company refused to avert the inconveniences and dangers that are inevitable in a strike, though it could have done so by the reasonable and fair expedient of submitting its controversy with the men to arbitration.

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The employer who refuses to arbitrate differences with his men must be presumed by public opinion to be conscious of having the weaker side of the controversy. If his business is a private one, the fact that he prefers to fall back upon the strength of his position as employer rather than the merits of his controversy as a man, is none of the public's affair. It may have its own opinion of him and there an end. But if his business is charged with public obligations in return for special privileges, the case is different. He has no right to involve the community he has contracted to serve, in the inconvenience, the disorders, and the dangerous disarrangements of a strike, merely to gratify his own pride of power. He must either be in the right and ready to prove it before arbitrators, or he must bear the odium of having wantonly caused the strike.

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That is the position of the Chicage City Railway company. As the matter now stands, public opinion must hold this corporation responsible to the public for its strike and for all that the strike has naturally involved or may involve. By refusing to arbitrate, this company has been recklessly indifferent to the rights of the public, and under no circumstances should the public ever trust it again. It should be trusted with a new franchise no more than an exposed "grafter" should be trusted with a new office. The alderman or other public official, from Mayor down, who even negotiates voluntarily with a public service corporation so indifferent to its public obligations, for an extension of its privileges, may be justly suspected of disloyalty to the public interests. Wholly irrespective of all other considerations, the action of the Chicago City Railway company with reference to arbitrating the controversy with its employes should be considered as a sufficient reason for discharging it from the public service at the earliest possible moment.

The Turner case (p. 498) is revealing the anti-anarchist law which Congress enacted last Winter as a menace to personal liberty of the most extraordinary character. The old "alien and sedition laws," which have been a hissing and a by-word for a century, were very pearls of liberty in comparison with this so-called anti-anarchist law. To doubters we commend a perusal of the procedure in the Turner case, which we quote in another column from the New York Daily News. It is doubtful if even in Turkey, much less in Russia, the material for a story so significant of absolutism could be gathered.

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But the worst is not told there. Besides what is told there and what we described last week, we find this law a complete reversal of the American theory of arrests. Except in time of war, or when the writ of habeas corpus is suspended, the executive department of the general government is supposed to have no power of arrest. Think of the anomaly of a Presidential order of arrest in time of peace! Orders of arrest are judicial writs, issued upon proof duly made, and subject to judicial investigation. But under this law the order of arrest is issued by a member of the President's cabinet. It may be issued by him against any alien who has not lived in this country more than three years. The person arrested can be immediately taken from any part of the country to Ellis Island; be there examined privately without witnesses or counsel, by three men who are appointed and can be dismissed by the cabinet officer issuing the warrant; and if two of them report to this cabinet officer that they believe the arrested man "disbelieves in all organized government," the cabinet officer can send him back to the country of his birth without allowing him to see friends or family or to settle his business affairs. From this decision there is no appeal to any court or jury. The practical result will be to put every alien who may take part in political or trade union agitation against the policy of the Administration, at the mercy of the Secretary of the Department of Commerce and Labor for three years after arrival, and open a door to blackmail by Federal officers.

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We have called this cabinet officer's order of arrest a "lettre de cachet," something the use of which helped mightily to bring on the French Revolution. Is it badly named? When the President can arbitrarily arrest and deport any alien of not more than three years' residence, seizing him anywhere in the country and depriving him of every legal right except a habeas corpus hearing before a judge whose hopes of promotion depend upon the President's good will, how long before he will be able arbitrarily to arrest citizens, and deport or incarcerate them at his own pleasure? Since Destiny began to determine Duty in this country, we have traveled far and fast toward the Gehenna of popular liberties. Each stage has made the next one easier to reach, for Gehenna lies at the bottom of a hill.

A brief and very clear statement of the present extraordinary attitude of the United States toward Panama has been made by Charles Francis Adams, the eminent publicist of Boston. We reprint it in the Miscellany department. All that Mr. Adams says is true and sound. But he needs to make a further explanation. He states that the action of our government "is avowedly exceptional—that is, something that this nation will not justify by any of the rules of law, of international usage." This implies not only that the case is admitted by

the Administration to be exceptional, but also that the Administration offers no reasons which, under international law, would justify it as an exception. But that is not the fact. The Administration does seek to justify, and it offers reasons that are plausible. What men like Mr. Adams should do is to expose the flimsiness of those reasons.

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The "avowed exception" is justified, according to the Administration, by the exceptional circumstances. As the argument runs, the obligations and rights of the United States with reference to Panama are different from those of any nation with reference to any other territory whatever; consequently, no precedent can be cited nor can this case make a precedent. It is absolutely exceptional; and not arbitrarily, but out of the peculiar circumstances.

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And what are the circumstances? Simply these. The United States are bound by treaty to preserve the peace along the Panama railroad. This peace was threatened by the seceders. If they had fought the general government of Colombia, the United States would have been obliged to interfere against them. But the general government of Colombia did not resist, and the seceding government has gained full control of Panama. This reverses the duty of the United States. If the Colombian government should now invade Panama, it would itself be the peace breaker; and against it the power of the United States government would have to be exerted in order to preserve freedom of traffic on the trans-Isthmian railway. Meanwhile, no government exists in Panama except the seceding government, and the United States has been obliged to recognize it in order to secure protection for Americans and their property. Of course this enables the United States to deal with willing Panama instead of reluctant Colombia, in the matter of the Isthmian canal; but that is only a fortunate incident. It might have been otherwise. Suppose Colombia had been willing and Panama reluctant; nevertheless the United States would have been obliged to recognize Panama in order to protect the railway.

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With any other Colombian territory that might have seceded we should have been bound by international law to withhold recognition until Colombia herself had agreed. But not so with Panama, where we are bound by treaty to protect the railway. This peculiar circumstance imposes upon us the necessity, not in defiance of international law but in harmony with it, of making an exception to international usage in the matter of recognizing the secession of Panama as an accomplished fact. The peace of the railroad is the point.

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What has Mr. Adams to say to that explanation which the Administration makes? Does it bring the "avowed exception" within the purview of international law? Is the case different from that of seceding South Carolina, because foreign nations had no railroad to protect in South Carolina and we have one to protect in seceding Panama? If so, would it make any difference if the Panama secession happens to have been organized under the inspiration and encouragement of the United States? Or would that fact also be only a fortunate incident? We trust that Mr. Adams will not continue to ignore the explanations of the Administration. He must not be allowed to evade its defense of this "avowed exception," namely, that it is exceptional in practice only, but entirely harmonious with international law in principle, under the circumstances—there being a railroad to protect.

When Henry George visited Great Britain as a lecturer for the second time, he spoke chiefly in support of the single tax programme, whereas he had emphasized on his first visit the doctrine of the abolition of land ownership. Supposing that these two ideas were essentially different, the British press congratulated Mr. George upon having receded from his former radical position! In fact he had not receded. All he had done was to emphasize method instead of principle, as the British editors would have known had they taken the pains to compare any of his speeches on his first visit with any of those on his second. A similar misunderstanding seems now to have influenced the press of New England, notably the leading papers of Boston.

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These papers have recently displayed great interest in a dispute between the president of the New England Single Tax league, Mr. C. B. Fillebrown, and some of his associates, as to the meaning of the single tax movement. Mr. Fillebrown takes the ground that the single tax movement does not contemplate the abolition of private property in land, but only the appropriation to public use of ground rent. This is really not a difference of principle but only a difference between principle and method.

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If all ground rent were taken for public use, private ownership of land would not exist. For ownership of anything implies ownership not only of the thing but of its increment of value. Consequently, to take the increment of value is to abolish ownership of the thing. But to abolish ownership of anything is by no means the same as abolishing possession of it and enjoyment of its use. Land could be possessed, used and enjoyed just as it is now, though the ground rent went not to the possessor and user but into the public treasury. Ownership would be abolished, but not possession and beneficial use. To argue that the taxation of ground rent is not inconsistent with ownership, because some ground rent is taxed now, has in it some dangerous possibilities. It might be applied as well to houses and