it weakens it.²⁾ The strength of the instinct is not a sufficient ground for moral obligation, and if this has no other "raison d'être" it becomes a mere hallucination. The definition of our duty should be made dependent on what gives us happiness or inflicts pain. It is true, that our morals are principally decided by our altruistic instincts which

¹⁾ J. Marie Guyau, *La morale anglaise contemporaine*.

²⁾ J. M. Guyau, *La morale anglaise*. pp. 334—354. *Esquisse*. p. 132.

we feel pleasure in obeying; these instincts themselves should, however, be accepted by reason before it becomes a duty to obey them. The fact that these instincts have power, does not justify them morally.

At the beginning of the century Maine de Biran had proved, through a very detailed analysis of our consciousness, that the central point of this is activity or the will. This view was adopted and further developed both by Fouillée and Guyau. Biran had maintained that the will is the centre, and that it expands and grows by being exercised. To will and to work is synonymous with expanding and growing (*s'étendre et s'accroître*); this saying of Biran may be made the motto of Guyau's collected works. He replaces will by life; but he considers life as original unconscious will. Life is self-assertion, self-activity, and self-regulation, which strive to secure the continued life of the organism under different external conditions. This process of life leads to a constant extension of its sphere of activity. The degree of intensity of life is closely combined with the degree of expansion. Food, growth, and propagation show us the main function of life as fruitfulness.

This tendency to expansion reaches its highest form in the life of thought. The thought is an "idée force" that continues itself in action, and duty is only this expansion, this desire to fulfil ideas in action. That only is immoral which hampers the inner self-assertion in its development and thus cripples the soul. Everybody feels ashamed at discovering his own imperfections and strives to overcome them. Imperfections cripple men and make them unable to perform their functions of life. Morality is equivalent to self-assertion, "pouvoir c'est devoir". The consciousness of self is the knowledge of one's power of self-assertion; we set up an ideal which becomes the standard of all our actions.

In our life in society this idea of the ideal self is determined by society's standard of what is normal and sound, and our ideal becomes therefore the image of such a normal, social type. Deviations from such a type would be felt as a monstrosity, and would make the person in default an outcast in society. This feeling of being an outcast produces profound pain as we are by nature social beings. We include society in our own ideals; all that benefits society gives us pleasure, all that threatens it casts a shadow into our very soul.

This evolution of our self happens only through the growth of our consciousness and thought. This striving to realize the social type cannot be considered in the light of an obsession. It is not due to a defect in our thinking, but to its clarity.

Guyau, however, was not blind to the fact that we are here faced with the most difficult of all questions. In the rational development of our ideas we have a means of controlling the unconscious life of our impulses. Reason makes us see our motives in a new light. But it is possible that rational thinking loses its importance when it becomes a question of the fundamental problems. Reason may examine whether we think logically, but it cannot decide whether the central valuation, on which the whole system depends, is valid or not. Guyau therefore returns to his supposition that what is our deepest necessity, is not determined by reason but by suggestion. Scientists had then begun to make those suggestion and hypnotic phenomena the subjects of systematic examination; Guyau was very much interested in promoting those researches.¹⁾ The possibility of essentially changing the disposition of man through suggestion is more and more recognized. In reality, this method has always been employed by educators; they have not only endeavoured to confer knowledge and develop the intelligence, but also to influence the feelings. If a strong feeling is aroused at an early age it may influence the individual for life. Such suggestion does not show us the reason for society, but it is only made possible through the existence of society. Suggestion should be seen in connection with the fact that the growing intensity of life is synonymous with growing expansion. Only in this way does a restriction of external expansion become one with a crippling of the mind. The fact that one cannot live outside society (*par soi*) becomes thus an expression of the fact that man cannot live only for himself (*pour soi*).

Life itself makes us regard all existence as a living, self-asserting universe. Existence contains in itself the instinct of evolution which we find in the organism. It must be regarded as contributing to the development of our consciousness. The stereotyping or decay, the destruction of all mental values which natural science considers to be the final, disastrous result of what we call evolution, Guyau

¹⁾ J. M. Guyau, *Éducation et Hérité*.

regards as a vague hypothesis which may be opposed by another hypothesis — the possibility that the most intelligent inhabitants of the universe may be able constantly to promote cosmic development. Whether this hypothesis is more than a fiction we cannot decide. Guyau stops, in reality, at the same point as Cournot.

But seen on the basis of this fiction reason becomes to Guyau one with universal sympathy; he regards all religions as an extension of this social function. Detached from all dogmas, the religion of the future becomes universal sympathy — it is a striving for unity that rules the natural processes. Universal sympathy as an “*idée force*” influences us. Life becomes a symbiosis. Society becomes solidarity. “Universal” may, however, be taken in two senses. It may either be taken in the quantitative sense — that sympathy comprises everything because it is the extension of our being. Every kind of egoism will mean a restriction of expansion and consequently also of intensity. Egoism is the eternal illusion of the miser who draws back terrified at the thought of opening his hand.¹⁾ This universal sympathy gives us the greatest and the most significant ideals. The most effective preaching of morality is that which appeals most to our feelings of generosity (*les sentiments les plus généreux*). “Universality” may, however, also mean that sympathy is the fundamental principle, all that happens in Nature being in its inmost being determined by this principle and a means of furthering it. It makes a great difference which of these points of view we adopt. If universal sympathy is an “*Idée force*” because we consider sympathy to be the fundamental force of the universe, the centre of gravity lies outside ourselves. If universal sympathy is considered as an “*idée force*” because it is the maximum of our expansion, it is without a sufficient basis. If we are determined by Nature, our intelligence will have to be regarded as a product. If, on the other hand, we are determined by the universal power, whose essence is universal sympathy, we are not to be considered as a product of Nature, but as a valuable factor in the universe. In that case our dependence on Nature determines only our existence, but not our character. The eternal war between Determinism and Liberty is a struggle between belief in Nature and belief in God. The former is a depressing in-

¹⁾ J. M. Guyau, *Irréligion*. pp. 351—354.

fluence and robs us of liberty, the latter helps our impotence, enables us to be loyal to our ideals and live in conformity with them. It is their cosmic force that makes the ideals objective. Here we once more meet Hegel's idea that it is only possible for us to believe that we act for a purpose, when we believe that the Universe acts in harmony with us.

The more this cosmic ideal force loses itself in a mist, the weaker become ideals as "idées forces". We are free, if our reason can force us to see universal sympathy as an expression of Cosmos. We are unfree, if we in our feelings as well as in our understanding are dazzled by a powerful suggestion. Guyau thinks that it is possible to make sympathy rational by raising it into a category of its own. We think in the category of society, as in those of time and space. Thus man is through his moral nature led to believe that the evil one will not get the last word. Man constantly revolts at the triumph of evil and injustice.¹⁾ This extension of morality into a cosmic judgment is, however, a testimony, that we are not made free by thought, but by the conception of thought as a cosmic power. Thoughts are, as Cournot said, not only a subjective power, but also an objective power, that shows us "la raison des choses".

Guyau's whole enthusiastic description of sympathy as the expression of the intensity and expansion of life exercised the strongest influence on the view of the sources and possibilities of social life. Even at the present day, Guyau is an inexhaustible treasury for all those who in egoism, as expressed in miserliness, see a stunted mental life that should be remedied. But it is also striking that Guyau's outlook on life is that of one of the "élite", suitable for the upper classes. Universal social sympathy is not an expression of social inter-relationship and still less of the lower classes' demand for equal rights. The friction between the upper and lower classes is, as Proudhon called it, a matter of balance, and the judgment as to which balance is right may differ very much according as it is made from the point of view of society or of the individual. The right society is that which makes all individuals free. But are all individuals fit for liberty? Sympathy is not a desire to accept all individuals as they are, but a tendency to change all individuals in

¹⁾ J. M. Guyau, *Esquisse*. p. 200.

the same direction, in spite of all hindrances to make them conform to the same ideal. The danger that the evolution towards general liberty might become a levelling that draws down the "élite", was constantly there, but it was not felt by Proudhon, but by those men who, themselves in the position of the "élite", stretched out their hands towards the new society. Gabriel Tarde acknowledged the sufficiency of the system of balance and thus made an important contribution to the sociological theories of the present day.

Gabriel Tarde (1843—1904).

As a statistician in criminal matters Tarde was in the habit of dealing with men's manner of feeling and thinking and this led him to look upon them as numerical figures. They produced in him an overpowering impression of the automatic way in which the mind acts. He felt convinced of the fundamental correctness of John S. Mill's psychology of association, but he criticized it because its views were not logically carried through. He adopted Fouillée's and Guyau's psychological view of ideas and feelings as attitudes and according to their nature automatic processes; on this he based a demand for regarding psychology as a doctrine of mechanics just as natural science is a doctrine of mechanics. Everything originates in the meeting of the movements, the vital processes are only a more intricate system of such movements, and the same applies to the mental processes. Rhythmical fluctuation is the law of Nature, heredity is the law of life, the law of mental complexes is equivalent to the formation of mental habits, logical and practical norms.¹⁾ Mill's psychology must therefore from studying the processes of association in the individual consciousness be extended to studying the inter-play of the individual consciousnesses. From Mill's inter-cerebral psychology we proceed to an intercerebral psychology, which is one with sociology and that again constitutes part of general mechanics.²⁾

Social life is only a continuation of the universal law of rhythm.

¹⁾ Gabriel Tarde, *Les transformations du droit*. p. 170.

²⁾ Gabriel Tarde, *Les lois sociales*. p. 27.

What we call the accord of individuals is different only on the surface, from the unity of the individual consciousness. As one complex of psychic attitudes influences another, as they break or bar the way for other complexes, one individual will influence the others. "This process", says Tarde, "is what we call imitation, which at first takes place freely but presently produces opposition and thus leads to adaptation". It was Tarde's object to study the laws of this process. He sees the central point in the importance to be attached to imitation. It was especially the hypnotic and suggestive phenomena, which had occupied Guyau to such a great extent, to which Tarde attached the greatest importance.¹⁾

The starting-point must be the study of the reactions through which a living being undertakes the movements which lead to the fulfilment of his wishes. These movements are in part reflective, in part seeking and uncertain, until they happen to find the right object. In the future the right courses will be found at once and the idea of the movement will precede its execution.²⁾ Imitation is one of the most important methods by which the ways of reaction are acquired, if they are not determined by heredity. We observe the way in which others act, and act in the same way. By this means the "croyances" are formed which give definite forms and shapes to our "désirs". Imitation, however, cannot create, but only continue. Somewhere with some person or other the first action must originate — it is therefore important not only to study the laws of imitation, but also the laws of action. The new laws of action are, as a rule, found through the casual or natural co-operation of many minds, where everybody gives his contribution to the new way of acting. The inter-play of the individual ideas lead to logical rules, which express the condition of constant equilibrium. The various individual complexes lead to the formation of forms of social life. A nation may almost be said to be a complex syllogism. The combat of ideas rejects judgments which have before been stable, and a conflict arises in our minds. Strife among individuals and among nations is only a continuation of the same principles. As in our mental activity strife between our ideas is the necessary prelude to finding a solution

¹⁾ Gabriel Tarde, *Études pénales*. p. 360.

²⁾ R. Turro, *Les Origines*.

³⁾ Gabriel Tarde, *La logique sociale*. Chap. IV.

of the strife, the war among the nations is a step towards universal harmony.¹⁾ One day this goal will be reached, imitation will lead us to the large, much desired harbour, where all the ships of humanity will constitute one single peaceful fleet.²⁾

This goal will not be reached through a development that moves according to definite lines. A slow, but an extremely difficult interflow of the individual minds into one large social mind will take place — this happens through the ideas meeting and influencing each other, but not by mutual explanations. It is futile to attempt to find a logical line in history. Fixed customs are to society what memory and habit are to the individual; these factors decide whether imitation takes this or that line. It is the number of adherents that decide "l'éclat d'une doctrine". The more cases that prove it, the more fixed it becomes. Three things are necessary in order that a social imitation shall strike root. Of these two are necessary, the third is almost a luxury, but of inestimable value. Religion establishes harmony of the convictions (croyance), morality makes the desires (désirs) accord, "les beaux arts" make the sensual impressions (sensations) agree.

Tarde fully develops an idea, which was set forth both by Proudhon and Cournot. It is the understanding of the significance of technical apparatus to society as a whole. The roads, the railways, the canals, the towns, the telegraph lines, etc. make the territory accessible and form the uniform frame that determines the individuals' way of living. These organizations of traffic must be of a democratic tendency as all are interested in them and all are subject to the same regulations in the use of them. This does not mean that any kind of hive life exists among mankind, as it does in the biological world; men are not given each his own function to perform which he executes with automatic regularity, while he is unable to perform any other function. Social technical evolution does not make the single individual unfit for all functions other than those which fall to his lot within the technical apparatus. The creation of a society among men does not depend on the individuals playing the same part as the cells within an organism. The individuals retain

¹⁾ G. Tarde, *La logique sociale*. pp. 65, 70, 72.

²⁾ G. Tarde, *Études pénales*. p. 394.

their individuality and their independence, while their egoistic interests become solidaric. The individuals are like the cells of a brain where each shares in the government.¹⁾

It is a very significant view which Tarde proposes here; it rapidly won a great number of adherents. The social body consists of all the material, established institutions. By material services we should not understand such only as deal with material or economic interests. The railway-system is an organization for trade and intercourse. Religious communities, scientific organizations are opportunities for mental life. Deviations which can scarcely find room within these organizations, will, on the whole, have difficulty in asserting themselves and will be set aside. While new ideas which are concerned with changing and improving the existing apparatus, find imitators and gain headway at a surprising speed. It is to be expected that democracy will be an opponent of all new formations, as such always, at first sight, seem apt to bring disturbances in the "lines of traffic". Perhaps this democratic conservatism will prove a beneficial substitute for the constant revolutions of the present day. — "But", says Tarde, "we should nevertheless rejoice that we are still far from having reached this, the peace of old age."²⁾

Tarde regards the psychical elements, the instincts and desires, as original. Characters are formed through the war of these elements, by which those instincts and desires are eliminated that are unfit for the formation of character. As the attitude of the ego is towards its psychic contents, is the attitude of society towards the individuals. The ego exercises a strong discipline over all sudden impulses and the object should be to influence the direction of the impulses without weakening their vital power. The ego itself is the power or the work that is performed in order to maintain unity. Society is, in the same way, a regulator of the individual entities. It must not kill the individuals which are strong sources of power, but it should conduct the vital forces they constitute into channels that are beneficial for society. Through this regulation the united force of the individuals grows. Instincts and impulses may rebel against the ego, but this will only weaken the consciousness of the ego.

¹⁾ G. Tarde, *La logique sociale*. pp. 127—133.

²⁾ G. Tarde, *Études pénales*. p. 396.

The individuals may rebel against society, but by this means they will only weaken themselves. With the same right as the ego claims the control over its impulses, society may claim the control over all anti-social instincts in the individuals.

The mechanic-motoric explanation of psychic phenomena given by Tarde directs the series of sociological explanations which Proudhon sought to lead back to the psychic phenomena, into the same sphere in which Darwin's attempts at a physiological explanation moved. The establishment of the psychology of suggestion as the centre of the sociological explanations and the emphasis laid on the psychological phenomena of the masses make society, in the view of Tarde, play the part of the great mediator in all motoric processes, which display themselves in the single individual and in the mutual inter-action of the individuals. "Society", says Simmel, "exists where several individuals enter into connection with each other; society is created through their interconnection, which creates a unity that comprehends them, just as organic unity is formed through the co-operation of the elements". We are here faced with the decisive question: can society at all be explained on the basis of the association of the individuals? All the difficulties which discussions of the relation between individual and society always encounter — because society seems unable to bind the individual when it has its root only in the association of the individuals, and the individuals, on their side, seem excluded from claiming any real independence, when they only exist by society — re-appear in the fact that suggestibility in animals as well as in men does not form society, but presupposes society. We are not social because we are suggestible, but we are suggestible because we are social. If we maintain that the motoric, mechanical uniform measures are the decisive factors in individual as well as in social psychology it should not be overlooked that we may have to deal with quite different motoric complexes, according as the individual meets other individuals with whom it is possible that he may enter into associations, or whether such individuals as will always remain alien to each other are connected in one society. Tarde has a keen eye to the problem which is set forth here, and which draws a sharp line between "mere vegetative existence" and "moral duty". We can only speak of social life where there is a question of duty. Much

research is required in order to ascertain how feelings of sympathy arise and how individuals become socially and not only legally bound together; it is quite a different problem, whether we are to accept or reject such evolution of social sympathy. It is Kant's "Problem der Kritik" that for ever re-asserts itself. Sympathy, mass-suggestion or whatever form the social character may assume cannot be satisfactorily explained as a natural disposition. Sympathy, suggestion, the social instincts have within the consciousness of mature man no right to assert themselves by their mere existence. They must like all impulses always be made subject to control, so that they do not rule us; they must always be accepted before they are obeyed. Tarde asserts definitely that man's criticizing and sanctioning function cannot be done away with without the fundamental object of sociology also being set aside. The consciousness of duty can never be dispensed with. Tarde differs from Guyau in maintaining that all instincts are not destroyed by being acknowledged, some may even be strengthened.¹⁾ It is the latter instincts that should be sanctioned. They constitute the series of impulses that are closely connected with the conditions of society. Whether Tarde is right in this judgment we need not consider, for it can never be satisfactory to base duty on such an uncertain foundation as imitation. We cannot speak of duty where two opposite actions have the same chance of being right.

It is well-known to what a great degree Adam Smith looked for the explanation of the moral bond that binds men together and contributes to the formation of society in sympathy, suggestion, and interchange of sentiment.²⁾ Already Adam Smith's predecessor and teacher, David Hume, had emphasized the close connection between people's intercourse and their imitation of each other; he also emphasized the great social importance of imitation as compared with the influence of natural phenomena, such as weather and climate.³⁾

¹⁾ G. Tarde, *Études pénales*. p. 420.

²⁾ Adam Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*.

³⁾ David Hume, *Essays* I. pp. 248 f.

The study of social institutions which flourished at the time when Darwin set forth his theories, produced a great number of more or less arbitrary theories of the origin of society (Bachofen, Lubbock, Taylor, and MacLennan). Although the truth of these theories was soon confuted¹⁾ they shook the old faith in the unalterable validity of our social institutions. A typical example of the far-fetched explanations that were set forth is the communistic explanation of the origin of the family and the State, which was set forth by Fr. Engels,²⁾ and which even now endows the communistic matriarchal theories, which by the way are entirely unfounded, with a certain dogmatic validity on viewing them in their relation to Marx's view on society. In contrast to those explanations that purposed to prove the primitive basis of our societies, Sir Henry Sumner Maine set forth his explanations of the patriarchal culture of the Aryan societies. Whether his explanations are correct is of less importance. The main point is his strong and undeniably correct demonstration, that no question of the formation of society can arise until a moral authority, an idea of legality is formed which is both above the individual ruler and the individual members of the group. He therefore thinks that the existence of society is undermined where the principle of legality is broken and ceases to be an insurmountable barrier to arbitrary private interests. Therefore he directed a vigorous attack against modern democratic evolution in his last work "Popular Government, 1883". Democracy as well as limited monarchy are, he says, destructive forms of government. Unconditional legality is not created by artificial means and cannot be brought into accord with the abolition of ruling customs and the creation of new laws. When there is a breach in legality, right is replaced by might — the State, where this happens, goes to meet her ruin.

The fundamental problem of society is the problem of authority, the problem of legal order, the problem of what ought to be, a problem that extends far beyond what only is. Sir Henry Sumner Maine's contemporary, the illustrious English jurist, Sir Walter Bagehot, made an attempt to solve the problem.

¹⁾ C. N. Starcke, Die primitive Familie.

²⁾ Fr. Engels, Der Ursprung der Familie, des Privateigentums und des Staates.

Walter Bagehot (1826—1877).

In his famous book "Physics and Politics" (1872) Bagehot¹⁾ attempts to apply Darwin's ideas of natural evolution to society and, at the same time, to continue the development of Maine's ideas. Heredity and variability are, briefly, the two necessary conditions which Darwin sets up, respectively, for the fixity of the species and their transformation and progress. In society, government and legislation corresponds, in Bagehot's opinion, to these conditions in Nature. The sine qua non of society is a firm government. In the beginning it is less a question of whether it is a good government if it is only a firm government.²⁾ He thought that those individuals who submitted to a leader and thus formed the first society were those best fit to survive; those who were quarrelsome and ungovernable were destroyed. As the breeder of cattle always kills the most ungovernable animals and thus, in the course of time, gets a peaceful stock of cattle, so does Nature kill the individuals who are not fit for life in society. Only those survive who are able to control themselves and to subordinate themselves to the law.

In the formation of a set of customs which are expressed in the laws, mutual imitation is the most effective factor.³⁾ But it is not sufficient for society to establish a law, "a cake of customs". It must, if they are not to stand still, also be able to alter it according to circumstances without making a breach in legality.⁴⁾ Without constant alteration the laws become rigid and injurious. The law that to one generation may mean thriving and prosperity, may become deadly poison to the next.⁵⁾

Public discussion is the historical form which this possibility of change takes. Without such discussion societies will stagnate. Ideas and principles that do not allow of discussion become sterile.⁶⁾ The societies that go on developing are those that can bear discussions

¹⁾ For Bagehot, see: E. Barker, *Political Thought in England*, 1914, p. 151; Harry Barnes, *Some typical Contributions of English Sociology to Political Theory*. *American Journal of Soc.* XXVIII, 1922, pp. 573—581.

²⁾ W. Bagehot, *Physics and Politics*. p. 25.

³⁾ *Opus cit.* pp. 36, 88.

⁴⁾ *Opus cit.* pp. 55 ff., p. 61.

⁵⁾ *Opus cit.* p. 74.

⁶⁾ *Opus cit.* p. 178.

without losing their solidarity. It should, however, be borne in mind that the discussion, which is socially necessary and fertile, does not consist in an exchange of opinions on practical conditions. It consists in a discussion of principles.¹⁾ These discussions look away from all dogmas and transcendental authorities, they set no forcible limits to the subjects of discussion. Such limits are always intolerant; good discussion creates tolerance,²⁾ and makes no other demand of the various opinions expressed than that they should reveal their motives. Good discussion is only carried on by intellectual men — in it victory always falls to intelligence. A great number of societies have been hampered in their development, because they were unable to give free play to intelligent discussion. The primitive societies in which customs and especially religious feelings were so powerful, made free discussion extremely difficult; only in a few societies, which have been favoured by fortunate circumstances, has it been possible to break the power of the past and of precedent and open out a new path that leads to progress without any breach of continuity.

The difficult point, which makes free discussion a double-edged sword, is the definition of what it is that gives some motives greater weight than others. There is a danger in the free use of the intelligence; it may destroy all fixed opinions and lead to general scepticism. "Good and evil" become mere terms, and "truth and falsehood" become vague definitions.³⁾ This danger can scarcely be escaped if there is not a fixed point in our consciousness in the light of which we may contemplate all phenomena.⁴⁾ This fixed point, which is not open to discussion, was formed in societies during the ages in which each society led an isolated existence and thus, through heredity, acquired a moral discipline which in later ages enabled it to enter into intercourse with other societies without losing its own character.⁵⁾ Mixed populations and mixed classes run the danger of dissolution. In order to carry on a discussion unhampered there must either be a connecting bond of ideas or of

¹⁾ Opus cit. p. 166.

²⁾ Opus cit. p. 163.

³⁾ Opus cit. p. 40.

⁴⁾ Opus cit. p. 112.

⁵⁾ Opus cit. p. 39.

acquired "Erkenntnisse" in the discussing parties, or there must be a particular force in those ideas which fortifies society. Both things are necessary. Without a subject matter there can be no thinking. The strongest nations are the best nations. The strongest and most attractive characters within society are the best, but their strength consists in their accumulated experiences.

It is not physical strength that is the decisive factor. It is intellectual strength. Intellect without physical strength is stronger than physical strength without intellect.¹⁾ Military authority may cause the trees to be cut down, but it is unable to make them grow. When victory is won by means of intellect the victorious nation has also a moral right to victory.²⁾ But the strength of the intellect does not only show itself in the perspicuity with which the individual link in the series of arguments is seen in its connection with the other links, but in the unchangeability of the background against which it is seen. It is this logical consecutiveness which makes the possessor of it stronger than he who is without it. Men who possess such mental firmness convert other people to their points of view which they thus make stronger.³⁾ It is personalities and not arguments that influence mankind.⁴⁾ Men who lack such firmness and who are amenable to all kinds of extreme ideas, become excluded from public life and lose all kinds of power. Any series of ideas that dominate our mental life appear as the truth⁵⁾; it becomes therefore of decisive importance, whether there is a connection between the validity of the opinions and their appearance of truth. If we would be able to lead others, we must possess the capacity of arousing such a definite series of ideas in their minds. Every uncertainty, every vagueness, every lack of connection with practical life that encloses us, destroys such influence.⁶⁾

The prominent place which Bagehot, at first, gave to the intellect becomes by degrees less marked. It is not the object of the intellect to give the reason for our view on life, but to lay clear the con-

¹⁾ Opus cit. p. 79.

²⁾ Opus cit. p. 82.

³⁾ Opus cit. p. 76.

⁴⁾ Opus cit. p. 90.

⁵⁾ Opus cit. p. 94.

⁶⁾ Opus cit. p. 203.

nection of the consistent parts. Bagehot wants to emphasize that the intellect does not create existence, but makes our view of it into a connected whole. If we regard this as a restriction of the intellect, we should at the same time bear in mind that intellect by this means grows more potent.

The varieties which are necessary for the progress of society cannot be of unlimited extent, because they must not destroy the foundation. They steal into our inmost intellectual nature, our intuitive opinion and our faith, and transform them.¹⁾

Many may think that the extension of the discussion weakens the energy. Bagehot regards this as an illusion. It is more probably the other way round. Discussion promotes deliberation and hinders precipitant action, which is often disastrous.²⁾ The form of government that avails itself of discussions is parliamentary government, which compels us to think more deeply and makes it possible to act more effectively and quietly. Authority created through centuries and the sure rule of law makes possible such a form of government. It increases the security of society by parrying off all attacks on this security which may be encountered when society is faced with the necessity of adapting itself to new conditions. Discussion leaves a way open to all possibilities of progress. Bagehot compares the influence of parliamentary government on the mind of society with the influence of machinery on trade. Machinery has multiplied man's capacity, it has enabled him to abandon old methods of production, but it has also disciplined man's way of thinking and feeling and brought them under rule and order. The government changes from governing by issuing commands to governing through committees.³⁾ Discussion gives us liberty, but it is authority that has transformed our brains and made us fit for being free.⁴⁾

In his emphasis on discussion Bagehot was an adherent of Proudhon, and in his emphasis on the significance of imitation he was a precursor of Tarde. His description of the way in which, during a discussion, our opponent's view imperceptibly steals into our own mind and transforms it, is a precursor of the doctrine of suggestion;

¹⁾ Opus cit. p. 95.

²⁾ Opus cit. p. 186.

³⁾ Opus cit. p. 192.

⁴⁾ Opus cit. p. 178.

Bagehot has discovered that it is not the logical arguments that decide our views, but he is uncertain as to which factor determines the strength of an opinion. As time goes on, the philosophers perceive more and more clearly that human actions are insufficiently explained by a purely schematic account of their origin, as caused by authority, discussion, etc. It is the tendency in social government that should be considered. This tendency may be said to be equal to authority where the governing power, an aristocracy or the people, restricts the individual's sphere of action and acts on the individual's behalf in all important ways of life. As a symbol of such a tendency we may take a machine or an organism. Discussion, on the other hand, shows that harmony among individuals is produced through a series of conflicts which are necessary, both to keep the individual demands alive, and to develop the capacity of the central government to keep all the elements together.

Herbert Spencer (1820—1903).

The ideas of liberty which characterized Spencer's youthful work, "Social Statics", went counter to the organizing and regulating tendency which seemed to be the inevitable accompaniment of the evolution of the State. In his synthetic philosophy Spencer tries to overcome this contrast, by proving that the growth of liberty must coincide with the growing differentiation and centralization of the State. He definitely regards society as an organism and emphasizes the necessity of definite stages of evolution. The differentiation of organs grows and their centralization increases. The only difference between society and the organism is that the cells of which the organism is made up lose their independence through centralization so that they exist only for the sake of the organism. They have no consciousness, the consciousness of the organism rests with the whole. In society, on the other hand, the individuals continue their independent consciousness; instead of regarding individuals as existing for the sake of society, we should regard society as existing for the sake of the individuals. However great may be the efforts made to benefit the social whole, the demands this whole may make are valueless in

themselves; they are only of importance in so far as they satisfy the demands of the social individuals.¹⁾

Spencer describes the origin of society as the result of the individuals' fight for supremacy. Like Bagehot he regards the individuals' subjection to discipline as the fundamental condition for society. In a fight with others it becomes a matter of life or death whether we stand alone or belong to a group. The necessary condition for victory is the capacity to subject oneself to a leader; it is the strongest and most resolute individual who takes the leadership. The leader becomes the centre from which the lives of the individuals are governed. Spencer calls this phase "militarism".

Gradually as the division of labour makes itself felt a variety of different relations between the individuals are created. Branches of trade and industry are severed and combined, means of exchange and transport arise, the tasks of the central government are transformed and a new social type, "the industrialist", arises. The central government becomes, to a constantly less degree, a centre for action, but it becomes a centre for information, where all the wants of the citizens may be set forth, and adapted to each other. Society comes to mean a thorough co-operation of the citizens, which depends on their free judgment and their free will. The idea of obedience to the authorities is replaced by the idea of the citizens' will being supreme and of the government's right of existence resting on the performance of this will. Nay, it becomes a duty to oppose an irresponsible government and the encroachment of such a government. The minority feel impelled to refuse to obey the legislative power, elected by the majority, when it encroaches on private domains.²⁾

Spencer's comparison of society to an organism leads to the idea of a mutual adaptation of the parts to the whole and vice versa. The individuals endeavour to use society to carry out their own will, but through unconscious evolution the individuals' special demands have assumed forms which coincide with the demands of the whole. The object of evolution is perfect adaptation, which makes all anti-social tendencies in the individuals disappear. Spencer's indivi-

¹⁾ Herbert Spencer, *Principles of Soc.* 1876. p. 479.

²⁾ *Opus cit.* pp. 587 ff.

dualistic sociology becomes thus, in reality, equivalent to social adaptation. But it has been objected against this point of view, that it makes individualism a mere sham; the free co-operation of the citizens is only possible through the interference of the State; the State is the great basis of adaptation, the more demand there is for adaptation, the more important becomes the function of the State. This objection must be refuted. Spencer only wants to assert the individuals' right to guard themselves against becoming victims to the rule of other individuals, when they believe they are serving the State. Spencer believes that the strong individuals who conquer are those whose nature is most social. The fact that the strong conquer the weak is equivalent to the fact that the social conquer the anti-social. This holds good only of the great whole and not of concrete individual cases. In real life the central power is always in the hands of certain definite individuals and it can only act by virtue of these individuals' separate consciousnesses. Spencer's individualistic sociology is not an expression of the individuals' de facto independence of each other, but an assertion that the mutual independence does not depend on the will of a few governing individuals. To society belongs, in Spencer's opinion, the whole of the surrounding Nature which men exploit for their own purposes: fields and woods, roads and railways, houses and cities. All these things determine their train of thought, their desires and wants. This exploitation may be placed in the hands of public offices, but it does not therefore become a function of the State, like the exercise of justice. The ideal society considers the liberty of the individual as sacred and inviolable, only restricted by other individuals' equal liberty. The only function of the State is the protection of one person against another and against external enemies. The highest political order is that in which political liberty is the greatest possible and the power of the government the least possible.¹⁾

Thus liberty becomes to Spencer, in his later years as in his youth, the idea that should control social evolution. But where does it originate? Is it the natural claim of the developed individual, or is it the concentrated expression of a series of tendencies contained in the ego? Is it something that society demands of the individual

¹⁾ Herbert Spencer, *First Principles*. p. 6.

or is it a demand the individual makes on society? It is true that discussions provide information and make the idea, which we accept, an expression of reason, but it becomes more and more difficult to explain what reason is. Reason should not consist only of a closely connected series of arguments; the arguments must be based on a firm and immovable foundation. What are the fundamental conditions on which society should be constructed cannot be defined by discussion. Graham Wallas has with great force emphasized that the rôle of intellect in public discussions is not actually to prove the correctness of the opinions that are proposed, but to furnish reasons for a way of action which has already been adopted for other than intellectual reasons. Discussions are expressions of will, rather than exchanges of thought. The arguments of our political opponent fail to make an impression on us, but the speech of our political partisan is applauded in proportion to the dexterity with which he piles up reasons to prove what he is expected to prove.¹⁾ The will is not determined by imitation, but by the uniformity of the conditions under which we live, modern business conditions, the leading men within capitalism, or the representatives of those classes of the population who live in the new healthy, but quite impersonal suburbs.²⁾ We often get the impression that feelings and interest, so to speak, have each their realm within the human mind, and do not interfere with each other. What is described as the result of the growth of sympathy, of mutual adaptation and increasing social spirit and solidarity, may seem to be an expression of the technical structure of modern society which creates a democracy "that", as Cournot says, "is founded in the fact that everybody avails himself of the railway service, and is thus subjected to the same regulations". But under this apparent democracy the few still reign over the many and nurse their economic private interests with the same heartlessness as before, only if possible with still greater power. If the constant improvement in the standard of life of the masses and the heavy apparatus of democratic politics were not the means of supplying the capitalists with greater profit and more power, democracy would hardly be allowed to develop. If the capi-

¹⁾ Graham Wallas, *The Great Society*. pp. 45, 242, 257.

²⁾ Graham Wallas, *Human Nature*. p. 4.

talists thought their interest seriously threatened, they would not only, as Proudhon said, show themselves impervious to all logic and human sympathy, but they would certainly prove themselves capable of carrying their wishes through. They would be able to buy most of the men of intellectual ability, and they would avail themselves of the apparatus which moulds public opinion and create the national, religious, and moral feelings which they thought desirable.

If the social instinct does not become our strongest motive, the future will always be uncertain. Reason, which is our strongest weapon in the struggle for existence, will then serve only the egoistic interests. For the egoistic instincts always seem to be rational rather than altruistic. The social instinct or the social feelings may be the foundation of a social structure which is in all parts completely rational, but they cannot themselves become rational. Rational thinking itself will, when it leads us to self-discipline and self-sacrifice, become irrational. No thoughts can grow without enthusiasm, without disinterestedness. The rational way of thinking must itself rest on the irrational, on that which exists without reasons in us or beyond us.

Benjamin Kidd (1858—1916).

It is on this foundation that Kidd builds his sociology. "Intellect", he maintains, "appeared relatively late as a factor in man's consciousness. The power that determined his life before the intellectual age and which is still his deepest instinct, is what we call religion. But a rational religion is a contradiction. Nothing which does not give an ultra-rational sanction to the individual's social life"¹⁾ can play the part of religion in our societies.

The contrast between religion and intellectualism corresponds to the contrast between society and the individual, as reason leads to the individual's self-assertion, while society demands the individual's subordination and demands actions from him from which he derives no personal benefit. Society cannot be regarded as a sum of individuals whose interests harmonize; harmony cannot even be established if the individuals, as Spencer thought, gradually develop a social nature so that they spontaneously act for the benefit of

¹⁾ B. Kidd, *Soc. Evol.* p. 103.

society. That which we call the right way of acting from a social point of view is not right from an individual point of view. The sanction of the social will is different from and superior to the sanction of the individual will. The religious sanction which is given by society, should be sought in a centre that lies outside the individual himself. The interests of the individual are represented by the present time, but the controlling centre must lie either in the past or in the future. Where it lies in the past and the customs of ancestors are the sacred standard, all possibilities of progress are chequed. Society cannot grow when enclosed in such an armour. The evolution goes, as Henry Maine proved, from status to contract. Also Bagehot and Spencer consider the object of evolution to be the casting off by the present time of the yoke of the past, i. e. a development from society to the individual. But in order that this constant growth of the individual may mean an evolution of society and not a dissolution of it, the centre of valuation, that lies outside the individual and is yet binding, should be maintained; this ultra-rational or religious centre should be sought in the future. While the religion which is bound to the past and has stiffened into a set of dogmas tends to disappear the race will become more and more religious in the sense that it values the individual not according to the good he does his age, but according to the capacity he shows of suffering sacrifices for the sake of the future. It approaches to a tautology when we say that the future belongs to those nations which are best able to subordinate their present interests to those of posterity. To sacrifice the present for the sake of the future may be simply a prudential measure, when both present and future lie within the individual's own life. But it is impossible to prove rationally that the present generation should bear burdens for the sake of succeeding generations. From this point of view the individual becomes unessential, while rational evolution of the individual must take the individual for its centre. Rational sanction breaks the continuity of the generations; the growth and existence of societies depend, however, on the continued connection of the generations. Society is more than a companionship of the living. It is a companionship of the living, the dead, and the unborn.¹⁾

¹⁾ B. Kidd, *Social Evol.* pp. 60, 80, 142, 290; *Western Civil.* pp. 6, 8, 118, 121, 142, 472.

The problem which Kidd has to solve is, how the strong non-rational sanction of the hard conditions of life, with which the present generation is burdened for the benefit of the future, may be maintained, at the same time as scope is given for the freest play of the intellectual powers which, although they hold the germ of a conflict with this sanction, are absolutely necessary if all the individuals of society are to reach their highest productive capacity for the good of society.

This is, clearly and definitely expressed, the real problem in all existing societies. Everywhere the individual makes his claims, but the decision as to whether those claims are justified must everywhere depend on their subordination to society. Every right which the individual obtains and may rightly claim, must be a right which society gives him for its own sake. Rousseau thought that society was formed through a contract where the individuals subordinate themselves wholly to society and only get the rights which society thinks fit to grant them. Kidd goes beyond this point of view in emphasizing that the demands of society are always subject to the individuals' criticism.¹⁾ As Proudhon asserted that authority will disappear where the sovereign is only obeyed when he can support his orders by reasons, thus will authority also disappear where the individuals constantly criticize the social demands which are made on them. Like Bagehot, Kidd sees that the life of society depends on its capacity to bear free discussion. But he thinks that it only obtains this capacity through the religious, authoritative habit which includes the future in all its valuations. This is in his opinion the life of society as a collective organism.²⁾

The preponderance of the claim of society is the sustaining force which has constantly displayed itself in the non-rational mastery of religion. Formerly it expressed itself in disregarding the individuals to such a degree that they became almost absorbed by society. At the present time the point is to preserve the preponderance of religion without narrowing the sphere of action of the individual. At the present day socialism stands as an attempt to defend the claims of society and at the same time guard the individuals; it does so in

¹⁾ B. Kidd, *Soc. Evol.* pp. 133, 240.

²⁾ B. Kidd, *Individualism and after*, pp. 25, 29.

a very ill-chosen way and if society wants to go on growing socialism will have to be abandoned. In reality socialism sacrifices the present for the sake of the future and yet fails to develop a capacity in the present generation to bear burdens for the sake of posterity. This is especially seen in its attempts at protecting the individuals by stopping free competition. Without free competition everything will stagnate and end in corruption. Free competition is not a cut-throat competition, it is a competition in yielding the most and the best. It is not competition that should be given up, although it always entails effort and difficulties; it is its methods that should be humanized. The object of the increasing authority of the State, which is necessary and will always be necessary, cannot be to protect the individuals against the consequences of their errors; it is to force the individuals into ways of action which are not determined by the consideration of momentary or merely personal advantages, but by deference to lasting considerations which are expressed in a wisely instituted and well-regulated legal system. Honour and dishonour should be attached to the observance of those rules of action and those laws, which control men's enterprise and activity.¹⁾

In his posthumous work "The Science of Power", which was written under the influence of the Great War, Kidd expresses his consternation at the degree to which the will to power has penetrated our societies. It has determined all our social institutions, because they have been built up by "the fighting man". Society consists of fighting groups which have found a new fighting-ground in the parliaments, where each party as *ultima ratio* has its: "I will". The State is above right and justice, and ratified contracts are set aside like a scrap of paper. The so-called social movements, the socialist trade unions, the social organization of capital, the press, the methods by which we try to promote eugenics, all follow the same track which the German general staff indicated. If we talk of the desirability of peace, it is not because peace in itself is a valuable thing which we should make sacrifices to keep, but because it is economically advantageous. There is no hope of changing men's fundamental instincts, such as their love of war and their

¹⁾ B. Kidd, *Soc. Evol.* pp. 71, 208, 211, 239, 245, 291.

short-sighted way of living in the happy present. Our hope of improvement should be built on women who possess an inborn capacity to bear burdens for the sake of the future. Men's individual instincts are only very slowly changed through inheritable transformations; it may, however, in a single generation be possible through a very short stretch of time to transform a people's character by means of a change in its social organization. The social inheritance is not determined by the nature of the individuals, but through institutions. Institutions show men the ways which are passable and those which lead into the desert, and you may make men attached to them by lighting in them at an early age that "emotion of the ideal" which comes to rule their later life and enables them to make sacrifices for a cause that is greater than themselves.

Everywhere in Nature power is the decisive factor. But in societies power is expressed in the "emotion of the ideal" which determines their institutions and becomes the living heart of the people for the defence of which it is willing to sacrifice itself. Kidd finds the decisive test of a people's vital power in whether or not it possesses this capacity to sacrifice its present for its future. It is an old truth that a people which has no ideals is going to its destruction. But although this is so, we do not know whether a people with ideals will survive, nor what must be the nature of the ideals for which it is willing to sacrifice blood and life. The question which interests us is how such ideals develop, and whether only those which we call true, vital ideals obtain such power. What Kidd teaches us is that history undoubtedly proves that no people has any hope of a future when it is not in the present willing to bear the burdens of this future, and that the ideals which are nourished by the people must be expressed in its institutions if they are not to vanish into thin air. But Kidd does not explain to us the nature of the future which should thus control our present. We may enflame the minds of young men and women with high ideals, but how are we to protect those ideas against criticism and against being denounced as mere suggestions? Many, therefore, regard Kidd with a certain scornfulness,¹⁾ because he only emphasizes certain

¹⁾ W. MacDougall, *The Group Mind*, p. 267.

aspects of the social problem, but fails to indicate a way of solving it. These objections are, however, only true to a certain extent. It should be emphasized as being of the greatest importance that in social evolution it is not intellect that creates the "will to power", by which a people lives or dies. It is the will, as expressed in its institutions, which admits or shuts out the ideas which decide its daily life. This "will to power" can never be explained by reason — it must be sufficient that "it is". On this point there is much in Kidd which reminds us of Nietzsche; Kidd himself briefly denounces the German thinker, whom he regards as a representative of the Darwinian heathen brute morality and the morality of the German general staff.¹⁾ There is, however, a closer relationship between those two than is immediately apparent. Nietzsche's "will" appears in many respects as a feeling by which he is overcome and which assumes the form of religion, while Kidd's religion develops into an all-powerful will.

Nixon Carver.

Like Kidd, the Harvard professor Nixon Carver takes it for granted that that people deteriorates which cannot sacrifice the present to the future, and that it should feel it to be a religious duty to do so. The religion which makes it more easy for people to do so, is the only true religion. Carver sympathizes with the pragmatic view of which James was so eloquent a spokesman. But he places religion in a much closer connection with "Erkenntnis", it being "Erkenntnis" which can best tell us of the future. It is our perception of the law of Nature that makes us acquainted with God's law; Carver adopts Descartes' point of view, that the laws of Nature are God's thoughts of the universe, and that it is undoubtedly God's will that a people which seeks the object of life in pleasure, which injures production, should be destroyed, while the people that builds up its institutions in such a way that its energy grows, and whose capability to perform useful work is constantly on the increase and which constantly regulates its lines of business according to the demands of justice, will rule the world. Carver contrasts the "Pig-Trough Philosophy of Life" with the "Work-Bench Philosophy".

¹⁾ B. Kidd, *The Science of Power*, pp. 52, 57, 74 ff.

The former destroys the nations, the latter makes them the rulers of the earth. Our whole "Erkenntniss" teaches us that those societies where the most capable are allowed to rule, while the incapable are kept in the background, will thrive. The man who by just work produces much and becomes rich does not rob his fellow-men, but increases the wealth of his nation. But he who enriches himself through rape, or he who wastes his riches on pleasure instead of using them to increase his production, detracts from the power of his nation. To learn to understand that the aim of life is not pleasure but work, is what Kidd called ultra-rational teaching and this can only be sustained by religion. It is not a question of the individual, but of the group, the society. "For the strength of the pack is the wolf, and the strength of the wolf is the pack".

This view contains a very definite protest against the general opinion that mechanical, law-bound Nature is without connection with our morality. "This", Carver maintains, "is a complete misunderstanding. Nature teaches us quite definitely that that people conquers which is most capable, and thus it becomes the law of the individual to live for the good of his nation. Justice is a sign of health in society, the punishment that attends injustice is the death of society". This may be expressed in two ways: we may say, either that justice is eternal and will therefore conquer by virtue of God's decree, or that that which conquers by virtue of the law of existence (which was created and is maintained by God) is justice. Whether we express it in one way or another the individual only becomes just when he unconditionally shapes his life by a law which has a wider aim than his own immediate advantage. It is without purpose to subject the individual to discipline, when this does not promote the prosperity of society. The individual should renounce his egoism which makes him trample on others, and his foolish desire for power which does not furnish him with a corresponding capacity to rule. The organization of society should therefore be framed in such a legal system as prevents one individual from violating another (the reign of destruction), and which also does not give him who possesses the gift of eloquence (the reign of palaver or parliament) precedence over him who possesses practical ability. "It is", says Carver, "impossible to make justice dependent on the popular will; the task cannot be to examine what a people may

possibly desire, and make that the measure of justice; it should be ascertained what is justice, and we should then try to make that the will of the people."

The simple economic law, that a person's income depends on the useful work he performs, we may call "the law of work". This is not immediately attractive to a great number of men. They are more ready to listen to those who promise to abolish this law, than to those who try to impress it. We therefore see so many great talkers raised to power and dignity; but this leads to the ruin of society, however happy the masses may be to have their will. Carver's objection to socialism is that it is a reign of palaver that draws away the people's attention from their work. The only way to make work well-paid is to raise a demand for it, and this is only done by an increased production. This is why we find so few practically capable people in the ranks of the socialists.

The religion of work is the only one which safeguards a people's future. We do not live in order to eat, but we eat in order to live. We do not work in order to consume, but we consume in order to be able to produce. It is the joy in creating and accomplishing things that should be the strongest driving force in life, and not the joy in enjoying and consuming. Only the joy in work makes life worth living, and only the religion of work is therefore worth nourishing. But this is a hard and unbending religion, which demands hard work, thrifty living, and unconditional discipline in order to lay the world under its feet. This religion is not supported by the State, but by the individuals; they do not accept it from the State, but they regard the State as an organ of it. The more the State is regarded as the sovereign power, in which one should try to get a share, the more is the competition in skill replaced by the competition for power. Political competition offers, however, only a poor guarantee of good work. Men are far more indifferent when it is a question of giving their votes, than when it is a question of spending their money, and only free individual power protects the minority against the tyranny of the majority. Even the smallest minority, the individual, is protected, so long as he is at liberty to leave off trading with the merchant with whom he is discontented. If trade were organized by the State, so that the individual lost this liberty and protection, he would be obliged to trade at the shop which

society had instituted and whose manager had been appointed by society. The disastrous consequences would soon make themselves felt. In order to get rid of such a manager the discontented customer would have to set in motion a complicated political machinery, i. e. his power would be practically non-existent.

It is by the service he renders that we determine a man's value. He who performs his work less perfectly than he can, acts wrongly. It should be possible for every man to choose the way he wants to go, the work he wants to perform, only provided that it is useful work. According to this plan the most clever will conquer, and the less capable, the lazy and inferior individuals will be pushed aside. To secure people their economic existence without regarding the way in which they work, is the sure way of making the quality of their work inferior. If society appropriates the right to prescribe people their work, it weakens their interest in their work, for everybody works best at the task he has chosen for himself. There are three maxims which must be absolutely valid in every society that is to thrive. The first is that every way injurious to society in which you want to nurse your particular interests should be suppressed. The second is that the individual's full liberty to foster his particular interests in every way that is useful, should be acknowledged. The third is that the individual should be fully responsible for the results of his own actions.

As the value of the individual is determined by the services he renders, the value of the State is determined in the same way. Its object is to bar the way for the individuals' injurious ways of acting, and keep a way open to their useful, self-chosen actions. Liberty is not a right to do whatever pleases you, but a right to do all that is useful. It becomes the task of the State to form the laws in accordance with a constantly clearer perception of what is useful. The growth of the life of trade makes this task, at the same time, more important and more difficult. Narrower and narrower become the limits which the State must draw to useful ways of action, but the limits that must be drawn are limits to actions, and not to persons. The questions of the organization of work, of the sphere of action of the trade-unions, of private property, of the distribution of wealth, are all questions of the greatest importance, which cannot be answered by taking either class-interests or the regard for men's

wisdom and insight as the starting-point. Those questions can only be answered by objectively laying clear the benefit or injury which these organizations render in regard to production. To the individual the object is to act as he should, but it is a quite different thing to say that the State should take the responsibility for preparing him to do so. The question of the duty of the State should be considered from a point of view quite different from that of the duty of the individual. The duty of the State is determined by the necessary conditions for the general good; these conditions may be shortly expressed, as consisting in preventing injurious actions by individuals and opening the way for their beneficial actions. Such a social organization may be called socialism, but it is quite different from the socialism which, at the present moment, shakes our societies. This is merely a struggle between the classes, which concerns itself not with justice or injustice, with utility or injury, but only with class-consciousness and class-difference. Its prospect of victory or defeat depends on will and passion, and not on an understanding of the necessary conditions for the well-being of society.

Carver builds on the fundamental economic principle which is called the principle of rarity. The more rare the thing we need is, the greater weight it gains in our eyes. Raw materials are valued according to the quantity in which they appear in proportion to the use we have for them. The same applies to the human working capacity. This fact influences society in two ways. A thing may be made more valuable by being made more useful as its relative quantity is diminished. Wages increase with the demand for workers. A thing may also be made dearer by making it rarer by artificial means. The trade unions may stop an increase of workers, the owners of the mines an increase in raw material, the great financiers an increase in credit, etc. The former way of making a thing more valuable is useful, the latter injurious, as it does not help to promote production, but only produces an increase in power and an unequal accumulation of riches in a few hands. Such accumulation is equally injurious whether it is the individual or the State that accumulates riches for their own disposal. The means of preventing such accumulation is not to hinder people or the State from receiving an income beyond a certain figure, but to take measures to distribute the right of property as widely as possible. Socialism sins on this point.

We fail to understand what Carver means by the religion of work if by it we understand that one must think of nothing but work. We are here faced with the question of a standard for our valuation. The whole interplay of feelings and interests which fills the human mind should be measured by whether it increases or diminishes man's working power. Egoistic and altruistic impulses, the capacity to keep aloof from one's fellow-men, or to sympathize with others and share in their joy, one's taste for art, etc. determine the colour of a man's mind at different periods. But the cause of one thing being valued above another, is to be found in an increase or decrease of our working capacity. We are able to perform more when we allow rest and careless indolence to interrupt our hours of work; we quickly consume our strength and do inferior work, when we fail to take the necessary rest. We get farther in our co-operation with other men when we know how to treat them and make them fond of their work. Carver emphasizes the fact that pleasure, of whatever nature it may be, which weakens our power of work should be rejected. We may perhaps formulate Carver's doctrine of the religion of work as follows: the standard by which a man is measured in his own eyes and in the eyes of society, is never capacity for pleasure, but capability to do useful work.

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With Carver we may conclude the series of views on human life which we began with Proudhon. In spite of all differences between starting-point and closing-point in the whole mental colouring, an identity of essentials is perceptible. It is the constant balance that should be maintained in the constantly fluctuating whole, which we find in physical as well as in social Nature. The laws of economy become thus in reality universal laws. All that hampers free movement contributes to create artificial, compulsory, and very unstable conditions of equilibrium.

Expressed socially, free men's free combinations must be the fundamental type round which their life must centre. The State becomes one of the organs which are formed by this life in society; but she is the expression of the inherent capacity of the free associations to create order, and not an instrument that creates an order which would not exist without her. None of the above theories have

been carried through in practical, social political life, although the forms which this life has assumed are, on decisive points, characterized by the leading ideas outlined above. What characterized political life in the course of the century, was the carrying through of general franchise; the problems and conflicts which were involved thereby, created what we call the Liberal State; this State stands in a quite different relation to the free associations of free men from that suggested by Proudhon. Proudhon raised his demand for liberty against the existing State; the Liberal State is a proof that confidence in the order that is inherent in liberty, is rather wavering. Proudhon denounced the belief in fate and providence that was set forth by Hegel; the Liberal State revives in many respects the view on the State as the divine organ of Eternal Providence.

The Liberal State.

The form of government which existed in England before Gladstone was not a Liberal State, but a government by the upper classes which gave a very wide scope to the private initiative of the trading classes. Gladstone's utterances in favour of an extension of the franchise, which were set forth in 1864, gave rise to a vehement conflict between him and Palmerston. In this way the laissez-faire system, which was then in force and which was represented by Palmerston, collided with the system of free co-operation. The laissez-faire system, under the semblance of regard for the individuals' liberty and through its doctrine of the State's non-interference with trade, tried to prevent the formation of organizations that might interfere with the supremacy of the reigning industrial and commercial upper class. In reference to this system Gladstone pronounced that he regarded every man who is not included in the category of the mentally deficient or disreputable, as morally fit for exercise of the franchise. By this utterance he aroused Palmerston's anger, and he had to resign his seat in Parliament. But at the elections his views gained the victory, and thus were initiated the repeated extensions of the franchise which, during the next twenty years, gave the State a more and more democratic character; this was seen mostly in the fact that everybody was allowed to set forth

¹) J. Morley, *The Life of W. E. Gladstone I*, pp. 567, 569, 584.

his opinion unhampered and to act independently.¹⁾ The task of the State became, under this system, to see to it that the various organizations and institutions came to form such a connected whole as to guard the interests of society. This does not mean that the State was considered as a being over or outside the individuals; but it was feared that an open acknowledgment of the fact that the State only represented the individual interests, might lead to unstable conditions which would also deprive the individual interests of their force. It became the task of the individual interest to assert itself with all its power. It became the object of the State to assert the principle or idea demanded by all the interests. The task of the State became not primarily authoritative, but rather of the nature of relief; the old idea of Hegel which had captured the youthful Humboldt and taught him to turn his back on revolutionary ideas, now cropped up once more in English society which had made such a great leap into the sea of the masses, the currents of which had not been fathomed.

The Oxford professor, Th. Hill Green (1836—1882), became a clear and authoritative spokesman of this view of the task of the State. In the last years of his life he gave a series of lectures on the principles of political duty. Green was the typical representative of the self-assertive and independent mind of the English citizen. A man is responsible for his actions. It is his will that determines whether they be good or bad. Green cares not for the speculative reflections on the liberty of the will, he only sets up the practical demand that a man should be responsible for his actions. If we, like Kant, think ourselves free only when we are ruled by reason, the criminal is not free, but if liberty means liberty of choice, the criminal, who with imperturbed judging power or in cold blood pursues his ends, is a free man. Whether our will be good or evil, we are free when we have control over our motives. Green asserts, and it is this that he has especially at heart, that there is a perfect harmony between the liberty that is characteristic of a citizen's position in a civilized State and that which is characteristic of that man who is able to control his own mind.¹⁾ Civil and political liberty is the fruit of man's mental liberty, it is therefore essential to create the necessary conditions for the development of this. Only where the

¹⁾ Th. Hill Green, *Lect. of Freedom II*, pp. 318—325. *Lect. of Kant II*, p. 1071.

external form of liberty exists do we obey the law because it conforms with our ideas of law, i. e. because it expresses our demand for self-control — and not merely because we are subject to it. Liberty, as conceived by Hegel, is in reality the individual's devotion to the ideals which are realized by the State — a devotion which may be prompted either by instinct or reason. Man is made a moral being through the position he occupies in his family or in the society to which he belongs; he shows the sort of man he is by the way in which he fills his position.

The close connection which existed between the English State and the trade-union movement influenced Hegel's view of the tasks of the State. It was Gladstone's early policy to endeavour to meet the demands of the trade unions and incorporate them in the normal life of the State. The State became in this way an organ of their desires for aid to self-help. If necessary the State should exercise force in order to create liberty and maintain man's right of developing freely. She should prevent the outbreak of social chaos; it may become her task to remove the impediments that may hinder the individual's free development, e. g. to take upon herself the charge of education and the fight against drunkenness. In Bosanquet's "Philosophical Theory of the State, 1889", this influence from Hegel was still more pronounced.

He regards the State as the modifying and harmonizing agent of the individual institutions,¹⁾ in which work she allows herself to be led by the particular characteristics of the age as expressed in a collective idea and by "sovereignty". The State does not rest on any single institution, but on the system which they constitute. The State is the incarnation of the general will or the real will, her various measures are expressions of the interference of the general will with private individual interests. This interference soon transforms itself into the expression of civil liberty in the form of legal machinery. Delisle Burns asserts, for instance, that the interference of the State is only a testimony that the existing system of government should be altered and assume new forms and accept new tasks. It appears in many ways to be more difficult to govern and organize a democratic society than an autocracy. The State does no

¹⁾ B. Bosanquet, *The Philosophical Theory of the State*, p. 140.

longer regulate the life of trade from outside. She is in the centre of pulsating trade, trying to increase the points of contact between private and common interests. She acknowledges, for instance, the trade unions as organs which may serve to organize social interests and not only the workers' interests in production and distribution, in workshop regulations, questions of wages, of unemployment, etc. The trade unions thus become transformed from being the fighting organizations of private interests into being the organs of the desires of new trade organizations, which take into consideration the whole life of trade as a social function. The State does not by this means put barriers to the activities of able and energetic men, she only gives them new organizations, where many of the defects which formerly hampered their initiative have disappeared. Strikes and trade union tyranny, which are turned both against the employers and against one's fellow-workers, will disappear when the parties meet for free discussion under the leadership of the State. The old view that the State should keep an eye on suspected persons, while the private businesses should themselves guard their independence, holds good no longer. Private enterprises, on whose experience the State is constantly depending, get a share in public authority.¹⁾ Thus the contrast between the government and the governed is effaced, and the power that is demanded on different occasions and in different places, is not regarded as an authority necessary per se, but as a necessary condition for the performance of the social function. Industry does not demand mastery, but such conditions of work as will make the performance of the necessary work possible. The wages are not payment for work that has been performed, but a standard of the payment necessary in order to make future work possible. But even though the erroneous ideas which are held to the effect that the government offices want to exploit private enterprises disappear, even though we are really convinced that the authorities do their best to make everything as good as possible, this does not suffice. Delisle Burns²⁾ is right when he regards it as the principal question, whether the administrative institutions leave the public, whom they serve, any real liberty or whether it is only

¹⁾ C. D. Burns, *Government and Industry*. Chap. III.

²⁾ C. D. Burns, *Industry and Civilization*, p. 90.

allowed to play the part of the grateful citizen and is given no real independent influence in deciding what is for its own benefit.

Throughout Liberal society runs a key-note of guardianship which, in spite of all ability, righteousness and humane feelings on the part of private and public leaders, characterizes Liberal society as an upper class society, and retains the pernicious contrast between capitalist and worker, stamping the latter as belonging to the proletariat. The wage-earner is profoundly sensible that he works at the order of another, and under very short-sighted economic conditions too, as he receives his income at fixed rates, a method of payment which is not likely to promote individual initiative. All the workers suffer, if not from actual unemployment, from a constant fear of losing their work, and those who are apt to ponder on their conditions feel themselves as tools in the hands of the employers; the purpose for which they work, and which enables them to earn their living is without any personal interest to them. The workers feel that the employers perform a social function quite apart from their own; class feeling establishes their mutual relationship.¹⁾

The most eminent theoretical advocate of the Liberal State, L. T. Hobhouse (born in 1864), likewise rejects the fear of allowing the State to act as a regulating and assisting factor, and regards this fear rather as a foolish *tu quoque* to socialism. It is the mechanical aspect of socialism that the Liberals must denounce, an aspect which rests on Marx's materialistic view of history and the low estimate of man, of which official socialism makes itself guilty, and which makes it despise the ideas of liberty and makes it regard men as generally so weak and helpless that they need a guardian. It is maintained by Liberalism that every experience that shows that an ordinary man cannot earn his own living, is proof of a defect in the organization of society. A wide-reaching economic re-organization is necessary in order to remedy this defect; we should, however, draw a distinction between that control which gives life more health and power, and that which quenches life.²⁾ To hesitate in rendering such assistance would be to shut our ears to human suffering and, moreover, it would be dangerous. To leave it to the lower classes

¹⁾ *Opus cit.* Chap. IV.

²⁾ L. T. Hobhouse, *Liberalism*, pp. 99, 147, 159, 165.

themselves to improve their conditions is not the best means of assisting their progress, and to teach them only to confide in their own powers will make them alien and hostile to the rest of society.¹⁾ In social organization justice and not charity should be considered.

"It is", asserts Hobhouse, "wrong to maintain that it is degrading to receive State relief. Only private charity has a demoralizing effect. Neither is it right to assert that all men are given the same chances of finding a fitting occupation. So many social factors inter-act on this point that they can only be controlled by the assistance of society; nobody can demand that the individual should be able to do this for himself. Thus it may be the task of society to regulate trade, to prevent arbitrary increases and restrictions of offers of work, to counteract the accumulation of excessive fortunes and anti-social desires for power, and the possibilities of satisfying foolish vanity in wasteful consumption."²⁾

The function of society is pre-eminently to create security. Therefore it becomes its task to subdue such forms of private enterprise as constitute a danger to society. In every private enterprise there is a social element. The individual who wants to utilize this social element must pay for it. Hobhouse emphasizes expressly that the landlords commit an injustice in accepting the increasing ground-values created by the increased population, without rendering a compensation. The same holds good of the riches contained in the mines, for the raw materials receive their value by the increasing use of them in trade. There is therefore no cause to acknowledge private ownership to such an increase of value; the acknowledgment of such private right is one of the main sources of economic inequality and of the preponderance of a few classes over the rest. Society renounces its just proprietorship in allowing the natural riches to become privately owned.³⁾

In his last work, "Social Development, its Nature and Conditions, 1924", Hobhouse essays to give a comprehensive explanation of the evolution of society. He depends on his numerous earlier studies of social psychology and on his extensive knowledge of modern socio-

¹⁾ Opus cit. pp. 105, 157, 160.

²⁾ Opus cit. pp. 183, 165, 201. Elements of Social Justice, p. 117.

³⁾ L. T. Hobhouse, Elements of Social Justice, p. 162.

logy, but he does not succeed in giving an explanation of the relation between State and citizen, beyond a merely practical, technical explanation. Liberalism becomes reduced to the carrying into effect of John Locke's practical principle, the kernel of which is that a people should be allowed to arrange its affairs as practically as possible, and make itself as happy as is possible. Old usages and prejudices should not be allowed to bar the way for improved methods, but the new methods should make no break in continuity; they should be the expression of the legal views which govern society and with which the old usages which we want to be altered accord no more. Hobhouse pursues to its end his view on Liberalism according to which the sphere of authority of the State rests on a practical valuation. There is no definite sphere for the activity of the State, or for that of the individual. The tasks which the State is able to perform better than the citizens should fall to her lot. Nobody can reasonably defend the citizens' individual liberty, when this will be synonymous with an inferior management of the affairs of society. The citizens should also be given the right of freeing themselves from a number of tasks, wasteful of time and strength, by shifting the performance of them on to the shoulders of the State. The decisive question is whether it be possible to come to a decision as to which tasks may thus be shifted on to the State, and what sort of increased authority the State will thereby obtain. Hobhouse does not actually set this up as a point of debate. He seems to be urged by an unmistakable tendency to distinguish between the functions of the State as the administrator of law in the individuals' personal quarrels, and as a technical agent. The utterance "what the State is able to perform better than the people, she should be allowed to perform", suggests that the State is regarded from the same point of view as the technical management of a factory. The modern State has right from the beginning of the century displayed an indisputable tendency to consider the administration of land and the questions of traffic as being of the first importance; in this way she becomes, to a constantly less degree, the maintainer of order in the old sense of the word, and more and more a system of special offices.

In France we find the above characteristics of the evolution of the Liberal State more pronounced and here we also perceive the

attitude of the Liberal State to the series of leading ideas which have since the day of Proudhon gathered the élite of French thinkers and philosophers under their banner. The Liberal State is, as we have mentioned, not a victorious outcome of the Democratic movement, but the last attempt by the old intellectual élite to maintain their power in modern society. As typical representatives of this movement we may take Léon Bourgeois, the leader of the French Radicals, and Léon Duguit, the most eminent representative of the students of the transformations within modern French law.

Léon Bourgeois (1851—1925).

In the movements which were started by the "petits bourgeois" in their efforts to re-build France after the war, the fight against the Great Financiers and the Catholic Church became dominating. The belief in the individual's right made it a matter of course to oppose the growing Social Democracy which, with its tendency towards strict organization, mainly gathered its adherents among the industrial workers, while the class of "petits bourgeois" consisted of small traders and artisans, farmers and men of letters. In those strata of the population the idea of solidarity dominated more and more, but this solidarity assumed a wholly individualistic form. From the end of the eighties Bourgeois attempted to call those tendencies by a definite name which might be made of political significance; and at the different conferences which, during the following twenty years at certain intervals, collected the most eminent minds of France for the discussion of great social and philosophical problems, Bourgeois succeeded in giving an exposition of the main principles of Liberal policy, which became of importance far beyond the boundaries of France.

"The State", asserts Bourgeois, "can make no demand on her own behalf. She is only an administrative system instituted by the citizens in order to decide their mutual relation. What we call social duties is only a question of simple legal measures which regulate the citizens' mutual accounts. So long as only one member of society remains who does not pay what he owes, no harmony can be established. Those who feel themselves set aside, grow embittered, and those who cannot exactly estimate their outstanding debts are

tempted to the perpetration of violent deeds or indulge themselves in dreams of a Utopian State, where justice reigns, but where man's only true value, liberty, is destroyed."¹⁾

Society rests on three fundamental principles, solidarity, liberty, and justice. Solidarity is the natural condition of life, liberty is the necessary condition of progress, and justice is the condition of order. Solidarity is not rooted in our feelings, but it is produced by our natural condition of individual impotence. Liberty is not a privilege, which certain individuals may claim, but it is the necessary condition of each individual's growth. We may express this in another way by saying that liberty is just as necessary to the individual as to society. We become free only when we have paid our debts. Justice is the exact estimation of each individual's debit and credit accounts. Society may be compared to a joint-stock company, where each member has his own account, and where nobody can overdraw his account. We are all debtors, we accept the sum of progress created by previous generations which no single individual has a right to appropriate; if the profit gained by our work exceeds what may be gained by our own unaided powers, it means that we appropriate that to which we have no claim.²⁾

On the acknowledgment of this fundamental relation of debit the mutual relations of the citizens must build. Fouillée considers this explanation incomplete,³⁾ while other philosophers regarded the theory as confused. But the idea has gained acknowledgment in wide circles; it is in reality a revival of Fourier's and Proudhon's fundamental demands on society for an honest keeping of accounts. In practical politics this means that the citizens must yield up such amounts of their income as are necessary to secure everybody a suitable education and a reasonable insurance against those misfortunes of which the individual himself is not the cause. Our societies distinguish themselves from those of the past by the constantly greater importance of contracts. The freely discussed and exactly fulfilled contract has become the basis of the rights of man. Authority is more and more thrown into the shadow. Almost simultaneously this

¹⁾ L. Bourgeois, *Solidarité*, pp. 45, 65, 92 ff.

²⁾ *Opus cit.* pp. 42, 46, 70, 80.

³⁾ A. Fouillée, *Les Éléments*, p. 313.

view was set forth by Emile Durkheim, the founder of the French sociological school, to whose view we shall presently return. Under strong influence from Durkheim, Duguit took up the whole idea in his own way from the juridical point of view. For the present we shall, however, concentrate on Bourgeois.

The emphasis of our position as debtors marks an immense step onward towards the recognition that we are all equal inheritors of the advantages which have been created by past generations. None has the right to reserve the inheritance for himself alone, debarring others from their share. The real trouble in our societies is that such encroachment constantly takes place and that the masses may therefore rightly consider themselves as having been cheated out of their inheritance. But it is a very peculiar way in which Bourgeois proposes that an honest valuation and distribution should be undertaken. In all cases of private inheritances it would be regarded as an unjust arrangement if the distribution of the inheritance was made in such a way as to leave the administration to a certain group, while profit was distributed in equal shares. Bourgeois fails to grasp the immense difference between the position as heir and receiver of interest in the business which is administered by others — and the position of heir to a legacy which you administer on your own responsibility. The arrangement which Bourgeois proposes, originates in his belief that the class in whose hands the administration remains consists of those men who are most able and most rich in initiative and whom everybody should obey. Whether he is right in his belief we cannot determine on the face of it; it will, at any rate, change the whole relation of citizen and society. The State receives a double task, in part as the delegate of the receivers of interest to watch that the managers administer the property to the best advantage, in part to exercise a control that they pay the full amount into the common account. The State's whole policy of taxation, her tendency to regulate trade, and her efforts to legislate in favour of extension of the system of State relief, are justified by this idea. Liberty has received its death blow, because people are condemned to content themselves with what is done for them by their kind, considerate leaders. From receiving an inheritance which they may rightly claim, the people are reduced to receive a gift, and

"this", says Proudhon, "is the strongest chain by which a people may be bound."

This is not a mere casual consequence of the way in which the Liberal State wants to settle its account with the single individual. It is the task of the Liberal State to ward off the pressure from the lower classes by remedying the worst misfortunes and making those allowances which are necessary, if the most essential features of the existing system shall be maintained. Justice is not really a settlement of accounts, but a payment considered to be necessary. "The world", says Bourgeois, "still falls short of being a system governed by reason. But we should strive to attain to government by reason, as this is a necessary condition for forming a real society. So long as the exchange of social services seems to violate justice, those services cannot be performed without meeting resistance, which makes compulsion necessary. If a great number of those services are compulsory, the discontent of the population assumes fixed forms. Compulsion is withstood by acts of violence. This is the history of all revolutions."¹⁾ But this "Erkenntnis" does not gain ground in the upper classes, unless a vivid sympathy with the injured party is entertained — a sympathy which makes you settle the accounts without pettiness and show the generosity which is befitting to a grandseigneur. But precisely through this emphasis on sympathy the Liberal State proves itself to be a government by the upper classes, and the idea of justice becomes effaced. "The condition of being free", says Bourgeois, "is to have paid your debt". But it is only the upper classes who are able to pay their debts and still keep their ability to fight their way through existence unaided. Although the value which falls to the lot of the lower classes, when the upper classes pay their debts, is said to be their legal possession, on which they have a claim, and not a gift, this is not a proof that their income is the result of their own work. Sympathy is satisfied when it heals the wounds which life deals, but justice makes a greater demand. It demands admission to independent work by which value is created, so that a man gains self-respect at the same time as he gains the respect of others. Bourgeois himself defined individual liberty as the right to work, and his opposition against every

¹⁾ L. Bourgeois, *Solidarité*, p. 91.

form of socialistic collectivism is an assertion of the principle that it is the access to work and not the right to receive a social dole, which should be considered. But his doctrine of social solidarity and his demand that the citizen should pay his debt to society makes it necessary for the lower classes, in all essentials, to content themselves with their social dole. They never get equal chances with the upper classes in their access to work.

Bourgeois throws out a suggestion¹⁾ of the consequences which would follow if we acknowledged the social cause of the increased value so that those increased values were included in the social insurance funds — he does not, however, develop this idea further; he fails to define which ground-values should be included and shows no understanding of the fact that the confiscation of these ground-values will open up a wider sphere for the work of the lower classes. He gets no further than to emphasize the fact that the social insurance funds will be increased by such confiscation. This view accords completely with the character of the Liberal view of the State. It is a concession, sprung from a vivid sympathy with the demand of the lower classes for improved conditions. The Liberals perceive the necessity of making real and considerable allowances, but they have no intention of surrendering the peculiar position held by the upper classes. They want to confer a great many advantages on the lower classes, such as removal of anxiety for daily bread, exemption from risk, from the performance of hard work, etc., they want to settle the accounts in a large-minded way. But an acknowledgment of real fellowship is out of the question. It is not by accident that Bourgeois lays so much stress on debit relations. The Liberal State may without remarkable exaggeration be regarded as the defender of existing society against progressive socialism. According to Marx's train of ideas there is no question of a settlement of debts, but it is a question of summarily putting an end to the private possession of the increased values of society, which are still seized by Liberal society under the cloak of its administrative rights. One of Bourgeois' partisans, the well-known professor, F. Boutroux, asserts that the Liberal idea consists of the union of freedom with solid-

¹⁾ L. Bourgeois, *Essai*, p. 95.

arity. "Solidarity is the free and intelligent co-operation of individuals who agree to associate in order to defend their material, spiritual, esthetic, moral and religious wants. Solidarity builds thus in all respects on human liberty."¹⁾ But he fails to perceive that solidarity is curtailed by the Liberal guardianship, liberty being a costly privilege which the administrators of the inheritance have reserved to themselves.

The conflict which is taking place in our societies has through the course of centuries shaped itself into the different theories which have been described above. It is not the conflict of the theories that determines the way evolution takes. The changes in society are not due to a syllogism. Social discussion is, as stated by Graham Wallas, an act of volition and not a logical acting on the most convincing arguments. It is our ability to work which is decisive. "Action", writes the American, Patten, "is better than thought, when we are to take up an attitude towards new conditions. It is not the fight of idea against idea, but the fight of social groups against social groups, which is the decisive factor in evolution."²⁾ This seems to go quite contrary to Bagehot's emphasis of the immense influence our thinking has on our way of acting. It is, however, not Patten's intention to recommend thoughtless action; but he demands that the idea which pretends to hold our whole view on life, should be in close contact with reality. Academic thinking is but of small value, we should include the life of reality in the life of our ideas. We can scarcely help thinking that the tendency of the age to rank action above thought is, in part, the cause of the strife and contest which mark the life of the present age. It has been impossible to give a philosophical exposition of the contesting interests. The illusory view, opposed by Carver, to the effect that you may serve your interests better by fighting and force than by ability, may seem to be supported by utterances like those of Patten, and all the sad experience men have harvested by regarding physical power as the *ultima ratio* has not yet deprived it of its power. The Liberal State, the gospel of solidarity, peace and goodwill has not led to the goal. Both internally among the classes, and externally among

¹⁾ Boutroux, *Rôle de l'idée de Solidarité*. Cited by Bourgeois in "Essai", p. 281.

²⁾ Simon N. Patten, *The Reconstruction of Economic Theory*, p. 70.

the nations, the state of war still threatens, because the solidarity on which the Liberal State pretends to build is only the recognition of an extensive system of common interests among the groups by which we admit the foolishness of adhering too closely to our own interests, but which has not yet expressed our perception that a secession from the other groups and a detachment from common solidarity would spell our own ruin.

In the years before the Great War, when an increasing warlike feeling made itself felt everywhere, many regarded war among the nations as being out of the question, as they were in so many ways economically dependent on each other. The war ideals as the expression of a sound constitution, personal disinterestedness and loyalty unto death, gained the upper hand over economic interests, as being of a higher ethical value. Norman Angell attempted with eminent skill and conciseness in his book "The Great Illusion", 1910, to prove how senseless it would be to enter upon a war. We should be able to build upon a solidarity among the nations of the same nature as that which exists between the individuals in the separate societies. Political boundaries are not the same as economic boundaries. No war pays economically; it is quite impossible to levy tribute on a conquered nation, for you cannot lay waste another nation without laying waste yourself. If we ruin another nation we ruin our own markets at the same time. Nobody can sell without buying, this does not apply only to the relation between men individually, but also to the relation between the individual nations. Competition should not lead to men ruining each other; it should only be a competition in ability, in useful activity and in the utilization of Nature and her raw materials. The individual dies if he is at war with his group; a nation who violates her solidarity with other nations, dies also. In order to live their life fully the nations should associate in one great association of mankind. The greater a nation's co-operation with other nations is, the greater is her vital power; isolated, she is but an incomplete organization.

The war came precisely because there was no such bond of fellowship among the nations, as made one feel another's will as part of her own. As class stands against class, because each has his separate function to perform, thus nation stands against nation. But when the war broke out, the employers and workers of each country

stood together although their relation had hitherto been hostile. Each class felt its own welfare to depend on its solidarity with the realm. Germany's industrial progress was, for instance, due to extraordinarily strenuous work as well as to the workers' contentment with low wages. The whole work of organization did not take place without violent internal conflicts, but, when it came to the point, everybody recognized the necessity of organization, and when war came, all presented one common front. There was nothing irrational in this state of affairs, only a clear perception by each separate individual that his fate was determined by the power of his nation and not by international brotherhood.¹⁾

After the war Keynes asserted with great perspicuity that the arrangement made by the peace-treaty at Versailles was disastrous to all parties. Peace rested on the erroneous idea that in the future also war will be the way in which the nations will settle their accounts. If this is so, it will be impossible to create security. France won in this round, but it will not be the last. France will not be able to limit the growth of the German people and ruin its conditions of economic life, and even if she had the power to do so, she would not have the right. It is vile and contemptible to attempt to keep a people in slavery for generations, and to make the life of millions degrading and unhappy. No nation can, either in religion or natural morality, find reasons which gives her the right to visit the iniquity of the fathers upon the children.²⁾

What was needed was a common high-way for the competing nations. It fell to the lot of the League of Nations to supply this. We have all witnessed how difficult it was for the League to become something more than a mere counting-house. Whether it will succeed in becoming an organ of common international tasks, the future will decide. But the indispensable condition, if the League of Nations is to solve this task, is that the individual nations should waive their idea of sovereignty. He is a sovereign with whom the decision rests in case of a conflict. Whether it will be possible to attain to a condition in which the interests of the States become so closely connected that they harmonize, is uncertain; it may, however, be possible that the necessity of their arriving at a common

¹⁾ P. Lensch, *Die Sozialdemokratie*.

²⁾ J. M. Keynes, *The Economic Consequences*, pp. 31, 209, Chap. VI.

decision becomes so pressing as to make them submit to such decision. If this is to be the basis of the decision, as no common agreement can come about, it will be the formal ways by which the agreement is made which will constitute its judicial basis. It is impossible that there should be one universal sovereign who possesses the necessary physical power. Sovereign power must be based on a machinery which gives all parties a chance of having their interests promoted and thoroughly examined and estimated. The jurists discussed these problems in their smallest details. The relation between might and right cannot be made clear, until the legal system is the only source of power in society.¹⁾ The supreme law for humanity is sought either in divine commandment or in a cosmic system of the world; the lasting idea which goes through all changes is that of a supreme law. Thus Tesar points out how the old Greek legal system was shaped in harmony with the idea of a law that pervades all the world. Man must needs have a system that harmonizes with that of the cosmos, but which is made by mankind itself. These ideas culminated in the philosophy of Plato; God i. e. reason walks everywhere. Justice is his follower.²⁾

The difficulty in giving vital force to such an international organization as is the League of Nations is found in the fact that a State can only be a government of free men, if it is not to lose its character of legality and become arbitrariness. So long as one party or other thinks himself strong enough to carry his special view through, wars can scarcely be avoided; and in the consciousness of men the strange interplay of ideas which confuse might with right, will continue. From the age of Hobbes and Spinoza we know that power is equal to right. God made "right", when He created the order of Nature and decided what should conquer and survive.

If we turn our attention to internal relations in the individual State we meet the same problems of the relation between right and might. It is true of every State that her strength and prosperity depend on her unity, and there must in all conflicts among the indi-

¹⁾ Carl Schmitt, *Soziologie des Souveränitätsbegriffes*; Max Weber, *Erinnerungsgabe II Abh.* p. 12; Hans Kelsen, *Das Problem der Souveränität*, p. 315; C. N. Starcke, *Sur l'idée de la Souveraineté*.

²⁾ O. Tesar, *Staatsidee und Strafrecht*, pp. 107, 119, 173—184; Carl Schmitt, *Soziologie des Souveränitätsbegriffes*, p. 32.

viduals or the groups be one who has the decisive word or with whom the sovereign power rests. "This unity", says Thoma (*Der Begriff der modernen Demokratie*. Max Weber, *Erinnerungsgabe*, Abh. p. 13) "democracy has once for all put an end to; the kings of olden times have now been replaced by the party-leaders — democracy is, however, wanting in unity; the basis on which democracy builds, is that everybody should have the same right to his own individual opinion." "Democracy", says Kelsen, "is relativism, but this cannot be carried through so long as the idea of sovereignty is maintained. If the idea of sovereignty is maintained in democracy, this is changed into the most brutal dictatorship which in order to maintain unity eliminates all opinions which differ from those of the leader".¹⁾ But it is no more necessary for the formation of unity, from an international point of view, that all should agree on decisive points, if only they comprehend the necessity of unity, than it is necessary within the States that all should agree on all points. Proudhon's doctrine of the free associations of free men, as the strongest social formation of power, has not been able to rule societies, and the reason is that the necessary conditions of free associations, the thoroughly honest settlement of accounts has not been effected. We here meet the central defect in the Liberal State, which is that the Liberal State is a cloaked attempt to maintain the sovereignty of an upper class, which is said to be no longer in existence. A double-sided idea of liberty has been created, a liberty of the upper classes, which consists in taking the leadership, in governing and organizing, and a liberty of the lower classes, which consists of safer and more agreeable conditions of life. In earlier times the political and economic powers were united on the same hands. Proudhon wanted them to continue to be so, only the hands were to be the hands of the people. But, as a matter of fact, what has happened is that political power has fallen to the people through general franchise, while economic power still rests with a select class of capitalists while it has, at the same time, grown immensely since the final victory of the Liberal State. In the Liberal State a constant war has therefore been conducted between the political and economic potentates; the latter having by all sorts of

¹⁾ H. Kelsen, *Sozialismus und Staat. Vom Wesen und Wert der Demokratie*.

ways attempted to make themselves masters of democracy, now by intimidation and now by bribing its leaders.¹⁾ It may be disputed whether the issue of this fight depends on the governing economic minority being in the possession of such superior ability that everybody would suffer, if the economic power and administration were to rest with the workers themselves; this is not, however, the central issue. In reality there is only a very small minority among the people who will look askance at allowing the experts to decide those questions which are of importance to the whole community. Most people would regard it as very foolish if the incapable were allowed to decide for the capable. The cleft which divides is to be found in this circumstance: the leaders are given such an overpoweringly huge common inheritance to administrate, and in the administration of this they get the control of all the jobs in the market. Under these conditions the State assumes gradually the shape of a great complicated business concern where the legal order is made dependent on the technique which is necessary in order to administrate the various affairs. This growth of technical and institutional interests, which began as early as in the days of Adam Smith, was completed under the evolution of the Liberal State.¹⁾

The thorough change in the legal system of society, which thus takes place in the Liberal State we find best set forth and most clearly explained by Duguit.

Léon Duguit, b. 1859.

Duguit, who occupies the chair of Professor of law at Bordeaux, is, in many respects, a pupil of his former colleague and contemporary, Emile Durkheim; he does not, however, adopt Durkheim's profound, sociological expositions. He collects all his force to prove that in modern society an explanation that builds on sovereignty is no good, and he then proceeds to examine which are the sources of the legal system.

¹⁾ E. Vanderwelde, *Le Socialisme contre l'Etat*; K. Landauer, *Die Wege zur Eroberung*, etc.; Max Weber, *Erinnerungsg.* II Abh. p. 16.

²⁾ Newell Le Roy Sims, *Society and its Surplus*; C. Wissler, *Man and Culture*. Chap. XV: M. Wolfe, *Conservatism, Radicalism, etc.*; J. R. Kantor, *An Essay toward an instit. Concep. of soc. Psychol.* Amer. Journ. of Soc. XXVII.

Duguit belongs to the adherents of the Liberal State because he strongly advocates the liberty of the individual and regards private initiative as well as private property as being absolutely necessary — and also because he takes up an adverse attitude towards socialism, talks of the mistakes of Karl Marx and regards collectivism as a step back towards barbarism. It must, however, be admitted that he appears to maintain that the only justification for the existence of the State is her function as the guardian of the liberty of the individual, at the same time as he reduced the liberty of man to a mere manner of speech, i. e. liberty to do one's duty.

Duguit does not ascribe any sovereign right, either to the will of the State or to the individual. Nothing becomes right because it is the will of the State, neither does the individual create right by proclaiming his will. The only binding consideration is the consideration of what serves the evolution of social life. Neither the State nor the individual as such possesses rights, but they have duties, as they both have their social functions to perform, which they cannot neglect without injuring society. In return they have a justified claim on the possession of such rights as are necessary for the performance of their function. In the present age the idea of the function of the State supersedes the idea of the right of the State. The authority of the State is fixed by the citizens' demands of what she should perform. This is nothing new. For the power of the State was always based on the citizens' belief in her usefulness, and only that government remained in power for any length of time under whose administration society thrived. From olden times it fell to the lot of the king to watch over order and peace by exercising justice, "a significant phrase", says Duguit, "because it decides that the delegate of public authority has more duties than right and that it is his principal duty to preserve peace".¹⁾ But those functions which fall to the State have grown immensely, because such an overpowering number of technical questions have cropped up which the citizens demand should be taken up for solution, as without the solution of these society would perish; these tasks should be executed without hesitation and be regularly performed. These tasks can be confided to the care of the State because they fall with-

¹⁾ Léon Duguit, *Souveraineté et Liberté*, p. 52.

in the duties of the State, but are not included in her rights, and because it is possible under the present system of government to assert the responsibility of the State, a thing which was impossible under the old system. The activity of the State becomes equal to that of a large factory, where it is a question of producing the best possible article, and where it is necessary that order should be maintained for the sake of the whole business. More and more government offices are needed, not because the State wants to interfere with everything, but because State enterprise everywhere supersedes private enterprise. It becomes the task of the State to see that every man keeps his field under cultivation, preserves his house in a good state, invests his capital wisely, etc. So long as you allow reason to guide you, your private dispositions are respected, but if you neglect your social duty, society is bound to interfere. It will also be the duty of the State to watch that nobody overworks himself; nobody should be allowed to work for more than eight hours a day and there should be at least one day of rest a week. It also falls to the share of the State to provide for insurance of different kinds, education, etc. Every instance of an average man's being unable to develop his bodily and mental strength should be regarded as proof of a lack in the social organization. Duguit defends the possibility of uniting State regulation and social factory administration with individual liberty, in the most ingenious manner.¹⁾

It is characteristic of this view that it centres on the necessity of the existence of the government offices for the function of social life. Just as we must have good railways, roads, and facilities of transport, and as the traffic in the streets of our towns and on our high-roads should be regulated, thus we must also have good schools and a satisfactory system of poor relief. Nobody feels it to be a violation of his liberty when he has to obey the traffic regulations, neither is his liberty curtailed because he has to submit to the rules necessary to check other kinds of social disorder. The functions of the State appear in a quite new light. In Germany, Simmel maintains, for instance, that the obligation which modern society lays on the State, to provide for the poor, does not spring from our increasing sympathy with the poor, but from the fact that poverty

¹⁾ Léon Duguit, *Transf. du droit privée*, pp. 34—51.

is a social disorder which should be combated, just as we would have putrid streams and marshes, etc. destroyed. Sympathy may act on man individually, but it does not explain social care.¹⁾

Duguit regards the legal system as constantly changing, because it must constantly be the expression of the existing conditions within societies. The realistic, socialistic, and objectivistic legal system, which he calls the system that he advocates, is merely "l'œuvre d'un jour dans l'histoire".²⁾ Duguit has nevertheless a vivid comprehension of the continuity in the history of a people.³⁾ But we do not get to the principles of this continuity through intuition, but only through a careful and close study of the life of a people.⁴⁾ It becomes one of the most profound features of his view on the legal evolution of society, that the best and safest security that society fulfils her functions is found in the existence of a supreme court, whose capability and disinterestedness is above all suspicion, and to whose decision all, governors as well as governed, even the legislator himself not excepted, bow; a court which is able to decide whether a certain measure is in accordance with the law or not, and which in the latter case has the power to cancel it.⁵⁾

Duguit has an extremely clear perception that through all the changes in society the existence of the individual must be made dependent on his fulfilling his function, i. e. his performance of the work which is necessary to procure his food. He also perceives that a difficult problem is contained in the vague status of the increased social values, and he follows with interest the steps which are taken in different countries in order to detach these increased values from the sphere of private ownership.⁶⁾ But he does not make this question the centre of his examinations, and he therefore shows in an indisputably clear way that all regulations within the Liberal society become fluid, decided neither by regard for the right of the State nor the right of the individual, but only by the way in which a matter may be most usefully arranged. It becomes gradually more

¹⁾ G. Simmel, *Soziologie*, p. 461.

²⁾ Léon Duguit, *Transf. du droit public*, p. 281.

³⁾ Léon Duguit, *Le droit social*. XLIV.

⁴⁾ *Opus cit.* pp. 10, 62.

⁵⁾ Léon Duguit, *Souver. et Lib.* p. 200.

⁶⁾ Léon Duguit, *Transf. du droit privé*. Append. III, p. 192.

and more necessary that the great businesses should be conducted in such a way that they are constantly in possession of the necessary capital as well as of a well-situated staff of workers who have no reasonable cause for declaring a strike nor any right to do so; it will therefore be the State who establishes the necessary establishments. But Duguit clearly perceives the danger of nursing an overbearing officialdom in this way; this would have destructive consequences and should be counteracted by a thorough decentralization, just as the demoralization which follows from the politicians' allowing themselves to be paid for their political activity, and from their adulteration of the whole political machinery, should be opposed by making the government offices self-governing and independent of the politicians.

The State which we thus see shaping itself is apparently quite different from that which Proudhon had imagined. The State seems to have constantly increased in power. But it is the technical spheres which have taken the upper hand, the technical tasks which have become of the first importance. The task of the modern State has become the regulation of railways, street-traffic, electric light, aeroplanes and motor-cars. The power becomes delegated to the chiefs of the government offices, but this is no personal power. They have no right to decide whether the various enterprises should be worked or abandoned. It is not their right or the right of the State to work them; it is their duty. It is open to everybody to obtain a leading position when he acquires the necessary skill; the necessity of private ownership of capital has been abandoned, at any rate theoretically.

But below this network of government undertakings, the immense number of private undertakings go on and it is more difficult to depict what happens in this sphere. Private capital seems to increase as a large rise in the ground-value, which is in private possession, takes place. The great expansion of the towns entails a corresponding increase in the value of the building-sites, and both these facts cause an increasing use of and growing dependency on capital. All these conditions may be regarded from two points of view: one is the increasing burden of taxation which is explained by the constantly increasing number of affairs which come under the State, the other is the immense, growing power over credit which the

banks collect in their own hands and which they try to withdraw from the authority of the State. This depends on the aforesaid strong rise in the ground-rent. The Liberal State shapes itself on those two groups of conditions. The common demand for a technically capable administration constitutes a firm kernel of interests which is common to the upper as well as to the lower classes. But it is in the interests of the lower classes to comprise a great number of things, in which the upper class takes no interest, in the demands for State administration, e. g. the whole social legislation. But the upper class is ready to give the lower class what it desires and to take it upon itself to raise the necessary capital by paying increased taxes. In this way the upper class pays its debt to the lower class. But the fact that you pay your debt through the payment of taxes which are, to a great extent, levied on those for whose benefit they are paid, and the fact that you pay them because by this means you are allowed to keep the increased ground-values, do not constitute an honest way of settling the social debt. In spite of the increasing power of the Liberal State, in spite of the fact that government by the upper classes is constantly more set aside in political organization, in spite of the constantly growing possibility, by means of general franchise, to regulate private enterprise, to enhance the taxes, and through measures of relief to raise the social standard of the lower classes, we see the trades suffering from all kinds of destructive disturbances, such as shortness of capital, closed markets, unemployment, and housing difficulties. In addition to this we see the ever widening gap between wage-earners and employers, the ever growing accumulation of capital and credit in a few hands, while those who work for wages, and who therefore stand outside the struggle which is fought by the capitalists, increase in number. The more the Liberal State is organized in view of the payment of the debt to the lower classes, the greater grows the debt. It is owing to the private possession of the ground-values which have not been created by the individual, but which have been given to all by Nature, that no balance can ever be established.

The Liberal State has overlooked the central point in the social programme, as set forth by Proudhon. In the course of the war the State had increased her prestige and her claims. She stood as the representative of the general will of the people to concentrate all

their efforts on one point: victory; on this point the State's capacity to keep the social machinery going had proved of supreme value. Whether the real power in this function of the State was to be found in an increasing power of organization against individual liberty or vice versa, cannot be decided so long as it is only Proudhon's view of the social movement that has been examined. We cannot cast the horoscope of the social movements before the contribution which Karl Marx made to social evolution has been laid clear.