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David Hume and international political theory: a reappraisal

EDWIN VAN DE HAAR*

Abstract. David Hume's ideas on international relations are different than most international relations academics suppose. Close scrutiny of Hume's views on the nation, international society, war, balance of power, empire and trade reveals the need to reassess his place within international political theory. Taking an English School perspective, the analysis also shows the possible benefits for IR theorists within this tradition to focus on Scottish Enlightenment philosophy, which will also strengthen the position of the pluralist perspective within international society.

Introduction

Nowadays, David Hume (1711–1776) is most famous for his philosophical work, while his contemporaries were far more interested in his political views. Perhaps that is one of the reasons why Hume's ideas on international political issues are often overlooked, or misconceived. Although he never wrote a book on international relations (IR), Hume refers to international affairs in most of his works. His political writings comprise the *Essays* and *The History of England*, which are reactions to contemporary debates and reflections on topical issues, but also attempts to empirically justify his philosophical views.¹ His ideas on politics and international relations are integral to his philosophy and should also be understood within that broader framework.

Hume was a practitioner of international relations, in various capacities, throughout his life. He acquired his earliest diplomatic and military experiences as an assistant to General St. Clair, when he dealt with the intelligence regarding the proposed military conquest of Canada in 1746. After a change of orders, this expedition actually turned into a mission in Western France. Two years later he joined the general on a secret mission to Vienna and Turin.² In the mid-1760s, Hume worked at the British Embassy in Paris, first as a personal secretary to the

* I would like to thank Razeen Sally, Frank van Dun, Nico Roos, Christward Dieterman, Anita Conijn and the two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. Of course, all remaining errors are mine.

¹ T. J. Schlereth, *The Cosmopolitan Ideal in Enlightenment Thought. Its Form and Function in the Ideas of Franklin, Hume and Voltaire, 1694–1790* (Notre Dame, NC and London: The University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), p. 108.

² R. Klibansky and E. C. Mossner, 'Editors Introduction', in *New Letters of David Hume* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954), p. xxvii.

ambassador, later as secretary to the embassy and *chargé d'affaires*. He also served as an Undersecretary of State, Northern Department, from February 1767 to January 1768. Most of his writings were published before he gained his main diplomatic experience in Paris, so it is hard to judge how these practical experiences fed into his theoretical thought.³ Nevertheless, it is clear that Hume had a great interest in international politics.

David Hume is one of the most famous authors of the Scottish Enlightenment. But, as Keene rightly notices, most IR scholars hardly ever get beyond the writings of Kant and Rousseau when discussing Enlightenment thought. This has led to the view that this period is the birthplace of cosmopolitanism, but that does not do justice to the Scottish philosophers, and certainly not to Hume.⁴ Certainly, he fully enjoyed the international character of the intellectual climate of his age⁵ and not only influenced his British contemporaries, but also developments in France⁶ and, to a lesser extent, in America. His correspondence covers influential people from several other nations as well. However, it will be shown that all these international personal contacts did not turn Hume into a political cosmopolitan.

The main purpose of this article is to present a full account of Hume's thought on international relations, within an IR theory framework. As such the article is 'more concerned with the historical than with the contemporary, with the normative than with the scientific, with the philosophical than with the methodological, with principles than policy', as Hedley Bull famously characterised the work of Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight,⁷ two of the founding theorists of the English School in IR theory. The English School perspective, with its well-established taxonomy and methodology, is specifically suitable for the present analysis, as it offers a sufficiently broad framework of reference by its use of three traditions in IR theory. The use of traditions is especially useful as a methodological aid. Comparing Hume's thought and the three traditions enables a better understanding of his international thought, while also detecting the 'internal debate between the traditions' in his thinking.⁸ So, the traditions are primarily useful organising devices, rather than being 'seen as three railroad tracks running parallel into infinity'.⁹

Hume's international thought will be compared with the three main traditions¹⁰ of English School theory: Realism, Rationalism and Revolutionism, with their respective 'flag-ship thinkers' Hobbes, Grotius and Kant. In the contemporary debate, the

³ For a detailed overview and positive judgement of his diplomatic efforts, see E. C. Mossner, *The Life of David Hume* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. 489, 533–56.

⁴ Edward Keene, *International Political Thought: A Historical Introduction* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005), pp. 135–7.

⁵ D. Forbes, *Hume's Philosophical Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 140.

⁶ L. L. Bongie, *David Hume: Prophet of the Counter-Revolution* (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 2000).

⁷ Hedley Bull, 'Introduction: Martin Wight and the Study of International Relations', in Martin Wight, *Systems of States*, ed. Hedley Bull (Leicester: Leicester University Press in association with the London School of Economics and Political Science, 1977), p. 1.

⁸ Ian Clark, 'Traditions of Thought and Classical Theories of International Relations', and Ian Clark and Iver B. Neumann, 'Conclusion', both in Clark and Neumann (eds.), *Classical Theories of International Relations* (Houndmills and London: Macmillan Press, 1996), pp. 1–19, 256–62.

⁹ M. Wight, *International Theory: The Three Traditions*, eds. Gabriele Wight and Brian Porter (London: Leicester University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1991), p. 260.

¹⁰ For a critical assessment of the use of traditions, see Renée Jeffery, 'Tradition as Invention: The "Traditions Tradition" and the History of Ideas in International Relations', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 34 (2005), pp. 57–84.

terms international system, international society and world society are often used to label the traditions.¹¹

Put very briefly, realism views international politics as a continuous state of war. No sovereign state recognises a higher power and therefore finds itself in an anarchical situation, characterised by a fundamental security problem. This makes international relations a zero-sum game: the interests of one state exclude the interests of any other state and there is no lasting place for moral concerns or international legal arrangements. Revolutionism is the universalist tradition, which has the accomplishment of the international community of humankind as its central goal. A cosmopolitan society has to replace the system of states and is indeed the highest moral goal in international relations.

In the English School's interpretation, rationalism is the internationalist tradition, which describes international affairs in terms of a society of states, with common rules and institutions. *Contra* realism, it holds that states are not engaged in a continuous struggle, rules do apply in IR. Contrary to the Kantian tradition, the Grotians contend that sovereign states will remain the most important actors in the international arena.¹² In the Grotian view, society is based on natural law. War is considered a necessary evil, an exception to the rule of peace, although sometimes instrumental for attaining international justice in anarchical international circumstances. There is a distinction between just and unjust wars. The balance of power mechanism is useful and justified to keep order in the international society.¹³ Although associated with the international legal tradition, the rationalists do not claim that international law is the solution to all problems in world politics. As Wight points out, even Grotius himself had sceptical expectations about the effect of international law on daily political practice.¹⁴

Of course, it would be teleological to claim that Hume was aware of writing in any of these IR traditions. But, as shall hopefully become clear, his international relations do relate to one of the traditions, yet not one he is most commonly associated with.

The article commences with Hume's ideas on the nation, the prime international actor, followed by his ideas on a range of international relations topics. In the final section, it will be argued that there is need for a reappraisal of Hume's place within international political thought, and that his ideas point to possibilities for further study within English School theory in general.

The nation as starting point

Hume's international politics commences with individuals forming a society, which is preserved on the basis of sympathy, or the affinity between its members. In political terms a society is called a nation, a country or a state, Hume is not very strict in the

¹¹ Barry Buzan, 'The English School: An Underexploited Resource in IR', *Review of International Studies*, 27 (2001), pp. 474–6.

¹² Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, 2nd edn. (Houndmills and London: Macmillan, 1995), pp. 23–6.

¹³ Wight, 'Three Traditions', pp. 39, 206, 165–6.

¹⁴ M. Wight, *Four Seminal Thinkers in International Theory*, eds. Gabriele Wight and Brian Porter (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 51.

use of these terms. The government should be seen as the steering body of the state.¹⁵ The state is a most useful intermediary in the international arena,¹⁶ and in times of conflict, society's survival even depends on a government strong enough to force all capable individuals to join in the nation's defence.¹⁷

The nation raises feelings or passions that originate in human emotion. An individual might experience negative passions, such as the feeling of humility,¹⁸ for instance when a war is lost. However, Hume puts more emphasis on the several positive emotions the nation stimulates, summarised as 'the passion of national pride'. National pride is caused by direct and indirect positive experiences.¹⁹ For example, the beauty of the landscape is a direct source, while indirect experiences come through the pleasures of the senses, like the goodness of nation's produce, or the pleasure humans get from the qualities of the people they are related to.²⁰ Among the other indirect sources are the nation's economic well-being,²¹ or the prevailing intellectual climate, which might positively influence the development of the science of man and human nature,²² a core concern for Hume and other Enlightenment thinkers.

Hume observes that there are few men to which 'their [. . .] country is in any period of time entirely indifferent'.²³ Once, he even asserted that he would 'joyfully spill a drop of ink or blood, in the cause of my country'.²⁴ Feelings for the nation are part of the individual self. Just as one is born into a family, one is also born into a nation.²⁵ Hume takes these feelings seriously in an empirical way, as important elements of human nature and drivers of human conduct. On the contrary, it is impossible for anybody to develop a real passion for a foreign country, as there is simply a lack of immediate cause.²⁶ Or, as Hume puts it when discussing the origin of natural virtues and vices:

We sympathise more with persons contiguous to us than with persons remote from us; with our acquaintances, than with strangers; with our countrymen than with foreigners. But notwithstanding this variation in our sympathy, we give the same approbation to the same moral qualities in China as in England.²⁷

Yet, at the same time, it is clear that 'your country engages you only so far it has a connexion with yourself',²⁸ and Hume notes that scholars who write with a patriotic

¹⁵ D. C. Ainslie, 'The Problem of National Self in Hume's Theory of Justice', *Hume Studies*, XXI (1995), pp. 289–94.

¹⁶ Schlereth, 'The Cosmopolitan Ideal', pp. 104–5.

¹⁷ R. J. Glossop, 'Hume and the Future of the Society of Nations', *Hume Studies*, X (1984), p. 54; Robert S. Hill, 'David Hume', in Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey (eds.), *History of Political Philosophy*, 3rd edn. (Chicago, IL and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1987), pp. 550–1.

¹⁸ David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature*, eds. David Fate Norton and Mary J. Norton (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 183.

¹⁹ Hume, 'Treatise', pp. 188–9.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 200.

²¹ David Hume, *Essays: Moral, Political and Literary*, ed. Eugene F. Miller (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1987), p. 288.

²² Hume, 'Treatise', p. 5.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 79.

²⁴ David Hume, *The Letters of David Hume*, ed. J. Y. T. Greig (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1932), letter 69a.

²⁵ Ainslie, 'Problem of National Self', p. 302.

²⁶ Hume, 'Treatise', p. 218.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 371. This view is very similar to Adam Smith's thoughts on this matter.

²⁸ Hume, 'Essays', p. 85.

heart are hardly ever sincere. Also, references to 'the public good' are all too often used by rulers who solely defend their own narrow interests.²⁹ Despite the important place he reserves for the nation in the individuals' life, Hume does not develop a 'nationalist' philosophy, as some liberals would in the nineteenth century.³⁰ He tends to take the world as it is and even refrains from endorsing the dissolution of the English–Scottish Union of 1707, although he considers it a failure.³¹

Differences between nations

In the eighteenth century there was a lively and esteemed debate on national characters. The major issues were the attempts to reconcile a belief in universal human nature with differences in national characters, and the explanation of those differences. Hayman notes that most participants in the debate did not get beyond generalisations and speculations. However, like for example Montesquieu, Hume has a different approach to the subject.³²

He begins his essay *Of National Characters* with the statement that only 'the vulgar take all national characters to the extremes'.³³ The national character is one of the individual's many characters,³⁴ and is not just a result of physical circumstance, as many of his contemporaries hold. In general, the national character develops through close human ties, communications, a shared language and the existence of geographical borders.³⁵ It is the link between generations in a society, constituted by fundamental moral and political convictions, such as a common set of institutions and moral beliefs, like virtue and obligation. National characters define the ties between the minds of individuals and the particular society to which they belong.³⁶ Different national characters call for different kinds of governments, which implies that it is not possible for one state, or government, to rule the whole world.³⁷ Hume regards the development of a national character as one of the social phenomena that are acts of 'spontaneous order', the unintended, not deliberately designed, effects of human order.³⁸

The differences between nations have real consequences in daily life, but they must not lead to a state's international isolation. Hume's basic outlook is internationalist, he values international contacts between individuals and groups of people. For example, when he describes the earliest contacts between the English and the Danes he points at the great advantages of interaction with foreigners, especially for

²⁹ J. B. Stewart, *Opinion and Reform in Hume's Political Philosophy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 312.

³⁰ Ainslie, 'Problem of National Self', pp. 305–7.

³¹ J. G. A. Pocock, *Virtue, Commerce and History: Essays on Political Thought and History, Chiefly in the Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 138.

³² J. G. Hayman, 'Notions on National Characters in the Eighteenth Century', *Huntington Library Quarterly*, 35 (1971), pp. 13–14.

³³ Hume, 'Essays', p. 197.

³⁴ Ainslie, 'Problem of National Self', pp. 295–6.

³⁵ Hume, 'Essays', pp. 197–215.

³⁶ F. G. Whelan, *Order and Artifice in Hume's Political Philosophy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 293.

³⁷ Stewart, 'Opinion and Reform', p. 311.

³⁸ Knud Haakonssen, *The Science of a Legislator: The Natural Jurisprudence of David Hume and Adam Smith* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 21.

islanders as it enlarges their views and cures them of the illiberal prejudices and rustic manners to which they are subject. Comparable advantages are related to the Saxon's conquest of Britain.³⁹ Also, one of Hume's major views is that the greatness of the state and the happiness of its subjects are strongly related to free international commerce,⁴⁰ which means mercantilist policies such as export controls are contrary to a nation's interest.⁴¹ In general, Hume maintains that while international order can be established within a world of states, this ultimately depends on their mutual cooperation.⁴² Individuals face a world comprised of nations and have strong feelings for their own country, but there is no point in hiding behind the national border.

Hume and international relations

We now turn to the full range of Hume's views on international relations. Several publications cover specific parts of his international politics, however the aim of this part of the article is to provide one of the first comprehensive overviews, to enable further analysis from an IR theory perspective.⁴³

International society

In the international system, sovereign states are the central actors, which directly follows from the existence of different political societies.⁴⁴ Neighbouring countries have the duty to maintain good relations, 'suitable to the nature of that commerce, which they carry on with each other'. Like individuals, states need mutual assistance.⁴⁵

A ruler is free to mind his own affairs, without another sovereign having the right to interfere, even when the latter does not approve of the particular conduct of the first.⁴⁶ As we shall see below, the balance of power mechanism also 'helps' countries to respect their borders.⁴⁷ Since states are collections of individuals, with a natural tendency to quarrel and fight, human selfishness and ambition remain perpetual sources of war and discord.⁴⁸ Therefore, the public good in foreign politics often depends on accidents, chances and the 'caprices of a few persons'.⁴⁹

³⁹ David Hume, *The History of England: From the Invasion of Julius Caesar to the Revolution in 1688. In Six Volumes*, ed. William B. Todd (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1983), vol. 1, pp. 103, 161.

⁴⁰ Hume, 'Essays', pp. 255, 260.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 308.

⁴² Frederick G. Whelan, *Hume and Machiavelli: Political Realism and Liberal Thought* (Lanham, MD and Oxford: Lexington Books, 2004), pp. 224–5.

⁴³ Whelan's recent book (see the previous note) comes close to a full overview, but does not cover all aspects of Hume's international relations.

⁴⁴ David Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 99.

⁴⁵ Hume, 'Treatise', p. 362, Glossop, 'Future', p. 51.

⁴⁶ Hume, 'History', vol. 4, p. 159.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, vol. 3, pp. 25, 88.

⁴⁸ Hume, 'Treatise', p. 362.

⁴⁹ Hume, 'Essays', p. 255.

Nevertheless, people are not blind to the advantages of certain political arrangements. Hence, Hume's conviction that an international society of nations exists, characterised by cooperation, international rules, diplomatic ties, and so forth. The relations between nations are regulated by the laws of nations. The most important rules are the sacredness of the persons of ambassadors, the principle of the declaration of war, the prohibition of the use of poisoned arms and the obligation to humanely treat prisoners of war.⁵⁰

Within the society of nations, the idea of international justice is of great importance, according to Hume. The laws of nations are additions to the laws of nature. The latter are 'the three fundamental rules of justice: the stability of possession, its transference by consent and the performance of promises'. These are duties of princes and subjects alike. The basic interests of men do not change in the international realm, so without respect for property rights, war is the norm. Where property is not transferred in agreement, there can be no commerce, and if promises are not kept, there can be no alliances or leagues. The laws of nature have the same advantages in national and international relations. However, there is a difference between the two realms. In international relations, the natural obligation to justice is not as strong as among individuals in a domestic situation. The intercourse between kingdoms is in itself less advantageous than the intercourse among individuals within national society. Without the latter people are not able to subsist, while it is possible to live without being engaged in international relations, Hume thinks. In international affairs, the moral obligations between the different rulers are less stringent, 'there is a systems of morals calculated for princes, much more free than which ought to govern private persons'. This does not mean that princes can forgo treaties, or that public duties and obligations have less force. 'The morality of the princes has the same extent, yet it has not the same force as that of private persons, and may lawfully be transgressed from a more trivial motive'. There are no fixed rules for such cases: 'the practise of the world goes farther in teaching us the degrees of our duty, than the most subtle philosophy, which was ever yet invented'. Natural and civil justice arise from human conventions and depend on the interest people see in preserving peace and order. The smaller the interest, the easier a transgression of justice in international relations is accepted.⁵¹

There are limits to the moral obligation for states to maintain international justice:

all politicians will allow and most philosophers, that reasons of state may in particular emergencies dispense with the rules of justice, and invalidate any treaty or alliance, where the strict observance of it would be prejudicial, in a considerable degree, to either of the contracted parties⁵²

It has to be noted that this quote also shows that the rules of justice can only be disregarded in emergency situations. Hume did not propagate a 'realist' disregard or denial of international justice as such. His emphasis is on the importance of international law, although he recognises the looser norms that apply in the international situation. International law has less force than national law, but should

⁵⁰ Hume, 'Principles of Morals', p. 99.

⁵¹ Hume, 'Treatise', pp. 362–4.

⁵² Hume, 'Principles of Morals', p. 100.

normally be respected. As Harrison points out, Hume maintains that the moral obligation to obey the laws of nations is founded on the utilitarian idea that every nation and its members gain benefit from the existence of those laws.⁵³ At the same time, it is clear Hume does not expect the evolution of a stable international system of justice, as he takes the outbreak of war more or less for granted.⁵⁴

It seems likely that Hume's appraisal of international law and the society of nations developed from his early youth. At Edinburgh University, in his early teens, he was exposed to the works of Grotius,⁵⁵ but he also read Pufendorf and other natural law writers. He clearly draws on their thought in developing his own political theory.⁵⁶ Later in life, in conversations with the ministers of Louis XV, Hume appealed 'aux droits des gens et à ceux de l'humanité',⁵⁷ which also shows his appreciation of this central idea in the natural law tradition. Property rights and rules of international law and justice are among the most important issues the natural law writers discuss. They attempt to develop universal rules of arbitration for conflicting interests in domestic and international relations. Hume also believes in a universal human nature and in universal moral norms that support international society. He differs from them in concentrating on descriptive accounts of morality, while they focus on prescription.⁵⁸ Also, Hume famously rejects metaphysical elements in political thought, preferring a strictly empirical approach. In his view, the preservation of international society ultimately depends on the recognition of the value of the law of nations,⁵⁹ which again points at his utilitarian views on the survival of political institutions.

Hume attempts to reconcile the tensions between international cooperation and international aggression, which suits a man who considered himself a moderate, and moderation an extremely important value, in a contemporary political world often characterised by dichotomy,⁶⁰ most notably between Whigs and Tories.⁶¹

International balance of power

Hume's best-known essay on international relations is *On the Balance of Power*, where he discusses the Ancient Greek origins of the balance of power mechanism.

⁵³ J. Harrison, *Hume's Theory of Justice* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), p. 233.

⁵⁴ J. L. Mackie, *Hume's Moral Theory* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980), pp. 113–15.

⁵⁵ Mossner, 'Life', pp. 41–2.

⁵⁶ Fania Oz-Salzberger, 'The Political Theory of the Scottish Enlightenment', in Alexander Broadie (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to the Scottish Enlightenment* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 169.

⁵⁷ Klibansky and Mossner, 'Editors Introduction', pp. xxvii–xxviii.

⁵⁸ T. L. Beauchamp, 'Editors Introduction', in David Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 18–19.

⁵⁹ Glossop, 'Future of the Society of Nations', pp. 46–53.

⁶⁰ Robert A. Manzer, 'A Science of Politics: Hume, The Federalist, and the Politics of Constitutional Attachment', *American Journal of Political Science*, 45 (2001), p. 512.

⁶¹ J. T. King, 'The Virtue of Political Skepticism', *Reason Papers*, 15 (1990), pp. 24–46. The question whether Hume was a Tory or a Whig has been subject of continued debate, but many commentators regard him as a Whig. See for example Eugene Miller, 'David Hume: Tory or Whig?', *New Individualist Review*, 1 (1961), pp. 19–27. Reprinted by Liberty Fund (1981); James Conniff, 'Hume on Political Parties: The Case for Hume as a Whig', *Eighteenth Century Studies*, 12 (1978–1979), pp. 150–73.

Despite some differences with the situation of eighteenth century Europe, he believes the basic idea to be identical. The central aim is to prevent the domination of one big power, so that it cannot execute its own plans without opposition. Prevailing powers can be sure to meet a coalition against them, often composed of their former friends and allies.⁶² The balance of power system is not magical, but is based on common sense and obvious reasoning, like for example the British efforts to balance France. However, Hume is concerned that the wars with France, that sometimes follow from the balancing act, start with justice and even necessity, but are pushed too far, mainly due to obstinacy and passion. For example, the peace of Ryswick was not concluded until 1697, though it was offered as early as 1692, mostly due to the imprudent behaviour of the British.⁶³

Hume praises the effects of the balance of power system for both states and their citizens. It is a secret in politics, that adds to a better management of foreign affairs.⁶⁴ Surely, the system is fragile and prone to set in motion a chain reaction of possibly negative events. Nevertheless, the balance of power mechanism also prevents violent revolutions and conquests of particular states.⁶⁵ The defence of large trading nations like England and the Dutch Republic is not a question of conquest and empire, but of maintaining a balance of power, through alliances and treaties, and the protection of trading routes.⁶⁶ Too much focus on domestic affairs leads to negligence in balancing upcoming powers,⁶⁷ which Hume takes as a serious neglect by a statesman. When the balance of power functions well, it keeps powerful empires from the abuse of their positions, which, ultimately, would endanger the freedom of individual citizens.⁶⁸

Although the mechanism is much debated by Hume and his contemporaries, it is an exaggeration to claim that that the eighteenth century is also a great example of balance of power practice.⁶⁹ Even so, it is plainly mistaken to hold that Hume is 'among the philosophers that opposed the policy of political-military alliances commonly known as the balance of power'.⁷⁰ Equally wrong are those scholars who consider Hume's defence of the balance of power as an attempt to promote British national interest and its rule of the world.⁷¹ It is more likely that Hume supports the balance of power to justify the (Whig) foreign policy of his days, which he sees as 'guarding the general liberties of Europe'.⁷²

⁶² Hume, 'Essays', p. 337.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, pp. 323–39.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 93.

⁶⁵ Hume, 'History', vol. 1, p. 296.

⁶⁶ K. Haakonssen, 'Introduction', in David Hume, *Political Essays* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. xxii.

⁶⁷ Hume, 'Essays', p. 507.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 337.

⁶⁹ J. Black, 'The Theory of Balance of Power in the First Half of the Eighteenth Century', *Review of International Studies*, 9 (1983), pp. 55–61; J. R. Sofka, 'The Eighteenth Century International System: Parity or Primacy?', *Review of International Studies*, 27 (2001), pp. 147–53.

⁷⁰ Schlereth, 'The Cosmopolitan Ideal', p. 113.

⁷¹ F. Linares, *Das Politischen Denken von David Hume* (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1984), pp. 81–2.

⁷² F. G. Whelan, 'Robertson, Hume and the Balance of Power', *Hume Studies*, XXI (1995), pp. 316–17.

War

Hume is uneasy about war, although he considers it one of the main institutions of international relations. In contrast to, for example, Machiavelli, he never fully endorses warfare as an instrument of conquest or power politics.⁷³ Hume simply accepts the inevitability of war, not least to keep the balance of power.⁷⁴ War can even be justified, for example when a nation threatens the freedom of other states.⁷⁵

The concept of justice is helpful when judging (possible) war efforts. Like the international jurists, Hume thinks wars need to be just.⁷⁶ However, a degree of justice is not the only Humean criterion to accept a war. Commenting on the possible war of the British against Spain and France over the Falkland Islands, in early 1771, Hume also looks into the reasonableness and the sensibility of war, while endorsing the virtue of prudence. Wars commence between two nations, but soon drag in their neighbours, therefore prudent leaders do not lightly risk a war.⁷⁷ Any war for frivolous causes, without a relation with serious spirits or ambitions, must be plainly refuted.⁷⁸

Hume puts emphasis on the negative sides of war, which are political, legal, and economical. 'The rage and violence of public war [. . .] is a suspension of justice among the warring parties'. Nations in war no longer consider the principle of justice advantageous. Instead, the laws of war prevail. Any enemy action, however bloody and pernicious, must be countered in a similar way. In those situations, justice literally becomes useless.⁷⁹ Wars disturb free commerce and create lazy labourers, because they are coerced to produce, instead of relying on their own creativity and the demand of the market. Obviously, wars are expensive, they require increases in the national debt of the warring parties, a development Hume strongly opposes.⁸⁰ A sovereign who raises an army imposes a tax on all people,⁸¹ and also diminishes the happiness of his subjects.⁸² It is clear that war limits the freedom of the individual in many different ways, which is one of the major Humean concerns.

War might be a part of the national psyche, though. If men are regularly obliged to expose themselves to the greatest dangers in order to defend their country, all ordinary men become soldiers. Whether this is experienced as a heavy tax or a light burden depends on the nation concerned. It is the latter for people who are addicted to arms, fight for honour and revenge, and are not acquainted with gain, industry and pleasure.⁸³ A strong patriotic public spirit may lead to continuous war, which also explains why Hume is hesitant to fully endorse the individual's national feelings.

According to Danford, Hume believes that the rise of civilisation, which depends on the degree of freedom and the protection of property, eventually decreases the

⁷³ Whelan, 'Hume and Machiavelli', pp. 210–11.

⁷⁴ Whelan, 'Balance of Power', p. 318.

⁷⁵ Hume, 'Essays', p. 337.

⁷⁶ Whelan, 'Hume and Machiavelli', p. 211.

⁷⁷ Hume, 'Letters', letter 453.

⁷⁸ Hume, 'New Letters', letter 127.

⁷⁹ Hume, 'Principles of Morals', p. 86.

⁸⁰ J. B. Stewart, *The Moral and Political Philosophy of David Hume* (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1963), p. 194.

⁸¹ Hume, 'Essays', pp. 261–2.

⁸² *Ibid.*, pp. 257–9.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 259.

desire for war.⁸⁴ But that is unlikely, as Hume's view of human nature makes it impossible to expect violent conflict to completely disappear. Man is a slave to his passions and needs a government to enforce the rules to keep him within society's bounds. Often, a man is 'seduced from the more important, but the more distant interest, by the allurements of the present, though very often, very frivolous temptations'.⁸⁵ For Hume, war is an inevitable feature of human life, no matter how far civilisation progresses.

Empire

Although Hume died before the American colonies declared independence, he did express his views on questions of empire and imperialism. During most of his life, Hume seems to be morally neutral about the European conquests, like many of his contemporaries. Instead, he underlines the enormous importance of the colonies to the world – and Europe in particular. Not so much for the increased availability of precious metal, because the conquest of the West Indies created a surge in the availability of gold and silver in England, which only resulted in inflation. Far more positive effects are the advancements of knowledge, the arts and the industries,⁸⁶ the increased levels of commerce, and some social benefits, like the fact that men of inferior rank get the chance to raise a fortune, which would otherwise be untenable. Generally, in England, not only the elites, but also the common people gain from the empire. If the upper class gets wealthier, they have less reason to repress the people, Hume reasons.⁸⁷

From the mid-1760s onwards, the debate on the American colonies gained more public prominence. Hume considers their independence both inevitable and desirable.⁸⁸ In 1775, he calls himself 'an American in my principles', and wishes that the British would leave the Americans to govern or misgovern themselves as they think proper. There is no use in attempting to govern a place so far away, let alone trying to force the American colonists to obey the rules of the English king.⁸⁹ He writes there should be no fear for the independence of the American colonies. Great economic or 'geopolitical' losses are not to be expected, apart from some negative influence on navigation and general commerce.⁹⁰ The only serious detriment is a possible decline in reputation and authority of the English government,⁹¹ which is inevitable because a war against the Americans will normally not be won.⁹²

⁸⁴ J. D. Danford, 'Hume's History and the Parameters of Economic Development', in D. W. Livingstone (ed.), *Liberty in Hume's History of England* (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990), pp. 161–8.

⁸⁵ Hume, 'Essays', p. 38.

⁸⁶ Hume, 'History', vol. 5, p. 39.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, vol. 3, pp. 80–1.

⁸⁸ Stewart, 'Opinion and Reform', p. 308; Shirley Robin Letwin, *The Pursuit of Certainty: David Hume, Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, Beatrice Webb* (Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund, 1998), p. 116.

⁸⁹ Hume, 'Letters', letter 510; Mossner, 'Life', pp. 553–4.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, letter 514.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, letter 511.

⁹² *Ibid.*, letter 512.

According to Pocock, there are also domestic political considerations. Hume is convinced that the empire is a burden, not least financially. He links the expansion of debt needed to keep the empire with political factions, barbarism in taste and fanaticism in religious affairs. Therefore, continuation of the North American empire endangers the survival of the nation.⁹³ Despite this open support, Hume does develop into a major thinker for the American cause. His Tory reputation meets resistance among the Whiggish Americans, although he did exert some influence on American politicians of different persuasion.⁹⁴

International trade

As has been briefly noted in the previous paragraphs, free trade is important in Humean international relations.⁹⁵ In general, commerce, the greatness of a state and the happiness of its inhabitants are positively related. Overall well-being and prosperity in society empowers the public against the elite,⁹⁶ and trade and commerce can be sources of opulence, grandeur and of military achievement, as long as they are accompanied by free government and general liberty, as for example in the British and Dutch cases. Foreign trade increases the stock of labour in a nation, and parts of this stock can be used by the sovereign to the service of the public. The increase in imports and exports leads to more industry, delicacies and luxuries, which is also beneficial to the individual citizen.⁹⁷ On this point, Hume is probably influenced by the French physiocrat Turgot.⁹⁸

Hume strongly rejects the mercantilist's inclination to be jealous of the commercial success of other nations, or the related concern about a positive balance of trade. Trade is a positive-sum process, as he attempts to show with rudimentary reference to modern topics in economic science, like regional development and trade, the competitiveness of nations, the infant industry argument and the issue of comparative advantage.⁹⁹ Concerns about imbalances of international trade are due to jealousy and the groundless fear that gold and silver may leave the country.¹⁰⁰ The increase of richness and commerce in one nation normally promotes the richness and commerce of all its neighbours. It is almost impossible for one state to flourish on the

⁹³ Pocock, 'Virtue, Commerce, History', pp. 137–9.

⁹⁴ Some writers use his uncharacteristically illiberal remark on the inferiority of negroes (in a note to the essay *Of National Characters*) as an excuse for slavery. Theorists of more fame look at the better known parts of his work. Franklin visits him several times and corresponds with him from the 1750s onwards. Hume influences Paine's ideas on the origin of government. Hamilton calls him a solid and ingenious writer and refers to his work in the last *Federalist* paper. In *Federalist* no. 10, Madison is clearly influenced by the essay *The Idea of a Perfect Commonwealth*, where Hume maintains that a stable republic may cover a large geographical area. See J. M. Werner, 'David Hume and America', *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 33 (1972), pp. 439–56.

⁹⁵ Hume, 'Essays', pp. 89, 92; Haakonssen, 'Introduction', pp. xxi–xxiii.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 255.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 263.

⁹⁸ J. Fieser (ed.), *Early Responses to Hume's Moral, Literary and Political Writings* (Bristol: Thoemmes Continuum, 2005), pp. xii–xiii; Lionel Robbins, *A History of Economic Thought: The LSE Lectures*, eds. Steven G. Medema and Warren J. Samuels (Princeton, NJ and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 151.

⁹⁹ A. S. Skinner, 'David Hume: Principles of Political Economy', in D. F. Norton (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Hume* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 239–45.

¹⁰⁰ Hume, 'Essays', pp. 308–9.

basis of trade and industry, if it is surrounded by states that 'are buried in ignorance, sloth and barbarism'.¹⁰¹ Hume was one of the first eighteenth century theorists to almost fully break away from mercantilist thought. This was underpinned by his ability to connect several elements of the economic system, such as trade, money, interest and taxes. He did not fully elaborate on his economic insights, which to some observers make them all the more remarkable.¹⁰²

Foreign trade and international political power are directly related, according to Hume. A richer commercial society is also likely to be a greater military power,¹⁰³ while the manufacturing sector is a reservoir of labour that supports the military effort.¹⁰⁴ 'Law, order, police, discipline: these can never be carried to any degree of perfection before human reason had refined itself by exercise and by an application of the more vulgar arts, at least of commerce and manufacture'.¹⁰⁵

Contrary to the impression of many present scholars, Hume does not foresee perpetual peace in a world dominated by commerce. No matter how beneficial commerce is, and despite its occasional peace-promoting effects, human nature is not changed by trade. Peace in the commercial age still depends on wise policies and the application of prudence, in order to overcome pride and jealousy, the eternal sources of conflict and war. Trade makes nations richer, which stimulates the development of military technology.¹⁰⁶ Hence, in stark contrast, for example, to the Manchester School liberals of the nineteenth century, Hume did not predict, nor expect, a movement towards peace from free trade. As a matter of fact, nor did Adam Smith.¹⁰⁷ In the view of both Scottish Enlightenment giants, trade has its defects and the increased prosperity that results from it, inevitably, also enables rulers to push forward bellicose plans.¹⁰⁸

To sum up, Hume's opinion of international relations is characterised by moderation and a clear preference for the *via media*. He combines an internationalist outlook with a firm national base. It is this balance between nationhood and cosmopolitanism that distinguishes him, and other Scottish Enlightenment thinkers, from both mercantilists and nationalists,¹⁰⁹ and also from many of their English contemporaries.¹¹⁰ Hume stays clear from advocating either one of the extreme English School traditions. He does not endorse ruthless international power politics, nor a revolutionary overhaul of the contemporary world system in favour of the community of mankind. Consistent with his general philosophy he takes the world as it is, and limits himself to recommending small steps for improvement, for example

¹⁰¹ Ibid., pp. 328–30.

¹⁰² R. W. McGee, 'The Economic Thought of David Hume', *Hume Studies*, XV (1989), pp. 197–9.

¹⁰³ D. Miller, *Philosophy and Ideology in Hume's Political Thought* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), p. 125.

¹⁰⁴ Hume, 'Essays', p. 262; E. Soule, 'Hume on Economic Policy and Human Nature', *Hume Studies*, XXVI (2000), p. 146.

¹⁰⁵ Hume, 'Essays', pp. 272–3.

¹⁰⁶ R. A. Manzer, 'The Promise of Peace? Hume and Smith on the Effects of Commerce on War and Peace', *Hume Studies*, XXII (1996), pp. 369–82.

¹⁰⁷ D. A. Irwin, *Against the Tide: An Intellectual History of Free Trade* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 76; R. Sally, *Classical Liberalism and International Economic Order: Studies in Theory and Intellectual History* (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), p. 57.

¹⁰⁸ For a modern confirmation, see Katherine Barbieri, *The Liberal Illusion: Does Trade Promote Peace?* (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 2005).

¹⁰⁹ Also see Fania Oz-Salzberger, 'Political Theory of Scottish Enlightenment', pp. 157–77.

¹¹⁰ Jerry Z. Muller, *The Mind and The Market: Capitalism in Modern European Thought* (New York: Anchor Books, 2003), p. 54.

by advocating the expansion of free trade. The Humean world is Grotian, with its international society of independent nations, regulated by basic international laws that supplement the laws of nature. These sets of laws combined are not sufficient for maintaining international order, only the balance of power mechanism can accomplish that, at least to a certain extent. The occurrence of war is regrettable but inevitable, and sometimes even required to keep the balance. However, Hume does not advocate war for conquest, that falls out of his framework for just and prudent warfare. He holds that some moral requirements are relevant in international relations,¹¹¹ but does not apply that to every situation, as is shown by his opinion that not all empire is problematic. Increased international contacts between individuals are encouraged for numerous reasons, in the strong conviction that these will improve the quality of their lives. Perhaps the only really novel insight Hume contributes to IR, is his view that international commerce stands out as the most beneficial form of international cooperation, even though its pacifying effects are limited at best. The relation between Hume's politics and his philosophy is exposed in his recurrent concern for the way international politics affect the individual's freedom and prosperity. Also, he notes that international politics is conducted by fallible individual humans, therefore his view on human nature applies to political activity beyond the border as well. Given his realistic apprehension of the human capacity, the possibilities for improvement in the international realm are limited to small steps, while the world is not destined for perpetual struggle either.

International Relations theory and Hume

We now turn to the analysis of Hume's international relations within the IR theory framework of the English School, as introduced above.

Hume and the three traditions

Most IR academics mainly refer to Hume in relation to his essay on the balance of power,¹¹² and the large majority leaves it to that. Besides the extended work of Sally,¹¹³ Brown is one of the few scholars who also briefly touch upon Hume's international economics.¹¹⁴ As a consequence of this one-sidedness, Hume is

¹¹¹ M. Cohen, 'Moral Skepticism and International Relations', *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 13 (1984), p. 301.

¹¹² See for example: E. B. Haas, 'The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept or Propaganda', *World Politics*, 5 (1953), p. 456; R. Jervis, 'A Political Science Perspective on the Balance of Power and the Concert', *The American Historical Review*, 97 (1992), p. 718; T. L. Knutsen, *A History of International Relations Theory* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997), p. 122; J. N. Nye, Jr., 'The Changing Nature of World Power', *Political Science Quarterly*, 105 (1990), pp. 177–92; Sofka, 'The Eighteenth Century System', p. 154; J.A. Vasquez, *Classics of International Relations* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1990), pp. 273–6; K. N. Waltz, 'Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power', in R. O. Keohane (ed.), *Neorealism and its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 119.

¹¹³ Sally, 'Classical Liberalism', pp. 35–63.

¹¹⁴ Chris Brown, *Understanding International Relations*, 2nd edn. (Houndmills, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 107, 152.

generally regarded as a realist. For instance, Boucher is in this vein¹¹⁵ and Walzer as well, albeit hesitantly.¹¹⁶ Wight even explicitly counts Hume among the realists,¹¹⁷ under reference to the essay on the balance of power, but also on the grounds of his distinction between the requirements for national and international justice.

Whelan's analysis of Hume as a realist is the most extended argument available and it therefore requires a more detailed discussion. His general thesis is that the thoughts of Hume and Machiavelli have so much in common that Hume should be counted among the political realists. Here, we shall limit ourselves to the application of this idea to their international relations. Interestingly enough though, when he arrives at this point of his analysis, Whelan cannot but underline the differences between Hume and Machiavelli. For example, the latter endorses conquest and the expansion of national territory, while the former mostly distances himself from such practices. According to Whelan, Hume belongs to the eighteenth century law of nations and Enlightenment writers who demand a lawful claim, or a just basis for conquest to be morally acceptable, even though Hume does not always denounce unjust wars in his *History*. Contrary to Machiavelli, Hume does not relate the greatness of a nation to its military victories or its conquests, but rather with its commercial success. As we have seen above he generally opposes wars that go beyond the need to keep the balance of power.¹¹⁸

Yet, Hume and other liberals are not pacifists, as Whelan rightly notices. There are enough justifications in Humean theory for the use of coercive measures by the state, both in domestic and international politics. However, compared to thinkers like Machiavelli, Hume has a different ethical standard when it comes to issues such as the necessity of political violence, violations of moral and legal principles, betrayal, breach of promises, *et cetera*. Certainly, Hume cannot be considered a forerunner of Morgenthau's modern international realism.¹¹⁹ Therefore, Whelan finds himself in need to draw an analytical distinction between 'soft' and 'hard' forms of realism. Hume is mostly associated with the former, which Whelan also labels realist liberalism, and Machiavelli with the latter.¹²⁰

From an English School perspective, it is clear that Whelan's 'hard realism' has most in common with the Hobbesian or realist tradition, while the 'soft realism' relates to the Grotian tradition. However, since Whelan appears to be unfamiliar with English School theory, he does not consider other classifications than the well known idealist-realist dichotomy. Perhaps this is due to the wider range of his hypothesis. For the purpose of the current analysis it suffices to note that he makes it very clear that, despite some common ideas, Hume's international relations sharply differs from Machiavelli's.

Contrary to Whelan, most IR academics are not distinguished Hume scholars. Therefore, one can understand why so many of them regard him as just another

¹¹⁵ D. Boucher, *Political Theories of International Relations: From Thucydides to the Present* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 145.

¹¹⁶ M. Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations* (New York: Basic Books, 1992), p. 76.

¹¹⁷ Wight, 'International Theory', pp. 17, 247, 267; M. Wight, *Power Politics*, eds. Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad (London: Leicester University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995), pp. 168–9.

¹¹⁸ Whelan, 'Hume and Machiavelli', pp. 209–11, 214–15, 217, 227–9.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 315.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 292, 297.

realist, without much further elaboration. After all, Hume holds that international rules of equity and justice ultimately depend upon utility, he approves of the balance of power system, does not oppose all warfare and considers the nation the central actor in international politics. However, as indicated above, to regard Hume as a realist is erroneous. In this respect, it is telling that he firmly opposes Hobbes: 'Hobbes's politics are fitted only to promote tyranny and his ethics to encourage licentiousness'.¹²¹ Hume is sceptical about the usefulness of what he calls 'the philosophical fiction of the state of nature'. He holds that 'men are necessarily born in a family-society; [. . .] and are trained up by their parents to some rule of conduct and behaviour'.¹²²

Hume is certainly no Kantian or revolutionist in his international theory either, as is sometimes argued.¹²³ Men are not capable of living in peace for a very long time, and he does not anticipate another international order than the society of states. His appreciation of the strength of national feelings, and differences in national characters, prevent him from developing ideas about international political institutions. He asserts that 'there is nothing more favourable to the rise of politeness and learning, than a number of neighbouring and *independent* [emphasis added] states, connected together by commerce and policy'.¹²⁴ In addition, he generally distrusts utopian or revolutionary ideas of an abstract rational nature and rejects the contractarianism that underlies Kant's argument. The idea of world peace is too remote from the 'real world' and from a classical liberal perspective a world government carries significant dangers to individual liberty.¹²⁵ Kant famously called the international legal scholars 'sorry comforters', but Hume is clearly influenced by Grotius and Pufendorf.¹²⁶ Contrary to many modern liberals, Hume has no unrealistic expectations of the peaceful effects of trade that pave the way for a global cosmopolitan union. Actually, Hume is far too sceptical in his philosophy and too moderate in his politics for revolutionary ideas of any kind.

Instead, Hume clearly should be regarded as a Grotian internationalist. We have seen that his international thought matches most, if not all, defining characteristics of the international society tradition.

Possible implications for current IR theory

It is surprising that Wight misses the similarities between Hume's international thought and the Grotian tradition, but his interpretation represents the rule rather than the exception. Most IR academics are unaware of the full range of Hume's ideas on international relations, but Rengger is one of the few exceptions. He clearly distinguishes the link between liberalism and the just war tradition, both aiming at

¹²¹ Hume, 'History', vol., p. 153.

¹²² Hume, 'Principles of Morals', pp. 87–8.

¹²³ Chris Brown, *Sovereignty, Rights and Justice: International Political Theory Today* (Cambridge: Polity, 2002), pp. 40–1, 47–8.

¹²⁴ Hume, 'Essays', p. 119.

¹²⁵ Whelan, 'Hume and Machiavelli', pp. 222–3, 297.

¹²⁶ See above and also Whelan, 'Hume and Machiavelli', pp. 224, 234.

enlarging the freedom of individual choice in political and moral affairs.¹²⁷ In a chapter written by him in *International Relations in Political Thought*, he points at Hume's appreciation of the bonds between the nations of Europe, and suggests that Hume 'is a thinker closer to the "international society tradition" than he is to realism as conventionally understood'.¹²⁸ Rengger does not follow up on this observation, but this article has attempted to show that his contention is far more convincing than other possibilities.

The analysis of Hume's international thought also raises some questions for current IR theory, especially in the English School tradition. These points might be cause for further elaboration, but can merely be touched upon here.

Obviously, Hume strongly endorses the positive effects of free trade, hence he adds far more economics to the English School than is usual.¹²⁹ This could for example lead to an English School defence of the world trade system and the related process of globalisation, which is not common practice, to say the least.

Another point to raise is the divide between solidarism and pluralism within English School theory. As Buzan summarises, this is about 'the nature and potentiality of international society, and particularly about the actual and potential extent of shared norms, rules and institutions within systems of states'.¹³⁰ It is a subdivision within the Grotian tradition, introduced by Bull,¹³¹ with pluralists leaning towards the realist side of rationalism, and solidarists towards revolutionism. By these measures Hume obviously is a pluralist, although he would object to the pluralist idea that international law is positive law, made by governments.¹³² More importantly, we saw that Hume judges the outcome of international politics by its potential beneficial effects to individuals, while his realistic view on human nature severely limits the expectations about improvement in the international realm. This might be seen as, at least, a partial criticism of those writers who expect, or advocate, a shift towards a better, more solidarist world.¹³³ It also makes clear it is wrong to assume that only solidarism gives moral priority to individuals.¹³⁴ This idea seems to rest on a limited reading of the liberal tradition in political philosophy and a neglect of the question on the compatibility of human nature with solidarism.

If Linklater and Suganami are correct to point out that one of the flaws of the English School is the underdevelopment of its historical work¹³⁵, then this article to a certain extent confirms their point. It is shown that there is more to the international society tradition than is often thought among English School theorists. Hume's international relations offers an access point for further research into the relation between Scottish Enlightenment thought and the international society

¹²⁷ Nicholas Rengger, 'On the Just War Tradition in the Twenty-First Century', *International Affairs*, 78 (2002), p. 363.

¹²⁸ C. Brown, T. Nardin and N. J. Rengger (eds.), *International Relations in Political Thought: Texts from the Ancient Greeks to the First World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 383.

¹²⁹ Andrew Linklater and Hidemi Suganami, *The English School of International Relations: A Contemporary Reassessment* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 175.

¹³⁰ Barry Buzan, *From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 45.

¹³¹ Linklater and Suganami, 'The English School', pp. 59–71.

¹³² Buzan, 'From International to World Society', p. 46.

¹³³ Linklater and Suganami, 'The English School', chs 4–7, pp. 266–8.

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 64–5.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 265.

tradition. Roy Jones was right when he criticised the English School for being cut off from the concerns for the relation between the individual and the political authority above him, and also for its lack of any commitment to the eighteenth century liberal tradition, most famously represented by the Scottish Enlightenment.¹³⁶

As suggested in the Introduction, there is surely more to Enlightenment IR than the usual suspects Kant and Rousseau. Therefore, to expand the boundaries of the English School, and to give him his due place in IR theory in general, a reappraisal of Hume's international thought is urgently needed.

¹³⁶ As cited by Linklater and Suganami, 'The English School', pp. 18–20. Also see N.J. Rengger, 'Serpents and Doves in Classical International Theory', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, 17 (1988), pp. 215–25.