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AN INQUIRY  
INTO THE  
PRINCIPLES  
OF  
POLITICAL ECONOMY.

BEING AN  
ESSAY ON THE SCIENCE  
OF



Domestic Policy in Free Nations.

IN WHICH ARE PARTICULARLY CONSIDERED

POPULATION, AGRICULTURE, TRADE,  
INDUSTRY, MONEY, COIN, INTEREST,  
CIRCULATION, BANKS, EXCHANGE,  
PUBLIC CREDIT, AND TAXES.

By Sir JAMES STEUART, Bart.

*Ore trahit quodcumque potest atque addit acervo.*

Hor. Lib. 1. Sat. 1.

V O L. I.



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M D C C X C V I.





## P R E F A C E.

**I**T is with the greatest diffidence that I present to the public this attempt towards reducing to principles, and forming into a regular science, the complicated interests of domestic policy. When I consider the time and labor employed in the composition, I am apt to value it from selfish considerations. When I compare it even with my own abilities, I still think favorably of it, for a better reason; because it contains a summary of the most valuable part of all my knowledge. But when I consider the greatness of my subject, how small does the result of my application appear!

The imperfections, therefore, discovered in this work, will, I hope, be ascribed to the disproportion between the extent of the undertaking, and that of my capacity. This has been exerted to the utmost: and if I have failed, it may, at least, with justice, be said, that I have miscarried in an attempt of the greatest importance to mankind.

I no where show the least desire to make my court to any particular statesman whose administration might have been hinted at. I freely follow the thread of my reasoning without a bias, either in favor of popular opinions, or of any of the numberless systems which have been formed by those who have written upon particular parts of my subject.

The warmth of my temper has led me often into commendations, when I was pleased; but when I felt the effects of ill humor on being dissatisfied with particular circumstances, relating to countries, to men, and to things, which I had in view at the time I was writing, I seldom thought it proper to be particular. I have, in general, considered the danger of error, either in blaming or commending the steps of any administration, without being well informed of the whole combination of circumstances which the statesman had before him at the time.

This composition being the successive labor of many years spent in travelling, the reader will find some passages in which the unities of time and place have not been observed. These I could have corrected with ease; had I not been advised to leave them as characters to point out the circumstances under which I wrote, and thereby to confirm the authenticity of certain facts.

The modes of thinking, also, peculiar to the several countries where I have lived, have, no doubt, had an influence on what I have writ concerning their customs: the work, therefore, will not, in general, correspond to the meridian of national opinions any where; and of this it is proper the reader should be apprized, that he may not apply to the domestic circumstances of his own country what was intended to refer to those of other nations; nor impute what was the irresistible effect of my experience and conviction, to wilful prejudice.

## P R E F A C E.

I have read many authors on the subject of political economy; and I have endeavoured to draw from them all the instruction I could. I have travelled, for many years, through different countries, and have examined them, constantly, with an eye to my own subject. I have attempted to draw information from every one with whom I have been acquainted: this, however, I found to be very difficult before I had attained to some previous knowledge of my subject. Such difficulties confirmed to me the justness of Lord Bacon's remark, that he who knows how to draw information by forming proper questions, is already possessed of half the science<sup>a</sup>.

I could form no consistent plan from the various opinions I met with: hence I was engaged to compile the observations I had casually made, in the course of my travels, reading, and experience. From these I formed the following work, after expunging the numberless inconsistencies and contradictions which I found had arisen from my separate inquiries into every particular branch.

I had observed so many persons declining in knowledge as they advanced in years, that I resolved early to throw upon paper whatever I had learned; and to this I used to have recourse, as others have to their memories. The unity of the object of all my speculations, rendered this practice more useful to

<sup>a</sup> *Prudens interrogatio, dimidium scientiæ.*

me than it would be to one whose researches are more extended.

Whoever is much accustomed to write for his own use merely, must contract a more careless style than another who has made language his study, and who writes in hopes of acquiring a literary reputation. I never, till very lately, thought of appearing as an author; and in the frequent perusals of what I had writ, my corrections were chiefly in favor of perspicuity: add to this, that the language in which I now write was, for many years, foreign to those with whom I lived and conversed. When these circumstances are combined with the intricacy of my subject, which constantly carried off my attention from every ornament of language, I flatter myself that those of my readers, at least, who enter as heartily as I have done into the spirit of this work, will candidly overlook the want of that elegance which adorns the style of some celebrated authors in this Augustan age. I present this inquiry to the public as nothing more than an essay which may serve as a canvass for better hands than mine to work upon.

It contains such observations only as the general view of the domestic policy of the countries I have seen, has suggested. It is a speculation, and no more. It is a rough drawing of a mighty plan, proportioned in correctness to my own sagacity, to my knowledge of the subject, and to the extent of my combinations.

It goes little farther than to collect and arrange some elements upon the most interesting branches of modern policy, such as *population, agriculture, trade, industry, money, coin, interest, circulation, banks, exchange, public credit, and taxes*. The principles deduced from all these topics, appear tolerably consistent; and the whole is a train of reasoning, through which I have adhered to the connexion of subjects as faithfully as I could: but the nature of the work being a deduction of principles, not a collection of institutions, I seized the opportunities which my reasoning threw in my way, to connect every principle, as I went along, with every part of the inquiry to which it could refer; and when I found the connexion sufficiently shown, I broke off such disquisitions as would have led me from the object then present.

When principles thus casually applied in one part to matters intended to be afterwards treated of in another, came to be taken up a-new, they involved me in what may appear prolixity. This I found most unavoidable, when I was led to thoughts which were new to myself, and consequently such as must cost me the greatest labor to set in a clear and distinct point of view. Had I been master of my subject on setting out, the arrangement of the whole would have been rendered more concise: but had this been the case, I should never have been able to go through the painful deduction which

forms the whole chain of my reasoning, and upon which, to many readers, flow in forming combinations, the conviction it carries along with it in a great measure depends: to the few, again, of a more penetrating genius to whom the slightest hint is sufficient to lay open every consequence before it be drawn, in allusion to Horace, I offer this apology, *Clarus esse laboro, prolixus fio.*

The path I have taken was new to me, after all I had read on the subject. I examined what I had gathered from others by my own principles; and according as I found it tally with collateral circumstances, I concluded in its favor. When, on the other hand, I found a disagreement, I was apprized immediately of some mistake: and this I found constantly owing to the narrowness of the combinations upon which it had been founded.

The great danger of running into error upon particular points relating to this subject, proceeds from our viewing them in a light too confined, and to our not attending to the influence of concomitant circumstances, which render general rules of little use. Men of parts and knowledge seldom fail to reason consequentially on every subject; but when their inquiries are connected with the complicated interests of society, the vivacity of an author's genius is apt to prevent him from attending to the variety of circumstances which render every consequence, almost, which he can draw, uncertain. To this I ascribe the habit of running into what the French call *Systemes*.



These are no more than a chain of contingent consequences, drawn from a few fundamental maxims, adopted, perhaps, rashly. Such systems are mere conceits; they mislead the understanding, and efface the path to truth. An induction is formed, from whence a conclusion, called a principle, is drawn; but this is no sooner done, than the author extends its influence far beyond the limits of the ideas present to his understanding, when he made his deduction.

The imperfection of language engages us frequently in disputes merely verbal; and instead of being on our guard against the many unavoidable ambiguities attending the most careful speech, we place a great part of our learning when at school, and of our wit when we appear on the stage of the world, in the prostitution of language. The learned delight in vague, and the witty in equivocal terms. In general, we familiarize ourselves so much with words, and think so little, when we speak and write, that the signs of our ideas take the place of the images which they were intended to represent.

Every true proposition, when understood, must be assented to *universally*. This is the case always, when simple ideas are affirmed or denied of each other. No body ever doubted that sound is the object of hearing, or color that of sight, or that black is not white. But whenever a dispute arises concerning a proposition, wherein complex ideas are com-

pared, we may often rest assured, that the parties do not understand each other. Luxury, says one, is incompatible with the prosperity of a state. Luxury is the fountain of a nation's welfare and happiness, says another. There may, in reality, be no difference in the sentiments of these two persons. The first may consider luxury as prejudicial to foreign trade, and as corrupting the morals of a people. The other may consider luxury as the means of providing employment for such as must live by their industry, and of promoting an equable circulation of wealth and subsistence, through all the classes of inhabitants. If each of them had attended to the combination of the other's complex idea of luxury, with all its consequences, they would have rendered their propositions less general.

The difference, therefore, of opinion between men is frequently more apparent than real. When we compare our own ideas, we constantly see their relations with perspicuity; but when we come to communicate those relations to other people, it is often impossible to put them into words sufficiently expressive of the precise combination we have made in our own minds.

This being the case, I have avoided, as much as possible, condemning such opinions as I have taken the liberty to review; because I have examined such only as have been advanced by men of genius and reputation: and since all matters of controversy regard the comparison of our *ideas*, if the terms we use

to express them were sufficiently understood by both parties, most political disputes would, I am persuaded, be soon at an end.

Here it may be objected, that we frequently adopt an opinion, without being able to give a sufficient reason for it, and yet we cannot gain upon ourselves to give it up, though we find it combated by the strongest arguments.

To this I answer, that in such cases we do not adhere to our own opinions, but to those of others, received upon trust. It is our regard for the authority, and not for the opinion, which makes us tenacious; for if the opinion were truly our own, we could not fail of seeing, or at least we should not long be at a loss in recollecting the ground upon which it is built. But when we assent implicitly to any political doctrine, there is no room for reason: we then satisfy ourselves with the persuasion that those whom we trust have sufficient reasons for what they advance. While our assent therefore is implicit, we are beyond conviction; not because we do not perceive the force of the arguments brought against our opinion, but because we are ignorant of the force of those which can be brought to support it: and as no body will sell what belongs to him, without being previously informed of its value, so no body will give up an implicit opinion, without knowing all that can be said for it. To this class of men I do not address myself in my inquiries.

But I insensibly run into a metaphysical speculation, to prove, that in political questions, it is better for people to judge from experience and reason, than from authority; to explain their terms, than to dispute about words; and to extend their combinations, than to follow conceits, however decorated with the name of systems. How far I have avoided such defects, the reader will determine.

Every writer values himself upon his impartiality; because he is not sensible of his faults. The wandering and independent life I have led may naturally have set me free, in some measure, from strong attachments to popular opinions. This may be called impartiality. But as no man can be deemed impartial, who leans to any side whatever, I have been particularly on my guard against the consequences of his sort of negative impartiality, as I have found it sometimes carrying me too far from that to which a national prejudice might have led me.

In discussing general points, the best method I found to maintain a just balance in that respect, was to avert my eye from the country in which I lived at the time; and to judge of absent things by the absent. Objects which are present, are apt to produce perceptions too strong to be impartially compared with those recalled only by memory.

When I have had occasion to dip into any question concerning the preference to be given to certain forms of government above others, and to touch upon points which have been the object of sharp

disputes, I have given my opinion with freedom, when it seemed proper: and in stating the question, I have endeavoured to avoid all trite, and, as I may call them, technical terms of party, which are of no other use than to assist the disputants in their attempts to blacken each other, and to throw dust in the eyes of their readers.

I have sometimes entered so heartily into the spirit of the statesman, that I have been apt to forget my situation in the society in which I live; and when the private man reads over the politician, his natural partiality in favor of individuals, leads him to condemn, as Machiavellian principles, every sentiment approving the sacrifice of private concerns, in favor of a general plan.

In order, therefore, to reconcile me to myself in this particular, and to prevent certain expressions, here and there interspersed, from making the slightest impression upon a reader of delicate sentiments, I must observe, that nothing would have been so easy as to soften many passages, where the politician appears to have snatched the pen out of the hand of the private citizen: but as I write for such only who can follow a close reasoning, and attend to the general scope of the whole inquiry, I have, purposely, made no correction; but continued painting in the strongest colors; every inconvenience which must affect certain individuals living under our free modern governments, whenever a wise statesman sets about correcting old abuses, pro-

ceeding from idleness, sloth, or fraud in the lower classes, arbitrary jurisdictions in the higher, and neglects in administrations, with respect to the interests of both. The more any cure is painful and dangerous the more ought men to be careful in avoiding the disease. This leads me to say a word concerning the connexion between the theory of morals and that of politics.

I lay it down as a general maxim, that the characteristic of a good action consists in the conformity between the motive, and the duty of the agent. If there were but one man upon earth, his duty would contain no other precepts than those dictated by self-love. If he comes to be a father, a husband, a friend, his self-love falls immediately under limitations: he must withhold from himself, and give to his children; he must know how to sacrifice some of his fancies, in order to gratify, now and then, those of his wife or of his friend. If he comes to be a judge, a magistrate, he must frequently forget that he is a friend, or a father: and if he rises to be a statesman, he must disregard many other attachments more comprehensive, such as family, place of birth, and even, in certain cases, his native country. His duty here becomes relative to the general good of that society of which he is the head: and as the death of a criminal cannot be imputed to the judge who condemns him, neither can a particular inconvenience resulting to an individual, in consequence of a step

taken for a general reformation, be imputed to him who sits at the helm of government.

If it should be asked, of what utility a speculation such as this can be to a statesman, to whom it is in a manner addressed from the beginning to the end: I answer, that although it seems addressed to a statesman, the real object of the inquiry is to influence the spirit of those whom he governs; and the variety of matter contained in it, may even suggest useful hints to himself. But his own genius and experience will enable him to carry such notions far beyond the reach of my combinations.

I have already said that I considered my work as no more than a canvass prepared for more able hands than mine to work upon. Now although the sketch it contains be not sufficiently correct, I have still made some progress, I think, in preparing the way for others to improve upon my plan, by contriving proper questions to be resolved by men of experience in the practical part of government.

I leave it therefore to masters in the science to correct and extend my ideas: and those who have not made the principles of policy their particular study, may have an opportunity of comparing the exposition I have given of them with the commonly received opinions concerning many questions of great importance to society. They will, for instance, be able to judge how far population can be increased usefully, by multiplying marriages, and by dividing

lands: how far the swelling of capitals, cities and towns, tends to depopulate a country: how far the progress of luxury brings distress upon the poor industrious man: how far restrictions laid upon the corn-trade, tend to promote an ample supply of subsistence in all our markets: how far the increase of public debts tends to involve us in a general bankruptcy: how far the abolition of paper-currency would have the effect of reducing the price of all commodities: how far a tax tends to enhance their value: and how far the diminution of duties is an essential requisite for securing the liberty, and promoting the prosperity and happiness of a people.

Is it not of the greatest importance to examine, with candor, the operations by which all Europe has been engaged in a system of policy so generally declaimed against, and so contrary to that which we hear daily recommended as the best? And to show, from the plain principles of common sense, that our present situation is the unavoidable consequence of the spirit and manners of the present times, and that it is quite compatible with all the liberty, affluence, and prosperity, which any human society ever enjoyed in any age, or under any form of government? A people taught to expect from a statesman the execution of plans, big with impossibility and contradiction, will remain discontented under the government of the best of Kings.



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
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AN INQUIRY  
INTO THE  
PRINCIPLES  
OF  
POLITICAL ECONOMY.



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B O O K I.  
OF POPULATION AND AGRICULTURE.

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I N T R O D U C T I O N .

**E**CONOMY in general is the art of providing for all the wants of a family, with prudence and frugality.

If any thing necessary or useful is found wanting, if any thing provided is lost or misapplied, if any servant, any animal, is supernumerary or useless, if any one sick or infirm is neglected, we immediately perceive a want of economy. The object of it, in a private family, is therefore to provide for the nourishment, the other wants, and the employment of every individual. In the first place, for the master, who is the head, and who directs the whole; next for the children, who interest him

above all other things; and last for the servants, who being useful to the head, and essential to the well-being of the family, have therefore a title to become an object of the master's care and concern.

The whole economy must be directed by the head, who is both lord and steward of the family. It is however necessary, that these two offices be not confounded with one another. As lord, he establishes the laws of his economy; as steward, he puts them in execution. As lord, he may restrain and give his commands to all within the house as he thinks proper; as steward, he must conduct with gentleness and address, and is bound by his own regulations. The better the economist, the more uniformity is perceived in all his actions, and the less liberties are taken to depart from stated rules. He is no ways master to break through the laws of his economy, although in every respect he may keep each individual within the house, in the most exact subordination to his commands. Economy and government; even in a private family, present therefore two different ideas, and have also two different objects.

What economy is in a family, political economy is in a state: with these essential differences however, that in a state there are no servants, all are children: that a family may be formed when and how a man pleases, and he may establish what plan of economy he thinks fit; but states are found formed, and the economy of these depends upon a thousand circumstances. The statesman (this is a general term to signify the head, according to



the form of government) is neither master to establish what economy he pleases, or in the exercise of his sublime authority to overturn at will the established laws of it, let him be the most despotic monarch upon earth.

The great art therefore of political economy is, first to adapt the different operations of it to the spirit, manners, habits, and customs of the people, and afterwards to model these circumstances so, as to be able to introduce a set of new and more useful institutions.

The principal object of this science is to secure a certain fund of subsistence for all the inhabitants, to obviate every circumstance which may render it precarious; to provide every thing necessary for supplying the wants of the society, and to employ the inhabitants) supposing them to be freemen) in such a manner as naturally to create reciprocal relations and dependencies between them, so as to make their several interests lead them to supply one another with their reciprocal wants.

If one considers the variety which is found in different countries, in the distribution of property, subordination of classes, genius of people, proceeding from the variety of forms of government, laws, and manners, one may conclude, that the political economy in each must necessarily be different, and that principles, however universally true, may become quite ineffectual in practice, without a sufficient preparation of the spirit of a people.

It is the business of a statesman to judge of the expediency of different schemes of economy, and

by degrees to model the minds of his subjects so as to induce them, from the allurements of private interest, to concur in the execution of his plan.

The speculative person, who removed from the practice, extracts the principles of this science from *observation* and *reflection*, should divest himself, as far as possible, of every prejudice, in favor of established opinions, however reasonable, when examined relatively to particular nations: he must do his utmost to become a citizen of the world, comparing customs, examining minutely institutions which appear alike, when in different countries they are found to produce different effects: he should examine the cause of such differences with the utmost diligence and attention. It is from such inquiries that the true principles are discovered.

He who takes up the pen upon this subject, keeping in his eye the customs of his own or any other country, will fall more naturally into a description of one particular system of it, than into an examination of the principles of the science in general: he will applaud such institutions as he finds rightly administered at home; he will condemn those which are administered with abuse; but, without comparing different methods of executing the same plan in different countries, he will not easily distinguish the disadvantages which are essential to the institution, from those which proceed from the abuse. For this reason a land tax excites the indignation of a Frenchman, an excise that of an Englishman. One who looks into the execution of both, in each country, and in every branch of management,

will discover the real effects of these impositions, and be able to distinguish what proceeds from abuse, from what is essential to the burden.

Nothing is more effectual towards preparing the spirit of a people to receive a good plan of economy, than a proper representation of it. On the other hand, nothing is better calculated to keep the statesman, who is at the head of affairs, in awe.

When principles are well understood, the real consequences of burdensome institutions are clearly seen: when the purposes they are intended for, are not obtained, the abuse of the statesman's administration appears palpable. People then will not so much cry out against the imposition, as against the misapplication. It will not be a land tax of four shillings in the pound, nor an excise upon wines and tobacco, which will excite the murmurs of a nation; it will be the prodigal dissipation and misapplication of the amount of these taxes after they are laid on. But when principles are not known, all inquiry is at an end, the moment a nation can be engaged to submit to the burden. It is the same with regard to every other part of this science.

Having pointed out the object of my pursuit, I shall only add, that my intention is to attach myself principally to a clear deduction of principles, and a short application of them to familiar examples, in order to avoid abstraction as much as possible. I farther intend to confine myself to such parts of this extensive subject, as shall appear the most interesting in the general system of modern politics, of which I shall treat with that spirit of liberty, which reigns

more and more every day, throughout all the polite and flourishing nations of Europe.

When I compare the elegant performances which have appeared in Great Britain, and in France with my dry and abstracted manner of treating the same subject, in a plain language void of ornament, I own I am discouraged on many accounts. If I am obliged to set out by laying down as fundamental principles the most obvious truths, I dread the imputation of pedantry, and of pretending to turn common sense into science. If I follow these principles through a minute detail, I may appear trifling. I therefore hope the reader will believe me, when I tell him, that these defects have not escaped my discernment, but that my genius, the nature of the work, and the connexion of the subject, have obliged me to write in an order and in a style where every thing has been sacrificed to perspicuity.

My principal aim shall be to discover truth, and to enable my reader to touch the very link of the chain where I may at any time go astray.

My business shall not be to seek for new thoughts, but to reason consequentially; and if any thing new be found, it will be in the conclusions.

Long steps in political reasoning lead to error; close reasoning is tedious, and to many appears trivial: this however must be my plan, and my consolation is, that the further I advance, I shall become the more interesting.

Every supposition must be considered as strictly relative to the circumstances presupposed; and though, in order to prevent misapplication, and

to avoid abstraction as much as possible, I frequently make use of examples for illustrating every principle; yet these, which are taken from matters of fact, must be supposed divested of every foreign circumstance inconsistent with the supposition.

I shall combat no particular opinion in such intricate matters; though sometimes I may pass them in review, in order to point out how I am led to differ from them.

I pretend to form no system, but by following out a succession of principles, consistent with the nature of man and with one another, I shall endeavour to furnish some materials towards the forming of a good one.

## C H A P. I.

*Of the Government of Mankind.*

**M**AN we find acting uniformly in all ages, in all countries, and in all climates, from the principles of self-interest, expediency, duty, or passion. In this he is alike, in nothing else.

These motives of human actions produce such a variety of combinations, that if we consider the several species of animals in the creation, we shall find the individuals in no class so unlike to one another, as man to man. No wonder then if people differ in opinion with regard to every thing which relates to man.

As this noble animal is a sociable creature, both from necessity and inclination, we also find, in all ages, climates and countries, a certain modification of government and subordination established among them. Here again we are presented with as great variety as there are different societies; all however agreeing in this, that the end of a *voluntary* subordination to authority is with a view to promote the general good.

Constant and uninterrupted experience has proved to man, that virtue and justice in those who govern, are sufficient to render the society happy, under any form of government. Virtue and justice when applied to government mean no more than a tender affection for the whole society, and an exact and impartial regard for the interest of every class.

All actions, and indeed all things, are good or bad only by relation. Nothing is so complex as relations when considered with regard to a society, and nothing is so difficult as to discover truth when involved and blended with these relations.

We must not conclude from this, that every operation of government becomes problematical and uncertain as to its consequences: some are evidently good; others are notoriously bad: the middle terms are always the least essential, and the more complex they appear to a discerning eye, the more trivial they are found to be in their immediate consequences.

A government must be continually in action, and one principal object of its attention must be, the consequences and effects of new institutions.

Experience alone will show, what human prudence could not foresee; and mistakes must be corrected as often as expediency requires.

All governments have what they call their fundamental laws; but fundamental, that is, invariable laws, can never subsist among men, the most variable thing we know: the only fundamental law, *salus populi*, must ever be relative, like every other thing. But this is rather a maxim than a law.

It is however expedient, nay absolutely necessary, that in every state, certain laws be supposed fundamental and invariable: both to serve as a curb to the ambition of individuals, and to point out to the statesman the out-lines, or sketch of that plan of government, which experience has proved to be the best adapted to the spirit of his people.

Such laws may even be considered as actually invariable, while a state subsists without convulsions or revolutions: because then the alterations are so gradual, that they become imperceptible to all, but the most discerning, who compare the customs and manners of the same people in different periods of time and under different combinations of circumstances.

As we have taken for granted the fundamental maxim, that every operation of government should be calculated for the good of the people, so we may with equal certainty decide, that in order to make a people happy, they must be governed according to the spirit which prevails among them.

I am next to explain what I mean by the spirit of a people, and to show how far this spirit must be made to influence the government of every society.

## C H A P. II.

### *Of the Spirit of a People.*

**T**HE spirit of a people is formed upon a set of received opinions relative to three objects; morals, government, and manners: these once generally adopted by any society, confirmed by long and constant habit, and never called in question, form the basis of all laws, regulate the form of every government, and determine what is commonly called the customs of a country.

To know a people we must examine them under



those general heads. We acquire the knowledge of their morals with ease, by consulting the tenets of their religion, and from what is taught among them by authority and under direction.

The second, or government, is more disguised, as it is constantly changing from circumstances, partly resulting from domestic and partly from foreign considerations. A thorough knowledge of their history, and conversation with their statesmen, may give one, who has access to these helps, a very competent knowledge of this branch.

The last, or the knowledge of the manners of a people, is by far the most difficult to acquire, and yet is the most open to every person's observation.

Certain circumstances with regard to manners are supposed by every one in the country to be so well known, so generally followed and observed, that it seldom occurs to any body to inform a stranger concerning them. In one country nothing is so injurious as a stroke with a stick, or even a gesture which implies a design or a desire to strike\*: in another a stroke is nothing, but an opprobrious expression is not to be borne †. An innocent liberty with the fair sex, which in one country passes without censure, is looked upon in another as the highest indignity §. In general, the opinion of a people with regard to injuries is established by custom only, and nothing is more necessary in government, than an exact attention to every circumstance peculiar to the people to be governed.

\* France.

† Germany.

§ S. in.

The kingdom of Spain was lost for a violence committed upon chastity\*; the city of Genoa for a blow †; the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily have ever been ready to revolt; because having been for many ages under the dominion of strangers, the people have never been governed according to the true spirit of their manners. Let us consult the revolutions of all countries, and we shall find, that the most trivial circumstances have had a greater influence on the event, than the more weighty reasons, which are always set forth as the real motives. I need not enlarge upon this subject, my intention is only to suggest an idea which any one may pursue, and which will be applied upon many occasions as we go along; for there is no treating any point which regards the political economy of a nation, without accompanying the example with some supposition relative to the spirit of the people. I return.

I have said, that the most difficult thing to learn concerning a people, is the spirit of their manners. Consequently, the most difficult thing for a stranger to adopt, is their manner. Men acquire the language, nay even lose the foreign accent, before they lose the oddity of their manner. The reason is plain. The inclinations must be changed, the taste of amusement must be new modelled; established maxims

\* By Roderigo, the last king of the Gothic line.

† Given by an Austrian officer to a Genoese, which occasioned the revolt in 1747, by which the Germans were expelled the city.

upon government, manners, nay even upon some moral actions, must undergo certain new modifications, before the stranger's conversation and behaviour becomes consistent with the spirit of the people with whom he lives.

From these considerations, we may find the reason, why nothing is more heavy to bear than the government of conquerors, in spite of all their endeavours to render themselves agreeable to the conquered. Of this experience has ever proved the truth, and princes are so much persuaded of it, that when a country is subdued in our days, or when it otherwise changes masters, there is seldom any question of altering, but by very slow degrees and length of time, the established laws and customs of the inhabitants. I might safely say, there is no form of government upon earth so excellent in itself, as, necessarily, to make the people happy under it. Freedom itself, *imposed* upon a people groaning under the greatest slavery, will not make them happy, unless it is made to undergo certain modifications, relative to their established habits.

Having explained what I mean by the spirit of a people, I come next to consider, how far this spirit must influence government.

If governments be taken in general, we shall find them analogous to the spirit of the people. But the point under consideration is, how a statesman is to proceed, when expediency and refinement require a change of administration, or when it becomes necessary from a change of circumstances.

The great alteration in the affairs of Europe within

these three centuries, by the discovery of America and the Indies, the springing up of industry and learning, the introduction of trade and the luxurious arts, the establishment of public credit, and a general system of taxation, have entirely altered the plan of government every where.

From feudal and military, it is become free and commercial. I oppose freedom in government to the feudal system, only to mark that there is not found now, that chain of subordination among the subjects, which made the essential part of the feudal form. The head there had little power, and the lower classes of the people little liberty. Now every industrious man, who lives with economy, is free and independent, under most forms of government. Formerly, the power of the barons swallowed up the independency of all inferior classes. I oppose commercial to military, only because the military governments now are made to subsist from the consequences and effects of commerce: that is, from the revenue of the state, proceeding from taxes. Formerly, every thing was brought about by numbers; now, numbers of men cannot be kept together without money.

This is sufficient to point out the nature of the revolution in the political state, and of consequence in the manners of Europe.

The spirit of a people changes no doubt of itself, but by slow degrees. The same generation commonly adheres to the same principles, and retains the same spirit. In every country we find two generations upon the stage at a time; that is to say,

we may distribute into two classes the spirit which prevails; the one amongst men between twenty and thirty, when opinions are forming; the other of those who are past fifty, when opinions and habits are formed and confirmed. A person of judgment and observation may foresee many things relative to government, from an exact application to the rise and progress of new customs and opinions, provided he preserve his mind free from all attachments and prejudices, in favor of those which he himself has adopted, and in that delicacy of sensation necessary to perceive the influence of a change of circumstances. This is the genius proper to form a great statesman.

In every new step the spirit of the people should be first examined, and if that be not found ripe for the execution of the plan, it ought to be put off, kept entirely secret, and every method used to prepare the people to relish the innovation.

The project of introducing popery into England was blown before it was put in practice, and so misgave. Queen Elizabeth kept her own secret, and succeeded in a similar attempt. The scheme of a general excise was pushed with too much vivacity, was made a matter of party, ill-timed, and the people nowise prepared for it; hence it will be the more difficult to bring about at another time, without the greatest precautions.

In turning and working upon the spirit of a people, nothing is impossible to an able statesman. When a people can be engaged to murder their wives and children, and burn themsel-

ves, rather than submit to a foreign enemy, when they can be brought to give their most precious effects, their ornaments of gold and silver, for the support of a common cause; when women are brought to give their hair to make ropes, and the most decrepit old men to mount the walls of a town for its defence; I think I may say, that by properly conducting and managing the spirit of a people, nothing is impossible to be accomplished. But when I say, nothing is impossible, I must be understood to mean, that nothing essentially necessary for the good of the people is impossible; and this is all that is required in government.

That it requires a particular talent in a statesman to dispose the minds of a people to approve even of the scheme which is the most conducive to their interest and prosperity, appears from this; that we see examples of wise, rich and powerful nations languishing in inactivity, at a time when every individual is animated with a quite contrary spirit; becoming a prey to their enemies, like the city of Jerusalem, while they are taken up with their domestic animosities, only because the remedies proposed against these evils contradict the spirit of the times\*.

The great art of governing is to divest one's self of prejudices and attachments to particular opinions, particular classes, and above all to particular persons; to consult the spirit of the people, to give way to it in appearance and in so doing to give it a turn capable of

\* This was writ in the year 1759, about the time the island of Minorca was taken by the French.

inspiring

those sentiments which may induce them to relish the change, which an alteration of circumstances has rendered necessary.

Can any change be greater among free men, than from a state of absolute liberty and independency to become subject to constraint in the most trivial actions? This change has however taken place over all Europe within these three hundred years, and yet we think ourselves more free than ever our fathers were. Formerly a gentleman who enjoyed a bit of land knew not what it was to have any demand made upon him, but in virtue of obligations by himself contracted. He disposed of the fruits of the earth, and of the labor of his servants or vassals, as he thought fit. Every thing was bought, sold, transferred, transported, modified, and composed, for private consumption, or for public use, without ever the state's being once found interested in what was doing. This, I say, was formerly the general situation of Europe, among free nations under a regular administration; and the only impositions commonly known to affect landed men were made in consequence of a contract of subordination, feudal or other, which had certain limitations; and the impositions were appropriated for certain purposes.

Daily experience shows, that nothing is more against the inclinations of a people, than the imposition of taxes; and the less they are accustomed to them, the more difficult it is to get them established.

The great abuse of governors in the application of taxes contributes not a little to augment and entertain this repugnancy in the governed: but besides abuse,

there is often too little management used to prepare the spirits of the people for such innovations: for we see them upon many occasions submitting with cheerfulness to very heavy impositions, provided they be well-timed, and consistent with their manners and disposition. A French gentleman, who cannot bear the thought of being put upon a level with a peasant in paying a land tax, pays contentedly, in time of war, a general tax upon all his effects, under a different name. To pay for your head is terrible in one country; to pay for light appears as terrible in another.

It often happens, that statesmen take the hint of new impositions from the example of other nations, and not from a nice examination of their own domestic circumstances. But when these are rightly attended to, it becomes easy to discover the means of executing the same plan, in a way quite adapted to the spirit, temper, and circumstances of the people. When strangers are employed as statesmen, the disorder is still greater, unless in cases of most extraordinary penetration, temper, and above all flexibility and discretion.

Statesmen have sometimes recourse to artifice instead of reason, because their intentions often are not upright. This destroys all confidence between them and the people; and confidence is necessary when you are in a manner obliged to ask a favor, or when at least what you demand is not indisputably your right. A people thus tricked into an imposition, though expedient for their prosperity, will oppose violently, at another time, a like measure, even when essential to their preservation.



At other times, we see statesmen presenting the allurements of present ease, precisely at the time when people's minds are best disposed to receive a burden. I mean when war threatens, and when the mind is heated with a resentment of injuries. Is it not wonderful, at such a time as this, to increase taxes only in proportion to the interest of money wanted; does not this imply a short-sightedness, or at least an indifference as to what is to come? Is it not more natural, that a people should consent to come under burdens to gratify revenge, than submit to repay a large debt when their minds are in a state of tranquillity.

From the examples I have given, I hope what I mean by the spirit of a people is sufficiently understood, and I think I have abundantly shown the necessity of its being properly disposed, in order to establish a right plan of economy. This is so true, that many examples may be found, of a people's rejecting the most beneficial institutions, and even the greatest favors, only because some circumstance had shocked their established customs. No wonder then, if we see them refuse to come under limitations, restraints and burdens, when the utmost they can be flattered with from them, is a distant prospect of national good.

I have found it necessary to premise these general reflexions, in order to obviate many objections which might naturally enough occur in the perusal of this inquiry. I shall have occasion to make a number of suppositions, and to draw consequences from them, which are abundantly natural, if a proper

spirit in the people be presupposed, but which would be far from being natural without this supposition. I suppose, for example, that a poor man, loaded with many children, would be glad to have the state maintain them; that another, who has wasted lands, would be obliged to one who would gratuitously build him a farm-house upon it. Yet in both suppositions I may prove mistaken; for fathers there are, who would rather see their children dead than out of their hands; and proprietors are to be found, who, for the sake of hunting, would lay the finest country in Europe into a waste.

In order to communicate an adequate idea of what I understand by political economy, I have explained the term, by pointing out the object of the art; which is, to provide food, other necessaries, and employment to every one of the society.

This is a very simple and a very general method of defining a most complicated operation.

To provide a proper employment for all the members of a society, is the same as to model and conduct every branch of their concerns.

Upon this idea, I think, may be formed the most extensive basis for an inquiry into the principles of political economy.

The next thing to be done, is to fall upon a distinct method of analyzing so extensive a subject, by contriving a train of ideas, which may be directed towards every part of the plan, and which, at the same time, may be made to arise methodically from one another.

For this purpose I have taken a hint from what the late revolutions in the politics of Europe have pointed out to be the regular progress of mankind, from great simplicity to complicated refinement.

This first book shall then set out by taking up society in the cradle, as I may say. I shall then examine the principles which influence their multiplication, the method of providing for their subsistence, the origin of their labor, the effects of their liberty and slavery, the distribution of them into classes, with some other topics which relate to mankind in general.

Here we shall find the principles of industry influencing the multiplication of mankind, and the cultivation of the soil. This I have thrown in on purpose to prepare my reader for the subject of the second book; where he will find the same principle (under the wings of liberty) providing an easy subsistence for a numerous populace, by the means of trade, which sends the labor of an industrious people over the whole world.

From the experience of what has happened these last two hundred years, we find to what a pitch the trade and industry of Europe has increased alienations, and the circulation of money. I shall, therefore, closely adhere to these, as the most immediate consequences of the preceding improvement; and, by analyzing them, I shall form my third book, in which I intend to treat of credit.

We see also how credit has engaged nations to avail themselves of it in their wars, and how, by the use of it, they have been led to contract

debts; which they never can satisfy and pay, without imposing taxes. The doctrine then of debts and taxes will very naturally follow that of credit in this great chain of political consequences

By this kind of historical clue, I shall conduct myself through the great avenues of this extensive labyrinth; and in my review of every particular district, I shall step from consequence to consequence, until I have penetrated into the utmost recesses of my own understanding.

When a subject is broken off, I shall render my transitions as gradual as I can, by still preserving some chain of connexion; and although I cannot flatter myself (in such infinite variety of choice, as to order and distribution) to hit off, at all times, that method, which may appear to every reader the most natural and the most correct, yet I shall spare no pains in casting the materials into different forms, so as to make the best distribution of them in my power.

### C H A P. III.

*Upon what Principles, and from what natural Causes do Mankind multiply? And what are the effects of Procreation in Countries where Numbers are not found to increase?*

**T**HE multiplication of mankind has been treated of in different ways; some have made out tables to show the progression of multiplications; others

have treated the question historically. The state of numbers in different ages of the world, or in different countries at different times, has been made the object of inquiry; and the most exact scrutiny into ancient authors, the means of investigating the truth of this matter. All passages relative to the subject have been laid together, and accompanied with glosses and interpretations the most plausible, in order to determine the main question. The elaborate performances of Mr. Hume, and Mr. Wallace, who have adopted opposite opinions in regard to the populousness of the ancient world, have left nothing new to be said upon this subject; at least the application they appear to have given in examining the ancients, is a great discouragement to any one who might otherwise still flatter himself, there, to find out circumstances proper to cast a new light upon the question.

My intention in this chapter is not to decide, nor even to give my opinion upon that matter, far less to combat the arguments advanced on either side. I am to consider the question under a different point of view; not to inquire what numbers of people were found upon the earth at a certain time, but to examine the natural and rational causes of multiplication. If we can discover these, we may perhaps be led to judge how far they might have operated in different ages and in different countries.

The fundamental principle of the multiplication of all animals, and consequently of man, is generation; the next is food: generation gives existence,

food preserves it. Did the earth produce of itself the proper nourishment for man, with unlimited abundance, we should find no occasion to labor in order to procure it. Now in all countries found inhabited, as in those which have been found desolate, if the state of animals be inquired into, the number of them will be found in proportion to the quantity of food produced by the earth, *regularly throughout the year*, for their subsistence. I say, *regularly throughout the year*, because we perceive in those animals which produce in great abundance, such as all the feathered genus, that vast multitudes are destroyed in winter; they are brought forth with the fruits of the earth, and fall in proportion. This principle is so natural, that I think it can hardly be controverted.

As to man, the earth does not spontaneously produce nourishment for him in any considerable degree. I allow that as some species of animals support life by devouring others, so may man; but it must be observed, that the species feeding must always be much inferior in number to the species fed upon. This is evident in reason and in fact.

Were the earth therefore uncultivated, the numbers of mankind would not exceed the proportion of the spontaneous fruits which she offers for their immediate use, or for that of the animals which might be the proper nourishment of man.

There is therefore a certain number of mankind which the earth would be able to maintain without any labor: allow me to call this quantity (A). Does

it not, from this exposition of the matter, appear plain, that without labor (A) never can increase any more than animals, which do not work for themselves, can increase beyond the proportion of food provided for them by nature? Let it be however observed, that I do not pretend to limit (A) to a determined number. The seasons will no doubt influence the numbers of mankind, as we see they influence the plenty of other animals; but I say (A) will never increase beyond the fixed proportion above-mentioned.

Having resolved one question with regard to multiplication, and shown that numbers must become greater or smaller according to the productions of nature, I come to the second thing proposed to be treated of in the chapter: to wit, what will become of the generative faculty after it has produced the full proportion of (A), and what effects will afterwards follow.

We see how beneficent, I might have said prodigal, nature is, in bestowing life by generation. Several kinds of animals, especially insects, multiply by thousands, and yet the species does not appear annually to increase. No body can pretend that particular individuals of any species have a privilege to live, and that others die from a difference in their nature. It is therefore reasonable to conclude, that what destroys such vast quantities of those produced, must be, among other causes, the want of food. Let us apply this to man,

Those who are supposed to be fed with the spontaneous fruits of the earth, cannot, from what has

been said, multiply beyond that proportion; at the same time the generative faculty will work its natural effects in augmenting numbers. The consequence will be, that certain individuals must become worse fed, consequently weaker; consequently, if in that weakly state, nature should withhold a part of her usual plenty, the whole multitude will be affected by it; a disease may take place, and sweep off a far greater number than that proportioned to the deficiency of the season. What results from this? That those who have escaped, finding food more plentiful, become vigorous and strong; generation gives life to additional numbers, food preserves it, until they rise up to the former standard.

Thus the generative faculty resembles a spring loaded with a weight, which always exerts itself in proportion to the diminution of resistance: when food has remained some time without augmentation or diminution, generation will carry numbers as high as possible; if then food come to be diminished, the spring is overpowered; the force of it becomes less than nothing. Inhabitants will diminish, at least, in proportion to the overcharge. If upon the other hand, food be increased, the spring which stood at 0, will begin to exert itself in proportion as the resistance diminishes; people will begin to be better fed; they will multiply, and in proportion as they increase in numbers, the food will become scarce again.

I must here subjoin a remark very analogous to this subject. That the generative faculty in man (which we have compared to a spring) and the care



and love we have for our children, first prompt us to multiply, and then engage us to divide what we have with our little ones. Thus from dividing and subdividing it happens, that in every country where food is limited to a certain quantity, the inhabitants must be subsisted in a regular progression, descending down from plenty and ample subsistence, to the last periods of want, and even sometimes starving for hunger.

Although the examples of this last extremity are not common in some countries, yet I believe they are more so than is generally imagined; and the other stages of want are productive of many diseases, and of a decay which extinguishes the faculty of generation, or which weakens it, so as to produce children less vigorous and less healthy. I appeal to experience, if this reasoning be not just.

Put two or three pairs of rabbits into a field proper for them, the multiplication will be rapid; and in a few years the warren will be stocked: you may take yearly from it a hundred pairs, I shall suppose, and keep your warren in good order: give over taking any for some years, you will perhaps find your original stock rather diminished than increased, for the reasons above mentioned. Africa yearly furnishes many thousands for the cultivation of America; in this she resembles the warren. I have little doubt but that if all her sons were returned to her, by far the greater part would die of hunger.

## C H A P. IV.

*Continuation of the same Subject, with regard to the natural and immediate effects of Agriculture, as to Population.*

**I** PROCEED in my examination. I now suppose man to add his labor and industry to the natural activity of the soil: in so far, as by this he produces an additional quantity of food, in so far he lays a foundation for the maintenance of an additional number. This number I shall call (B). From this I conclude, that as (A) is in a constant proportion to the spontaneous fruits, so (B) must be in proportion to agriculture (by this term I understand at present every method of augmenting food by labor) consequently the number maintained by the labor of mankind must be to the whole number of mankind as (B) is to (A + B), or as (B) is to (A) and (B) jointly.

By this operation we find mankind immediately divided into two classes; those who, without working, live upon the spontaneous fruits of the earth; that is upon milk, cattle, hunting, &c. The other part, those who are obliged to labor the soil. It is proper next to inquire what should naturally oblige a man to labor; and what are the natural consequences of it as to multiplication.

We have already said, that the principle of generation is inherent in man, and prompts him to multiply. Another principle, as naturally inherent

in the mind, as the first is in the body, is self-love, or a desire of ease and happiness, which prompts those who find in themselves any superiority, whether personal, or political, to make use of every natural advantage. Consequently, such will multiply proportionably: because by appropriating to themselves the fruits of the earth, they have the means of subsisting their offspring. The others, I think, will very naturally become their servants; as this method is of all others the most easy to procure subsistence. This is so analogous to the nature of man, that we see every where, even among children, that the smallest superiority in any one over the rest, constantly draws along with it a tribute of service in one way or other. Those who become servants for the sake of food, will soon become slaves: for slavery is but the abuse of service, established by a civil institution; and men who find no possibility of subsisting otherwise, will be obliged to serve upon the conditions prescribed to them.

This seems a consequence not unnatural in the infancy of the world: yet I do not pretend to affirm that this was the origin of slavery. Servants, however, there have always been; and the abuse of service is what we understand by slavery. The subordination of children to their parents, and of servants to their masters, seems to be the most rational origin of society and government. The first of these is natural, and follows as the unavoidable consequence of an entire dependance: the second is political, and may very naturally take place as to those who cannot otherwise procure subsistence. This last

species of subordination may, I think, have taken place, the moment man became obliged to labor for subsistence, but no sooner.

The wants of man are not confined to food merely. When food is to be produced from the rude surface of the earth, a great part of his time must be taken up with this object, even supposing him to be provided with every utensil proper for the exercise of his industry: he must therefore be in a worse condition to provide for his other wants: consequently, he may be willing to serve any one who will do it for him. Whereas on the other hand, if we suppose all mankind idle and fed, living upon the spontaneous fruits of the earth, the plan of universal liberty becomes quite natural: because under such circumstances they find no inducement to come under a voluntary subordination.

Let us now borrow the idea of a primitive society, of a government, of a king, from the most ancient history we have, the better to point out the effects of agriculture and multiplication. The society is the whole taken together; it is Jacob, his sons, their wives, their children, and all the servants. The government regards the institutions prescribed by Jacob, to every one of the family, concerning their respective subordination and duty. Multiplication will here go forward, not in proportion to the generative faculty, but according to the employment of the persons already generated. If Jacob continue pasturing his herds, he must extend the limits of his right of pasture; he must multiply his stock

of cattle, in proportion as the mouths of his family augment. He is charged with all this detail: for he is master, and director, and statesman, and general provider. His servants will work as they are ordered; but if he has not had the proper foresight, to break up lands so soon as his family comes nearly up to that proportion which his flocks can easily feed; if in this case, a dry season should burn up the grass in Palestine, he will be obliged to send some of his flock of cattle, with some of his family, to market, there to be sold; and with the price he must buy corn. For in this early age, there was money, there were manufacturers of sackcloth, of common rayment, and of party-colored garments; there was a trade in corn, in spicery, balm, and myrrh. Jacob and his family were shepherds, but they lived not entirely on flesh; they eat bread: consequently there was tillage in those days, though they exercised none. The famine however was ready to destroy them, and probably would have done it, but for the providential circumstance of Joseph's being governor of Egypt. He relieved their distress, he gave to his family the best country in the whole kingdom for pasture; and they had a gratuitous supply of bread.

No doubt, so long as these favorable circumstances subsisted, multiplication would go on apace. What supernatural assistance God was pleased to grant for the increase of his chosen people, does not concern my inquiry.

I have mentioned tranſiently this example of the patriarch, only to point out how ancient the uſe of money, the invention of trade and manufactures appear to have been. Without ſuch previous eſtabliſhments, I conſider mankind as ſavages, living on the ſpontaneous fruits of the earth, as in the firſt ſuppoſition; and confined, as to numbers, to the actual extent of theſe productions.

From what has been ſaid, we may conclude, that the numbers of mankind muſt depend upon the quantity of food produced by the earth for their nourishment; from which, as a corollary, may be drawn,

That mankind have been, as to numbers, and muſt ever be, in proportion to the food produced; and that the food produced will be in the compound proportion of the fertility of the climate, and the induſtry of the inhabitants.

From this laſt propoſition it appears plain, that there can be no general rule for determining the number of inhabitants neceſſary for agriculture, not even in the ſame country. The fertility of the ſoil when labored; the eaſe of laboring it; the quantity of good ſpontaneous fruits; the plenty of fiſh in the rivers and ſea; the abundance of wild birds and beaſts; have in all ages, and ever muſt influence greatly the nourishment, and, conſequentially, regulate the multiplication of man, and determine his employment.

To make an eſtabliſhment in a country not before inhabited, to root out woods, deſtroy wild  
and

and venomous animals, drain marshy grounds, give a free course to water, and to lay down the surface into corn fields, must surely require more hands than to cultivate the same after it is improved. For the truth of this, I appeal to our American brethren.

We may therefore conclude, that the most essential requisite for population, is that of agriculture, or the providing of subsistence. Upon this all the rest depends: while subsistence is upon a precarious footing, no statesman can turn his attention to any thing else.

The great importance of this object has engaged some to imagine, that the luxurious arts, in our days, are prejudicial both to agriculture and multiplication. It is sometimes a loss to fix one's attention too much upon any one object, however important. No body can dispute that agriculture is the foundation of multiplication, and the most essential requisite for the prosperity of a state. But it does not follow from this, that almost every body in the state should be employed in it; that would be inverting the order of things; and turning the servant into the master. The duty and business of man is not to feed; he is fed, in order to do his duty, and to become useful.

It is not sufficient for my purpose to know, that the introduction of agriculture, by multiplying the quantity of the earth's productions; does evidently tend to increase the numbers of mankind. I must examine the *political causes* which must concur, in order to operate this effect.

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For this purpose, my next inquiry shall be directed towards discovering the true principles which influence the employment of man, with respect to agriculture. I shall spare no pains in examining this point to the bottom, even though it should lead me to anticipate some branches of my subject.

I shall endeavour to lay down principles consistent with the nature of man, with agriculture, and with multiplication, in order, by their means, to discover both the use and abuse of the two last. When these parts are well understood, the rest will go on more smoothly, and I shall find the less occasion to interrupt my subject, in order to explain the topics upon which the whole depends.

#### C H A P. V.

*In what Manner, and according to what Principles, and political Causes, does Agriculture augment Population?*

I have already shown, how the spontaneous fruits of the earth provide a fund of nourishment for a determined number of men, and I have slightly touched upon the consequences of adding labor to the natural activity of the soil.

Let me now carry this inquiry a little farther. Let me suppose a country fertile in spontaneous productions, capable of improvements of every kind, inhabited by a people living under a free government, and in the most refined simplicity,



without trade, without the luxurious arts, and without ambition. Let me here suppose a statesman, who shall inspire a taste for agriculture and for labor into those who formerly consumed the spontaneous fruits of the earth in ease and idleness. What will become of this augmentation of food produced by this additional labor?

The sudden increase of food, such as that here supposed, will immediately diffuse vigor into all; and if the additional quantity be not very great, no superfluity will be found. No sooner will the inhabitants be fully nourished, but they will begin to multiply a-new; then they will come to divide with their children, and food will become scarce again.

Thus much is necessary for the illustration of one principle; but the effects, which we have been pointing out, will not be produced barely by engaging those who lived by hunting (I suppose) to quit that trade, and turn farmers. The statesman must also find out a method to make the produce of this new branch of industry circulate downwards, so as to relieve the wants of the most necessitous. Otherwise, the plenty produced, remaining in the hands of those who produced it, will become to them an absolute superfluity; which, had they any trade with a neighbouring state, they would sell, or exchange, and leave their fellow citizens to starve. And as we suppose no trade at all, this superfluity will perish like their cherries, in a year of plenty; and consequently the farmers will immediately give over working.

If, to prevent this inconveniency, the statesman forces certain classes to labor the soil, and, with discretion, distributes the produce of it to all that have occasion for subsistence, taking in return their services for the public benefit; this will prove an infallible way of multiplying inhabitants, of making them laborious, and of preserving a simplicity of manners; but it is also the picture of ancient slavery, and is therefore excluded from the supposition.

If he acts consistently with that spirit of liberty, which we have supposed to animate his subjects, he has no method left, but to contrive different employments for the hands of the necessitous, that, by their labor, they may produce an equivalent which may be acceptable to the farmers, in lieu of this superfluity; for these last will certainly not raise it, if they cannot dispose of it; nor will they dispose of it, but for a proper equivalent. This is the only method (in a free state) of procuring additional food, and of distributing it through the society, as the price of those hours which before were spent in idleness: and, as this will prove a more certain and more extensive fund of subsistence, than the precarious productions of spontaneous fruits, which cannot be increased at discretion, and in proportion to demand, it will greatly increase numbers; but, on the other hand, it must evidently destroy that simplicity of manners which naturally reigns among nations who do not labor.

A people, therefore, who have an industrious turn, will multiply in proportion to the superfluity of their farmers; because the labor of the necessitous will prove an equivalent for it.

Now this additional number of inhabitants being raised and fed with the superfluity *actually* produced by the farmers, can never be supposed necessary for providing that quantity, which (though relatively to the farmers it be called a superfluity) is only a sufficiency relatively to the whole society; and, therefore, if it be found necessary to employ the new inhabitants also in farming, it must only be with a view to a still greater multiplication.

Farther, we may lay it down as a principle, that a farmer will not labor to produce a superfluity of grain relatively to his own consumption, unless he finds some want which may be supplied by means of that superfluity; neither will other industrious persons work to supply the wants of the farmer for any other reason than to procure subsistence, which they cannot otherwise so easily obtain. These are the reciprocal wants which the statesman must create, in order to bind the society together. Here then is one principle: *Agriculture among a free people will augment population, only in proportion as the necessitous are put in a situation to purchase subsistence with their labor.* I proceed.

If in any country which actually produces nourishment for its inhabitants, according to the progression above-mentioned, (p. 36.) a plan is set on foot for the extension of agriculture; the augmentation must be made to bear a due proportion to the progress of industry and wants of the people, or else an outlet must be provided for disposing of the superfluity. And if, at setting out, a foreign consumption cannot be procured for the produce

of husbandry, the greatest caution must be had to keep the improvement of the soil within proper bounds: for, without this, the plan intended for an improvement will, by over-doing, turn out to the detriment of agriculture. This will be the case, if the fruits of the earth be made to increase faster than the numbers and the industry of those who are to consume them. For if the whole be not consumed, the regorging plenty will discourage the industry of the farmer.

But if, together with an encouragement to agriculture, a proper outlet be found for the superfluity, until the numbers and industry of the people, by increasing, shall augment the home-consumption, which again by degrees will diminish the quantity of exportation, then the spring will easily overcome the resistance; it will dilate; that is, numbers will continue to increase.

From this may be derived another principle: *That agriculture, when encouraged for the sake of multiplying inhabitants, must keep pace with the progress of industry; or an out-let must be provided for all superfluity.*

In the foregoing example, I have supposed no exportation, the more to simplify the supposition: I was, therefore, obliged to throw in a circumstance, in order to supply the want of it; to wit, an augmentation of inland demand from the suspension of hunting; and I have supposed those who formerly supported themselves by this, to consume the superfluous food of the farmers for the price of their labor. This may do well enough as a supposition, and has been made use of only to explain principles;

but the manners of a people are not so easily changed; and therefore I have anticipated a little the supposition of trade, only to show how it must concur with industry, in the advancement of agriculture and multiplication.

Let me next consider the consequences of an augmentation of agriculture in a country where the inhabitants are lazy; or where they live in such simplicity of manners, as to have few wants which labor and industry can supply. In this case, I say, the scheme of agriculture will not succeed, and, if set on foot, part of the grounds will soon become uncultivated again.

The laziest part of the farmers, disgusted with a labor which produces a plenty superfluous to themselves, which they cannot dispose of for any equivalent, will give over working, and return to their ancient simplicity. The more laborious will not furnish food to the necessitous for nothing: such therefore who cannot otherwise subsist, will naturally serve the industrious, and thereby sell their service for food. Thus by the diminution of labor, a part of the country, proportional to the quantity of food which the farmers formerly found superfluous, will again become uncultivated.

Here then will be found a country, the population of which must stop for want of food; and which, by the supposition, is abundantly able to produce more. Experience every where shows the possible existence of such a case, since no country in Europe is cultivated to the utmost, and that there are many still, where cultivation, and consequently multi-

plication, is at a stop. These nations I consider as in a *moral incapacity* of multiplying, the incapacity would be *physical*, if there was an actual impossibility of their procuring an augmentation of food by any means whatsoever.

These principles seem to be confirmed by experience, whether we compare them with the manner of living among the free American savages, or among the free, industrious, and laborious Europeans. We find the productions of all countries, generally speaking, in proportion, to the number of their inhabitants; and, on the other hand, the inhabitants are most commonly in proportion to the food.

I beg that this may not be looked upon as a quibble, or what is called a vicious circle. I have qualified the general proposition by subjoining that it is found true most commonly; and from what is to follow, we shall better discover both the truth and meaning of what is here advanced. While certain causes operate, food will augment, and mankind will increase in proportion; when these causes cease, *procreation* will not augment numbers; then the general proposition will take place; numbers and food will remain the same, and balance one another. This I imagine to be so in fact; and I hope to show that it is rational also. Let me now put an end to this chapter, by drawing some conclusions from what has been laid down, in order to enlarge our ideas, and to enable us to extend our plan.

I. One consequence of a fruitful soil, possessed by a free people, given to agriculture, and inclined

to industry, will be the production of a superfluous quantity of food, over and above what is necessary to feed the farmers. Inhabitants will multiply; and according to their increase, a certain number of the whole, proportional to such superfluity of nourishment produced, will apply themselves to industry and to the supplying of other wants.

II. From this operation produced by industry, we find the people distributed into two classes. The first is that of the farmers who produce the subsistence, and who are necessarily employed in this branch of business; the other I shall call *free hands*; because their occupation being to procure themselves subsistence out of the superfluity of the farmers, and by a labor adapted to the wants of the society, may vary according to these wants, and these again according to the spirit of the times.

III. If in the country we are treating of, both money and the luxurious arts are supposed unknown, then the superfluity of the farmers will be in proportion to the number of those whose labor will be found sufficient to provide for all the other necessities of the inhabitants; and so soon as this is accomplished, the consumption and produce becoming equally balanced, the inhabitants will increase no more, or at least very precariously, unless their wants be multiplied.

I. Classe = Agricoltori, produttori di alimenti

II. Classe = Mani libere; occupati a consumare  
 le superfluità di prima; per provvedere  
 di loro bisogni -

## C H A P. VI.

*How the Wants of Mankind promote their Multiplication,*

**I**F the country we were treating of in the former chapter be supposed of a considerable extent and fruitfulness, and if the inhabitants have a turn for industry; in a short time, *luxury* and the use of *money* (or of something participating of the nature of money) will infallibly be introduced.

By *LUXURY*, I understand *the consumption of any thing produced by the labor or ingenuity of man, which flatters our senses or taste of living, and which is neither necessary for our being well fed, well clothed, well defended against the injuries of the weather, nor for securing us against every thing which can hurt us* \*.

\* As my subject is different from that of morals, I have no occasion to consider the term *luxury* in any other than a political sense, to wit, as a principle which produces employment, and gives bread to those who supply the demands of the rich. For this reason I have chosen the above definition of it, which conveys no idea, either of abuse, sensuality, or excess; nor do I, at present, even consider the hurtful consequences of it as to foreign trade. Principles here are treated of with regard to mankind in general, and the effects of luxury are only considered relatively to multiplication and agriculture. Our reasoning will take a different turn, when we come to examine the separate interest of nations, and the principles of trade.

I beg therefore, that at present my reasoning be carried no further (from inductions and suppositions) than my intention is that it should be. I am no patron, either of vice, profusion,



By MONEY, I understand any commodity, which purely in itself is of no material use to man for the purposes above-mentioned, but which acquires such an estimation from his opinion of it, as to become the universal measure of what is called value, and an adequate equivalent for any thing alienable.

Here a new scene opens. This money must be found in the hands of some of the inhabitants; naturally, of such as have had the wit to invent it, and the address to make their countrymen fond of it, by representing it as an equivalent value for food and necessaries; that is to say, the means of procuring, without work or toil, not only the labor of others, but food itself.

Here then is produced a new object of want. Every person becomes fond of having money; but how to get it is the question. The proprietors will not give it for nothing, and by our former supposition every one within the society was understood to be abundantly supplied with food and necessaries; the farmers, from their laboring the ground; the free hands, by the return of their own ingenuity, in

or the dissipation of private fortunes; although *I may now and then reason very coolly upon the political consequences of such diseases in a state, when I only consider the influence they have as to seeding and multiplying a people.* My subject is too extensive of itself to admit of being confounded with the doctrine either of morals, or of government, however closely these may appear connected with it; and did I not begin by simplifying ideas as much as possible, and by banishing combinations, I should quickly lose my way, and involve myself in perplexities inextricable.

furnishing necessaries. The proprietors therefore of this money have all their wants supplied, and still are possessors of this new kind of riches, which we now suppose to be coveted by all.

The natural consequence here will be, that those who have the money will cease to labor, and yet will consume; and they will not consume for nothing, for they will pay with money.

Here then is a number of inhabitants, who live and consume the produce of the earth without laboring: food will soon become scarce; demand for it will rise, and that will be paid with money; this is the best equivalent of all; many will run to the plough; the superfluity of the farmers will augment; the rich will call for superfluities; the free hands will supply them, and demand food in their turn. These will not be found a burden on the husbandmen, as formerly; the rich, who hired of them their labor or service, must pay them with money, and this money in their hands will serve as an equivalent for the superfluity of nourishment produced by additional agriculture.

When once this imaginary wealth, money, becomes well introduced into a country, luxury will very naturally follow; and when money becomes the object of our wants, mankind become industrious, in turning their labor towards every object which may engage the rich to part with it; and thus the inhabitants of any country may increase in numbers, until the ground refuses farther nourishment. The consequences of this will make the subject of another chapter.

Before we proceed, something must be said, in order to restrain these general assertions a little.

We have supposed a very rapid progress of industry, and a very sudden augmentation of inhabitants, from the introduction of money. But it must be observed, that many circumstances have concurred with the money, to produce this effect.

We have supposed a country capable of improvement, a laborious people, a taste of refinement and luxury in the rich, an ambition to become so, and an application to labor and ingenuity in the lower classes of men. According to the greater or less degree of force, or concurrence of these and like circumstances, will the country in question become more or less cultivated, and consequently peopled.

If the soil be vastly rich, situated in a warm climate, and naturally watered, the productions of the earth will be almost spontaneous: this will make the inhabitants lazy. Laziness is the greatest of all obstacles to labor and industry. Manufactures will never flourish here. The rich, with all their money, will not become luxurious with delicacy and refinement; for I do not mean by luxury the gratification of the animal appetites, nor the abuse of riches, but *an elegance of taste and in living, which has for its object the labor and ingenuity of man*; and as the ingenuity of workmen begets a taste in the rich, so the allurements of riches kindles an ambition, and encourages an application to works of ingenuity in the poor.

Riches therefore will here be adored as a god, but

not made subservient to the uses of man; and it is only by the means of swift circulation from hand to hand, (as shall be observed in its proper place) that they become productive of the effects mentioned above\*.

When money does not circulate, it is the same thing as if it did not exist; and as the treasures found in countries where the inhabitants are lazy do not circulate, they are rather ornamental than useful.

It is not therefore in the most fruitful countries of the world, nor in those which are the best calculated for nourishing great multitudes, that we find the most inhabitants. It is in climates less favored by nature, and where the soil only produces to those who labor, and in proportion to the industry of every one, where we may expect to find great multitudes; and even those will be found greater or less, in proportion as the turn of the inhabitants is directed to ingenuity and industry.

In such countries where these are made to flourish, the free hands (of whom we have spoken above) will be employed in useful manufactures, which, being refined upon by the ingenious, will determine what is called the standard of taste; this taste will increase consumption, which again will mul-

\* Every transition of money from hand to hand, for a valuable consideration, implies some service done, something wrought by man, or performed by his ingenuity, or some consumption of something produced by his labor. The quicker therefore the circulation of money is in any country, the more strongly it may be inferred, that the inhabitants are laborious; and *vice versa*: but of this more hereafter.

tively workmen, and these will encourage the production of food for their nourishment.

Let it therefore never be said, that there are too many manufacturers employed in a country; it is the same as if it were said, there are too few idle persons, too few beggars, and too many husbandmen.

We have more than once endeavoured to show, that these manufacturers never can be fed but out of the superfluity of nourishment produced by the farmers. It is a contradiction, I think, to say, that those who are fed upon the surplus of those who cultivate the soil are necessary for producing a sufficiency to themselves. For if even this surplus were to diminish, the manufacturers, not the laborers, would be the first to be extinguished for want of nourishment.

The importance of the distributive proportion of mankind into laborers and free hands appears so great, and has so intimate a connexion with this subject, that it engages me to seek for an illustration of the principles I have been laying down, in an example drawn from facts, as it is found to stand in one of the greatest and most flourishing nations in Europe. But before I proceed farther in this part of my subject, I must examine the consequences of slavery with regard to the subject we are now upon. Relations here are so many and so various, that it is necessary to have sometimes recourse to transitions, of which I give notice to my reader, that he may not lose the connexion.

## C H A P. VII.

*The Effects of Slavery upon the Multiplication and Employment of Mankind.*

**B**EFORE I go on to follow the consequences of the above reasoning, I must stop, to consider a difference, of no small importance, between ancient and modern times, which will serve to illustrate the nature of slavery, with regard to population and the employment of mankind.

We have endeavoured to lay down the principles which seem to influence these two objects, supposing all to be free. In that case I imagine the human species will multiply pretty much in proportion to their industry; their industry will increase according to their wants, and these again will be diversified according to the spirit of the times.

From this I conclude, that the more free and simple the manners of a country are, *ceteris paribus*, the fewer inhabitants will be found in it. This is proved by experience every where. The Tartars, who freely wander up and down a country of vast extent, multiply but little; the savages in America, who live upon hunting, in a state of great independence; the inhabitants of several mountainous countries in Europe, where there are few manufactures, and where the inhabitants do not leave the country; in all such places mankind do not multiply. What is the reason of this? One would imagine, where there is a great extent of ground capable of producing food, that mankind should multiply

tiply until the soil refused to give more. I imagine the answer may be easily discovered from the principles above laid down.

Where mankind have few wants, the number of free hands necessary to supply them is very small, consequently very little surplus from the farmers is sufficient to maintain them. When therefore it happens, that any poor family in the class of free hands is very numerous, division there comes to be carried to its utmost extent, and the greatest part become quite idle, because there is no demand for their work. As long as they can be fed by the division of the emoluments arising from the labor of their parents, or by the charity of others, they live; when these resources fail, they become miserable. In so wretched a situation it is not easy to find bread. The farmers will not double their diligence from a charitable disposition. Those who have land will not allow those indigent people a liberty to raise grain in it for nothing; and although they should, the poor are not in a capacity to provide what is necessary for doing it. All other work is fully stocked, the wretched die, or extinguish without multiplying.

To make this more evident, let us suppose the wants of mankind, in any polite nation of Europe, which lives and flourishes in our days upon the produce of its own soil, reduced all at once to the simplicity of the ancient patriarchs, or even to that of the old Romans. Suppose all the hands now employed in the luxurious arts, and in every branch of modern manufactures, to become quite

idle, how could they be subsisted? What economy could be set on foot able to preserve so many lives useful to the state? Yet it is plain by the supposition, that the farmers of the country are capable of maintaining them, since they do so actually. It would be absurd to propose to employ them in agriculture, seeing there are enough employed in this, to provide food for the whole.

If it be certain, that such people would die for want without any resource, must it not follow, that unless their parents had found the means of maintaining them when children, and they themselves the means of subsisting by their industry in supplying wants, they could not have existed beyond their first infancy.

This seems to strike deep against the populousness of the old world, where we know that the wants of mankind, with regard to trades and manufactures, were so few.

But in those days the wants of mankind were of a different nature. At present there is a demand for the ingenuity of man; then there was a demand for his person and service. Now provided there be a demand for man, whatever use he be put to, the species will multiply; for those who stand in need of them will always feed them, and as long as food is to be found, numbers will increase.

In the present times food cannot, in general, be found, but by labor, and that cannot be found but to supply wants. Nobody will feed a free man, more than he will feed the wild birds or beasts of the field, unless he has occasion for the labor of the one or the flesh of the other.



In the old world the principles were the same, but the spirit of nations was different. Princes wanted to have numerous armies. Free states fought for power in the number of their citizens. The wants of mankind being few, and a simplicity of manners established, to have encouraged industry, excepting in agriculture, which in all ages has been the foundation of population, would have been an inconsistency. To make mankind labor beyond their wants, to make one part of a state work to maintain the other gratuitously, could only be brought about by slavery, and slavery was therefore introduced universally. Slavery was then as necessary towards multiplication, as it would now be destructive of it. The reason is plain. If mankind be not forced to labor, they will only labor for themselves; and if they have few wants, there will be little labor. But when states come to be formed, and have occasion for idle hands to defend them against the violence of their enemies, food at any rate must be procured for those who do not labor; and as, by the supposition, the wants of the laborers are small, a method must be found to increase their labor above the proportion of their wants.

For this purpose slavery was calculated: it had two excellent effects with respect to population. The first, that, in unpolished nations, living upon the spontaneous fruits of the earth, and almost continually in war, lives were preserved for the sake of making slaves of the captives. These sold to private people, or different states, were sure

of being fed ; whereas remaining in their own country, they only occupied a place, which, by the force of the generative faculty, as has been observed, was soon to be filled up by propagation : for it must not be forgot, that when numbers are swept off, by any sudden calamity, which does not proportionally diminish subsistence, a new multiplication immediately takes place. Thus we perceive the hurt done by plagues, by war, and by other devastations, either among men, or cattle, repaired in a few years, even in those countries where the standard number of both is seldom found to increase. What immense quantities of cattle are yearly slaughtered ! Does any body imagine that if all were allowed to live, numbers would increase in proportion ? The same is true of men.

The second advantage of slavery was, that in countries where a good police prevailed, and where the people had fewer wants by far than are felt in modern times, the slaves were forced to labor the soil which fed both them and the idle freemen, as was the case in Sparta ; or they filled all the fertile places which freemen fill now ; and they were likewise employed, as in Greece and in Rome, in supplying with manufactures those whose service was necessary for the state.

Here then was a violent method of making mankind laborious in raising food ; and providing this be accomplished, (by any means whatever) numbers will increase.

Trade, industry, and manufactures, only tend to multiply the numbers of men, by encouraging agriculture. If it be therefore supposed, that two

states are equally extended, equally fruitful, and equally cultivated, and the produce consumed at home, I believe they will be found equally peopled. But suppose the one labored by free men, the other by slaves, what difference will be found in making war? In the first, the free hands must, by their industry and labor, purchase their food, and a day lost in labor is in a manner a day of fasting: in the last, the slaves produce the food, they are first fed, and the rest costs nothing to the body of free men, who may be all employed in war, without the smallest prejudice to industry.

From these principles it appears, that slavery in former times had the same effect in peopling the world that trade and industry have now. Men were then forced to labor because they were slaves to others; men are now forced to labor because they are slaves to their own wants.

I only add, that I do not pretend that in fact slavery in ancient times did every where contribute to population, any more than I can affirm that the spirit of industry in the Dutch is common to all free nations in our days. All that is necessary for my purpose is, to set forth the two principles, and to show the natural effects of the one and the other, with respect to the multiplication of mankind and advancement of agriculture, the principal objects of our attention throughout this book.

I shall at present enlarge no farther upon this matter, but return to where I left off in the preceding chapter, and take up the farther examination of the fundamental distribution of inhabitants into labourers and free hands.

## C H A P. VIII.

*What Proportion of Inhabitants is necessary for Agriculture, and what Proportion may be usefully employed in every other Occupation ?*

**I** HAVE proposed this question, not with an intention to answer it fully, but to point out how, with the proper lights given, it may be answered.

As I write under circumstances, not the most favorable for having recourse to books, I must employ those I have. The article *Political Arithmetic*, of Mr. Chambers's Cyclopaedia, furnishes me with some extracts from Sir William Petty, and Dr. Davenant, which I here intend to employ, towards pointing out a solution of the question proposed. These authors consider the state of England as it appeared to them, and what they say is conclusive only with respect to that state.

Sir William Petty supposes the inhabitants of England to be six millions, the value of grain yearly consumed by them ten millions sterling, the bushel of wheat reckoned at 5s. and that of barley at 2s. 6d. If we cast the two together, and reckon upon an average, this will make the quarter, or eight bushels of grain, worth 1 *l*. 10s. but in regard, the barley cannot amount to one half of all the grain consumed, especially as there is a good quantity of rye made use of, which is worth more than the barley, though less than the wheat; let us suppose the grain worth

32s. *per* quarter, at a medium ; then ten millions sterling will purchase six millions of quarters of grain, or thereabouts ; which used for nourishment, in bread and beer, gives the mean quantity of one quarter, or 512 pounds of grain for every inhabitant, including the nourishment of his proportional part of animals ; supposing that Sir William attended to this circumstance, for it is not mentioned by Chambers. And I must observe, by the by, that this computation may hold good as to England, where people eat so little bread ; but would not answer in France, nor in almost any other country I have seen.

Dr. Davenant, correcting Sir William's calculation, makes the inhabitants 5,545,000. These, according to Sir William's prices and proportions, would consume to the amount of 8,872,000*l.* sterling ; but the Dr. carries it, with reason, a little higher, and states it at 9,075,000 *l.* sterling ; the difference, however, is inconsiderable. From this he concludes, the gross produce of the corn fields to be about 9,075,000*l.* sterling. I make no criticism upon this computation.

Next, as to the value of other lands ; I find Sir William reckons the gross produce of them in butter, cheese, milk, wool, horses yearly bred, flesh for food, tallow, hides, hay, and timber, to amount to 12,000,000*l.* sterling : The amount therefore of the gross produce of all the lands in England must be equal to these two sums added together, that is to 21,075,000*l.* sterling.

From these data, the Dr. values the yearly rent of corn lands at two millions sterling, and those of pasture, &c. at seven millions, in all nine millions.

From this it appears, that the land rents of England are to the gross produce, as nine is to twenty-one, or thereabouts.

Let me now examine some other proportions.

The rents of the corn lands are to the gross produce of them, as two is to nine; those of pasture, as seven to twelve.

Now it is very certain, that all rents are in a pretty just proportion to the gross produce, after deducting three principal articles.

1. The nourishment of the farmer, his family and servants.
2. The necessary expenses of his family, for manufactures, and instruments for cultivating the ground,
3. His reasonable profits, according to the custom of every country.

Of these three articles, let us distinguish what part implies the direct consumption of the pure produce, from what does not.

Of the first sort are the nourishment of men and cattle, wool and flax for clothing, firing, and other smaller articles.

Of the second are all manufactures bought, servants wages, the hire of laborers occasionally, and profits, either spent in luxury, (that is superfluous) lent, or laid up.

The three articles above mentioned (which we have distributed under two heads) being deducted from the gross produce, the remaining value shows the land rent.

This being the case, I am next to examine the cause of the great disproportion between the rents

of corn lands, and those of pasture, when compared with the gross produce, in order to draw some conclusion, which may lead to the solution of the question here proposed.

This difference must proceed from the greater proportion of laboring and other inhabitants employed in consequence of tillage; which makes the expense of it far greater than that of pasture. And since, in the one and the other, every article of necessary expense or consumption, appears to be proportionally equal among those concerned in both, that is, proportional to the number of laboring inhabitants; it follows, that the proportion of people employed in agriculture, and upon the account of it, in different countries, is nearly in the ratio of the gross produce to the land-rent; or in other words, in the proportion of the consumption made by the farmers, and by those employed necessarily by them, to the net produce; which is the same thing.

Now as the consumption upon corn farms is  $\frac{7}{11}$ , and that upon pasture  $\frac{1}{11}$ , the proportion of these two fractions must mark the ratio between the populousness of pasture lands, and those in tillage; that is to say, tillage lands in England were, at that time, peopled in proportion to pasture lands, as 84 is to 45, or as 28 to 15.

This point being settled, I proceed to another; to wit, the application of this net produce or surplus of the quantity of food and necessaries remaining over and above the nourishment, consumption and expense, of the inhabitants employed

in agriculture; and which we have observed above, to be equal to the land-rents of England, that is to say, to nine millions yearly.

Must not this of necessity be employed in the nourishment, and for the use of those whom we have called the *free hands*; who may be employed in manufactures, trades or in any way the state pleases.

Now the number of people, I take to be very nearly in the proportion of the quantity of food they consume; especially when a society is taken thus, in such accumulative proportion, and when all are found under the same circumstances as to the plenty of the year.

The whole gross produce of England we have said to be 21,000,000 *l.* sterling, of which 9 millions have remained for those not employed in agriculture; the farmers, therefore, and their attendants, must annually consume 12 millions; consequently the last class is to the first as 12 is to 9. If therefore, according to Dr. Davenant, there be 5,545,000 people in that kingdom, there must be about 3,168,571 employed or dependent upon agriculture, and 2,376,429 free hands for every other occupation. But this proportion of farmers will be found far less, if we reflect, that we have reckoned for them the total amount of the three articles above mentioned, that is to say, the total consumption they make, as well in manufactures, profits upon their labor, &c. as for food and necessaries; whereas there has been nothing reckoned for the free hands, but the land-rent: consequently there



should be added to the number of the latter as many as are employed in supplying with all sorts of manufactures the whole of the farmers of England and all those who depend upon them; and this number must be taken from one and added to the other class.

If this number be supposed to amount to four hundred thousand, it will do more than cast the balance upon the opposite side.

From these matters of fact (in so far as they are so) we may conclude:

I. That the raising of the rents of lands shows the increase of industry, as it swells the fund of subsistence consumed by the industrious; that is, by those who buy it.

II. That it may denote either an increase of inhabitants, or the depopulation of the land, in order to assemble the superfluous mouths in villages, towns, &c. where they may exercise their industry with greater conveniency.

While the land-rents of Europe were very low, numbers of the inhabitants appeared to be employed in agriculture; but were really no more than idle consumers of the produce of it. This shall be farther illustrated in the subsequent chapters.

III. The more a country is in tillage, the *more* it is inhabited, and the smaller is the proportion of *free hands* for all the services of the state. The more a country is in pasture, the *less* it is inhabited, but the greater is the proportion of *free hands*.

I do not pretend, as I have said above, that there is any calculation to be depended on in this

chapter; I have only endeavoured to point out how a calculation might be made, when the true state of England comes to be known.

This question not being of a nature to enter into the chain of our reasoning, may be considered rather as incidental than essential; I have therefore treated it superficially, and chiefly for the sake of the conclusions.

Our next inquiry will naturally be into the principles which determine the residence of inhabitants, in order to discover why, in all flourishing states, cities are now found to be every where increasing.

#### C H A P. IX.

*What are the Principles which regulate the Distribution of Inhabitants into Farms, Villages, Hamlets, Towns, and Cities ?*

**H**AVING pointed out the natural distribution of inhabitants into the two capital classes of which we have been treating, I am now going to examine how far their employment must decide as to their place of residence.

I. When mankind is fed upon the spontaneous fruits of the earth, the distribution of their residence depends upon the division of the lands. If these are in common to all, then the inhabitants will be scattered abroad, or gathered together, according as the productions of the earth are equally distributed over the face of the country, or confined to some fruitful spots.

Hence the Tartars wander with their flocks and feed upon them: hence the hunting Indians are scattered in small societies, through the woods, and live upon game: hence others, who feed upon the fruits of the earth, are collected in greater numbers upon the sides of rivers, and in watered vallies.

Where therefore the surface of the earth is not appropriated, *there* the place producing food determines the place of residence of every one of the society, and *there* mankind may live in idleness, and remain free from every constraint.

II. When the earth is not in common to those who live upon her spontaneous fruits, but appropriated by a few, *there* either slavery or industry must be introduced among those who consume the surplus of the proprietors; because they will expect either service or work in return for their superfluity. In that case, the residence of the inhabitants will depend upon the circumstances we are going to consider; and the object of agriculture (in countries where the surface of the earth is not broken up, being solely directed towards the gathering in of fruits) will only determine the residence of those who are necessary for that purpose: consequently it will follow, that in climates where the earth produces spontaneously, and in vast abundance, *there may* be found large cities; because the number of those who are necessary for gathering in the fruits, is small in proportion to their quantity; whereas in other countries, where the earth's productions are scanty, and where the climate refuses

those of the copious and luxuriant kind, there will hardly be found any considerable town, as the number of those who are necessary for collecting the subsistence, bear a great proportion to the fruits themselves. I do not say, that in the first case there *must* be large towns, or that in the other there *can* be none; but I say, that in the first case, those who *may* be gathered into towns, bear a great proportion to the whole society; and that in the second, they bear a small one.

I think I have found this principle confirmed by experience. When I compare the bulk and populousness of the cities of Lombardy, and still more, those of the watered provinces of Spain, with the inhabitants of the territory which maintains them, I find the proportion of the first vastly greater than in those of France and England; and still more again in these two last mentioned kingdoms, than in the more northern countries and provinces, where the earth's productions bear a less proportion to the labor bestowed in producing them. Now, although I allow that neither the one or the other be fed by spontaneous productions, yet still it may be inferred, that the more the climate contributes to favor the labor of man, the more the productions participate of the spontaneous nature\*.

\* Hence we may conclude, that in those countries where the people live upon the spontaneous fruits, the whole society (considered in a political light) is found composed of free hands. Nature there supplies the place of the whole class of farmers.

Again, in countries where labor is required for feeding a society, the smaller the proportion of laborers, the greater will be that of the free hands. Fruits which are produced by annual labor, and still more, such as are the consequence of a thorough cultivation, (such as luxuriant pasture) give returns far superior to the nourishment of those employed in the cultivation; consequently, all the surplus is consumed by people not employed in agriculture; consequently, by those who are not bound to reside upon the spot which feeds them, and who may chuse the habitation best adapted for the exercise of that industry which is most proper to produce an equivalent to the farmers for their superfluities.

From this it is plain that the residence of the farmers only, is essentially attached to the place of cultivation. Hence, farms in some provinces, villages in others.

I now proceed to the other class of inhabitants; the free hands who live upon the surplus of the farmers.

These I must subdivide into two conditions. The first, those to whom this surplus directly belongs,

We have said that industry and manufactures are the occupation of the free hands of a state; consequently, where the proportion of them is the largest, industry should flourish to the greatest advantage; that is to say, in countries where the inhabitants live upon the spontaneous fruits: but that is not the case. Why? Because there is another circumstance of equal weight which prevents it. These people are unacquainted with want, and want is the spur to industry. Let this suffice, in general, as to the distribution of inhabitants in countries unacquainted with labor.

or who, with a revenue in money already acquired, can purchase it. The second, those who purchase it with their daily labor or personal service.

Those of the first condition may live where they please; those of the second, must live where they can. The residence of the consumers, in many cases, determines that of the suppliers. In proportion, therefore, as those who live where they please chuse to live together, in that proportion the others must follow them. And in proportion as the state thinks fit to place the administration of government in one place; in that proportion must the administrators, and every one depending upon them, be gathered together. These I take to be principles which influence the swelling of the bulk of capitals, and smaller cities.

When the residence of the consumer does not determine that of him who supplies it, other considerations are allowed to operate. This is the case in what may properly be called manufactures, distinguished from trades, whether they be for home consumption, or foreign exportation. These considerations are,

I. Relative to the place and situation of the establishment, which gives a preference to the sides of rivers and rivulets, when machines wrought by water are necessary; to the proximity of forests, when fire is employed; to the place which produces the substance of the manufacture, as in mines, collieries, brick-works, &c.

II. Relative to the conveniency of transportation, as upon navigable rivers, or by great roads.

III. Relative

III. Relative to the cheapness of living, consequently not (frequently) in great cities, except for their own consumption. But it must be observed, that this last consideration can hardly ever be permanent: for the very establishment being the means of raising prices, the advantage must diminish in proportion as the undertaking comes to succeed. The best rule therefore is, to set down such manufactures upon the banks of navigable rivers, where all necessary provisions may be brought from a distance at a small cost. This advantage is permanent, the others are not; and may prove in time hurtful, by a change in these very circumstances which decided as to the choice of the situation. From the establishment of manufactures we see hamlets swell into villages, and villages into towns.

Sea-ports owe their establishment to foreign trade. From one or other of these and similar principles, are mankind gathered into hamlets, villages, towns, and cities.

## C H A P. X.

*Of the Consequences which result from the Separation of the two principal Classes of a People, the Farmers and the Free Hands, with regard to their Dwelling.*

I AM next going to examine the consequences resulting to the state, to the citizens, and to the landed interest, from this kind of separation, as I may

call it, between the parent earth and her laborious children, which I suppose to take place every where in proportion to the progress of industry, luxury, and the swift circulation of money.

As to the state, it is, I think, very plain, that, without such a distribution of inhabitants, it would be impossible to levy taxes. For as long as the earth nourishes directly those who are upon her surface, as long as she delivers her fruits into the very hand of him who consumes them, there is no alienation, no occasion for money, consequently no possibility of establishing an extensive taxation, as shall in its place be fully explained, and from this principle is, I imagine, to be deduced the reason, why we find taxation so little known under the feudal form of government.

The personal service of the vassals, with their cattle and servants, upon all occasions made the power and wealth of the lords, and their rents were mostly paid in kind. They lived upon their lands, were commonly jealous of one another, and had constant disputes. This was a very good reason to keep them from coming together. Towns were situated round their habitations. These were mostly composed of the few tradesmen and manufacturers that were in the country. The lord's judge, his fiscal, and his court of record, added to these numbers; law-suits, and the lord's attendance, brought the vassals frequently together; this gave encouragement to houses of entertainment; and this I take to be the picture of the greatest part of small towns, if we ascend three or four hundred years from the present time.

Cities were the residence of bishops. These lords



were very independent of the civil government, and had at the same time the principal direction in it. They procured privileges to their cities, and these communities formed themselves by degrees into small republics: taxes here have ever been familiar. The feudal lords seldom appeared there, and the inferior classes of the people enjoyed liberty and ease in these cities only.

In some countries of Europe, as in Germany, the principal citizens, in time, became patricians. In France certain offices of public trust sometimes procured nobility to those who bore them, and always consideration. The representatives of the citizens were even admitted into the states, and formed the *tiers état*. Elsewhere they received casual marks of distinction from the sovereign, as the Lord Mayor of London does to this day usually receive knighthood. In short, the only dawning of public liberty to be met with during the feudal government, was in the cities; no wonder then if they increased.

Upon the discovery of America and the East-Indies industry, trade, and luxury, were soon introduced in the kingdoms of Spain, France, and England: the grandeur and power of the Hans-towns had already pointed out to sovereigns the importance of those objects.

The courts of princes then became magnificent; the feudal lords insensibly began to frequent them with more assiduity than formerly. The splendor of the prince soon eclipsed those rays which shone around them upon their own lands. They now no more appeared to one another as objects of jealousy,

but of emulation. They became acquainted, began to relish a court life, and every one proposed to have a house in the capital. A change of habitation made a change of circumstances, both as to city and country. As to the city; in so far as inhabitants were increased, by the addition of the great lords, and of those who followed their example, demand increased for every sort of provision and labor; and this quickly drew more inhabitants together. Every one vied with another in magnificence of palaces, clothes, equipages. Modes changed, and by turns enlivened the different branches of ingenuity. Whence came so great a number of inhabitants all of a sudden? He who would have cast his eyes on the deserted residences of the nobility, would have seen the old people weeping and wailing, and nothing heard among them but complaints of desolation: the youth were retired to the city; there was no change as to them.

This is no doubt a plain consequence of a sudden revolution, which never can happen without being attended with great inconveniencies. Many of the numerous attendants of the nobility who uselessly filled every house and habitation belonging to the great man, were starving for want. He was at court, and calling aloud for money, a thing he was seldom accustomed to have occasion for, except to lock up in his chest. In order to procure this money, he found it expedient to convert a portion of the personal services of his vassals into cash: by this he lost his authority. He then looked out for a farmer (not a husbandman) for an estate which he formerly

consumed in its fruits. This undertaker, as I may call him, began by dismissing idle mouths. Still greater complaints ensued. At last, the money spent in the city began to flow into the hands of the industrious: this raised an emulation, and the children of the miserable, who had felt the sad effects of the revolution, but who could not foresee the consequences, began to profit by it. They became easy and independent in the great city, by furnishing to the extravagance of those under whose dominion they were born.

This progression is perhaps too minutely traced to be exact; I therefore stop, to consider the situation of affairs at that period, when all the inconveniences of the sudden revolution had ceased, and when things were come to the state in which we now find them. Capitals swelled to a great extent, Paris and London appear monstrous to some, and are said to be a load upon the rest of the country. This must be examined.

We agree, I suppose, that the inhabitants of cities are not employed in agriculture, and we may agree that they are fed by it: we have examined into the causes of the increase of cities, and we have seen the fund provided for their subsistence, to wit, the surplus of fruits produced by husbandmen.

What are then the advantages resulting to the citizens from this great increase of their city? I cannot find any great benefit resulting to individuals from that circumstance; but I conclude, that the same advantages which many find in particular,

must be common to great numbers, consequently great numbers are gathered together.

The principal objections against great cities are, that health there is not so good, that marriages are not so frequent as in the country, that debauchery prevails, and that abuses are multiplied.

To this I answer, that these objections lie equally against all cities, and are not peculiar to those complained of for their bulk; and that the evils proceed more from the spirit of the inhabitants, than from the size of the capital. As for the prolongation of life, it is more a private than a public concern.

It is farther urged, that the number of deaths exceeds the number of births in great cities; consequently smaller towns, and even the country, is stripped of its inhabitants, in order to recruit these capitals.

Here I deny, first, that in all capitals the number of deaths exceeds the number of births; for in Paris it is otherwise. But supposing the assertion to be true, what conclusion can be drawn from it, except that many people who are born in the country die in town. That the country should furnish cities with inhabitants is no evil: What occasion has the country for supernumerary hands? If it has enough for the supply of its own wants, and of the demands of cities, has it not enough? Had it more, the supernumeraries would either consume without working, or, if added to the class of laborers, instead of being added to the number of free hands, would overturn the balance between the two classes; grain would become too plentiful, and that would cast a general discouragement upon

agriculture: whereas, by going to cities, they acquire money, and therewith purchase the grain they would have consumed, had they remained in the country; and this money, which their additional labor in cities will force into circulation, would otherwise have remained locked up, or at least would never have gone into the country, but in consequence of the desertion of the supernumeraries. The proper and only right encouragement for agriculture, is a moderate and gradual increase of demand for the productions of the earth: this works a natural and beneficial increase of inhabitants; and this demand must come from cities, for the husbandmen never have occasion to demand; it is they who offer to sale.

The high prices of most things in large cities is surely a benefit, not a loss to the country. But I must observe, that the great expense of living in capitals does not affect the lower classes, nor the moderate and frugal, in any proportion to what it does the rich. If you live on beef, mutton, bread, and beer, you may live as cheap in London and in Paris as in most cities I know. These articles abound, and though the demand be great, the provision made for supplying it is in proportion. But when you come to fish, fowl, and game; delicacies of every kind brought from far, by the post, by ships, and messengers; when you have fine equipages, large houses, expensive servants, and abundance of waste in every article, without one grain of economy in any, it is no wonder that money should run away so fast.

I do not, from what has been said, conclude, that there is any evident advantage in having so overgrown a capital as London in such a kingdom as England; but only that I do not find great force in the objections I have met with against it. That there may be others which I do not know, I will not deny, because I am not sufficiently acquainted with that kingdom to be a competent judge of the matter.

Let me now conclude this chapter, by mentioning in what respects I think cities an advantage, in general, to a country; and, as I go along, I shall point out wherein they prove a disadvantage, in particular, to some parts of it.

The general advantages of them are;

I. To remove the unnecessary load upon the land; those idle people, who eat up a part of the produce of labor without contributing to it.

II. The opportunity of levying taxes, and of making these affect the rich, in proportion to the consumption they make, without hurting industry or exportation.

III. The advantages resulting to the landed interest are no less considerable. This is proved by universal experience: for we see every where, that the moment any city, town, or village, begins to increase, by the establishment of trade or manufactures, the lands round about immediately rise in their value. The reason of this seems easily deduced from the above principles.

== When a farmer has got his economy under right regulations, not one supernumerary, nor useless

*Altra che una gran città mantene abbia una certa  
te comunione, ogni superflua è moneta.*

mouth, but abundance of hands for every kind of labor, which is generally the case near towns and cities, the proximity of them discharges him of every superfluity. His cattle consume the exact quantity of grain and of forage necessary; what remains is money; a superfluous egg is money; a superfluous day of a cart, of a horse, a superfluous hour of a servant, is all money to the farmer. There is a constant demand for every thing he can do or furnish. To make this the more sensibly perceived, remove into a province, far from a town, and compare situations. There you find abundance of things superfluous, which cannot be turned into money, which therefore are consumed without much necessity, and with no profit. It is good to have an estate there, when you want to live upon it; it is better to have one near the great town, when you do not.

It may be alledged, that the disadvantages felt by the distant farmer and proprietor, when they compare situations with those situated near the town, proceed from the town: this must be examined.

If the town consume the produce of this distant farm, it must consume it in competition with every place at a smaller distance; consequently this competition must do more good than harm to the distant farm. If the city consumes none of the produce, wherein does it affect it? It may be answered, that, by entering into competition with the distant farmer for the laboring inhabitants, these desert agriculture, in favor of a more lucrative occupation, to be found in the city. Scarcity of hands in the country raises the price of labor on one hand, while it diminishes

the demand on the other ; consequently the farmer suffers a double disadvantage. Of this there can be no doubt ; but as these revolutions cannot by their nature be sudden , it becomes the duty of the statesman , whom I suppose constantly awake , to set on foot directly some branch of industry in every such distant part of the country ; and as prices will diminish for a while , for the reasons above-mentioned , this will prove an encouragement to the establishment ; this again will accelerate propagation , as it will prove an outlet for children , and , in a short time , the farmer will find himself in a better situation than ever. But even without this assistance from the state , a few years will set all to rights , providing the spirit of industry is kept up : for cities , by swelling , extend their demand to the most distant corners of a country ; the inhabitants who desert do not cease to consume , and there by they repair the hurt they did by their desertion. I appeal to experience for the truth of this. Do we not perceive demand extending every year farther and farther from great capitals ? I know places in France which , twenty years ago , never knew what it was to send even a delicacy to Paris , but by the post , and which now send thither every week loaded waggons , with many thousand weight of provisions ; in so much that I may almost say , that a fatted chicken in the most distant province of that country can be sold with great profit in the Paris market during all the winter season ; and cattle carry thither their own flesh cheaper than any waggon can. What distant farm then can complain of the greatness of that noble city ? There is how-



ever a case, where a distant part of a country may suffer in every respect, to wit, when the revolution is sudden; as when a rich man, used to spend his income in his province, for the encouragement of industry, goes to Paris or London, and stays away for a year or two, without minding the interest of the estate he abandons. No doubt that must affect his province in proportion; but in every revolution which comes on gradually by the desertion of such as only lived by their industry, new mouths are born and supply the old. The only question is about employing them well: while you have superfluous food and good economy, a country will always reap the same benefit from her natural advantages.

IV. Another advantage of cities is, the necessity arising from thence of having great roads, and these again prove a considerable encouragement to agriculture.

The miserable condition of roads over all Europe almost, till within these hundred years, is a plain proof of the scanty condition of the cities, and of the small encouragement formerly given towards extending the improvement of the soil.

Let any one examine the situation of the landed interest before the making of great roads in several provinces in France, and compare it with what it is at present. If this be found a difficult inquiry, let him compare the appearance of young gentlemen of middling fortune, as he finds them at Paris, or in their regiment, with that of their fathers, who live in their province in the old way, and he will have a very good opportunity of perceiving

the progress of ease and refinement in that class, which has proceeded from no other cause than the improvement of the soil. People complain that prices are risen; of this there is no doubt with regard to many articles. Is it not quite consistent with our principles? It is not because there is now a larger mass of money in the kingdom, though I allow this to be true, and also that this circumstance may have contributed to raise prices; but the direct principle which has influenced them, and which will always regulate their rise and fall, is the increase of demand. Now the great roads in a manner carry the goods to market; they seem to shorten distances, they augment the number of carriages of all sorts, they remove the inconveniences above-mentioned resulting from the distance of the city. The more distant parts of the country come to market, in competition with the farmers in the neighbourhood of the cities. This competition might make the rents of lands lying round such as were the first to encourage industry, sink in their value. But the hurt in this respect done to the proprietors of these lands would soon be repaired. The cities would increase in bulk, demand would increase also, and prices would rise a-new. Every thing which employs inhabitants usefully promotes consumption; and this again is an advantage to the state, as it draws money from the treasures of the rich into the hands of the industrious. The easy transportation of fruits produces this effect: the distant farmer can employ his idle hours in providing, and the idle days of

his servants and cattle in sending, things to market, from farms which formerly never knew what it was to sell such productions.

I shall carry these speculations no farther, but conclude by observing, that the making of roads must advance population, as they contribute to the advancement of agriculture.

## C H A P. XI.

*Of the Distribution of Inhabitants into Classes; of the Employment and Multiplication of them.*

**H**AVING deduced the effects of modern policy, in assembling so large a proportion of inhabitants into cities, it is proper to point out the principles which should direct the statesman to the proper means of providing, supporting, and employing them. Without this they neither can live nor multiply. Their parent, Earth, has in a manner banished them from her bosom; they have her no more to suckle them in idleness; industry has gathered them together; labor must support them, and that must produce a surplus for bringing up children. If this resource should fail, misery will ensue: the depopulation of the cities will be followed by the ruin of the lands, and all will go to wreck together.

We have already laid down the principles which appear the most natural to engage mankind to labor, supposing all to be free; and we have

observed how slavery, in former times, might work the same effect, as to peopling the world, that trade and industry do now; men were then forced to labor because they were slaves to others, men are forced to labor now because they are slaves to their own wants: provided man be made to labor, and make the earth produce abundantly, and providing that either authority, industry or charity, can make the produce circulate for the nourishment of the free hands, the principle of a great population is brought to a full activity.

I shall now suppose these principles to be well understood. Wants promote industry, industry gives food, food increases numbers: the next question is, how numbers are to be well employed.

It is a general maxim in the mouth of every body; increase the inhabitants of the state: the strength and power of a state is in proportion to the number of its inhabitants.

I am not fond of condemning opinions; but I am very much for limiting general propositions. I have hardly ever escaped being led into error by every one I have laid down. Nothing is so systematical, nothing so pretty in a treatise as general maxims; they facilitate the distribution of our ideas, and I have never been able to dash them out but with a certain regret.

As I often recur to private economics for clearing up my ideas concerning the political, I have asked myself, if it be a general rule, that the master of a family should increase the mouths of it, to the full proportion of all he can feed? Now it is my

opinion, that in a small family well composed, and where every one is properly employed, both master and servants are much happier than in others vastly more numerous, where the same order and regularity is not kept up; and that a small number of well disciplined soldiers is more formidable, and really stronger, than the numerous populace of a large city.

The use of inhabitants is to be mutually serviceable one to another in particular, and to the society in general. Consequently, every state should, in good policy, first apply itself to make the inhabitants they have answer that purpose, before they carry their views towards augmenting their numbers. I think it is absurd to wish for new inhabitants, without first knowing how to employ the old; and it is ignorance of the real effects of population, to imagine that an increase of numbers will infallibly remove inconveniencies which proceed from the abuses of those already existing.

I shall then begin by supposing that inhabitants require rather to be well employed than increased in numbers.

If I know the number of inhabitants, I may know the proportion which die every year: consequently, I know how many pairs of breeders are necessary to keep up the stock. If I want to raise twenty bushels of grain only, I do not sow my lands with twenty bushels. If I have as many children born as there are people who die, I have enough by the supposition. But these children must be raised proportionally, from the different

classes of inhabitants, which I here consider as distributed into two conditions; those who do not labor, and those who do. May I not venture to say, that there is no absolute necessity that those of the first class should multiply in order to recruit the second. If then the second class is kept up to its proper standard by its own multiplication, and if their work be all consumed, will it not be found that the diminution of those mouths who do not work, and which appear only useful in consideration of the consumption they make, is no real loss to the nation? But to this it is objected, that if the number of the first class be diminished, the work of the second will lie upon hand.

Here I look for my answer from what daily experience points out. Two persons (A) and (B) have each 1000*l.* a year; (A) has many children, (B) has none: they both spend their income; (A) upon the necessaries of life for his family, and for the education of his children; for the supplying of which, those of the working class are only employed, for who ever does or gives any thing for money, I consider as a worker: (B) spends his income as a fashionable young gentleman; he has a fine chariot, abundance of footmen in laced liveries; in short, without examining into the particulars of his expense, I find the whole 1000*l.* spent at the end of the year. Neither (A) nor (B) do any work; nor are any of (A's) children necessary as a supply to the working hands, by the supposition. Is it not true then, that (B) has consumed as much work or service, for these I consider as the same thing, as (A) with his family? Nay, I may still go farther, and affirm, that (B) has contributed as much

*pendono 1000 £ per anno: A per i suoi figli B, (che per vivere più comodamente, ed  
in bene alla Nob.?) A spende per nutrire della buona orna; B per nutrire colui che lavorano.*

much, if not more, to population than (A). For if it be true, that he who gives food gives numbers, I say, that the expense of (B) has given food to the children of the industrious employed by him: consequently, in place of having directly contributed to the increase of the idle of the state, which is the case with (A), he has indirectly contributed to the multiplication of the industrious. What good then does the state reap from (A's) children from his marriage, from his multiplication? Indeed, I see no harm although he had remained a bachelor: for those who produce only idle consumers, certainly add neither riches, strength, or ease to a state. And it is of such people alone that there is any question here.

From this I conclude, that there can be no determined number of rich idle consumers necessary to employ a determined number of industrious people, no more than of masters to employ a fixt number of menial servants. Do we not see a single man frequently attended by more servants than are necessary when he gets a wife and family: nay, it many times happens, that a young man, upon his marriage, diminishes the number of his domestics, in order to give bread to his children.

If riches are calculated, as I hope to be able to show, for the encouragement of industry; if circulation is to be accelerated by every method, in order to give bread to those who are disposed to work, or, in other words, who are disposed to become vigorous members of the commonwealth, by contributing with their strength, their ingenuity, or their talents,

to supply her wants, to augment her riches, to promote and administer a good government at home, or to serve it abroad: then, I say, the too great multiplication of those, who come under none of these classes, the idle consumers as I have called them, contribute directly to make the other part languish.

There is no governing a state in perfection, and consequently no executing the plan of a right distribution of the inhabitants, without exactly knowing their situation as to numbers, their employment, the gains upon every species of industry, the numbers produced from each class. These are the means of judging how far those of a particular trade or occupation are in a situation to bring up a family. To examine, on the other hand, the state of the higher classes who do not labor, the ease of their circumstances, and the use the state has for their service, may appear superfluous. Since those who do not work, must be supposed to have where-withal to live; and consequently, not to stand in need of assistance. But this is not every where, nor always the case: many excellent subjects are lost to a state, for want of a proper attention in the statesman to this object.

I have observed how necessary a thing it was to govern a people according to their spirit: now by governing I understand, protecting, cherishing, and supporting, as well as punishing, restraining and exacting. If therefore, there be found in any country, a very numerous nobility, who look upon trade and the inferior arts, as unbecoming their birth; a



good statesman must reflect upon the spirit of former times, and compare it with that of the present. He will then perceive, that these sentiments have been transmitted from father to son, and that six generations are not elapsed since, over all Europe, they were universally adopted: that although the revolution we talked of in the 10th chap. has in effect rendered them less adapted to the spirit of the present times, they are however productive of excellent consequences; they serve as a bulwark to virtue, against the allurements of riches; and it is dangerous to force a set of men who form a considerable body in a state, from necessity, to trample under foot, what they have been persuaded from their infancy to be the test of a noble and generous mind.

About 200 years ago, the nobility of several nations, I mean, by this term, all people well born, whether adorned with particular marks of royal favor or not, used to live upon the produce of their lands. In those days there was little luxury, little circulation; the lands fed numbers of useless mouths, in the modern acceptance of useless, consequently produced a very moderate income in money to the proprietors, who were, notwithstanding, the most considerable persons in the state. This class of inhabitants remaining inactive in the country, during the revolution above mentioned, have, in consequence of the introduction of industry, trade and luxury, insensibly had the balance of wealth, and consequently of consideration turned against them. Of this there is no doubt. This class however has

retained the military spirit, the lofty sentiments ; and notwithstanding of their depression in point of fortune, are found calculated to shine the brightest, when set in a proper elevation. In times of peace, when trade flourishes, the lustre of those who wallow in public money, the weight and consideration of the wealthy merchant, and even the ease and affluence of the industrious tradesman, eclipse the poor nobility: they become an object of contempt to bad citizens, an object of compassion to the good ; and political writers imagine they render them an important service, when they propose to receive them into the lower classes of the people. But when danger threatens from abroad, and when armies are brought into the field, compare the behaviour of those conducted by a warlike nobility, with those conducted by the sons of labor and industry ; those who have glory, with those who have gain for their point of view. Let the state only suffer this nobility to languish without a proper encouragement, there is no fear but they will soon disappear ; their lands will become possessed by people of a way of thinking more a la mode, and the army will quickly adopt new sentiments, more analogous to the spirit of a moneyed interest.

I find nothing more affecting to a good mind, than to see the distress of a poor nobility in both sexes. Some have proposed trade for this class. Why do you not trade ? I answer, for the nobility ; Because, in order to trade, I must have money. This objection is unanswerable. Why then do you not apply to other branches of industry ? If it is the state who

is supposed to ask the question, I ask, in my turn, What advantage she can reap from their industry? What profit from their becoming shop-keepers, weavers, or taylors? Are not, or ought not all these classes to be provided with hands from their own multiplication? What advantage can she reap by the children of one class taking the bread out of the mouths of another?

If the sentiments in which the nobility have been educated, prove detrimental to the state, throw a discouragement upon them. If birth is to be no mark of distinction, let it not be distinguished by any particular privilege, which in appearance sets that class above the level of those with whom the state intends they should be incorporated. You do not make your valet de chambre get behind your coach, though upon an occasion it might be convenient, and though perhaps he had been your footman the day before; you would even turn him out of doors, did he not change his company with his rank.

If you cannot afford to have a nobility, let it die away: grant, as in England, the title of noble to one of a family, and let all the rest be commoners; that is to say, distinguished by no personal privilege whatsoever from the lowest classes of the people. But if you want them to serve you as soldiers, and that they should preserve those sentiments you approve of in a soldier, take care at least of their children. If these appear to you poor and ragged, while they are wandering up and down their fathers land, chasing a wretched hare or a partridge, compare them, when

in the troops, with those of your wealthy neighbours, if any such you have.

The establishment of an *hôtel militaire* shows at least that there are people who lend an ear to such representations. I do not propose that a prince should divert into that channel those streams of wealth which flow from every part of the state, though nothing is more reasonable than for men to pay in order to protect their gains, but let a tax be imposed upon noble property, and let that be applied for the education of the generous youth from their earliest years. There the state will have all under her eye, they are her children, her subjects, and they ask no more than to be taken from the obscurity of their habitations, and rendered capable of being employed while young and vigorous. When they have done their task, the country which produced them will receive them back into her warm bosom; there they will produce others like themselves, and support the spirit and propagation of their own class, without becoming any charge upon others.

A statesman should make it his endeavour to employ as many of every class as possible, and when employment fails in the common run of affairs, to contrive new outlets for young people of every denomination. The old and idle are lost beyond recovery in many particulars.

The mutual relations likewise, through industry, between class and class should be multiplied and encouraged to the utmost. Relations by marriage, I am apt to believe, prove here more hurtful than

beneficial. That is to say, I would rather discourage the intermarriage of the persons of different classes; but I would encourage, as much as possible, all sorts of mutual dependencies between them, in the way of their trades. The last tends to keep every one employed, according to the wants and spirit of his class; the first is productive in general of no good effect that I can perceive; which is reason sufficient for a state to give at least no encouragement to such marriages, and this is all the restraint proper to be imposed.

Such members of the society as remain unemployed, either from natural infirmities or misfortunes, and who thereby become a load upon others, are really a load upon the state. This is a disease which must be endured. There is no body, no thing, without diseases. A state should provide retreats of all sorts, for the different conditions of her decayed inhabitants: humanity, good policy, and christianity, require it. Thus much may be said in general upon the principles which direct the employment and distribution of inhabitants, which in every state must be different, according to circumstances relating to the extension, situation and soil of the country, and above all, to the spirit of the people. I am next to offer some considerations with regard to the proper methods of augmenting numbers.

## C H A P. XII.

*Of the great Advantage of combining a well digested Theory and a perfect Knowledge of Facts with the Part of Government, in order to make a People practical multiply.*

WE have the happiness to live in an age where daily opportunities offer, of perceiving the difference between exercising an art according to the mechanical received practice, and according to the principles which study and refinement have introduced for bringing it to perfection. This will appear in the strongest light to one who compares the operation of building an ordinary house, with that of executing a great public work, where the most able architects are employed; the making a common parish road, with that of a military way, through mountains, forests, and marshes. In the first, every difficulty appears unfurmountable; in the second, the greatest obstacles are made to vanish. By comparing these things, we distinguish between the artist, who proceeds by the rules of the science, and the ordinary tradesman, who has no other resource than common practice, aided by his own ingenuity.

Every branch of science must be carried to perfection by a master in it, formed by the hand of nature, and improved by application and experience. The great genius of Mr. de Colbert saw through the confusion and perplexity of the administration of the French finances; he invented

resources for swelling the public treasure, which never would have been liable to so many inconveniencies as are complained of, had the administration been conducted with as much disinterestedness, as it was set on foot with ability. The genius of Mr. Law was original as to figures and paper credit. Sir Robert Walpole discovered new principles of taxation, he extended the plan of public credit, and reduced the application of it to a science. These were born statesmen, they were creators of new ideas, they found out new principles for the government of men, and led them by their interest to concur in the execution of their plans. Men of a speculative disposition may <sup>imagine ideas</sup> ~~draw hints~~ although the force of theory, destitute of practice, and unassisted by experiment, be not sufficient to carry them the length of forming a plan. A great genius, with power and authority, has occasion for no more than a hint to strike out the system, and to carry it, with success, into execution.

No problems of political economy seem more obscure than those which influence the multiplication of the human species, and which determine the distribution and employment of them, so as best to advance the prosperity of each particular society.

I have no where found these matters treated to my wish, nor have I ever been able to satisfy myself concerning them. There are many clouds which still cover the fruitful fields of this science; and until these be dissipated, the political eye cannot take in the whole <sup>landscape</sup> ~~land~~ <sup>painter's</sup> ~~land~~ <sup>painter's</sup> nor judge of the deformities which appear in the many representations which our modern painters are daily giving of it.

I may here, without an imputation of vanity, put myself so far upon a level with the great Montesquieu, as to adopt the saying of Correggio, *Io anche son pittore*: I am also a dawber; for I frankly acknowledge my own insufficiency to treat this subject with perspicuity: my frequent repetitions, and my often returning to it at different times, in order to clear up my ideas and those of my readers, shows plainly, that I am sensible of my own insufficiency. By setting it in different lights, and viewing it as it were from different stations, perhaps both my reader and I may come at last to see a little clearer.

In a former chapter, I have endeavoured to lay down the principles which influence multiplication: but alas! they are all so general, that they can be considered only as the most remote. They may satisfy a slight speculation, but can be of little use in practice. I have principally insisted upon those which are found to operate at all times among societies where primitive simplicity prevails. Now this matter comes to be examined in a more complex light, as relative to the modern manners of mankind, which no statesman, however able, can change, where trade, industry, luxury, credit, taxes, and debts, are introduced. In these the most polite nations of Europe are involved. This is a chain of adamant, it hangs together by a cohesion, which the successive revolutions of three centuries have so cemented with the spirit of nations, that it appears to be indissoluble. It is not my business to examine how far the modern system is to be preferred to the ancient; my point of view is, to investigate



how a statesman may turn the circumstances which have produced this new plan of economy to the best advantage for mankind, leaving the reformation of such plan to time and events, of which I am not the master. Schemes of recalling ancient simplicity, and of making mankind honest and virtuous, are beautiful speculations: I admire them as much as any body, but not enough to believe them practicable in our degenerate age.

If therefore the principles I here lay down appear contradictory to so amiable a system of policy, let no man thence conclude any thing to my disadvantage upon the account of my particular opinion of it, which is a matter of no importance whatsoever. My object is to examine the consequences of what we feel and see daily passing, and to point out how far the bad may be avoided, and the good turned to the best advantage.

The loss of ancient simplicity, and the introduction of this complicated scheme of living, has rendered the mechanism of government infinitely more difficult, and almost every disorder in the political body affects multiplication. Depopulation is as certain a mark of political diseases, as wasting is of those in the human body. The increase of numbers in a state shows youth and vigor; when numbers do not diminish, we have an idea of manhood, and of age when they decline.

The importance of the subject therefore requires me to bring it once more upon the carpet, in order to inquire into the proper methods of restoring and preserving youth, and of diffusing

vigor into every articulation, into every vein, into every nerve, as I may say, of a modern society.

In the republic of Lycurgus an unmarried man met with no respect; because no reason but debauchery could prevent his marrying. Marriage was no load in a state where all were fed and taken care of at the public charge. A Spartan who did not marry, was considered as one who refused to contribute towards recruiting of the army, only to gratify a vicious habit.

The *jus trium liberorum*, and the other encouragements given by Augustus Cæsar to engage the Romans to marry, were calculated chiefly for the nobility, and only for the citizens, but not at all for the inferior class (the slaves) bound to labor. The vice to be corrected, and that which the emperor had in his eye in those institutions, was the prodigal and dissolute life of rich men who lived in celibacy. This affected the Roman state, and deprived it of its principal force, the military power, the equites. Judge of the force of this class by the numbers of them destroyed at Cannæ. In those days, the chief encouragement to multiplication was to be directed towards the higher classes; the lower classes of the people (by far the most numerous in all countries and in all ages) were easily recruited, by the importation of slaves, as they are now in the West-Indies, where, consequently, the same principle must naturally operate, which fixed the attention of the wise emperor. The state of affairs in Europe, and in England

particularly, is changed entirely, by the establishment of universal liberty. Our lowest classes are absolutely free; they belong to themselves, and must bring up their own children, else the state becomes depopulated. There is no resource to us from importation, whether by ships, or acts of parliament for naturalization. We shall always have a numerous and free common people, and shall constantly have the same inconveniencies to struggle with, as long as the lowest classes remain in such depression as not to be able to support their own numbers. Here then lies the difficulty. In order to have a flourishing state, which Sir William Temple beautifully compared to a pyramid, we must form a large and solid basis of the lowest classes of mankind. As the classes mount in wealth, the pyramid draws narrower until it terminate in a point, (as in monarchy) or in a small square, as in the aristocratical and mixed governments. This lowest class therefore must be kept up, and, as we have said, by its own multiplication. But where every one lives by his own industry, a competition comes in, and he who works cheapest gains the preference. How can a married man, who has children to maintain, dispute this preference with one that is single? The unmarried therefore force the others to starve; and the basis of the pyramid is contracted. Let this short sketch of a most important part of our subject suffice at present; it shall be taken up and examined at more length, in the chapter of physical necessaries, or natural wants.

From this results the principal cause of decay in modern states : it results from liberty, and is inseparably connected with it.

Several modern writers upon this subject, recommend marriage, in the strongest manner, to all classes of inhabitants ; yet a parish priest might, properly enough, not be warranted to join a couple unless they could make it appear that their children were not likely to become a burden to the parish. Could any fault be found, reasonably, with such a regulation ? Those who are gratuitously fed by others are a load upon the state, and no acquisition, certainly, so long as they continue so. Nothing is so easy as to marry ; nothing so natural, especially among the lower sort. But as in order to reap, it is not sufficient to plow and to sow, so in order to bring up children, it is not sufficient to marry. A nest is necessary for every animal which produces a helpless brood : a house is the nest for children ; but every man who can beget a child cannot build or rent a house.

These reflections lead me to make a distinction which I apprehend may be of use in clearing up our ideas concerning population. Let me therefore consider the generation of man in a political light, and it will present itself under two forms. The one as a real multiplication, the other only as procreation.

Children produced from parents who are able to maintain them, and bring them up to a way of getting bread for themselves, do really multiply and serve the state. Those born of parents whose subsistence is precarious, or which is proportioned only to their own physical necessary, have a precarious

existence, and will undoubtedly begin their life by being beggars. Many such will perish for want of food, but many more for want of ease; their mendicity will be accompanied with that of their parents, and the whole will go to ruin; according to the admirable expression of the Marechal de Vauban, in his *Dixme Royale*. *La mendicité, says he, est un mal qui tue bientôt son homme.* He had many examples of the truth of it before his eyes; whoever has not, must have seen little of the world.

When marriage is contracted without the requisites for multiplication, it produces a procreation, attended with the above mentioned inconveniencies; and as by far the greater part of inhabitants are in the lower classes, it becomes the duty of a statesman to provide against such evils, if he intends, usefully to increase the number of his people.

Every plan proposed for this purpose, which does not proceed upon an exact recapitulation of the inhabitants of a country, parish by parish, will prove nothing more than an expedient for walking in the dark. Among such recapitulations or lists I would recommend, as an improvement upon those I have seen in the Marechal de Vauban's excellent performance above cited, and in the states of his Prussian Majesty, or elsewhere, to have one made out, classing all the inhabitants, not only by the trades they exercise, but by those of their fathers, with a view to distinguish those classes which multiply, from those which only procreate. I should be glad also to see bills of mortality made out for every class, principally to compare the births and deaths of the children in them.

Let me take an example. Suppose then, that I have before me a general recapitulation of all the inhabitants of a country, parish by parish, where they may appear distributed under the respective denominations of their fathers' employment. I shall immediately find a considerable number produced from the higher classes, from those who live upon an income already provided, and upon branches of industry which produce an easy and ample subsistence. These have no occasion for the assistance of the state in bringing up their children, and you may encourage marriage, or permit celibacy in such classes, in proportion to the use you find for their offspring when they are brought up. When, I come to the lower classes, I examine, for example, that of shoemakers, where I find a certain number produced. This number I first compare with the number of shoemakers actually existing, and then with the number of marriages subsisting among them, (for I suppose recapitulations of every kind) from which I discover the fertility of marriage, and the success of multiplication in that part. When the state of the question is examined, class by class, I can decide where marriage succeeds, and where it does not. I have said, that I imagine it an advantage that every class should support at least its own numbers; and when it does more, I should wish (were it possible) that the higher classes might be recruited from the lower, rather than the lower from the higher; the one seems a mark of prosperity, the other of decay:  
but

but I must confess that the first is by far the most difficult to be obtained.

According therefore to circumstances, and in consistence with these principles, I would encourage marriage by taking the children off the hands of their parents. Where marriage succeeds the worst, if it happens to be in a very low class, great encouragement should be given to it: perhaps the whole should be taken care of. Certain trades may be loaded with one child, others with two, and so progressively. But of this, more in another place. I beg it may not here be imagined that I propose, that the whole of the lower classes of people are to marry and propagate, and that the state is to feed all their offspring. My view extends no farther, than to be assured of having such a number of children yearly taken care of as shall answer the multiplication proposed, and that these be proportionally raised from each class, and from each part of the country, and produced from marriages protected by the state, distinguished from the others, which under a free government must always be found exposed to the inconveniencies of want and misery. To guard against such evils ought to be another object of public care. Hospitals for foundlings are an admirable institution; and colonies are an outlet for superfluous inhabitants. But I insensibly enter into a detail which exceeds my plan. To lay down a scheme, you must suppose a particular state perfectly known. This lies beyond my reach, and therefore I shall go no farther, but illustrate what I have said, by

some observations and reflections which seem analogous to the subject.

I have not here proposed plans of multiplication inconsistent with the spirit of the nations with which I am a little acquainted; nor with the religion professed in Europe, for many reasons, obvious to any rational man. But principally, because, I believe, it will be found, that a sufficient abundance of children are born already; and that we have neither occasion for concubinage, nor polygamy, to increase their numbers. But we want a right method of taking care of those we have, in order to produce a multiplication proportioned to the possibility of our providing nourishment and employment. I have therefore proposed, that a statesman, well informed of the situation of his people, the state of every class, the number of marriages found in each, should say, let there be so many marriages authorized in every class, distributed in a certain proportion for every parish, city, borough, &c. in the country; let rules be laid down to direct a preference, in case of a competition, between different couples; and let the consequence of this approbation be, to relieve the parents of all children above a certain number, as has been said. I propose no new limitations upon marriage, because I am a friend to liberty, and because such limitations would shock the spirit of the times. I therefore would strongly recommend hospitals for foundlings over all the country; and still more strongly the frugal maintenance of



children in such hospitals, and their being bred up early to fill and recruit the lowest classes of the people.

## C. H., A. P. XIII.

*Continuation of the same Subject, with regard to the Necessity of having exact Lists of Births, Deaths, and Marriages, for every Class of Inhabitants in a modern Society.*

MR. Derham has furnished some tables which show the proportion between marriages and births in England, to be as 1 to 4; that of births to burials as 1  $\frac{1}{2}$  to 1: from which it appears that multiplication there goes on, though slowly: a mark of youth and vigor. Dr. Davenant values the augmentation at 9000 a year. Could matters be kept at that standard, I should prefer it by far to a more rapid multiplication: it amounts to about a million in a century (without entering into accumulations or exact calculations) and the longer youth is preserved so much the better. A rapid multiplication will stop at some period, and that stop, which marks distress, must produce great inconveniencies.

These calculations extracted from very lame vouchers, show how necessary it is to have authentic recapitulations: since, lame as they are, it is from these and the like, that Dr. Halley, and others, have calculated the value of annuities, which (at a time when all the states of Europe are borrowing

money at the expense of every man's private industry or property) ought to be valued at their real worth. Now, in all these calculations of mortality; it appears that what we have called the abuse of marriage or procreation is included.

If it be true, as I think it is, from what I have seen and observed, that numbers, especially of children, among the lower classes, perish from the effects of indigence; either directly by want of food, or by diseases contracted gradually from the want of convenient ease; and that others perish for want of care, when the slightest assistance of a surgeon to let them blood, would be sufficient to preserve them against the inflammatory distempers to which they are chiefly exposed.

If these things are so, must we not infer, that calculations formed upon a conclusion drawn from the births and deaths of mankind in general, cannot possibly be so exact as if the like were drawn from those of every class of inhabitants taken separately.

It may here be answered, that among the rich and easy, there are found diseases which sweep off numbers, in as great a proportion as other distempers do of the poor: that we see very large families brought up among the lowest classes, while a great man has all the pains in the world to preserve a young boy from the wreck of a number of children.

All this I agree may be true; but I should be glad to see in what proportion it is so, and to be certain of the fact. I want to know the diseases of the rich and of the poor; I want to have as particular details of the births and deaths of every

class, as I can have of those of the cities of Paris, London, or Breslaw. I want to know from what parents those multitudes of poor which I find every where are sprung; and most of all to have such accounts from different countries, where different manners prevail. For no just conclusion can be drawn from the comparison of facts, without examining circumstances. The most barren class in one country, may be the most fruitful in another. As an example of this, let any one compare the state of marriage among the footmen of London and of Paris.

I find error concealed every where under general propositions. The children of the poor, says one, thrive better than those of the rich. If it be so, it ought not to be so in common reason. But the same person will tell you, I have made my son a merchant; he will be a rich man. Why? Because (A B) was a merchant, who, from nothing, died worth a hundred thousand pounds. But if you go through all the letters of the alphabet following (A B), among those who set out as he did, you will find, that perhaps every one of them died a bankrupt. Those who prove successful are remarkable: those who miscarry are never heard of. It is just so with respect to the question before us. But to return to our tables, and what are called calculations.

One marriage produces four children at a medium in England. If you reckon 6,000,000 of people in that country, and that  $\frac{1}{20}$  part dies annually, then to keep up the stock it is sufficient that 200,000 be annually born; add to this the yearly increase of 9000,

the total of births will then be 209,000: for if 200,000 die this year, and if 209,000 be born, this must certainly imply an increase of 9000, providing we suppose the acquisition of foreigners to be equal to the exportation of the natives. As this is only meant as an illustration, I need not examine the matter of fact. The next question is, how many marriages, properly contracted or encouraged as above, will give this increase? For we may know that these subsisting in that kingdom, joined with the effects of extramatrimonial conjunctions, is just sufficient to produce it. I imagine that nothing but experiment can give the solution of this question. Mr. King supposes every 104th person in England to marry yearly, that is 57,682 persons, or 28,841 couples. If this number of marriages be supposed to subsist with fertility for seven years, producing a child every year, the number of 200,000 births would be procured; but I apprehend that marriages, rightly contracted, subsist much longer in general than seven years, even with fertility, though not in proportion to a child every year: consequently, the number of marriages constantly subsisting with fertility in England, where it is supposed that 28,841 are yearly contracted, must be much greater than seven times that number, or than 201,887. If we suppose the whole of the 209,000 births to be produced by marriages, at three marriages to every child annually produced, then the number of marriages subsisting will be 627,000. From these speculations (for I do not pretend to call them calculations) I conclude, that the more fruitful marriages are rendered

(not with regard to procreation, merely, but multiplication, which I have above distinguished) the fewer become necessary; and the fewer unnecessary marriages are contracted, the better for the state, and the less misery for those who contract them. I shall here stop, and leave to the reader to draw his conclusions, putting him in mind of the wide difference that is always found between theory and practice.

From this reasoning I infer, that no exact judgment can be formed, as to the numbers in any society, from the single datum of the annual number of deaths among them; and although the just proportion between numbers and deaths may exactly be determined in one particular place, yet that proportion will not serve as a general standard, and being taken for granted may lead to error.

Here are the reasons for my opinion.

Were no body to marry but such as could maintain their children, the bills of births and burials would, I apprehend, diminish, and yet numbers might remain as before; and were every body to marry who could procreate, they certainly would increase, but still numbers would never exceed the proportion of subsistence. Could we but see bills of births and deaths for the city of Rome, while in all its glory; or indeed for the sugar colonies in America, where slaves are imported, adding the number of those imported, to that of births, and supposing the colony neither upon the growing nor the declining hand, then the deaths and births would be equal; but the proportion of them to all in the colony, I apprehend,

would be far less than in any state in Europe, where slavery does not prevail.

It may be alledged, that were all to marry, the consequence would be a great multiplication. I say not; or if it were, what sort of multiplication would it be? A multitude of children who never could come to manhood; or who would starve their parents, and increase misery beyond expression. All therefore that can be learned from bills of mortality, &c. is, that if the births exceed the deaths, and that all remain in the country, numbers will increase; that if the deaths exceed the births, numbers will diminish; but while they stand at par, no conclusion can be drawn as to numbers in general: these will be in a less proportion as abusive procreation goes forward; and, *vice versa*, they will be in a greater. There still hangs a cloud upon this subject: let me therefore reason upon an example. Suppose the inhabitants of a country to stand at 6,000,000, one thirtieth to die every year, and as many to be born, that is, the births and burials to stand at 200,000; that every three marriages subsisting produce a child every year, that is 600,000 marriages; let the quantity of food be supposed the same, without a possibility of being augmented. Would not the consequence be, that numbers could not increase? Now let me suppose marriages carried to, 1,000,000, I say the effect would be, either that they would become in general less fruitful, or if they suffered no diminution in this particular, that the bills of births and deaths would rise to 333,333; that is to

say, they would be to the number of inhabitants as 1 to 18, instead of being as 1 to 30. Now this increase of mortality proceeding from want of food, either the old would starve the young, or the young would starve the old; or a third case, more probable than either, would happen, the rich would starve the poor. What would be the consequences in all these three suppositions? In the first, the number of 6,000,000 would be found to diminish; because the proportion of large consumers would rise, and mortality would increase among the children. In the second, the standard number would augment, because the proportion of small consumers would rise, and mortality would increase among the parents. In the third, numbers would remain pretty much the same, but misery and distress would lay all the lower classes waste. It is computed that one half of mankind die before the age of puberty in countries where numbers do not augment; from this I conclude, that too many are born. If methods therefore are fallen upon to render certain diseases less mortal to children, all the good that will be got by it, in general, will be to render old people of the lower classes more wretched; for if the first are brought to live, the last must die.

From these speculations I cannot help wishing to see bills of mortality made out for different classes, as well as for different ages. Were this executed it would be an easy matter to perceive, whether the mortality among children proceeds from diseases to which infancy is necessarily exposed,

or from abusive procreation. I am pretty much convinced before I see the experiment, that it proceeds from the latter; but should experience prove it, the principles I have laid down would acquire an additional force. In the mean time, I must conclude, that it is not for want of marrying that a people does not increase, but from the want of subsistence; and it is miserable and abusive procreation which starves one half of the whole, and is the fountain of so much wretchedness.

Upon the whole, I may say, that were it possible to get a view of the general state of births and burials in every class of the inhabitants of a country, marriage might surely be put upon a better footing than ever it has been, for providing a determined number of good and wholesome recruits every year towards national multiplication. This is walking in the light, and is a means of procuring whatever augmentation of hands you wish for. What difficulties may be found in the execution, nothing but experience can show; and this, to a judicious eye, will point out the remedy. In my opinion, this will be far better than a general naturalization, which I take to be a leap in the dark. For however easy it may be to naturalize men, I believe nothing is so difficult as to naturalize customs and foreign habits; and the greatest blessing any nation can enjoy, is an uniformity of opinion upon every point which concerns public affairs and the administration of them. When God blesses a people, he makes them unanimous, and bestows upon them a governor who loves them,



and who is beloved, honored and respected by them; this, and this only, can create unanimity.

Let this suffice at present, as to the distribution, employment, and increase of a people. Upon the proper employment of the free hands, the prosperity of every state must depend: consequently the principal care of a statesman should be, to keep all employed, and for this purpose he must acquire an exact knowledge of the state of every denomination, in order to prevent any one from rising above, or sinking below that standard which is best proportioned to the demand made for their particular industry. As the bad consequences resulting from the loss of this exact balance are not immediate, a moderate attention, with the help of the proper recapitulations, will be sufficient to direct him.

This and the two preceding chapters have in a manner wholly treated of the employment of the free hands: I must now consider the effects of an overcharge of those employed in agriculture. Here we shall still discover inconveniencies, resulting from the want of that just proportion in the distribution of classes, which gives health and vigor to a state; and we shall see how it may happen, that even an overcharge of inhabitants in general may become a political disease; as an abundance of blood, however rich and good, may affect the health of the human body.

## C H A P. XIV.

*Of the Abuse of Agriculture and Population.*

I HAVE taken notice above of two performances, wherein the authors, with equal ability, have treated of the numbers of mankind; a subject which has a very close connexion with political economy.

Although (as I have said) I do not pretend to decide between them as to the point in dispute, I find that in this chapter I shall be naturally led into a chain of reasoning very contrary to that of Mr. Wallace, which is a thing I should have dispensed with, did not the merit of his performance in the eyes of the learned world appear sufficient to draw my attention.

Agriculture is without all doubt the foundation of multiplication, which must ever be in proportion to it; that is, to the earth's productions, as has been said. But it does not follow, that in proportion to multiplication those produced must of course become useful to one another, and useful to the society in general. Now I consider multiplication as no otherwise useful to a state, than in so far as the additional number becomes so, to those who are already existing, whom I consider as the body-politic of the society. If it therefore happens, that an additional number produced do no more than feed themselves, then I perceive no advantage gained to the society by their production.

If, without rendering any equivalent service, they are fed by others, there is a loss.

Agriculture may be said to be carried to its utmost extent, when the earth is so labored as to produce the greatest quantity of fruits possible for the use of man; and in judging of the improvement of two spots of ground of the same extent, that may be said to be most improved which produces the greatest quantity of food: but as to population, the question does not stop there, for let the quantity be equal on both, yet if the inhabitants of the one be more frugal livers than those of the other, this circumstance alone will make an inequality. If agriculture therefore be considered only with respect to population, we must consider that country as the best peopled, where productions are the most abundant, and where the inhabitants are the most sober. Thus much with regard to the extent of agriculture and population: we come now to consider the inconveniencies which may result to a society from an over-stretch, or from what I call an abuse of either the one or the other.

I call every thing an abuse in society which implies a contradiction to the spirit of it, or which draws along with it an inconveniency to certain classes, which is not compensated by the general welfare.

The political economy of government is brought to perfection, when every class in general, and every individual in particular, is made to be aiding and assisting to the community, in proportion to the assistance he receives from it. This conveys

my idea of a free and perfect society, which is, *a general tacit contract, from which reciprocal and proportional services result universally between all those who compose it.*

Whenever therefore any one is found, upon whom nobody depends, and who depends upon every one, as is the case with him who is willing to work for his bread, but who can find no employment, there is a breach of the contract, and an abuse. For the same reason, if we can suppose any person entirely ~~taken~~ <sup>applied</sup> up in feeding himself, depending upon no one, and having nobody depending on him, we lose the idea of society, because there are no reciprocal obligations between such a person and the other members of the society.

Those who are for employing the whole of a people in agriculture may answer, that all their time cannot be employed in this occupation, and that in the intervals they may apply themselves to supply reciprocal wants.

I very readily agree, that any person, who would calculate his labor in agriculture, purely for his own subsistence, would find abundance of idle hours. But the question is, whether in good economy such a person would not be better employed in providing *nourishment* for others, than in providing for any other want. When he provides food, he surely provides for a want; and experience shows, that it is better for a man to apply close to one trade, than to turn himself to several.

Hence I conclude, that the best way of binding a free society together, is by multiplying reciprocal

obligations, and creating a general dependence between all its members. This cannot be better effected, than by appropriating a certain number of inhabitants, for the production of the quantity of food required for all, and by distributing the remainder into proper classes for supplying every other want. I say farther, that this distribution is not only the most rational, but that mankind fall naturally into it; and misery attends and has ever attended those who have been found without a particular employment.

It must not be concluded from this reasoning, that abuse is always implied when we find any of the classes of the free hands of a state casually employed in agriculture.

There is such a variety of circumstances in every country, that without a peculiar talent of laying principles together, so as to answer every combination, the most perfect theory which can be proposed must appear defective.

In countries ill-improved, where industry begins to take root, we are not to conclude, that good policy requires a sudden and immediate separation between the dwellings of the husbandmen and free hands. Sudden revolutions are constantly hurtful, and a good statesman ought to lay down his plan of arriving at perfection by gradual steps.

If he finds, as is the case of rude and uncivilized societies, that many are occupied, partly, in providing subsistence for their own family, partly, in other useful pursuits, he may by degrees detach as many as he can from every other branch of

industry, except that of agriculture. The most wealthy are the most proper to carry this branch to any degree of perfection. The landed men ought to be encouraged by every means to apply to the study of farming. This employment has been considered as honorable in all ages of the world, and very well suits the rank, the interest, and the amusement of gentlemen.

The next step is to introduce manufactures into the country, and to provide a ready market abroad for every superfluous part of them. The allurements of gain will soon engage every one to pursue that branch of industry which succeeds best in his hands. By these means many will follow manufactures and abandon agriculture; others will prosecute their manufactures in the country, and avail themselves at the same time, of small portions of land, proper for gardens, grass for cows, and even for producing certain kinds of fruit necessary for their own maintenance.

This I do not consider as a species of farming. It is more properly, in a political light, a sort of village life, only the village here appears dispersed over a large extent; and I call it a village life, because here the occupation of the inhabitants is principally directed towards the prosecution of their trades: agriculture is but a subaltern consideration, and will be carried on so far only, as it occasions no great avocation from the main object. It will however have the effect to parcel out the lands into small possessions: a system admirably calculated for the improvement of the soil, and advantageous to population,

population, when the spirit of industry is not thereby checked. This is not the case when such possessors apply totally to agriculture, and content themselves with a bare subsistence from it, without prosecuting any other branch of industry, or forming any plan of ambition for themselves, or for their children's emerging from so circumscribed a sphere of life: from this alone proceeds, in most countries, the inconveniency of a minute subdivision of land property.

We shall presently see, by various examples, the truth of this proposition; and from what observations I have been able to make, it appears, that a great inconvenience flows from it; the *property* of the lands, and not the *bare possession* of them, is vested in the lower classes. While they only remain as tenants, the interest of the proprietor, on one hand, will lead him to incorporate these small possessions into larger farms, the moment the possessors, by relaxing from their principal occupation (industry) are no longer able to pay a rent above the value of the grounds when let in farms; and the interest of these tenants, on the other hand, will frequently lead them to abandon such small possessions, when the prosecution of their industry demands a change of habitation. Thus the interest of agriculture will go hand in hand with that of industry, and classes will separate their habitations, according as their respective interests require.

It is certainly the interest of every landlord, whose land is ill improved, to multiply habitations upon it, providing he makes choice of such people as can

live by some other branch of industry than bare agriculture: and, in many cases, it may be his advantage to incorporate his lands into farms as soon as they are fully cultivated. By this plan he will advance the improvement of his land; he will multiply the useful inhabitants; and he will at the same time share the profits of their industry beyond the value of the land rent.

By these means has the woollen manufacture in England, and the linen in Ireland and Scotland been greatly augmented. But as the improvement of land goes on, this economy will decline: towns will swell in consequence of the principles we are now going to deduce; the lands will become more thinly inhabited; and farms will by degrees grow more extensive. I appeal to experience for the justness of this opinion.

Hence it plainly appears, that, in every light this matter can be represented, we still find it impossible to employ usefully above a certain part of a people in agriculture. The next question is, how to determine the just proportion. For this purpose, we must have recourse to facts, not to theory. We have, in a former chapter, examined the state of this question with regard to one country. I shall here only add, that, in proportion to the culture of the soil, and to the number of crops it is made to produce, a greater or less number will be required; and in proportion to the surplus of food above what is necessary to maintain the laborers, will a number of free hands be provided for. If therefore a species of agriculture can be found established, which produces little or



no surplus, *there* little or no industry can be exercised; few wants can be supplied: this will produce a wonderful simplicity of manners, will ruin the system of modern policy, and produce what I must call an abuse. Let me look for some examples, in order to set this question in a clearer light.

In the wine-provinces of France, we find the lands which lie round the villages divided into very small lots, and there cultivation is carried to a very extraordinary height. These belong *in property* to the peasants, who cultivate the vines. No frugality can be greater than in the consumption of this produce, and the smallest weed which comes up among the grain, is turned to account, for the food of animals. The produce of such lands, I may say, is entirely consumed by the proprietor and his family, who are all employed in the cultivation, and there is no superfluous quantity here produced for the maintenance of others. Does not this resemble the distribution of lands made by the Romans in favor of 5000 Sabine families, where each received two *plethra* of ground. [See numbers of Mankind, p. 23.] Now let me examine the political state of agriculture, and of other labor performed by my French vine-dresser.

By the supposition we imply, that the bit of land is sufficient for maintaining the man and his family, and nothing more; he has no grain to sell, no food can by him be supplied to any other person whatever; but the state of other lands capable of yielding a surplus, such as the vineyard, produces a demand for his labor. This labor, considered with

*ma lo stato de  
altri terre cap  
di remunerarsi*

*Per la supposizione. non si conseguirà*

*1 2 un sopra più, come un  
vigneto, produce un*

*limanda per suo lavoro. Questo lavoro, considerato rispetto  
al vignajo è un capitale per provvedere tutti i  
sui bisogni in manifatture, ed essere e ciò che  
verrà debbasi arrivare a suo profitto, oltre*

respect to the vine-dresser, is a fund for providing all his wants in manufactures, salt, &c. and what is over must be considered at his profits, out of which he pays the royal impositions. The same labor, considered with regard to the proprietor of the vineyard, enters into that necessary deduction out of the fruits, which, when deducted, leaves the remainder, which we call surplus, or what answers to the land rent. This belongs to the proprietor, and becomes a fund for supplying all his wants.

Here we have an idea of society. The vine-dresser depends upon the proprietor for the price of his labor; the proprietor upon the vine-dresser for his surplus. But did we suppose all the kingdom parcelled out, and labored, as the spot which lies round the village, what would become of the vine-dresser with regard to all his other wants; there would be no vines to dress, no surplus nourishment any where found, consequently no employment, not even life, for those who had no land. From this example we discover the difference between agriculture exercised *as a trade* and *as a direct means of subsisting*, a distinction to be attended to, as it will very frequently occur in the prosecution of our subject. We have the two species in the vine-dresser: he labors the vineyard as a trade, and his spot of ground for subsistence. We may farther conclude, that, as to the last part, he is only useful to himself; but, as to the first, he is useful to the society, and becomes a member of it; consequently, were it not for his trade, the state would lose nothing, though the vine-dresser and his land were both swallowed up by an earthquake. The food and the consumers

would both disappear together, without the least political harm to any body: consequently, such a species of agriculture is no benefit to a state; and consequently, neither is that species of multiplication, implied by such a distribution of property, any benefit. Thus an over-extension of agriculture and division of lands becomes an abuse, and so, consequently, does an over-multiplication.

Here I am obliged to conclude, that those passages of Roman authors which mention the frugality of that people, and the small extent of their possessions cannot be rightly understood, without the knowledge of many circumstances relative to the manners of those times. For if you understand such a distribution of lands to have extended over all the Roman territory, the number of the citizens would have far exceeded what they appear to have been by the Census, and even surpass all belief. But farther, I may be allowed to ask, whether or no it be supposed that these frugal Romans labored this small portion of lands with their own hands and consumed the produce of it? If I am answered in the affirmative, (which is necessary to prove the advantages of agriculture's being exercised by all the classes of a people) then I ask, from whence were the inhabitants of Rome, and other cities, subsisted; who fed the armies when in the field? If these were fed by foreign grain imported, or plundered from their neighbours, where was the advantage of this subdivision of lands, and of this extensive agriculture, which could not feed the inhabitants of the state? If it be said, that notwithstanding this frugal distribution of property

among the citizens, there was still found surplus enough to supply both Rome and the armies, will it not then follow, that there was no necessity for employing all the people in agriculture, since the labor of a part might have sufficed.

*That number of husbandmen, therefore, is the best, which can provide food for all the state; and that number of inhabitants is the best, which is compatible with the full employment of every one of them.*

Idle mouths are only useful to themselves, not to the state; consequently, are not an object of the care of the state, any farther than to provide employment for them; and their welfare (while they remain useless to others) is, in a free country, purely a matter of private concern. Let me take another example for the farther illustration of this matter.

Those who travel into the southern provinces of Spain, find large tracts of land quite uncultivated, producing only a scanty pasture for herds of the lesser cattle. Here and there are found interspersed some spots of watered lands, which, from the profusion of every gift which nature can bestow, strike a northern traveller with an idea of paradise. In such places villages are found, and numbers of inhabitants. It must be allowed that industry and labor do not here go forward as in other countries; but to supply this want charity steps in. Charity in Spain (in proportion to its extent) is as powerful a principle towards multiplication as industry and labor. *Whatever gives food gives numbers*; but charity cannot extend beyond superfluity, and this must ever be in proportion to industry. These watered lands are

well labored and improved. The value of them in one sense, is in proportion to their fertility, and the surplus of the laborers should naturally be given for an equivalent in money or work: but this equivalent cannot be found, because the consumers have neither the one nor the other. If the Spaniards, therefore, were not the most charitable people upon earth, it is very plain that the laboring of these watered lands would diminish, until it came upon a level with the wealth and industry of the consumers. But here it is otherwise: labor goes on mechanically, and without combination of circumstances, and the poor live in ease, in proportion to the plenty of the year.

Here then is a third principle of multiplication. The first is slavery, or a violent method of making mankind labor; the second is industry, which is a rational excitement to it; the third is charity, which resembles the manna in the desert, the gift of God upon a very extraordinary occasion; and when nothing else could have preserved the lives of his people. Whether, in all cases, this principle of christianity advances the prosperity of a modern society (when complied with from obedience to precept, without consulting reason as to the circumstances of times and situations) is a question which lies out of my road to examine. The action, considered in the intention of the agent, must in every case appear highly beautiful, and we plainly see how far it contributes to multiplication, though we do not so plainly perceive how this again is advantageous to society.

Now if we examine the state of agriculture in the territory of this Spanish village, we find, upon the whole, no more surplus of fruits than upon the French vine dresser's portion of land; consequently, if all Spain was labored and inhabited like this village and its small garden, as it is called, it would be the most populous country in the world, the most simple in the manner of living; but it never could communicate the idea of a vigorous or a flourishing state. It is the employment alone of the inhabitants which can impress that character.

Now in this last example, what a number of free hands do we find! are not all the poor of this class? Would it not be better if all these by their labor could purchase their subsistence, than be obliged to receive it in the precarious manner they do? Can one suppose all these people industrious, without implying what I call superfluity of labor? Is not this luxury, according to my definition of it? Where would be the harm if the Spanish farmer, who gives a third of his crop in charity, should in return receive some changes of raiment, some convenient furniture for his house, some embellishment to his habitation; these things would cost him nothing; he would receive them in exchange for what he now gives from a principle of charity, and those who have a precarious, would have a certain livelihood. Let us travel a little farther in search of the abuse of population.

In Germany, we find many small towns, formed into corporations, which enjoy certain privileges,

*beno popolate e coltivate in piccole porzioni, sarebbe la più popolata, ma condannata ad una vita rozza, la quale non ci potrebbe dar punto l'idea di uno stato florido e vigoroso —*

*se noi convertiamo lo stato dell'agricoltura in questo territorio della Spagna, noi troviamo, nel  
tutto, una copia di prodotti non più maggiori di quelli del pezzo di terra che  
popoli della Spagna, per conseguenza se tutte la Spagna popolata così*

The freedom of such towns is not easily purchased; and one, upon considering outward circumstances, must be not a little surpris'd to hear of the sums refused, when offered, to obtain it. Round these towns there is a small territory divided into very small portions, and not able to maintain the inhabitants: these lands therefore are infinitely overstocked with husbandmen; for every proprietor, less or more, concerns himself with the cultivation. Here, one who would aspire to extend his possession would, according to the sentiment of Manius Curius Dentatus, certainly be considered as a dangerous citizen, and a hurtful member of the society. Those lots are divided among the children of the proprietors, who are free of the town, by which means they are constantly splitting by multiplication, and consolidating by death, and by marriage: these nearly balance one another, and property remains divided as before. A stranger is at a loss to find out the reason why the liberty of so poor a little town should be so valuable. Here it is; first there are certain advantages enjoyed in common, such as the privilege of pasture on the town lands, and others of a like nature; but I find the charges which the burgessees are obliged to pay, may more than compensate them. The principal reason appears to be, that no one who has not the liberty of the town, can settle in a way of industry so as to marry and have a family: because without this his labor can only be directed towards furnishing the wants of peasants who live in villages; these are few, and little ingenuity is

required for it. In towns there is found a greater diversity of wants, and the people there have found out mechanically, that if strangers were allowed to step in and supply them, their own children would starve; therefore the heads of the corporation, who have an interest to keep up the price of work, have also an interest to hold the liberty of their town at a high value. This appears to me a pretty just representation of the present state of some towns I have seen, relative to the present object of inquiry.

But as industry becomes extended, and trade and manufactures are established, this political economy must disappear.

Such a change, however, will not probably happen without the interposition of the sovereign, and a new plan of administration; what else can give a turn to this spirit of idleness, or rather, as I may call it, of this trifling industry? Agriculture can never be a proper occupation for those who live in towns: this therefore is an abuse of it, or rather indeed an abuse of employment.

Ease and plenty can never enter a little town, but by the means of wealth; wealth can never come in but by the produce of labor going out; and when people labor purely for their own subsistence, they only make the little money they have circulate, but can acquire nothing new; and those who with difficulty can maintain themselves, can never hope to increase their numbers.

If in spite of the little industry set on foot in such towns, the generative faculty shall work its

*l'aggio e l'abbondanza non può penetrare in una piccola  
città senza l'aiuto della ricchezza, questa non può  
venirle.*



effect and increase numbers, this will make the poor parents still divide, and misery will ensue; this again may excite compassion, and that will open the chests of those who have a charitable disposition: hospitals are founded for the relief of the poor, they are quickly filled, and as many necessitous remain as ever. The reason is plain; the hospital applies a palliative for the abuse, but offers no cure. A tree is no sooner discharged of its branches than it pushes new ones. It has been said, that numbers are in proportion to food; consequently, poor are in proportion to charity. Let the King give his revenue in charity, he will soon find poor enough to consume it. Let a rich man spend 100,000*l.* a year upon a table; he will find guests (the best in the kingdom) for every cover. These things, in my way of considering them, are all analogous, and flow from the same principle. And the misery found in these little German towns, is another modification of the abuse of population. These examples show the inconveniencies and abuses which result from a misapplication of inhabitants to agriculture, which produces a population more burdensome than beneficial to a modern state.

If the simplicity of the ancients is worthy of imitation, or if it appears preferable to the present system, which it is not my business to decide, then either slavery must be introduced to make those subsist who do not labor, or they must be fed upon charity. Labor and industry can never, I think, be recommended on one hand, and the effects of them proscribed on the other. If a great

body of warlike men (as was the case in Sparta) be considered as essential to the well being of the state; if all trade and all superfluity be forbid amongst them, and no employment but military exercises allowed; if all these warriors be fed at public tables, must you not either have a set of helotes to plow the ground for them, or a parcel of charitable Spanish farmers to feed them gratis.

Thus much I have thought might, be of use to say to illustrate the principles I have laid down. I find these very contrary to the reasoning which runs through the whole of the performance which I mentioned above, and which I have had in my eye. A more particular examination of it might be useful, and even amusing; but it would engage me in too long a disquisition for the nature of this work. I cannot however help, in this place, adding one observation more, in consequence of our principles, which *seems* contrary to the strain of our ingenious author's reasoning. I say *seems*, because almost all difference of opinion upon such subjects proceeds from the defect of language in transmitting our ideas when complex or abstract.

The effect of diseases which sweep off numbers of people does not essentially diminish population, except when they come suddenly or irregularly, any more than it would necessarily dispeople the world if all mankind were to be swept off the stage at the age of forty six years. I apprehend that in man, as in every other animal, the generative faculty is more than able to repair all losses occasioned by regular diseases; and I have shown, I think, more

than once, that multiplication never can stop but for want of food. As long then as the labor of man can continue annually to produce the same quantity of food as at present, and that motives are found to make him labor, the same numbers may be fed, and the generative faculty, which from one pair has produced so many millions, would certainly do more than keep up the stock, although no person were to pass the age above mentioned. Here is the proof: was the life of man confined to forty six years, the state of mortality would be increased in the proportion which those who die above forty six bear to those who die under this age. This proportion is, I believe, as 1 to 10, consequently, mortality would increase  $\frac{1}{10}$ , consequently, numbers would be kept up by  $\frac{1}{10}$  increase upon births; and surely the generative faculty of man far exceeds this proportion, when the other requisites for propagation, to wit, food, &c. are to be found, as by the supposition.

## C H A P. XV.

*Application of the above Principles to the State of Population in Great-Britain.*

A LETTER from Dr. Brakenridge, F. R. S. addressed to George Lewis Scott, Esq; which I found in the Danish Mercury for March 1758, furnishes me with a very good opportunity of applying the principles we have been laying down to

the state of population in Great-Britain. I shall therefore, according to my plan, pass in review that gentleman's opinion, without entering upon any refutation of it. I shall extract the propositions he lays down, examine the conclusions he draws from them, and then show wherein they differ from those which result from the theory established in this inquiry.

The author's calculations and suppositions as to matters of fact shall be taken for granted, as I believe the first are as good as any that can be made, upon a subject where all the data required for solving the problem are quite a piece of guess-work.

I must follow the Mercury, not having the original.

PROP. I. After a very close examination, says our author, I find, that our islands gain, as to population, absolutely no more than what is requisite for repairing their losses, and that, in England itself, numbers would diminish; were they not recruited from Ireland and Scotland.

PROP. II. Men, able to carry arms, that is from 18 to 56 years, make, according to Dr. Halley, the fourth part of a people; and when a people increase in numbers, every denomination, as to age, increases in that proportion: consequently in England, where the number of inhabitants does not exceed six millions, if the annual augmentation upon the whole do not exceed 18,000, as I am pretty sure it does not, the yearly augmentation of those fit to carry arms will be only 4,500.

PROP. III. In England, burials are to births, as

100 is to 113. I suppose that, in Scotland and Ireland, they may be as 100 is to 124. And as there may be, in these two last kingdoms, about two millions and a half of inhabitants, the whole augmentation may be stated at 15,000; and consequently that, of such as are fit to carry arms, at 3,750. Add this number to those annually produced in England, and the sum total of the whole augmentation in the British isles will be about 8,250.

PROP. IV. The strangers, who arrive in England, in order to settle, are supposed to compensate those who leave the country with the same intent.

PROP. V. It is out of this number of 8,250, that all our losses are to be deduced. If the colonies, wars, and navigation, carry off from us annually 8000 men, the British isles cannot augment in people: if we lose more, numbers must diminish.

PROP. VI. By calculations, such as they are, our author finds, that, upon an average of 66 years, from 1690 to 1756, this number of 8000 have been annually lost, that is, have died abroad in the colonies, in war, or on the account of navigation.

PROP. VII. That, since the inhabitants of Britain and Ireland are about 8,000,000, and that the augmentation is annually about 8000, we may conclude in general for all Europe, that, for every million of inhabitants, there is an annual augmentation of 1000; consequently, every thousand men slain in war must destroy all the augmentation of a million of inhabitants during a year. Consequently France, which contains 14 millions, according to Sir William Petty, having lost above 14,000 men a-year, during the

same 66 years, cannot have augmented in population.

PROP. VIII. That the progress of trade and navigation augmenting the loss of people by sea, must consequently have diminished population over all Europe.

PROP. IX. The exportation of our corn proves what the above propositions have demonstrated. For supposing the progress of agriculture to compensate the additional quantity distilled of late years, there is still  $\frac{1}{2}$  of the crop exported, which proves that our numbers, are small, and that they do not augment.

From these propositions our author concludes, that what stops multiplication in the British isles is, 1st, That living in celibacy is become a-la-mode: 2dly, That wars have been carried on beyond the nation's force: 3dly, That the use of spirituous liquors destroys great numbers of inhabitants.

I shall now shortly apply the principles I have been laying down, in order to resolve every phenomenon here described, as to the population of Great Britain. These I shall willingly take for granted, as it is of no consequence to my reasoning, whether they be exact or not: it is enough that they may be so; and the question here is only to account for them.

England, says he, would diminish in numbers, were it not recruited from Scotland and Ireland. This, I say, is a contingent, not a certain consequence: for did those grown-up adventurers cease to come in, the inhabitants of England themselves would undoubtedly multiply, provided an additional

onal number of breeders could be found, able to bring up their children. Now the importation of grown men into a country in so far resembles the importation of slaves into our colonies, that the one and the other diminishes the price of labor, and thereby prevents marriage among certain classes of the natives, whose profits are not sufficient for bringing up a family: and when any such do marry notwithstanding, they do not multiply, as has been said. Now were the Scots and Irish to come no more into England, the price of labor would rise; those who now cannot bring up children, might then be enabled to do it, and this would make the English multiply themselves; that is, it would augment the number of their own breeders. On the other hand, did the price of labor continue too low to prove a sufficient encouragement for an additional number of English breeders, the contingent consequence would take place; that is, numbers would diminish, according to our author's supposition, and the exportation of grain would increase, in proportion to that diminution; and did foreign demand for grain also diminish, then agriculture would suffer, and every thing would decline: but of this more as we go along.

The representation he gives of the state of population in these countries, is one modification of what I have called a moral incapacity of a people's increasing in numbers. It is just so in Africa, where the inhabitants are sold; just so in Switzerland, and in many mountainous countries, where inhabitants desert, in order to seek their fortunes elsewhere.

The national stock remains at an equal standard; and the augmentation upon births above burials, is constantly in proportion to the exportation of inhabitants. Let this proportion rise ever so high, an increase of national population is noways essentially to be implied from this phenomenon alone, but must proceed from other causes.

I can find nothing advanced by our author to prove, or even to induce one to believe, that had the lives of those eight thousands been yearly preserved from extraordinary dangers, numbers would have augmented. England enjoyed in a manner 26 years peace after the treaty of Utrecht. For many years before, a very destructive war had been carried on. Had the bills of births been produced from 1701 to 1713, had they been compared with those from this last period to 1739, when the Spanish war began, had we seen a gradual augmentation from year to year during those last 26 years, such as might be expected from the preservation of a considerable number at least of the 8,250 able healthy men, just in the period of life fit for propagation, one might be tempted to conclude, that the preceding war had done hurt to population, by interrupting the propagation of the species. But if, by comparing the bills of births for a considerable number of years, in war and in peace, one can discover no sensible difference, it is very natural to conclude, either that those wars did not destroy many breeders, or that others must have slipt in directly, and bred in the place of those who had been killed. What otherwise can be the reason why the number



which our author supposes to have been destroyed abroad, should so exactly compensate the annual augmentation, but only that those nations are stocked to the full proportion of their subsistence: and what is the reason why, after a destructive war, which, by the suddenness of the revolution, sweeps off numbers of the grown men, and diminishes the original stock, numbers should in a few years get up to the former standard, and then stop a-new.

From our author's representation of the bills of births and deaths, I should be apt to suspect, in consequence of my principles, that upon a proper examination it would be found, that, in those years of war, the proportion of births to deaths had been higher than in years of peace, because more had died abroad. And, had the slaughter of the inhabitants gone gradually on, increasing every year beyond the 8, 250, I am of opinion, that the proportion of births might very possibly have kept pace with it. On the contrary, during the years of peace, the proportion should have diminished, and had nobody died out of the country at all, the births and deaths would have become exactly equal.

From what I have here said, the reader may perceive, that it is not without reason that I have treated the principles relating to my subject in general, and that I avoid as much as possible to reason from facts alledged as to the state of particular countries. Those our author builds upon may be true, and may be false: the proportion of births and deaths in one place is no rule for another; we know nothing exactly about the state of this question in

the British isles; and it may even daily vary, from a thousand circumstances. War *may* destroy population as well as agriculture, at it *may not*, according to circumstances. When the calamity falls upon the breeders, and when these are supposed the only people in the country in a capacity of bringing up their children, births will soon diminish. When it destroys the indigent, who cannot bring up their children, or who do not marry, births will remain the same. The killing the wethers of a flock of sheep does not diminish the brood of lambs next year; the killing of old pigeons makes a pigeon-house thrive. When the calamity falls upon the farmers, who make our lands produce, agriculture is hurt, no doubt: does it fall upon the superfluities of cities; and other classes of the free hands, it may diminish manufacturers, but agriculture will go on, while there is a demand for its produce; and if a diminution of consumption at home be a consequence of the war, the augmentation upon exportation will more than compensate it. I do not find that war *diminishes* the demand for subsistence.

The long wars in Flanders in the beginning of this century interrupted agriculture now and then, but did not destroy it. That in the Palatinate in the end of the last ruined the country so, that it has hardly as yet recovered it. War has different effects, according to circumstances.

OBJ. The population of the British isles is not stopt for want of food, because one-sixth part of the crop is annually exported. I answer, That it is still stopt for want of food, for the exportation only

marks that the home demand is satisfied; but this does not prove that the inhabitants are full fed, although they can buy no more at the exportation-price. Those who cannot buy, are exactly those who I say die for want of subsistence: could they buy, they would live and multiply, and no grain perhaps would be exported. This is a plain consequence of my reasoning; and my principal point in view throughout this whole book, is to find out a method for enabling those to buy who at present cannot, and who therefore do not multiply; because they can give no equivalent to the farmers for their superfluity, which consequently they export. By this application of our principles, I have no occasion to call in question our author's facts. It is no matter what be the state of the case; if the principles I lay down be just, they must resolve every phenomenon.

## C H A P. XVI.

*Why are some Countries found very populous in respect of others, equally well calculated for Improvement?*

**T**HIS question comes immediately under the influence of the principles already laid down, and must be resolved in consequence of them. It is with a view to make the application of these, that I have proposed it; and, in the examination, we shall prove their justness, or discover their defects.

It may be answered in general, that every such difference must proceed from what I call the spirit of the government and of the people, which will not only decide as to numbers, but as to many other things. I must however observe, that the question in itself is of little importance, if nothing but numbers be considered; for of what consequence is it to know how many people are in a country, when the employment of them does not enter into the inquiry? Besides, it is only by examining the employment of a people, that I can form any judgment as to this particular. But as the numbers of mankind have been thought a point worthy of examination, I have chosen this title for a chapter, which might perhaps have more properly stood under another.

While slavery prevailed, I see no reason to conclude against the numbers of mankind, as I have said already: when slavery was abolished, and before industry took place, if my principles be true that period I think should mark the time of the thinnest population in Europe; for I believe it will be found, that there never was an example of a country, however fertile by nature, where every one was absolutely free; where there was little or no industry, nor labor, but in agriculture; and where, at the same time, there were many inhabitants, not beggars, nor living upon charity. I have mentioned this so often, that I am afraid of tiring my reader with useless repetitions. I have brought it in here, only to give him an opportunity of applying this principle to the solution of the question before us.

I shall begin my inquiry by asking what is understood by a country's being populous; for that term presents different ideas, if circumstances are not attended to. I have heard it said, that France was a desert, and that there was nobody found in it but in towns; while in England one cannot travel half a mile without finding a farm, perhaps two together; and in looking round, one sees the whole country divided into small possessions. The difference here found, I apprehend, decides nothing in favor of, or against the real populousness of the one or the other, but proceeds entirely from circumstances relative to agriculture, and to the distribution of free hands. These circumstances will be better understood from the examination of facts, than from the best theory in the world. Let one consider the state of agriculture in Picardy and in Beauce, and then compare it with the practice in many provinces in England, and the contrast will appear striking. Were there more forest in England, to supply the inhabitants with fuel, I imagine many inclosures, useful at first for improving the grounds, would be taken away, and the country laid more open; were wolves less common in France, there would be found more scattered farms. Cattle there must be shut up in the night, and cannot be left in the fields; this is a great discouragement to inclosing. Where there are no inclosures, there are few advantages to be found from establishing the farm-house exactly upon the spot of ground to be labored; and then the advantages which result to certain classes of inhabitants, from being gathered together, th

farmers with the tradesmen, are found to preponderate. Thus the French farmers are gathered into villages, and the English remain upon their fields. But farther, in Picardy and Beauce agriculture has been long established, and, I imagine, that, at the time when lands were first broken up, or rather improved, their habitations must have been closer together.

This drawing together of inhabitants must leave many ruinous possessions, and this, by the by, is one reason why people cry out upon the desolation of France, because ruinous houses (which may often times be a mark of improvement, not of desertion) are found in different places in the country. Paris has grown considerably in bulk, and from this it naturally happens, that the country round is purged of idle mouths. If this makes labor dear in the country, it is the city alone which suffers by it, the country must certainly be the gainers. So much for two species of population in two of the best inhabited countries of Europe. I now come to another in one of the worst.

In some countries you find every farm-house surrounded with small huts, possessed by numbers of people, supposed to be useful to the farmer. These in Scotland are called cottars, (cottagers) because they live in cottages. If you consider them in a political light, they will appear to be inhabitants appropriated for agriculture. In one sense they are so, if by that you understand the gathering in of the fruits; in another they are not, if by agriculture you understand the turning up the surface. I bring in this example, and shall en-

large a little upon it, because I imagine it to be, less or more, the picture of Europe 400 years ago.

The Scotch farmer must have hands to gather in a scanty produce, spread over a large extent of ground. He has six cottars, I shall suppose; but these cottars must have wives, and these wives will have children, and all must be fed before the master's rent can be paid. It never comes into the cottar's head to suppose that his children can gain money by their labor; the farmer never supposes that it is possible for him to pay his rent without the assistance of his cottars to tend his cattle; and gather in his crop; and the master cannot go against the custom of the country, without laying his land waste. All these children are ready at the farmer's disposal; he can, without any expense, send what parcels of sheep he pleases, to different distances of half a mile or more, to feed upon spots of ground which, without the conveniency of these children, would be entirely lost. By this plan of farming, landlords who have a great extent of country which they are not able to improve, can let the whole in a very few farms, and at the same time all the spontaneous produce of the earth is gathered in and consumed. If you compare the rent of these lands with the extent, it appears very small; if you compare it with the numbers fed upon the farm, you will find that an estate in the highlands maintains, perhaps, ten times as many people as another of the same value in a good and fertile province. Thus it is in some estates as in some convents of the begging order, the more mouths the better cheer.

I shall now suppose our modern policy to inspire an ingenious or public spirited lady to set up a weaver or two at a farm-house. The cottars begin to spin; they will be a long time in attaining to a dexterity sufficient to appear at the weaver's house, in competition with others who are accustomed to the trade; consequently this manufacture will be long in a languishing condition; but if the undertaking is supported with patience, these obstacles will be got the better of. Those who tended herds of cattle for a poor maintenance, will turn themselves to a more profitable occupation; the farmer will find more difficulty in getting hands, he will complain, perhaps give way, the master will lose a year's rent, and no body will take so extensive a farm; it must be divided, then it must be improved, and then it produces more grain upon one tenth, than perhaps formerly was produced upon the whole. This grain is bought with the price of spinning; the parents divide with the children, who are fed, and spin in their turn. When this is accomplished, what is the revolution? Why, formerly the earth fed all the inhabitants with her spontaneous productions, as I may call them, now more labor is exercised upon turning up her surface, this she pays in grain, which belongs to the strong man for his labor and toil; women and children have no direct share, because they have not contributed thereto, as they did in feeding cattle. But they spin, and have money to buy what they have not force to produce; consequently they live; but as they



become useless as cottars, they remove from their mother earth, and gather into villages. When this change is effected the lands appear less inhabited; ruinous huts (nay, villages I may call them) are found frequently, and many would be apt to conclude, that the country is depopulated; but this is by no means found to be the case, when the whole is taken together.

The spirit therefore of the principal people of a country determines the employment of the lower classes; the employment of these determines their usefulness to the state, and their usefulness, their multiplication. The more they are useful, the more they gain, according to the definition of the contract of society; the more they gain, the more they can feed; and consequently the more they will marry and divide with their children. This increases useful population, and encourages agriculture. Compare the former with the present situation, as to numbers, as to ease, as to happiness!

Is it not plain, that when the earth is not improved it cannot produce so much nourishment for man as when it is? On the other hand, if industry does not draw into the hands of the indigent, wherewith to purchase this additional nourishment, no body will be at a considerable first expense to break up grounds in order to produce it. The withdrawing therefore a number of hands from a trifling agriculture forces, in a manner, the husbandman to work the harder; and by hard labor upon a small spot, the same effect is produced as with slight labor upon a great extent.

I have said, that I imagined the fate of agriculture in the Scotch farm, was a pretty just representation of the general state of Europe about 400 years ago: if not in every province of every country, at least in every country for the most part. Several reasons induce me to think so: first, where there is no industry, nothing but the earth directly can feed her children, little alienation of her fruits can take place. Next, because I find a wonderful analogy between the way of living in some provinces of different countries with what I have been describing. Pipers, blue bonnets, and oat meal, are known in Swabia, Auvergne, Limousin, and Catalonia, as well as in Lochaber: numbers of idle, poor, useless hands, multitudes of children, whom I have found to be fed, no body knows how, doing nothing at the age of fourteen, keeping of cattle and going to school, the only occupations supposed possible for them. If you ask why they are not employed, they tell you because commerce is not in the country: they talk of commerce as if it was a man, who comes to reside in some countries in order to feed the inhabitants. The truth is, it is not the fault of these poor people, but of those whose business it is to find out employment for them.

Another reason I derive from the nature of the old tenures, where we find lands which now produce large quantities of grain, granted for a mere trifle, when at the same time others in the neighbourhood of cities and abbies are found charged with considerable prestations. This I attribute to

the bad cultivation of lands at that time, from which I infer, a small population. In those days of trouble and confusion, confiscations were very frequent, large tracts of lands were granted to the great lords upon different revolutions, and these finding them often deserted, as is mentioned in history, (the vassals of the former, being either destroyed or driven out to make-place for the new comers) used to parcel them out for small returns in every thing but personal service. Such sudden and violent revolutions must dispeople a country; and nothing but tranquillity, security, order and industry, for ages together, can render it populous.

Besides these natural causes of population and depopulation (which proceed, as we have observed, from a certain turn given to the spirit of a people) there are others which operate with irresistible force, by sudden and violent revolutions. The King of Prussia, for example, attempted to people a country all at once, by profiting of the desertion of the Saltburghers. America is become very poorly peopled in some spots upon the coast, and in some islands, at the expence of the exportation of millions from Europe and from Africa; such methods never can succeed in proportion to the attempt. Spain, on the other hand, was depopulated by the expulsion of its antichristian inhabitants. These causes work evident effects, which there is little occasion to explain, although the more remote consequences of them may deserve observation. I shall, in another place, have occasion to examine the manner of our peopling

America. In this place, I shall make a few observations upon the depopulation of Spain, and finish my chapter.

That country is said to have been anciently very populous under the government of the Moors. I am not sufficiently versed in the politics, economy and manners of that people, to judge how far these might be favorable to population: what seems, however, to confirm what we are told, is, the large repositories they used for preserving grain, which still remain entire, though never once made use of. They watered the kingdoms of Valencia, Murcia and Granada. They gathered themselves into cities of which we still can discover the extent. The country which they now possess (though drier than Spain) furnishes Europe with considerable quantities of grain. The palace of the Moorish King at Granada, shows a taste for luxury. The mosque of Cordoua speaks a larger capital. All these are symptoms of population, but they only help one to guess. The numbers which history mentions to have been driven out, is a better way still of judging, if the fidelity of historians could be depended upon, when there is any question about numbers.

Here was an example of a country depopulated in a very extraordinary manner: yet I am of opinion, that the scarcity of inhabitants complained of in that country, for a long time after the expulsion, did not so much proceed from the effects of the loss sustained, as from the contrast between the spirit of those christians who remained after

the expulsion, and their catholic deliverers. The christians who lived among the Moors, were really Moors as to manners, though not as to religion. Had they adopted the spirit of the subjects of Castile, or had they been governed according to their own, numbers would soon have risen to the former standard. But as the christian lord governed his Murcian, Andalousian, and Granada subjects, according to the principles of christian policy, was it any wonder that in such an age of ignorance, prejudice, and superstition, the country (one of the finest in the world) should be long in recovering? Recover, however, it did; and sooner perhaps than is commonly believed: for I say it was recovered so soon as all the flat and watered lands were brought into cultivation; because I have reason to believe that the Moors never carried their agriculture farther in these southern provinces.

From this I still conclude, that no destruction of inhabitants by expulsion, captivity, war, pestilence or famine, is so permanently hurtful to population, as a revolution in that spirit which is necessary for the increase and support of numbers. Let that spirit be kept up, and let mankind be well governed, numbers will quickly increase to their former standard, after the greatest reduction possible: and while they are upon the augmenting hand, the state will be found in more heart and more vigor, than when arrived even at the former height; for so soon as a state ceases to grow in prosperity, I apprehend it begins to decay both in health and vigor.

## C H A P. XVII.

*In what Manner and according to what Proportion do Plenty and Scarcity affect a People?*

**I**N a former chapter I have examined this question, relatively to mankind fed by the hand of nature: I now come nearer home, and shall keep close to modern times, considering circumstances and effects which by daily experience we see and feel.

I have often said, that numbers are in proportion to the produce of the earth. I now say, that in most countries of Europe, the food produced in the country is *nearly* consumed by the inhabitants: and by *nearly* I understand, that the part exported bears a small proportion to the home-consumption. I do by no means establish this as an universal proposition; but I say it is true *for the most part*: and the intention of this chapter is to enable us to judge how far these limitations should extend. I allow, for example, that Holland, not producing food for its inhabitants, must draw it from some country which produces a superfluity, regularly: but let it be observed that Poland, Germany, Flanders, and England, with many other countries, contribute their contingents to supply the demand of the Dutch; and of several large trading towns which have small territories. This being the case, the quota furnished by each country, must be in a small proportion to the respective quantity growing in it. But these are general conclusions upon vague suppositions, which throw no light on the question. I shall therefore  
endeavour

endeavour to apply our reasoning to facts, and then examine consequences.

There are few countries, I believe, in Europe more abounding in grain than England: I shall therefore keep that kingdom in my eye while I examine this matter. Nothing is more common than to hear that an abundant crop furnishes more than three years subsistence: nay, I have found it advanced by an author of consideration, (*Advantages and disadvantages of France and Great Britain, &c.* article Grain) that a plentiful year produces five years nourishment for the inhabitants. If this be a mistake, it may prove a very hurtful one in many respects. I am, on the contrary, apt to believe, that no annual produce of grain ever was so great in England as to supply its inhabitants fifteen months, *in that abundance with which they feed themselves in a year of plenty.* If this be the case, at what may we compute the surplus in ordinary good years; I believe it will be thought a very good year which produces *full* subsistence for fifteen months; and crops which much exceed this are, I believe, very rare. Here follow my reasons for differing so widely from the gentleman whom I have cited. If I am in the wrong, I shall have the most sensible pleasure in being set right; and nothing will be so easy to any one who has access to be better informed as to facts than I can pretend to be.

I consider all the yearly crop of grain in England as consumed at home, except what is exported; for I cannot admit that any considerable quantity is lost: that it may be abused, misapplied, drank when it

should be eat, I do not deny. These are questions which do not regard the present inquiry. Whether therefore it be consumed in bread, beer, spirits, or by animals, I reckon it consumed; and in a year when the greatest consumption is made at home, this I call *the abundance with which the inhabitants feed themselves in years of plenty*. Now I find in the performance above cited, a state of exportations for five years, from 1746 to 1750 inclusive, where the quantity exported amounts in all to 5,289,847 quarters of all sorts of grain. This is not one year's provision, according to Sir William Petty's calculation, of which we have made mention above: The bounties upon corn (continues the author above-mentioned) have amounted in one year to 500,000*l.* sterling. He does not mention the year, and I am little able to dispute that matter with him. I suppose it to be true; and still farther, let it be understood that the whole exportation was made out of the produce of one crop. I do not find that this sum answers to the bounty upon 3,000,000 of quarters, which, according to Sir William Petty, make six months provision. I calculate thus. The bounty upon wheat is 5*s.* a quarter, that upon rye 3*s.* 6*d.* that upon barely 2*s.* 6*d.* these are the species of grain commonly exported: cast the three premiums together, and divide by three, the bounty will come to 3*s.* 8*d.* at a medium; at which rate 500,000*l.* sterling will pay the bounty of 2,727, 272 quarters of grain. An immense quantity to be exported! but a very inconsiderable part of a crop supposed capable to maintain England for five years.



It may be answered, that the great abundance of a plentiful year is considerably diminished when a scanty crop happens to precede it, or to follow upon it. In the first case, it is sooner begun upon; in the last, it supplies the consumption in the year of scarcity, considerably. This I allow to be just; but as it is not uncommon to see a course of good years follow one another, the state of exportation at such times must certainly be the best, nay, the only method of judging of the real extent of superfluity.

On the other hand, I am apt to believe, that there never was a year of such scarcity as that the lands of England did not produce greatly above six months subsistence, *such as the people are used to take in years of scarcity*. Were six months of the most slender subsistence to fail, I imagine all Europe together might perhaps be at a loss to supply a quantity sufficient to prevent the greatest desolation by famine.

As I have no access to look into records, I content myself with less authentic documents. I find then by the London news-papers, that, from the 9th of April to the 13th of August, 1757, while great scarcity was felt in England, there were declared in the port of London no more than 71,728 quarters of wheat, of which 15,529 were not then arrived. So that the whole quantity there imported to relieve the scarcity, was 56,199 quarters. Not one month's provision for the inhabitants of that city, reckoning them at 800,000 souls! One who has access to look into the registers of the trade in grain, might in a moment determine this question.

Another reason which induces me to believe what the above arguments seem to prove, I draw from what I see at present passing in Germany; I mean the univerfal complaints of scarcity in those armies which are now assembled, [ 1757 ] When we compare the numbers of an army, let it be of a hundred thousand men, suppose the suite of it to be as many more, and forty thousand horses, all strangers, ( for the others I reckon nothing extraordinary ) what an inconsiderable number does this appear, in proportion to the inhabitants of this vast country of Germany! Yet let us observe the quantity of provisions of all sorts constantly coming down the Rhine, the Moselle, and many other rivers, collected from foreign provinces on all hands; the numbers of cattle coming from Hungary; the loads of corn from Poland; and all this in a year which has produced what at any other time would have been called an excellent crop. After these foreign supplies, must not one be astonished to find scarcity complained of in the provinces where the war is carried on, and high prices every where else. From such circumstances I must conclude, that people are generally very much deceived in their estimation of plenty and scarcity, when they talk of two or three years subsistence for a country being found upon their lands at once. I may indeed be mistaken in my conclusions; but the more I have reflected upon this subject, the more I find myself confirmed in them, even from the familiar examples of the sudden rise of markets from very inconsiderable monopolies, and of their sudden fall by inconfi-

derable quantities imported. I could cite many examples of these vicissitudes, were it necessary, to prove what every one must observe.

I come now to resolve a difficulty which naturally results from this doctrine, and with which I shall close the chapter.

If it be true, that a crop in the most plentiful year is nearly consumed by the inhabitants, what becomes of them in years of scarcity; for nobody can deny, that there is a great difference between one crop and another. To this I answer, first, That I believe there is also a very great deceit, or common mistake, as to the difference between crops: a good year for one soil, is a bad one for another. But I shall not enlarge on this; because I have no sufficient proof of my opinion. The principal reason upon which I found it, is, that it is far from being true, that the same number of people consume always the same quantity of food. In years of plenty every one is well fed; the price of the lowest industry can procure subsistence sufficient to bear a division; food is not so frugally managed; a quantity of animals are fatted for use; all sorts of cattle are kept in good heart; and people drink more largely, because all is cheap. A year of scarcity comes, the people are ill fed, and when the lower classes come to divide with their children, the portions are brought to be very small; there is great economy upon consumption, few animals are fatted for use, cattle look miserably, and a poor man cannot indulge himself with a cup of generous ale. Add to all these circumstances, that in England the produce of pasture

is very considerable, and it commonly happens, that a bad year for grain, which proceeds from rains, is for the same reason a good year for pasture; and in the estimation of a crop, every circumstance must be allowed to enter.

From what has been said I must conclude in general, that the best corn-country in the world, provided slavery be not established, does not produce wherewithal fully to maintain, as in years of plenty, one third more than its own inhabitants; for if this should be the case, all the policy of man would not be able to prevent the multiplication of them, until they arose nearly up to the mean proportion of the produce in ordinary years, and it is only what exceeds this standard, and proceeds from unusual plenty, which can be exported. Were plentiful years more common, mankind would be more numerous; were scarcity more frequent, numbers would be less. Numbers therefore must ever be, in my humble opinion, in the ratio of food, and multiplication will never stop until the balance comes to be nearly even.

#### C H A P. XVIII.

*Of the Causes and Consequences of a Country's being fully peopled.*

**I**N the titles of my chapters, I rather seek to communicate a rough idea of the subject than a correct one. In truth and in reason, there is no such thing as a country actually peopled to the full, if by this

term numbers only are meant, without considering the proportion they bear to the consumption they make of the productions of their country. I have in a former chapter established a distinction between the physical and moral impossibility of increasing numbers. As to the physical impossibility, the case can hardly exist, because means of procuring subsistence from other countries, when the soil refuses to give more, seem, if not inexhaustible, at least very extensive. A country therefore fully peopled, that is, in a physical impossibility of increasing their numbers, is a chimerical and useless supposition. The subject here under consideration is, the situation of a people, who find it their interest to seek for subsistence from abroad. This may happen, and commonly does, long before the country itself is fully improved: it decides nothing as to the intrinsic fertility of the soil, and proves no more, than that the industry of the free hands has made a quicker progress in multiplying mouths, than that of the farmers in providing subsistence. To illustrate this idea, let me propose the following question.

Is multiplication the efficient cause of agriculture, or is agriculture that of multiplication?

The answer, that multiplication is the efficient cause of agriculture, though I allow, that, in the infancy of society, the spontaneous fruits of the earth, which are free to all; are the efficient cause of a multiplication, which may rise to the exact proportion of them; as has been said above. This must be explained.

I have already distinguished the fruits of agriculture from the earth's spontaneous production: I must

farther take notice, that when I employ the term agriculture in treating of modern policy, I always consider it to be exercised as a trade, and producing a surplus, and not as the direct means of subsisting, where all is consumed by the husbandman, as has been fully explained above. We have said, that it is the surplus produced from it, which proves a fund for multiplying inhabitants. Now there must be a demand for this surplus. Every person who is hungry will make a demand, but every such demand will not be answered, and will consequently have no effect. The demander must have an equivalent to give: it is this equivalent which is the spring of the whole machine; for without *that* the farmer will not produce any surplus, and consequently he will dwindle down to the class of those who labor for actual subsistence. The poor, who produce children, make an ineffectual demand, and when they cannot increase the equivalent, they divide the food they have with the new comers, and prove no encouragement to agriculture. By dividing, the whole become ill fed, miserable, and thus extinguish. Now because it is the *effectual* demand, as I may call it, which makes the husbandman labor for the sake of the equivalent, and because this demand increases, by the multiplication of those who have an equivalent to give, therefore I say that multiplication is the cause, and agriculture the effect. On the other hand, I think the spontaneous fruits of the earth, as in the supposition, may be considered as the cause of a certain limited multiplication; because in that case there is no equivalent demanded.

The earth produces, whether her fruits be consumed or not : mankind are fed upon these gratuitously, and without labor, and the existence of the fruits is anterior to the production of those who are to consume them. Those who are first fed, draw their vigor from their food, and their multiplication from their vigor. Those who are produced, live freely upon their parent earth, and multiply until all the produce be consumed : then multiplication stops, as we have said ; *but establish agriculture*, and multiplication will go on a-new. Consequently, my reader will say, agriculture is as much the cause of this new multiplication, as the spontaneous fruits were of the first. Here is a very natural conclusion, which seems directly to contradict what we have been endeavouring to prove ; but the knot is easily untied. We have seen how the existence of agriculture must depend upon the industry of man ; that is, on the only means of *establishing agriculture* : now, as this industry is chiefly promoted by the motive of providing for our children, the procreation of them must be considered as the first, or at least the most palpable political cause of setting mankind to work, and therefore may be considered as anterior to agriculture ; whereas, on the other hand, the earth's spontaneous productions being in small quantity, and quite independent of man, appear, as it were, to be furnished by nature, in the same way as a small sum is given to a young man, in order to put him in a way of industry, and of making his fortune. The small sum sets him a-going, but it is his industry which makes the fortune. From this illustration it

appears, that if the demand for food can be more readily supplied from abroad than from home, it will be the foreign subsistence, which will preserve numbers, produced from *industry*, not from *domestic agriculture*; and these numbers will, in their turn, produce an advancement of it at home, by inspiring a desire in the husbandman to acquire the equivalent which their countrymen give to strangers.

Such nations, whose statesmen have not the talent to engage the husbandmen to wish for the equivalent, which the labor of their fellow-citizens can produce; or, in other words, who cannot create reciprocal wants and dependencies among their subjects, must stand in a moral incapacity of augmenting in numbers. Of such states we have no occasion to treat in this chapter, any more than of those who are supposed to be in the physical incapacity of multiplying: our point of view is, to examine the natural consequences resulting from a demand for subsistence extending itself to foreign countries. This I take to be the mother of industry at home, as well as of trade abroad; two objects which come to be treated of in the second book.

A country may be fully peopled (in the sense we understand this term) in several different ways. It may be fully stocked at one time with six millions, and at another may maintain perhaps eight or even nine millions with ease, without the soil's being better cultivated or improved. On the other hand, a country may maintain twenty millions with ease, and by being improved as to the soil, become overstocked with fifteen millions. These two assertions must be explained.



The more frugal a people are, and the more they feed upon the plentiful productions of the earth, the more they may increase in numbers.

Were the people of England to come more into the use of living upon bread, and give over consuming so much animal food, inhabitants would certainly increase, and many rich grass fields would be thrown into tillage. Were the French to give over eating so much bread, the Dutch so much fish, the Flemish so much garden stuff, and the Germans so much saurkraut, and all take to the English diet of pork, beef, and mutton, their respective numbers would soon decay, let them improve their grounds to the utmost. These are but reflections, by the by, which the reader may enlarge upon at pleasure. The point in hand is, to know what are the consequences of a country's being so peopled, no matter from what cause, that the soil, in its actual state of fertility, refuses to supply a sufficient quantity of such food as the inhabitants incline to live upon. These are different according to the diversity of spirit in the people.

If they be of an indolent disposition, directed in their political economy by established habits and old prejudices, which prevent innovations, although a change of circumstances may demand them, the effect will be to put a stop to population; which cannot augment without an increase of food on one hand, and of industry on the other, to make the first circulate. These must go hand in hand: the precedence between them is a matter of mere curiosity and speculation.

If, on the contrary, a spirit of industry has brought the country to a certain degree of population, this spirit will not be stopt by the want of food; it will be brought from foreign countries, and this new demand, by diminishing among them the quantity usually produced for their own subsistence, will prompt the industrious to improve their lands, in order to supply the new demand without any hurt to themselves. Thus trade has an evident tendency towards the improvement of the world in general, by rendering the inhabitants of one country industrious, in order to supply the wants of another, without any prejudice to themselves. Let us make a step further.

The country fully stocked can offer in exchange for this food, nothing but the superfluity of the industry of the free hands, for that of the farmers is supposed to be consumed by the society: except indeed some species of nourishment or productions, which, being esteemed at a higher value in other countries than in those which produce them, bring a more considerable return than the value of what is exported, as when raw silk and delicate wines, &c. are given in exchange for grain and other provisions.

The superfluity of industry must, therefore, form the principal part of exportation, and if the nation fully stocked be surrounded by others which abound in grain and articles of subsistence, where the inhabitants have a taste for elegance, and are eager of acquiring the manufactures and improvements of their industrious neighbours; it is certain, that a

trade with such nations will very considerably increase the inhabitants of the other, though fully stocked, relatively to the production of their own soil; and the additional numbers will only increase that of manufacturers, not of husbandmen. This is the case with Holland, and with many large trading cities which are free and have but a small territory.

If, on the contrary, the nation fully stocked be in the neighbourhood of others who take the same spirit as itself, this supply of food will become in time more difficult to be had, in proportion as their neighbours come to supply their own wants. They must therefore seek for it at a greater distance, and as soon as the expense of procuring it comes to exceed the value of the labor of the free hands employed in producing the equivalent, their work will cease to be exported, and the number of inhabitants will be diminished to the proportion of the remaining food.

I do not say that trade will cease on this account; by no means. Trade may still go on, and even be more considerable than before; but it will be a trade which never can increase inhabitants, because for this purpose there must be subsistence. It may have however numberless and great advantages: it may greatly advance the wealth of the state, and this will purchase even power and strength. A trading nation may live in profound peace at home, and send war and confusion among her enemies, without even employing her own subjects;

Thus trade without increasing the inhabitants of a country can greatly add to its force, by arming those hands which she has not fed, and employing them for her service.

## C H A P. XIX.

*Is the Introduction of Machines into Manufactures prejudicial to the Interest of a State, or hurtful to Population?*

**T**HIS I find has been made a question in modern times. The ancients held in great veneration the inventors of the saw, of the lathe, of the wimble, of the potters wheel; but some moderns find an abuse in bringing mechanism to perfection: (see *Les Interets de la France mal entendus*, p. 272. 313.) the great Montesquieu finds fault with water-mills, though I do not find that he has made any objection against the use of the plow.

Did people understand one another, it would be impossible that such points could suffer a dispute among men of sense; but the circumstances referred to, or presupposed, which authors almost always keep in their eye, though they seldom express them, render the most evident truths susceptible of opposition.

It is hardly possible suddenly to introduce the smallest innovation into the political economy of a state, let it be ever so reasonable, nay ever so profitable, without incurring some inconveniencies. A

room cannot be swept without raising dust, one cannot walk abroad without dirtying one's shoes; neither can a machine, which abridges the labor of men, be introduced *all at once* into an extensive manufacture, without throwing many people into idleness.

In treating every question of political economy, I constantly suppose a statesman at the head of government, systematically conducting every part of it, so as to prevent the vicissitudes of manners, and innovations, from hurting any interest within the commonwealth, by their natural and immediate effects or consequences. When a house within a city becomes crazy, it is, taken down; this I call systematical ruin: were it allowed to fall, the consequences might be fatal in many respects. In like manner, if a number of machines are all at once introduced into the manufactures of an industrious nation, (in consequence of that freedom which must necessarily be indulged to all sorts of improvement, and without which a state cannot thrive) it becomes the business of the statesman to interest himself so far in the consequences, as to provide a remedy for the inconveniencies resulting from the sudden alteration. It is farther his duty to make every exercise even of liberty and refinement an object of government and administration; not so as to discourage or to check them, but to prevent the revolution from affecting the interests of the different classes of the people, whose welfare he is particularly bound to take care of.

The introduction of machines can, I think, in no

other way prove hurtful by making people idle, than by the suddenness of it: and I have frequently observed, that all sudden revolutions, let them be ever so advantageous, must be accompanied with inconveniencies. A safe, honorable, and lasting peace, after a long, dangerous, and expensive war, forces a number of hands to be idle, and deprives them of bread. Peace then may be considered as a machine for defending a nation, at the political loss of making an army idle; yet no body, I believe, will alledge that in order to give bread to soldiers, sutlers, and undertakers, the war should be continued. But here I must observe, that it seems to be a palpable defect in policy, if a statesman shall neglect to find out a proper expedient (at whatever first expence it may be procured) for giving bread to those who, at the risk of their lives, have gone through so many fatigues for the service of their country. This expence should be charged to the account of the war, and a state ought to consider, that as their safety required that numbers should be taken out of the way of securing to themselves a lasting fund of subsistence, which would have rendered them independent of every body, (supposing that to have been the case) she becomes bound by the contract of society, which ties all together, to find them employment. Let me seek for another illustration concerning this matter.

I want to make a rampart cross a river, in order to establish a bridge, a mill, a sluice, &c. For this purpose, I must turn off the water, that is, stop the river; would it be a good objection against my improvement

provement to say, that the water would overflow the neighbouring lands, as if I could be supposed so improvident as not to have prepared a new channel for it? Machines stop the river; it is the business of the state to make the new channel, as it is the public which is to reap the benefit of the sluice: I imagine what I have said will naturally suggest an answer to all possible objections against the introduction of machines; as for the advantages of them, they are so palpable that I need not insist upon them. There is however one case in which I think they may be disapproved of; but it seems a chimerical supposition, and is brought in here for no other purpose than to point out and illustrate the principle which influences this branch of our subject.

If you can imagine a country peopled to the utmost extent of the fertility of the soil, and absolutely cut off from any communication with other nations; all the inhabitants fully employed in supplying the wants of one another, the circulation of money going forward regularly, proportionally, and uniformly, through every vein, as I may call it, of the political body; no sudden or extraordinary demand at any time for any branch of industry; no redundancy of any employment; no possibility of increasing either circulation, industry, or consumption. In such a situation as that I should disapprove of the introduction of machines, as I disapprove of taking physic in an established state of perfect health. I disapprove of a machine only because it is an innovation in a state absolutely perfect in these branches of its political economy; and where there is perfection there can

be no improvement. I farther disapprove of it because it might force a man to be idle, who would be found thereby in a physical impossibility of getting his bread, in any other way than that in which he is supposed to be actually employed.

The present situation of every country in Europe, is so infinitely distant from this degree of perfection, that I must consider the introduction of machines, and of every method of augmenting the produce or facilitating the labor and ingenuity of man, as of the greatest utility. Why do people wish to augment population, but in order to compass these ends? Wherein does the effect of a machine differ from that of new inhabitants?

As agriculture, exercised as a trade, purges the land of idle mouths, and pushes them to a new industry which the state may turn to her own advantage; so does a machine introduced into a manufacture, purge off hands which then become superfluous *in that branch*, and which may quickly be employed in another.

If therefore the machine proves hurtful, it can only be because it presents the state with an additional number of hands bred to labor; consequently, if these are afterwards found without bread, it must proceed from a want of attention in the statesman: for an industrious man made idle, may constantly be employed to advantage, and with profit to him who employs him. What could an act of naturalization do more, than furnish industrious hands forced to be idle, and demanding employment? Machines therefore I consider as a method of augmenting



(virtually) the number of the industrious, without the expense of feeding an additional number: this by no means obstructs natural and useful population, for the most obvious reasons.

We have shown how population must go on, in proportion to subsistence, and in proportion to industry: now the machine eats nothing, so does not diminish subsistence, and industry (in our age at least) is in no danger of being overstocked in any well governed state; for let all the world copy your improvements, they still will be the scholars. And if, on the contrary, in the introduction of machines you are found to be the scholars of other nations, in that case you are brought to the dilemma of accepting the invention with all its inconveniencies, or of renouncing every foreign communication.

In speculations of this kind, one ought not; I think, to conclude, that experience *must* of necessity prove what we imagine our reasoning has pointed out.

The consequences of innovations in political economy, admit of an infinite variety, because of the infinite variety of circumstances which attend them: no reasoning, therefore, however refined, can point out a priori, what upon such occasions must indispensably follow. The experiment must be made, circumstances must be allowed to operate; inconveniencies must be prevented or rectified as far as possible; and when these prove too many, or too great to be removed, the most rational, the best concerted scheme in theory must be laid aside, until preparatory steps be taken for rendering it practicable.

Upon the whole, daily experience shows the advantage and improvement acquired by the introduction of machines. Let the inconveniencies complained of be ever so sensibly felt, let a statesman be ever so careless in relieving those who are forced to be idle, all these inconveniencies are only temporary; the advantage is permanent, and the necessity of introducing every method of abridging labor and expense, in order to supply the wants of luxurious mankind, is absolutely indispensable, according to modern policy, according to experience, and according to reason.

## C H A P. XX.

### *Miscellaneous Observations upon Agriculture and Population.*

I HAVE hitherto considered the object of agriculture, as no more than the raising of grain; the food of mankind has been estimated by the quantity they consume of that production; and husbandmen have been supposed to have their residence in the country. As my subject has but an indirect connexion with the science of agriculture, I have simplified many things complex in themselves, the better to adapt them to the principal object of my inquiry, and the better to keep my attention fixed upon one idea at a time. I am now going to return to some parts of my subject, which I think I have treated too superficially; and to examine, as I go

along, some miscellaneous questions which will naturally arise from what is to be said.

Almost every one who has writ upon population, and upon agriculture, considered as an essential concomitant of it, has recommended the equal distribution of the property of lands as useful to both: a few reflections upon this question, after what has been thrown out in the course of the foregoing chapters, may not be improper; more in order to examine and apply the principles laid down, than with a view to combat the opinion of others. QUEST. I.

I have already, upon several occasions, taken notice of the great difference between the political economy of the ancients, and that of modern times; for this reason, among others, that I perceive the sentiments of the ancients, which were founded upon reason and common sense, relative to their situation, have been adopted by some moderns, who have not perhaps sufficiently attended to the change of our manners, and to the effects which this change must operate upon every thing relative to our economy. The ancients recommended strongly an equal distribution of lands as the best security for liberty, and the best method, not only to preserve an equality among the citizens, but also to increase their number.

In those days, the citizens did not compose one half of the state relatively to numbers; and there was almost no such thing as an established monied interest, which can no where be founded but upon trade, and an extensive industry. In those days

there was no solid income but in land : and that being equally divided among the citizens, was favorable to their multiplication and produced equality. But in our days, riches do not consist in lands only; nay we sometimes find the most considerable proprietor, of these in very indifferent circumstances; loaded with debts, and depending upon the indulgence of men who have not an acre, and who are their creditors. Let us therefore divide our lands as we please, we shall never produce equality by it. This is an essential difference between us and the ancients, with respect to one point. Now as to the other, population.

The equal division of lands, no doubt, greatly tends to increase the numbers of one class of inhabitants; to wit, the landlords. In ancient times, as has been observed, the chief attention was to increase the citizens, that is the higher classes of the state; and the equal division of property so effectually produced this effect, that the Greek states were obliged to allow the exposition of children; and Aristotle looked upon it as a thing indispensably necessary, as M. de Montesquieu has very judiciously observed. The multiplication of the lowest classes, that is of the slaves, never entered into the consideration of the public, but remained purely a matter of private concern; and we find it was a question with some, whether or not it was worth while to breed from them at all. But in our days the principal object is to support the lower classes from their own multiplication, and for this purpose, an unequal division of property seems to me the more favorable scheme;

because the wealth of the rich falls naturally into the pockets of the industrious poor; whereas the produce of a very middling fortune, does no more than feed the children of the proprietor, who in course become very commonly and very naturally an useless burden upon the land. Let me apply this to an example. Do we not familiarly observe, that the consolidation of small estates, and the diminution of gentlemen's families of middling fortunes, do little harm to a modern state. There are always abundance of this class of inhabitants to be found whenever there is occasion for them. When a great man buys up the lands of the neighbouring gentry, or small proprietors, all the complaints which are heard, turn upon the distress which thence results to the lower classes, from the loss of their masters and protectors; but never one word is heard of that made by the state, from the extinction of the former proprietor's family. This abundantly shows that the object of modern attention is the multiplication of the lower classes, consequently it must be an inconsistency to adopt the practice of the ancients, when our economy is entirely opposite to theirs.

Let this suffice to point out how far the difference of our manners should influence the division of our lands. I shall now examine a question relative to the science of agriculture, not considered as a method of improving the soil, (this will come in more naturally afterwards) but of making it produce to the best advantage, supposing it to be already improved.

In treating of the productions of the earth, in con-

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sequence of agriculture, I have all along distinguished them from those which spontaneously proceed from the force of nature: these are the immediate gift of God, those are the return of the labor of his creatures. Every one knows that the labor of mankind is not in proportion to their numbers, but to their industry. The produce therefore of agriculture must be estimated, not according to the quantity of fruits only, but also according to the labor employed to produce them. These things premised, the question here proposed to be examined arises, viz. Which species of agriculture is the most advantageous to a modern society, that which produces the greatest quantity of fruits *absolutely* taken, or that which produces the greatest quantity *relatively* taken, I mean to the labor employed?

This question might easily be resolved, in general, by the application of principles already deduced; although it cannot admit of a direct answer, in the manner I have put it. One, therefore, may say indeterminately, that species is the best which produces a surplus the best proportioned to the industry, and to the demands of all the free hands of the state. But as this solution would not lead me to the object I have in view, I have thrown in an alternative in order to gain attention to the principles which I am going to examine, and which influence and determine the establishment of the one or the other species of agriculture.

The principal difficulty I find in the examination of this question, is to distinguish the effects of agriculture from those of the spontaneous production of

*quella di agricoltura è più vantaggiosa alla società me-  
ra, quella che produce la maggior quantità di frutti  
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the earth. The returns from pasture, for example, relatively taken, are, as we have observed, both from reason and from experience, far greater than those of corn fields, (vid. supra, chap. 8.) though I little doubt but that, absolutely taken, the case is quite otherwise; that is to say, that an acre of the finest corn-land will produce more nourishment for man, than an equal portion of the finest pasture: but here we are following the proportion of space and produce, not of labor; for if the produce of both acres be considered relatively to the *labor* necessary for the cultivation, as well as to the extent; the produce of pasture will be found far greater: this however I ascribe to the spontaneous operation of nature, and not to the superior utility of this kind of agriculture.

Since therefore it is impossible, rightly to separate the effects of nature from those of art and industry, in this species of improvement, let us confine our speculations to those only which have for their object the turning up the surface, and the sowing or cultivating annual vegetables. For the better conveying our ideas, let us take an example, and reason from a supposition.

Let me suppose an island of a small extent and fruitful soil, sufficiently improved, and cultivated after the manner of the best lands of England, in the ordinary method of farming.

In that case we may infer, from what was laid down in the 8th chapter, that the number of people employed about farming may be nearly about one half of the whole society. Let the whole inhabitants

of the island be called 1000, that is 500 farmers, and as many free hands. The 500 farmers must then feed 1000; the 500 free hands must provide for all the other wants of 1000. By this supposition, and allowing that there is an equal degree of industry in these two classes, the providing of food will appear to be an occupation just equal to that of providing for all other wants. From this let me draw a few consequences, by the by, before I proceed.

Experience shows that in all countries there are found many who are here understood to be included in the class of free hands, who consumed infinitely more of other things than of food; consequently we must conclude, that as the wants of some do far exceed the proportion of their food, so in order to bring the balance even, the wants of others must fall far below it. That this is the case, I believe, will be found by experience. Let me follow this thought a little farther.

In proportion as a greater number than one half of the people becomes employed in agriculture, must it not follow, that all other work must come to bear a smaller proportion than formerly to the food consumed; consequently the manner of living must become more simple. Now we have shown that what we call wants, in contradistinction to food, can only be supplied by the free hands, and that these again can only be fed from the surplus of the farmers consequently the fewer wants, and the fewer free hands, the less surplus, which of course infers an agriculture less productive, relatively to the number of farmers. Were therefore a whole society employed in agriculture, carried on as a direct method of subsisting,



there would be no surplus, consequently no free hands; consequently no work for supplying any want but food. This may be thought an impossible supposition. If you suppose agriculture exercised as a trade, I allow it to be so, but not if it be carried on as a method of subsisting only; and if you throw away the idea of labor altogether, and suppose mankind in its infancy, that is in paradise, living upon the spontaneous fruits of the earth, and quite naked, you will find the case not only supposable, but exactly so. It is exactly so among the cattle: every one of them may be considered in a parallel situation with a husbandman who works for his own nourishment. They feed upon the spontaneous fruits of the earth, and have no surplus; and having no other want, they are freed from every other care. Let me return now to the island.

The 500 farmers feed 1000; and we suppose the lands labored as in a good English farm. One of the society proposes to augment the number of inhabitants by introducing a more operose species of agriculture, the produce of which may be *absolutely* greater, though relatively less.

The first question the statesman would naturally put to this reformer would be, What is your view in increasing the number of our inhabitants, is it to defend us against our enemies, is it to supply the wants of strangers, and thereby to enrich ourselves, is it to supply our own *wants* with more abundance, or is it to provide us more abundantly with *food*? I can hardly find out any other rational view in wishing for an additional number of people in any

country whatsoever. Let it be answered, that all these ends may be thereby obtained: and now let us examine how far this reformation upon agriculture will have the effect of increasing inhabitants, how far such increase will procure the ends proposed, and how far the execution of such a plan is a practicable scheme to an industrious people.

If the inhabitants be not sufficiently fed, which is the only thing that can prevent their multiplication, it must proceed from one of two causes. Either *first*, that those do procreate who cannot produce an equivalent for the food of their children; or *secondly*, that industry making a quicker progress than agriculture, the industrious come too strongly in competition with one another, for the surplus of food to be found; which has the effect of raising the prices of it, and reducing the portions too low to suffer a division; and thereby of preventing marriage and multiplication in the lower classes of the free hands.

In the first case, it is to no purpose to increase the produce of agriculture, by rendering it more expensive; for those who have no equivalent to give when food is cheap, will still be in greater necessity when it rises in the price. In the second case, it is to no purpose to diminish the surplus of the farmers, because the supposition proves that the balance is already too heavy upon the side of the free hands, that is, that the surplus of the farmers is already become insufficient fully to feed them.

Two remedies may be proposed for this inconvenience, the one tending to population, the other

to depopulation ; and as the end to be compassed is to set the balance even between husbandmen and free hands, I shall explain both, and point out *how far* from principles it appears, that in either way the end may be attained.

That tending to increase population is the remedy proposed, and, no doubt, was it possible to introduce a new system of agriculture of a larger absolute production, although the relative production should be less, the inhabitants of the state becoming thereby better fed, though at a greater cost, would infallibly multiply. Let me therefore examine this first part before I say any thing of the other ; and for the greater distinctness I shall return to my example, and examine both the consequences and the possibility of putting such a plan in execution.

Let me suppose, that by using the spade and rake, <sup>2</sup> instead of the plow and harrow, <sup>2</sup> the lands of our island might be brought to produce with more abundance ; this is a method of increasing the expense of agriculture, which would require an additional number of husbandmen. 20 pps, vol 2  
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Now, by the supposition, 500 farmers fed, though scantily, the whole of the inhabitants, that is 1000 persons. If therefore 100 of the free hands can be engaged to become farmers, the end may be attained: more nourishment will be produced; the people will be better fed; they will multiply; that is, their number will rise above 1000. Let us next endeavour to form a judgment of this increase, and of the consequence of the revolution.

The society will now be composed of 600 farmers

and 400 free hands. The 600 will certainly produce more fruits than formerly; but as their labor is relatively less productive by the supposition, it will be impossible for them to furnish surplus equal to their own consumption; consequently, the free hands never will be able to rise to a number equal to theirs; that is, the society will never get up to 1200. But we supposed, that the other wants of the society required the industry of one half of the inhabitants to supply them; that is, of all the 500 free hands; and, as the number of these has been already reduced, and can never more rise to that proportion, as has been said, must not either the people voluntarily adopt a more simple way of living; or must not the demand for work rise very considerably? Let me consider the consequences in both cases. In the first, you perceive, that if the inhabitants themselves are obliged to simplify their way of living, for want of hands to supply what they formerly consumed, three of the four objects proposed by the reformation become impossible to be attained; to wit, the defending themselves against their enemies, the supplying the wants of strangers, and the supplying their own with more abundance. And with regard to the fourth, the being better fed, that must cease to be the case, the moment the end is obtained; that is, the moment the inhabitants are multiplied up to the proportion of additional food. Consequently, by simplifying their way of life, and allowing farming to stand upon the new footing, they compass not any one of the ends they proposed.

Next, if we suppose, that the inhabitants do not incline to simplify their way of life, but that the wealthy among them insist upon purchasing all the instruments of luxury which they formerly were used to enjoy, must not demand for work greatly rise, and must not, of consequence, an additional encouragement be given to that species of labor which had been diminished, in taking 100 persons from industry, to throw them into the class of farmers? Will not this make them quickly desert their spade, and the rather, as they have taken to an employment less lucrative than that of farming, according to the former systems?

So much for the consequences which would follow, in case the plan proposed was found practicable; that is, supposing it to be a thing possible to transport into agriculture a part of an industrious society, already otherwise employed, and to change *all at once* the relative proportion between those who supply food, and those who purchase it with their industry. We have begun, by taking that first step for granted; and now I am to show what obstacles will be found in the execution.

We have said, that it is the multiplicity and complexity of wants which give an encouragement to agriculture, and not agriculture, or an abundance of food, which inspires mankind with a disposition to labor. Now, if this principle be true, the supposition we have proceeded upon is absurd. I am afraid, both reason and experience will abundantly prove that it is so.

The natural and necessary effect of industry, in

*Handwritten notes:*  
 The natural and necessary effect of industry, in  
 agriculture, is to increase the quantity of food  
 and to diminish the price of it. This is the  
 natural and necessary effect of industry, in  
 agriculture, and it is the cause of the  
 increase of the human race.

trades and manufactures, is to promote the increase of relative husbandry; which, by augmenting the surplus, tends of course to increase the proportion of the free hands relatively to the farmers. A river may as easily ascend to its source, as a people voluntarily adopt a more oporose agriculture than that already established, supposing the lands to be fully improved, the spirit of industry to prevail on one hand, and the farmers to have profit only in view on the other.

What farmer could sell the surplus of an expensive agriculture in competition with another who exercised a species relatively more productive?

When lands are improved, the simplification of agriculture is a necessary concomitant of industry, because diminishing expense is the only method of gaining a preference at market.

QUEST. III. Whether industry has done hurt to population, by augmenting the relative, and diminishing the absolute produce of agriculture; or whether it has done good to it, by encouraging the science in general, and extending the exercise of it over the face of the earth, is a matter of fact which I shall leave to others, better informed than I am, to determine. For my own part; I believe that thousands of examples may be found of the one and the other. I know corn-fields, where villages formerly stood, the inhabitants of which fed themselves with the pure produce of absolute agriculture; that is, with a bit of garden-ground, and the milk of a cow: there surely is depopulation: but, at a small distance from the place where those villages stood, I see corn-

*Un fiume può così facilmente essere navigato in sino a' suoi sorgenti, come un popolo volontariamente può adottare una agricoltura più attiva di quella già stabilita, supposto aver le terre poco a poco migliorate, prevalendo lo spirito d'industria da un lato, e gli ostacoli proibitivi solo rimossi all'altro.*

fields, where nothing but <sup>man's</sup> heath was to be met with; this marks population. I seek no more than to explain from facts the principles I am endeavouring to discover, and shall leave general conclusions to others, as I have already said.

There is a maxim in law, which may be extended almost to every thing in this world, *unum quodque eodem modo solvitur quo colligatum est*. Industry forms this species of absolute agriculture; industry destroys it. A military force raised the Roman greatness; a military force destroyed it. A spirit of liberty may form a noble constitution, and a spirit of liberty may break the same to pieces. The States of Denmark restrained the royal power and established a free government; the same States rendered that very power unlimited, and established there the purest monarchy in Christendom. But these reflections are foreign to our subject: *Ne futor ultra credam*. I return.

When industry is set on foot, it gives encouragement to agriculturè exercisèd as a trade: and by the allurements of ease, which a large surplus procures to the farmers, it does hurt to that species which is exercisèd as a method of subsistence. Lands become more generally and less <sup>thoroughly</sup> laborèd. In some countries tillage is set on foot and encouraged; this is an operose agriculture. While industry goes forward, and while a people can remain satisfied with a nourishment consistìng chiefly of bread, this system of agriculture will subsist, and will carry numbers very high. If wealth increases, and if those who have it begin to demand a much greater

proportion of work than formerly, while they consume no more food, then I believe numbers may diminish from the principles I am now going in quest of.

I return to the council of the island where the proposition laid down upon the carpet is, *The scanty subsistence of the inhabitants requires redress.*

A Machiavelian stands up (of such there are some in every country) and proposes, in place of multiplying the inhabitants, by rendering agriculture more operose, to diminish their number, by throwing a quantity of corn-fields into grass. What is the intention of agriculture, says he, but to nourish a state? By our operose method of plowing and sowing, one half of the whole produce is consumed by those who raise it; whereas by having a great part of our island in pasture, one half of the husbandmen may be saved. Pray what do you propose to do with those whom you intend to make idle? replies a citizen. Let them betake themselves to industry. But industry is sufficiently, nay more than sufficiently stocked already. If, says Machiavel, the supernumerary husbandmen be thrown out of a way of living, they may go where they please; we have no occasion for them, nor for any one who lives only to feed himself. But you diminish the number of your people, replies the citizen, and consequently your strength; and if afterwards you come to be attacked by your enemies, you will wish to have those back again for your defence, whom in your security you despised. To this the other makes answer: there you trust to the



Egyptian reed. If they be necessary for feeding us at present, how shall we be able to live while we employ them as soldiers? We may live without many things, but not without the labor of our husbandmen. Whether we have our grounds in tillage or in pasture, if that class be rightly proportioned to the labor required, we never can take any from it. In those countries where we see princes have recourse to the land to recruit their armies, we may safely conclude that there the land is overstocked; and that industry has not as yet been able to purge off all the superfluous mouths: but with us the case is different, where agriculture is justly proportioned to the number of husbandmen. If I propose a reform, it is only to augment the surplus, upon which all the state, except the husbandmen, are fed; if the surplus after the reform is greater than at present, the plan is good, although 250 of our farmers should thereby be forced to starve for hunger.

Though no man is, I believe, capable to reason in so inhuman a style, and though the revolution here proposed be an impossible supposition, if meant to be executed all at once, the same effects however must be produced, in every country where we see corn-fields by degrees turned into pasture; only the change is gradual, industry is not overstocked any where, and subsistence may be drawn from other countries, where the operose species of agriculture can be carried on with profit.

Familiar experience proves the truth of this. I have a corn-farm, where I maintain ten horses and

four servants for the cultivation alone: at the end of the year I find my surplus equal to 40*l.* sterling. If, by throwing my grounds into grass, I can dismiss three servants and eight horses, and at the end of the year raise my surplus to 50*l.* sterling, who doubts of my doing it? Is not this following the doctrine above laid down? But there is nothing odious in this; because I do not see these three servants die for hunger, nor is it a consequence they should, as states are formed. They turn themselves to industry, and food comes from abroad, in proportion as the country itself produces a less quantity. Fact and experience prove this assertion, and I cite Holland as an example, where every branch of operative agriculture is exploded, except for such productions as cannot be brought from other countries. I introduced the rough Machiavelian only to set principles in a strong light, and particularly that concerning the recruiting of armies from the land, which I take to be both a true one, and one necessary to be attended to, to wit, that those who must labor for the subsistence of the society, can be of little use for the defence of a state, in case of any emergency. Princes have found out the truth of this, and in proportion as industry has extended itself, regular armies have been found necessary to be kept up in times of peace, in order to be had in times of war. A militia composed of people truly industrious, I take to be far better in speculation than in practice. How would a militia do in Holland? how admirable was it not formerly in Scotland, Poland, and Catalonia? And how admirably does it still succeed

in the armies of the house of Austria? I may however be mistaken; for a military and an industrious spirit may be found compatible with one another in some particular nations: time perhaps will clear up this matter. Thus much with regard to a militia. Now as to recruiting a regular army.

The more they are recruited from the land, the less they desert. The army of the Russians, for example, now assembled (1758) hardly knows desertion, those of the house of Austria, taken from certain provinces where there is almost no industry are in the same case, also the militia of France which I consider as regular troops. On the other hand, those armies which are raised in the countries where industry has taken root are chiefly composed of loose fellows, the excrements of populous cities, the sons of vice and idleness, who have neither domicile nor attachment. These are soldiers truly by trade, and make a trade of it; how many thousands of such are now to be found? they come to market every season, and the best bidder has them while he can hold them. Some princes make a point not to receive their own deserters back, but accept of those who have committed the same infidelity to others; while others content themselves with punishing those who fail in their attempt to desert, but receive them back when they return of their own accord, after having accomplished their desertion. All is now become commerce, and seems to be regulated by the principles of it. I return to our agriculture.

Does not the exposition we have now given of these principles tend to cast a light upon the first question

N 3

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dismissed in this chapter, to wit, the effects of an equal and an unequal distribution of the property of lands?

When these are once well cultivated and improved, it is of no consequence to whom the property belongs; for by the property of such lands I only can mean the surplus, as we have abundantly explained elsewhere. Let therefore the property of all the lands of a kingdom, fully improved, belong to the state, or to any number of individuals, however few, there is no question of improvement; no difference as to agriculture, no difference as to population, according to modern policy. So long as the whole is well cultivated and made to produce, by a set of men I call farmers, the end is fully obtained; and according to the nature of the agriculture, which many different circumstances of taste and manner of living has introduced, larger or smaller portions of land must be allotted to each of them.

If you suppose a country not as yet improved, as many are, then the case becomes quite different, and small possessions are necessary, both for multiplying the inhabitants and for improving the soil. In this supposition the most operose agriculture may be carried on in competition with the most lucrative; because when there is a question of improvement, there is frequently a considerable outgoing instead of any surplus after paying the labor.

Agriculture for improvement can be carried on by none but those who have wealth and superfluity, and is prosecuted with a view to future, not to present advantage: of this we shall treat in another

*L'Agricoltura non può esser migliorata se non dove  
vi sono ricchezze e superfluità (capitali) e allora  
vi si attende a vantaggi di futuro non de  
presenti vantaggi.*

place. For I consider it as a quite different operation, influenced by different principles, and no ways to be confounded with the present subject of inquiry. But I have insensibly been wandering through an extensive subject, and it is now time to return.

I have said above that a river might as easily ascend to its source, as an industrious people voluntarily adopt a more operose system of agriculture than that already established, while the spirit of industry prevails on one hand, and while farmers have profit only in view on the other. In consequence of this position, I have treated the plan proposed for augmenting the inhabitants of the island, by the introduction of a more operose agriculture as absurd, and so it certainly is: but let me throw in a circumstance which affects the spirit of a people, and the plan becomes plausible and easy.

Let a part of the wealthy proprietors of the lands take a taste for agriculture. Let a Tull, a Du Hamel turn agriculture into an object of luxury, of amusement. Let this science be turned into a Mississippi, or South Sea scheme. Let the rich be made to believe that treasures are to be found at a small expense, laid at first out upon farming, and you will soon see the most operose species of the science go forward, and the produce of it come to market and be sold, in spite of all competition. My Lady Duchess's knotting may be sold at so much a pound, as well as that performed by a girl who does not spend six pence a day; but if the one and the other be considered relatively to the expense of the manufacturer, every knot of my Lady's will be found to have cost

*land's gain*

as much as a pound of the other. The Duchess's pound, however, increases the quantity of knots; and so does my Lord's farm the mass of subsistence for the whole society. The nation also gains by his extravagance having taken a turn, which may produce the permanent good effect of improving a part of the country, though at an expense infinitely beyond the value of it. I must now again touch upon another part of my subject, which I think has been treated too superficially.

In a former chapter I have shown how industry has the natural effect of collecting into towns and cities the free hands of a state, leaving the farmers in their farms and villages. This distribution served the purpose of explaining certain principles; but when examined relatively to other circumstances which at that time I had not in my eye, it will be found by far too general. Let me therefore add some farther observations upon that matter.

The extensive agriculture of plowing and sowing, is the proper employment of the country, and is the foundation of population in every nation fed upon its own produce. Cities are commonly surrounded by kitchen gardens, and rich grass fields; these are the proper objects of agriculture for those who live in suburbs, or who are shut up within the walls of small towns. The gardens produce various kinds of nourishment, which cannot easily be brought from a distance, in that fresh and luxuriant state which pleases the eye, and conduces to health. They offer a continual occupation to man, and very little for cattle, therefore are properly situated

in the proximity of towns and cities. The grass fields again are commonly either grazed by cows, for the production of milk, butter, cream, &c. which suffer by long carriage; or kept in pasture for preserving fatted animals in good order until the markets demand them; or they are cut in grass for the cattle of the city. They may also be turned into hay with profit; because the carriage of a bulky commodity from a great distance is sometimes too expensive. Thus we commonly find agriculture disposed in the following manner. In the centre stands the city surrounded by kitchen gardens; beyond these lies a belt of fine luxuriant pasture or hay fields; stretch beyond this and you find the beginning of what I call *operose* farming, plowing and sowing; beyond this lie grazing farms for the fattening of cattle; and last of all come the mountainous and large extents of unimproved or ill improved grounds, where animals are bred. This seems the natural distribution, and such I have found it almost every where established, when particular circumstances do not invert the order.

The poorness of the soil near Paris, for example; presents you with fields of rye corn at the very gates, and with the most extensive kitchen gardens and orchards, even for cherries and peaches, at a considerable distance from town. Other cities I have found, and I can cite the example of that which I at present inhabit, Padoua, where no kitchen garden is to be found near it, but every spot is covered with the richest grain; two thirds with wheat, and the remaining third with Indian corn. The

reason of this is palpable. The town is of a vast extent, in proportion to the inhabitants; the gardens are all within the walls, and the dung of the city enables the soil to produce constantly. Hay is brought from a greater distance, because the expense of distributing the dung over a distant field, would be greater than that of transporting the hay by water-carriage. The farm houses here appear no larger than huts, as they really are, built by the farmers, because the space to be labored is very small, in proportion to the produce; hence it is, that a farmer here pays the value of the full half of the crop to the landlord, and out of the remaining half, not only sows the ground and buys the dung, but furnishes the cattle and laboring instruments, nay even rebuilds his house, when occasion requires.

When first I examined these fertile plains, I began to lament the prodigal consumption of such valuable lands, in a multitude of very broad highways, issuing to all quarters; many of which I thought might be saved, in consideration of the vast advantage accruing upon such economy: but upon farther reflection I perceived, that the loss was inconsiderable; for the fertility of the soil proceeding chiefly from the manure laid upon it, the loss sustained from the roads ought to be computed at no more than the value of the land when uncultivated. The case would be very different, were roads now to be changed, or new ones carried through the corn fields; the loss then would be considerable, though even that would be temporary, and only affect particular persons: for the same



ding, which now supports these lands in their fertility, would quickly fertilize others in their place, and in a few years matters would stand as at present.

These last reflections lead me naturally to examine a question which has been treated by a very polite French writer, the author of *l'Ami de l'homme*, and which comes in here naturally enough, before I put an end to this first book. Here it is.

Does an unnecessary consumption of the earth's productions, either in food, clothing, or other wants; and a prodigal employment of fine rich fields, in gardens, avenues, great roads, and other uses which give small returns, *hurt population*, by rendering food and necessaries less abundant, in a kingdom such as France, in its present situation? QUEST. IV.

My answer is, That if France were fully cultivated and peopled, the introduction of superfluous consumption would be an abuse, and would diminish the number of inhabitants; as the contrary is the case, it proves an advantage. I shall now give my reasons for differing in opinion from the gentleman whose performance I have cited.

As the question is put, you perceive the end to be compassed is, to render food and necessaries abundant; because the abuse is considered in no other light, than relatively to the particular effect of diminishing the proper quantity of subsistence, which the king would incline to preserve, for the nourishment and uses of his people. I shall therefore confine myself chiefly to this object, and if I show, that these superfluous employments of the surface of the earth, and prodigal consumptions of her fruits,

are really no harm, but an encouragement to the improvement of the lands of France *in her present state* I shall consider the question as sufficiently resolved: because if the abuse, as it is called, proves favorable to agriculture, it can never prove hurtful to population. However, from the inattention of the government, it may affect foreign trade, but this is an object entirely foreign to the question. But before I enter upon the subject, it is proper to observe, that I am of opinion, that any system of economy which necessarily tends to corrupt the manners of a people, ought by every possible means to be discouraged, although no particular prejudice should result from it, either to population, or to plentiful subsistence.

Now, in the question before us, the only abuse I can find in these habits of extraordinary consumption, appears relative to the character of the consumers, and seems in no way to proceed from the effects of the consumption. The vices of men may no doubt prove the cause of their making a superfluous consumption, but the consumption they make can hardly ever be the cause of this vice. The most virtuous man in France may have the most splendid table, the richest clothes, the most magnificent equipages, the greatest number of useless horses, the most pompous palace, and most extensive gardens. The most enormous luxury to be conceived; in our acceptation of the term, so long as it is directed to no other object than the consumption of the labor and ingenuity of man, is compatible with virtue as well as with vice. This being premised, I come to the point in hand.

France, at present, is in her infancy as to improvement, although the advances she has made within a century excite the admiration of the world. I shall not go far in search of the proof of this assertion. Great tracts of her lands are still uncultivated, millions of her inhabitants are idle. When all comes to be cultivated, and all are employed, then she will be in a state of perfection, relatively to the moral possibility of being improved. The people are free, slavery is unknown, and every man is charged with feeding himself, and bringing up his children. The ports of the country are open to receive subsistence, and that nation, as much as any other, may be considered as an individual in the great society of the world; that is, may increase in power, wealth, and ease, relatively to others in proportion to the industry of her inhabitants. This being the case, all the principles of political economy, which we have been inquiring after, may freely operate in this kingdom.

France has arrived at her present pitch of luxury, relatively to consumption, by slow degrees. As she has grown in wealth, her desire of employing it has grown also. In proportion as her demands have increased, more hands have been employed to supply them; for no article of expense can be increased, without increasing the work of those who supply it. If the same number of inhabitants in the city of Paris consume four times as much of any necessary article as formerly, I hope it will be allowed, that the production of such necessaries must be four times as abundant, and consequently, that many

more people must be employed in providing them.

What is it that encourages agriculture, but a great demand for its productions? What encourages multiplication, but a great demand for people; that is, for their work? Would any one complain of the extravagant people in Paris, if, instead of consuming those vast superfluities, they were to send them over to Dover, for a return in English gold? What is the difference between the prodigal consumption, and the sale? The one brings in money, the other brings in none: but as to food and necessaries, for providing the poor and frugal, their contingent, in either case, stands exactly the same.

But, says one, were it not for this extraordinary consumption, every thing would be cheaper: This I readily allow; but will any body say, that reducing the price of the earth's productions is a method to encourage agriculture, especially in a country where grounds are not improved, and where they cannot be improved; chiefly, because the expense surpasses all the profits which possibly can be drawn from the returns? High prices therefore, the effect of great consumption, are certainly advantageous to the extension of agriculture. If I throw my rich corn fields into gravel-walks and gardens, I suppose they will no more come into competition with those of my neighbour, the laborious husbandman. Who will then lose by my extravagance? Not the husbandman. It will perhaps be said, the nation in general will lose; because you deprive them of their food. This

might be true, were the laying waste the corn fields a sudden revolution, and extensive enough to affect the whole society; and were the sea-ports and barriers of the kingdom shut: but that not being the case, the nation, upon the smallest deficiency, goes to market with her money, and loses none of her inhabitants.

OBJ. But if living is made dear, manufacturers must starve, for want of employment.

ANSW. Not those who supply home consumption, but only those who supply foreigners living more cheaply; and of such I know but few. The interest of this class shall be fully examined in another place. At present I shall only observe, that the laying waste corn fields in an industrious country, where refinement has set on foot a plan of useful husbandry, will have no other effect, than that of rendering grain for a while proportionally dearer: consequently, agriculture will be thereby encouraged; and in a few years the loss will be repaired, by a farther extension of improvement. This will make food plentiful and cheap: then numbers will increase, until it become scarce again. It is by such alternate vicissitudes, that improvement and population are carried to their height. While the improvement of lands goes forward, I must conclude, that demand for subsistence is increasing; and if this be not a proof of population, I am much mistaken.

I can very easily suppose, that a demand for *work* may increase considerably, in consequence of an augmentation of riches only; because there is no bounds to the consumption of *work*; but as for articles

of nourishment the case is quite different. The most delicate liver in Paris will not put more of the earth's productions into his belly, than another: he may pick and chuse, but he will always find, that what he leaves will go to feed another: victuals are not thrown away in any country I have ever been in. It is not in the most expensive kitchens where there is found the most prodigal dissipation of the abundant fruits of the earth; and it is with such that a people is fed, not with ortolans, truffles, and oysters, sent from Marenne.

OBJ Roads of a superfluous breadth are carried many times through the finest fields, belonging to the poor and industrious, without a proper indemnity being given.

ANSW. The with-holding the indemnity is an abuse; the loss of the fields is none *to the state*, except in such countries where the quantity of arable lands is small, as in mountainous provinces; there a proper consideration should be had to the breadth, because the loss cannot be made up. In such countries as I here describe, and I cite the Tirol for an example, I have found all the inhabitants in a manner employed in that species of agriculture, which is exercised as a method of subsisting. The little ground that is arable, is divided into very small lots; the people multiply very much, and leave the country. Those who remain are usually employed in cutting wood, for building and burning, which they send down the rivers, and in return buy corn, which comes from the south and from the north. This is the best plan of industry they

they can follow, without the assistance of their sovereign. Roads here are executed to great perfection, with abundance of solidity, and with a tender regard for the little ground there is. I return to France.

OBJ. A multitude of superfluous horses are kept in Paris, which consume what would feed many more inhabitants.

ANSW. True: but he who feeds the horses, because *he thinks* he has use for them, would not feed those inhabitants, because *he is sure* he has no use for them: and did he, in complaisance for the public, dismiss his cattle, the farmer, who furnishes the hay and oats, would lose a customer, and nobody would gain. These articles are produced, because they are demanded: when additional inhabitants are produced, who will demand and can pay, their demand will be answered also, as long as there is an unemployed acre in France.

OBJ. The increase of the consumption of wood for firing is hurtful to population; because it marks the extension of forests.

ANSW. This consequence I deny; both from fact and reason. From fact, because forests are not extended, and that nothing but the hand of nature, in an ill-inhabited country, seems capable of forming them. In France, forests are diminishing daily; and were it not for the jurisdiction of the *Table de marbre*, they would have been more diminished than they are. I agree, that the consumption of wood is at present infinitely greater than formerly, and likewise, that the price of it is greatly risen every where. These two circumstances rather seem to mark the

contraction, than the extension of forests. But the increase of consumption and price proceed from other causes, as I shall show, in order to point out some new principles relative to this extensive subject.

1. The increase of consumption proceeds from the increase of wealth. 2. The increase of price proceeds from the increase upon the value of labor, and not from the scarcity of forests, nor the height of the demand for firing. As to the first, I believe the fact will not be called in question, as it is one of the superfluities of consumption complained of, and put down to the account of luxury and extravagance. As to the second, the true cause of the rise of the price of that commodity demands a little more attention, and in order to point it out with some distinctness, I must first show the political impossibility of forests becoming extended over the *arable* lands of France in her present situation.

The best proof I can offer to support my opinion is, to compare the inconsiderable value of an acre of standing forest in the king's adjudications, where thousands are sold at a time, with the value of an acre of tolerable corn lands, and then ask, if the present value of forests is so considerable, as to engage any proprietor to sow such a field for raising wood, when he must wait, perhaps 40 years, before it be fit for cutting? Add to this, what whoever plants a tree in France, comes under the jurisdiction above-mentioned, and is not at liberty to cut it down, and dispose of it, without their permission. It is in a great measure for this reason, that so few trees are seen about French villages; and I never heard of



one example, of corn lands being sown with the seeds of forest-trees, with a view to improvement. That forests, which are well kept, may extend themselves over grounds not worth the cultivation, I do not deny; but this surely can do no harm to agriculture; and it is only in that respect, I pretend that forests in France are not at present in a way of gaining ground.

Now as to the rise in the price of wood for burning, I say, it proceeds not from the rise of the price of timber growing in forests, so much as from the increase of the price of labor, and principally of the price of transportation. This is not peculiar to France alone, but is common to all Europe almost, for the reasons I shall presently give. But in the first place, as to the matter of fact, that the rise in the price proceeds from the cause assigned, may be seen, by comparing the low price of an acre of standing forest, with the great value of the timber when brought to market: the first is the neat value of the wood; the last includes that of the labor.

Next as to the price of labor; the rise here is universal in all industrious nations, from a very plain reason, easily deducible from the principles above laid down.

While the land remained loaded with a number of superfluous mouths, while numbers were found in every province employed in agriculture, for the sake of subsistence, merely, such people were always ready to employ their idle hours and days, for a very small consideration from those who employed them. They did not then depend upon this employ-

ment for their subsistence; and a penny in their pocket purchased some superfluity for them. But when modern policy has by degrees drawn numbers from the country, the few that remain for the service of the public must now labor for their subsistence; and he who employs them, must feed them, clothe them, and provide for all their other wants. No wonder then, if labor be dearer: there is a palpable reason for the augmentation.

The price of all necessaries has risen, no doubt, partly for the same reason, and this circumstance certainly enters into the combination: but work, in the country especially, has risen far beyond the proportion of the price of necessaries, and will rise still more as the lands become better purged of superfluous mouths.

Notwithstanding what I have said, I readily allow, that the great consumption of wood for burning, but more particularly for forges, has considerably raised the intrinsic value of forest lands; but the consequence has not been, to extend the forests, as we have shown, but to produce a general revenue from them all over the kingdom; whereas formerly, in many provinces, they produced almost nothing. When they were cut, cattle were turned in, and by eating up the tender shoots from year to year, the forest ran into a wild, neither producing timber, nor pasture. This practice was established upon the ruling principle of private interest. The land was not worth the expense of grubbing up the timber; the timber when grown, did not compensate the loss of a few years pasture. No jurisdiction, how-

ever well administered, can check the operation of that principle, and a statesman who would attempt it, would be called a tyrant: he would distress the husbandman, and do no service to the state.

From what has been said, I must conclude, that while the consumption of the earth's produce, and of the work of man tend to excite industry, in providing for extraordinary demands; when the interest of foreign trade does not enter into the question; and while there are lands enough remaining unimproved, to furnish *the first matter*; there can be no political abuse from the misapplication or unnecessary destruction of either fruits or labor. The misapplier, or dissipator, is punished by the loss of his money; the industrious man is rewarded by the acquisition of it. We have said, that vice is not more essentially connected with superfluity, than virtue with industry and frugality. But such questions are foreign to my subject. I would however recommend it to moralists, to study circumstances well, before they carry reformation so far, as to interrupt an established system in the political economy of their country.

## C H A P. XXI.

### *Recapitulation of the First Book.*

**I** SET out by distinguishing government from political economy; calling the first the power to command, the second the talent to execute. Thus the

INTROD.

governor may restrain, but the steward must lead, and, by direct motives of self-interest, gently conduct free and independent men to concur in certain schemes ultimately calculated for their own proper benefit.

The object is, to provide food, other necessaries and employment, not only for those who actually exist, but also for those who are to be brought into existence. This is accomplished, by engaging every one of the society to contribute to the service of others, in proportion only as he is to reap a benefit from reciprocal services. To render this practicable, the spirit of the people must be studied, the different occupations prescribed to each must first be adapted to their inclinations, and when once they have taken a taste for labor, these inclinations must be worked upon by degrees, so as to be bent towards such pursuits as are most proper for attaining the end desired.

**CHAP. I.** He who sits at the head of this operation, is called the statesman. I suppose him to be constantly awake, attentive to his employment, able and uncorrupted, tender in his love for the society he governs, impartially just in his indulgence for every class of inhabitants, and disregarding of the interest of individuals, when that regard is inconsistent with the general welfare.

Did I propose a plan of execution, I confess this supposition would be absurd; but as I mean nothing farther than the investigation of principles, it is no more so, than to suppose a point, a straight line, a circle, or an infinite, in treating of geometry.

To prepare the way for treating this subject, in that order which the revolutions of the last centuries have pointed out as the most natural, I have made the distribution of my plan in the following order, Population and agriculture are the foundations of the whole. Civil and domestic liberty, introduced into Europe by the dissolution of the feudal form of government, set trade and industry on foot; these produced wealth and credit; these again debts and taxes; and all together established a perfectly new system of political economy, the principles of which it is my intention to deduce and examine. CHAP. II.

Population and agriculture, as I have said, must be the basis of the whole, in all ages of the world; and as they are so blended together in their connections and relations, as to make the separation of them quite incompatible with perspicuity and order, they have naturally been made the subject of the first book.

I have shown, that the first principle of multiplication is generation; the second is food: the one gives existence and life; the other preserves them. CHAP. III.

The earth's spontaneous fruits being of a determined quantity, never can feed above a determined number. Labor is a method of augmenting the productions of nature, and in proportion to the augmentation, numbers may increase. From these positions, I conclude.

That the numbers of mankind must ever have been in proportion to the produce of the earth; and this produce must constantly be in the compound ratio of the fertility of the soil, and labor of the inhabitants. CHAP. IV.

sequently, there can be no determined universal proportion over the world, between the number of those necessary for laboring the soil, and of those who may be maintained by its produce. Here I am led to examine the motives which may induce one part of a free people to labor, in order to feed the other.

This I show to proceed from the different wants to which mankind are liable.

CHAP. V. Here I introduce a statesman, as being necessary to model the spirit of a society. He contrives and encourages reciprocal objects of want, which have each their allurements. This engages every one in a different occupation, and must hurt the former simplicity of manners. I show how essential it is, to keep a just balance throughout every part of industry, that no discouragement may be cast upon any branch of it, either from superfluity, or want; and I have pointed out, how the dividing of food between parents and children, is the means of bringing on scarcity, which inconveniency can only be removed by an augmentation of labor.

If a society does not concur in this plan of reciprocal industry, their numbers will cease to increase; because the industrious will not feed the idle. This I call a state of a moral impossibility of increase in numbers, and I distinguish it from the physical impossibility, which can take place only when nature itself, not man, refuses to produce subsistence. From this I apply to each particular society what I had before found applicable to mankind in general; to wit.

That the inhabitants of every country must be in the compound proportion of the quantity of food produced in it, and of the industry of the lower classes. If the food produced surpasses the proportion of industry, the balance of food will be exported; if the industry surpasses the proportion of food, its deficiency must be supplied by imports.

Reciprocal wants excite to labor; consequently, those whose labor is not directed towards the cultivation of the soil, must live upon a surplus produced by those who do. This divides the society into two classes. The one I call farmers, the other free hands,

As the creating these reciprocal wants was what set the society to work, and distributed them naturally into the two classes we have mentioned; so the augmentation of wants will require an augmentation of free hands, and their demand for food will increase agriculture.

Here I define luxury to mean no more than the consumption of superfluity, or the supplying of wants not essentially necessary to life; and, I say, that a taste for superfluity will introduce the use of money, which I represent as the general object of want, that is of desire, among mankind; and I show how an eagerness to acquire it becomes an universal passion, a means of increasing industry among the free hands; consequently, of augmenting their numbers; consequently, of promoting agriculture for their subsistence.

CHAP. VI

The whole operation I have been describing proceeds upon one supposition, to wit, that the people

have a taste for labor, and the rich for superfluity. If these be covetous and admirers of simplicity: or those be lazy and void of ambition, the principles laid down will have no effect: and so in fact we find, that it is not in the finest countries in the world where most inhabitants are found, but in the most industrious.

Let it therefore never be said, there are too many manufacturers in a free country. It is the same thing as if it was said, there are too few idle persons, too few beggars, and too many husbandmen.

**CHAP. VII.** Here I break off my subject, to answer an objection arising from these principles.

**OBJ.** How could the simplicity of the ancients be compatible with a great multiplication?

**ANSW.** In ancient times men were forced to labor the ground because they were slaves to others. In modern times the operation is more complex, and as a statesman cannot make slaves of his subjects, he must engage them to become slaves to their own passions and desires; this is the only method to make them labor the ground, and provided this be accomplished, by whatever means it is brought about, mankind will increase.

**CHAP. VIII.** This question being dismissed, I point out a method of estimating the proportion of numbers between the farmers and free hands of a country, only as an illustration of the principle already laid down, to wit, that it is the surplus of the farmers which goes for the subsistence of the others.

This surplus I show to be the same thing as the value of the land rents; and hence I conclude,



1st, That the rising of the rents of lands proves the augmentation of industry, and the multiplication of free hands; but as rents may rise, and yet the number of inhabitants continue the same as before, I infer,

2dly, That the revolution must then mark the purging of the lands of superfluous mouths, and forcing these to quit their mother earth, in order to retire to towns and villages, where they may usefully swell the number of the free hands and apply to industry.

3dly, That the more a country is in tillage, the more it is inhabited, and the fewer free hands are to be found: that the more it is laid into pasture, the less it is inhabited, and the greater is the proportion of free hands.

Next I consider the principles which determine CHAP. IX.  
the place of residence.

The farmers must live upon, or near the spot they labor; that is, either upon their farms or in their villages.

The free hands I divide into two conditions. The first composed of the proprietors of the surplus of food, that is the landlords; together with those who can purchase it with a revenue already acquired, that is, the monied interest. The second condition is composed of those who must purchase some of this surplus with their daily labor.

Those of the first condition may live where they please; those of the second must live where they can.

When those of the first chuse to live together, a considerable number of those of the second must

follow them, in order to supply their consumption. This forms towns and cities.

When a statesman places the whole administration of public affairs in the same city, this swells a capital.

When manufacturers get together in bodies, they depend not directly upon consumers, but upon merchants. The situation of their residence depends upon circumstances relative to their occupation, provision and transportation of their work. From this hamlets swell into villages, and villages into towns. Sea ports owe their establishment to the increase of foreign trade.

CHAP. X. As the collecting such numbers of inhabitants together is a late revolution in the political economy of Europe, I endeavour to give a short historical representation of it, and examine the consequences which result from it, both to the state from the growth of cities, and to the land proprietors from the desertion, as I may call it, of so many vassals and dependents. One principal effect I observe to be, the additional occupation it has given to statesmen; that is to say, political economy is thereby become more complex.

CHAP. XI. Formerly the inhabitants were dispersed, and by sucking, as it were, their mother earth, were more easily subsisted: now industry has gathered them together, and industry must support them. The failing of industry, is like the cutting off the subsistence of an army. This it is the care of a general to prevent, that the care of a statesman.

The supporting industry means no more than

employing those who must live by it; and keeping their numbers in proportion to their work. The first point, therefore, is to find work for the present inhabitants; the second is, to make them multiply, if the demand for their labor increases.

Increasing numbers will never remove, but rather augment such inconveniencies, as proceed from the abuses of those already existing.

In order to employ a people rightly, it is proper to know the exact state of numbers necessary for supplying the demand for every occupation; to distribute those who must live by their industry into proper classes; and to make every class (as far as possible) at least, support their own numbers by propagation.

Where the value of any species of industry is CHAP. XII. not sufficient for that purpose, a proper remedy must be applied. When any are found incapable, from age or infirmities, to gain their livelihood, they must be maintained. Infants exposed by their parents must be taken care of, and thrown back into the lowest classes of the people; the most numerous always, and the most difficult to be supported by their own propagation. Marriage, without assistance, will not succeed in a class who gain no more by their industry than a personal physical necessary. Here our economy differs widely from that of the ancients. Among them marriage was encouraged in many ways; but it was only for the free. These did not amount to one half of the people. The slaves who represented our lower classes were recruited from other countries, as they are at present in America.

If, therefore, according to modern economy, the lowest species of labor must be kept cheap, in order to make manufactures flourish, the state must be at the expense of the children; for as matters stand, either the unmarried gain as much as the married should do, and become extravagant; or the married gain no more than the unmarried can do, and become miserable. An unequal competition between people of the same class, always implies one of these inconveniencies; and from these principally proceeds the decay and misery of such numbers in all modern states, as well as the constant complaints of the augmentation of the price of labor.

Every individual is equally inspired with a desire to propagate. A people can no more remain without propagating, than a tree without growing: but no more can live than can be fed; and as all augmentations of food must come at last to a stop, so soon as this happens, a people increase no more; that is to say, the proportion of those who die annually increases. This insensibly deters from propagation, because we are rational creatures. But still there are some who, though rational, are not provident; these marry and produce. This I call vicious propagation. Hence I distinguish propagation into two branches, to wit, multiplication, which goes on among these who can feed what they breed, and mere procreation, which takes place among those who cannot maintain their offspring.

This last produces a political disease, which mortality cures at the expense of much misery; as forest trees which are not pruned, dress themselves and

become vigorous at the expense of numbers which die all round. How to propose a remedy for this inconveniency, without laying some restraint upon marriage; how to lay a restraint upon marriage without shocking the spirit of the times, I own I cannot find out; so I leave every one to conjecture.

Although a complete remedy cannot be obtained CHAP XIII. against the effects of abusive procreation; yet with the help of accurate lists of births and deaths for every class of people, many expedients may be fallen upon to preserve the few who escape the dangers of their infancy, from falling back into the unhappy class which produced them. From these lists the degree of mortality and nature of diseases, as well as the difference between the propagation of the easy and of the miserable, will plainly appear; and if it be the duty of a statesman to keep all his people busy, he certainly should acquire the most exact knowledge possible of the numbers and propagation of those of every denomination, that he may prevent any class from rising above or sinking below the standard, which is best proportioned to the demand for their respective industry.

Population and agriculture have so close a con- CHAP XIV. nexion with one another, that I find even the abuses to which they are severally liable, perfectly similar. I have observed how naturally it must happen, that when too many of a society propagate, a part must starve: when too many cultivate, a part must starve also. Here is the reason:

The more of a people cultivate a country, the smaller portion of it must fall to every man's share;

and when these portions are reduced so low as to produce no more than what is necessary to feed the laborers, then agriculture is stocked to the utmost.

From this I divide agriculture into two branches; the one useful, the other abusive. The first is a trade, that is, a method of producing not only subsistence for the laborers, but also a surplus to be provided for the free hands of the state, for their subsistence, and for an equivalent either in work itself, or for the produce of it. The second is no trade, because it implies no alienation, but is purely a method of subsisting. If, therefore, in any country where agriculture is exercised as a trade, and where there are many free hands, the farmers should be allowed to multiply up to the proportion of the whole produce; would not all the free hands be forced to starve? What would be the advantage of having so many farmers; for there is one evident loss? Every one would be entirely taken up in feeding himself, wants would disappear; life indeed would be simplified to the last degree, but the bond of society, mutual dependence, would be dissolved; therefore I call this species abusive, in proportion as these effects are produced. I cite several examples of this abusive agriculture in different countries, where I take occasion to observe, that the christian virtue, charity, in proportion to its extent, is as conducive to multiplication as either slavery, or industry: whatever gives food must give numbers. I do not say that charity is conducive to industry.

CHAP. XV. I next apply these general principles to a particular representation given of the state of population  
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in the British isles; from which I conclude, that population there is not obstructed, either by losses sustained from war and commerce, or from the exportation of their subsistence, but from the political situation of that country, which throws it at present into a moral incapacity of augmenting in numbers.

The establishment of trade and industry naturally rectifies this misapplication of agriculture, by purging the land of superfluous mouths, and thereby reduces it, as it ought to be, to a trade calculated to furnish a surplus, which comes to be sold for the labor of all the industrious. It is this alone which can rivet the bond of general dependence among free men who must live by their industry; by making one part laborious farmers, and the other ingenious tradesmen and manufacturers. It is by the vibration of the balance between these two classes, that multiplication and agriculture are carried to their height. When industry goes on too fast, free hands multiply above the standard, that is, their scale sinks; this raises the price of food, and gives an additional encouragement to agriculture: when this again becomes the more weighty, food becomes plentiful and cheap, then numbers augment a-new. These reflections lead me to consider the effects of plentiful and scarce years in modern times, when famines are almost things unknown; and I conclude,

That were plentiful years more common, mankind would be more numerous; that were scarce years more frequent, numbers would diminish. Then applying this observation to the state of exportations of grain from England, I am tempted to infer,

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that this kingdom, the most fertile perhaps in Europe, has never been found to produce, in one year, eighteen months full subsistence for all its inhabitants; nor ever less than ten months scanty provision in the years of the greatest sterility.

CHAP.  
XVIII.

When a country is fully peopled and continues to be industrious, food will come from abroad. When a loaf is to be had, the rich will eat it, though at the distance of a mile; and the poor may starve, though at the next door. It is the demand of the rich, who multiply as much as they incline, which encourages agriculture even in foreign nations; therefore I conclude, that this multiplication is the cause, and that the progress of agriculture is but the effect of it.

A country once fully stocked may diminish in numbers, and still remain stocked. This must proceed from a change in the manner of living; as when an indolent people quit the consumption of the more abundant productions of the earth, to seek after delicacies. On the other hand, the industrious bring an additional supply from abroad, and by furnishing strangers with the produce of their labor, they still go on and increase in numbers. This is the case of Holland: and this scheme will go on, until abuses at home raise the price of labor; and experience abroad, that universal school-mistress, teaches foreigners to profit of their own advantages.

When food ceases to be augmented, numbers come to a stand; but trade may still go on and increase wealth: this will hire armies of foreigners; so the traders may read of their own battles, victories, and trophies, and by spending their money, never smell gunpowder.



When they cannot augment their numbers, they will introduce machines into many manufactures; and these will supply the want, without adding to the consumption of their food. Foreigners, astonished at a novelty which lowers prices, and checks their growing industry, will copy the inventions; but being no more than scholars, who go awkwardly to work, this improvement will throw many of their hands into idleness: the machines will be cried down, and the traders will laugh in their sleeves, well knowing that nothing is more easy than to put work into the hands of an industrious man made idle. Wit and genius, in short, will always set him who possesses them above the level of his fellows, and when one resource fails him, he will contrive another.

The wit I here mention is not that acquired in the closet; for there one may learn, that an equal distribution of lands was so favorable to multiplication in ancient times, that it must be owing to a contrary practice, that our numbers now are so much smaller. But he who walks abroad, and sees millions who have not one moment's time to put a spade in the ground, so busily are they employed in that branch of industry which is put into their hands, must readily conclude, that circumstances are changed, and that the fewer people are necessary for feeding the whole society, the more must remain free to be employed in providing every other thing that can make life agreeable, both to themselves and to strangers; who in return deliver into the hands of their industrious servants, the ensigns of superiority and dominion, money. Who is best employed, he who works to

feed himself, or he who works to be fed, clothed, and supplied, disposing only of his superfluities to those whom, consequently, he shortly must command. This is obtained by the introduction of the useful species of agriculture, and by the explosion of the abusive. And when strangers are so kind as to allow their neighbours the privilege of clothing and adorning them, good nature, not to say self-interest, demands, in return, that the first be indulged in a permission to exercise those branches of toil and labor which are the least profitable, though the most necessary for the subsistence of the latter.

When the eye of humanity considers the toil of the farmer, and the indifference of his rich countryman in squandering, the abuse appears offensive. The rich man is advised to consider of the pain incurred by the poor husbandman, in consequence of his dissipation. Upon this the rich, touched with compassion, simplifies his way of life. The husbandman in a fury falls upon the reformer, and, in his rough way, gives him to understand, that he by no means looks upon him as his friend: for, says he, do you take me for the rich man's slave; or do you imagine that I toil as I do, either by his command, or for any consideration for him? Not in the least, it is purely for his money; and from the time you persuaded him to become an economist, here am I, and my poor family, starving. We are not the only people in this situation; there is my neighbour who has all his hay and oats upon hand, since, by your instigation, likewise, he dismissed his useless horses. Do you think he will give his oats in charity to feed the

poor? He is poor enough himself, and all those who have been working to get this provision together are in no better humor than I am. Hold your tongue, says the reformer, you are a parcel of extravagant fellows, you laborers. A hundred years ago, one could have got as many of you as one pleased, for the half of what you cost us at present. Give us back our lands, says the other, at the rate we had them; and let us all be well fed before we give you a farthing, and you shall have us as cheap as ever. But do you think that after you have chased one half of us into towns, and raised your rents with the price of their food, that we can work twice as hard, and serve you as formerly? No, Sir! you ought to have more sense than to expect it.

This is a sketch of the first book; I thought a short abridgment of it might be of service for recollecting ideas, and ranging them in order before I proceed.

END OF THE FIRST BOOK.

AN INQUIRY  
INTO THE  
PRINCIPLES  
OF  
POLITICAL ECONOMY.

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B O O K II.  
OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY.

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I N T R O D U C T I O N .

**B**EFORE I enter upon this second book, I must premise a word of connexion, in order to conduct the ideas of my reader by the same way through which the chain of my own thoughts, and the distribution of my plan have naturally led me.

My principal view hitherto has been to prepare the way for an examination of the principles of modern politics, by inquiring into those which have, less or more, operated regular effects in all the ages of the world.

In doing this, I confess, it has been impossible for me not to anticipate many things which, according to the plan I have laid down, will in some measure involve me in repetitions.

I propose to investigate principles which are all relative and depending upon one another. It is impossible to treat of these with distinctness, without applying them to the objects on which they have an influence; and as the same principles extend their influence to several branches of my subject, those of my readers who keep them chiefly in their eye, will not find great variety in the different applications of them.

In all compositions of this kind, two things are principally requisite. The first is, to represent such ideas as are abstract, clearly, simply, and uncompounded. This part resembles the forging out the links of a chain. The second is, to dispose those ideas in a proper order; that is, according to their most immediate relations. When such a composition is laid before a good understanding, memory finishes the work, by cementing the links together; and providing any one of them can be retained, the whole will follow of course.

Now the relations between the different principles of which I treat, are indeed striking to such as are accustomed to abstract reasoning, but not near so much so, as when the application of them is made to different examples.

The principle of self-interest will serve as a general key to this inquiry; and it may, in one sense, be considered as the ruling principle of my subject, and may therefore be traced throughout the whole. This is the main spring, and only motive which a statesman should make use of, to engage a free

people to concur in the plans which he lays down for their government.

I beg I may not here be understood to mean, that self-interest should conduct the statesman: by no means. Self-interest, when considered with regard to him, is public spirit; and it can only be called self-interest, when it is applied to those who are to be governed by it.

From this principle men are engaged to act in a thousand different ways, and every action draws after it certain necessary consequences. The question therefore constantly under consideration comes to be, what will mankind find it their interest to do, under such and such circumstances?

In order to exhaust the subject of political economy, I have proposed to treat the principles of it in relation to circumstances; and as these are infinite, I have taken them by categories; that is, by the more general combinations, which modern policy has formed. These, for the sake of order, I have represented as all hanging in a chain of consequences, and depending on one another. See Book I. Chap. ii.

I found this the best method for extending my plan, from which it is natural to infer, that it will also prove the best for enabling my readers to retain it.

I shall do what I can to diversify, by various circumstances, the repetitions which this disposition must lead me into. There is no seeing a whole kingdom, without passing now and then through a town which one has seen before. I shall therefore imitate the traveller, who, upon such occasions,

makes his stay very short, unless some new curiosity should happen to engage his attention.

I have said, that self-interest is the ruling principle of my subject, and I have so explained myself, as to prevent any one from supposing, that I consider it as the universal spring of human actions. Here is the light in which I want to represent this matter.

The best way to govern a society, and to engage every one to conduct himself according to a plan, is for the statesman to form a system of administration, the most consistent possible with the interest of every individual, and never to flatter himself that his people will be brought to act in general, and in matters which purely regard the public, from any other principle than private interest. This is the utmost length to which I pretend to carry my position. As to what regards the merit and demerit of actions in general, I think it fully as absurd to say, that no action is truly virtuous, as to affirm, that none is really vitious.

It might perhaps be expected, that, in treating of politics, I should have brought in public spirit also, as a principle of action; whereas all I require with respect to this principle is, only a restraint from it; and even this is, perhaps, too much to be taken for granted. Were public spirit, instead of private utility, to become the spring of action in the individuals of a well-governed state, I apprehend, it would spoil all. I explain myself.

Public spirit, in my way of treating this subject, is as superfluous in the governed, as it ought to be all-powerful in the statesman; at least, if it is not

altogether superfluous, it is fully as much so, as miracles are in a religion once fully established. Both are admirable at setting out, but would shake every thing loose were they to continue to be common and familiar. Were miracles wrought every day, the laws of nature would no longer be laws: and were every one to act for the public, and neglect himself, the statesman would be bewildered, and the supposition is ridiculous.

I expect, therefore, that every man is to act for his own interest in what regards the public; and, politically speaking, every one ought to do so. It is the combination of every private interest which forms the public good, and of this the public, that is, the statesman, only can judge. You must love your country. Why? Because it is yours. But you must not prefer your own interest to that of your country. This, I agree, is perfectly just and right: but this means no more, than that you are to abstain from acting to its prejudice, even though your own private interest should demand it; that is, you should abstain from unlawful gain. Count Julian, for example, who, from private resentment, it is said, brought the Moors into Spain, and ruined his country, transgressed this maxim. A spy in an army, or in a cabinet, who betrays the secrets of his country, and he who sells his trust, are in the same case: defrauding the state is, among many others, a notorious example of this. To suppose men, in general, honest in such matters, would be absurd. The legislature therefore ought to make good laws, and those who transgress them ought to be speedily, severely,



and most certainly punished. This belongs to the coercive part of government, and falling beyond the limits of my subject, is ever taken for granted.

Were the principle of public spirit carried farther; were a people to become quite disinterested, there would be no possibility of governing them. Every one might consider the interest of his country in a different light, and many might join in the ruin of it, by endeavouring to promote its advantages. Were a rich merchant to begin and sell his goods without profit, what would become of trade? Were another to defray the extraordinary expense of some workmen in a hard year, in order to enable them to carry on their industry, without raising their price, what would become of others, who had not the like advantages? Were a man of a large landed estate to distribute his corn-rents at a low price in a year of scarcity, what would become of the poor farmers? Were people to feed all who would ask charity, what would become of industry? These operations of public spirit ought to be left to the public, and all that is required of individuals is, not to endeavour to defeat them.

This is the regular distribution of things, and it is only this which comes under my consideration.

In ill-administered governments I admire as much as any one every act of public spirit, every sentiment of disinterestedness, and nobody can have a higher esteem for every person remarkable for them.

The less attentive any government is to do their duty, the more essential it is that every individual be animated by *that* spirit, which then languishes in

the very part where it ought to flourish with the greatest strength and vigor; and on the other hand, the more public spirit is shown in the administration of public affairs, the less occasion has the state for assistance from individuals.

Now as I suppose my statesman to do his duty in the most minute particulars, so I allow every one of his subjects to follow the dictates of his private interest. All I require is an exact obedience to the laws. This also is the interest of every one; for he who transgresses ought most undoubtedly to be punished: and this is all the public spirit which any perfect government has occasion for.

## C H A P. I.

*Of the reciprocal Connexions between Trade and Industry.*

I AM now going to treat of trade and industry, two different subjects, but which are as thoroughly blended together, as those we have discussed in the first book. Similar to these in their mutual operations, they are reciprocally aiding and assisting to each other, and it is by the constant vibration of the balance between them, that both are carried to their height of perfection and refinement.

*TRADE is an operation, by which the wealth, or work, either of individuals, or of societies, may be exchanged, by a set of men called merchants, for an equivalent, proper for supplying every want, without any interruption to industry, or any check upon consumption.*

*INDUSTRY is the application to ingenious labor in a free man, in order to procure, by the means of trade, an equivalent, fit for the supplying every want.*

I must observe, that these definitions are only just, relatively to my subject, and to one another, for *trade* may exist without *industry*, because things produced partly by nature may be exchanged between men; *industry* may be exercised without *trade*, because a man may be very ingenious in working to supply his own consumption, and where there is no exchange, there can be no *trade*. *Industry* likewise is different from *labor*. *Industry*, as I understand the term, must be voluntary; *labor* may be forced: the

one and the other may produce the same effect, but the political consequences are vastly different.

*Industry*, therefore, is only applicable to free men; *labor* may be performed by slaves.

Let me examine this last distinction a little more closely, the better to try whether it be just, and to point out the consequences which result from it.

I have said, that without the assistance of one of the three principles of multiplication, to wit, slavery, industry, or charity, there was no possibility of making mankind subsist, so as to be serviceable to one another, in greater numbers than those proportioned to the spontaneous fruits of the earth. Slavery and industry are quite compatible with the selfish nature of man, and may therefore be generally established in any society: charity again is a refinement upon humanity, and therefore, I apprehend, it must ever be precarious.

Now I take slavery and industry to be equally compatible with great multiplication, but incompatible with one another, without great restrictions laid upon the first. It is a very hard matter to introduce industry into a country where slavery is established; because of the unequal competition between the work of slaves and that of free men. supposing both equally admitted to market. Here is the reason:

The slaves have all their particular masters, who can take better care of *them*, than any statesman can take of the industrious freemen; because their liberty is an obstacle to his care. The slaves have all their wants supplied by the master, who may keep them within the limits of sobriety. He may either recruit

their numbers from abroad, or take care of the children, just as he finds it his advantage. If the latter should prove unprofitable, either the children die for want of care, or by promiscuous living few are born, or by keeping the sexes asunder, they are prevented from breeding at all. A troop of manufacturing slaves, considered in a political light, will be found all employed, all provided for, and their work, when brought to market by the master, may be afforded much cheaper, than the like performed by freemen, who must every one provide for himself, and who may perhaps have a separate house, a wife, and children, to maintain, and all this from an industry, which produces no more, nay not so much, as that of a single slave, who has no avocation from labor. Why do large undertakings in the manufacturing way ruin private industry, but by coming nearer to the simplicity of slaves. Could the sugar islands be cultivated to any advantage by hired labor? were not the expenses of rearing children supposed to be great, would slaves ever be imported? Certainly not: and yet it is still a doubt with me, whether or not a proper regulation for bringing up the children of slaves might not turn this expedient to a better account, than the constant importation of them. But this is foreign to the present purpose. All I intend here to observe is, the consequences of a *competition* between the work of slaves and of free men; from which competition I infer, that, without judicious regulations, it must be impossible for industry ever to get the better of the disadvantages to which it will necessarily be exposed at first, in a state where slavery is already introduced.

These regulations ought to prevent the competition between the industrious freemen and the masters of slaves, by appropriating the occupation of each to different objects: to confine slavery, for example, to the country; that is, to set the slaves apart for agriculture, and to exclude them from every other service of work. With such a regulation *perhaps* industry might succeed. This was not the case of old; industry did not succeed as at present: and to this I attribute the simplicity of those times.

It is not so difficult to introduce slavery into a state where liberty is established; because such a revolution might be brought about by force and violence, which make every thing give way; and, for the reasons above-mentioned, I must conclude, that the consequences of such a revolution would tend to extinguish, or at least, without the greatest precaution, greatly check the progress of industry: but were such precautions properly taken; were slavery reduced to a temporary and conditional service, and put under proper regulations; it might prove, of all others, the most excellent expedient for rendering the lower classes of a people happy and flourishing; and for preventing that vicious procreation, from which the great misery to which they are exposed at present chiefly proceeds. But as every modification of slavery is quite contrary to the spirit of modern times, I shall carry such speculations no farther. Thus much I have thought it necessary to observe, only by the way, for the sake of some principles which I shall have occasion afterwards to apply to our own economy; for wherever any notable advantage

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is found accompanying slavery, it is the duty of a modern statesman to fall upon a method of profiting by it, without wounding the spirit of European liberty. And this he may accomplish in a thousand ways, by the aid of good laws, calculated to cut off from the lower classes of a people any interest they can have in involving themselves in want and misery, opening to them at the same time an easy progress towards prosperity and ease.

Here follows an exposition of the principles, from which I was led to say, in a former chapter, that the failure of the slavish form of feudal government, and the extension thereby given to civil and domestic liberty, were the source from which the whole system of modern policy has sprung.

Under the feudal form, the higher classes were perhaps more free than at present, but the lower classes were either slaves, or under a most servile dependence, which is entirely the same thing as to the consequence of interrupting the progress of private industry.

I cannot pretend to advance, as a confirmation of this doctrine, that the establishment of slavery in our colonies in America was made with a view to promote agriculture, and to curb manufactures in the new world, because I do not know much of the sentiments of politicians at that time: but if it be true, that slavery has the effect of advancing agriculture, and other laborious operations which are of a simple nature, and at the same time of discouraging invention and ingenuity; and if the mother-country has occasion for the produce of the first, in order to

provide or to employ those who are taken up at home in the prosecution of the latter; then I must conclude, that slavery *has been* very *luckily*, if not *politically*, established to compass such an end: and therefore, if any colony, where slavery is not common, shall ever begin to rival the industry of the mother-country, a very good way of frustrating the attempt will be, to encourage the introduction of slaves into such colonies without any restrictions, and allow it to work its natural effect.

Having given the definition of trade and industry, as relative to my inquiry, I come now to examine their immediate connexions, the better to cement the subject of this book, with the principles deduced in the former.

In treating of the reciprocal wants of a society, and in showing how their being supplied by labor and ingenuity naturally tends to increase population on one hand, and agriculture on the other, the better to simplify our ideas, we supposed the transition to be direct from the manufacturer to the consumer, and both to be members of the same society. Matters now become more complex, by the introduction of trade among different nations, which is a method of collecting and distributing the produce of industry, by the interposition of a third principle. Trade receives from a thousand hands, and distributes to as many.

To ask, whether trade owes its beginning to industry, or industry to trade, is like asking, whether the motion of the heart is owing to the blood, or the motion of the blood to the heart. Both the one and the



other, I suppose, are formed by such insensible degrees, that it is impossible to determine where the motion begins. But so soon as the body comes to be perfectly formed, I have little doubt of the heart's being the principle of circulation. Let me apply this to the present question.

A man must first exist, before he can feel want; he must want, that is, desire, before he will demand; and he must demand, before he can receive. This is a natural chain, and from it we have concluded in Book I. that population is the cause, and agriculture the effect.

By a parallel reason it may be alledged, that as wants excite to industry, and are considered as the cause of it; and as the produce of industry cannot be exchanged without trade; so trade must be an effect of industry. To this I agree: but I must observe, that this exchange does not convey my idea of trade, although I admit that it is the root from which the other springs; it is the seed, but not the plant; and trade, as we have defined it, conveys another idea. The workman must not be interrupted, in order to seek for an exchange, nor the consumer put to the trouble of finding out the manufacturer. The object of trade therefore is no more than a new want, which calls for a set of men to supply it; and trade has a powerful effect in promoting industry, by facilitating the consumption of its produce.

While wants continue simple and few, a workman finds time enough to distribute all his work: when wants become more multiplied, men must work

harder; time becomes precious; hence trade is introduced. They who want to consume, send the merchant, in a manner, to the workman, for his labor, and do not go themselves; the workman sells to this interposed person, and does not look out for a consumer. Let me now take a familiar instance of infant trade, in order to show how it grows and refines: this will illustrate what I have been saying.

I walk out of the gates of a city in a morning, and meet with five hundred persons, men and women, every one bringing to market a small parcel of herbs, chickens, eggs, fruit, &c. It occurs to me immediately, that these people must have little to do at home, since they come to market for so small a value. Some years afterwards, I find nothing but horses, carts, and waggons, carrying the same provisions. I must then conclude, that either those I met before are no more in the country, but purged off, as being found useless, after a method has been found of collecting all their burdens into a few carts; or that they have found out a more profitable employment than carrying eggs and greens to market. Which ever happens to be the case, there will be the introduction of what I call trade; to wit, this collecting of eggs, fruit, fowl, &c. from twenty hands, in order to distribute it to as many more within the walls. The consequence is, that a great deal of labor is saved; that is to say, the cart gives time to twenty people to labor, if they incline; and when wants increase, they will be ready to supply them.

We cannot therefore say, that trade will force industry, or that industry will force trade; but we

may say, that trade will facilitate industry, and that industry will support trade. Both the one and the other however depend upon a third principle; to wit, a taste for superfluity, in those who have an equivalent to give for it. This taste will produce demand, and this again will become the main spring of the whole operation.

## C H A P. II.

*Of Demand.*

**T**HIS is no new subject; it is only going over what has been treated of very extensively in the first book under another name, and relatively to other circumstances. *These* ideas were there kept as simple as possible; *here* they take on a more complex form, and appear in a new dress.

The wants of mankind were said to promote their multiplication, by augmenting the demand for the food of the free hands, who; by supplying those wants, are enabled to offer an equivalent for their food, to the farmers who produced it; and as this way of bartering is a representation of trade in its infancy, it is no wonder that trade, when grown up, should still preserve a resemblance to it.

*Demand*, considered as a term appropriated to trade, will now be used in place of *wants*, the term used in the first book relatively to bartering; we must therefore expect, that the operations of the same principle, under different appellations, will con-

stantly appear similar, in every application we can make of it, to different circumstances and combinations.

Whether this term be applied to bartering or to trade, it must constantly appear reciprocal. If I demand a pair of shoes, the shoemaker either demands money, or something else for his own use. To prevent therefore the ambiguity of a term, which from the sterility of language, is taken in different acceptations, according to the circumstances which are supposed to accompany it, I shall endeavour shortly to analyze it.

*1mo.* Demand is ever understood to be relative to merchandize. A demand for money, except in bills of exchange, is never called demand. When those who have merchandize upon hand, are desirous of converting them into money, they are said to offer to sale, and if, in order to find a buyer, they lower their price, then, in place of saying the demand for money is high, we say the demand for goods is low.

*2do.* Suppose a ship to arrive at a port loaded with goods, with an intention to purchase others in return, the operation only becomes double. The ship offers to sale, and the demand of the port is said to be high or low, according to the height of the price offered, not according to the quantity demanded, or number of demanders. When all is sold, then the ship becomes demander; and if his demand be proportionally higher than the former, we say upon the whole, that the demand is for the commodities of the port; that is, the port offers, and the ship demands. This I call reciprocal demand.

3<sup>to</sup>. Demand is either simple or compound. Simple, when the demander is but *one*, compound, when *they are more*. But this is not so much relative to persons as to interests. Twenty people demanding from the same determined interest form but a simple demand; it becomes compound or high, when different interests produce a competition. It may therefore be said, that when there is no competition among buyers, demand is simple, let the quantity demanded be great or small, let the buyers be few or many. When therefore in the contract of barter the demand upon one side is simple, upon the other compound, that which is compound is constantly called the demand, the other not.

4<sup>to</sup>. Demand is either great or small: great, when the *quantity* demanded is great; small, when the *quantity* demanded is small.

5<sup>to</sup>. Demand is either high or low: high, when the competition among the *buyers* is great; low, when the competition among the *sellers* is great. From these definitions it follows, that the consequence of a great demand, is a great sale; the consequence of a high demand, is a great price. The consequence of a small demand, is a small sale; the consequence of a low demand, is a small price.

6<sup>to</sup>. The nature of demand is to encourage industry; and when it is regularly made, the effect of it is, that the supply for the most part is found to be in proportion to it, and then the demand is commonly simple. It becomes compound from other circumstances. As when it is irregular, that is, unexpected, or when the usual supply fails; the consequence of

which is, that the provision made for the demand, falling short of the just proportion, occasions a competition among the buyers, and raises the current, that is the ordinary prices. From this it is, that we commonly say, demand raises prices. Prices are high or low according to demand. These expressions are just; because the sterility of language obliges us there to attend to circumstances which are only implied.

Demand is understood to be *high* or *low*, relatively to the common rate of it, or to the competition of buyers, to obtain the provision made for it. When demand is relative to the quantity demanded, it must be called great or small, as has been said.

7mo. Demand has not always the same effect in raising prices: we must therefore carefully attend to the difference between a demand for things of the first necessity for life, and for things indifferent, also between a demand made by the immediate consumers, and one made by merchants, who buy in order to sell again. In both cases the competition will have different effects. Things of absolute necessity must be procured, let the price be ever so great: consumers who have no view to profit, but to satisfy their desires, will enter into a stronger competition than merchants, who are animated by no passion, and who are regulated in what they offer by their prospect of gain. Hence the great difference in the price of grain in different years; hence the uniform standard of the price of merchandize, in fairs of distribution, such as Frankfort, Beaucaire, &c. hence, also, the advantage which consumers find in making their provision at the same time that mer-

chants make theirs; hence the sudden rise and fall in the price of laboring cattle in country-markets, where every one provides for himself.

Let what has been said suffice at setting out: this principle will be much better explained by its application as we advance, than by all the abstract distinctions I am capable to give of it.

### C H A P. III.

*Of the first Principles of bartering, and how this grows into Trade.*

**I** MUST now begin by tracing trade to its source, in order to reduce it to its first principles.

The most simple of all trade, is that which is carried on by bartering the necessary articles of subsistence. If we suppose the earth free to the first possessor, this person who cultivates it will first draw from it his food, and the surplus will be the object of barter: he will give this in exchange to any one who will supply his other wants. This (as has been said) naturally supposes both a surplus quantity of food produced by labor, and also free hands; for he who makes a trade of agriculture cannot supply himself with all other necessaries, as well as food; and he who makes a trade of supplying the farmer with such necessaries, in exchange for his surplus of food, cannot be employed in producing that food. The more the necessities of man increase, *ceteris paribus*, the more free hands are required to supply

them; and the more free hands are required, the more surplus food must be produced by additional labor, to supply their demand.

This is the least complex kind of trade, and may be carried on to a greater or less extent, in different countries, according to the different degrees of the wants to be supplied. In a country where there is no money, nor any thing equivalent to it, I imagine the wants of mankind will be confined to few objects; to wit, the removing the inconveniencies of hunger, thirst, cold, heat, danger, and the like. A free man who by his industry can procure all the comforts of a simple life, will enjoy his rest, and work no more: And, in general, all increase of work will cease, so soon as the demand for the purposes mentioned comes to be satisfied. There is a plain reason for this. When the free hands have procured, by their labor, wherewithal to supply their wants, their ambition is satisfied: so soon as the husbandmen have produced the necessary surplus for relieving theirs, they work no more. Here then is a natural stop put to industry, consequently to bartering. This, in the first book, we have called *the moral impossibility of augmenting numbers*.

The next thing to be examined, is, how bartering grows into trade, properly so called and understood, according to the definition given of it above; how trade comes to be extended among men; how manufactures, more ornamental than useful, come to be established; and how men come to submit to labor, in order to acquire what is not absolutely necessary for them.



This, in a free society, I take to be chiefly owing to the introduction of money, and a taste for superfluities in those who possess it.

In ancient times, money was not wanting; but the taste for superfluities not being in proportion to it, the specie was locked up. This was the case in Europe four hundred years ago. A new taste for superfluity has drawn, perhaps, more money into circulation, from our own treasures, than from the mines of the new world. The poor opinion we entertain of the riches of our forefathers, is founded upon the modern way of estimating wealth, by the quantity of coin in circulation, from which we conclude, that the greatest part of the specie now in our hands must have come from America.

It is more, therefore, through the taste of superfluity, than in consequence of the quantity of coin, that trade comes to be established; and it is only in consequence of trade that we see industry carry things in our days to so high a pitch of refinement and delicacy. Let me illustrate this by comparing together the different operations of barter, sale, and commerce.

When reciprocal wants are supplied by barter, there is not the smallest occasion for money: this is the most simple of all combinations.

When wants are multiplied, bartering becomes (for obvious reasons) more difficult; upon this money is introduced. This is the common price of all things: it is a proper equivalent in the hands of those who want, perfectly calculated to supply the occasions of those who, by industry, can relieve

them. This operation of buying and selling is a little more complex than the former; but still we have here no idea of trade, because we have not introduced the merchant, by whose industry it is carried on.

Let this third person be brought into play, and the whole operation becomes clear. What before we called wants, is here represented by the consumer; what we called industry, by the manufacturer; what we called money, by the merchant. The merchant here represents the money, by substituting credit in its place; and as the money was invented to facilitate barter, so the merchant, with his credit, is a new refinement upon the use of money. This renders it still more effectual in performing the operations of buying and selling. This operation is trade: it relieves both parties of the whole trouble of transportation, and adjusting wants to wants, or wants to money; the merchant represents by turns both the consumer, the manufacturer, and the money. To the consumer he appears as the whole body of manufacturers; to the manufacturer as the whole body of consumers; and to the one and the other class his credit supplies the use of money. This is sufficient at present for an illustration. I must now return to the simple operations of money in the hands of the two contracting parties, the buyer and the seller, in order to show how men come to submit to labor in order to acquire superfluities.

So soon as money is introduced into a country it becomes, as we have said above, an universal object of want to all the inhabitants. The consequence is, that the free hands of the state, who before

stopt working, because all their wants were provided for, having this new object of ambition before their eyes, endeavour, by refinements upon their labor, to remove the smaller inconveniencies which result from a simplicity of manners. People, I shall suppose who formerly knew but one sort of clothing for all seasons, willingly part with a little money to procure for themselves different sorts of apparel properly adapted to summer and winter, which the ingenuity of manufacturers, and their desire of getting money, may have suggested to their invention.

I shall not here pursue the gradual progress of industry, in bringing manufactures to perfection; nor interrupt my subject with any further observations upon the advantages resulting to industry, from the establishment of civil and domestic liberty, but shall only suggest, that these refinements seem more generally owing to the industry and invention of the manufacturers (who by their ingenuity daily contrive means of softening or relieving inconveniencies, which mankind seldom perceive to be such, till the way of removing them is contrived) than to the taste for luxury in the rich, who, to indulge their ease, engage the poor to become industrious.

Let any man make an experiment of this nature upon himself, by entering into the first shop. He will no where so quickly discover his wants as there. Every thing he sees appears either necessary, or at least highly convenient; and he begins to wonder (especially if he be rich) how he could have been so long without that which the ingenuity of the workman alone had invented, in order that from the

novelty it might excite his desire ; for perhaps when it is bought, he will never once think of it more, nor ever apply it to the use for which it at first appeared so necessary.

Here then is a reason why mankind labor though not in want. They become desirous of possessing the very instruments of luxury, which their avarice or ambition prompted them to invent for the use of others.

What has been said represents trade in its infancy, or rather the materials with which that great fabric is built.

We have formed an idea of the wants of mankind multiplied even to luxury, and abundantly supplied by the employment of all the free hands set apart for that purpose. But if we suppose the workman himself disposing of his work, and purchasing, with it food from the farmer, clothes from the clothier, and in general seeking for the supply of every want from the hands of the person directly employed for the purpose of relieving it; this will not convey an idea of trade, according to our definition.

Trade and commerce are an abbreviation of this long process ; a scheme invented and set on foot by merchants, from a principle of gain, supported and extended among men, from a principle of general utility to every individual, rich or poor ; to every society, great or small.

Instead of a pin-maker exchanging his pins with fifty different persons, for whose labor he has occasion, he sells all to the merchant for money or for credit; and, as occasion offers, he purchases all his

wants, either directly from those who supply them, or from other merchants who deal with manufacturers in the same way his merchant dealt with him.

Another advantage of trade is, that industrious people in one part of the country, may supply customers in another, though distant. They may establish themselves in the most commodious places for their respective business, and help one another reciprocally, without making the distant parts of the country suffer for want of their labor. They are likewise exposed to no avocation from their work, by seeking for customers.

Trade produces many excellent advantages; it marks out to the manufacturers when their branch is under or overstocked with hands. If it is understocked they will find more demand than they can answer: if it is overstocked, the sale will be slow.

Intelligent men, in every profession, will easily discover when these appearances are accidental, and when they proceed from the real principles of trade; which are here the object of our inquiry.

Posts, and correspondence by letters, are a consequence of trade, by the means of which merchants are regularly informed of every augmentation or diminution of industry in every branch, in every part of the country. From this knowledge they regulate the prices they offer; and as they are many, they serve as a check upon one another, from the principles of competition which we shall hereafter examine.

From the current prices the manufacturers are as well informed as if they kept the correspondence

themselves: the statesman feels perfectly where hands are wanting, and young people destined to industry, obey, in a manner, the call of the public, and fall naturally in to supply the demand.

Two great assistances to merchants, especially in the infancy of trade, are public markets for collecting the work of small dealers, and large undertakings in the manufacturing way by private hands. By these means the merchants come at the knowledge of the quantity of work in the market, as on the other hand the manufacturers learn, by the sale of the goods, the extent of the demand for them. These two things being justly known, the price of goods is easily fixt, as we shall presently see.

Public sales serve to correct the small inconveniencies which proceed from the operations of trade. A set of manufacturers got all together into one town, and entirely taken up with their industry, are thereby as well informed of the rate of the market as if every one of them carried thither his work, and upon the arrival of the merchant, who readily takes it off their hands, he has not the least advantage over them from his knowledge of the state of demand. This man both buys and sells in what is called wholesale (that is by large parcels) and from him retailers purchase, who distribute the goods to every consumer throughout the country. These last buy from wholesale merchants in every branch, that proportion of every kind of merchandize which is suitable to the demand of their borough, city, or province.

Thus all inconveniencies are prevented, at some additional cost to the consumer, who, for reasons

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we shall afterwards point out, must naturally reimburse the whole expense. The distance of the manufacturer, the obscurity of his dwelling, the caprice in selling his work, are quite removed; the retailer has all in his shop, and the public buys at a current price.

#### C H A P. IV.

*How the Prices of Goods are determined by Trade.*

**I**N the price of goods, I consider two things as really existing, and quite different from one another; to wit, the real value of the commodity, and the profit upon alienation. The intention of this chapter is to establish this distinction, and to show how the operation of trade severally influences the standard of the one and the other; that is to say, how trade has the effect of rendering fixt and determined, two things which would otherwise be quite vague and uncertain.

1. The first thing to be known of any manufacture when it comes to be sold, is, how much of it a person can perform in a day, a week, a month, according to the nature of the work, which may require more or less time to bring it to perfection. In making such estimates, regard is to be had only to what, upon an average, a workman of the country in general may perform, without supposing him the best or the

worst in his profession ; or having any peculiar advantage or disadvantage as to the place where he works.

Hence the reason why some people thrive by their industry, and others not; why some manufactures flourish in one place and not in another.

II. The second thing to be known, is the value of the workman's subsistence and necessary expense, both for supplying his personal wants, and providing the instruments belonging to his profession, which must be taken upon an average as above; except when the nature of the work requires the presence of the workman in the place of consumption; for although some trades, and almost every manufacture, may be carried on in places at a distance, and therefore may fall under one general regulation as to prices, yet others there are which, by their nature, require the presence of the workman in the place of consumption; and in that case the prices must be regulated by circumstances relative to every particular place.

III. The third and last thing to be known, is the value of the materials, that is the first matter employed by the workman; and if the object of his industry be the manufacture of another, the same process of inquiry must be gone through with regard to the first, as with regard to the second: and thus the most complex manufactures may be at last reduced to the greatest simplicity. I have been more particular in this analysis of manufactures than was absolutely necessary in this place, that I might afterwards with the greater ease point out the methods of diminishing the prices of them.



These three articles being known, the price of manufacture is determined. - It cannot be lower than the amount of all the three, that is, than the real value; whatever it is higher, is the manufacturer's profit. This will ever be in proportion to demand, and therefore will fluctuate according to circumstances.

Hence appears the necessity of a great demand, in order to promote flourishing manufactures.

By the extensive dealings of merchants, and their constant application to the study of the balance of work and demand, all the above circumstances are known to them, and are made known to the industrious, who regulate their living and expenſe according to their certain profit. I call it certain, because under these circumstances they seldom overvalue their work, and by not overvaluing it, they are sure of a sale: a proof of this may be had from daily experience.

Employ a workman in a country where there is little trade or industry, he proportions his price always to the urgency of your want, or your capacity to pay; but seldom to his own labor. Employ another in a country of trade, he will not impose upon you, unless perhaps you be a stranger, which supposes your being ignorant of the value; but employ the same workman in a work not usual in the country, consequently not demanded, consequently not regulated as to the value, he will proportion his price as in the first supposition.

We may therefore conclude from what has been said, that in a country where trade is established, ma-

factures must flourish, from the ready sale, the regulated price of work, and certain profit resulting from industry. Let us next inquire into the consequences of such a situation.

## C H A P. V.

*How foreign Trade opens to an industrious People, and the consequences of it to the Merchants who set it on foot.*

**T**HE first consequence of the situation described in the preceding chapter, is, that wants are easily supplied, for the adequate value of the thing wanted.

The next consequence is, the opening of foreign trade under its two denominations of passive and active. Strangers and people of distant countries finding the difficulty of having their wants supplied at home, and the ease of having them supplied from this country, immediately have recourse to it. This is passive trade. The active is when merchants, who have executed this plan at home with success, begin to transport the labor of their country-men into other regions, which either produce, or are capable of producing such articles of consumption, proper to be manufactured, as are most demanded at home? and consequently will meet with the readiest sale, and fetch the largest profits.

Here then is the opening of foreign trade, under its two denominations of active and passive: but as our present point of view is the consequences of this revolution to the merchants, we shall take no farther

notice, in this place, of that division: it will naturally come in afterwards.

What then are the consequences of this new commerce to our merchants, who have left their homes in quest of gain abroad?

The first is, that arriving in any new country, they find themselves in the same situation, with regard to the inhabitants, as the workman in the country of no trade, with regard to those who employed him; that is, they proportion the price of their goods to the eagerness of acquiring, or the capacity of paying, in the inhabitants, but never to their real value.

The first profits then, upon this trade, must be very considerable; and the demand from such a country will be *high* or *low*, *great* or *small*, according to the spirit, not the real wants of the people: for these in all countries, as has been said, must first be supplied by the inhabitants themselves, before they cease to labor.

If the people of this not-trading country (as we shall now call it) be abundantly furnished with commodities useful to the traders, they will easily part with them, at first, for the instruments of luxury and ease; but the great profit of the traders will insensibly increase the demand for the productions of their new correspondents; this will have the effect of producing a competition between themselves, and thereby of throwing the demand on their side, from the principles I shall afterwards explain. This is perpetually a disadvantage in traffic: the most unpolished nations in the world quickly perceive the effects of

it; and are taught to profit of the discovery, in spite of the address of those who are the most expert in commerce.

The traders will, therefore, be very fond of falling upon every method and contrivance to inspire this people with a taste of refinement and delicacy. Abundance of fine presents, consisting of every instrument of luxury and superfluity, the best adapted to the genius of the people, will be given to the prince and leading men among them. Workmen will even be employed at home to study the taste of the strangers, and to captivate their desires by every possible means. The more eager they are of presents, the more lavish the traders will be in bestowing and diversifying them. It is an animal put up to fatten, the more he eats the sooner he is fit for slaughter. When their taste for superfluity is fully formed, when the relish for their former simplicity is sophisticated, poisoned, and obliterated, then they are surely in the fetters of the traders, and the deeper they go, the less possibility there is of their getting out. The presents then will die away, having served their purpose; and if afterwards they are found to be continued, it will probably be to support the competition against other nations, who will incline to share of the profits.

If, on the contrary, this not-trading nation does not abound with commodities useful to the traders, these will make little account of trading with them, whatever their turn may be; but if we suppose this country inhabited by a laborious people, who, having taken a taste for refinement from the traders, apply themselves to agriculture, in order to produce

articles of subsistence, they will solicit the merchants to give them part of their manufactures in exchange for those; and this trade will undoubtedly have the effect of multiplying numbers in the trading nation. But if food cannot be furnished, nor any other branch of production found out to support the correspondence, the taste for refinement will soon die away, and trade will stop in this quarter.

Had it not been for the furs in those countries adjacent to Hudson's Bay, and in Canada, the Europeans never would have thought of supplying instruments of luxury to those nations; and if the inhabitants of those regions had not taken a taste for the instruments of luxury furnished to them by the Europeans, they never would have become so indefatigable nor so dexterous hunters. At the same time we are not to suppose, that ever these Americans would have come to Europe in quest of our manufactures. It is therefore owing to our merchants, that these nations are become in any degree fond of refinement; and this taste, in all probability, will not soon exceed the proportion of the productions of their country. From these beginnings of foreign trade it is easy to trace its increase.

One step towards this, is the establishing correspondences in foreign countries; and these are more or less necessary in proportion as the country where they are established is more or less polished or acquainted with trade. They supply the want of posts, and point out to the merchants what proportion the productions of the country bear to the demand of the inhabitants for manufactures. This communicates

an idea of commerce to the not-trading nation, and they insensibly begin to fix a determined value upon their own productions, which perhaps bore no determined value at all before.

Let me trace a little the progress of this refinement in the savages, in order to show how it has the effect of throwing the demand upon the traders, and of creating a competition among them, for the productions of the new country.

Experience shows, that in a new discovered country, merchants constantly find some article or other of its productions, which turns out to a great account in commerce; and we see that the longer such a trade subsists, and the more the inhabitants take a taste for European manufactures, the more their own productions rise in their value, and the less profit is made by trading with them, even in cases where the trade is carried on by companies; which is a very wise institution for one reason, that it cuts off a competition between our merchants.

This we shall show, in its proper place, to be the best means of keeping prices low in favor of the nation; however it may work a contrary effect with respect to individuals who must buy from these monopolies.

When companies are not established, and when trade is open, our merchants, by their eagerness to profit of the new trade, betray the secrets of it, they enter into competition for the purchase of the foreign produce, and this raises prices and favors the commerce of the most ignorant savages.

Some account for this in a different manner.

They alledge that it is not this competition which raises prices; because there is also a competition among the savages as to which of them shall get the merchandize; and this may be sufficient to counter-balance the other, and in proportion as the quantity of goods demanded by the savages, as an exchange for the produce of their country, becomes greater, a less quantity of this produce must be given for every parcel of the goods.

To this I answer, That I cannot admit this apparent reason to be consistent with the principles of trade, however ingenious the conceit may be.

The merchant constantly considers his own profit in parting with his goods, and is not influenced by the reasons of expediency which the savages may find, to offer him less than formerly; for were this principle in proportion admitted generally, the price of merchandize would always be at the discretion of the buyers.

The objection here stated is abundantly plain; but it must be resolved in a very different manner. Here are two solutions:

1. Prices, I have said, are made to rise, according as demand is *high*, not according as it is *great*. Now, in the objection, it is said, that, in proportion as the demand is *great*, a less proportion of the equivalent must go to every parcel of the merchandize; which I apprehend to be false: and this shows the necessity of making a distinction between the *high* and the *great* demand, which things are different in trade, and communicate quite different ideas.

2. In all trade there is an exchange, and in all ex-

exchange, we have said, there is a reciprocal demand implied : it must therefore be exactly inquired into, on which hand the competition between the demanders is found ; that is to say, on which hand it is *strongest* ; according to the distinction in the second chapter.

If the inhabitants of the country be in competition for the manufactures, goods will rise in their price most undoubtedly, let the quantity of the produce they have to offer be large or small ; but so soon as these prices rise above the faculties, or desire of buying, in certain individuals, their demand will stop, and their equivalent will be prevented from coming into commerce. This will disappoint the traders ; and therefore, as their gains are supposed to be great, either a competition will take place among themselves, who shall carry off the quantity remaining, supposing them to have separate interests ; or, if they are united, they may, from a view of expediency, voluntarily sink their price, in order to bring it within the compass of the faculties, or intention, to buy in those who are still possessed of a portion of what they want.

It is from the effects of competition among sellers that I apprehend prices are brought down, not from any imaginary proportion of quantity to quantity in the market. But of this more afterwards, in its proper place.

So soon as the price of manufactures is brought as low as possible, in the new nation ; if the surplus of their commodities does not suffice to purchase a quantity of manufactures proportioned to their



wants, this people must begin to labor: for labor is the necessary consequence of want, real or imaginary; and by labor it will be supplied. —

When this comes to be the case, we immediately find two trading nations in place of one; the balance of which trade will always be in favor of the most industrious and frugal; as shall be fully explained in another place.

Let me now direct my inquiry more particularly towards the consequences of this new revolution produced by commerce, relative to the not-trading nation, in order to show the effect of a passive foreign trade. I shall spare no pains in illustrating, upon every occasion, as I go along the fundamental principles of commerce, demand, and competition, even perhaps at the expense of appearing tiresome to some of my readers.

## C H A P. VI.

*Consequences of the introduction of a passive foreign Trade among a People who live in Simplicity and Idleness.*

WE now suppose the arrival of traders, all in one interest, with instruments of luxury and refinement at a port in a country of great simplicity of manners, abundantly provided by nature with great advantages for commerce, and peopled by a nation capable of adopting a taste for superfluities.

The first thing the merchants do, is to expose their goods, and point out the advantages of many things, either agreeable or useful to mankind in general, such as wines, spirits, instruments of agriculture, arms, and ammunition for hunting, nets for fishing, manufactures for clothing, and the like. The advantages of these are presently perceived, and such commodities are eagerly sought after.

The natives on their side produce what they most esteem, generally something superfluous or ornamental. The traders, after examining all circumstances, determine the object of their demand, giving the least quantity possible in return for this superfluity, in order to impress the inhabitants with a high notion of the value of their own commodities; but as this parsimony may do more hurt than good to their interest, they are very generous in making presents, from the principles mentioned above.

When the exchange is completed, and the traders depart, regret is commonly mutual; the one and the other are sorry that the superfluities of the country fall short. A return is promised by the traders, and assurances are given by the natives, of a better provision another time.

What are the first consequences of this revolution?

It is not evident, that, in order to supply an equivalent for this new want, more hands must be set to work than formerly. And it is evident also, that this augmentation of industry will not essentially increase numbers; as was supposed to be the effect of it through the whole train of our reasoning in the first book. Why? Because *there* the produce of the

industry was supposed to be consumed at home; and *here* it is intended to be exported. But if we can find out any additional consumption at home even implied by this new trade, I think it will have the effect of augmenting numbers. An example will make this plain.

Let me suppose the superfluity of this country to be the skins of wild beasts, not proper for food; the manufacture sought for, brandy. The brandy is sold for furs. He who has furs, or he who can spare time to hunt for them, will drink brandy in proportion: but I cannot find out any reason to conclude from this simple operation, that one man more in the country must necessarily be fed, (for I have taken care to suppose, that the flesh of the animals is not proper for food) or that any augmentation of agriculture must of consequence ensue from this new traffic.

But let me throw in a circumstance which may imply an additional consumption at home, and then examine the consequences.

A poor creature, who has no equivalent to offer for food, who is miserable, and ready to perish for want of subsistence, goes a-hunting, and kills a wolf; he comes to a farmer with the skin, and says; You are well fed, but you have no brandy; if you will give me a loaf, I will give you this skin, which the strangers are so fond of, and they will give you brandy. But, says the farmer, I have no more bread than what is sufficient for my own family. As for that, replies the other, I will come and dig in your ground, and you and I will settle our account

as to the small quantity I desire of you. The bargain is made; the poor fellow gets his loaf, and lives at least, perhaps he marries, and the farmer gets a dram. But had it not been for this dram, (that is, this new want) which was purchased by the industry of this poor fellow, by what argument could he have induced the farmer, to part with a loaf.

I here exclude the sentiment of charity. This alone, as I have often observed, is a principle of multiplication, and if it was admitted here, it would ruin all my supposition; but as true it is, on the other hand, that could the poor fellow have got bread by begging, he would not probably have gone a-hunting.

Here then it appears, that the very dawning of trade, in the most unpolished countries, implies a multiplication. This is enough to point out the first step, and to connect the subject of our present inquiries with what has been already discussed in relation to other circumstances. I proceed.

So soon as all the furs are disposed of, and a taste for superfluity introduced, both the traders and the natives will be equally interested in the advancement of industry in this country. Many new objects of profit for the first will be discovered, which the proper employment of the inhabitants, in reaping the natural advantages of their soil and climate, will make effectual. The traders will therefore endeavour to set on foot many branches of industry among the savages, and the allurements of brandy, arms, and clothing, will animate these in the pursuit of them. Let me here digress for a few lines.

If we suppose slavery to be established in this country, then all the slaves will be set to work, in order to provide furs and other things demanded by the traders, that the masters may thereby be enabled to indulge themselves in the superfluities brought to them by the merchants. When liberty is the system, every one, according to his disposition, becomes industrious, in order to procure such enjoyments for himself.

In the first supposition, it is the head of the master which conducts the labor of the slave, and turns it towards ingenuity: in the second, every head is at work, and every hand is improving in dexterity. Where hands therefore are principally necessary, the slaves have the advantage; where heads are principally necessary, the advantage lies in favor of the free. Set a man to labor at so much a day, he will go on at a regular rate, and never seek to improve his method: let him be hired by the piece, he will find a thousand expedients to extend his industry. This is exactly the difference between the slave and the free man. From this I account for the difference between the progress of industry in ancient and modern times. Why was a *peculium* given to slaves, but to engage them to become dexterous? Had there been no *peculium* and no *libertini*, or free men, who had been trained to labor, there would have been little more industry any where, than there was in the republic of Lycurgus, where, I apprehend, neither the one or the other was to be found. I return.

When once this revolution is brought about; when those who formerly lived in simplicity become

industrious; matters put on a new face. Is not this operation quite similar to that represented in the fifth chapter of the first book? There I found the greatest difficulty, in showing how the mutual operations of supplying food and other wants could have the effect of promoting population and agriculture, among a people who were supposed to have no idea of the system proposed to be put in execution. Here the plan appears familiar and easy. The difference between them seems to resemble that of a child's learning a language by grammar, or learning it by the ear in the country where it is spoken. In the first case, many throw the book aside, but in the other none ever fail of success.

I have said, that matters put on a new face; that is to say, we now find two trading nations instead of one, with this difference, however, that as hitherto we have supposed the merchants all in one interest, the compound demand, that is, the competition of the buyers, has been, and must still continue on the side of the natives. This is a great prejudice to their interest, but as it is not supposed sufficient to check their industry, nor to restrain their consumption of the manufactures, let me here examine a little more particularly the consequences of the principle of demand in such a situation; for although I allow, that it can never change sides, yet it may admit of different modifications, and produce different effects, as we shall presently perceive.

The merchants we suppose all in one interest, consequently there can be no competition among them; consequently no check can be put upon their  
raising

raising their prices, as long as the prices they demand are complied with. So soon as they are raised to the full extent of the abilities of the natives, or of their inclination to buy, the merchants have the choice of three things, which are all perfectly in their option, and the preference to be given to the one or the other depends entirely upon themselves, and upon the circumstances I am going to point out.

First, they may support the *high* demand; that is, not lower their price; which will preserve a high estimation of the manufactures in the opinion of the inhabitants, and render the profits upon their trade the greatest possible. This part they may possibly take, if they perceive the natives doubling their diligence, in order to become able, in time, to purchase considerable cargoes at a high value; from which supposition is implied a strong disposition in the people to become luxurious, since nothing but want of ability prevents them from complying with the highest demand: but still another circumstance must concur, to engage the merchants not to lower their price. The great proportion of the goods they seek for, in return, must be found in the hands of a few. This will be the case if slavery be established; for then there must be many poor, and few rich: and they are commonly the rich consumers who proportion the price they offer, rather to their desires, than to the value of the thing.

The second thing which may be done is, to open the door to a *great* demand; that is, to lower their prices. This will sink the value of the manufactures in the opinion of the inhabitants, and render profits

less in proportion, although indeed, upon the voyage, the profits may be greater.

This part they will take, if they perceive the inhabitants do not incline to consume great quantities of the merchandize at a high value, either from want of abilities or inclination; and also, if the profits upon the trade depend upon a large consumption, as is the case in merchandize of a low value, and suited chiefly to the occasions of the lower sort. Such motives of expediency will be sufficient to make them neglect a *high* demand, and prefer a *great* one; and the more, when there is a likelihood that the consumption of low-priced goods in the beginning may beget a taste for others of a higher value, and thus extend in general the taste of superfluity.

A third part to be taken, is the least politic, and perhaps the most familiar. It is to profit by the competition between the buyers, and encourage the rising of demand as long as possible; when this comes to a stop, to make a kind of auction, by first bringing down the prices to the level of the highest bidders, and so to descend by degrees, in proportion as demand sinks. Thus we may say with propriety, according to our definitions of demand, that it commonly becomes *great*, in proportion as prices sink. By this operation, the traders will profit as much as possible, and sell off as much of their goods as the profits will permit.

I say, this plan, in a new discovered country, is not politic, as it both discovers a covetousness and a want of faith in the merchants, and also throws open the secrets of their trade to those who ought to be kept ignorant of them.



Let me next suppose, that the large profits of our merchants shall be discovered by others, who arrive at the same ports in a separate interest, and who enter into no combination which might prevent the natural effects of competition.

Let the state of demand among the natives be supposed the same as formerly, both as to *height* and *greatness*, in consequence of the operation of the different principles, which might have induced our merchants to follow one or other of the plans we have been describing; we must however still suppose, that they have been careful to preserve considerable profits upon every branch.

If we suppose the inhabitants to have increased in numbers, wealth, and taste for superfluity, since the last voyage, demand will be found rather on the rising hand. Upon the arrival of the merchants in competition with the former, both will offer to sale; but if both stand to the same prices, it is very natural to suppose, that the former dealers will obtain a preference as; *ceteris paribus*, it is always an advantage to know and to be known. The last comers, therefore, have no other way left to counterbalance this advantage, but to lower their prices.

This is a new phenomenon: here the fall of prices is not voluntary as formerly; not consented to from expediency; not owing to a failure of demand, but to the influence of a new principle of commerce, to wit, a double competition. This I shall now examine with all the care I am capable of.

## C H A P. VII.

*Of double Competition.*

**W**HEN *competition* is much stronger on one side of the contract than on the other, I call it *simple*, and then it is a term synonymous with what I have called *compound demand*. This is the species of competition which is implied in the term *high demand*, or when it is said, that *demand raises prices*.

*Double competition* is, when, in a certain degree, it takes place on both sides of the contract at once; or vibrates alternately from one to the other. This is what restrains prices to the adequate value of the merchandize.

I frankly confess I feel a great want of language to express my ideas, and it is for this reason I employ so many examples, the better to communicate certain combinations of them, which otherwise would be inextricable.

The great difficulty is to distinguish clearly between the principles of *demand*, and those of *competition*: here then follows the principal difference between the two, relatively to the effects they produce severally in the mercantile contract of buying and selling, which I here express shortly by the word *contract*.

*Simple demand* is what brings the quantity of a commodity to market. Many demand, who do not buy; many offer, who do not sell. This demand is called *great* or *small*; it is said to *increase*, to *augment*,

to *swell*; and is expressed by these and other synonymous terms, which mark an augmentation or diminution of quantity. In this species, two people never demand the same thing, but a part of the same thing, or things quite alike.

*Compound demand* is the principle which raises prices, and never can make them sink; because in this case more than one demands the very same thing. It is solely applicable to the buyers, in relation to the price they offer. This demand is called *high* or *low*, and is said to *rise*, to *fall*, to *mount*, to *sink*, and is expressed by these and other synonymous terms.

*Simple competition*, when between buyers, is the same as *compound* or *high demand*, but differs from it in so far, as this may equally take place among sellers, which *compound demand* cannot, and then it works a contrary effect: it makes prices *sink*, and is synonymous with *low demand*: it is this competition which overturns the balance of work and demand; of which afterwards.

*Double competition* is what is understood to take place in almost every operation of trade; it is this which prevents the excessive rise of prices; it is this which prevents their excessive fall. While *double competition* prevails, the balance is perfect, trade and industry flourish.

The capital distinction, therefore, between the terms *demand* and *competition* is, that *demand* is constantly relative to the buyers, and when money is not the price, as in barter, then it is relative to that side upon which the greatest *competition* is found.

We therefore say, with regard to *prices*, demand is *high* or *low*. With regard to the *quantity of merchandize*, demand is *great* or *small*. With regard to *competition*, it is always called *great* or *small*, *strong* or *weak*.

*Competition*, I have said, is, with equal propriety, applicable to both parties in the contract. A *competition* among buyers is a proper expression; a *competition* among sellers, who have the merchandize, is fully as easily understood, though it be not quite so striking, for reasons which an example will make plain.

You come to a fair, where you find a great variety of every kind of merchandize, in the possession of different merchants. These, by offering their goods to sale, constitute a tacit competition; every one of them wishes to sell in preference to another, and at the same time with the best advantage to himself.

The buyers begin, by cheapening at every shop. The first price asked marks the covetousness of the seller; the first price offered, the avarice of the buyer. From this operation, I say, competition begins to work its effects on both sides, and so becomes double. The principles which influence this operation are now to be deduced.

It is impossible to suppose the same degree of eagerness, either to buy or to sell, among several merchants; because the degree of eagerness I take to be exactly in proportion to their view of profit; and as these must necessarily be influenced and regulated by different circumstances, that buyer, who has the best prospect of selling again with profit, obliges him,

whose prospect is not so good, to content himself with less; and that seller, who has bought to the best advantage, obliges him, who has paid dearer for the merchandize, to moderate his desire of gain.

It is from these principles, that competition among buyers and sellers must take place. This is what confines the fluctuation of prices within limits which are compatible with the reasonable profits of both buyers and sellers; for, as has been said, in treating of trade, we must constantly suppose the whole operation of buying and selling to be performed by merchants; the buyer cannot be supposed to give so high a price as that which he expects to receive, when he distributes to the consumers, nor can the seller be supposed to accept of a lower than that which he paid to the manufacturer. This competition is properly called double, because of the difficulty to determine upon which side it stands; the same merchant may have it in his favor upon certain articles, and against him upon others; it is continually in vibration, and the arrival of every post may less or more pull down the heavy scale.

In every transaction between merchants, the profit resulting from the sale must be exactly distinguished from the value of the merchandize. The first *may* vary, the last never *can*. It is this profit alone which can be influenced by competition; and it is for that reason we find such uniformity every where in the prices of goods of the same quality.

The competition between sellers does not appear so striking, as that between buyers; because he who offers to sale, appears only passive in the first opera-

tion; whereas the buyers present themselves one after another; they make a demand, and when the merchandize is refused to one at a certain price, a second either offers more, or does not offer at all: but so soon as another seller finds his account in accepting the price the first had refused, then the first enters into competition, providing his profits will admit his lowering the first price, and thus competition takes place among the sellers, until the profits upon their trade prevent prices from falling lower.

In all markets, I have said, this competition is varying, though insensibly, on many occasions; but in others, the vibrations are very perceptible. Sometimes it is found strongest on the side of the buyers, and in proportion as this grows, the competition between the sellers diminishes. When the competition between the former has raised prices to a certain standard, it comes to a stop; then the competition changes sides, and takes place among the sellers, eager to profit of the highest price. This makes prices fall, and according as they fall, the competition among the buyers diminishes. They still wait for the lowest period. At last it comes; and then perhaps some new circumstance, by giving the balance a kick, disappoints their hopes. If therefore it ever happens, that there is but one interest upon one side of the contract, as in the example in the former chapter, where we supposed the sellers united, you perceive, that the rise of the price, occasioned by the competition of the buyers, and even its coming to a stop, could not possibly have the effect of producing any competition on the other side; and therefore, if prices come

afterwards to sink, the fall must have proceeded from the prudential considerations of adapting the price to the faculties of those, who, from the height of it, had withdrawn their demand.

From these principles of competition, the forestalling of markets is made a crime, because it diminishes the competition which ought to take place between different people, who have the same merchandize to offer to sale. The forestaller buys all up, with an intention to sell with more profit, as he has by that means taken other competitors out of the way, and appears with a single interest on one side of the contract, in the face of many competitors on the other. This person is punished by the state, because he has prevented the price of the merchandize from becoming justly proportioned to the real value; he has robbed the public, and enriched himself; and in the punishment, he makes restitution. Here occur two questions to be resolved, for the sake of illustration.

Can competition among buyers possibly take place, when the provision made is more than sufficient to supply the quantity demanded? On the other hand, can competition take place among the sellers, when the quantity demanded exceeds the total provision made for it?

I think it may in both cases; because in the one and the other, there is a competition implied on one side of the contract, and the very nature of this competition implies a possibility of its coming on the other, provided separate interests be found upon both sides. But to be more particular.

1. Experience shows, that however justly the proportion between the demand and the supply may be determined in fact, it is still next to impossible to discover it exactly, and therefore buyers can only regulate the prices they offer, by what they may reasonably expect to sell for again. The sellers, on the other hand, can only regulate the prices they expect, by what the merchandize has cost them when brought to market. We have already shown, how, under such circumstances, the several interests of individuals affect each other, and make the balance vibrate.

2. The proportion between the supply and the demand is seldom other than *relative* among merchants, who are supposed to buy and sell, not from necessity, but from a view to profit. What I mean by *relative*, is, that their demand is *great* or *small*, according to prices: there may be a great demand for grain at 35 shillings *per* quarter, and no demand at all for it at 40 shillings; I say, among merchants.

Here I must observe, how essential it is, to attend to the smallest circumstance in matters of this kind. The circumstance I here have in my eye, is the difference I find in the effect of competition, when it takes place purely among merchants on both sides of the contract, and when it happens, that either the consumers mingle themselves with the merchant-buyers, or the manufacturers, that is, the furnishers, mingle themselves with the merchant-sellers. This combination I shall illustrate, by the solution of another question,



and then conclude my chapter with a few reflections upon the whole.

Can there be no case formed, where the competition upon one side may subsist, without a possibility of its taking place on the other, although there should be separate interests upon both?

I answer. The case is hardly supposable among merchants, who buy and sell with a view to profit; but it is absolutely supposable, and that is all, when the direct consumers are the buyers; when the circumstances of one of the parties are perfectly known; and when the competition is so strong upon one side, as to prevent a possibility of its becoming double, before the whole provision is sold off, or the demand satisfied. Let me have recourse to examples.

Grain arriving in a small quantity, at a port where the inhabitants are starving, produces so great a competition among the consumers, who are the buyers, that their necessity becomes evident; all the grain is generally bought up before prices can rise so high as to come to a stop; because nothing but want of money, that is, an impossibility of complying with the prices demanded by the merchants, can restrain them: but if you suppose even here, that prices come naturally to a stop; or that, after some time, they fall lower, from prudential considerations, then there is a possibility of a competition taking place among the sellers; from the principles above deduced. If, on the contrary, the stop is not natural, but occasioned by the interposition of the magistrate, from humanity, or

the like, there will be no competition; because then the principles of commerce are suspended; the sellers are restrained on one side, and they restrain the buyers on the other. Or rather, indeed, it is the magistrate, or compassion, who in a manner fixes the price, and performs the office of both buyer and seller.

A better example still may be found, in a competition among sellers; where it may be so strong, as to render a commodity in a manner of no value at all, as in the case of an uncommon and unexpected draught of fish, in a place of small consumption, when no preparations have been made for salting them. There can be then no competition among the buyers; because the market cannot last, and they find themselves entirely masters, to give what price they please, being sure the sellers must accept of it, or lose their merchandize. In the first example, humanity commonly stops the activity of the principle of competition; in the other it is stopt by a certain degree of fair-dealing, which forbids the accepting of a merchandize for nothing.

In proportion therefore as the rising of prices can stop demand, or the sinking of prices can increase it, in the same proportion will competition prevent either the rise or the fall from being carried beyond a certain length: and if such a case can be put, where the rising of prices cannot stop demand, nor the lowering of prices augment it, in such cases double competition has no effect; because these circumstances unite the most separate interests of buyers and sellers in the mercantile contract, and when upon

one side there is no separate interest, there can then be no competition.

From what has been said, we may form a judgment of the various degrees of competition. A book not worth a shilling, a fish of a few pounds weight, are often sold for considerable sums. The buyers here are not merchants. When an ambassador leaves a court in a hurry, things are sold for less than the half of their value: he is no merchant, and his situation is known. When, at a public market, there are found consumers, who make their provision; or manufacturers, who dispose of their goods for present subsistence; the merchants, who are respectively upon the opposite side of the contract to these, profit of their competition; and those who are respectively upon the same side with them, stand by with patience, until they have finished their business. Then matters come to be carried on between merchant and merchant, and then, I allow, that profits may rise and fall, in the proportion of quantity to demand; that is to say, if the provision is less than the demand, the competition among the demanders, or the rise of the price, will be in the compound proportion of the falling short of the commodity, and of the prospect of selling again with profit. It is this combination which regulates the competition, and keeps it within bounds. It can affect but the profits upon the transaction; the intrinsic value of the commodity stands immovable: nothing is ever sold below the real value; nothing is ever bought for more than it may probably bring. I mean in general. Whereas so soon as consumers

and needy manufacturers mingle in the operation, all proportion is lost. The competition between them is too strong for the merchants; the balance vibrates by jerks. In such markets merchants seldom appear: the principal objects there, are the fruits and productions of the earth, and articles of the first necessity for life, not manufactures strictly so called. A poor fellow often sells, to purchase bread to eat; not to pay what he did eat, while he was employed in the work he disposes of. The consumer often measures the value of what he is about to purchase, by the weight of his purse, and his desire to consume.

As these distinctions cannot be conveyed in the terms by which we are obliged to express them, and as they must frequently be implied, in treating of matters relating to trade and industry, I thought the best way was, to clear up my own ideas concerning them, and to lay them in order before my reader, before I entered farther into my subject.

All difference of opinion upon matters of this nature proceeds, as I believe, from our language being inadequate to express our ideas, from our inattention, in using terms which appear synonymous, and from our natural propensity to include, under general rules, things which, upon some occasions, common reason requires to be set asunder.

## C H A P . VIII.

*Of what is called Expense, Profit, and Loss.*

AS we have been employed in explaining of terms, it will not be amiss to say a word concerning those which stand in the title of this chapter.

The term *expense*, when simply expressed, without any particular relation, is always understood to be relative to money. This kind I distinguish under the three heads, of *private*, *public*, and *national*.

1. *Private expense* is, what a private person, or private society, lays out, either to provide articles of consumption, or something more permanent, which may be conducive to their ease, convenience, or advantage. Thus we say, *a large domestic expense*, relative to one who spends a great income. We say, a merchant has been at *great expense* for magazines, for living, for clerks, &c. but never that he has been at any in buying goods. In the same way a manufacturer may expend for building, machines, horses, and carriages, but never for the matter he manufactures. When a thing is bought, in order to be sold again, the sum employed is called *money advanced*; when it is bought not to be sold, it may be said to be *expended*.

2. *Public expense* is, the employment of that money, which has been contributed by individuals, for the current service of the state. The contribution, or gathering it together, represents the effects of many articles of *private expense*; the laying it out when collected, is *public expense*.

3. *National expense*, is what is expended out of the country: this is what diminishes national wealth. The principal distinction to be here attended to, is between *public expense*, or the laying out of public money, and *national expense*, which is the alienating the nation's wealth in favor of strangers. Thus the greatest *public expense* imaginable, may be no national expense; because the money may remain at home. On the other hand, the smallest *public*, or even *private expense*, may be a national expense; because the money may go abroad.

*Profit*, and *loss*, I divide into *positive*, *relative*, and *compound*. *Positive profit*; implies no loss to any body; it results from an augmentation of labor, industry, or ingenuity, and has the effect of swelling or augmenting the public good.

*Positive loss*, implies no profit to any body; it is what results from the cessation of the former, or of the effects resulting from it, and may be said to diminish the public good.

*Relative profit*, is what implies a loss to some body; it marks a vibration of the balance of wealth between parties, but implies no addition to the general stock.

*Relative loss*, is what, on the contrary, implies a profit to some body; it also marks a vibration of the balance, but takes nothing from the general stock.

The *compound* is easily understood; it is that species of profit and loss which is partly *relative*, and partly *positive*. I call it compound, because both kinds may subsist inseparably in the same transaction.

## C H A P. IX.

*The general consequences resulting to a trading Nation,  
upon the opening of an active foreign Commerce.*

**D**ID I not intend to confine myself to very general topics in this chapter, I might in a manner exhaust the whole subject of modern economy under this title; for I apprehend that the whole system of modern politics is founded upon the basis of an active foreign trade.

A nation which remains passive in her commerce; is at the mercy of those who are active, and must be greatly favored, indeed, by natural advantages, or by a constant flux of gold and silver from her mines, to be able to support a correspondence, not entirely hurtful to the augmentation of her wealth.

These things shall be more enlarged upon as we go along: the point in hand, is, to consider the consequences of this trade, relatively to those who are the actors in the operation.

When I look upon the wide field which here opens to my view, I am perplexed with too great a variety of objects. In one part, I see a decent and comely beginning of industry; wealth flowing gently in, to recompense ingenuity; numbers both augmenting, and every one becoming daily more useful to another; agriculture proportionally extending itself; no violent revolutions; no exorbitant profits; no insolence among the rich; no excessive misery among the poor; multitudes employed in producing; great

economy upon consumption; and all the instruments of luxury, daily produced by the hands of the diligent, going out of the country for the service of strangers; not remaining at home for the gratification of sensuality. At last the augmentations come insensibly to a stop. Then these rivers of wealth, which were in brisk circulation through the whole world, and which returned to this trading nation as blood returns to the heart, only to be thrown out again by new pulsations, begin to be obstructed in their course; and flowing abroad more slowly than before, come to form stagnations at home. These, impatient of restraint, soon burst out into domestic circulation. Upon this cities swell in magnificence of buildings; the face of the country is adorned with palaces, and becomes covered with groves; luxury shines triumphant in every part; inequality becomes more striking to the eye; and want and misery appear more deformed, from the contrast: even fortune grows more whimsical in her inconstancy; the beggar of the other day, now rides in his coach; and he who was born in a bed of state, is seen to die in a gaol, or in an alms-house. Such are the effects of great domestic circulation.

The statesman looks about with amazement; he, who was wont to consider himself as the first man in the society in every respect, perceives himself, perhaps, eclipsed by the lustre of private wealth, which avoids his grasp when he attempts to seize it. This makes his government more complex and more difficult to be carried on; he must now avail himself of art and address as well as of power and force. By



the help of cajoling and intrigues, he gets a little into debt; this lays a foundation for public credit, which, growing by degrees, and in its progress assuming many new forms, becomes, from the most tender beginnings, a most formidable monster, striking terror into those who cherished it in its infancy. Upon this, as upon a triumphant war-horse, the statesman gets a-stride, he then appears formidable a-new, his head turns giddy; he is choked with the dust he has raised; and at the moment he is ready to fall, to his utter astonishment and surprise, he finds a strong monied interest, of his own creating, which, instead of swallowing him up as he apprehended, flies to his support. Through this he gets the better of all opposition, he establishes taxes, multiplies them, mortgages his fund of subsistence, either becomes a bankrupt, and rises again from his ashes; or if he be less audacious, he stands trembling and tottering for a while on the brink of the political precipice. From one or the other of these perilous situations, he begins to discover an endless path which, after a multitude of windings, still returns into its self, and continues an equal course through this vast labyrinth: but of this last part, more in the fourth book.

It is now full time to leave off rhapsody, and return to reasoning and cool inquiry, concerning the more immediate and more general effects and revolutions produced by the opening of a foreign trade in a nation of industry.

The first and most sensible alteration will be an increase of demand for manufacturers, because by

supplying the wants of strangers, the number of consumers will now be considerably augmented. What again will follow upon this, must depend upon circumstances.

If this revolution in the state of demand should prove too violent, the consequence of it will be to *raise* demand; if it should prove gradual, it will *increase* it. I hope this distinction is well understood, and that the consequence appears just: for, if the supply do not increase in proportion to the demand, a competition will ensue among the demanders; which is the common effect of such sudden revolutions. If, on the other hand, a gentle increase of demand should be accompanied with a proportional supply, the whole industrious society will grow in vigor, and in wholesome stature, without being sensible of any great advantage or inconveniency; the change of their circumstances will even be imperceptible.

The immediate effects of the violent revolution will, in this example, be flattering to some, and disagreeable to others. Wealth will be found daily to augment, from the rising of prices, in many branches of industry. This will encourage the industrious classes, and the idle consumers at home will complain. I have already dwelt abundantly long upon the effects resulting from this to the lower classes of the people, in providing them with a certain means of subsistence. Let me now examine in what respect even the higher classes will be made likewise to feel the good effects of this general change, although at first they may suffer a temporary inconveniency from it.

Farmers, as has been observed, will have a greater difficulty in finding servants, who, instead of laboring the ground, will chuse to turn themselves to manufactures. This we have considered in the light of purging the lands of superfluous mouths; but every consequence in this great chain of politics draws other consequences after it, and as they follow one another, things put on different faces, which affect classes differently. The purging of the land is but one of the first; here follows another.

The desertion of the hands employed in a trifling agriculture will at first, no doubt, embarrass the farmers; but in a little time every thing becomes balanced in a trading nation, because *here* every *industrious* man must advance in prosperity, in spite of all general combinations of circumstances.

In the case before us, the relative profits upon farming must soon become greater than formerly, because of this additional expense which must affect the whole class of farmers; consequently, this additional expense, instead of turning out to be a loss to either landlord or farmer, will, after some little time, turn out to the advantage of both: because the produce of the ground, being indispensably necessary to every body, must in every article increase in its value. Thus in a short time accounts will be nearly balanced on all hands; that is to say, the same proportion of wealth will, *cæteris paribus*, continue the same among the industrious. I say among the industrious; for those who are either idle, or even negligent, will be great losers.

A proprietor of land, inattentive to the causes of

his farmer's additional expenſe, may very imprudently ſuffer his rents to fall, inſtead of aſſiſting him on a proper occaſion, in order to make them afterwards riſe the higher.

Thoſe who live upon a determined income in money, and who are nowiſe employed in traffic, nor in any ſcheme of induſtry, will, by the augmentation of prices, be found in worſe circumſtances than before.

In a trading nation every man muſt turn his talents to account, or he will undoubtedly be left behind in this univerſal emulation, in which the moſt induſtrious, the moſt ingenious, and the moſt frugal will conſtantly carry off the prize.

This conſideration ought to be a ſpur to every body. The richeſt men in a trading nation have no ſecurity againſt poverty, I mean proportional poverty; for though they diminiſh nothing of their income, yet by not increaſing it in proportion to others, they loſe their rank in wealth, and from the firſt claſs in which they ſtood, they will ſlide inſenſibly down to a lower.

There is one conſequence of an additional beneficial trade, which raiſes demand and increaſes wealth; but if we ſuppoſe no proportional augmentation of ſupply, it will prove at beſt but an airy dream which laſts for a moment, and when the gilded ſcene is paſſed away, numberleſs are the inconveniencies which are ſeen to follow.

I ſhall now point out the natural conſequences of this augmentation of wealth drawn from foreign nations, when the ſtateſman remains inattentive to

increase the supply both of food and manufactures; in proportion to the augmentation of mouths, and of the demand for the produce of industry.

In such a situation profits will daily swell, and every scheme for reducing them within the bounds of moderation, will be looked upon as a hurtful and unpopular measure: be it so; but let us examine the consequences.

We have said, that the rise of demand for manufactures naturally increases the value of work: now I must add, that under such circumstances, the augmentation of riches, *in a country, either not capable of improvement as to the soil, or where precautions have not been taken for facilitating a multiplication of inhabitants, by the importation of subsistence*, will be productive of the most calamitous consequences.

On one side, this wealth will effectually diminish the mass of the food before produced; and on the other, will increase the number of useless consumers. The first of these circumstances will raise the demand for food; and the second will diminish the number of useful free hands, and consequently raise the price of manufactures: here are shortly the outlines of this progress.

The more rich and luxurious a people are, the more delicate they become in their manner of living; if they fed on bread formerly, they will now feed on meat; if they fed on meat, they will now feed on fowl. The same ground which feeds a hundred with bread, and a proportional quantity of animal food, will not maintain an equal number of delicate lives. Food must then become more scarce; demand

for it rises; the rich are always the strongest in the market; they consume the food, and the poor are forced to starve. Here the wide door to modern distress opens; to wit, a hurtful competition for subsistence. Farther, when a people become rich, they think less of economy; a number of useless servants are hired, to become an additional dead weight on consumption; and when their starving countrymen cannot supply the extravagance of the rich so cheaply as other nations, they either import instruments of foreign luxury, or seek to enjoy them out of their own country, and thereby make restitution of their gains.

Is it not therefore evident, that if, before things come to this pass, additional subsistence be not provided by one method or other, the number of inhabitants must diminish; although riches may daily increase by a balance of additional matter, supposed to be brought into the country in consequence of the hitherto beneficial foreign trade. This is not all. I say farther, that the beneficial trade will last for a time only. For the infallible consequence of the rise of prices at home will be, that those nations which at first consumed your manufactures, perceiving the gradual increase of their price, will begin to work for themselves; or finding out your rivals who can supply them cheaper, will open their doors to them. These again, perceiving the great advantages gained by your traders, will begin to supply the market; and since every thing must be cheaper in countries where we do not suppose the concurrence of all the circumstances mentioned above, these nations will supplant you, and be enriched in their turn,

Here comes a new revolution. Trade is come to a stop: what then becomes of all the hands which were formerly employed in supplying the foreign demands?

Were revolutions so sudden as we are obliged to represent them, all would go to wreck; in proportion as they happen by quicker or slower degrees, the inconveniencies are greater or smaller.

Prices, we have said, are made to rise by competition. If the competition of the strangers was what raised them, the distress upon the manufacturers will be in proportion to the suddenness of their deserting the market. If the competition was divided between the strangers and the home consumers, the inconveniencies which ensue will be less; because the desertion of the strangers will be in some measure made up by an increase of home consumption which will follow upon the fall of prices. And if, in the third case, the natives have been so imprudent as not only to support a competition with the strangers, and thereby disgust them from coming any more to market, but even to continue the competition between themselves, the whole *loss* sustained by the revolution will be national. Wealth will cease to augment, but the inconveniencies, in place of being felt by the manufacturers, will only affect the state; those will continue in affluence, extolling the generosity of their countrymen, and despising the poverty of the strangers who had enriched them.

Domestic luxury will here prove an expedient for preserving from ruin the industrious part of a people, who, in subsisting themselves, had enriched their

country. No change will follow in their condition ; they will go on with a painful assiduity to labor, and if the consequences of it become now hurtful to one part of the state, they must, at least, be allowed to be essentially necessary for the support of the other.

But that luxury is no necessary concomitant of foreign trade, in a nation where the true principles of it are understood, will appear very plain, from a contrast I am now going to point out, in the example of a modern state, renowned for its commerce and frugality. The country I mean, is Holland.

A set of industrious and frugal people were assembled in a country, by nature subject to many inconveniencies, the removing of which necessarily employed abundance of hands. Their situation upon the continent, the power of their former masters, and the ambition of their neighbours, obliged them to keep great bodies of troops. These two articles added to the numbers of the community, without either enriching the state by their labor exported, or producing food for themselves or countrymen.

The scheme of a commonwealth was calculated to draw together the industrious ; but it has been still more useful in subsisting them : the republican form of government, being there greatly subdivided, vests authority sufficient in every part of it, to make suitable provision for their own subsistence ; and the tie which unites them, regards only matters of public concern. Had the whole been governed by one sovereign, or by one council, this important matter never could have been effectuated.



I imagine it would be impossible for the most able minister that ever lived, to provide nourishment for a country so extended as France, or even as England, supposing these as fully peopled as Holland is: even although it should be admitted that a sufficient quantity of food might be found in other countries for their subsistence. The enterprise would be too great, abuses would multiply; the consequence would be, that the inhabitants would die for want. But in Holland the case is different, every little town takes care of its own inhabitants; and this care, being the object of application and profit to so many persons, is accomplished with success.

When once it is laid down as a maxim in a country, that food must of necessity be got from abroad, in order to feed the inhabitants at home, the corn-trade becomes considerable, and at the same time certain, regular, and permanent. This was the case in Holland: as the inhabitants were industrious, the necessary consequence has been, a very extraordinary multiplication; and at the same time such an abundance of grain, that instead of being in want themselves, they often supply their neighbours. There are many examples of England's being supplied with grain from thence, and, which is still more extraordinary, from the re-exportation of the very produce of its own fruitful soil.

It is therefore evident, that the only way to support industry, is to provide a supply of subsistence, constantly proportional to the demand that may be made for it. This is a precaution indispensably necessary for preventing hurtful competition. This

is the particular care of the Dutch: so long as it can be effectual, their state can fear no decline; but whenever they come to be distressed in the markets, upon which they depend for subsistence, they will sink into ruin. It is by mere dint of frugality, cheap and parsimonious living, that the navigation of this industrious people is supported. Constant employment, and an accumulation of almost imperceptible gains, fills their coffers with wealth, in spite of the large outgoings to which their own proper nourishment yearly forces them. The large profits upon industry in other countries, which are no proof of generosity, but a fatal effect of a scanty subsistence, is far from dazzling their eyes. They seldom are found in the list of competitors at any foreign port; if they have their cargo to dispose of, they wait with pleasure in their own vessels, consuming their own provisions, and at last accept of what others have left. It may be said, that many other circumstances concur in favor of the Dutch, besides the article of subsistence. I shall not dispute this matter; but only remind my reader of what was said in the first book; to wit, that if a computation be made of the hands employed in providing subsistence, and of those who are severally taken up in supplying every other want, their numbers will be found nearly to balance one another in the most luxurious countries. From this I conclude, that the article of food, among the lower classes, must bear a very high proportion to all the other articles of their consumption; and therefore a diminution upon the price of subsistence, must be of

infinite consequence to manufacturers, who are obliged to buy it. From this consideration, let us judge of the consequence of such augmentations upon the price of grain, as are familiar to us; 30 or 40 *per cent.* seems nothing. Now this augmentation operates upon two thirds, at least, of the whole expense of a laboring man: let any one who lives in tolerable affluence make the application of this to himself, and examine how he would manage his affairs if, by accidents of rains or winds, his expenses were to rise 30 *per cent.* without a possibility of restraining them; for this is unfortunately the case with all the lower classes. From whence I conclude, that the keeping food cheap, and still more the preserving it at all times at an equal standard, is the fountain of the wealth of Holland; and that any hurtful competition in this article must beget a disorder which will affect the whole of the manufacturers of a state.

## C H A P. X.

*Of the Balance of Work and Demand.*

**I**T is quite impossible to go methodically through the subject of political economy, without being led into anticipations. We have frequently mentioned this balance of work and demand, and showed how important a matter it is for a statesman to attend to it. The thing, therefore, in general is well understood;

and all that remains to be done, is to render our ideas more determined concerning it, and more adequate, if possible, to the principles we have been laying down.

We have treated fully of demand, and likewise of competition. We have observed how different circumstances influence these terms, so as to make them represent ideas entirely different; and we have said that double competition supports the balance we are now to speak of, and that single competition overturns it.

The word demand in this chapter is taken in the most simple acceptation; and when we say that the balance between work and demand is to be sustained in equilibrio, as far as possible, we mean that the quantity supplied should be in proportion to the quantity *demanded*, that is, *wanted*. While the balance stands justly poised, prices are found in the adequate proportion of the real expence of making the goods, with a small addition for profit to the manufacturer and merchant.

I have, in the fourth chapter, observed how necessary a thing it is to distinguish the two constituent parts of every price; the value, and the profit. Let the number of persons be ever so great, who upon the sale of a piece of goods, share in the profits; it is still essential, in such inquiries as these, to suppose them distinctly separate from the real value of the commodity; and the best way possible to discover exactly the proportion between the one and the other, is by a scrupulous watchfulness over the balance we are now treating of, as we shall presently see.

The value and profits, combined in the price of a manufacture produced by one man, are easily distinguished, by means of the analysis we have laid down in the fourth chapter. As long as any market is *fully* supplied with this sort of work, and *no more*; those who are employed in it live by their trade, and gain no unreasonable profit: because there is then no violent competition upon one side only, neither between the workmen, nor between those who buy from them, and the balance gently vibrates under the influence of a double competition. This is the representation of a perfect balance.

This balance is overturned in four different ways:

Either the demand diminishes, and the work remains the same:

Or the work diminishes, and the demand remains:

Or the demand increases, and the work remains:

Or the work increases, and the demand remains:

Now each of these four combinations may, or may not, produce a competition upon one side of the contract only. This must be explained.

If demand diminishes, and work remains the same, which is the first case, either those who furnish the work will enter into competition, in which case they will hurt each other, and prices will fall below the reasonable standard of the even balance; or they will not enter into competition, and then prices continuing as formerly, the whole demand will be supplied, and the remainder of the work will lie upon hand.

This is a symptom of decaying trade.

Let us now, on the other hand, suppose demand to increase, and work to remain as before.

This example points out no diminution on either side, as was the case before, but an augmentation upon one; and is either a symptom of growing luxury at home, or of an increase in foreign trade.

Here the same alternation of circumstances occurs. The demanders will either enter into competition and raise the price of work, or they will enter into no competition; but being determined not to exceed the ordinary standard of the perfect balance, will defer making their provision till another time, or supply themselves in another market; that is to say, the new demand will cease as soon as it is made, for want of a supply.

Whenever, therefore, this perfect balance of work and demand is overturned by the force of a simple competition, or by one of the scales preponderating, one of two things must happen; either a part of the demand is not answered, or a part of the goods is not sold.

These are the immediate effects of the overturning of the balance.

Let me next point out the object of the statesman's care, relatively to such effects, and show the consequences of their being neglected.

We may now simplify our ideas, and instead of the former combinations, make use of other expressions which may convey them.

Let us therefore say, that the *fall* or *rise* upon either side of the balance, is *positive*, or *relative*. *Positive*, when the side we talk of really augments beyond, or diminishes below the usual standard. *Relative*, when there is no alteration upon the side

we

we speak of, and that the subversion of the balance is owing to an alteration on the other side. As for example :

Instead of saying demand diminishes, and work remains the same, let us say, demand diminishes *positively*, or work increases *relatively*; according as the subject may lead us to speak either of the one or of the other. This being premised.

If the scale of work shall preponderate *positively*, it should be inquired, whether the quantity furnished has really swelled, in all respects, beyond the proportion of the consumption, (in which case the statesman should diminish the number of hands, by throwing a part of them into a new channel) or whether the imprudence of the workmen has only made them produce their work unseasonably; in which case, proper information, and even assistance should be given them, to prevent merchants from taking the advantage of their want of experience: but these last precautions are necessary only in the infancy of industry.

If a statesman should be negligent on this occasion; if he should allow natural consequences to follow upon one another, just as circumstances shall determine; then it may happen, that workmen will keep upon hand that part of their goods which exceeds the demand, until necessity forces them to enter into competition with one another, and sell for what they can get. Now this competition is hurtful, because it is all on one side, and because we have supposed the preponderating of the scale of work to be an overturning of a perfect balance, which can by

no means be set right, consistently with a scheme of thriving, but by the scale of demand becoming heavier, and re-establishing a double competition. Were this to happen before the workmen come to fell in competition, then the balance would again be even, after what I call a *short vibration*, which is no *subversion*; but when the scale of work remains too long in the same position, and occasions a strong, hurtful, and lasting competition, upon one side only, then, I say, the balance is *overturned*; because this diminishes the reasonable profits, or perhaps, indeed, obliges the workmen to sell below prime cost. The effect of this is, that the workmen fall into distress, and that industry suffers a discouragement; and this effect is certain.

But it may be asked, Whether, by this fall of prices, demand will not be increased; That is to say, will not the whole of the goods be sold off?

I answer, That this may, or may not, be the effect of the fall, according to circumstances: it is a contingent consequence of the simple, but not the effect of the double competition: the distress of the workmen is a certain and unavoidable consequence of the first.

But supposing this contingent consequence to happen, will it not set the balance even, by increasing the demand? I answer, the balance is then made even by a violent shock given to industry, but it is not set even from any principle which can support it, or make it flourish. Here is the criterion of a perfect balance: *A positive moderate profit must balance a positive moderate profit; the balance must vibrate, and no loss must be found on either side.* In the example



before us, the balance stands even, it is true; the work and the demand are equally poised as to quantity; but it is a *relative profit*, which hangs in the scale, opposite to a *relative loss*. I wish this may be well understood; farther illustrations will make it clear.

Next, let me suppose the scale of *demand* to preponderate positively. In this case, the statesman should be still more upon his guard, to provide a proportional supply; because the danger here may at first put on a show of profit, and deceive him.

The consequences of this subversion of the balance are either,

1st, That a competition will take place among the demanders only, which will raise profits. Now if, after a short vibration, the supply comes to be increased by the statesman's care, no harm will ensue; competition will change sides, and profits will come down again to the perfect standard. But if the scale of demand remains preponderating, and so keeps profits high, the consequence will be, that, in a little time, not only the immediate seller of the goods, but also every one who has contributed to the manufacture, will insist upon sharing these new profits. Now the evil is not, that every one should share, or that the profits should swell, as long as they are supported by demand, and as long as they can truly be considered as precarious; but the mischief is, that, in consequence of this wide repartition, and by such profits subsisting for a long time, they insensibly become *consolidated*, or, as it were, transformed into the intrinsic value of the goods. This, I say, is

brought about by time; because the habitual extraordinary gains of every one employed induce the more luxurious among them to change their way of life insensibly, and fall into the habit of making greater consumptions, and engage the more slothful to remain idle, till they are exhausted. When therefore it happens, that large profits have been made for a considerable time, and that they have had the effect of forming a taste for a more expensive way of living among the industrious, it will not be the cessation of the demand, nor the swelling of the supply, which will engage them to part with their gains. Nothing will operate this effect but sharp necessity; and the bringing down of their profits, and the throwing the workmen into distress, are then simultaneous; which proves the truth of what I have said, that these profits become, by long habit, virtually *consolidated* with the real value of the merchandize. These are the consequences of a neglected simple competition, which raises the profits upon industry, and keeps the balance overturned for a considerable time.

2dly, Let me examine the consequences of this overturn in the actual preponderancy of demand, when it does not occasion a competition among the demanders, and consequently, when it does not increase the profits upon industry.

This case can only happen, when the commodity is not a matter of great necessity, or even of great use; since the desire of procuring it is not sufficient to engage the buyers to raise their price; unless, indeed, this difference should proceed from the ease

of providing the same, in other markets, as cheap as formerly. This last is a dangerous circumstance, and loudly calls for the attention of the statesman. He must prevent, by all possible means, the desertion of the market, by a speedy supply for all the demand, and must even perhaps give encouragements to manufacturers, to enable them to diminish the prices fixed by the regular standard. This is the situation of a nation which is in the way of losing branches of her foreign trade; of which afterwards.

Whatever therefore be the consequence of the actual preponderancy of the scale of demand; that is, whether it tend to raise profits, or to discredit the market; the statesman's care should be directed immediately towards making the balance come even of itself, without any shock, and that as soon as possible, by increasing the supply. For if it be allowed to stand long in this overturned state, natural consequences will operate a forced restitution; that is, the rise in the price, or the call of a foreign market, will effectually cut off a proportional part of the demand, and leave the balance in an equilibrium, disadvantageous to trade and industry.

In the former case, the manufacturers were forced to starve, by an unnatural restitution, when the relative profit and loss of individuals balanced one another. Here the manufacturers are enriched for a little time, by a rise of profits, relative to the loss the nation sustains, by not supplying the whole demand. This results from the competition of their customers; but so soon as these profits become consolidated with the intrinsic value, they will cease to

have the advantage of profits, and, becoming in a manner necessary to the existence of the goods, will cease to be considered as advantageous. These forced restitutions then, brought about, as we have said, by selling goods below their value, by cutting off a part of the demand, or by sending it to another market, resemble the operation of a carrier, who sets his ass's burden even, by laying a stone upon the lightest end of it. He however loses none of his merchandize; but the absurdity of the statesman is still greater, for he appears willingly to open the heavy end of the load, and to throw part of his merchandize into the high-way.

I hope, by this time, I have sufficiently shown the difference in effect between the *simple* and the *double* competition; between the *vibrations* of this balance of work and demand, and the *overturning* of it. When it vibrates in moderation, and by short alternate risings and sinkings, then industry and trade go on prosperously, and are in harmony with each other; because both parties gain. The industrious man is recompensed in proportion to his ingenuity; the intrinsic value of goods does not vary, nor deceive the merchant; profits on both sides fluctuate according to demand, but never get time to consolidate with, and swell the real value, and never altogether disappear, and starve the workman.

This happy state cannot be supported but by the care of the statesman; and when he is found negligent in the discharge of this part of his duty, the consequence is, that either the spirit of industry, which, it is supposed, has cost him much pains to cultivate,

is extinguished, or the produce of it rises to so high a value, as to be out of the reach of a multitude of purchasers.

The progress towards the one or the other of these extremes is easily perceived, by attending to the successive overturnings of the balance. When these are often repeated on the same side, and the balance set right, by a succession of forced restitutions only, the same scale preponderating a-new, then is the last period soon accomplished. When, on the contrary, the overturnings are alternate, sometimes the scale of demand overturning the balance, sometimes the scale of work, the last period is more distant. Trade and industry subsist longer, but they remain in a state of perpetual convulsion. On the other hand, when the balance gently vibrates, then work and demand, that is, trade and industry, like agriculture and population, prove mutually assisting to each other, in promoting their reciprocal augmentation.

In order therefore to preserve a trading state from decline, the greatest care must be taken, to support a perfect balance between the hands employed in work and the demand for their labor. That is to say, according to former definitions, to prevent demand from ever standing long at an immoderate height, by providing at all times a supply, sufficient to answer the greatest that ever can be made: or, in other words, still; in order to accustom my readers to certain expressions, to encourage the *great*, and to discourage the *high* demand. In this case, competition will never be

found too strong on either side of the contract, and profits will be moderate, but sure, on both.

If, on the contrary, there be found too many hands for the demand, work will fall too low for workmen to be able to live; or, if there be too few, work will rise, and manufactures will not be exported.

For want of this just balance, no trading state has ever been of long duration, after arriving at a certain height of prosperity. We perceive in history the rise, progress, grandeur, and decline of Sydon, Tyre, Carthage, Alexandria, and Venice, not to come nearer home. While these states were on the growing hand, they were powerful; when once they came to their height, they immediately found themselves laboring under their own greatness. The reason of this appears from what has been said.

While there is a demand for the trade of any country, inhabitants are always on the increasing hand. This is evident from what has been so often repeated in the first book, and confirmed by thousands of examples. There never was any branch of trade established in any kingdom, province, city, or even village; but such kingdom, province, &c. increased in inhabitants. While this gradual increase of people is in proportion to the growing demand for hands, the balance between work and demand is exactly kept up: but as all augmentations must at last come to a stop, when this happens, inconveniencies must ensue, greater or less, according to the negligence of the statesman, and the violence or suddenness of the revolution.

## C H A P. XI.

*Why in time this Balance is destroyed.*

**N**OW let us examine what may be the reason why, in a trading and industrious nation, time necessarily destroys the perfect balance between work and demand.

We have already pointed out one general cause, to wit, the natural stop which must at last be put to augmentations of every kind.

Let us now apply this to circumstances, in order to discover in what manner natural causes operate this stop, either by preventing the increase of work, on one side of the balance, or the increase of demand, on the other. When once we discover how the stop is put to augmentations, we may safely conclude, that the continuation of the same, or similar causes, will soon produce a diminution, and operate a decline.

We have traced the progress of industry, and shown how it goes hand in hand with the augmentation of subsistence, which is the principal allure-ment to labor. Now the augmentation of food is relative to the soil, and as long as this can be brought to produce, at an expence proportioned to the value of the returns, agriculture, without any doubt, will go forward in every country of industry. But so soon as the progress of agriculture demands an additional expence, which the natural return, at the stated prices of subsistence, will not defray, agriculture

comes to a stop, and so would numbers, did not the consequences of industry push them forward, in spite of small difficulties. The industrious then, I say, continue to multiply, and the consequence is, that food becomes scarce, and that the inhabitants enter into competition for it.

This is no contingent consequence, it is an infallible one; because food is an article of the first necessity, and here the provision is supposed to fall short of the demand. This raises the profits of those who have food ready to sell; and as the balance upon this article must remain overturned for some time, without the interposition of the statesman, these profits will be consolidated with the price, and give encouragement to a more expensive improvement of the soil. I shall here interrupt the examination of the consequences of this revolution as to agriculture, until I have examined the effects which the rise of the price of food produces on industry, and on the demand for it.

This augmentation on the value of subsistence must necessarily raise the price of all work, because we are here speaking of an industrious people fully employed, and because subsistence is one of the three articles which compose the intrinsic value of their work, as has been said.

The rise therefore, upon the price of work, not being any augmentation of that part of the price which we call profits, as happens to be the case when a rise in demand has produced a competition among the buyers, cannot be brought down but by increasing the supply of subsistence; and were a statesman



to mistake the real cause of the rise, and apply the remedy of increasing the quantity of work, in order to bring down the market, instead of augmenting the subsistence, he would occasion a great disorder; he would introduce the hurtful simple competition between people who labor for moderate profits, mentioned in the last chapter, and would throw such a discouragement upon their industry, as would quickly extinguish it altogether.

On the other hand, did he imprudently augment the subsistence, by large importations, he would put an end to the expensive improvements of the soil, and this whole enterprise would fall to nothing. Here then is a dilemma, out of which he can extricate himself by a right application of public money, only.

Such a necessary rise in the price of labor may either affect foreign exportation, or it may not, according to circumstances. If it does, the price of subsistence, at any rate, must be brought down at least to those who supply the foreign demand; if it does not affect foreign exportation, matters may be allowed to go on; but still the remedy must be ready at hand, to be applied the moment it becomes expedient.

There is one necessary augmentation upon the prices of industry, brought about by a very natural cause, viz. the increase of population, which may imply a more expensive improvement of the soil; that is, an extension of agriculture. This augmentation may very probably put a stop to the augmentation of demand for many branches of manufactures,

consequently may stop the progress of industry ; and if the same causes continue to operate in a greater degree, it may also cut off a part of the former demand, may discredit the market, open a door to foreign consumption, and produce the inconveniences of poverty and distress, in proportion to the degree of negligence in the statesman.

I shall now give another example, of a very natural augmentation upon the intrinsic value of work, which does not proceed from the increase of population, but from the progress of industry itself ; which implies no internal vice in a state, but which is the necessary consequence of the reformation of a very great one. This augmentation must be felt less or more in every country, in proportion as industry becomes extended.

We have said, that the introduction of manufactures naturally tends to purge the lands of superfluous mouths: now this is a very slow and gradual operation. A consequence of it was said to be (Book I. Chap. xx.) an augmentation of the price of labor, because those who have been purged off, must begin to gain their whole subsistence at the expense of those who employ them.

If therefore, in the infancy of industry, any branch of it shall find itself assisted in a particular province, by the cheap labor of those mouths superfluously fed by the land, examples of which are very frequent, this advantage must diminish, in proportion as the cause of it ceases ; that is, in proportion as industry is extended, and as the superfluous mouths are of consequence purged off.

This circumstance is of the last importance to be attended to by a statesman. Perhaps it was entirely owing to it, that industry was enabled to set up its head in this corner. How many examples could I give, of this assistance given to manufactures in different provinces, where I have found the value of a day's work, of spinning, for example, not equal to half the nourishment of the person. This is a great encouragement to the making of cloaths; and accordingly we see some infant manufactures dispute the market with the produce of the greatest dexterity; the distaff dispute prices with the wheel. But when these provinces come to be purged of their superfluous mouths, spinning becomes a trade, and the spinners must live by it. Must not then prices naturally rise? And if these are not supported by the statesman, or if assistance is not given to these poor manufacturers, to enable them to increase their dexterity, in order to compensate what they are losing in cheapness, will not their industry fail? Will not the poor spinners be extinguished? For it is not to be expected, that the landlord will receive them back again from a principle of charity, after he has discovered their former uselessness.

A third cause of a necessary augmentation upon the intrinsic value of goods proceeds from taxes. A statesman must be very negligent indeed, if he does not attend to the immediate consequences of his own proper operations. I shall not enlarge on this at present, as it would be an unnecessary anticipation; but I shall return, to resume the part of my reasoning which I broke off abruptly.

I have observed, how the same cause which stops the progress of industry, gives an encouragement to agriculture: how the rise in the price of subsistence necessarily increases the price of work to an industrious and well-employed people: how this cuts off a part of the demand for work, or sends it to a foreign market.

Now all these consequences are entirely just, and yet they seem contradictory to another part of my reasoning, (Book I. Chap. xvi.) where I set forth the advantages of a prodigal consumption of the earth's produce as advantageous to agriculture, by increasing the price of subsistence, without taking notice, on the other hand, of the hurt thereby done to industry, which supports the consumption of that produce.

The one and the other chain of consequences is equally just, and they appear contradictory only upon the supposition, that there is no statesman at the helm. These contradictions represent the alternate overturn of the balance. The duty of the statesman is, to support the double competition every where, and to permit only the gentle alternate vibrations of the two scales.

When the progress of industry has augmented numbers, and made subsistence scarce, he must estimate to what height it is expedient that the price of subsistence should rise. If he finds, that, in order to encourage the breaking up of new lands, the price of it must rise too high, and stand high too long, to preserve the intrinsic value of goods at the same standard as formerly; then he must assist agriculture with

his purse, in order that exportation may not be discouraged. This will have the effect of increasing subsistence, according to the true proportion of the augmentation required, without raising the price of it too high. And if that operation be the work of time, and the demand for the augmentation be pressing, he must have subsistence imported, or brought from abroad, during that interval. This supply he may cut off whenever he pleases, that is, whenever it ceases to be necessary.

If the supply comes from a sister country, it must be so taken, as to occasion no violent revolution when it comes to be interrupted a-new. As for example: One province demands a supply of grain from another, only for a few years, until their own soil can be improved, so as to provide them sufficiently. The statesman should encourage agriculture, no doubt, in the province furnishing, and let the farmers know the extent of the demand, and the time it may probably last, as near as possible; but he must discourage the plucking up of vineyards, and even perhaps the breaking up of great quantities of old pasture; because, upon the ceasing of the demand, such changes upon the agriculture of the province furnishing, may occasion a hurtful revolution.

While this foreign supply is allowed to come in, the statesman should be closely employed in giving such encouragement to agriculture at home, according to the principles hereafter to be deduced, as may nearly balance the discouragement given to it by this newly permitted importation. If this step be neglected, the consequence may be, that the foreign

supply will go on increasing every year, and will extinguish the agriculture already established in the country, in place of supplying a temporary exigency, which is within the power of the country itself to furnish. These, I suppose, were the principles attended to by the government of England, upon opening their ports for the importation of provisions from Ireland.

The principle, therefore, being to support a gentle increase of food, inhabitants, work, and demand, the statesman must suffer small vibrations in the balance, which, by alternate competition, may favor both sides of the contract; but whenever the competition stands too long upon either side, and threatens a subversion of the balance, then, with an artful hand, he must endeavour to load the lighter scale, and never, but in cases of the greatest necessity, have recourse to the expedient of taking any thing from the heaviest.

In treating of the present state of France, we observed, in the chapter above-cited, how the vibration of the balance of agriculture and population may carry food and numbers to their height; but as foreign trade was not there the direct object of inquiry, I did not care to introduce this second balance of work and demand, for fear of perplexing my subject. I hope I have now abundantly shown the force of the different principles, and it must depend upon the judgment of the statesman to combine them together, and adapt them to his plan: a thing impossible to be even chalked out by any person who is not immediately at the head of the affairs  
of

of a nation. My work resembles the formation of the pure colors for painting, it is the artist's business to mix them: all I can pretend to, is to reason consequentially from suppositions. If I go at any time farther, I exceed my plan, and I confess the fault.

I shall now conclude my chapter by introducing a new subject. I have been at pains to show how the continued neglect of a statesman, in watching over the vibrations of the balance of work and demand, naturally produces a total subversion of it; but this is not, of itself, sufficient to undo an industrious people. Other nations must be taught to profit of the disorder; and this is what I call the competition between nations.

## C H A P. XII.

### *Of the Competition between Nations.*

**M**ANKIND daily profit by experience, and acquire knowledge at their own cost.

We have said that what lays the foundation of foreign trade, is the ease and conveniency which strangers find in having their wants supplied by those who have set industry on foot. The natural consequence of this foreign demand is to bring in wealth, and to promote augmentations of every kind. As long as these go on, it will be impossible for other nations to rival the traders, because their situation is every day growing better: dexterity increasing, diminishes

the price of work; every circumstance, in short, becomes more favorable; the balance never vibrates, but by one of the scales growing positively heavier, and it is constantly coming even by an increase of weight on the other side. We have seen how these revolutions never can raise the intrinsic value of goods, and have observed that this is the road to greatness.

The slower any man travels, the longer he is in coming to his journey's end; and when his health requires travelling, and that he cannot go far from home, he rides out in a morning and comes home to dinner.

This represents another kind of vibration of the balance, and when things are come to such a height as to render a train of augmentations impossible, the next best expedient is, to permit alternate vibrations of diminution and augmentation.

Work augments, I shall suppose, and no more demand can be procured; it may then be a good expedient to diminish hands, by making soldiers of them; by employing them in public works; or by sending them out of the country to become useful in its colonies. These operations give a relative weight to the scale of demand, and revive a competition on that side. Then the industrious hands must be gently increased a-new, and the balance kept in vibration as long as possible. By these alternate augmentations and diminutions, hurtful revolutions, and the subversion of the balance, may be prevented. This is an expedient for standing still without harm, when one cannot go forward to advantage.



If such a plan be followed, an industrious nation will continue in a situation to profit of the smallest advantage from revolutions in other countries, occasioned by the subversion of *their* balance; which may present an opportunity of new vibrations by alternate augmentations.

On such occasions, the abilities of a statesman are discovered, in directing and conducting what I call the delicacy of national competition. We shall then observe him imitating the mariners, who do not take in their sails when the wind falls calm, but keep them trimmed and ready to profit of the least breath of a favorable gale. Let me follow my comparison. The trading nations of Europe represent a fleet of ships, every one striving who shall get first to a certain port. The statesman of each is the master. The same wind blows upon all; and this wind is the principle of self-interest, which engages every consumer to seek the cheapest and the best market. No trade-wind can be more general, or more constant than this; the natural advantages of each country represent the degree of goodness of each vessel; but the master who sails his ship with the greatest dexterity, and he who can lay his rivals under the lee of his sails, will, *ceteris paribus*, undoubtedly get before them, and maintain his advantage.

While a trading nation, which has got an established advantage over her rivals, can be kept from declining, it will be very difficult, if not impossible, for any other to enter into competition with her: but when the balance begins to vibrate by alternate diminutions; when a decrease of demand operates a

failure of supply; when this again is kept low, in order to raise the competition of consumers; and when, instead of restoring the balance by a gentle augmentation, a people are engaged, from the allurements of high profits, to discourage every attempt to bring down the market; then the scissars of foreign rivalry will fairly trim off the superfluity of demand; the simple competition will cease; prices will fall, and a return of the same circumstances will prepare the way for another vibration downwards.

Such operations as these, are just what is requisite for facilitating the competition of rival nations; and the only means possible to engage those who did not formerly work, to begin and supply themselves.

Did matters stand so, the evil would be supportable; strangers would only supply the superfluities of demand, and the balance would still be found in a kind of equilibrium at home. But, alas! even this happy state can only be of short duration. The beginnings of trade with the strangers will prove just as favorable to the vibration of their balance, by augmentations, as it was formerly to the home-traders; and now every augmentation to those, must imply a diminution to the others. What will then become of those hands, in the trading nation, who subsist only by supplying the foreign market? Will not this revolution work the same effect, as to them, as if an additional number of hands had been employed to supply the same consumption? And will not this utterly destroy the balance among the traders, by throwing an unsurmountable competition on the

side of the supply? It will however have a different effect from what might have happened, if the same number of hands had been thrown into the trading nation; for in this case, they might only destroy the consolidated profits upon labor, and perhaps restore the balance: the inconveniency would be equally felt by every workman, but profit would result to the public. But in the other case, the old traders will find no foreign sale for their work; these branches of industry will fall below the price of subsistence, and the new beginners will have *reasonable* profits in supplying their own wants. I say *reasonable*, because this transition of trade from one nation to another, never can be sudden or easy; and can only take place in proportion to the rise in the intrinsic value of goods in that which is upon the decline, not in proportion to the rise in their profits upon the sale of them: for as long as the most extravagant profits do not become consolidated, as we have said, with the value of the work, a diminution of competition among the consumers, which may be occasioned by a beginning of foreign industry, will quickly make them disappear; and this will prove a fatal blow to the first undertakings of the rival nations. But when once they are fairly so consolidated, that prices can no more come down of themselves, and that the statesman will not lend his helping hand, then the new beginners pluck up courage, and set out by making small profits: because in all new undertakings there is mismanagement and considerable loss; and nothing discourages mankind from new undertakings more than difficult beginnings.

As long, therefore, as a trading state is upon the rising hand, or even not upon the decline, and while the balance is kept right without the expedient of alternate diminutions, work will always be supplied from that quarter, cheaper than it possibly can be furnished from any other, where the same dexterity does not prevail. But when a nation begins to lose ground, then the very columns which supported her grandeur, begin, by their weight, to precipitate her decline. The wealth of her citizens will support and augment home demand, and encourage that blind fondness for high profits, which it is impossible to preserve. The moment these consolidate to a certain degree, they have the effect of banishing from the market the demand of strangers, who only can enrich her. It is in vain to look for their return after the nation has discovered her mistake, although she should be able to correct it; because, before this can happen, her rivals will have profited of the golden opportunity, and during the infatuation of the traders, will, even by their assistance, have got fairly over the painful struggle against their superior dexterity.

Thus it happens, that so soon as matters begin to go backward in a trading nation, and that by the increase of their riches, luxury and extravagance take place of economy and frugality among the industrious; when the inhabitants themselves foolishly enter into competition with strangers for their own commodities; and when a statesman looks coolly on, with his arms across, or takes it into his head, that it is not his business to interpose, the prices of the

dexterous workman will rise above the amount of the mismanagement, loss, and reasonable profits, of the new beginners; and when this comes to be the case, trade will decay where it flourished most, and take root in a new soil. This I call a competition between nations.

## C H A P. XIII.

*How far the Form of Government of a particular Country may be favorable or unfavorable to a Competition with other Nations, in matters of Commerce.*

THE question before us, though relative to another science, is not altogether foreign to this. I introduce it in this place, not so much for the sake of connexion, as by way of digression, which at the same time that it has a relation to general principles, may also prove a relaxation to the mind, after so long a chain of close reasoning.

In setting out, I informed my readers that I intended to treat of the political economy of free nations only; and upon every occasion where I have mentioned slavery, I have pointed out how far the nature of it is contrary to the advancement of private industry, the inseparable concomitant of foreign and domestic trade.

No term is less understood than that of *liberty*, and it is not my intention, at present, to enter into a particular inquiry into all the different acceptations of it.

By a people's being free, I understand no more than their being governed by general laws, well known, not depending upon the ambulatory will of any man, or any set of men, and established so as not to be changed, but in a regular and uniform way; for reasons which regard the body of the society, and not through favor or prejudice to particular persons, or particular classes. In so far as a power of dispensing with, restraining or extending general laws, is left in the hands of any governor, in so far, I consider public liberty as precarious. I do not say it is hereby hurt; this will depend upon the use made of such prerogatives. According to this definition of liberty, a people may be found to enjoy freedom under the most despotic forms of government; and perpetual servitude itself, where the master's power is limited according to natural equity, is not altogether incompatible with liberty in the servant.

Here new ideas present themselves concerning the general principles of *subordination* and *dependence* among mankind: which I shall lay before my reader before I proceed, submitting the justness of them to his decision.

As these terms are both relative, it is proper to observe, that by *subordination* is implied an authority which superiors have over inferiors; and by *dependence*, is implied certain advantages which the inferiors draw from their subordination: a servant is under *subordination* to his master, and *depends* upon him for his subsistence.

Dependence is the only bond of society; and I have observed, in the fourth chapter of the first

book, that the dependence of one man upon another for food, is a very natural introduction to slavery. This was the first contrivance mankind fell upon, in order to become useful to one another.

Upon the abolishing of slavery, from a principle of christianity, the next step taken, was the establishment of an extraordinary subordination between the different classes of the people; this was the principle of the feudal government.

The last refinement, and that which has brought liberty to be generally extended to the lowest denominations of a people, without destroying that dependence necessary to serve as a band of society, was the introduction of industry; by this is implied, the circulation of an adequate equivalent for every service, which procures to the rich, every advantage they could expect to reap, either from the servitude or dependence of the poor; and to these again, every comfort they could wish to enjoy under the mildest slavery, or most gentle subordination.

From this exposition, I divide dependence into three kinds. The first natural, between parents and children; the second political, between masters and servants, lords and vassals, Princes and subjects; the third commercial, between the rich and the industrious.

- May I be allowed to transgress the limits of my subject for a few lines, and to dip so far into the principles of the law of nature, as to inquire, how far subordination among men is thereby authorized? I think I may decide, *that in so far as the subordination is in proportion to the dependence, in so far it is reason-*

*able and just.* This represents an even balance. If the scale of subordination is found too weighty, tyranny ensues, and licentiousness is implied, in proportion as it rises above the level. From this let me draw some conclusions.

*1mo.* He who depended upon another, for the preservation of a life justly forfeited, and at all times in the power of him who spared it, was, by the civil law, called a slave. This surely is the highest degree of dependence.

*2do.* He who depends upon another for every thing necessary for his subsistence, seems to be in the second degree; this is the dependence of children upon their parents.

*3tio.* He who depends upon another for the means of procuring subsistence to himself by his own labor, stands in the third degree: this I take to have been the case between the feudal lords, and the lowest classes of their vassals, the laborers of the ground.

*4to.* He who depends totally upon the sale of his own industry, stands in the fourth degree: this is the case of tradesmen and manufacturers, with respect to those who employ them.

These I take to be the different degrees of subordination between man and man, considered as members of the same society.

In proportion, therefore, as certain classes, or certain individuals become more dependent than formerly, in the same proportion ought their just subordination to increase: and in proportion as they become less dependent than formerly, in the same proportion ought this just subordination to diminish.



This seems to be a rational principle: next for the application.

I deduce the origin of the great subordination under the feudal government, from the necessary dependence of the lower classes for their subsistence. They consumed the produce of the land, as the price of their subordination, not as the reward of their industry in making it produce.

I deduce modern liberty from the independence of the same classes, by the introduction of industry, and circulation of an adequate equivalent for every service.

If this doctrine be applied in order to resolve the famous question so much debated, concerning the origin of supreme authority, in so far as it is a question of the law of nature, I do not find the decision so very difficult: *All authority is in proportion to dependence, and must vary according to circumstances.*

I think it is as rational to say, that the fatherly power proceeded originally from the act of the children, as to say, that the great body of the people who were fed, and protected by a few great lords, was the fountain of power, and creator of subordination. Those who have no other equivalent to give for their food and protection, must pay in personal service, respect, and submission; and so soon as they come to be in a situation to pay a proper equivalent for these dependencies, in so far they acquire a title to liberty and independence. The feudal lords, therefore, who, with reason, had an entire authority over many of their vassals, being subdued by their King; the usurpation was upon *their* rights, not

upon the rights of the lower classes: but when a King came to extend the power he had over the vassals of the lords, to the inhabitants of cities, who had been independent of that subordination, his usurpation became evident.

The rights of Kings, therefore, are to be sought for in history; and not founded upon the supposition of tacit contracts between them and their people, inferred from the principles of an imaginary law of nature, *which makes all mankind equal*: nature can never be in opposition to common reason.

The general principle I have laid down, appears, in my humble opinion, more rational than that imaginary contract; and as consonant to the full with the spirit of free government. If the original tacit contract of government between Prince and people is admitted universally, then all governments ought to be similar; and every subordination, which appears contrary to the entire liberty and independence of the lowest classes, ought to be construed as tyrannical: whereas, according to my principle, the subordination of classes may, in different countries, be vastly different; the prerogative of one sovereign may, from different circumstances, be far more extended than that of another.

May not one have attained the sovereignty (by the free election of the people, I suppose) because of the great extent of his possessions, number of his vassals and dependents, quantity of wealth, alliances and connexions with neighbouring sovereigns? Had not, for example, such a person as Hugh Capet, the greatest feudal Lord of his time, a right to a much

more extensive jurisdiction over his subjects, than could reasonably be aspired to by a King of Poland, sent from France, or from Germany, and set at the head of a republic, where he has not one person depending upon him for any thing?

The power of Princes, as *Princes*, must then be distinguished from the power they derive from other circumstances, which do not necessarily follow in consequence of their elevation to the throne. It would, I think, be the greatest absurdity to advance, that the title of King abolishes, of itself, the subordination due to the person who exercises the office of that high magistracy.

Matter of fact, which is stronger than all reasoning, demonstrates the force of the principle here laid down. Do we not see how subordination rises and falls under different reigns, under a rich Elizabeth, and a necessitous Charles, under a powerful Austrian, and a distressed Bavarian Emperor? I proceed no farther in the examination of this matter: perhaps my reader has decided that I have gone too far already.

From these principles may be deduced the boundaries of subordination. A people who depend upon nothing but their own industry for their subsistence, ought to be under no farther subordination than what is necessary for their protection. And as the protection of the whole body of such a people implies the protection of every individual, so every political subordination should there be general and equal: no person, no class should be under a greater subordination than another. This is the subordina-

tion of the laws ; and whenever laws establish a subordination more than what is proportionate to the dependence of those who are subordinate, in so far such laws may be considered as contrary to natural equity, and arbitrary.

These things premised, I come to the question proposed, namely, How far particular forms of government are favorable or unfavorable to a competition with other nations, in point of commerce ?

If we reason from facts, and from experience, we shall find, that trade and industry have been found mostly to flourish under the republican form, and under those which have come the nearest to it. May I be allowed to say, that, perhaps, one principal reason for this has been, that under these forms the administration of the laws has been the most uniform, and consequently, that most liberty has *actually* been there enjoyed : I say *actually*, because I have said above, that in my acceptation of the term, liberty is equally compatible with monarchy as with democracy ; I do not say the enjoyment of it is equally secure under both ; because under the first it is much more liable to be destroyed.

The life of the democratical system is equality. Monarchy conveys the idea of the greatest inequality possible. Now if, on one side, the equality of the democracy secures liberty ; on the other, the moderation in expense discourages industry ; and if, on one side, the inequality of the monarchy endangers liberty, the progress of luxury encourages industry on the other. From whence we may conclude, that the democratical system is naturally the

best for giving birth to foreign trade; the monarchical, for the refinement of the luxurious arts, and for promoting a rapid circulation of inland commerce.

The danger which liberty is exposed to under monarchy, and the discouragement to industry, from the frugality of the democracy, are only the natural and immediate effects of the two forms of government; and these inconveniencies will only take place while statesmen neglect the interest of commerce, so far as not to make it an object of administration.

The disadvantage, therefore, of the monarchical form, in point of trade and industry, does not proceed from the inequality it establishes among the citizens, but from the consequence of this inequality, which is very often accompanied with an arbitrary and undetermined subordination between the individuals of the higher classes, and those of the lower; or between those vested with the execution of the laws, and the body of the people. The moment it is found that any subordination within the monarchy, between subject and subject, is left without proper bounds prescribed, liberty is so far at an end. Nay monarchy itself is thereby hurt, as this undetermined subordination implies an arbitrary power in the state, not vested in the monarch. *Arbitrary* power never can be delegated: for if it be *arbitrary*, it may be turned against the monarch, as well as against the subject.

I might therefore say, that when such a power in individuals is constitutional in the monarchy, such

monarchy is not a government, but a tyranny, and therefore falls without the limits of our subject; and when such a power is anti-constitutional, and yet is exercised, that it is an abuse, and should be overlooked. But as the plan of this inquiry engages me to investigate the operations of general principles, and the consequences they produce, I cannot omit, in this place, to point out those which flow from an undetermined subordination, from whatever cause it may proceed.

Whether this undetermined subordination between individuals be a *vice* in the constitution of the government, or an *abuse*, it is the same thing as to the consequences which result from it. It is this which checks and destroys industry, and which in a great measure prevents its progress from being equal in all countries. This difference in the form or administration of governments, is the only one which it is essentially necessary to examine in this inquiry; and so essential it is, in my opinion, that I imagine it would be less hurtful, in a plan for the establishment of commerce, fairly, and at once, to enslave the lower classes of the inhabitants, and to make them vendible like other commodities, than to leave them nominally free, burdened with their own maintenance, charged with the education of their children, and at the same time under an irregular subordination; that is, liable at every moment to be loaded with new prestations or impositions, either in work or otherwise, and to be fined or imprisoned at will by their superiors.

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It produces no difference, whether these irregularities be exercised by those of the superior classes, or by the statesman and his substitutes. It is the irregularity of the exactions more than the extent of them which ruins industry. It renders living precarious, and the very idea of industry should carry along with it, not only an assured livelihood, but a certain profit over and above.

Let impositions be ever so high, provided they be proportional, general, gradually augmented, and permanent, they may have indeed the effect of stopping foreign trade, and of starving the idle, but they never will ruin the industrious, as we shall have occasion to show in treating of taxation. Whereas, when they are arbitrary, falling unequally upon individuals of the same condition, sudden, and frequently changing their object, it is impossible for industry to stand its ground. Such a system of economy introduces an unequal competition among those of the same class, it stops industrious people in the middle of their career, discourages others from exposing to the eyes of the public *the ease of their circumstances*, consequently encourages hoarding; this again excites rapaciousness upon the side of the statesman, who sees himself frustrated in his schemes of laying hold of private wealth.

From this a new set of inconveniencies follow. He turns his views upon solid property. This inspires the landlords with *indignation* against *him* who can load *them* at will; and with *envy* against the *monied interest*, who can baffle his attempts. This class again is constantly upon the catch to profit of the public

distress for want of money. What is the consequence of all this? It is, that the lowest classes of the people, who ought by industry to enrich the state, find on one hand the monied interest constantly amassing, in order to lend to the state, instead of distributing among *them*, by seasonable loans, their superfluous income, with a view to share the reasonable profits of their ingenuity; and on the other hand, they find the emissaries of taxation robbing them of the seed before it is sown, instead of waiting for a share in the harvest.

Under the feudal form of government, liberty and independence were confined to the nobility. Birth opened the door of preferment to some, and birth as effectually shut it against others. I have often observed how, by reason and from experience, such a form of government must be unfavorable both to trade and industry.

From reason it is plain, that industry must give wealth, and wealth *will* give power, if he who possesses it be left the master to employ it as he pleases. A government could not therefore encourage a system which tended to throw power into the hands of those who were only made to obey. It was consequently very natural for the nobility to be jealous of wealthy merchants, and of every one who became easy and independent by means of their own industry; experience proved how exactly this principle regulated their administration.

A statesman ought, therefore, to consider attentively every circumstance of the constitution of his country, before he sets on foot the modern system



of trade and industry. I am far from being of opinion that this is the only road to happiness, security, and ease; though, from the general taste of the times I live in, it be the system I am principally employed to examine. A country may be abundantly happy, and sufficiently formidable to those who come to attack it, without being extremely rich. Riches indeed are forbid to all who have not mines, or foreign trade.

If a country be found laboring under many natural disadvantages from inland situation, barren soil, distant carriage, it would be in vain to attempt a competition with other nations in foreign markets. All that can be then undertaken is a passive trade, and that only in so far as it can bring in additional wealth. When little money can be acquired, the statesman's application must be, to make that already acquired to circulate as much as possible, in order to give bread to every one in the society.

In countries where the government is vested in the hands of the great lords, as is the case in all aristocracies, as was the case under the feudal government, and as it still is the case in many countries in Europe, where trade, however, and industry are daily gaining ground; the statesman who sets the new system of political economy on foot, may depend upon it, that either his attempt will fail, or the constitution of the government will change. If he destroys all arbitrary dependence between individuals, the wealth of the industrious will share, if not totally root out the power of the grandees. If he allows such a dependence to subsist, his project will fail.

While Venice and Genoa flourished, they were obliged to open the doors of their senate to the wealthy citizens, in order to prevent their being broken down. What is venal nobility? The child of commerce, the indispensable consequence of industry, and a middle term, which our Gothic ancestors found themselves obliged to adopt, in order not entirely to lose their own rank in the state. Money, they found, must carry off the faces, so they chose rather to adopt the wealthy plebeians, and to clothe ignoble shoulders with their purple mantle, than to allow these to wrest all authority out of the hands of the higher class. By this expedient, a sudden revolution has often been prevented. Some kingdoms have been quit for a bloody rebellion, or a long civil war. Other countries have likewise demonstrated the force of the principles here laid down: a wealthy populace has broken their chains to pieces, and overturned the very foundations of the feudal system.

All these violent convulsions have been owing to the short-sightedness of statesmen; who, inattentive to the consequences of growing wealth and industry, foolishly imagined that hereditary subordination was to subsist among classes, whose situation, with respect to each other, was entirely changed.

The pretorian cohorts were at first subordinate to the orders of the Emperors, and were the guards of the city of Rome. The Janissaries are understood to be under the command of the principal officers of the Porte. So soon as the leading men of Rome and Constantinople, who naturally were entitled to govern the state, applied to these tumultuous bodies for their

protection and assistance, they in their turn, made sensible of their own importance, changed the constitution, and shared in the government.

A milder revolution, entirely similar, is taking place in modern times; and an attentive spectator may find amusement in viewing the progress of it in many states of Europe. *Trade and industry* are in vogue; and their establishment is occasioning a wonderful fermentation with the remaining fierceness of the feudal constitution.

Trade and industry owed their establishment to *war* and to *ambition*; and perhaps mankind may hope to see the day when they will put an end to the first, by exposing the expensive folly of the latter.

Trade and industry, I say, owed their establishment to the ambition of princes, who supported and favored the plan in the beginning, principally with a view to enrich themselves, and thereby to become formidable to their neighbours. But they did not discover, until experience taught them, that the wealth they drew from such fountains was but the overflowing of the spring; and that an opulent, bold, and spirited people, having the fund of the prince's wealth in their own hands, have it also in their own power, when it becomes strongly their inclination, to shake off his authority. The consequence of this change has been the introduction of a more mild, and a more regular plan of administration. The money-gatherers are become more useful to princes, than the great lords; and those who are fertile in expedients for establishing public credit, and for drawing money from the coffers of the rich,

by the imposition of taxes, have been preferred to the most wise and most learned counsellors.

As this system is new, no wonder if it has produced phenomena both new and surprising. Formerly, the power of Princes was employed to destroy liberty, and to establish arbitrary subordination; but in our days, we have seen those who have best comprehended the true principles of the new plan of politics, arbitrarily limiting the power of the higher classes, and thereby applying their authority towards the extension of public liberty, by extinguishing every subordination, other than that due to the established laws.

The fundamental maxim of some of the greatest ministers, has been to restrain the power of the great lords. The natural inference that people drew from such a step, was, that the minister thereby intended to make every thing depend on the prince's will only. This I do not deny. But what use have we seen made of this new acquisition of power? Those who look into events with a political eye, may perceive several acts of the most arbitrary authority exercised by some late European sovereigns, with no other view than to establish public liberty upon a more extensive bottom. And although the prerogative of some princes be increased considerably beyond the bounds of the ancient constitution, even to such a degree as perhaps justly to deserve the name of usurpation; yet the consequences resulting from the revolution, cannot every where be said, upon the whole, to have impaired what I call *public liberty*. I should be at no loss to prove this assertion from

matters of fact, and by examples, did I think it proper: it seems better to prove it from reason.

When once a state begins to subsist by the consequences of industry, there is less danger to be apprehended from the power of the sovereign. The mechanism of his administration becomes more complex, and, as was observed in the introduction to the first book, he finds himself so bound up by the laws of his political economy, that every transgression of them runs him into new difficulties.

I only speak of governments which are conducted systematically, constitutionally, and by general laws; and when I mention princes, I mean their councils. The principles I am inquiring into, regard the cool administration of their government; it belongs to another branch of politics, to contrive bulwarks against their passions, vices and weaknesses, as men.

I say, therefore, that from the time states have begun to be supported by the consequences of industry, the plan of administration has become more moderate; has been changing and refining by degrees; and every change, as has been often observed, must be accompanied with inconveniencies.

It is of governments as of machines, the more they are simple, the more they are solid and lasting; the more they are artfully composed, the more they become useful; but the more apt they are to be out of order.

The Lacedemonian form may be compared to the wedge, the most solid and compact of all the mechanical powers. Those of modern states to watches, which are continually going wrong; some-

times the spring is found too weak, at other times too strong for the machine: and when the wheels are not made according to a determined proportion, by the able hands of a Graham, or a Julien le Roy, they do not tally well with one another; then the machine stops, and if it be forced, some part gives way; and the workman's hand becomes necessary to set it right.

#### C H A P. XIV. •

*Security, Ease and Happiness, no inseparable Concomitants of Trade and Industry.*

**T**HE republic of Lycurgus represents the most perfect plan of political economy, in my humble opinion, any where to be met with, either in ancient or modern times. That it existed cannot be called in question, any more than that it proved the most durable of all those established among the Greeks; and if at last it came to fail, it was more from the abuses which gradually were introduced into it, than from any vice in the form.

The simplicity of the institution made the solidity of it; and had the Lacedemonians at all times adhered to the principles of their government, and spirit of their constitution, they might have perhaps subsisted to this very day.

My intention, in this chapter, is not to enter into a critical disquisition concerning the mechanism of every part of the Spartan republic; but to compare

the general plan of Lycurgus's political economy with the principles we have been laying down.

Of this plan we have a description in the life of that legislator written by Plutarch, one of the most judicious authors to be met with in any age.

This historian flourished at least 800 years after the institution of the plan he describes. A plan never reduced into a system of written laws, but stamped at first upon the minds of the Spartans by the immediate authority of the gods, which made them submit to the most violent revolution that perhaps ever took place in any nation, and which they supported for so many ages by the force of education alone.

As the whole of Lycurgus's laws was transmitted by tradition only, it is not to be supposed, that the description Plutarch, or indeed any of the ancients, have given us of this republic, can be depended on with certainty as a just representation of every part of the system laid down by that great statesman. But on the other hand, we may be very sure, that as to the outlines of the institution, we have them transmitted to us in all their purity; and, in what relates to my subject, I have no occasion to launch out into any particulars which may imply the smallest controversy, as to the matter of fact.

Property among the Lacedemonians, at the time when Lycurgus planned his institution, was very unequally divided: the consequence of which, says our historian, was to draw many poor people into the city, where the wealth was gathered into few hands; that is, according to our language, *the*

*luxury of the rich, who lived in the city, had purged the lands of useless mouths, and the instability of the government had rendered industry precarious, which must have opened the door to general distress among all the lower classes.*

The first step our legislator took, was to prepare the spirit of the people, so as to engage them to submit to a total reform, which could not fail of being attended with innumerable inconveniencies.

For this purpose he went to Delphi, without having communicated his design to any body. The Pythia declared him to be the darling of the gods, and rather a god than a man; and publicly gave out, that Apollo had delivered to him alone the plan of a republic which far exceeded every other in perfection.

What a powerful engine was this in the hands of a profound politician, who had travelled over the world with a previous intention to explore the mysteries of the science of government! and what advantages did such an authentic recommendation, coming directly (as was believed) from the voice of the Divinity, give him over a superstitious people, in establishing whatever form of government he thought most proper!

The sagacious Lacedemonian did not, however, entirely depend upon the blind submission of his countrymen to the dictates of the oracle; but wisely judged that some preparatory steps might still be necessary. He communicated, therefore, his plan, first to his friends, and then by degrees to the principal people of the state, who certainly never could



have been brought to relish an innovation so prejudicial to their interest, had it not been from the deepest reverence and submission to the will of the gods. Assured of their assistance, he appeared in the market place, accompanied by his party, all in arms; and having imposed respect, he laid the foundation of his government by the nomination of a senate.

Whatever regards any other object than his plan of political economy, shall be here passed over in silence. It is of no consequence to my inquiry, where the supreme power was vested: it is sufficient to know that there was an authority in the state sufficient to support the execution of his plan.

He destroyed all inequality at one stroke. The property of all the lands of the state was thrown together, and became at the disposal of the legislator. Every branch of industry was proscribed to the citizens. And a monied interest was made to disappear, by the introduction of iron coin. The lands he divided into equal lots, according to the number of citizens.

Thus all were rendered entirely equal in point of fortune, as neither wealth, industry, or lands, could give a superiority to any body. From this part of the plan I conclude, that Lycurgus discovered the utter insufficiency of an agrarian law for establishing equality among the individuals of a state, without proscribing, at the same time, both wealth and industry. A circumstance which seems to have escaped every other statesman in ancient times, as well as the modern patrons of equality and simplicity of manners.

The lands were cultivated by the Helotes, who were nourished from them, and who were obliged to deliver the surplus, that is, a determined quantity of fruits, to the proprietor of the lot. Every necessary mechanic art was likewise exercised by this body of slaves.

By this distribution, the produce of the earth (that is every article of nourishment) came free and without cost to every individual of the state. The Spartan landlords were rather overseers of the slaves, and collectors of the public subsistence, than direct proprietors of the soil which produced it. For although every man was fed from his own lands, and provided his own portion, yet this portion was regulated, and was to be consumed in public; and any one who pretended to eat alone, or before he came to the public hall, was held in the utmost contempt.

Their clothing was the most simple possible, perfectly alike, and could be purchased for a small value. This frugality produced no bad effect; because no man lived by his industry. Arts, as has been said, were exercised by the Helotes, the property of private citizens; and if such masters as entertained manufacturing slaves gained by that traffic (as some must do) every method of profiting of their superior riches was cut off.

The Spartans were continually together, they had nothing to do but to divert themselves; and their amusements were mostly martial exercises. The regulations of these numerous assemblies (which were compared, with great elegance and justness, to swarms of bees) cut off all outward marks of distinc-

tion. There was not a possibility for luxury to introduce itself, either in eating, drinking, clothing, furniture, or any other expense.

Here then was a whole nation fed and provided for gratuitously; there was not the least occasion for industry; the usefulness of which we have shown principally to consist in its proving an expedient for procuring for the necessitous, what the Spartans found provided for them without labor.

Under such circumstances we may conclude; from the principles we have laid down, that a people thus abundantly nourished, must have multiplied exceedingly. And so no doubt they did. But the regulation of the lots permitted no more than a fixt number of citizens. Whenever, therefore, numbers were found to exceed this standard, the supernumeraries were dismissed, and sent to form colonies. And when the Helotes increased too much, and thereby began to rise above the proportion of the labor required of them, in order to prevent the consuming the food of their masters, which they had among their hands, and thereby becoming idle, licentious, and consequently dangerous to the state, it was permitted to destroy them by way of a military exercise, conducted by stratagem and address; arts which this people constantly preferred in war, to labor, strength, and intrepidity.

This appears a very barbarous custom, and I shall not offer any thing as an apology for it, but the ferocity of the manners of those times. Abstracting from the cruelty, the restraining the numbers of that class within certain limits, was absolutely necessary. The

Lacedæmonian slaves were in many respects far happier than those of other nations. They were in reality a body of farmers, which paid a certain quantity of fruits out of every lot; to wit, 70 medimni of barley: their numbers were not recruited from abroad, as elsewhere, but supported by their own propagation; consequently there was an absolute necessity either to prevent the over-multiplication of them, or to diminish an income proportioned exactly to the necessities of the state: and what expedient could be fallen upon? They were slaves, and therefore could not be inrolled in the numbers of citizens; they could not be sold to strangers, for money which was forbid; and they were of no use to industry. No wonder then if the fierceness of the manners of those days permitted the inhuman treatment they received; which, however, Plutarch is far from attributing to the primitive institution of Lycurgus. Besides, when we see that the freemen themselves were obliged to quit the country the moment their numbers exceeded a certain standard, it was not to be expected, that useless slaves should be permitted to multiply at discretion.

From this sketch of Lycurgus's political economy, we find the state abundantly provided with every necessary article; an effectual stop put to vicious procreation among the citizens; and a corrective for the over-multiplication of the slaves. The next care of a statesman is to regulate the employment of a people.

Every freeman in the state was bred up from his

infancy to arms. No family-care could prevent him from serving the state as a soldier; his children were no load upon him; it was the business of the Helotes to supply them with provisions; of the servants in town to prepare these, and the public tables were always ready furnished. The whole youth of Sparta was educated not as the children of their parents, but of the state. They imbibed the same sentiments of frugality, temperance, and love of simplicity. They exercised the same employment, and were occupied in the same way in every respect. The simplicity of Lycurgus's plan, rendered this a practicable scheme. The multiplicity and variety of employments among us, makes it absolutely necessary to trust the parents with the education of their children; whereas in Sparta, there were not two employments for a freeman; there was neither orator, lawyer, physician, or politician, by profession to be found. The institutions of their lawgiver were constantly inculcated by the old upon the minds of the young; every thing they heard or saw, was relative to war. The very gods were represented in armor, and every precept they were taught, tended to banish superfluity, and to establish moderation and hard living.

The youth were continually striving together in all military exercises; such as boxing and wrestling. To keep up, therefore, a spirit of emulation, and to banish animosity at the same time, sharp, satirical expressions were much encouraged; but these were always to be seasoned with something gracious or polite. The grave demeanour likewise, and down-cast look which they were ordered to observe in the

streets, and the injunction of keeping their hands within their robes, might very naturally be calculated to prevent quarrels, and especially blows, at times when the authority of a public assembly could not moderate the vivacity of their passions. By these arts, the Spartans lived in great harmony in the midst of a continual war.

Under such regulations a people must enjoy security from foreign attacks; and certainly the intention of the legislator never was to extend the limits of Laconia by conquest. What people could ever think of attacking the Lacedemonians, where nothing but blows could be expected?

They enjoyed ease in the most supreme degree; they were abundantly provided with very necessary of life; although, I confess, the enjoyment of them in so austere a manner, would not be relished by any modern society. But habit is all in things of this kind. A coarse meal to a good stomach, has more relish than all the delicacies of the most exquisite preparation to a depraved appetite; and if sensuality be reckoned among the pleasures of life, enough of it might have been met with in the manners of that people. It does not belong to my subject to enter into particular details on this head. But the most rational pleasure among men, the delightful communication of society, was here enjoyed to the utmost extent. The whole republic was continually gathered together in bodies, and their studies, their occupations, and their amusements, were the same. One taste was universal; and the young and the old being constantly together, the first under the im-

mediate

mediate inspection and authority of the latter, the same sentiments were transmitted from generation to generation. The Spartans were so pleased, and so satisfied with their situation, that they despised the manners of every other nation. If this does not transmit an idea of happiness, I am at a loss to form one. Security, ease, and happiness, therefore, are not inseparable concomitants of trade and industry.

Lycurgus had penetration enough to perceive the weak side of his institution. He was no stranger to the seducing influence of luxury; and plainly foresaw, that the consequences of industry, which procures to mankind a great variety of new objects of desire and a wonderful facility in satisfying them, would easily root out the principles he had endeavoured to instil into his countrymen, if the state of simplicity should ever come to be sophisticated by foreign communications. He affected, therefore, to introduce several customs which could not fail of disgusting and shocking the delicacy of neighbouring states. He permitted the dead to be buried within the walls; the handling of dead bodies was not reckoned pollution among the Lacedemonians. He forbade bathing, so necessary for cleanliness in a hot country; and the coarseness and dirtiness of their clothes, and sweat from their hard exercises, could not fail to disgust strangers from coming among them. On the other hand, nothing was found at Sparta which could engage a stranger to wish to become one of their number. And to prevent the contagion of foreign customs from getting in, by means of the citizens themselves, he forbade the Spartans to travel;

and excluded from any employment in the state, those who had got a foreign education. Nothing but a Spartan breeding could have fitted a person to live among them.

The theft encouraged among the Lacedæmonians was calculated to make them artful and dexterous; and contained not the smallest tincture of vice. It was generally of something eatable, and the frugality of their table prompted them to it; while on the other hand, their being exposed to the like reprisals, made them watchful and careful of what belonged to themselves; and the pleasure of punishing an unsuccessful attempt, in part indemnified them for the trouble of being constantly upon their guard. A Lacedæmonian had nothing of any value that could be stolen; and it is the desire and intention of making unlawful gain, which renders theft either criminal or scandalous.

The hidden intercourse between the Spartans and their young wives was, no doubt, calculated to impress upon the minds of the fair sex, the wide difference there is between an act of immodesty, and that of simply appearing naked in the public exercises; two things which we are apt to confound, only from the impression of our own customs. I am persuaded that many a young person has felt her modesty as much hurt by taking off her handkerchief, the first time she appeared at court, as any Lacedæmonian girl could have done by stripping before a thousand people; yet both her reason and common sense, must make her sensible of the difference between a compliance with a custom in a matter of



dress, and a palpable transgression against the laws of her honor, and the modesty of her sex.

I have called this Lacedemonian republic a perfect plan of political economy; because it was a system, uniform and consistent in all its parts. *There*, no superfluity was necessary, because there was no occasion for industry, to give bread to any body. *There*, no superfluity was permitted, because the moment the limits of the absolutely necessary are transgressed, the degrees of excess are quite indeterminate, and become purely relative. The same thing which appears superfluity to a peasant, appears necessary to a citizen, and the utmost luxury of this class, frequently does not come up to what is thought the mere necessary for one in a higher rank. Lycurgus stopt at the only determined frontier, the pure physical necessary. All beyond this was considered as abusive.

The only things in commerce among the Spartans were,

*1mo.* What might remain to them of the fruits of their lot, over their own consumption; and *2do.* The work of the slaves employed in trades. The numbers of these could not be many, as the timber of their houses was worked only with the saw and ax; and every utensil was made with the greatest simplicity. A small quantity, therefore, of iron coin, as I imagine, must have been sufficient for carrying on the circulation at Sparta. The very nature of their wants must, as I have said, terminate all their commerce, in the exchange of their surplus-food of their

portions of land, with the work of the manufacturing slaves, who must have been fed from it.

As the Lacedemonians had no mercantile communication with other nations, the iron coin was no more than a bank-note of no intrinsic value, as I suppose, but a middle term introduced for keeping accounts, and for facilitating barter. An additional argument for this opinion of the coin being of no intrinsic value, is, that it is said to have been rendered unserviceable for other uses, by being flaked in vinegar. In order consequently to destroy, as they imagined, any intrinsic value which might therein otherwise remain. If this coin, therefore, was made of an extraordinary weight, it must have been entirely with a political view of discouraging commerce and circulation, an institution quite consistent with the general plan, and nowise a consequence of the baseness of the metal of which it was made: a small quantity of this, with the stamp of public authority for its currency and value, would have answered every purpose equally well.

Let me now conclude this chapter by an illustration of the subject, which will still more clearly point out the force of the principles upon which this Lacedemonian republic was established.

Were any Prince in Europe, whose subjects, I shall suppose, may amount to six millions of inhabitants, one half employed in agriculture, the other half employed in trade and industry, or living upon a revenue already acquired; were such a Prince, I say, supposed to have authority sufficient to engage his people to adopt a new plan of economy, cal-

culated to secure them against the designs of a powerful neighbour, who, I shall suppose, has formed schemes of invading and subduing them.

Let him engage the whole proprietors of land to renounce their several possessions: or if that supposition should appear too absurd, let him contract debts to the value of the whole property of the nation; let the land-tax be imposed at twenty shillings in the pound, and then let him become bankrupt to the creditors. Let the income of all the lands be collected throughout the country for the use of the state; let all the luxurious arts be proscribed; and let those employed in them be formed, under the command of the former land-proprietors, into a body of regular troops, officers and soldiers, provided with every thing necessary for their maintenance, and that of their wives and families at the public expense. Let me carry the supposition farther. Let every superfluity be cut off; let the peasants be enslaved, and obliged to labor the ground with no view of profit to themselves, but for simple subsistence; let the use of gold and silver be proscribed; and let all these metals be shut up in a public treasure. Let no foreign trade, and very little domestic be encouraged; but let every man, willing to serve as a soldier, be received and taken care of; and those who either incline to be idle, or who are found superfluous, be sent out of the country. I ask, what combination, among the modern European Princes, would carry on a successful war against such a people? What article would be wanting to their ease, that is, to their ample subsistence?

Their happiness would depend upon the temper of their mind. And what country could defend themselves against the attack of such an enemy? Such a system of political economy, I readily grant, is not likely to take place: but if ever it did, would it not effectually dash to pieces the whole fabric of trade and industry, which has been forming for so many years? And would it not quickly oblige every other nation to adopt, as far as possible, a similar conduct, from a principle of self-preservation.

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

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