

and friend and companion of John Brown in the Kansas border warfare. He is a thorough democrat and has often made a wealthy patient wait while he treated a poor washer-woman.

To claim that even a slight pressure upon a nerve, or a small deviation of a vertebra from its normal position, would cause serious trouble in some other part of the body, and to say that to put the human machine in perfect order, thus allowing a free flow of blood through the body, would cure any curable disease was too ridiculous for the ordinary "regular" physician to believe. But this is the fundamental principle upon which osteopathy is founded; and when to this heretical doctrine is added the fact that osteopathy has cured many so-called "incurable" cases, we have sufficient cause for bitter opposition to the new science on the part of organized medicine. From the earliest history, opposition to new and decidedly different ideas has always been "for the protection of the dear people." It seems impossible for the majority of men and women to have any definite conception of what equal freedom means. Those in power feel that they must regulate the lives of their fellow-men or dire disaster will follow.

Dr. Booth gives a detailed account of the legislative fights for legal recognition in the various States, and they who are unacquainted with the methods employed by the "ins" to keep out the "outs" would be surprised to find that machine politicians are not alone in using every means to prevent legislation that is opposed to their interests. The statements are sustained by proof which cannot be doubted.

The book also contains a chapter on various other methods of healing, and the more than 400 pages are well worth careful perusal by all who wish to judge of a system on its merits and not on the testimony of its opponents; also by those who care to see another example of the struggle of a new and radically different idea for recognition.

Dr. Booth has done a great service in compiling this history, especially as he was able, Dr. Still and the other earliest practitioners being still with us, to give their personal experiences, an advantage which later historians will lack.

FLORENCE A. BURLEIGH.

#### EVOLUTION OR REVOLUTION.

**Evolution — Revolution; Which?**  
By H. M. Williams. The M. W. Hazen Co.

Here we have a book laying out a scheme of government with an amount of detail which indicates that the author, who evidently thinks his plan evolutionary, has no appreciation whatever of the idea of evolution as a law of growth. He approaches the subject as one of Alice's friends in Wonderland opened a conversation:

"The time has come," the Walrus said,  
"To talk of many things:

Of shoes—and shops—and sealing wax—  
Of cabbages—and kings—  
And why the sea is boiling hot  
And whether pigs have wings."

The author seems at times to analyze, but his analyses are not logical distinctions; they are arbitrary classifications. Some notion of this, and at the same time of the general character of his book, is suggested by his theory of legislative checks and balances.

He finds in society "three sources of power, muscle, brains, money"—money meaning not currency, but property—"as represented in true manhood, education, and the homes of our citizens." Therefore he would divide Congress into three houses: The Commons, to represent the muscular power, the House, to represent the brain power, and the Senate, to represent the money (or property) power. For the election of this legislative body, every man would have one vote—for representation in the lower house; every man educated up to a certain standard would have two votes—one each for representation in the lower and the middle house; every educated tax payer (paying a certain amount of taxes) would have three votes—one each for representation in all the houses; every educated woman would have one vote—for representation in the middle house; and every educated and tax-paying woman would have two the middle and the upper houses.

Though this seems rather fanciful, it is not more so than many institutions which we accept as matter of course, because we are accustomed to them; such, for instance, as hereditary legislators in Great Britain; and a large popular assembly automatically registering only the will of the speaker in the United States.

The book as a whole is given over so completely to detail without principle, that it ought to delight the heart of the publicists who while insisting upon government declare that there are no natural laws of government.

#### ETHICS OF IMPERIALISM.

**The Ethics of Imperialism: An Inquiry Whether Christian Ethics and Imperialism are Antagonistic.** By Albert R. Carman. Boston: Herbert B. Turner & Co. Price \$1.00 net.

With apologies to that hackneyed chapter on snakes in Ireland, one might say that Mr. Carman could have made his monograph on the ethics of imperialism the shortest in literature. He need have written no more than this: "There are no ethics in imperialism." Evidently he felt this himself, for while he has extended the thought over a hundred and sixty-odd most readable pages, he has really not altered it.

At times one suspects that Mr. Carman may be slyly laughing at innocent imperialistic readers who imagine that imperialism is ethical after

all and that Mr. Carman is demonstrating it.

The trend of his discussion is through that labyrinthine no-thoroughfare philosophy which so divides human motives into egoistic and altruistic as to leave no room for the profound philosophy of the golden rule, which recognizes an egoism that includes others and an altruism which includes self. Rigidly defined, altruism doubtless does lead logically to suicide; but egoism, rigidly defined, leads as certainly to murder. The equilibrium is found by whatever name we distinguish it, in loving others neither more nor less than self but equally with self.

Ignoring this equilibrium, Mr. Carman seems to find ethical elements in imperialism, the ethical elements of national self-defense. In all progress, writes Mr. Carman, there has been a preservative or defensive "fighting unit:" the individual, the family, the tribe, and now the nation; and the question on which the ethics of imperialism turns with reference to imperialistic wars is merely a question of whether "the war will strengthen the chances of the imperializing nation to survive."

To this ethical theory Mr. Carman looks for the extension of liberty. He regards liberty as a gift of egoism to which altruism has been the persistent foe; for "men who have felt it laid so heavily upon their consciences to care for the interests of others that they would resort to means to force 'good' upon others which they would not willingly endure themselves, have in many cases well-nigh murdered human liberty in their altruistic zeal for human betterment." But that observation, a most welcome one, condemns imperialism, which is now as always heretofore resorted to for precisely such "altruistic" ends. This is not the altruism of the golden rule, as Mr. Carman himself testifies when he adds: "They have done unto others what they would that these others should not do unto them; and the result has been disastrous to all concerned."

In so far as Mr. Carman seems seriously to ascribe ethics to imperialism, its ethics are those of brutishness and savagery and not of civilization. What he says in criticism of altruism is very true, as he understands altruism; but we conceive that injustice to others for one's own good is quite as reprehensible and as pregnant with ultimate disaster as injustice to others for their good.

#### MONOPOLIES PAST AND PRESENT.

**Monopolies Past and Present. An Introductory Study.** By James Edward Le Rossignol, Ph. D., professor of economics in the University of

Denver, etc. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell & Company. Price \$1.25. In embodying in a single small volume a digest of that great mass of historical information regarding monopolies, which, until he wrote, had been collected only in several special treatises, Prof. Le Rossignol has rendered a useful service. His work in this respect appears to have been done conscientiously and judiciously.

Of the general principles, however, which Prof. Le Rossignol defines, and by which he is influenced in his running comment on the historical facts he has collated, it can only be said that he has apparently been always conscientious and frequently judicious.

His contrast of monopoly and competition, as varying "in inverse ratio to each other," is excellent. So is his observation that "no monopoly is entirely free from the influence of competition, and that seldom is competition so fierce as to leave no opportunity for monopoly and monopoly profits." But his formal definition of monopoly is fatally defective.

He defines "monopoly as the control of the supply or the demand of an economic good, by one person or a combination of persons, to such an extent that that person or combination of persons is able to control the price of the economic good." This definition is fatally defective, not for what it states, but for what it omits. It fails to take into consideration a tremendous and fundamental monopoly, one which exists in favor of large numbers of persons who are not combined and between whom competition acts and reacts with great freedom, yet which is to most other persons as hard and fast and destructive as if the favored persons were in formal combination. Indeed, it might be said that they actually are combined, but automatically by community of interest, instead of agreement.

We should conclude that Prof. Le Rossignol intended to include such persons inferentially in his definition, were it not that the rest of his book forbids this conclusion. At page 14, for instance, in referring to the rise of land values near growing cities, he says: "This is due to the increased utility of the land, and to the consequent eagerness of the people to buy it; the owners do not possess or exercise any control over the price as long as they compete with one another in the sale of their lands." But what about persons who, wishing to use the land productively, are eager to buy? Aren't they victims of monopoly in consequence of laws allowing the appropriation by a few, without appropriate and full use, of all this land of increasing utility? It is thus made so scarce in the market that its value keeps constantly ahead of its utility. Aren't those eager buyers, then, as truly and almost as

abstractly, victims of monopoly, though the owners compete among themselves, as they would be if the owners were formally combined?

Because he ignores, or, as appears at page 15, unconsciously rejects this insidious and fundamental form of monopoly from his definition, Prof. Le Rossignol falls into such errors as suggesting that the power of the Standard Oil company and other great trusts resides in the magnitude of their produced property (capital), instead of in the effect of their monopoly of tactical localities and privileges.

A collateral but much less important error of the book consists in confusing patents for inventions with copyrights of books. Patents operate to create monopolies of the essential ideas of inventions, but copyrights do not create monopolies of the essential ideas of books. All that is monopolized by a copyright is the author's own collocation of words, everybody being free to adopt and utilize his ideas in their own verbal collocations. Not so with patents. They, like grants of ownership in the earth, create monopolies of the laws and forces of nature. It may be that neither patents nor copyrights should be granted, or that it is proper to grant both. This question we do not now discuss. Our point is that economists should avoid confusing two things so essentially different economically, even if lawyers do see a resemblance in statutory form. Economics and statutes are in different categories.

#### CIVICS.

**Advanced Civics: The Spirit, the Form, and the Functions of the American Government.** By S. E. Forman, Ph. D. New York: The Century Co.

Dr. Forman's book is not only a political text book of a high order for school use, but it is a work that would elevate the morality and clarify the intelligence of our citizenship if it were in general and common use.

The author explains in his preface that he has constantly "kept in mind the truth that instruction in civics should have for its highest aim the indoctrination of the learner in sound notions of political morality." In trying to make his book realize that purpose he has for the most part succeeded.

His chapter on "Popular Government," for instance, is in this respect all that could be desired. "We are accustomed," he writes, "to associate the idea of tyranny with kings, but what is tyranny? It is an exercise of power without regard to justice." For this reason he holds that in popular government a majority may tyrannize over a minority; and so he urges majorities in popular governments to avoid the danger of tyranny, by remembering

"justice and right" which "are not always identical with the popular will." And here he quotes approvingly from another writer, who says: "To say that the will of the majority makes a thing right or wrong is a palpable absurdity; right and wrong are what they are by their own nature."

How thoroughly sound that idea of political morality is; and how singular that the author who adopts it on page 14, should so completely lose sight of it on pages 102 and 105 as to say this:

The suffrage, or the right of voting, is sometimes regarded as a natural right, as a right inherent in citizenship. Men say that you might as well deny the right of acquiring property or of defending one's person from attack, as to deny the right of suffrage. This view is justified neither by the facts of history nor by the present policy of the government.

If "right and wrong are what they are by their own nature," how can "the facts of history" and "the present policy of the government" prove that the suffrage is not "a natural right?"

But this is only one important defect in a book which on the whole well represents a reviving spirit of natural righteousness in social relationships. Another defect of importance is the misinterpretation on page 269 of Adam Smith's first principle of taxation as equality in proportion to abilities. Smith did use the phrase "in proportion to abilities," but he so qualified it as to show that what he referred to was income derived through the aid of government, which is a very different thing from income regardless of governmental aid in its acquisition.

Quite exceptional is the author's statement of the character of the "single tax." Although he describes it as a tax "on land," which to many minds suggests an area tax instead of an ad valorem tax, the idea that this tax would be "in proportion to value" is brought out clearly enough. Brief though the explanation is, it gives a substantially accurate statement of the fundamental principle.

#### OUR PHILIPPINE PROBLEM.

**Our Philippine Problem. A Study of American Colonial Policy.** By Henry Parker Willis, Ph. D., professor of economics and politics in Washington and Lee University. New York: Henry Holt & Company. Price, \$1.50 net. Sold by The Public Publishing Co., Chicago.

"The Philippine problem is approaching—indeed has even now arrived at—a point where definite action looking to the future is essential." It is under this conviction that Henry Parker Willis reviews our experience as a nation in governing the Philippines, and suggests the main elements of the problem. He has qualified himself especially for his task by extensive travel in the islands, careful inquiries of persons most directly re-