

suicide (*Le Suicide*, 1897) Durkheim shows how this sad loss of belief in the value of life is connected with the individual's lack of sympathy with his fellow-men. Suicide happens more frequently among unmarried than among married, among the inhabitants of towns than among the inhabitants of the country, among Protestants than among Catholics, among the irreligious than among the religious. The religious feeling is strengthened through a system of ideas which explains its connection with the order of the world; and it grows according as social solidarity increases with the division of labour and according as a sphere of work is opened to every individual, which is his own. This sphere of work makes him, however, at the same time, fulfil a function which is indispensable to society. In this way his personal way of living is made subject to a categorical imperative which bids him qualify himself to fulfil his work.<sup>1)</sup>

The thorough transformation which man's relation to society undergoes under the influence of the system of the division of labour, consists in the fact that his dependence on society becomes the general background of his duty to obey the fundamental laws of society, while the definition of the single paragraphs of the whole legal system is based on an objective valuation of their relation to the natural conditions of work. In the past the general social feeling created the idea of the sovereignty of society, its divine right, the citizens' unconditional duty to obey the laws which society made, and society's (the King's, the Church's, Parliament's) unconditional right to make such laws. This idea of sovereignty has now been replaced by the idea that no society has any inherent right to command or make laws; it has only a function to perform. Its right depends exclusively on its undertaking this function in a sufficiently capable manner. It is a business point of view which supersedes the divine point of view. The State is not one with society, but is at every point liable to criticism. This criticism depends on whether the organization of the State at any given time conforms with the methods of work which have been formed. The government of the State is to be compared to the management of a factory; the factory director who is able to manage his factory, in such a way that it in

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<sup>1)</sup> Emile Durkheim, *De la division*, etc., p. 6.

the most perfect manner fulfils its task, has the right to be manager precisely by virtue of his capability, and not by virtue of any inborn right to command.

In his preface to the second edition of "De la division du travail social" Durkheim describes the growing organization which is bound to accompany the division of labour, and which is going to transform society from a group of private enterprises into a great system of national corporations.<sup>1)</sup> This evolution has no connection with the communist dreams. It is doubtful whether civilization has any moral value,<sup>2)</sup> and whether it increases man's happiness;<sup>3)</sup> it does not spring from psychological motives which have their root in these efforts, but only from practical, natural and economic conditions for the performance of work. Communism is, on the contrary, the manifestation of psychological dreams which express themselves in a number of different ways, which are all attempts to revive primitive social feeling. Thomas More and Campanella were such representatives, and Durkheim traces their ideas back to those of Plato whom he regards as their spiritual ancestor — while he considers Plato's teaching as an attempt to revive the constitution of old Sparta, this being the most primitive constitution of Greece.<sup>4)</sup> A sharp line of division must be drawn between this kind of communism and socialism, if the latter is to be something more than merely personal lamentations which the sick person expresses, but which cannot in the least be given any objective value as an means of remedying the disease.<sup>5)</sup> Socialism as social theory exceeds by a long reach these lamentations; it does not only want to occupy itself with the workers' question, which has its roots in the strained condition between employer and worker. By this strained condition the worker is placed outside the social sphere because he is no longer dependent on society, but on the employer.<sup>6)</sup> Socialism is going to change the whole structure of society, in such

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<sup>1)</sup> Opus cit. XXXI.

<sup>2)</sup> Opus cit. IV, p. 13.

<sup>3)</sup> Opus cit. Liv. II Chap. I.

<sup>4)</sup> Emile Durkheim, Définition du socialisme. Rev. de Métaphysique et de Morale. 1921, pp. 601, 605, 614.

<sup>5)</sup> Opus cit., p. 482.

<sup>6)</sup> Opus cit., p. 595, Emile Durkheim, De la division, etc. Liv. III. Chap. II.

a way as to make the whole social machinery work better, but this purpose is promoted neither by the lamentations of the workers nor by the private interests of the employers. The nature of work should determine the organization of work.

"We call", writes Durkheim, "every teaching socialistic which demands that all economic functions, or some of them which are now unorganized, should be made subject to the social centres of administration."<sup>1</sup>) But this does not mean that the State should be given a constantly greater rôle to play and a greatly increased sovereign power; it is possible that the State may be dispensed with in her quality of a coercive power and be replaced by increasing organization.<sup>2</sup>) But this possibility is in no way connected with a social tendency in the individual's train of ideas; it has its roots solely in the objective connection of things. As man in his work must comply with the natural laws of material and machinery, and in this way becomes able to do much which it would else be impossible for him to do, thus he must also comply with the working conditions of the associations. There are in our society a great number of undertakings whose uninterrupted functions are necessary to life. Natural wilderness is gradually changed into a civilized scenery; highways supersede the pathless waste, bridges and ferries make general traffic possible; railways and the modern means of traffic continue this evolution. Electric lighting must also at the present time be counted as a necessity. Local markets are replaced by world markets, and private economy gives way to national economy. The question which should be answered by public right is "in what way may all these functions be best maintained?" The answer is not made dependent on whether the State has a natural right to organize these affairs, but it is dependent on whether she is better suited to do so, than are the private undertakings themselves.

We have seen that Spencer and Tarde, Kidd and Wallas extended the social idea to comprise the utilization of external nature as well. By this is formed what Wallas calls "Our Social Heritage". Durk-

<sup>1</sup>) Emile Durkheim, *Définition du socialisme*. Rev. de Métaphysique et de Morale, pp. 494 ff.

<sup>2</sup>) Opus cit., pp. 593, 614; Emile Durkheim, *De la division, etc.*, pp. 177, 196, 202—208.

heim makes this point of view his starting-point. It is not the object of socialism to make society or State take over private enterprises, its goal is only to create the best possible regulated system of traffic, the best possible structure within which private enterprises may carry on their work. A too concentrated judgment as to the formation of this structure may involve great injustices; modern evolution tends therefore to guard the special functions against the arbitrariness of authority, to protect the citizen against the encroachment of the official, and society against the tyranny of any existing parliamentary majority. The sovereign right of the majority to give laws at random, is a prejudice; decentralization, and each citizen's right to refer laws, regulations, and special administrative decisions to the courts of justice are becoming the generally acknowledged means of protecting the citizens and replacing the idea of the State's sovereign and incontestable supremacy by the idea of the responsibility of the State.<sup>1)</sup>

Man's liberty is not impaired by his acknowledgment of the necessity to bend to the natural laws. The same holds good of his relation to the combinations which modern technique has made necessary. His liberty is only impaired if he is to adjust his way of acting to arbitrary regulations in such a way that his own judgment becomes of no value. Arbitrariness was embodied in the old doctrine of sovereignty; it was the sovereign authority who made the law. At present Proudhon's demand that the sovereign should support his commands by reasons and Bagehot's demand for the carrying through of the principle of discussion are, although not completely carried through, at any rate, unmistakably in process of being carried through. The transition from arbitrariness to reason was always the law of social evolution. In antiquity this was expressed in the metaphysical theories; Socrates recognized reason as being equal to goodness; moral obligation became equal to knowledge. Liberty was not arbitrariness, but obedience to reasonable laws; those laws are reasonable which govern the cosmos. The State and her penal authority is the carrying through of the legality

<sup>1)</sup> L. Duguit, *Le droit social, le droit individuel et la Transformation de l'État*. 1908. 3me Ed. 1922; *Manuel de Droit constitutionnel*, 1911; *Les Transformations générales du droit privé*, 1912; *Les Transformations du droit public*, 1913.

<sup>2)</sup> O. Tesar, *Staatsidee und Strafrecht I*. 1914, pp. 170—184.

which governs the cosmos. Man must be governed by a system which answers to the system of the cosmos; only it must be carried through by man himself. God or reason governs everything, justice is his follower and God becomes the standard by which everything should be measured (*das Mass aller Dinge*).<sup>1)</sup>

Durkheim takes up a hostile attitude towards Karl Marx's materialistic view of history. We are mistaken in looking for the source of our moral and spiritual ideas in economic conditions. The preponderance which economic interests have gained in the course of the last centuries throws into the background the moral unconditional demand for self-control, capacity to sacrifice oneself and subject oneself to a power which stands above the individual in moral value, and which alone gives life value. The moral code and its continuation, religion, has its roots in the fact which in primitive society was of essential importance, the complete absorption of the individual in society. The more the division of labour loosens the individual from this tie and gives a greater importance to his individual particularities the greater is the possibility that egoism may spread and dissolve society. But the division of labour is only possible within society and the whole system of social laws must always be based on that social sanction which constitutes the source of our sense of justice. It is not economic conditions which determine our sense of justice, but they constitute one of the principal domains which are being regulated by our sense of justice. Our way of living consists not only in obeying the natural (economic) laws, but also in utilizing them. Social solidarity decides the way in which we are going to utilize them.

Durkheim does not ask whether there is an evolution towards greater and greater perfection. As Marx only asked what must necessarily happen from certain circumstances, Durkheim also wants merely to point out the necessity of the division of labour and its necessary consequences. All that impedes the division of labour kills the societies; it may be hampered by too rigid forms and regulations which do not give sufficient scope to free initiative, or by want of solidarity which makes man stand against man and class

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<sup>1)</sup> O. Tesar, *Staatsidee und Strafrecht I*, 1914, pp. 170—184.

against class. The picture he draws of the life of society is nevertheless sharp and decisive and very elucidating.

Society moves from a primitive state with strong collective feelings and without any scope worth mentioning for individuality to an immensely composite machinery where social solidarity itself demands an increasing evolution of the particularities of the individuals and a thorough respect for their demands. The economic expression of this is the recognition of the right of propertyship which originates in the fact that things must circle round the human wills according to definite rules, in such a way that everybody knows what lies within the sphere of his will.<sup>1)</sup> The individual does not possess sovereign power any more than the State. The power which the State may be able to obtain depends on historic conditions, her right, however, consists always in her necessary solidarity with the functions she is to perform. What power the individual may obtain depends on his personal qualities, but his right depends on the connection of society with the individualities. "The object of my work", writes Durkheim, "has been to find out the connection which exists between the individual personality and social solidarity. How does it happen that the individual while he becomes more independent, becomes more and more dependent on society? How is it possible at the same time to be more personally and more solidarically defined? For it is indisputable that those movements, however mutually contrary they may seem, are happening side by side".<sup>2)</sup> Also Spencer set forth a similar explanation; he regarded it as the law of evolution that the ideal society would be that which regarded the liberty of the individual, restricted only by the equal liberty of other individuals, as being sacred and inviolable. The only function of the State is her protection of one person against another and against external enemies. The highest political system must be that under which personal liberty is as great as possible and the power of the government as small as possible.<sup>3)</sup> Between these views there is the closest similarity and an immense difference. The similarity con-

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<sup>1)</sup> H. Hetherington and J. Muirhead, *Social Purpose*, 1918.

<sup>2)</sup> Emile Durkheim, *De la division*, etc. XLIII.

<sup>3)</sup> Herbert Spencer, *First Principles*, 1860. Popular Ed. 1915, p. 6.

sists in the fact that no State has a right to exist *per se*, but only in so far as she is necessary for the existence of social life. The principle of everybody's equal liberty is in reality only an expression of their fundamental solidarity. The difference is found in the fact that Durkheim shows that solidarity is the fundamental idea and that it demands the greatest possible individual liberty, while Spencer regards the isolated individual as the fundamental factor which struggles against solidarity in order to reduce it as much as possible. In Durkheim's view we find a wider basis for the faith in increasing personal liberty than in that of Spencer, as the limit between arbitrariness and reason is more sharply drawn by Durkheim. Arbitrariness will become less in the course of time while reason will be given a wider sphere. Wherever arbitrariness rules, it injures social life. Right is not a limit which society draws to our liberty, but a necessary condition of liberty which society should use its authority to maintain. In Durkheim's book the social valuation has in a very significant manner been changed from taking the isolated individual to taking the social individual for its basis. Human passions are only kept in check by their respect for a moral power. If there is no moral authority, the law of the strongest rules and, smouldering under the embers or fully aflame, a state of war becomes chronic.<sup>1)</sup>

The division of labour involves a great change in our moral valuations. If we take the isolated individual and the free will for our basis, the object of our efforts is to enlarge our minds as much as possible, to make our own selves sufficient unto us. But if we take solidarity for our basis it becomes our moral object to be a part of a whole, an organ in an organism.<sup>2)</sup> It is more and more regarded as a mark of incapacity and weakness to take an interest in everything and try to work at all kinds of different things; we demand that our activity instead of spreading over a large sphere should concentrate, and gain in strength what it loses in extent. From a historical point of view isolated individuals have never existed; society is reality, this circumstance is expressed by the fact that our whole

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<sup>1)</sup> Emile Durkheim, *De la division*, etc. III.

<sup>2)</sup> *Opus cit.*, pp. 4 ff.

psychological mental life happens within the given structure of solidarity. Rousseau took a psychology which contained no social elements for his starting-point and constructed society as an artificial product which might coerce the individual by force, but which contained no moral obligation. Rousseau did not succeed in making the regard for society obligatory to the individual; he sought refuge in a number of sophisms, which tended to make the individual's subordination to the general will synonymous with his assertion of true liberty. According to Rousseau's view it is external and not internal causes which induce the individuals to form themselves into a society; from an internal point of view every individual is sufficient unto himself. The state of innocence was devoid of any moral sense, and it is impossible to produce such a sense through a merely external connection. It should be maintained as a fact that men become mutually solidaric only by being solidaric with society.<sup>1)</sup>

Where original mechanical primitive solidarity reigns the particular qualities of the individuals remain undeveloped. The more customs and habits reign supreme, the more is the division of labour hampered and its possibilities of growth stopped. Division of labour leads to the evolution of individual peculiarities. The collective demand for uniformity compels the single individual to be like and act like his fellow-men, but through the division of labour these demands for uniformity, which bind and restrict, yield the place to professional regulations which are of an objective tendency and which hamper us less in the free evolution of our peculiarities and are felt to do so less from one day to another.<sup>2)</sup> The fact that we in working must take the nature of the work into account does not interfere with our liberty; we would only show ourselves to be foolish and incompetent if we were to disregard the consideration of the nature of our work. The more we are able to adapt ourselves to the objective conditions, which are necessary for the performance of our work, the more we grow in capability and worth.

Society transforms itself from the aggregate sum of passions and feelings to the sum of functions which are necessary for the perform-

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<sup>1)</sup> Le contrat social de Rousseau. Rev. de mét. et de mor. 1918, pp. 4, 10, 133, 143; L. Duguit, Jean Jaques-Rousseau, Kant et Hegel 1908.

<sup>2)</sup> Emile Durkheim, De la division, etc., pp. 268 ff., p. 290.



ance of a certain piece of work, the neglect of which would cause a general disturbance. The system of law must work regularly and trustworthily, the means of traffic should be maintained, production should be supported and all crises that may threaten it should be counteracted. The form of government which best solves this task is the only right one. It is not the sovereign power of society which creates the organizations, but it is the recognition of the nature of the work which manifests itself in the existing organizations. The idea of the majesty of society disappears and is replaced by the idea of the adaptability of the social system for public service.

As society becomes an organ of public service, the individual and his free evolution becomes also such an organ. As the idea of the sovereign right of society disappears, the idea of the sovereign right of the individual disappears also. The individual has no natural rights which he may demand that society should respect in all circumstances, even when they counteract the interests of society. But it is the recognition, which is involved by the division of labour, that the liberty of the individual is the indispensable condition for the best possible fulfilment of the social functions, which makes the respect for the right of the individual sacred in our societies. Where man is sensible of this recognition there has been created an absolute hindrance to the tendency of society to push the interests of the individual into the background for the sake of immediate, casual and transitory interests. The individual may be disposed to set his own will against the demand of society, and a struggle between individual and society may ensue. But such a struggle is never of a moral nature and does not give the individual any right, no more than the tendency of society arbitrarily to command over the individual gives it a right to do so. The noble feelings which are expressed in the individual's demand for liberty do not depend on the strength of his will to take his own counsel, but on the profound social feeling that the individual is only able to fulfil his social function when he is free. Durkheim distinguishes himself not only from Spencer in his assertion that the individual's liberty and right are social products and cannot be taken as starting-points; he also distinguishes himself decisively from Karl Marx, who maintains like Durkheim that isolated man is a figment of the imagination,

but makes this view the basis of a system of evolution where social regards supersede all regard for the individuals. Karl Marx fails to perceive that the constantly greater rôle organized work is playing depends on the nature of the work and not on the demands of society.

The sociological view which is asserted by Durkheim and his school leads us right up to the great burning questions which divide our minds to-day. Those questions deal especially with the growth of the social tasks and the consequent increased demands of society for the disposal of increased pecuniary means.

The demands which are made on external apparatus, means of traffic, lighting, the regular routine of trade, etc. are constantly increasing. It may be disputed whether all these things are best regulated direct by society or by private societies which are subject to public control. But even though it is probable that society is best able to administrate, this fact does not give society increased sovereign authority. Every kind of authority which is thus given to society will always depend on this authority being necessary for the best possible performance of the work in question. Centralization always holds a great danger, as it involves the growth of officialdom, and this is under all forms of government an unfortunate phenomenon, but in a democracy it becomes fatal, as it nourishes the pursuit for offices and introduces an element of falseness into politics. Decentralization counteracts this tendency and makes itself constantly more forcibly felt even in the most centralized modern States. It is necessary to save the great technical undertakings from the injurious influence of the politicians in order to avoid dissolution, anarchy, and plundering of the finances.<sup>1)</sup> The state of dependency on the State, into which numerous businesses have come during the war, have shown the public how far this condition is from that of normal life, as it creates circumlocution, slowness, unpracticalness and indifference to the interests of the consumers.

"In spite of all the tangible proofs we have and which increase day by day, of the system of monopolies being a detestable system, for the public, for the finances, and also for the State,

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<sup>1)</sup> L. Duguit, *Les transformations du droit public*, pp. 55, 57.

the difficulties of which they increase, there is still a group of politicians which clings to them and wants to increase them."<sup>1)</sup>

Together with the growth of the tasks of the State the demand for greater pecuniary means increases, and taxation is consequently increased. This is an extremely dangerous means in the hand of the State and the municipalities of encroaching on the citizens' right of property and liberty. Durkheim and his school fully realize this danger, but they indicate no means of averting it. They regard it as a matter of course that money should be raised through taxation. We must, however, maintain that this does not apply to such undertakings as railways, lighting, etc. These undertakings must procure their money, whether they are worked by the State or by private companies, through people's payment for the use of them. It is different with such undertakings as give no revenue, such as the construction and maintenance of roads, the maintenance of a sanitary system in its widest sense, public education and the system of poor-relief which is made necessary by existing poverty. But precisely on these points the necessity of examining which of those tasks may rightly be regarded as coming within the sphere of society, makes itself felt, and more especially whether the money which is used to remedy poverty is a secret payment for the maintenance of social conditions which create poverty for many and riches for a few. The State's duty to relieve, what Bourgeois called "la dette sociale", should like all the duties of society be regarded from the point of view of its necessity as the best possible means of solving pressing social problems.

Also the great question of the organization of the workers, of the employers associations, and the trade unions of the wage-workers should be regarded from a different point of view from that of their quality as militant organizations. They are only socially justified if they in form and organization promote the carrying on of production and ensure the greatest possible social utility. The trade unions should not be regarded as being based on a contract of the members, but as an expression of the regulations according to which the member of the individual trade union may enter into a contract with a member of another trade union.<sup>2)</sup> They do not represent a

<sup>1)</sup> E. Poyen, *Les Monopoles*, 1920, pp. 400, 402.

<sup>2)</sup> L. Duguit, *Opus cit.*, pp. 128—132.

common action on the part of a group of socially isolated individuals, but they constitute a link in the general movement to replace the private markets by a world market and private contracts by fixed market prices.

The social law is thus in the view of Durkheim not a law of human feelings, but a law of the division of labour. Human passions and the ideals to which they attach themselves are themselves social phenomena which have a different value according as they are manifestations of the growing division of labour or of the friction by which every new formation is met. The division of labour itself is recognized by the fact whether it increases the possibilities of life in society and strengthens the solidarity of the individuals at the same time as it increases their mutual differences. Where solidarity is weakened through the development of the differences it is not a division of labour which takes place, but a dissolution, where the personal liberty of the individual is curtailed. It is not a growing and more fruitful organization which is taking place, but an anti-social organization which threatens social solidarity. The belief in human liberty has gained a far wider and stronger basis than the idea of the individual's inherent right justified. It is not a question of a lasting struggle between individual and society, but of the living evolution of society itself. The growth of society is identic with the growth of liberty, and the growth of liberty is therefore precisely the same as the growth of moral consciousness, the deep sense of obligation to fill one's post and in this way obtain the feelings of pride and self-esteem which are entertained only by those who know that they are not without worth.

What threatens our societies is not the growing division of labour, but, on the contrary, an increasing hindrance of its free development. If the division of labour is hampered, a more and more vehement struggle is created in our societies, as the relation between men is changed from being an organized state of solidarity to a compulsory state. The contrast between the great poverty and state of dependence of the masses, and the immense riches and power of the few, seems to be the necessary corollary of the objective conditions of work and of the conditions necessary for the constant extension of production. We have seen that throughout the century it was the central social problem whether it was possible to unite

the efforts to promote the technical means of trade with the demand to abolish poverty, or whether there would arise a conflict between those two tendencies in which the anger against poverty would come out more strongly, and, without paying regard to trade, would destroy the whole system which created such immense difference in the conditions of man. The division of labour and the industrial necessities are, after all, not the most fundamental conditions of the existence of society. It is primitive solidarity which makes social life obligatory to us. We prefer a small degree of justice to every kind of industrial progress. Morality is the indispensable minimum, the strictly necessary daily bread without which society cannot exist.<sup>1)</sup> The division of labour depends not merely on the external technical possibilities, but also on the fact that it happens within society. Every organization must, if it would be just, be recognized as such by society, and however far we may remove ourselves in the course of evolution from the primitive demand for the uniformity of all individuals, we can never let go the fundamental demand for solidarity. We are here faced by a problem which it is impossible to solve, if we cannot perceive how man's growth into a constantly freer and more independent individual may itself become the source of a stronger moral sense of obligation and thus turn the division of labour into courses which do not injure solidarity.

The growing contrast of poverty and riches cannot be a necessary corollary of the best possible organization of work. On the contrary, it must be taken as an evidence of a defect at some point in this system. Neither great poverty nor great riches are necessary conditions of the growth of work or of the greatest possible productive capacity of trade; they are, on the contrary, hindrances to the evolution of trade. This is seen both in external regulations which divide society into one party which stands inside and another which stands outside, and internally in man's mind as each in its own way violates man's fundamental instincts. The division has its root in the fact that our instincts do not constitute an aggregate whole, while our evolution depends on our capacity to unite them. The external social organizations which we create must be valued according as they support or prevent this harmonization, and we should there-

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<sup>1)</sup> Emile Durkheim, *De la division, etc.*, IV, pp. 13 ff.

fore endeavour to understand which sides of our nature the different social tasks especially appeal to.

Durkheim lays the main emphasis on the social structures and rejects the attempts to construct societies by purely psychological means; but he does not therefore disregard the fact that social life is the joint life of intellectual beings who thrive under one system, but decay under another; he maintains, however, that social evolution does not depend on the psychological interplay of the mutually independent psychic elements, which in the view of Tarde and his adherents forms the consciousness of the single individual and produces harmony among the different individuals. The evolution depends in Durkheim's opinion on the fact that the whole psychological play happens within society which forms the conditions under which the individual is made to live from his birth; the conditions, geographical as well as social, constitute the influences which decide men's way of action, and this is changed, when the conditions are changed. But we distort Durkheim's view if we conceive it to mean that men are purely passive figures and that their way of action may be varied according to existing conditions. It is not possible for a society which debar man from food and drink to survive. Man's demand for food draws a limit to the variability of society, but the useful function which a certain social organization performs, is not the cause of its existence, but only the necessary condition of its continuous existence; and these conditions should be sought in the fundamental possibilities of life of the organism. The organism must be made in such a way that it answers to various influences from the surroundings in a way which is favourable for its continuous existence; it should be able to adapt its way of action to varying circumstances, and it should be able to act on the basis of a wider and wider horizon so that not only a few immediate conditions, but also more complicated conditions of a wider perspective influence it.

The organism may be built up in this way by the formation of structures which act as artificial reflex action mechanisms or by an evolution of the life of instinct and intelligence. Between the reflex machinery and the conscious life of the instincts we place the unconscious life of the instincts which should be distinguished from the conscious life by the unconsciousness of the instincts of all

understanding of the goal which they drive the individual to reach through his actions; instincts which distinguish themselves from the reflex movements by their wonderfully composite character. But it is not their composite character which prevents us from including them in the category of reflex actions; it is the rôle which the instinct and the individual's capacity to modify his way of action according to special circumstances actually plays in the whole event, which makes us regard the instinct as an intermediate stage between reflex and intelligence.

*William MacDougall.*

William James cut through the mysticism which was attached to the word "instinct" by proving that all instinctive actions are reflex actions which are set in movement by different surrounding influences.<sup>1)</sup> He makes use of the image of a lock within the individual, the key of which is formed by certain external influences. If there is no key to insert in the lock the mechanism does not work, if there is no mechanism the lock is of no avail.<sup>2)</sup> But the mechanism may be there and the key may be inserted into the lock without any action being set in motion; the mechanism should be ready for use and it only becomes so through individual conditions which manifest themselves as a more or less pronounced instinct to use the mechanism. In the person who is well-fed the sight of food does not set those instinctive actions in motion which it invariably produces in the hungry individual. Outside the period of mating male and female live together without the sexual instinct being aroused. "We should", asserts MacDougall, "regard the whole machinery of action not as instincts, but only as the instruments of the instincts. There is no doubt that each separate instinct is better able to put one machinery into action than another, but, in all circumstances, it will be able to manifest itself in different kinds of machinery. The machines are in themselves only dead mechanisms which are only made to work by means of an impulse, a cur-

<sup>1)</sup> William James, *Principles of Psychology*, 1890. Vol. II Chap. XXIV.

<sup>2)</sup> William James, *Opus cit.*, p. 384; William MacDougall, *An Outline of Psychology*, 1923, p. 109; *An Introduction to Social Psychology*, 1908, 9th Ed. 1915.

rent of energy which has its root in an instinct."<sup>1</sup>) "If circumstances involve that the individual does not at once find a free course to his instinctive actions, we find even as low down as in the world of the insects a seeking, a variation, and an adaptation of the actions which are often astounding, and which make it difficult for us to deny that intelligence is a co-operative factor."<sup>2</sup>) In the higher animals this attempt to adapt themselves to existing circumstances becomes more pronounced, because the mechanism gets a constantly less rigid character and becomes more easily changeable. But intelligence does not of itself become a motive power. It may teach us which actions and which qualities in the human character are best fitted to contribute to the realization of the supreme good, but it cannot itself exercise any definite influence. It is not an instinct, and only an instinct is able to set other instincts in action.<sup>3</sup>) The contrast between reflex and intelligence is thus reduced to the contrast between a rigid unchangeable machinery, and a machinery which has a wide scope of variation. In men this variability may be so great as to make many people believe that man is born without instincts. This view is, however, denounced by most men. William James maintained that men have more instincts than animals, and that the difference which exists between animals and men only consists in the instincts of men being varied.<sup>4</sup>) MacDougall is of the same opinion, and the instinct is to him merely an expression that there also in man are limits to its variability which it cannot exceed without being destroyed. With his work "An Introduction to Social Psychology, 1908", MacDougall (born in 1871) emphasized these views for the first time, and since then he has maintained his position as the principal advocate of this view.

MacDougall displays a propensity for metaphysical speculations concerning the relation between body and mind; this tendency appears in his strict distinction between the mechanisms (which are supplied by the body) and the impulses (which are produced by the soul); he sympathizes with Bergson's doctrine that the soul

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<sup>1</sup>) William MacDougall, *An Outline of Psychology*, 1923, p. 117; *An Introduction to Social Psychology*, 1908, pp. 46 ff.

<sup>2</sup>) William MacDougall, *An Outline*, p. 92.

<sup>3</sup>) *Opus cit.*, p. 440.

<sup>4</sup>) William James, *Opus cit.*, p. 389.



builds up a bodily instrument which, on its side, binds its further activity.<sup>1)</sup> MacDougall's use of "the instinct" has therefore been severely criticized. It is not necessary to explain that the soul is regarded as something more than a system of reaction to external influences.<sup>2)</sup> MacDougall answered these attacks by maintaining that the opposition to the doctrine of the instincts is reactionary and obscure, man being more than "a stimulus-response behaviorist". There must be a series of natural dispositions of relative durability which, on any given occasion, arouses (or are the indispensable conditions of) desires of a certain kind, desires for harmony, sexual connection, food, etc.<sup>3)</sup> The instinct prevents man from forming society on the basis of any casual interests and becomes thus the true basis of scientific sociology. But it is precisely this limit which the other party will not acknowledge. If sociology is to be a science it must be a science of natural history and detach itself from all animal principles. But instincts are nothing but stubborn animal ideas which correspond to the primitive nations' ideas of orenda, mana, wakanda, etc.

It must be admitted that the use of the word "instinct" holds a danger, as it is apt to become a term which we use to cover our lack of knowledge. It may become a hindrance to us in our examination of the true causes of man's actions. But this much is certain, we cannot explain those actions only on the basis of the surrounding conditions. We cannot be interested in going deeper and deeper into a metaphysical discussion of a naturalistic explanation of the instincts, we only want an answer to the question whether in human nature, as we know it, there are given definite limits as to what the conditions should be under which we live. MacDougall

<sup>1)</sup> William MacDougall, *Body and Mind*, 1911.

<sup>2)</sup> I. R. Kantor, *An Essay toward an institutional Conception of social Psychology*. *American Journal of Sociology*, 1922, XXVII; G. Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, 1922; Ellsworth Faris, *Are Instincts Data or Hypotheses?* *Amr. Journal*, 1922, XXVII.

<sup>3)</sup> William MacDougall, *Can Sociology and Social Psychology dispense with Instincts?* *American Journal of Sociology* 1924, XXIX, pp. 657—668; Fr. Alverdes, *Tiersoziologie*, 1925, p. 5.

<sup>4)</sup> L. L. Bernard, *Discussion, The Objective Viewpoint in Sociology*. *Amr. J. of S.* XXV, pp. 670—673; J. R. Kantor, *The Institutional Foundation of a Scientific Social Psychology*; *Opus cit.*, pp. 674—687.

gave a final answer to this question. His doctrine of the instincts is in reality only a minute account of the complexes of instincts which control or make up man, and which must therefore exist in every society which is able to survive. In 1908 he published his epoch-making work "An Introduction to Social Psychology" of which it has been said that it does give a minute explanation of the growth of the instincts which influence society, but hardly shows how they lead to the formation of society. "MacDougall", it was said, "seems busily occupied with preparations for a journey, but he never gets started."<sup>1</sup>) But this should not be regarded as against MacDougall, it is precisely his own purpose to define the sum total of vital conditions which man must be able to fulfil if he is to progress. There is the closest connection between MacDougall and his opponents with whom he wages war; social evolution depends in the view of both parties on the experience which man gathers from his surroundings; he lives among mountains and woods, and rivers and lakes in sunshine and rain, in storm and calm, in winter and summer, but he also lives among his fellow-men, whose way of living likewise influences him. The group in which he lives is an objective reality, it is in part a number of individuals, in part the whole which comprises them and influences them in different ways. But a group of men need not be one man, a number of wills need not be one will; it is the connections which we see to hold men together, and not men "per se which influence our own minds as the necessary conditions of ourselves being able to find our places within the social system."<sup>2</sup>) A point which MacDougall further emphasizes is that the essential features of this system must be of a certain quality.

Man's dominating instincts are, in part, such as immediately express the vital functions of man, in part, such as are determined by the greater or smaller facility or perfection with which those instincts may be carried through. In the former group I include the

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<sup>1</sup>) E. Barker, *Political Thought in England from Herbert Spencer to the present day*, p. 157; MacDougall, *An Introduction*. Preface to the first Edition; *The Group Mind*. 1920, XI; H. Barnes, *Some Typical Contributions of English Sociology to Political Theory*. *American Journal of Sociology*, XXVII.

<sup>2</sup>) R. Barton Perry, *Is there a Social Mind?* *American Journal of Sociology*, 1922, XXVII, pp. 561, 721.

food instincts, the sexual and parental (maternal) instinct. I take fear and anger, the instinct of subjection and the fighting instinct as belonging to the latter group. We may say that the former instincts determine the individual's way in life, the aims towards which he strives, while the latter instincts are aroused by the hindrances which block his way and prevent him from following his instincts. All these instincts together are, however, not able to form a society, and they are found both in animals which live in herds and in those which live separately. But in the herd animals they develop under different circumstances than in the other animals, and they therefore gain a further value through the individual's experience of what strengthens or weakens his position in the flock.<sup>1)</sup> It is a fundamental experience on which social psychology ought to build that the individual's actions and mental states undergo a definite change as soon as he knows that his actions have become the objects of public attention.<sup>2)</sup>

By the side of all the above-mentioned instincts we should therefore place that or those instincts which induce the individual to live in groups. MacDougall calls it "the gregarious instinct". In his first book he described the activity of this instinct in an incomplete way as he attached its principal importance to its gift of making people congregate at the places which are most populated. The gregarious instinct determines our ways of recreation, theatres, sport performances, etc., and this is the principal reason of the constant growth of the towns.<sup>3)</sup> There is no particular sympathy for one's fellows within the group; it is only a question of living together and rubbing against each other. In his later book "The Group Mind", 1920, MacDougall gave, however, a more detailed description of the gregarious instinct, maintaining that to most people it is a source of great pleasure to partake in the life of the crowd. Left to himself every individual feels a certain degree of depression, the

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<sup>1)</sup> W. Trotter, *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War*, 1916, p. 17. Trotter here (p. 24) calls attention to the fact that Karl Pearson was the first to emphasize the importance of the herd instinct as set forth by Spencer.

<sup>2)</sup> F. Znaniecki, *The Laws of Social Psychology*, 1925.

<sup>3)</sup> W. MacDougall, *An Introduction*, pp. 84, 296—301; J. Drever, *Instinct in Man*, 1917, p. 184; Fr. Alverdes, *Tierssoziologie*; W. MacDougall, *National Welfare*, p. 95.

companionship with other individuals gives rise to new impulses and a desire is born to become the object of this incentive.<sup>1)</sup> In conformity with Le Bon's famous description of the most pronounced feature in the life of the crowd (*Psychologie des Foules*) MacDougall points out that the simple unorganized crowd is excessively impulsive, violent and changeable, inaccessible to reflections, without self-consciousness or any feeling of responsibility, but with a strongly pronounced feeling of power. It is like a wicked child.<sup>2)</sup> But side by side with this, the lowest form of casual groups, there are other groups which both morally and intellectually raise the individual to a higher level. This group system on which our whole civilization is based, is produced when a "group self-consciousness" has been formed, i. e. when every single individual feels himself attached to the group as to a whole to which he himself is bound and which he serves. MacDougall finds the source of this group formation in the fact that the consciousness of being a member of a group produces a sense of power and security, a certainty of finding support and assistance, a moral and physical support without which man can hardly take up an attitude towards the world. In thousands of cases this consciousness is a source of fixed opinions and restrained manners, while it relieves one of the often cumbrous necessity of having to form an independent judgment.<sup>3)</sup> The former kind of groups is not always produced by the gregarious instinct; if, for instance, some event or other makes people crowd together impelled by curiosity this has nothing to do with their desire to combine in a group; but if they throng together and thus become members of a group, they are also, to a certain extent, subject to the influence of the group. The latter kind of group formation is always produced by the originally quite unorganized group creating an organization.

MacDougall examines various hypotheses which have been set forth, in order to explain the powerful influence of the group on the single individuals, and he arrives at the conclusion that this phenomenon must be explained as a particularly vigorous infectious

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<sup>1)</sup> W. MacDougall, *The Group Mind*, p. 24.

<sup>2)</sup> *Opus cit.*, pp. 39, 45.

<sup>3)</sup> *Opus cit.*, pp. 65, 69.

feeling, but on the basis of the same grounds as those which make us share in each others' feelings. We laugh with those who are happy and hang our heads in sympathy with those who are sad. The single individual we meet will with his smile infect our own state of mind, with his look of suffering make us depressed. If these influences meet us from many quarters, and if they all operate in the same direction the suggestive action on us grows. We partake in the general enthusiasm, the general rage, or the general fear.

These circumstances constitute no particular problem. We must only stick to the fact, which we have repeatedly emphasized, that the necessary condition that this infection or suggestive action may take place is that the individual's mind is open to the influence of the expression of his fellow-being and not occupied with other exclusive interests. Everybody who mingles in a crowd is precisely in such a condition; he has in the very act of crowding together with others forgotten his own particular interests for the moment. The groups which are formed through the immediate influence of the gregarious instinct, as an expression of our desire to be the members of a group, are in the single individual due to a feeling of safety, which is of a purely physiological value. It is the immediate value of the group that it creates protection; within the herd the animal may browse undisturbed; within the group man may abandon himself to all the impulses which fill his existence. The social value of the herd (or group) is its creation of a feeling of safety. An individual who gets separated from the herd, is seized with a feeling of fear, which paralyses or disturbs its vital functions, it becomes unable to absorb nourishment or digest it, it is no longer able to distinguish the objects in its surroundings, and it dies, if it cannot find its way back to the herd. But in the group all the vital functions run their quiet harmonious course, and it creates a sphere for a higher play of ideas and an increased activity. The group becomes the object of the individual's attention, and the individual has then all the necessary conditions of being influenced by it.<sup>1)</sup>

Round those two centres, the gregarious and circulation instincts the whole social drama grows, as they may both support and hamper each other. As a safeguard the group creates a possibility that the

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<sup>1)</sup> W. Trotter, *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War*. 1916, pp. 20, 27.

circulation instincts may assume a great variety of forms and react to each other in the most various ways; but it also constantly regulates their play in such a way that the group is not dissolved. Men are then faced by two tasks, to learn to control their instincts of circulation in such a way that they serve and strengthen the security which is given by the existence of the group, and to form the group in such a way that it renders possible the manifold evolution of the circulation instincts.

Animals must, in order to protect themselves, notice what happens about them. They are frightened at the unknown (as a rule, a sound, often a smell, sometimes a sight), and all these things give, according to circumstances, occasion for a closer examination (curiosity), fear, which may lead to senseless flight, to trembling or threatening behaviour (roaring, barking, snarling, etc.) followed by attack (anger, rage). In the herd the individual's safety is not only increased by the fact that it is surrounded by the herd, is sheltered against its enemies, but also by the fact that it may be advised of dangers which it has not detected itself. There are dangers which threaten the whole herd or some of its members, and the herd is advised of the presence of the danger by one or another call, which either a sentinel or some accidental member gives. To such calls the members of the herd are particularly susceptible; each single member is frightened and all rush away in a panic. Fear washes all sense away and makes reason useless.<sup>1)</sup> The more susceptible each member of the herd is to the herd signals and the more unconditionally he obeys them the more united becomes the collective behaviour of the herd and the greater the strength the herd gets both for attack and defence. In the case of the herbivorous animals the herd protection is of the first importance in order that the animal may browse undisturbed. In accordance with this circumstance the protective function of the herd develops and the herd signals call to flight by the flock and not to attack. But in the case of beasts of prey who hunt in the pack (wolves, dogs), herd life does not act as a protection against attacks, but as a means of hunting and obtaining prey with greater certainty. In this case the herd

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<sup>1)</sup> W. MacDougall, *An Introduction*, p. 49; *The Group Mind*, p. 24; *An Outline*, pp. 149 ff; W. Trotter, *Instincts of the Herd*, p. 111.

signals arouse aggressive tendencies. The signal becomes what may be called a feeding signal and not a signal of warning. Whether those two forms may be made parallel seems doubtful. At any rate, they are of a quite different significance in the herd life.<sup>1)</sup>

In the case of men, special circumstances lead the herd life into new courses, as the herd security is supported not only by different defensive actions, but by attacks, which do not, as in the case of the wolves, have the least connection with hunting for prey, but which should be regarded as a kind of anticipative defence, — but also by the fact that the protective instinct is directed towards the life of the group and exercises justice among the individual members of the group mutually. The history of mankind abounds with descriptions of wars between the herds and tribes, which have no economic motive, but should be regarded as expressions of pugnacity, the purpose of which is to secure the individuals against being attacked themselves by inspiring the neighbouring nations with fear.<sup>2)</sup> In all, even the most docile animals, a fearful anger may be aroused under certain circumstances, an anger which is expressed in relentless attack. Other animals are easily provoked, and in the case of the beasts of prey attacks act directly in the service of the feeding instincts. We must suppose that in all these cases the aroused party possesses a feeling of increased strength. If victory is gained, it is probable that this feeling will disappear with the feeling of anger; at any rate, it will not grow into a feeling of pride. It is, however, with such a feeling of pride that man's fighting spirit unites itself and from which it sucks nourishment. It is the social significance of the fighting spirit which in this case gives it a quite new background. You fight against the other members of the group and inspire them with awe. You fight with the neighbouring tribes and frighten them, and in this way you gain esteem in your own tribe, not by teaching your fellows to be on guard, but by partaking in the self-assertion of the group.

Men are the only animals who are able to carry on fights of this nature. The beast of prey who chases his prey does not fight with it; wars of plunder and conquest have a quite different psycholo-

<sup>1)</sup> *Opus cit.*, p. 112.

<sup>2)</sup> William MacDougall, *An Introduction*, p. 279.

gical motive and are in reality no more wars than is the lion's chase of the deer. It is possible that we in the societies of the bees and ants may find something like the wars which men carry on for the sake of greatness.<sup>1)</sup> In the course of time pugnacity will yield place to the wars of plunder or emulation, but this evolution which gives the group new and more comprehensive functions is only possible on the basis of the group consciousness which has been created by the wars through the establishment of organization and a moral consciousness in the individual of his duty in the group.

MacDougall asserts with great strength the significance of war as the former of groups, war creating a firm organization. The group is as a mass quite unable to think and decide ways and means; the energy which it sets free acts like a flood, it runs simply in the direction of least resistance; if one individual rushes in one direction, the others follow. The individual who reacts most vigorously and most definitely to the general group signal, becomes leader. If a similar occasion arrives, the gaze of everyone will be fixed on him who on the former occasion led the way, he is once more the man with the quick and sure impulses and he feels once more the call of the group to become its leader as something which at the same time gives him a task, a duty, and invests him with authority. There is in the group both a desire to be a leader and to submit to a leader and it is not long in finding its definite course, its organization.

Organization is in its nature only a habit which builds on the basis that the once trodden roads are retraced because it makes the road easier to travel. On a given impulse a certain action is started. But organization means also a wider view so that the reflex mechanism which is created becomes more and more complex. The vitality of the group depends like the vitality of the individual organism on its organization, and this means again its management, its understanding, and ability. The more precisely the machinery works, so that the same answer is given on the same occasion, the better armed is society; but it is only possible to develop the machinery when there are, in the first place, minds which determine

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<sup>1)</sup> Opus cit., pp. 112, 293; J. Sageret, *Philosophie de la Guerre et de la Paix*. 1919, pp. 35, 117, 226; W. Trotter, Opus cit., p. 130.



what is to be done at any given moment and are able to show which part of the machinery should be set in motion, and, in the second place, minds which willingly submit to the demands of the machine. If it were possible to make the machinery quite automatic there would be constantly less use for the mind; but however perfect the social machinery became there would constantly be new circumstances to be taken into consideration, new adaptations to be fitted in with the old system. Society will never become a finished and fixed idea, it will always be a growing process, which should be led, and it will therefore always need both leaders who point out the road and subordinate individuals who follow it.

We now put the question why the fact of being a leader causes a man pleasure, what it is that makes him strive to become a leader and to continue to be so. In the next place we ask what it may be worth to a man to subject himself to a leader, what makes him want to do so and what induces him to order his existence in accordance with the demands of the leader. The answer to this question will be decisive for the understanding of social life and furnish the standard for the demands for social reform.

To be a leader is not synonymous with being a master. The feeling of power which is gained by carrying one's will through is originally no part of the feeling of leadership, as the leadership is gained precisely by that individual who gives an impulse which is followed by the group. To start with, there is scarcely any absolutely distinctive feeling of leadership besides the strong feeling of vitality which constant watchfulness and resolute behaviour produce. But in becoming the centre of general attention the leader feels a pride in his power of leadership which is an immediate expression of this social reaction. It has for its basis the joy of the group in being led. To have a road pointed out in any given situation when we ourselves are without ideas or only paralysed is a great source of pleasure and means an increase of our feeling of carefreeness and safety. We therefore subject ourselves willingly to the leader, and the subjection is not an expression of fear, but of pleasure.<sup>1)</sup> Among animals as among men, in primitive as in modern societies, we see

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<sup>1)</sup> W. MacDougall, *An Introduction*, p. 311; *Group Mind*, p. 79; *Outline*, p. 158; W. Trotter, *Opus cit.*, p. 190.

the joy which the small dog takes in wagging his tail to the large dog, the pleasure which mediocrity takes in looking up to the leader and taking his advice. This state of affairs creates a loyalty which is constantly more strongly emphasized, the more it is needed in the group life. It is easily understood that under primitive conditions it is especially in the elementary self-assertion of the group, in its warlike feeling towards other groups that such loyalty is needed. What we call man's moral capacity to subordinate himself to interests that are greater than himself and to waive his own interests, has its roots in this feeling of loyalty.<sup>1)</sup>

The sense of power becomes at a very early stage a part of the feeling of leadership, as it will be quite impossible to assert one's position as leader without a fight; such fights presuppose, however, that the position of leader gives positive advantages. The qualities which make an individual a leader enables him also to secure to himself various advantages in his daily life within the group; the strongest takes the women he desires, the best food, and all the good things which otherwise offer themselves. At a very early period we see that the chieftains know by all kinds of religious commands how to frighten the young people from consuming the most palatable food or how, at certain times, to make them gather large stores of food for Dukduk spirits and surrender these stores to themselves.<sup>2)</sup> It will always be a profitable post to be a leader, and the group pays what is necessary in order that the leader may secure its safety in the relation to its gods and its neighbouring tribes, which he alone is able to secure. Misfortune overtakes him who disobeys the chieftain or takes his own advice.<sup>3)</sup> The leader must constantly in fact or by means of illusion keep alive this belief in his power to create safety. However many open or secret acts of violence, to which he must have recourse, in order to frighten the other members of the group into obedience, a decisive difference between leader and ruler continues to exist. You may be a leader of your fellows in the group, — the leader and those he leads are

<sup>1)</sup> W. MacDougall, Introduction, p. 289; Outline, p. 441; Group Mind, p. 181.

<sup>2)</sup> H. Schurtz, Altersklassen und Männerbünde, 1902, p. 369.

<sup>3)</sup> In H. Hesketh Prichard's book, "Where Black rules White" 1910, he gives an illustrative picture of the way in which this belief in the consequences of disobedience is maintained.

bound together by the group tie; it is only possible to be a ruler over strangers. One group makes itself the ruler of another, levies a tribute on it and creates a system of government which has for its purpose to secure the government of the rulers, but which does not concern itself with the welfare of those who are being ruled, until it appears that it is necessary to take the welfare of the suppressed nation into consideration, if it is to go on paying tribute. Everywhere evolution tends to create a system of ruling or government which makes it constantly more difficult to the members of society to avoid it, or to transform government by a ruler into government by a leader. To live under fixed laws becomes necessary to every group that wants to assert itself in relation to other groups, and every ruler who wants to procure a sufficient army is obliged to provide such conditions as will make the civil trades thrive in his country, as he will not otherwise be able to levy taxes, which are sufficient to pay for an army.<sup>1)</sup> The more the ruler creates new and improved conditions of trade for the population, the more he gains the character of a leader, the more he becomes one with his nation.

The primary condition of being a leader is that you belong to the group. It is a necessary condition of every possibility of suggestive influence that there is no estrangement between the two parties. The leader must not place too large a gulf between himself and the group, if he is too much in advance of the group it ceases to follow him. A political leader who estranges himself too much from the way of thinking of his generation, loses every influence and is likely to get ostracized.<sup>2)</sup> The more the social machinery develops, the more it supersedes the individual, and the less grows the prospect of such an estrangement being formed between the group and the leader, i. e. between the population and the constitution. But if such estrangement takes place there are bound to be changes in the constitution; whether they be peaceful or violent depends on the scope for alterations which are given by the existing constitution. The more rigid it is, the more likely revolution is to

<sup>1)</sup> N. Machiavelli, *Il Principe*, 1515, XXI; Immanuel Kant, *Zum ewigen Frieden*. 1795. Akad. Ausg. VIII, pp. 357 ff; C. N. Starcke, *Den sociale Uro og den evige Fred*. 1920.

<sup>2)</sup> W. Trotter, *Opus cit.*, p. 116.

become the only expedient. But whether the power of government be vested in a person or a system, the condition of its effectiveness is the same. The leader or the system should not be estranged from the group; the members of the group should under the existing government be able to live their own lives with greater freedom and safety; the government should not be a new source of coercion or danger. The leader's honour and power is dependent on his relation to the group.<sup>1)</sup>

It remains still an unsolved question what significance should be ascribed to the great men, the personal leaders. There are some who only acknowledge their symptomatic importance. It is the period, the circumstances which possess the power of creation and the great men perform only the reforms for which the age is ripe, and which would have taken place even if the great man had not appeared. There are others who think that the course of history might have been quite different, if the great man, the leader had not appeared. As regards this question the only answer to be made is that it is difficult to decide what would have happened if circumstances had been different. It is, however, scarcely possible quite to avoid reflexions on this question and by all that the study of life teaches us we must say that it is improbable that social life would have developed in the way it has no matter whether the great men, who at certain times have decided fate, had existed or not. At times when it is necessary to find new methods and to suggest new ideas there seems to have been a greater need of great men than at times when the existing organization sufficed. The necessary conditions for creating an organization are different from those which are necessary in order that any existing organization may work, other conditions are necessary for the creation of ideas than where only means of diffusing them are needed in order that men may be subjected to their influence.<sup>2)</sup> The great men appear at certain times; there are times when they abound, other times when they seem to be needed, but fail to appear. They appear at critical periods when the methods hitherto applied lead nowhere; at such periods it may be of importance that the way to new formations should be indi-

<sup>1)</sup> W. MacDougall, *The Group Mind*, pp. 78 ff.

<sup>2)</sup> A. A. Cournot, *Traité de l'enchaînement des Idées fondamentales*, 1—2, 1861, II, p. 23.

cated by great men. Critical times are periods of dissolution to a greater or smaller extent, and it is at such times that the fates of societies are determined. Under such conditions it is important who is at the helm, while in halcyon days it is unessential.<sup>1)</sup> If the great men fail to appear at the critical periods confusion prevails, or things arrange themselves in an unsatisfactory manner. If political geniuses are born at times when great men are not needed, they obtain no influence. The question of the influence of the great men is simply reduced to the importance of the existence of minds of an extraordinary capacity.<sup>2)</sup> We never progress so far that the social machine fits in with all kinds of circumstances; it must constantly be amended and improved, and so long as this state of affairs lasts it will be of importance which minds are to become the means of adaptation.

The position of leadership will under advanced conditions be distributed over a whole group of leading functions, in part, because the functions to be performed by a leader are so varied that they cannot be performed by one single individual, in part, because the group is in need of various leaders who are subordinate to the group leader and whose task it is to prevent the leader from interfering with the interests of the group. The original primitive group formation had for its purpose external protection; it is against external enemies that the group reacts as a unity, and its leaders become warrior chiefs. But within the group the lives of the individuals develop, their circulation instincts operate through their feeding instincts, their sexual connections and their care of the progeny, and it becomes the task of the chieftain or leader to make the necessary provisions that the individuals do not collide with each other and endanger the solidarity of the group. Within the group a number of special groups are formed, of which each has its own spokesman or leader, and the party mechanism with its system of party leaders becomes the form of political government. But under all circumstances the original peculiarities in the leader and in his relation to those he leads remain the same. He who is able to point out a way becomes a leader; those who are led take

<sup>1)</sup> Newell Le Roy Sims, *Society and its Surplus*, pp. 342 ff.

<sup>2)</sup> William James, *Great Men and their Environment*; "The Importance of Individuals" in "The Will to Believe". 1897.

pleasure in being led. As a rule a mutual loyalty exists; the leader sticks to his party, he does not leave it or betray it, and the party does not fail its leader, but is grateful to him for what he has accomplished.<sup>1)</sup> At the same time a mingling is bound to take place of the leader's private interests and his interests as a leader. His first appearance is dictated by ideal enthusiasm, but it is not long before his endeavours to maintain the advantages in being a leader make themselves strongly felt, and the regard for the group interests which he originally felt himself called upon to advocate, are reduced to a mere means. In doing so he does not sever himself from his fellows in the group, the number of those who have any understanding of or take any interest in the welfare of the whole, being exceedingly small.<sup>2)</sup> The combat against other candidates for the leading position becomes bitter and occupies much of the leader's time and life becomes in part a play-ground, but also a drainage system for human passions which would otherwise burst the bounds of society.<sup>3)</sup> Often a combat is fought between the man of the new ideas and the men of the old organizations, as a rule the latter conquer in the long run, while the spokesman of the new ideas is thrust to the wall. It is discipline, the exact knowledge of the small things, and the closer intimacy with the way of thinking of the general members of the party which effect this victory. But within the party a system of parties is bound to grow up which on a smaller scale represents the same process which led to the party formation within society. There will always be a small group, which seizes the leadership and uses the interests of their fellows in order to promote their own interests.

It is the organization of the internal conditions of the group which draws a line between the different social organizations and creates a system of wise regulations instead of primitive subjugation.

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<sup>1)</sup> R. Michels, *Zur Soziologie des Parteiwesens in der modernen Demokratie*, 1911, pp. 21, 49, pp. 60 ff, pp. 87, 173.

<sup>2)</sup> *La science de l'économie sociale a surtout en vue les intérêts et la politique et principalement pour ressorts les mouvements passionnés du coeur humain. Chaque révolte contre les lois de l'inexorable nature sera puni. La force politique est organisée pour empêcher ces retours de la crise.* A. A. Cournot, *Opus cit.*, II, pp. 227, 240. Chap. XI.

<sup>3)</sup> R. Michels, *Opus cit.*, p. 362.

tion by the instilling of fear. Impulses which we are afraid to follow may go on moving in us and express themselves in the strangest ways. But when the impulse is explained and is thus incorporated in modern society it is given new courses to follow which are in harmony with itself. Mr. Freud's one-sided doctrine of the phenomena of psychic suppression suffers from his attempt to account for every kind of suppression as a suppression of sexual impulses. Also his social explanations suffer from this one-sidedness. There is no reason to emphasize the fact that the social organizations are expressions of mental discipline. The question is only, what is disciplined, and why it is disciplined? Mr. Freud gives us no proof that it is the unconscious and conscious sexual life which is the object and also the impulse of every kind of discipline. Perhaps Mr. Freud is not far wrong when he maintains that our sense of responsibility is in its kernel social fear, at any rate, it is not a sexual fear.<sup>1)</sup> The primitive sexual qualities which originally arouse the sexual instinct lose their power and it is only in connection with a great number of other qualities that belong to social life, that one sexual individual is able to arouse the sexual instinct in another. Everything that is a necessary condition of the individual's fitness as partaker in the household, his quality as a faithful and sympathetic companion in life, as the gainer of social esteem, as the educator of the children, etc. arouses the sexual instinct and induces it to seek satisfaction by that method which secures the life together to its full extent. The isolated sexual desire prevents the bringing into existence of this state and the social valuation turns against those persons who are governed by this isolated desire. It is not fear which holds the individual back, but self-esteem. The thing, which we call our self has gained a wider significance.<sup>2)</sup> The self has become a more useful member of the group.

As is the case with the sexual instinct, so is the case with the feeding instinct and the parental instinct. It is useless to try to regulate them by fear and coercion, the consequence will only be that they break out in unexpected and revolutionary, brutal ex-

<sup>1)</sup> S. Freud, *Totem und Tabu*, 1913; *Massenpsychologie und Ich-Analyse*, 1921; O. Spengler, *Der Untergang des Abendlandes II*, 1922, p. 15.

<sup>2)</sup> William MacDougall, *An Outline*, p. 440; C. N. Starcke, *Samvittighedslivet*, Chap. 13.

pressions. It is possible to regulate them by subordinating them to a greater whole, to control them is not synonymous with weakening them, but with making them a link in a more securely working social system. The government is the expression of this system. A distinction should be drawn among three kinds of leaders (or constitutions), when the personal element is set aside. The great institutors of religion, the great legislators and statesmen are those who make the forms of men's life together better, i. e. safer and more universally defined than they were before. Such leaders Conway calls "crowd compellers". In contrast to them stand the political strugglers, who become leaders by being spokesmen of ideas which have already caught a hearing among the people, by being the expression of its short-sighted or immediate wants. Conway calls those "crowd exponents". They utilize the sensations of the group, are perhaps themselves caught by them, but are not inspired with them as with something which they want to advocate because it is just, which they are ready to assert with all their powers for life or death. They see their object in the attractiveness of being a leader and gaining the advantages which the leadership involves for their own persons. There may finally be leaders of a third kind who, in one way or another, have become representatives of that which in the group life has assumed the form of an institution. Kings, presidents, etc. become representatives of a number of collective ideas, such as memories of the past, standards, and similar symbols. Conway calls the leaders who constitute those symbols, "crowd representatives".<sup>1)</sup> They are the expressions of a dignity, but not of a will. It may be dangerous to a nation to abolish such symbols, because this will often be a sign that the very ideas which they symbolise, the united life of the group through the times, has lost its power. And if they are removed the group will often by virtue of its own desire create other crowd representatives such as, e. g. Hindenburg in Germany. The exceedingly great importance of collective ideas as the manifest expressions of the central moral powers is found in the fact that a visible expression of the central moral powers cannot be dispensed with without a weakening of those powers. The fact that a nation is a unity is immediately expressed

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<sup>1)</sup> M. Conway, *The Crowd in Peace and War*. Chap. VI—VIII.



by the circumstance that above all the various opinions which are maintained in the centre stands a set of ideas which holds the others together.<sup>1)</sup> Those symbolic leaders need not play any active parts themselves; they are expressions of the unity which has been created by the past and which shows that the life of the nation is not changeable and disconnected. They are the lasting echo of the crowd compellers of the past, the evidence of how the nation heard the voice of God and found its life in fulfilling his will.

God may be said to be the foundation on which the group builds. The group may further develop its ideas of God, but God himself does not change. Conscience is the voice of the group; the individual who does not belong to a group has no conscience. But the voice of the group is not any accidental public opinion which is rumoured and which says something to-day and something else to-morrow; it derives its authority from the fact that it speaks in the name of the eternal laws which form the conditions for the nation's existence and prosperity.

Through the division of labour the nation is made into a system of groups and organizations, each of which has its own function which supplements the others in such a way that everybody would be placed in a precarious situation if one or another group disappeared and the system was broken up. The group whose function is most closely related to the gregarious instinct is that on which everybody's hope for external and internal safety mainly depends. When the gregarious instinct is aroused it washes all other interests aside; the circulation instincts are brought to silence, when the gregarious instincts are aroused; under the influence of the gregarious instinct the single individual is capable of sacrificing everything for the existence of the group; the supreme Authority of War, the Civil Authority, and the Church form the centres of social life. But their lasting power depends on their being able to create security in order that the circulation instincts under peaceful, quiet conditions in daily life may attain a freer development.<sup>1)</sup>

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<sup>1)</sup> E. Durkheim, *Représentations individuelles et représentations collectives*. Rev. de Métaphysique et de Morale. 1898.

<sup>2)</sup> William MacDougall, *The Group Mind*, pp. 101, 183.

*Equality and Liberty.*

There are nations whose circulation instincts are weak and one-sided, and whose history consists in the one-sided, all-prevailing passionateness of the gregarious instinct. They may gain an enormous power as a nation, but they offer only few conditions of evolution. In this way the Semitic nations have been ruled by religious ideas, the Tatar nations by warlike ideas. But in the civilized nations of Western Europe we find the circulation instincts to be the decisive factors in social organizations, and the gregarious instinct as active in preserving these organizations.<sup>1)</sup> The circulation instincts express themselves everywhere as the demand for the free movements of the individuals and their interests within the group and their equal acknowledgment as parts of the group. The task of the gregarious instinct becomes then to guard the free movements and the equal membership. Liberty and equality become therefore the leading ideas of these civilizations, and the necessary condition of the feeling of safety of these civilized nations is that they in their social organizations are able to assert both the above ideas.

This is the enormous task which these civilizations had to solve and which it was only possible to solve through an incessant series of struggles, as there is not only an unbreakable connection between liberty and equality, but also a profound contrast. The freer the courses the individuals seek, the stronger become the contrasts between the demands of the individuals and those of the societies. Society is not the result of the individuals' private efforts, and the State is formed as an organ of the authority by which society makes itself felt.<sup>2)</sup> But the subordination of private interests to society cannot take place through the assertion of their equality, but only through an organized system of their functions and through relative organization. It is not true that the interests of the individuals are identical with those of society, but neither is it true that the interests of society are identical with the interests of the majority at any given time. If one or other great nation would in very earnest adopt the system of State Socialism the interests of

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<sup>1)</sup> William MacDougall, *The Group Mind*, p. 139.

<sup>2)</sup> *Opus cit.*, p. 155.

the masses would very probably be strongly promoted; they would be able to live in greater prosperity and pleasure, with greater leisure for cultivating their higher interests. But it is just as probable that the higher interests of the nation would be seriously threatened, and a period of stagnation be the consequence which would weaken enterprise, and, after the course of a few generations, lead us deep into that state of decay which led all the great societies of the past to their destruction.<sup>1)</sup>

The problem is then how both considerations, both for liberty and equality, may be fulfilled when the nation becomes an organized system of interests. It is impossible to solve the question through the one-sided authority of one or other group of interests over the others, it is only possible to solve it through that free public discussion which Bagehot emphasized as the necessary condition of progress, if this was to take place on the basis of the common recognition of solidarity. The common weal must through the gregarious instinct be a spiritual power, stronger than all others, and this power does not consist in the private interests of a certain number of individuals, but in the fundamental demand for safety of every separate individual. "The highest and most perfectly organized nation and that which possesses the highest capacity is not that which rules the individuals, completely controls their actions, and suppresses their wills by means of the State. It is, on the contrary, that, in which the individual's self-consciousness, initiative and will, in short, his personality, is developed to the highest degree, and where the citizens' minds and wills work harmoniously together under the guidance and the pressure of the national idea in its clearest, fullest, and most exact form."<sup>2)</sup>

The idea of liberty grows according as the gregarious instinct is aroused through every interference with the individual's liberty instead of, as was originally the case, being aroused by every expression of individual liberty which indicates a breach in the similarity of the members of the group. The group does not tolerate a violation of its collective feelings, neither does it tolerate the liberty of the individual when this threatens the stability of the group life. But, as Durkheim showed, the division of labour involved the re-

<sup>1)</sup> Opus cit., p. 15.

<sup>2)</sup> Opus cit., p. 176.

cognition of the differences of the individuals and their particular and independent sphere of action, to a great extent, as a necessary condition of internal peace and of the maintenance of the solidarity of the group, and only when the liberty of the individual is recognized as being a necessary condition of the life of the group, "right" is created to which the individual should subject himself. Liberty is, as we asserted in accordance with Durkheim, not the natural right of the individual, but his social right. Liberty is therefore everywhere limited; only that kind of liberty, which is necessary for the life of the group, being recognized as legal, while that which threatens the life of the group, is not at any stage of the evolution of the life of the group recognized as legal. The idea of liberty is a consequence of the superior demands of the life of society; the right, i. e. the social use of liberty, is protected, while misuse, the use which acts as a threat to society, is condemned. The idea of liberty becomes therefore in all societies an organic and not a mechanic idea. In this way legal liberty is distinguished from arbitrariness, and society itself creates laws which protect the individual against all restriction, to which both the existing social authority and each single member of society may attempt to subject the individual arbitrarily. While originally everybody, who deviated from his fellow-beings, had to make a struggle to be tolerated, the case is now reversed, and every barrier which other individuals or the social authority set up against the full use of liberty must be explained and supported by reasons. Its justification must always be found in the vital conditions of society.

The maxim is set forth that the liberty of each separate individual goes just as far as it does not interfere with other individuals' equal liberty. In Denmark Severin Christensen supported and carried through this maxim with great sagacity as the necessary condition of replacing a government by power by a government by right, a government by power being still in force in many cases.<sup>1)</sup> Severin Christensen is not blind to the fact that it is social considerations which first make the individual's demand for liberty into a legal claim; the arbitrary and dangerous use of liberty, which is fought

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<sup>1)</sup> Severin Christensen, *Naturlig Ret*, 1907; *Retsstaten*, 1911; *Retsstaten*, Second improved edition, 1922.

by society, only loses its right because it cannot be reconciled with the recognition of the equal right of every individual. He asserts with great power that the life of society rests on a condition of confidence and that justice only expresses the natural conditions for such a state of confidence being produced. No special considerations of welfare under particular circumstances may justify a breach with the fundamental and simple principles which render the state of confidence possible. Justice is the supreme and unconditional regard for the welfare of society, and there is therefore a profound division between the doctrine of justice and the doctrine of welfare. The doctrine of welfare pays every possible regard to time and circumstances, and in this way it lets go the unconditional, eternal regard for safety, confidence and loyalty.<sup>1)</sup> Already David Hume founded justice on the fact of its being the fundamental condition of peaceful and loyal social life, and on the fact that the maintenance of such a social life is our predominant desire.<sup>2)</sup> It is, as we may express it in accordance with MacDougall's statement, the gregarious instinct which creates right, and sets the limits to and makes the conditions for the manifestations of every circulation instinct.

"Liberty", writes Severin Christensen, "is a completely negative idea, born in times of serfdom ..... the desire for liberty is always a mark of soundness; it should be allowed to develop. But we recommend that the mere idea of liberty should no longer be the standard which is put at the head of such a movement; for it is a blind, instinctive watchword. Made free from one yoke men will bend to another. But the free citizen who has liberated himself completely from the character of serfdom, will no longer content himself with the negative question: "How may I be able to emancipate myself from this or that"? — "So far and no longer!" he says with the same authority to State and society, as to the individual who violates his rights."<sup>3)</sup>

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<sup>1)</sup> Severin Christensen, *Retsstaten*, 1911, pp. 51—73.

<sup>2)</sup> David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*. Ed. Green and Grose, 1909, II, pp. 252 ff.

<sup>3)</sup> Severin Christensen, *Retsstaten*, 1922, pp. 180 ff; *Indad*. 1918.

The central point becomes the right of the individual. This depends, however, wholly on what kind of individual it is who demands to be respected. — It is an individual who may live his life in society without colliding with other egos, and the maxim of everybody's right to such liberty as is reconcilable with the equal liberty of his fellow-men, is excellently suited for defining the rules for such a life in society. If a conflict arises, it becomes the task of the administrators of law to ascertain which individual was the cause of the conflict and to straighten out things by making the guilty party remedy the injury. The administration of law becomes, as Durkheim maintained and as Severin Christensen likewise states, a system of indemnification. It is not the peculiar nature of the individual which should be respected; it is his life in society which must not be disturbed. The respect for his person, his material property, his family interests, and religious and cultural convictions should be maintained. Society creates right in all those spheres through a public discussion which is based on the widest possible recognition of the objective conditions of circulation, which must prevail, if the division of labour is to take place. The law therefore pays no regard to the value of the person whose course of circulation is to be left undisturbed, or to the competence of those, who are to respect it. In my legal claim no expectation of the kind feelings of my fellow-citizens is included. A legal system should not be regarded as a system which demands more from the individuals than their will to live peacefully in the same society; all that has its roots in mutual sympathy, in friendship and readiness to sacrifice oneself for one's fellow-citizens, lies outside the legal system which society may defend by force. A merely legal system becomes in so far a heartless society. Such a system is, however, recognized, precisely because it is the best soil in which all the individual feelings may grow and attain their highest evolution. With the restriction of the demand for the inviolability of the courses of circulation, which is made by the legal system, the valuation of society of the individual's capacity is not set aside; it is only placed outside the sphere, which comes under the authority of the State. The task of the State must be regarded as being accomplished when it protects the individual in the enjoyment of his material and spiritual goods. It does not fall to the task of the State to influence the citizens'

faith, feelings, and convictions, but only to protect them against violation.<sup>1)</sup>

A sharp distinction should be made between society and State. Society is the sum total of valuations which decide the individuals' mutual relations, whether they like each other, whether one suspects another, whether you think that your fellow-citizen acts wisely or foolishly. The experience of one's fellows' valuation of one's behaviour, of whether you are greeted with warmth or indifference, is a great power of education. The State, however, is the demand of society to decide the individual's behaviour by force even in the teeth of his own judgment. And it is this demand which modern society condemns through its ideas of liberty. Provided that the individual does not interfere with the rights of his fellows, he may behave as foolishly as he wants. The attempts of the State to prescribe to the individual what opinions he ought to entertain, violates the collective feelings, and the individual who submits to such a State guardianship is regarded as being less valuable. In this way the demand for the liberty of the individual becomes something more than the extension of his proper will, it becomes his social duty.

This unconditional assertion of the individual's free right in relation to the State, and the opposite just as unconditional condemnation of the attempts of the State to prescribe to the individual for what purpose he is to use his leisure, is of course not accompanied by any demand that however the individual uses his liberty, his position towards his fellow-men ought to be the same. Man must take the consequences of his actions. It is only the attitude of the State towards him which should not be altered by his prudent or foolish use of his personal liberty. The vigorous condemnation of the guardianship of the State which is at the centre of the youthful Humboldt's, of Eötvös's, R. K. Wilson's and Severin Christensen's assertions of the individual's right to personal liberty, is not founded on a natural, or as Duguit called it, a metaphysical right in the individual, but solely on the general recognition that the life together in the societies only becomes sound where this, the right

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<sup>1)</sup> Baron J. Eötvös, *Der Einfluss der herrschenden Ideen des 19ten Jahrh. auf den Staat*, II, pp. 103 ff.

of the individual, is respected. Only in that case the instincts of circulation are given the chance of developing unhampered, and the individuals gain the widest experience as to how they may guide their circulation instincts, without violating their gregarious instinct. In this way Hegel's belief in the State's task of playing providence is deadly wounded, and the attempt of the Liberal State to avail itself of this view becomes futile. We here once more stand on the same simple maxims which penetrated the doctrine of the Physiocrats and of Adam Smith. The government should restrict itself to secure and maintain internal and external security, protect liberty and right of property, and remove the barriers for the free evolution of the economic powers.<sup>1)</sup> Or as Adam Smith expresses it: "Under the system of natural liberty the State has only three duties which are certainly of great importance, but simple, and easily understood by everybody. Namely, in the first place, the duty to protect society against violence from other societies. In the second place, in so far as it is possible to protect every citizen against injustice or suppression from his fellow-citizen, which is the duty to maintain a proper administration of justice, and, in the third place, the duty to institute and maintain certain public undertakings and institutions, which it is impossible for single individuals or organizations to start and keep going, as the profit cannot possibly cover the expense as far as the individual enterprise is concerned; while such enterprises, on the other hand, may be very profitable to society as a whole."<sup>2)</sup>

The desire to protect people against their own weaknesses and the consequences of the injustices to which they are subjected, is a human desire, which the assertion of the individual's right to liberty does not abolish, but only protects against faulty expressions. It is the task of the State to overcome injustice, to punish transgression and violence, to compel that individual who injures his fellow-men to render compensation. Or as it says in the preface to "Jydske Lov"<sup>3)</sup>: "It is the task of the king and of the chieftains of the country to pronounce judgment and administer law in order to

<sup>1)</sup> F. Quesnay, *Tableau économique*, 1757.

<sup>2)</sup> Adam Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, 1776, III, p. 43.

<sup>3)</sup> "Jydske Lov" is a codification of the customary laws of Jutland, made by Bishop Gunner of Viborg in 1241.



protect those individuals who would otherwise be forced by main power”.

Injustice is not overcome merely by protecting those who fall victims to it, if the opportunity of committing injustice is still the same.

The more the State prescribes to men for what purpose they are to use their leisure hours, which things they are to like and which things they are to hold in contempt, the greater is the injury which the State commits if she fails in her judgment. Life offers the different individuals a chance of deciding what is worth cherishing, but the State cannot prescribe it, because, in that case, she will prevent other valuations from being tried and stop the criticism of the existing ideals. It is in the moral sphere that the doctrine of justice asserts the system of free competition in making the individual's free self-determination inviolable in his relation to the State. It is only against the misuse, violence, and transgression of free competition that the State is to guard us. But the care of the State is itself such a forcible application of power.

The more society becomes a system of organizations, the more will the individual judge himself by as to whether he through his actions disturbs this system or whether he acts in conformity with it. The individual will recognize it, as he recognizes every other objective system — and, in order to live, he must submit to the regulations of the organizations. This circumstance does not, however, solve the problem, which was stated above by Fouillée, of how the perception that man cannot live “par soi” entails the fact that man does not want to live “pour soi”. If the organizations are only machines, which utilize men as the means of getting some piece of work performed, this problem will be insoluble, and everybody will stand uncomprehending towards the whole organized social life by which he is surrounded. But the case will be quite different, if society and its various organizations are governed with a view to making the single individuals into freer and stronger personalities. In that case no individuals will object to live in society. The freer a personality becomes, the more valuable he becomes as a member of society, his demand for liberty is no longer to be regarded as a hostile demand, by means of which he wants to protect himself against society, but it becomes his duty to society. Society cannot

very well rank him within its numbers, if he is ready to sell his liberty for a dish of pottage, no more may it use him, if he takes up a hostile attitude towards it.<sup>1)</sup> Both in the organization of family relations and of trade relations, not to mention the organization of all educational institutions, liberty assumes the form of the demand of society to the individuals.

*Society's Organization of the Family.*

It is the sexual and parental instincts which form the basis for sexual life. MacDougall emphasizes especially the parental instinct which he calls the parent of both intellect and morality, the only really altruistic element in Nature.<sup>2)</sup> In primitive society the sexual instinct was in all probability the cause of violent mating quarrels which often threatened to dissolve the group; while the parental instinct rather contributed to strengthen the group life. But the organization by society of the family relations has been decided by still another factor, namely the consideration of the way in which husband and wife can make a division of labour and live life together in harmony, each contributing his or her work in the common home. It is on the basis of these, the social functions of the family, that the legal measures have grown up which have led to the maintenance of the monogamous family on the principle that the connection should be of life-long duration, "communitas omnis vitae" between the parents' and the lawful children's claim to be

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<sup>1)</sup> One cannot help drawing an analogy between the fact that the individual does not only live in society, but is completely determined by his position in society and the biological fact, which Dr. Albert Fischer has described in his book "Tissue Culture", 1925. He sums up his examinations of the possibility of keeping the cell tissue in a state, which makes it fit to survive, so that cell division is constantly taking place, in the following way: "The stimulus, which initiates the cell division, is probably not of environmental nature, but is produced within the cytoplasm of the cells and transported within the cytoplasm directly from cell to cell. — Multiplication took place only in those cases where several individuals were in close contact with each other (pp. 166 ff)." But besides those normal cells there are malign cells, which produce cankerous tumors and greedily destroy the organism in which they are found. "They are observed to divide even when the cells are scattered isolated and in no protoplasmic contact with other cells." p. 256.

<sup>2)</sup> William MacDougall, *An Introduction*, Chap. X; Outline, p. 131.

provided for.<sup>1)</sup> Modern views have made great changes in these ideas in asserting the equal rights of the married parties, facilitating the dissolution of marriage, and making the entering into the married state entail as few changes in the parties' civic position as possible. At the present moment it is impossible to tell whether this legislation will contribute to weaken the institution of marriage, because it weakens the emphasis on the strictly binding significance of the marriage promise as a promise of life-long solidarity. But this much is certain, it will weaken the marriages if the regard for the sexual life and the care of the children become the essential factors in family life. The sexual instinct does not lead to life-long fidelity; the care of the children is in present-day society undertaken in many other places than in the common home. Husband and wife cannot be kept together in life-long marriage as two mutually completely free and independent persons, unless it becomes of vital importance to them to have a companion whom they may trust without reserve, confide in under all circumstances, in joy and in sorrow, each sharing each other's fate completely. Such a condition cannot possibly arise between persons who stand only in a temporary or limited relation to each other. The future of family life will depend on whether this desire for "communitas omnis vitae" still survives i. e. whether it is necessary for a man who wants to feel himself rooted in existence to attach his fate completely to that of one of his fellows. Such a relation is not made or maintained through force. Liberty is an indispensable condition of that marriage, which is to be something more than a merely external form; but it is given to the married parties not in order that they may divorce, but in order to bind them more closely together. Family life demands self-education and control over impulses and desires out of regard for the demands of the common life. For this reason the family is of great ethical value,<sup>2)</sup> and society would suffer if the increase of moral power which family life offers fell away.

But to the full evolution of the family belongs the care of the children. MacDougall is right in maintaining that in our desire to provide for our children lies the source of our capacity to understand and sympathize with our fellow-men. One mother under-

<sup>1)</sup> C. N. Starcke, *Die primitive Familie; Samvittighedslivet*.

<sup>2)</sup> H. Hetherington and J. H. Muirhead, *Social Purpose*, 1918, p. 140.

stands the feelings of another mother, when her face beams with pleasure as she holds her baby in her arms, or when filled with anxiety and sorrow she bends over her sick child.<sup>2)</sup> Therefore society provides for the children, when the parents are unable to do so. But these endeavours have become of such a comprehensive nature as almost to push the parents to the wall. It looks as if society thought that it is much better fitted than the parents to take care of the children. And in many respects society will be able to do so. Nobody can deny that present-day children have been liberated from a pressure, which gives a fair promise that they may grow up into freer and more self-dependent men. But there is one thing which social care cannot possibly give the children, a thing which even the poorest home is able to give its children, the internal feeling of safety which you get by knowing that you are rooted somewhere, that in one place the world is your own. There are many examples that parents have not known how to bring up their children, and how precisely their abundant love has spoilt the children; but much more numerous are the examples of how the love of the home has given the children an invincible power of resistance and kept the mind open to all good influences. The education given by society with everything which it brings comes only lagging behind that of the home, its object being, in the last instance, to teach the children that society demands that they should be free self-supporting citizens.

#### *Society's Organization of Trade.*

The attitude of society towards the life of trade seems to be of a different nature. Here the task seems to be quite different from that of securing men liberty, it consists in getting the work done. Nobody is able to work by himself, everybody must attach himself to some group; but this is not the kernel of the question, which is whether these workers' groups ought to be voluntary or to be carried on and watched by the State. The conditions and organization of trade play a decisive rôle in the opinion which the citizen entertains as to the excellence of any given society. The English, German, French, and American societies are judged according to the con-

<sup>1)</sup> William MacDougall, *Outline*, p. 136.

ditions which they offer the workers. Three circumstances are decisive in the valuation. I) How is the organization of the social area and the means of communication between its parts? Roads, railways, telegraph and telephone, the conditions of habitation, the plans of the towns, cleanliness and hygienic conditions? II) What are the working conditions, how is the technical management, the technical skill, the economic foundation, and the possibilities of admittance to the world market? III) How are the distribution of wealth, the conditions of wages and the other working conditions, and what protection is there against unemployment?

It would not be possible for the people of to-day to live without roads, well developed means of traffic, organization and cleanliness. Society must provide all these things and keep them from falling into decay; no single individual would be able to provide them, or see his interest in doing so.<sup>1)</sup> There is no money in them, i. e. an expenditure of money is necessary in order to provide them, but they give no immediate profit. Furthermore they must be organized according to a collective plan. It is therefore the State which must undertake all these tasks, and she must be able to overcome every opposition which may be interposed by special interests.<sup>2)</sup> The necessary money should be placed at the disposal of the State, which should be trusted with such authority as is demanded by the nature and extent of the tasks. The judgment of the excellence and right of the State will in this case depend on the fact of her being able to solve her tasks in a satisfactory manner. The whole sphere comes outside the idea of liberty.

As soon, however, as it is a question of industries which give a profit the state of affairs is, as has been mentioned above, different, and what arrangements should be made, and whether they are to be undertaken by the State or by private enterprise will depend on the relation which exists between trade and society. The danger and difficulty entailed by State administration will always lie in its being bureaucratic, in its paying more regard to regulations than to existing conditions, and in the fact that it does not work on personal responsibility and with personal risk. It is not our task in this place to make these conditions the object of a further discussion, but we

<sup>1)</sup> Adam Smith, *Wealth of Nations*, Vol. III, pp. 42—43.

<sup>2)</sup> Severin Christensen, *Retsstaten*, 1920, p. 105.

shall point out that the decision in favour of State enterprise or of private enterprise will always depend on the weight which is attached to personal responsibility and personal risk, and on the interest of the party in power in personal loss or profit. But the fact of the centre of gravity lying here, shows that private enterprise must on principle be organized on the basis of the idea of liberty. Under State administration enterprise ceases to be a branch of trade. The whole general discussion of the importance of private initiative is an expression of the demand of the trade instinct for free evolution, and it is impossible that a suppression of this may take place without it causing an explosion, unless it may be proved that in reality trade is more satisfactorily carried on when it uses the State as an intervening link. The fact of whether the State supports small or large scale trade is an evidence as to which of the two groups of interest is in power, but it is quite different from the question of whether the State herself intends to carry on trade. Large or small scale trade are two forms of industry, and that form will conquer which is most favourable for the promotion of trade.

But, at the present day, it is not only regard for trade interests which influences political power, but rather regard for the distribution of profit and the organization of the relation between employer and worker which determine the right of interference and regulation which is given to the State. Formerly political power was vested in those persons who possessed economic power; at the present day, political power is vested in a majority whose interest in trade is not determined by its capacity to organize trade, but by the advantages which it may obtain from trade in its capacity of consumers. The leaders of trade try by means of their trade organizations (cartels, etc.) to make the political authorities dependent on them or to undermine the State; the political authorities are not in a state so to organize, but only exploit the trades.<sup>1)</sup>

The reason why the political power has fallen into the hands of a democracy, which possesses no knowledge and is incapable of governing the life of trade, is evident. It should never be forgotten

<sup>1)</sup> C. Landauer, *Die Wege zur Eroberung des demokratischen Staates durch den Wirtschaftleiter*. Hauptprobleme der Sociologie. Erinnerungsgabe für Max Weber, 1923, II, pp. 115—143.

that Karl Marx definitely emphasized the fact that the prospect of the victory of the proletariat depended on its being able to increase the productive power of trade; the general democracy entertains still a vague idea of the importance of the liberty of the individual branches of trade. But the tendency to grow into a social democracy, which every present-day democracy has, is accounted for by it being a question of wages, the fight against free competition, and the general provision for the working classes, of which it is a question. MacDougall's criticism, which has been mentioned above, of this social democratic tendency coincides with Durkheim's description of it as an unreasonable tale of woe. They do not contest that the social democrats may be able to attain great immediate results and improve the position of the lower class, but they maintain that it will not be of lasting duration, as the demands of the workers are not regulated by the work which they perform. We know from experience that all social regulations are bound to weaken that living energy of a people which is its fundamental condition for reaching the top of its capacity.<sup>1)</sup> They sin against what was called by Nixon Carver "the religion of work". But, furthermore, it is impossible that the advantages which are given the workers by these regulations will last, if the workers receive more than their work is worth. Marx started his campaign in anger, because the employers deprived the workers of the increased value which they had created. But how great is this value? Has the increase in the workers' wages not long ago altered this state of affairs, if it has ever existed. "It is", writes an American author, "the internal contradiction of socialism that if there exists an increased value, which has not been distributed, it is due to other sources than work, and the workers have no claim to it. And if there is no increased value, there is nothing to quarrel over."<sup>2)</sup> But in the description of things, as they are, the writers fluctuate between emphasizing the workers' unfortunate situation and unsatisfactory wages and enthusiastic descriptions of all that the workers have attained, not only their improved private conditions, but all the public provisions that are made in their favour, poor-relief, elementary

<sup>1)</sup> J. Th. Rogers, *Six Centuries of Work and Wages*, p. 551.

<sup>2)</sup> S. Patten, *The Reconstruction of Economic Theory*. The Annals of American Academy of Political Social Science, Supplement. November 1912, p. 21.

schools, public libraries, sports grounds, etc. We are to-day almost surpassing Athens and Rome in giving the electors bread and dramas, but also in repeating their mistakes, because there was no economic basis for those gifts to the people. In Athens the gifts originated in the tributes of the federated States and later on, when the union had been dissolved, in the gifts of the rich men who desired to get a share in the government. In Rome the gifts came from the plundering of the provinces, and they were the payment for which the population of Rome sold their votes to the Caesars.<sup>1)</sup> When the revenue dwindled the demands on the exchequer of the State drove the State to a constantly stricter interference with trade; it became more and more tyrannical and more and more greedy.<sup>2)</sup> If evolution once more tends in this direction, the present-day societies will fall into decay like those of antiquity. What it has cost centuries to build up, it will only take decades to ruin.

The interference of the State depends on the belief that in this way the whole life of trade may be made more methodical, more rich in capital and less divided into classes, in such a way as to produce greater economic equality. Here as on other points much may be attained through a more thorough sensible organization, and the interference of the State becomes, in so far, only one of the forms which express the tendency towards organization and co-operation. The danger lies always in the fact that every kind of organization is apt to stereotype, get in the way of new formations and to become mechanized, and this danger grows to the same extent as the goal, i. e. an improvement of the whole life of trade assumes the form of efforts towards equality. The more we regard work, its different forms and shapes, the more are we driven to keep a door open for the individual and his liberty; the more, however, equality becomes the standard, the less is the rôle which is played by liberty. Liberty becomes the natural claim of all those individuals who think, and they refuse to be hampered by arbitrary organizations, which they find unreasonable, and they will not take the responsibility and run the risk, when they have not had a vote in the affair. The demand for equality, however, becomes dominant in those individuals who, through the intervention of the State, hope to gain more and ob-

<sup>1)</sup> J. MacCabe, *The Evolution of Civilization*. 1922.

<sup>2)</sup> G. Ferrero, *La Ruine de la Civilisation antique*. 1921.



tain greater security than they may produce for themselves. The principle "to yield according to capacity and enjoy according to one's wants" is an exact expression of the carrying through of economic equality. This principle cannot, however, be carried through, because no command whatever has power to make people yield according to capacity. When the ability to enjoy according to his wants is secured to man, he lacks the motive for producing the most possible.

Two kinds of democracy arise. The general democracy, which by liberty understands man's opportunity to work according to his own judgment and which takes "equality" to mean that everybody possesses this liberty to the same extent. In the second place, there is the social democracy which by "democracy" understands the general improvement of man's economic position, his possibilities of consumption. The prevailing uncertainty as to the sharp difference between those two kinds of democracy makes discussion difficult, but the difference is there and cannot be overlooked. Democracy is a "religion of work" which hopes that production may increase when everybody will be able to work, and which thinks to abolish poverty by this means. Social democracy, on the other hand, strives first and foremost to abolish poverty, has less sense of the necessity to increase productive power, and attaches the greatest importance to a more favourable distribution. Democracy acts on the basis of the law concerning the division of labour, which was indicated by Durkheim, and wants on all points to make this as free as possible. Social democracy disregards this law, places in thousands of ways impediments in the way of the free distribution of work, creates regular structures of production, but severs distribution from production, and must therefore place it in the hands of men and their judgment. Social democracy "per se" does, it is true, denounce the principle of complete equality and wants wages to be regulated by work, — they become not individually defined in the form of profit, but they take the form of class valuations in such a way that they keep their external character of equality.

The contrast between democracy and social democracy is distinctly seen in their different view on the right of property. In America we find pure democracy which is based on the "Declaration

of Independence" and is expressed in the constitution. Every man's right to work at his own will is protected by the declaration that life, liberty, and property are inviolable, and of these things the inviolability of the right of property is the most important, because life and liberty are threatened or of no value, when property is threatened. It was, as Tocqueville pointed out, a principle in the American democracy, which made up for all social inequality, that everybody owed to his work his social and financial position; he, who was nobody, had a chance to become somebody. The American democracy has to-day developed into the most marked plutocracy which the world has ever seen, precisely by unconditionally defending the inviolability of the right of property without seeing that private ownership of land is not right of property, but rape.<sup>1)</sup> The social democracy does not recognize any proper right of property, but only the consumer's share. Duguit, whom we mentioned above, sees, as one of the marks of the movement from individualism towards socialism<sup>2)</sup> which took place in the course of the last century, precisely those changes in the view on the right of property and the right to work which are constantly making themselves more felt, — especially, during the Great War, society did not scruple to make it compulsory for people to cultivate their fields, build on their sites, and rent their houses; through regulations of prices of different kinds society tried by force to keep trade alive and secure everybody his right to live. Duguit regards this as an evidence that the supreme principle which rules the legal system becomes, to a constantly greater extent, the duty of society to keep the social functions working. He denounces expressly the view that he by his attitude confirms the political demand of the social democratic party. He only asserts that both the rights of individual and society depend upon their social functions.<sup>3)</sup> He visualizes the image of

<sup>1)</sup> Scott Nearing, *The American Empire*, 1921, pp. 118, 217.

<sup>2)</sup> L. Duguit, *Les Transformations générales du Droit privé*. 1912.

<sup>3)</sup> Duguit takes up a decisively antagonistic attitude against the syndicalist movement in so far as it aims at splitting up the group. In the preface to the third edition of "*Le droit social, le droit individuel et la transformation de l'État*", 1922, he writes: "Grève et service public sont deux choses contradictoires et qui s'excluent" (XXXVI). "Mais si la doctrine syndicaliste est théoriquement sans valeur et pratiquement néfaste ..... le fait syndicalisme reste certain et d'une importance primordiale" (X.2.11.). The new which is develop-

society, as we all see it, as consisting of the individual members; and his judgment is ruled by the question whether the individuals within society do what is in their power to improve society, and whether society gives sufficient scope to the actions of the individuals. The peculiarity of this view, of which Duguit makes himself the spokesman, is the fact that he regards the sense of justice as synonymous with the individual's self-assertion, and the right of property merely as a power necessary for the carrying on of trade in society. The capitalists of to-day have no interests as consumers; their claim to property is a claim to such power as enables them to organize the enterprises of production in such a manner as is necessary in order to promote production.

The legal order of society must be built on the basis of the free division of labour. Equality means equality in the possibility of circulation. Nobody is born to belong to a definite group, and nobody is condemned to stay in that, which he has once chosen. In whichever group he takes up his position he must work in conformity with its objective demands, but no group, should be able to prevent him from going over into another group, from taking up a new job and thus obtaining new functions and duties.<sup>1)</sup> The class warfare does not exist for the sake of production, but for the sake of the division of profit, and even though there is the closest connection between a man's will to work and his certainty of keeping the profit from his work, there is the most decisive difference between desiring the same position under the sun as one's fellows, because one is able to enjoy it just as much as the others, and to desire it because one has made oneself just as worthy of it as the others. Democracy takes up a hostile attitude towards class government, be-

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ing is: "Co-existence dans l'esprit humain du sentiment individuel de justice et du sentiment social de solidarité; pluralité des classes sociales, tendant, malgré des résistances, des luttes et des violences momentanées, à se rapprocher, à se coordonner et à collaborer; appropriation individuelle des capitaux, stimulant indispensable du travail et de la production; existence d'une puissance supérieure organisée et sanction haut par la force la règle sociale, imposant à chacun des devoirs correspondant à sa situation dans la société, voilà autant de faits qui sont le produit d'un effort humain millénaire et dont la méconnaissance conduit fatalement une société à la misère, à la famine, à la mort. L'exemple de la Russie bolcheviste en est une preuve éclatante." (X.11.IV).

<sup>1)</sup> E. Durkheim, De la Division. Livre II. Chap. V.

cause it does not admit that some are born to take up the foremost places in society, while some are born to stand cap in hand. "Democracy wants the upper class to give up its prejudices", wrote Tocqueville. Everybody has a right to the post he is able to fill. The social democracy changes this demand into a claim to the right to point out the posts.

An admirable work has been done to bring order into society by means of the government.<sup>1)</sup> During the last fifty years the system of communications in the country has developed to such a degree as almost to remove all distance of space and time. The towns have grown on the most enormous scale, but are, at the same time, developing into paragons of cleanliness, order, and health, while they used to be dirty, pestilential holes, which like the god Moloch consumed their inhabitants. But in spite of this, our social system shows serious marks of disease, crises of trade, huge accumulation of riches, which far exceed the improvement which has taken place in the conditions of the working class, the increasing burden of taxation, and the growing recognition of the impossibility of the workers' obtaining the improved conditions, which they desire, through the means of their wages, — they being given them by means of subsidy — all these circumstances are marks of disease, of a defective equilibrium among the different functions of society. In order to obtain relief the sick man grasps after stimulants and fantastic remedies, instead of strengthening his will to live a healthy life under more natural and peaceful conditions. It is a mistake to believe that the crises in trade are due to natural economic laws, and not to human incapacity or greed; it is a mistake to believe that the State fulfils a beneficial function when she, in order to be able to solve the tasks she takes upon herself, burdens people with taxation; it is a mistake to believe that you maintain the equality of a people, by giving one part subsidies which the other part is to pay, and to believe that you may gladly accept the subsidy without your self-respect suffering, and that you are equal with those who accept no subsidies.

Formerly the governing classes looked at the industrial workers with an indifference, to a degree of which the people of to-day have

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<sup>1)</sup> Two excellent descriptions by Delisle Burns; *Government and Industry*, 1921; *Industry and Civilization*, 1925.

no idea.<sup>2)</sup> This has now disappeared; but has it been replaced by a sense of equality? And does the whole social insurance system promote such a sense of equality?

What is the matter with society? In so far there can be no doubt of the answer. No free course has been given to our leading instincts; instead of a well-adapted system of control a number of artificial impediments have been created. Instincts that are hampered create restlessness and disquietude. The frightened horse who is allowed to gallop off freely does not quiver, but he who is reined in forcibly, quivers all over.<sup>1)</sup> What forms the natural system of our instincts and creates the strong and highly developed group feeling, which we call national feeling is the fact that all our interests bring us into an organized connection with now these now those of our fellow-men, in such a way as to make us members of many groups which form a mutual hierarchy.<sup>2)</sup> The nation means to us first and foremost this hierarchy, and in those cases where State and nation are synonymous — and this is the normal state — this hierarchy is, in the first line, marked by the common legal system under which we live. Our love of our nation demands much more, it demands that there should be ample space in the nation for the formation of groups of a religious, scientific, and social nature. We demand liberty and social organization,<sup>3)</sup> but the fundamental condition for these things is that the State is the guardian of justice. There may be a doubt as to what is justice under various circumstances, but there is no doubt that the law under which society is to live, should be guarded. But it is the constantly increasing disease, the fact that law is not safeguarded in essential points, which causes a fever in society. Our whole view of social justice is based on the sharp distinction which we make between robbery and trade; our societies have been built up under a fight against robbery. The communist ideas have from a historical point of view not contributed an iota to create our societies. They appear at a certain stage of the social disease which the robbery, which is ratified by the State, produces. We might say that communism is no-

<sup>2)</sup> E. J. Solano, *Labour as an International Problem*. 1920. LVII.

<sup>1)</sup> William MacDougall, *An Outline*, p. 151.

<sup>2)</sup> William MacDougall, *The Group Mind*, p. 80.

<sup>3)</sup> *Opus cit.*, Chap. XX.

thing but robbery, ratified by the State<sup>4</sup>) It is not the function of the State to rob people; but from the olden days the leaders in society have always appropriated the surplus profit, and they have always known how to invent one or other Duk-Duk myth, which covered the robbery under some noble or altruistic purpose. In our societies the whole intricate taxation system constitutes the Duk-Duk myth, by the force of which the greatest encroachments are made on the citizens' property, but this taxation system rests on still another system, which is so old that it is no longer necessary to support it by reasons.

It is the private ownership of land which conflicts with the gregarious animal's natural demand to move freely within the group, and, in so far as man is concerned, to be able to support himself within the group. The private ownership of land makes all the other members of the group void of subsistence, rootless and slave-bound. The rulers have always understood what the possession of land meant.<sup>1</sup>)

*Henry George.*

I shall not go further into Henry George's well-known doctrine on this point, but only call attention to the fact that as land is not created by work, only is at hand in a limited quantity, does not decay by lying waste, and is necessary to everybody who wants to work, society should give other laws for the acquisition of and the right of disposal over land, and for purchase and sale of the products of work. If the system of private ownership of land is to be maintained the nursery teaching must be abandoned that it is necessary to show initiative, honesty, earnestness, endurance, and

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<sup>4</sup>) C. N. Starcke, *Røveri og Erhverv*. 1923.

<sup>1</sup>) I have attempted to show that the pauperism and the degradation of the English labourer were the result of a series of acts of Parliament and acts of government, which were designed or adapted with the express purpose of compelling the labourer to work at the lowest rates of wages possible and which succeeded at last in effecting "that purpose". J. Rogers, *Six centuries of work and wages*. 1844. Ed. 1919, p. 6. "Ownership of the land involves claims upon the services of the peasants dwelling upon it". Newell Le Roy Sims, *Society and its Surplus*, 1924, p. 383. "So long as the sources of economic power remain in private hands, there will be no liberty except for the few who control these sources". B. Russell, *Icarus or the Future of Science*, 1925, p. 38.

capacity, if we want to get on in the world and be able to support ourselves and our families. It is necessary to own land, to own raw material, and by this means to get power over all work which is performed by man. To own land means that we are able to say to our fellow-citizens: "You are to work, while I am going to consume the bread you are producing."

In order to be able to work we must own land, but this does not mean that we should own land which we make other men work, while we support ourselves by our power over land without doing any work ourselves. We see how the new American world power is being built up through the private ownership of land and the increased economic value which the ownership of large uninhabited stretches of land and unused mineral fields give the proprietors, when the uninhabited stretches of land are colonized and large cities with millions of inhabitants arise, when the mines are worked, and the fountains of petroleum become one of the most important sources of energy in the world. The great capitalists have not been created and increased by the working of land and raw material, but it is the ownership of land which has created the great capitalists from the profit produced by those who work the land. The surplus profit which is created in this way is so large that it is not disposed of by a "consumer's interest", but it involves a demand for investment; in this way the gigantic banks are created, and (particularly after the Great War) the idea arises through the investment of money in the leading enterprises of all the countries of the world to make the whole world indebted to and dependent on a small number of American financiers, who have disposal of land and raw materials. Henry George's proposal to allow this surplus profit from land, its ground-rent, to go to the exchequer would put an end to this state of affairs, and in this way stop the source of social disease. It is only natural that those who possess the privilege of the possession of land make every effort in their power to preserve it, and, on one side, use their actual power to destroy those who might threaten to take it from them, on the other side, spread various Duk-Duk myths of their capable administration of the riches of the earth, of their clever financial administration, etc.<sup>1)</sup> But all this

<sup>1)</sup> One of the most generally used of these Duk-Duk myths is to call Henry George a quack doctor who deludes people with the idea that society may be

does not change the case that it is not the use of land, but the power over it, which creates the great capitalists, the rule of the high financiers, and the state of dependence of all great and small producers.

The finances which by ground-rent would be placed at the disposal of society would be sufficient for the performance of the work which the development of the territory demands (roads, streets, sewerage, etc.), and as a guarantee for the capital which is demanded for such constructions as are later on paid for by the public (railways, electric light, etc.). Trade would be relieved of the enormous burden of taxation which hampers it now, and the workers would become independent of the employers. The rôle which we have shown above, to be played by the city industries and trades, namely, to create positions for those who immigrate from the country to places where there is no use for them, would still fall to the cities, but it would no longer be people without land and without means of subsistence who came to the factories. The just rate of wages would be that which might tempt people to migrate to the cities and not, as is the case now, that which one party through a casual trial of strength enforces on the other party. If the workers understood of what importance a just land-system would be to their liberty and welfare, the resistance of the capitalists would soon be broken, because the reform would not in the least curtail their power as leaders and their use of land and raw material, but only lay down the necessary conditions for obtaining the administration of capital. Instead of the whole degrading system of State subsidy which is to-day the price for which the worker is tempted to surrender his co-ownership of the social territory, there would be a system which gives the sound and healthy men, who are in possession of their free access to work, far better prospects than does

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cured through the application of a panacea. It is overlooked that it has been proved that the cause of the principal disease in society is the fact that the enormous rape of land has been allowed to subsist. Just as simple as is the disease, must be the remedy: through ground-duty to put a stop to this robbery. I have been surprised to number J. Rogers among those who denounce ground-duty. J. Rogers, *Opus cit.*, p. 531. — Brougham Villiers contends the possibility of defraying all the expenses of society by means of the ground-duty, but he perceives clearly that the monopoly of land ought to be abolished. "Modern Democracy" 1912, p. 57 ff., 74 ff.



any however abundant subsidy. This would in the natural course of things never be so great as the advantages which the landowners and their retinue, who dispose over the field of labour, obtain through this monopoly. So long as the workers do not see how things stand and therefore take recourse to other remedies than the only one, which is really useful, society will continue in a state of disease, and the disease will grow, because there is no equilibrium between the profit which is attached to the monopoly of land, and the work which the monopolists render in compensation. The lower classes exult over a successful strike, a forcible improvement of working hours and working conditions, but they are without any clear understanding of where the causes of their unfavourable conditions are to be found, they do not see that the greater part of the concessions they have obtained are only illusory, as the upper classes constantly take back the advantages which have been given. It is as if the workers are still preserving a dim memory of past times, when the position of the workers was not only more favourable from an economic point of view, but also more esteemed from a social point of view.<sup>1)</sup> But they apply their force to bring back those times on wrong and superficial points. Without the monopoly of land, capital will become the servant of labour — with the monopoly of land it will continue being the master of labour and on decisive points an ungracious master.

A man who lived outside society would have no use for the greater part of his brains,<sup>2)</sup> and his mental life would die. In a society which is so firmly organized that it does not depend on the individual's choice and desire, where his place in society is to be, and which has sacrificed the liberty of the individual for the sake of

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<sup>1)</sup> J. Th. Rogers, *Opus cit.*, p. 490. In the fifteenth century the working-day in England was eight hours.

<sup>2)</sup> William MacDougall, *An Introduction*, p. 325, "The superiority of man would seem to be due in the main to his possession of a very large brain, containing a mass of plastic nervous tissue which exceeds in bulk the sum of the innately organised parts and makes up the principal part of the substance of the cerebral hemispheres. This great brain, and the immense capacity for mental adaptation and acquisition implied by it, must have been evolved hand in hand with the development of man's social life and with that of language, the great agent and promotor of social life. For to an individual living apart from any human society the greater part of this brain and of this capacity for acquisition would be

order, the individual will always lose more than half of his worth, he becomes unfree and thus he performs less work. But in a society which is so thoroughly organized that it may offer the citizens liberty and free evolution of their individualities without the entirety being violated, lies the standard of our legal demands. It is the fact that we belong to a society which gives us dignity and self-control; it is the demand of society to the individual that he should control himself and seek his dignity in his liberty. Liberty is not found in primitive society, it is created by the highly organized society. Where the State must build her legal order on force, there is neither personal liberty nor security for the existence of order. Antiquity never attained to the creation of a nation. Egypt and Babel created a mixture of religious and mercantile realms. The Greeks got no further than to the evolution of a city community, to which everybody was subject, but in the government of which everybody partook. The Romans got no further than to founding the rule of a town over the world. The nations of to-day, where millions of men form an entirety, are only possible by the formation of a common measure of oscillation, a widely spread net of connections, which in the form of institutions, historic memories, common wars and events, and common leading ideas, includes everybody.

This national unity assumes a definite form by occupying a certain territory, and this territory is always that of the tribe. It becomes, as it were, the personification of the gregarious instinct. Where a group of men from different parts of the world have come together in the same place, in a territory which they seize and occupy, this connection between the gregarious instinct and land is scarcely produced. In the colonies of settlers it is therefore to a large degree the structure of the society which becomes decisive as to whether something more than a group should be created; but the

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useless and would lie dormant for lack of any store of knowledge, belief, and custom to be acquired or assimilated." In his previous work "Body and Mind", 1911, 2nd Ed. 1913 he wrote, p. 277: "Clear consciousness and conation are the invariable concomitants, not of nervous processes in general, nor of all nervous processes occurring in the cerebral cortex or in any part of the brain, but of those nervous processes that occur in nervous elements not yet organised in fixed systems, and wherever a new path has to be forced through the untrodden jungle of nerve cells, there and there only is conscious effort, true mental activity, involved.

lack of the close connection between men or society and land, which existed in the old countries, is strongly felt and characterizes the national consciousness of the new world.<sup>1)</sup> In our old Germanic societies the kings and chiefs were the leaders of the tribes, and as such they obtained a mastery over land, not as cultivators but as recipients of rent, a rent, which enabled them to fulfil their position and perform their functions, and guard the security of the group and the territory. In the course of time the division between the function and private proprietorship became effaced, and land became a source of income to the private owner. But the nobility and the squirarchy continued bearing the stamp of the period, when land belonged to the tribe and they were the representatives of the tribe; they felt themselves as those on whom the tribe depended, as the noble blood of the country. Their position was attached to the ownership of land and not to the cultivation of land. Detached from land the nobility lost its value.<sup>2)</sup> In the course of time the mastery over land passed from the squires to the peasants, and their relation to land was drawn into the general current of trade, which measured the value of the possession of land by its monetary value. But the peasants have preserved a great deal of the pride of the old squire, of being one with the land, which no inhabitant of a town who purchases a landed estate may ever obtain. In the new colonies of settlers like America and Australia, this feeling for land is not found; land is a spoil which the invaders have taken, an article of trade and use.<sup>3)</sup> In these countries it is the growing understanding of the degree to which private ownership of land disturbs the equilibrium between the members of society, which creates the demand for severing the ownership of land from the use of land and for following Henry George's indications. But in the old Germanic countries there is something more in the hatred of the squire than anger at his greater riches, there is the bitterness that he has taken something which does not belong to him, but belongs to the whole

<sup>1)</sup> E. A. Ross, *The Outlines of Sociology*. 1923.

<sup>2)</sup> Spengler has made this fact the basis of his brilliant description of the formation of the State; his aristocratic views which are influenced by the "Junkerherrschaft" of Prussia are the expression of the view that the land-owning nobility stands as the representatives in which the soul and honour of the tribe live. "Der Untergang des Abendlandes" II; *Der Staat*, pp. 412—459.

<sup>3)</sup> E. A. Ross, *Opus cit.*; *The Grapple for Land*, pp. 237 ff.

people and is a necessary condition for its life, its national feeling, its honour, and its feeling of dignity. "This country is ours", is the living expression of the close connection which from olden days existed between the gregarious instinct and the territory. The peasant, who comes to replace the squire, becomes a cultivator like everybody else, but he must share his national feeling with the population of the cities and cannot ascribe any particular ownership of land to himself. The demand for the abolition of the private ownership of land by means of a land tax is therefore in the old Germanic countries supported by the feeling of common solidarity which prevails both in the towns and in the country. The historic circulation fulfils itself; the profound consciousness of the tribe that land belonged to it and that its existence and prosperity depended on the right to land of all the members of the tribe, awakes once more, and, when the private ownership of ground-rent is abolished, the source of the sickness and disturbed equilibrium of society goes with it.