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Traits Unique to Japan

Public Sentiment as a Measure of Political Influence

One quantifiable way to measure political influence is to look at public sentiment, and in this regard, Japan stands apart as possibly the most negatively disposed country in the world toward China. According to a spring 2019 Pew Research poll, Japanese had the most negative views of China among all 34 countries surveyed, at 85 percent negative.⁸⁸ Japan's official opening to China in 1972, when Japanese public sentiment, according to Japan's Cabinet Office polls, saw significantly more positive public sentiment—coinciding with the nation's "panda boom." Public sentiment has fallen consistently ever since, while Japanese sentiment toward the United States has remained consistently the most positive.⁸⁹ Masaharu Hishida, who tracks bilateral sentiment at Hosei University, told us that while younger Japanese are relatively fonder of China, older Japanese are jaded by China's actions over the past few decades, specifically the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, the sense of betrayal among Japanese leftists that China did not stick to its socialist principles, and the arrest of Japanese researchers in China. Hishida sees negative attitudes toward China in Japan as a vicious circle starting with a negative bias that drives people to seek confirmation in negative news stories, thus compelling the media to provide those stories.


Xi Jinping complained on November 22, 2019, that Japanese opinion of China is plagued by bias and prejudice.⁹⁰ A Bloomberg report astutely noted that Xi's complaint would probably only make things worse—again creating further backlash. "The fact that Chinese people have a more favorable view of Japan [than Japanese do of China] shows that China is following the right path," Xi said, adding, "we are encouraging people to visit Japan." The Abe administration

88. Laura Silver, Kat Devlin, and Christine Huang, "People around the globe are divided in their opinions of China," Pew Research Center, December 5, 2019, <https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/12/05/people-around-the-globe-are-divided-in-their-opinions-of-china/>.

89. The Japanese Cabinet Office poll annually has tracked the favorability among 3,000 Japanese surveyed of China and the United States and other countries since 1978. Retrieved (Jan. 2, 2020) from <https://survey.gov-online.go.jp/index-gai.html>; and Alex Martin, "The public has spoken: Xiang Xiang is the name of Ueno Zoo's newest star," *Japan Times*, September 25, 2017, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/09/25/national/baby-panda-ueno-zoo-named-xiang-xiang/#.XiZN5hdKjMJ>.

90. "Japan Needs to Do More to Fix China's Image Problem, Xi Says," Bloomberg News, November 22, 2019, <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-11-22/japan-needs-to-do-more-to-fix-china-s-image-problem-xi-says>.

Japanese Sentiment Toward China (%)



Source: Public Relations Office, Cabinet Office (Government of Japan), *Overview of the Public Opinion Survey on Diplomacy* (December 2017), distributed by the government of Japan, <https://www.gov-online.go.jp/eng/pdf/summaryg17.pdf>.

has relaxed tourist visas from China, and between 2013 and 2018, Chinese visits to Japan increased 600 percent to a record high of more than 8 million in 2018 (conversely, only about 2.5 million Japanese visit China annually).⁹¹ By contrast, Japanese television news featured stories about U.S.-China economic conflict “almost every day” during the polling period of September 2019.⁹² When media is profit-driven, it caters to the audience’s bias, and the Japanese public appears to thirst for China-bashing stories. Over the years, complaints from Chinese officials about critical media reports in Japan demonstrate that Chinese and Japanese interlocutors are speaking past one another based on incompatible norms.

In sum, China’s hard and coercive power does not necessarily translate into soft power, an aim which Hu Jintao introduced in 2007 at the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party. Scholar Joseph Nye has frequently noted this challenge for Beijing. China’s positives, such as its economic growth, military power, and political influence, paradoxically manifest as threats in the global and Japanese imaginations, while its negatives—such as human rights violations; its handling of the Hong Kong democracy protests, Covid-19, and Uighurs in Xinjiang; or territorial ambitions in the East and South China Seas—serve to add to the list of negatives. Either way, China cannot seem to win in a conflict that is fundamentally a clash of values. Nevertheless, sharp episodes of influence do present a risk to sustaining the relative peace. What are some of the traits that are unique to Japan that shape attitudes toward China?

91. He Huifeng, “Chinese tourism to Japan hits record highs, as travelers turn their back on protest-hit Hong Kong, Taiwan,” *South China Morning Post*, November 24, 2019, <https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3038966/chinese-tourism-japan-hits-record-highs-travellers-turn-their>.

92. Yashushi Kudo, “Why do the Japanese have negative views of China?,” Genron NPO, October 25, 2019, http://www.genron-npo.net/en/opinion_polls/archives/5506.html.

A Long History of Conflict with China

Popular historical recollection among both the Japanese public and armed forces describes five distinct wars, mainly over the Korean Peninsula, between Japan and China that have shaped relations between the two states. According to retired Japanese Navy vice admiral Yoji Koda, Japanese society, including the military, sees China as a great teacher, but it also sees the relationship through the prism of fighting wars with China over regional security for nearly 2,000 years (similar the view of China in Vietnam). Armed conflicts flared in 663AD (Battle of Baekgang), 1274 (Mongol invasions), 1592 (Japanese invasion of Korea), 1894 (First Sino-Japanese War), and 1931 (Second Sino-Japanese War). In addition to the five wars, several interviewees identified the 2010-2012 China-Japan conflict over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and China's decision to stop exports of rare earth metals to Japan as a "turning point" and a nadir in the relationship. While China-Japan economic harmony was previously seen as protected from any political disputes, that perception changed during this time, and views in Japan about China reached new lows. This episode is one of the sharpest examples of China's use of economic coercion, although China denies that description, arguing that a reduction in rare earth exports was previously planned and was unrelated to the conflict.⁹³ In any case, China's restriction of the minerals likely backfired, according to a report by the Heritage Foundation: "In the years following the Chinese move [to restrict rare earths], Australia and the United States both substantially expanded their production of rare earth minerals, as did Brazil, Malaysia, Russia, Thailand, and Vietnam. New reserves were also identified in India and Canada. Most recently, Japan discovered a major offshore deposit of rare earths that is estimated to be able to meet centuries of demand."⁹⁴

Japan's Relative Isolation as a "Galapagos" Island

Japan has historically been relatively isolated from foreign migration and investment, making it less susceptible to foreign influence. To this day, many Japanese describe their country as having a "Galapagos syndrome," an expression that captures its relative cultural, economic, and linguistic separation from the rest of the world. Yuichi Hosoya of Keio University told us that when he served as adviser to the prime minister, he would receive emails spoofing the accounts of Japanese journalists, but he could tell they were from Chinese agents due to their poor grammar and Chinese characters. Japan's ambivalence to economic globalization for most of its postwar period has helped to bring about an isolationist image among the world's industrialized economies.⁹⁵ This image largely stemmed from Japan's economic recovery strategy beginning in the 1950s that included state subsidies, protective trade barriers, and strict quotas in order to limit competition from imports until its industries could compete internationally.⁹⁶

93. Michael Green et al., "CSIS Counter Coercion Series: Senkaku Islands Trawler Collision," CSIS, May 18, 2017, <https://anti.csis.org/counter-co-trawler-collision/>.

94. Dean Cheng, Nicolas Loris, and Klon Kitchen, *China is a paper tiger on rare earth minerals* (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2019), <https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/china-paper-tiger-rare-earth-minerals>.

95. "No Country is an Island," *The Economist*, December 1, 2007, <https://www.economist.com/special-report/2007/12/01/no-country-is-an-island>.

96. R. Taggart Murphy, "A Loyal Retainer? Japan, capitalism, and the perpetuation of American Hegemony," *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus* 8, no. 41 (2010): 2, <https://apjff.org/-R-Taggart-Murphy/3425/article.html>.

Although Japan has long been one of the world's largest investors and is the top country (trailed by Germany and China) for outbound foreign direct investment (FDI), with \$143 billion in global investments in 2017-2018, it has undergone significant reforms regarding its traditionally limited inbound FDI.⁹⁷ Once labeled "the most closed investment market in the developed world," the promotion of inbound FDI, a top Abenomics priority, has been unveiled through a series of interministerial policy initiatives.⁹⁸

Historically, Japan's aversion to foreign investments has been attributed to stringent regulations, protected industries that prohibit majority foreign ownership, and the prevailing fear that non-Japanese owners would disrupt lifetime employment norms by cutting costs through mass layoffs.⁹⁹ Additionally, foreign investors have been deterred by Japan's comparative low returns on investments, the high price of land and labor, and strict consumer protections as well as the language barrier and geographic distance.¹⁰⁰ While Abe has sought to reduce some of these barriers, Japan's inbound FDI in 2018 was just \$9.8 billion, which is not even among the world's top 20 countries and, at just 4 percent of GDP (in 2017), is far below the rest of the OECD.¹⁰¹

Japan's isolationist inclinations have not only included capital inflows but people as well. Among OECD countries, Japan is ranked near the bottom among rich countries for the proportions of foreign born (1.9 percent), immigrants (1.76 percent), and refugees admitted (only 22 total in 2018).¹⁰² While it is the fourth-largest exporter and importer in the world, Japan is also near the bottom in overall trade dependence at 37 percent, compared to the world average of 59 percent, as measured by international trade as a percentage of GDP, according to World Bank statistics for 2018.¹⁰³

Nevertheless, before the Covid-19 outbreak, the promotion of temporary visitors, including tourism and study abroad students, has been an important Abenomics policy goal along with free trade and FDI. The Covid-19 crisis had cut visits from overseas by 99 percent in April 2020 and was expected to reduce tourist spending by some \$22

97. UNCTAD, *World Investment Report 2019: Special Economic Zones* (New York: United Nations Publications, 2019), 7, https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2019_en.pdf.

98. Peter Mandelson, "Unfinished Globalisation: Investment and the EU-Japan relationship," (speech, Tokyo, April 21, 2008), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_08_210; Government of Japan. "Abenomics," January 2020, 14, https://www.japan.go.jp/abenomics/_userdata/abenomics/pdf/2001_abenomics.pdf; and "INVEST JAPAN Foreign Direct Investment Promotion," Office of Foreign Direct Investment Promotion Cabinet Office (Japan), February 5, 2020, http://www.invest-japan.go.jp/en_index.html.

99. Stephen Hibbard et al., "How the Environment for Foreign Direct Investment in Japan Is Changing—for the Better," *Knowledge @ Wharton*, April 20, 2009, <https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/how-the-environment-for-foreign-direct-investment-in-japan-is-changing-for-the-better/>.

100. Masako Suginoara, "The Politics of Economic Nationalism in Japan: Backlash against Inward Foreign Direct Investment?," *Asian Survey* 48, no. 5 (2008): 844, doi:10.1525/AS.2008.48.5.839.

101. UNCTAD, *World Investment Report 2019*, 10.

102. "International Migration Outlook 2019: The foreign-born as a percentage of the total population in OECD countries, 2000 and 2018," OECD, February 5, 2020, https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/social-issues-migration-health/the-foreign-born-as-a-percentage-of-the-total-population-in-oecd-countries-2000-and-2018_3f252c6f-en#page1; Tomohiro Ebuchi and Yusuke Yokota, "Japan immigration hits record high as foreign talent fills gaps," *Nikkei Asian Review*, April 13, 2019, <https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Japan-immigration/Japan-immigration-hits-record-high-as-foreign-talent-fills-gaps>; and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), *UNHCR Projected Global Resettlement Needs 2020* (Geneva: UNHCR, 2019), 82, <https://www.unhcr.org/5d1384047.pdf>.

103. "Trade (% of GDP)," World Bank, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.TRD.GNFS.ZS?most_recent_val_ue_desc=false.

billion by August.¹⁰⁴ In 2018, Japan had the eleventh most tourists (with the world's highest tourism growth rate),¹⁰⁵ and it had the fifth most international students in the OECD in 2012, the year Abe returned to power.¹⁰⁶ Between 2013 and 2018, Japan enjoyed consistent growth in total foreign students, rising from 135,519 to 298,980, was on track (before the Covid-19 crisis) to reach its goal of hosting 300,000 students by 2020, and reached its goal of hosting 20 million tourists with 20,080,600 in 2019.¹⁰⁷ Incidentally, China has become the largest source of both tourists and international students for Japan (as well as for the world).¹⁰⁸ One might suspect that with a growing tourism industry, Japan would excel in English-language proficiency, but that is not the case; it fell from 49th to 53rd out of 100 non-English speaking countries in 2019 and ranks below the world average for English proficiency.¹⁰⁹ This linguistic isolation is also thought to be part of the country's Galapagos syndrome.

Although Chinese inbound FDI to Japan has grown, it continues to be hindered by the overall wariness toward a rising China. Total Chinese investment in Japan in 2017 remained just below the \$600 million mark, less than that of smaller economies, such as Singapore and Taiwan.¹¹⁰ As a result, Japan continues to be one of the least exposed economies to China as measured by inbound FDI from China as a share of domestic investment.¹¹¹

China's domination of Japan's tourism, however, poses unique challenges for Japanese society, not least because Japanese citizens have complained about the influx and manners of Chinese tourists at cultural sites. As its growing tourism industry continues to depend heavily on Chinese tourists (who now constitute nearly a third of all visitors), Japan becomes increasingly vulnerable to shifts in Chinese consumer preferences and the health of the bilateral political relationship.¹¹² Meanwhile, the growth of Chinese university students (who represent

104. "Coronavirus to cut foreign visitors' spending in Japan by \$22 bil.," Kyodo News, May 27, 2020, <https://english.kyodonews.net/news/2020/05/768afb35b669-coronavirus-to-cut-foreign-visitors-spending-in-japan-by-22-bil.html>.

105. "International tourism, number of arrivals," World Bank, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ST.INT.ARVL?most_recent_value_desc=true&view=map.

106. "OECD Tourism Trends and Policies 2018: International tourist arrivals, 2012-16," OECD, February 5, 2020, https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/urban-rural-and-regional-development/oecd-tourism-trends-and-policies-2018/international-tourist-arrivals-2012-16_tour-2018-table2-en#page1; and "Foreign/international students enrolled: Non-resident students of reporting country 2012," OECD, February 5, 2020, <https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=RFOREIGN>.

107. "International Students in Japan 2018," Japan Student Services Organization (JASSO), January 2019, https://www.jasso.go.jp/en/about/statistics/intl_student/data2018.html; and Jiji Press, "Visitors from ROK declined 26% in '19," *Japan News*, January 18, 2020, <https://the-japan-news.com/news/article/0006296165>.

108. Min-Hua Chiang, "Contemporary China-Japan Relations: the Politically Driven Economic Linkage," *East Asia* 36, no. 4 (2019): 283, doi:10.1007/s12140-019-09321-x; and "2019 Open Doors Report," Institute of International Education, <https://www.iie.org/research-and-insights/open-doors/data/international-students/places-of-origin>.

109. Jiji Press, "Japanese ranked 53rd in English skills in annual worldwide survey," *Japan Times*, November 9, 2019, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/11/09/national/japanese-ranked-53rd-english-skills-annual-worldwide-survey/#.XtVRUpbQjm0>.

110. OECD, *OECD International Direct Investment Statistics 2018, 2008-2017* (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2019), 163-164, https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/finance-and-investment/oecd-international-direct-investment-statistics-2018_bb55ccaf-en#page13.

111. Jonathan Woetzel et al., *China and the World: Inside the Dynamics of a Changing Relationship* (New York: McKinsey Global Institute, July 2019), 53, <https://www.mckinsey.com/~media/mckinsey/featured%20insights/china/china%20and%20the%20world%20inside%20the%20dynamics%20of%20a%20changing%20relationship/mgi-china-and-the-world-full-report-june-2019-vf.ashx>.

112. John West, "The China-Japan Economic Relationship Is Getting Stronger," Brink, January 21, 2020, <https://www.brinknews.com/the-china-japan-economic-relationship-is-getting-stronger/>; and André Andonian et al., *The future of*

40 percent of all international higher education students in Japan as of 2018) has been accompanied by suspicions regarding government-funded CIs on Japanese campuses and their use as “centers of spy activity and propaganda tools of the CCP.”¹¹³ The recent shuttering of CIs in other countries for similar concerns has not gone unnoticed.

Still, the recognition that the Galapagos syndrome mentality is no longer sustainable and that past isolationist policies have become incompatible with future growth strategies are evidenced by recent reforms. Although Japan has long sought to avoid exposure to foreign economic interests, Abenomics policies have in fact increased its reliance on China, which represents a top source of foreign students, tourists, and parts suppliers to the Japanese economy and manufacturers. While Japan has passed on other Chinese projects (such as the BRI) for political reasons, its long-term economic plan for continued growth has seemingly ushered in with it the potential for greater Chinese influence, which it has mostly avoided otherwise.

Political Homogeneity and an Apathetic Public

Japan has enjoyed a high degree of political stability, especially since the LDP returned to power in 2012. Other than two short hiatuses (1993 to 1994 and 2009 to 2012), the LDP has almost continually controlled the government since 1955.¹¹⁴ As a result, it represents one of the foremost cases of single-party domination among the world’s postwar democracies.¹¹⁵

From a return on investment viewpoint, China’s efforts to interfere in Japan’s elections may not be worth the trouble, explains scholar Tina Burrett, who studies political interference and disinformation at Sophia University in Tokyo. In an interview with us in Tokyo, she pointed out that the outcome of such election interference would likely be too marginal to make a substantial difference. An effective Chinese campaign would need to create an unlikely dramatic change in the way people vote in Japan, and perhaps only a referendum on the constitution would be worth such an effort. “For elections you’d have to make a massive difference in the way people vote in order to make a difference. For Brexit and Trump, it was non-voters who were targeted. In Japan, you’d have to create such a sea change,” she told us. (The Brexit and Trump campaigns used the same strategy and the same consulting firm, Cambridge Analytica.¹¹⁶)

Japan’s tourism: Path for sustainable growth towards 2020 (New York: McKinsey Japan and Travel, Transport and Logistics Practice, October 2016), 13, <https://www.mckinsey.com/~media/mckinsey/industries/travel%20transport%20and%20logistics/our%20insights/can%20inbound%20tourism%20fuel%20japans%20economic%20growth/the%20future%20of%20japans%20tourism%20full%20report.ashx>.

113. JASSO, “International Students in Japan 2018”; and “Rekishisen Dai 20-bu Koshi Gakuin: ‘Bunka Supai Kikan’ Hatsugen de Kainin ‘Chugoku’ wo Hasshin, Nihon ni wa 14 shidai, Kankatsu Aimai ‘Amari ni Mubobi’ [History Battle Part 20: Confucius Institutes: Dismissed as ‘Cultural Spy Agencies’ from ‘China’ to 14 private universities in Japan, Vague jurisdictions leave everyone ‘too defenseless’],” *Sankei Nyusu*, April 11, 2018, <https://www.sankei.com/politics/news/180411/pl1804110003-n6.html>.

114. Michio Umeda, “The Liberal Democratic Party: Its Adaptability and Predominance in Japanese Politics for 60 Years,” *Asian Journal of Comparative Politics* 4, no. 1 (2019): 8, <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/2057891118783270>.

115. T. John Pempel, ed., *Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dominant Regimes* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2019).

116. Payne, Adam, “A British firm which helped deliver Brexit is working for Donald Trump’s campaign,” *Business Insider*, Sept. 22, 2016, <https://www.businessinsider.com/donald-trump-brexit-us-presidential-election-2016-9>.

A major feature of Japan's political stability has been its growing voter apathy. A centralized political process that favors organized interests (such as businesses, labor unions, and farmers) at the expense of individuals gives the impression that voting is "largely procedural."¹¹⁷ The strong sense of political detachment in Japan is exacerbated by a general acceptance of neoliberal reforms as an inevitability, which fuels an intraparty ideological convergence.¹¹⁸ Japan is now ranked near the bottom (36th out of 40) among OECD countries for civic engagement, as the voter turnout rate has declined from 73 percent in 1990 to just 48 percent in 2019.¹¹⁹

As Japan is controlled by a homogenous, dynastic establishment that is concerned about Chinese power, China's elite capture tactics have been less effective than in more competitive democracies. The ban on foreign political contributions likely provides an added layer of insulation.¹²⁰ Moreover, Japan's bipartisan wariness toward, as well as its historical familiarity with, China makes it "less amenable" to malign influence activities.¹²¹ Although the now-defunct Democratic Party of Japan (the ruling party from 2009 to 2012) was viewed as more pro-China than the LDP, it also adhered to many hardline positions, including the Senkaku territorial dispute.¹²²

One could look outside Japan's political mainstream for outlying vectors of influence, but even the politically-weak Japan Communist Party (holding just 12 of 465 seats in Japan's dominant lower house of parliament) remains resistant to Chinese influence and is rather nationalistic.¹²³ China's inability to influence Japan is reflected by its negative popular depictions, including skeptical outlooks on China's self-proclaimed "peaceful" rise, particularly since territorial disputes gained prominence in the 2000s.¹²⁴ As a result, the Japanese public maintains a negative view of China given the highly-publicized nature of these security issues.¹²⁵ Although the number of Chinese tourists visiting Japan, along with overall Chinese opinions of Japan, are both at historical highs, 85 percent of Japanese maintain "unfavorable" opinions of China.¹²⁶ Given the ongoing

117. Yuki Ishikawa, "Calls for Deliberative Democracy in Japan," *Rhetoric & Public Affairs* 5, no. 2 (2002): 339, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41939748?seq=1>.

118. Chris Pope, "Bringing back 'Japan': Prime minister Abe's political rhetoric in critical perspective," (PhD dissertation, University of Sheffield, 2017), <http://etheses.whiterose.ac.uk/17709/1/Chris%20G.%20Pope%20-%20Bringing%20back%20%27%20Japan%27%20-%20Prime%20minister%20Abe%27s%20political%20rhetoric%20in%20critical%20perspective.pdf>.

119. "Civic Engagement," OECD Better Life Index, January 24, 2020, <http://www.oecdbetterlifeindex.org/topics/civic-engagement/>; and Hiroataka Kasai, "Democratic Meltdown and the Contemporary Forms of Political Apathy," *Kokusai Kankeigaku Kenkyu [Study of International Relations]* 45 (2018): 19; "Kokusei Senkyo ni okeru Nendai Betsu Tohyo-Ritsuu ni tsuite [Age-Specific Voter Turnout in National Elections]," Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, January 24, 2020. https://www.soumu.go.jp/senkyo/senkyo_s/news/sonota/nendaiбетu/.

120. Sayuri Umeda, "Japan," In *Regulation of Foreign Involvement in Elections* (Washington, DC: Law Library of Congress, 2019), 58, <https://www.loc.gov/law/help/elections/foreign-involvement/foreign-involvement-in-elections.pdf>.

121. Diamond and Schell, *China's Influence & American Interests*, 187.

122. Ming Wan, "Japan's Party Politics and China Policy: The Chinese Fishing Boat Collision Incident," *Journal of Social Science (University of Tokyo)* 63, 3-4 (2011): 99, https://jww.iss.u-tokyo.ac.jp/jss/pdf/jss630304_095110.pdf.

123. Diamond and Schell, *China's Influence & American Interests*, 187.

124. Yun Yu and Ji Young Kim, "The stability of proximity: the resilience of Sino-Japanese relations over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Dispute," *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 19, no. 2 (2019): 328, doi:10.1093/irap/lcy012.

125. Hsiao, "A Preliminary Survey of CCP Influence Operations in Japan."

126. "The 15th Joint Public Opinion Poll: Japan-China Public Opinion Survey 2019," Genron NPO; and Japan National Tourist Office, "Honichi-Gai kyakusu, Kokuseki/Tsukibetsu Honichi-gai Kyakusu (2003-nen ~ 2019-nen) [Number of Foreign Visitors to Japan, Number of foreign visitors to Japan by Nationality/Month (2003-2019)]," Japanese National

Covid-19 outbreak and recent Hong Kong protests, such public vigilance toward China's rise is likely to continue to reward political parties that prioritize Japan's national security, a defining feature of Abe's LDP.

Tightly Controlled Private Media in Japan

The flip side of a weak Chinese media presence in Japan is the extremely strong grip Japan's media has on the domestic market. Also, while China's state media advances its national interests (including good relations with Japan), Japan's media follow a profit motive and therefore cater to consumer preferences (bashing China). Thus, the information space is tight. As journalist Kenji Minemura put it, the *Asahi Shimbun* and *Yomiuri Shimbun*, akin to Japan's *New York Times* and *Wall Street Journal*, dominate the Japanese media sphere like monopolists, leaving little room for foreign influence. To be sure, as one of the most literate and media-saturated societies, Japan boasts the world's largest newspaper circulation and lowest news avoidance rate, as news consumption is considered a civic "duty."¹²⁷

The five major media conglomerates—consisting of the TV-newspaper cross-ownerships of TBS-Mainichi, TV Asahi-Asahi, NTV-Yomiuri, Fuji TV-Sankei, and TV Tokyo-Nikkei, along with public broadcaster NHK—control nearly all of the major mainstream print and broadcast media. Media political leanings are typically centrist but can vary from left-center (TV Asahi-Asahi) to conservative-nationalistic (Fuji TV-Sankei).¹²⁸ The industry's cross-ownership structure, while allowing its comparative stability, has also contributed to a dearth in the variety of views represented and has effectively prevented outside takeovers that are common in other markets.¹²⁹ Given the industry's centralized "oligopolistic" structure, as it is described in a 2019 report by Bertelsmann Stiftung, it is also comparatively resistant toward foreign ownership and influence.¹³⁰ However, Abe's drive for deregulation may change this stable situation.

While Japan is not immune to global media consumption trends, the overall shift to digital and online news has been slower than in many countries given the industry's incentives to protect traditional revenue sources.¹³¹ Most regional newspapers are still operated by their original owners and have circulation shares averaging over 50 percent of households. Newspapers in Japan do not list their shares on financial exchanges, giving them

Tourism Office, January 24, 2020, https://www.jnto.go.jp/jpn/statistics/since2003_visitor_arrivals.pdf.

127. Dentsu Media Innovation Lab, *Information Media Trends in Japan 2018* (Tokyo: Diamond, Inc., 2018), 3, https://www.dentsu.com/knowledgeanddata/publications/pdf/information_media_trends_in_japan_2018.pdf; and Nic Newman et al., *Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2019* (Oxford: Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, 2019), 26, https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2019-06/DNR_2019_FINAL_0.pdf.

128. Werner Pascha, Patrick Köllner, and Aurel Croissant, *Sustainable Governance Indicators 2019: Japan Report* (Gütersloh, Germany: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2019), 26, https://www.sgi-network.org/docs/2019/country/SGI2019_Japan.pdf.

129. Tatsunari Tsuruta, "Housou Jigyuu Kisei no Nichibei Hikaku to Nihon no Mondaiten [Comparisons of Japan and US Broadcasting Regulations and the Problems of Japan]," *Kiyo* 61 (2018): 8; and Joseph Lee, "The Current Barriers to Corporate Takeovers in Japan: Do the UK Takeover Code and the EU Takeover Directive Offer a Solution?," *European Business Organization Law Review*, November 2017, doi:10.1007/s40804-017-0091-1.

130. Koichi Iwabuchi, "To Globalize, Regionalize or Localize us, that is the Question: Japan's Response to Media Globalization," in *The New Communications Landscape*, Georgette Wang, Jan Servaes, and Anura Goonasekera, eds. (New York: Routledge, 2000), 145. One of the most prominent examples of this insularity is the public backlash that prevented media mogul Rupert Murdoch from successfully acquiring TV Asahi in the early-2000s.

131. Newman, *Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2019*, 136.

protection from external interference.¹³² Still, print revenue and circulation have been in a downward trend for nearly two decades, exacerbated by Japan's shrinking domestic population.¹³³ As online news has grown since the 2000s, Yahoo! Japan has maintained its role as the most popular online news portal and now reaches two-thirds (66 percent) of smartphone users.¹³⁴ More recently, independent online media sources have grown in prominence, including those espousing extremist right-wing views (i.e., *netto-uyo*, or the "internet neo-nationalists" phenomenon). An estimated 40 percent of the population accesses social media, and this share is projected to continue to grow.¹³⁵

Although freedom of speech and a free press are both constitutionally guaranteed, Japan has fallen from 22nd in 2012 to 66th in the 2020 World Press Freedom Index, now last among the G-7 countries.¹³⁶ The passage of a vaguely-worded, controversial state secrets law in 2013 that can send whistleblowers to jail for 10 years if they leak classified information contributed to Japan's drop in the ranking as it could be used to muzzle the press. The law also was passed to facilitate intelligence sharing between Japan and the United States on China's military assertiveness. Officials in all ministries can designate state secrets for up to 60 years in the areas of defense, diplomacy, counter-terrorism, and counter-espionage.¹³⁷ In recent years under the Abe administration, the government also has been accused of pressuring and bullying domestic press to support government positions, further narrowing the space for an already-limited press.

A reoccurring accusation is that Abe uses access to reward allies and shunning to punish enemies.¹³⁸ In 2017, the UN special rapporteur David Kaye issued a report on "worrying signals" on Japan's freedom of expression, pointing to media self-censorship, government pressure, and restrictions on information.¹³⁹ In 2018, Abe's attempt to deregulate the media sector by revising the broadcast law (of 1950), whose Article 4, chapter 2, requires political neutrality and that broadcasts "not distort the facts," was met with criticism that such a change would lead to a flood of fake news.¹⁴⁰ Paradoxically, that same broadcast law article (akin to the US Fairness Doctrine 1949-1987) has also been described as a potential government tool of censorship.¹⁴¹ In any

132. Dentsu Media Innovation Lab, *Information Media Trends in Japan 2018*, 3.

133. "Circulation and Households," Nihon Shinbun Kyokai [Japan Newspaper Publishers and Editors Association], January 12, 2020, <https://www.pressnet.or.jp/english/data/circulation/circulation01.php>.

134. Newman, *Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2019*, 18.

135. "Japan social media user penetration 2017-2023," Statista, September 24, 2019, <https://www.statista.com/statistics/553650/mobile-messaging-user-reach-japan/>.

136. "Japan," Reporters Without Borders, January 12, 2020, <https://rsf.org/en/japan>; and "World Press Freedom Index 2011/2012," Reporters Without Borders, <https://rsf.org/en/world-press-freedom-index-20112012>.

137. Linda Sieg and Kiyoshi Takenaka, "Japan enacts state secrets law despite protests," Reuters, Dec. 6, 2013, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-secrets/japan-enacts-strict-state-secrets-law-despite-protests-idUSBRE9B-50JT20131206>

138. Martin Fackler, "The Silencing of Japan's Free Press," *Foreign Policy*, May 27, 2016, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/27/the-silencing-of-japans-free-press-shinzo-abe-media/>.

139. Justin McCurry, "Japan accused of eroding press freedom by UN special rapporteur," *Guardian*, June 13, 2017, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/13/japan-accused-of-eroding-press-freedom-by-un-special-rapporteur>

140. Tomohiro Osaki, "Panel balks at proposing the killing of Japan's political fairness clause," *Japan Times*, June 4, 2018, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/06/04/national/politics-diplomacy/panel-balks-proposing-killing-japans-political-fairness-clause#.Xuz--2pKjMI>

141. "Intimidation via the Broadcast Law," Editorial, *Japan Times*, February 11, 2016, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2016/02/11/editorials/intimidation-via-broadcast-law/#.Xuz_P2pKjMI.

case, these critiques of the media space do not mean that newspapers are monoliths; left-leaning *Asahi Shimbun* regularly criticizes the Abe administration in its editorial section and has faced Abe's wrath for critical reporting on political scandals.

Another major reason for the comparative weakness of Japan's press freedoms is a press club system (*kisha kurabu*) that disincentivizes investigative journalism by the mainstream media. This has left the role of public watchdog to be filled by the tabloid magazine media (*shukanishi*), which have historically been barred from press club membership along with freelance, independent, and foreign journalists. Established in 1890 to regulate the orderly flow of information from government ministries, Japanese press clubs are unique in that the club member organizations determine membership.¹⁴²

As the highly exclusive press club memberships are limited to the five major media conglomerates plus NHK, these mainstream reporters—who already bear an obligatory pressure to maintain good relations with government officials—are often so personally close to their sources that they become compelled to ignore compromising information. If there is widespread elite capture or bribery by China of Japanese officials, the press might not be reporting it because of this cozy relationship between the government and the press. Journalist Jonathan Watts has argued that Japan's watchdog press is more like a “lapdog” since the club system rewards self-censorship.

Fellow Travelers in Japan

Due to their ties to China or ideological backgrounds, some officials and institutions in Japan are natural allies of China. Given their influential pacifist ideology, the Japanese Buddhist group Soka Gakkai and its affiliated political party Komeito have played roles in restoring and improving China-Japan relations. Despite distrust at the government level, Komeito party leader Yoshikatsu Takeiri visited China to meet Zhou Enlai in June 1971, setting the groundwork for his second visit in July 1972 soon after Kakuei Tanaka became prime minister. While Takeiri was not necessarily representing the Japanese government, notes from the Takeiri-Zhou meeting (later known as the “Takeiri Memo”) helped convince Tanaka to move forward with normalization. The meeting notes revealed that China was not seeking war reparations from Japan and that a joint statement could avoid any mention of the Japan-U.S. security alliance and the “Taiwan Clause.”¹⁴³ In 1972, Chinese and Japanese leaders also gave short shrift to the Senkaku dispute, and China displayed satisfaction with a “vague apology” about Imperial Japan's invasion.¹⁴⁴

142. Michiko Higuchi, “Nihon no ‘Kisha Kurabu Seido’ ni tsuite [About Japan's ‘Press Club System’],” *Toyo Daigaku* 37, no. 1 (1993): 221; William Kelly, Tomoko Masumoto, and Dirk Gibson, “*Kisha kurabu and koho*: Japanese media relations and public relations,” *Public Relations Review* 28, no. 3 (2002): 266.

143. Masaya Inoue, “‘Takeiri Memo’ Nicchu Kokkou Seijouka wo Susumeta Koumeitou Iinchou no Dokudan Senkou [‘Takeiri Memo’ Independent decision by Komeitou Party Leader who promoted normalization of Japan-China diplomatic relations],” *Gaikou* (foreign ministry journal) 7, https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/press/pr/gaikou/vol7/pdfs/gaikou_vol7_15.pdf; “Record of the Third Meeting Between Takeiri Yoshihikatsu and Zhou Enlai. July 29, 1972,” Wilson Center, <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/118835>; and “Shirarezaru Koumeitou Abe Seiken wo Tasuke Nankyoku to Dakai [Unknown Komei Party Helping Abe Administration for a Breakthrough],” *J.people.com.cn*, March 15, 2013, http://japanese.china.org.cn/jp/txt/2013-03/15/content_28250718_2.htm.

144. Charles Kraus, “Debating the Sino-Japanese Normalization, 1972,” Wilson Center, April 3, 2017, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/debating-the-sino-japanese-normalization-1972>.

The Komeito Party website claims that promoting the normalization of China-Japan relations has been its priority since the party's foundation in 1964.¹⁴⁵ In fact, Daisaku Ikeda, the third chairman of Soka Gakkai, gave a speech promoting China-Japan normalization in September 1968, years before the actual normalization.¹⁴⁶ Following the official 1972 normalization, Ikeda visited China in May 1974 and again in December the same year at the invitation of Zhou Enlai.¹⁴⁷ The following year, Soka University (which was established by Soka Gakkai) became Japan's first university to host Chinese exchange students through a scholarship funded by the Chinese government. According to our interviews, the CCP sees Soka Gakkai as a natural ally to influence the cabinet toward maintaining Japan's Article 9, although the CCP must keep some distance since the organization is religious.

Among those six original students was former Chinese ambassador to Japan Cheng Yonghua, who became the longest-serving ambassador at that post from 2010 to 2019.¹⁴⁸ In September 2018, the Komeito's current party leader, Natsuo Yamaguchi, visited Zhou Enlai's alma mater, Nankai University, in Tianjin to mark the 50th anniversary of Ikeda's proposal for the normalization of bilateral ties. This visit reaffirmed the Komeito's long-standing position of promoting the China-Japan friendship.¹⁴⁹ That same month, the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, which is backed by CCP, gave an award to Ikeda for his contributions to China-Japan relations.¹⁵⁰

In August 2016, when the China-Japan relationship deteriorated over the South China Sea territorial disputes, a subsidiary cable TV program aired on China's state TV network, CCTV, ran a documentary about the friendship between Zhou Enlai and Daisaku Ikeda six times.¹⁵¹ That month, Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida said Japan's ties with China were "significantly deteriorating" after several Chinese fishing boats and coast guard

145. Komeito, "Nicchu Kokkou Seijouka heno Jinryoku – Ryoukoku no Hashiwatashi yaku ni 1972 nen [Contributing to Japan-China normalization – Bridging both countries (1972)]," Komei.or.jp, <https://www.komei.or.jp/campaign/ko-me155/page/10/>.

146. "Nicchu Kokkou Seijouka Teigen (Souka Gakkai Dai 11 Kai Gakuseibu Soukai) 1968 Nen 9 Gatsu 8 Nichi [Proposal for Japan-China normalization (Soka Gakkai 11th Students Assembly) September 8th 1968]," YouTube Video, DateHanzo, July 6, 2013, 1:14:14, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mAGbG2rvUgA>.

147. Hiroko Inoue, "Shinkan Shoukai: Shu Onrai, Ikeda Taisaku to Nicchu Yuukou (Hakuteisha 2006 Nen) [New Book: Zhou Enlai, China-Japan Friendship with Taisaku Ikeda (Hakuteisha 2006)]," Soka.co.jp, https://www.soka.ac.jp/files/en/20170804_022830.pdf; and "Ikeda Taisaku Sensei no Sokuseki: Sekai Kouyuu Roku (Shu Onrai) [Footprint of Mr. Taisaku Ikeda: Global friendship (Zhou Enlai)]," Soku-net, accessed January 15, 2020, <https://www.soku-net.jp/daisaku-ikeda/koyu/zhouenlai.html>.

148. Masayuki Takada and Tamiyuki Kihara, "Chunichi Chugoku Taishi ga Rinin Aisatsu Abe Shushou to Issho ni Kaijou Iri [Farewell speech by Chinese ambassador to Japan, Entering the venue with Prime Minister Abe]," *Asahi Shimbun*, May 7, 2019, <https://www.asahi.com/articles/ASM575FF7M57UHB102Q.html>.

149. Komeito, "'Kokkou Seijouka Teigen' 50 Shuunen Aratana Nicchu no Rekishi wo Hiraku ['Proposal for diplomatic normalization' 50th anniversary, Opening up for new Japan-China history]," Komei.or.jp, September 12, 2018, <https://www.komei.or.jp/komeinews/p10527/>.

150. "Ikeda Taisaku Shi ni 'Nicchu Yuukou Koukenshou' ['China-Japan Friendship Contribution Award' to Mr. Taisaku Ikeda]," China.org.cn, September 27, 2019, http://japanese.china.org.cn/jp/txt/2018-09/27/content_64171213.htm; and Yoshihisa Komori, "Nihon deno Chugoku Touitsu Sensen Kousaku [China's United Front Work in Japan]," *Sankei Shimbun*, August 25, 2019, <https://www.sankei.com/premium/news/190825/prm1908250013-n2.html>.

151. Akio Yaita, "Chugoku Media, Ikeda Taisaku Shi to Shu Onrai no Tokuban wo Housou Kankei Shufuku he Shigunaru Okuru? [Chinese media broadcasting special program on Taisaku Ikeda and Zhou Enlai, Signaling recovery in relationship?]," *Sankei Shimbun*, August 30, 2016, <https://www.sankei.com/world/news/160830/wor1608300011-n1.html>.

vessels entered disputed waters.¹⁵² A month prior, China rejected a high-profile decision by the International Criminal Court (ICC) that ruled against Chinese claims to its rights in the South China Sea.¹⁵³

Former Japanese prime minister Yukio Hatoyama is an example of an influential Japanese elite who is in sync with many of Beijing's interests in Japan. Hatoyama has attended several events with CCP-supported groups in Japan.¹⁵⁴ During his administration, Hatoyama pursued a foreign policy that was more independent of the U.S.-Japan relationship, though this was also influenced by Ichiro Ozawa, who was known as the backroom "shadow shogun." In 2009, Hatoyama hastily arranged a meeting between then-Vice President Xi Jinping and the Japanese emperor; the meeting sparked public controversy and he was accused of "injecting politics" into the relationship.

Hatoyama has been quoted asking, "How far do we really need the U.S.-Japanese alliance?"¹⁵⁵ Such sentiments are in line with CCP aims of a Japan independent of the United States. Hatoyama has publicly apologized for the Japanese military's role in the Nanjing Massacre, a historical taboo for Japanese officials. (He also apologized to South Korea.) Economically, he supports Beijing-backed initiatives, joining the international advisory board of the Chinese-led AIIB. He has urged Japan to join the AIIB and BRI initiatives. The newspaper *Mainichi Shimbun* suggested that this placement is a way for China to urge Japan to join the Chinese-led institutions.¹⁵⁶

Although there is plenty of speculation, there is no documented evidence of wrongdoing or bribery on the part of Hatoyama (he is the rich son of another former prime minister, like most prime ministers); yet many of his positions are in line with Chinese objectives. Mike Green, of Georgetown University and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), told us that Japan's intelligence community was able to thwart an attempt by Chinese intelligence to influence Hatoyama on the design of an East Asian Community, which he proposed while in office in 2009. It is important to clarify, Hatoyama is known for being abnormal for Japanese politicians and earned the nickname "the alien." It is possible that Hatoyama is unwitting and not an example of elite capture or genuinely believes in these positions.

Japan's aid relationship with China also can be seen as an opening for Chinese influence. In addition to advocating for Xi's state visit and the BRI, LDP Secretary General Nikai has long been an advocate of foreign aid to China. Official development assistance (ODA) is defined by the OECD as "government aid that promotes and specifically targets the economic development and welfare of developing countries."¹⁵⁷ The aid relationship

152. "Japan says ties with China 'deteriorating' over disputed islands," BBC, August 9, 2016, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-37019028>.

153. "South China Sea: Tribunal backs case against China brought by Philippines," BBC, July 12, 2016, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-36771749>.

154. See Shanghai International Holding, an affiliate of the Shanghai Municipal Government, <http://www.shanghai.co.jp/en/bridge-links.html>.

155. Robin Harding, "Japan's ex-prime minister, Yukio Hatoyama, answers his critics," *Financial Times*, July 20, 2016, <https://www.ft.com/content/f0a23660-4918-11e6-b387-64ab0a67014c>.

156. "Former PM Hatoyama offered advisory role at Beijing-backed AIIB," *Mainichi Shimbun*, June 27, 2016, <https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20160627/p2a/00m/0na/001000c>.

157. "Official Development Assistance (ODA)," OECD, <https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/>

between China and Japan has been an artery of influence for nearly four decades (1979 to 2018), as money begets power and influence. The aid program peaked in 2000, the year before a 2001 embezzlement scandal at the ministry, with 214.4 billion yen in loans, but came under increased scrutiny, especially after China overtook Japan as the world's second-largest economy in 2010. The power of the foreign ministry's ODA purse had created a cadre of officials with an interest in China. Money relationships present potential for the emergence of vested interests or bribery in the country's capital; the foreign ministry set up cost-based assessments of contractors for its ODA projects after a 2009 bribery scandal was revealed in Vietnam involving a Tokyo-based company.¹⁵⁸

Within Japan's foreign ministry, the phrase "China School" is an informal term that refers to foreign ministry officials who underwent language training in China.¹⁵⁹ These officials are known for their relatively friendly attitude toward China, viewing it as a major recipient of Japanese aid and policy tutelage. According to Masayuki Masuda of Japan's National Institute for Defense Studies, an embezzlement scandal (of \$2.6 million) in the foreign ministry in 2001 precipitated the ministry's and, with it, the China School's loss of influence in foreign policymaking.¹⁶⁰ Masuda argued that when the government decided to reduce and end new low-interest loans in FY 2007 to China, ahead of the 2008 Beijing Olympics, those related foreign ministry officials lost their leverage with China. Japan's decision was a response to criticism that China was using the assistance to expand its military. As a result, the bilateral relationship became more "securitized." Japan had long viewed itself as the "lead goose" among the Asian "flying geese" economies since it became the first advanced economy in the region.

The current Japanese ambassador to China, Yutaka Yokoi, appointed in March 2016, is the first China School ambassador since Yuji Miyamoto six years earlier. The newspaper *Sankei* reported that the Japanese government has refrained from appointing China School diplomats due to objections from the LDP and the public perception that they are overly sympathetic toward China. But a more recent view is that the China School's expertise may in fact be a much-needed asset for Tokyo, given the rising uncertainty about China.¹⁶¹ The group's status is therefore ambiguous, reflecting the complicated array of views about China in Tokyo.¹⁶² This assessment is consistent with the findings from our interviews "on background" (not for attribution) with Japanese officials.

When the DPJ came to power in September 2009, the party appointed Uichiro Niwa, the former chairman of Itochu as ambassador to China. Niwa, who currently serves

development-finance-standards/official-development-assistance.htm.

158. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs website on anti-corruption measures: "Introducing Anti-Corruption Measures Related to Japanese ODA Loan Projects," MOFA, April 1, 2009, <https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/reform/anti-corrupt/measure.html>.

159. Ayako Mie, "Diplomat Yutaka Yokoi named new ambassador to China," *Japan Times*, March 25, 2016, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/03/25/national/politics-diplomacy/diplomat-yutaka-yokoi-named-new-ambassador-china/#.Xh_mEy3MzMI.

160. Katsutoshi Matsuo, "Another scandal jolts Japan," CNN, January 25, 2001, <https://edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/east/01/25/japan.scandal/>.

161. "Jiki Chugoku Taishi, Hisabisa no China School Kiyoi [Next Japanese ambassador to China, First China School in a long time]," *Sankei Shimbun*, March 13, 2016, <https://www.sankei.com/politics/news/160313/plt1603130001-n1.html>.

162. YA, "The Virtues of a Confrontational China Strategy," *The American Interest*, April 10, 2020, <https://www.the-american-interest.com/2020/04/10/the-virtues-of-a-confrontational-china-strategy/>.

as chairman of the United Front-supported Japan-China Friendship Association, was recalled to Japan in July 2012 after he apologized for criticizing Tokyo Governor Ishihara's plan to purchase the Senkaku Islands, prompting Chinese protests against Japan.¹⁶³ While Ishihara's proposal was meant to challenge the DPJ's pro-China policy, it ironically compelled then-prime minister Noda to nationalize the islands in an attempt to diffuse the situation.¹⁶⁴ On September 11, 2012, the day Japan purchased the islands, Noda appointed the UK-educated Shinichi Nishimiya as the new ambassador, but he collapsed on a street in Tokyo and died at the age of 60 just five days later.¹⁶⁵ Masato Kitera, a French specialist, was then appointed and served until the China School official Yutaka Yokoi took over in March 2016.¹⁶⁶ Following the nationalization of the Senkakus, Noda's already-low approval rating dropped sharply by 13 percentage points to 20 percent in late October 2012, and his call for snap elections ended with a major defeat to Abe's LDP in December 2012.¹⁶⁷

163. Chico Harlan, "Japan's ambassador to China returns for talks amid new row over islands," *Washington Post*, July 15, 2012, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/japans-ambassador-to-china-returns-for-talks-amid-new-island-row/2012/07/15/gJQAQ9K6IW_story.html; Justin McCurry, "Tokyo's rightwing governor plans to buy disputed Senkaku Islands," *Guardian*, April 19, 2012, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/apr/19/tokyo-governor-senkaku-islands-china>; and "Kaichou Aisatsu Kyoukai Gaiyou [Greetings from Chairman, Association Profile]," Japan-China Friendship Association, <https://www.j-cfa.com/about/>.

164. Martin Fackler, "Japan Said to Have Tentative Deal to Buy 3 Disputed Islands From Private Owners," *New York Times*, September 6, 2012, <https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/07/world/asia/japan-agrees-to-buy-islands-at-center-of-dispute-with-china.html?ref=asia>; and Jane Perlez, "China Accuses Japan of Stealing After Purchase of Group of Disputed Islands," *New York Times*, September 11, 2012, <https://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/12/world/asia/china-accuses-japan-of-stealing-disputed-islands.html>.

165. Sheila Smith, "Ambassador Shinichi Nishimiya, 1952–2012," Council on Foreign Relations, September 17, 2012, <https://www.cfr.org/blog/ambassador-shinichi-nishimiya-1952-2012>; and Paul Armstrong, "Japan's newly-appointed Chinese ambassador dies," CNN, September 17, 2012, <https://www.cnn.com/2012/09/17/world/asia/japan-china-ambassador-dead/index.html>.

166. Kyodo, "China hand Yokoi to become ambassador to China," *Japan Times*, March 14, 2016, <https://www.japan-times.co.jp/news/2016/03/14/national/politics-diplomacy/japan-may-appoint-china-school-diplomat-yokoi-next-ambassador-beijing/#.XiHdMi3MzMI>.

167. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, "Naikaku Shijiritsu 20% ni Kyuraku, Noda Seiken de Saitei, Honsha Yoron Chousa [Cabinet approval rating declined rapidly to 20%, Lowest during Noda Administration, Public opinion poll]," *Nikkei Asian Review*, October 28, 2011, https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXNASFS28017_Y2A021C1MM8000/.