

Ethical Aspects of Social Science

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That is my first principle. But my second is, that I think we should be bold. We possess in ourselves the criterion of reason; or, with due effort, we may develop it within us; and it is a sacred privilege which we must never abdicate, that everything must submit to be tested by that criterion. In the end we cannot accept anything as a right or as a duty, however venerable may appear to be its authority, however august its sanction, if it cannot somehow be made clear to us that it is an essential element or a necessary stage in the development of a full and perfect humanity.*

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ETHICAL ASPECTS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE.

THERE is a sense in which all science is ethical. Aside from the mere dogma, which is, however, sound, that truth is always in the long run beneficial, though usually based on the other dogma, which is not sound, that nature is always beneficent, it is susceptible of proof that every step in the process of revealing the secrets of the universe has resulted, or is likely to result, in some advantage to man. This is true even of political economy, which many besides Carlyle have supposed to have no other purpose than to teach the world how miserable it is, and a no less able expounder of that science than Mr. William Cunningham has remarked that "it

* In order to give more point to my statements, and to avoid endless complications, which would have been quite unmanageable in a single lecture, I have spoken throughout of a man's rights and obligations as if they belonged to him simply as an individual, without reference to his place in society. Of course, I do not mean in the slightest degree to imply (and I hope this may be sufficiently apparent to the careful reader) that a man's rights and obligations could possibly be determined apart from this social reference. How the individual and social aspects are related to one another is a problem that I have purposely sought to evade for the present.

has no *raison d'être* except as directing conduct towards a given end."*

But this sense of the word "ethical" is a new one, and not the same that it has been the fashion to give it in times gone by. In common with all other persons who are now in or past middle life, I have always been kept familiar with the current meaning of the word *ethics* and with the leading doctrines of "moral philosophy." Although for a long time unable to analyze the subject or give a reason for the impressions that these teachings produced, nevertheless, I always felt that there was something fundamentally unsound in the general philosophy of conduct as inculcated in books, in the church, and in society at large. For this reason I never wrote an article or delivered a lecture on ethics. It early became clear to me that the moral progress of the world, which history shows to have taken place, though in a less phenomenal way than its material progress, has been due only to a very limited extent, if at all, to ethical teaching, and that true moral progress, thus far at least, stands in some such relation to material progress as an effect stands to its cause.

In fact, the old ethics is cold, austere, ascetic, and forbidding, and does not pretend to have human happiness as its aim. On the contrary, it openly condemns nearly all forms of conduct that tend to produce happiness. The reasons for this will be stated later, and I will only say here that I believe this school of ethics is passing away. There is springing up in these last years of the nineteenth century what, at the risk of using a form of expression now becoming too common, I may call the *new ethics*,—an ethics which, though now only in the bud, as it were, is destined not only to blossom but to bear abundant fruit in the century now so close upon us. In contrast with the old ethics this new ethics will be warm, generous, sympathetic, and attractive. It will have for its avowed

* "Politics and Economics: an Essay on the Nature of the Principles of Political Economy, together with a Survey of Recent Legislation." London, 1885, p. 12.

aim the increase of human happiness, and it will approve and enjoin all forms of conduct that contribute to that end.

Let us look a little more closely into the true nature of the ethical idea. Broadly viewed, it may be said that the ethical is nearly the same as the practical. This was admitted by Immanuel Kant,* who clearly saw the distinction above pointed out between the old and the new ethics. The ethical is the useful, and this is what is meant by saying that all science has an ethical basis. But the analysis is still incomplete.

I do not propose in this paper to be profoundly philosophical, much less metaphysical, but there is one psychological principle that lies at the foundation of the subject and must be considered before further progress can be made with it. It would need only to be stated were it not that it has been so generally rejected, and were it not that it is the essence of the old ethics to deny its validity. It will therefore be necessary not only to state it but to furnish proof of its truth. That principle is that the basis of ethics is *feeling*,—that pleasure and pain furnish the only tests of moral quality.

In searching for a moral element in action let us consider three hypothetical cases. We will suppose first that, by reason of his power to do so, one man exploits another, extorts from him that to which he is not in justice entitled, compels him to serve him without rendering an equivalent, or, in fact, enslaves him and profits by his enforced labor. All will agree that a moral quality resides in such an act and that it is morally wrong.

Let us suppose, in the second place, that a man exploits an inferior creature, an animal, that he compels it to carry his burdens and to perform other labor useful to him. Under ordinary circumstances such action would not be considered wrong, but the reason is that in his treatment of the animal he is believed to confer as much benefit upon it as he requires of sacrifice. This is, in fact, the only ethical ground upon which human slavery has ever been defended. To show that this is the basis of popular judgment, let us suppose there to

* "Kritik der reinen Vernunft," ed. Hartenstein. Leipzig, 1868, p. 529.

be no such reciprocity, and that the man abuses the animal. At once the moral quality enters into the action and it is condemned.

Finally, let us suppose that a man exploits the mineral kingdom, compels certain substances and material objects to minister to his wants, directs natural forces into channels that cause them to benefit him. In so doing he exercises the same qualities of mind as in the preceding cases. By reason of his intelligence he is able to gain an advantage over inorganic matter and physical forces and to derive from them benefits which they would not otherwise yield. The psychological principle is the same in all three cases.

Apply the same test here, and see if there is any way in which such action can be clothed with a moral quality. Can man in any way wrong the inorganic world? Obviously not. Where, then, lies the distinction between the first two and the third of these cases? It lies wholly in the fact that the man and the animal can feel, while the inorganic substance cannot. Sensibility to pain is all that makes a moral question possible. It would not be difficult to illustrate the same truth from the standpoint of pleasure. In fact, so frequently are pain and pleasure relative that most ethical questions, like the one respecting the animal, turn upon the relative amounts of each that are given or received in any course of conduct.

The practical and the useful are at bottom the agreeable, or at least a surplus of the agreeable over the disagreeable. Moral philosophers agree that the end of ethics is the *good*, as distinguished from that of science, which is the true, and from that of art, which is the beautiful. But what is the good but the useful, the practical, the agreeable? To cause happiness or relieve suffering is the real purpose of moral conduct: This is what is meant by "doing good," and many who deny that pleasure is the end of conduct work unceasingly to give pleasure to others.

This, too, is the true meaning of virtue,—conduct which in the long run is believed to yield a surplus of enjoyment,—while vice, although yielding a present pleasure of a low order and short duration, is believed to be followed by pains

that more than counterbalance this, either to the agent himself or to others. There are all degrees in conduct from this point of view, and everybody knows that there are thousands of acts which lie so close to the line between good and bad that their true ethical position is a question of opinion. There is, therefore, in modern, as there was in mediæval times, a real *casuistry* being debated, inaudibly for the most part, by large numbers of well-minded people.

What, then, is the true field of ethics? It is that of human *conduct*. Conduct is not the same as *action*. It is only a species of action. Etymologically, the word connotes a sort of leading, vaguely implying difficulties in the way. The terms "right," "rectitude," etc., are ill-chosen, since they connote directness, which proper conduct never possesses. Conscience, the so-called ethical sense, always leads the agent through a sort of labyrinth. The least attempt to go straight, *i. e.*, to follow his impulses, which, being true natural forces, move on straight lines, brings him into conflict with the interests of others, which is to go wrong. Action, *i. e.*, the normal result of human motives, produces constant collisions in the interests of the agents, and it is this that ethics seeks to prevent. The ethical code is a digest for the guidance of men through this labyrinth. But the "path of rectitude" is a crooked and tortuous path, perpetually dodging in and out to avoid these collisions, which inflict pain. This, in so far, limits free activity. The windings and climbings required to keep in the ethical trail make a severe demand upon human energy and cost heavily.

The essence of the ethical idea, then, is *restraint*. It is a check upon human action. I have compared it to friction in machinery and called it "social friction."* In fact, so far as ethics can be called a science, it is simply the science of social friction. Mechanical progress has consisted largely in the successive steps taken in the direction of reducing friction. This might be illustrated in almost any department. That of transportation will serve my purpose.

* "Psychic Factors of Civilization," chap. xvii.

As the first step, representing the minimum economy in this direction, may be instanced the "stone-boat." Every New England farmer knows what a stone-boat is. It has the shape of a flat-bottomed boat or scow, is taken into the stony field and loaded with stones. Then it is dragged by strong horses or oxen to the wall or fence which is built of these stones. Its whole under surface is in contact with the ground and thus gives the maximum friction, its economy consisting entirely in the ease with which it is loaded, so that any boy can "haul stone." A step in reducing the friction is sometimes taken by transforming the stone-boat into a sort of sled or "bob" with two thick runners.

From this it is a long way to a vehicle with wheels, in which part of the friction is transferred to the axle; and, from rude carts having wide felloes without tire and rough wooden axles to the Studebaker wagon and the improved types of carriages, the reduction in the amount of friction is immense.

The improvement of roads forms another series of steps, but the next long stride is taken when two wooden stringers are laid down for the wheels to run on and flanges put on the wheels to prevent them from running off. This is the tram in its simplest form. The chief improvement consists in putting cross-ties under these stringers and iron rails upon them. For these last the T-rail, first of iron and then of steel, is ultimately substituted.

But even the modern railroad does not represent the absolute minimum of friction. Besides the friction of axles, the wheel still rests to a width of several inches on the track. This last element it has been sought to overcome by a beveled wheel or a convex rail, reducing the contact to a single point. A still bolder innovation has been made, applicable at least to certain kinds of transportation, which abolishes the axle and reduces the friction to the minimum conceivable. This is the sphere propelled by air through a tube. Many are aware that this device was once introduced, though unsuccessfully, in conveying public documents from the National Capitol to the Government Printing Office at Washington. Mr. Brisbane's principle was certainly unas-

sailable, and I am informed that it has been successfully applied in Paris and other European cities.

Now the moral progress of the world has consisted, and must continue to consist, in a similar series of steps in reducing the friction of society. When we look back over the history of the world and realize how much better it is than it once was, especially in public life, it looks as if we had come a long way ; but when day after day we scan the heads of the newspapers and note the ever-recurring horrors of our present state, we are compelled to admit that the moral world is still in the stone-boat stage of its history, dragging its heavy body over the rugged field of human life with the utmost friction and the smallest ethical economy. It is the painfulness of this feature of life that so arouses the quickened sympathies of mankind and lends such an intense interest to all ethical questions.

I am bound to say that in all this there is far more heat than light, that the problem itself is misunderstood, that ethical teaching is in the main misdirected and ineffective. The positive side of ethics is lost sight of in the prominence of its negative side. The object has been, not to increase happiness, but to mitigate suffering. This has always been the principal form of doing good. Even where it is sought to confer pleasure, it is only upon isolated individuals. In fact, the ethical method has been applied only to special cases, and not to underlying conditions. It is superficial and temporary, not fundamental and lasting. It is therapeutic, not prophylactic, and its effect is always static, never dynamic. This desultory beneficence has been erected into a creed and inculcated as the great duty. By many it is regarded as the supreme end of life, and philosophers have characterized it as the highest aim of science.*

In the face of all this it may seem presumptuous to raise a dissenting voice. But it is not without prolonged reflection

* The only two philosophical systems claiming to be universal, viz., those of Comte and Spencer, both make ethics the last, highest, and most important of the sciences.

that I have been compelled to conclude that, except in so far as it means the discovery of ways to diminish social friction, ethics not only is not a science, but is only an expression for the imperfection of the social order, an imperfection which, theoretically at least, is removable. The phenomena to which ethics relates constitute a transitional stage in social development.

The fundamental assumption of the old ethics is that there is something essentially evil in human nature. Its whole purpose is to destroy this evil element. No other science is wholly destructive. Nothing that is such can be a science. Suppose, for a moment, that it shall have accomplished its mission and eradicated the last vestige of preventable evil. Its "occupation's gone." The great science—that to which all others are "subsidiary"*—has been eliminated, has eliminated itself! Or, imagine the condition of one of those excellent beings, familiar to everybody, whose only satisfaction in life consists in alleviating the sufferings of others, placed in a world in which there are no sufferings to alleviate! The intolerable boredom of such a state would have to be classed among the unpreventable evils. The avowed object of ethics is to contract and ultimately to remove the entire field of ethics. The highest moral state is one in which there shall be nothing that can be called moral.

We have seen that the so-called science of ethics is essentially negative, that it aims at restraint, that its tendency is to curb, repress, and ultimately destroy the alleged evil propensities of mankind. But all true science is essentially constructive. Where, then, is the fundamental fallacy which must lurk somewhere in the current moral philosophy? It lies in the very assumption of evil propensities. Such supposed propensities form an integral part of the natural forces that underlie the social world. They belong to the nature of man. They would never have been planted there if they had not been necessary to his development. They are evil only in so far as they conflict with individual or social interests.

* Spencer, "Data of Ethics," Preface, p. v.

They do not differ in this respect from any other element of power in the world. If man only knew fire as something that destroys, that would be classed as an evil agency. Man may have passed through such a stage in his history. Certainly, this was his attitude towards electricity until within less than a century. The attitude changes in proportion as the knowledge of the nature of the agent increases. Strange as it may seem, the natural forces about which man knows least are those that reside within him. The latest sciences to be developed are those of mind and society,—psychology and sociology. But when man shall attain to an acquaintance with the laws governing these fields at all proportional to that which he has now acquired in the fields of physics and mechanics, the practical value of this knowledge will probably be as much greater than the other, as it is more difficult to acquire.

This knowledge of the psychic and social forces constitutes the basis of the new ethics. But it seems folly to call it ethics. The real science to which all these ethical considerations belong is *social science*. This is a true science. It is constructive. Like every other true science, it aims to utilize the forces operating within its domain. These are the social forces, and included in them are all the supposed evil propensities of human nature. Instead of condemning these, it recognizes them, and, after the manner in which science deals with all natural powers, it seeks first to render them harmless and then to make them useful. This is always possible so soon as their nature is known. Such has been the history of science in every other field. Such will be its history in the social field.

The method of science is not that of checking the flow of natural forces. It aims not to diminish, but to increase their effect. It restrains only where they are doing harm. But this is done by directing them into new courses where they no longer do harm. It seeks to find useful directions, and thus brings good out of evil. More than this. It unites many currents into one, and multiplies the power which it is desirable to have applied to any useful purpose. It assists

nature to store its energy that it may expend it economically. Thus it secures far greater results than nature would achieve unaided, and renders these results beneficial, instead of indifferent or injurious.

All this social science aims to accomplish in the domain of the social forces. Its field is not restricted to conduct, but extends to all action. Its object is not to limit activity, but to increase it. It uses restraint only in order to direct it into useful avenues. But this results in the greatest freedom and the maximum activity. Man has already learned that liberty is not secured through anarchy, but through government. What is true in the political world is true in the social world. The new ethics, which is social science, seeks the utmost individual liberty. But, like every science, it aims at results. Its true object, to use the forcible expression of Mr. Benjamin Kidd, is *social efficiency*. The social forces, once in their proper grooves, may all exert their utmost energy, as their friction is thus reduced to the minimum. Enthusiasm and zeal are beneficent powers when directed to useful ends. The emotions and even the passions of men are precious gifts to society, because they represent vast powers for the accomplishment of results. These results constitute social progress, which follows necessarily upon the liberation of the dynamic agencies of society.

It cannot, of course, be denied that there are catabolic elements in man's nature, elements productive of evil results. There are criminal impulses, often congenital, in dealing with which moral suasion is powerless, and which are therefore beyond the reach of the ethical code. Most of these are survivals from an antecedent state, savage or even animal. They were once useful, but are now mere vestiges, like the tonsils or the vermiform appendage—sources of social, as these are of physical disease. Where this is not the case, and the destructive elements are not atavistic but normal, such as anger, hate, jealousy, envy, and the rest, they are the products of a cramped social environment. They only appear when the free play of the healthy, harmless, anabolic sentiments is impeded or prevented. In the ancestral state these impulses passed into action and caused battles between rivals, the

destruction of the weaker, and the ultimate restoration to the conquerors of liberty to pursue harmless pleasures. In society they result in immoral conduct or crime.

Now, it is precisely the function of social science to do away with this state of things, not by allowing free vent to catabolic impulses, but by removing the conditions under which they arise. As they are due to the constraint of the harmless impulses, the liberation of these latter prevents the former from manifesting themselves. This constitutes one of the best illustrations of the theory of the social forces and of social friction. Rage is the true homologue of the heat generated by friction. Remove the friction and the heat will not exist. It is only a "mode" of the general force employed. The social forces are identical with all other natural forces, even to the extent of conforming to the law of the transmutation of forces. The catabolic impulses are only modes of manifestation of the general psychic force; they are the forms which the natural or anabolic sentiments assume under frictional restraint.

The sociological point of view is thus seen to be precisely the opposite of the ethical point of view. It is that of the liberation instead of the restraint of human activity. In short, it is positive, not negative, and on this the whole distinction turns. It is not necessary to abandon the good as the end of action. Indeed, however insignificant the domain of feeling may be (and it is certainly an exceedingly restricted field relatively to the whole universe of matter, space, and time), we are so circumstanced that we are compelled to regard it as everything to us. Therefore a positive even more than a negative ethics will make the good its end. But there is this manifest difference. Negative ethics sets bounds to its own scope and tends to consume itself. When all preventable evil shall disappear its course is run. As this is only theoretical and cannot probably be actualized, it can only be regarded as a logically fatal objection, but the practical objection is that the method of negative ethics would repress the normal activities of society which form the condition of positive ethics.

Is there, then, no limit to the extent to which the good may be increased? At first view it would seem that there must be such a limit. Reduced to its simplest expression, the good consists in the exercise of the faculties. To go into the physiology of this proposition would carry me too far, but I believe it can be sustained. Even an unexpected physical pleasure, such as that derived from a delicious morsel or a fragrant bouquet, presupposes a specialization of the nerves of taste or smell which has made the flavor or the odor agreeable, and the fact of experiencing such a pleasure is simply the exercise of a faculty which it has required untold ages to develop. The human body is a reservoir of a vast number of such capacities for enjoyment, and when we include the psychic faculties, æsthetic, intellectual, social, there is scarcely any limit even now to the wants which men possess to be satisfied. The good is nothing more nor less than the satisfaction of these wants.

But can we say of good as we may say of evil that its range is limited? Can all desires be conceived as gratified just as all pains may be conceived as removed? Not in the *élite* of the human race, certainly. In the animal, with only physical and a few social wants, this might be possible, but in man, with all his spiritual aspirations, it is inconceivable. Certain individuals with coarse organizations might perhaps be placed in the same class with animals in this respect, but the finer organizations cannot be so placed. It is not, however, with individuals that the question chiefly deals, but with the race as a whole. It is not a question of satisfying present as much as future wants. History furnishes plenty of examples of the creation of new wants.

In the domain of æsthetics this is very manifest. Music is a comparatively modern art. This is not altogether nor chiefly because musical notation, instruments, and methods were unknown to the ancients. It is principally because the love of music had not yet been created in the physical mechanism of the men of that time. There are still not only races, but individuals of our own race, in whom it does not exist.

The Greeks and Romans were far advanced in architecture

and sculpture, and they had the art of painting men and animals, plants and buildings, all symmetrical objects. But there appears to be no evidence that they painted landscapes. They had not yet acquired the power of admiring the landscape. Cæsar marched his armies over the Alps and wrote much of his Commentaries on their summits, but he was utterly oblivious of their beauties. The love of nature as a whole, especially in its amorphous aspects,—mountains, waters, clouds, etc.,—is a recent acquirement, like the love of music.

In the domain of social life, the more refined sexual sentiments furnish a striking example of the power of man to acquire new wants. It is only in the European race that these have assumed any marked prominence, and even in this race they have been developed within comparatively recent times. Brilliant as were the intellectual achievements of the Greeks and Romans, and refined as were many of their moral and æsthetic perceptions, nothing in their literature conclusively proves that love with them meant more than the natural demands of the sexual instinct under the control of strong character and high intelligence. The romantic element of man's nature had not yet been developed. This constitutes a distinctly modern need. It is rooted in the lower passion and has grown out of it, but it is distinguished from it by the fact that the presence alone of the object is its satisfaction. This step is an exceedingly long one, and was gradually taken during the Middle Ages, assuming its developed proportions under the knights-errant and the troubadours from the eleventh to the thirteenth century. To-day it prevails throughout Europe, America, and other countries that have been settled by Europeans, and nowhere else. It has completely revolutionized the social life of these peoples and has purified their literature. This is why the older literature requires to be expurgated before it is fit for modern ears. It was too erotic. Modern literature, although it deals with love to a far greater extent than ancient, is chaste, because love means something entirely different from what it formerly meant. The needs of modern peoples growing ou

of it are much more numerous and imperative than before, but they are so pure and elevated that it is possible to treat them with the utmost freedom without causing the least shock to the finest sensibilities.

Again, true conjugal affection, as it exists to-day in enlightened communities, and which is a different thing from the spiritualized sexual sentiment last considered, although an outgrowth from it as that is an outgrowth from the sexual instinct, constitutes another and still more modern source of social enjoyment developed by civilization. Nor is it less important, for it has done more than all other influences combined to cement and solidify the most important of all social structures, the family. The monogamic sentiment is gaining strength and becoming more and more the bulwark of society. Those who see in the prevailing unrest relative to marriage only signs of degeneracy fail to interpret these signs correctly. It is in reality due to the very strengthening that I have mentioned of the true bonds of conjugal affection, coupled with a rational and altogether proper determination on the part of individuals to accept, in so important a matter, nothing less than the genuine article.

I might go on and enumerate the proofs that the race is constantly acquiring new powers of enjoyment in the æsthetic, moral, social, and intellectual world, but these examples must suffice. Nor is there to be found the slightest evidence that its capacity for such acquisition will ever be exhausted. This, then, is the basis for a positive ethics which cannot consume itself. It stands on the same footing with every other science and is in all essential respects a true science. These higher aspirations, which are the spiritual representatives of the lower wants, sublimated by intelligence and culture, are, like the bodily cravings out of which they have evolved, *faculties—i. e.,* powers, and contribute to the full extent of their intensity to the motor strength of society. The new ethics aims not only to liberate all these social forces, but to utilize them in propelling the machinery of society.

I have thus far only spoken of the dynamic agencies of society. These would, indeed, be unmanageable without the

aid of a directive agency. This is the *intellect*, which serves as a guide to the social forces. And right here lies the explanation of the sterility of the old or negative ethics. It does not recognize the reason as a factor. It does not attempt to guide or direct the destructive elements of social activity. It treats them as only baneful, and wages a crusade against them. It invents such epithets as sin, vice, immorality, and seeks to stamp these out. It denounces, anathematizes, condemns, or else it pleads, expostulates, and exhorts. All this, if separated from the influence of example and personal magnetism, is without effect—mere *brutum fulmen*. As well might King Canute command the sea to retire, or Pope Calixtus III. drive Halley's comet from the skies.

The method of science under the guidance of intelligence is to attract the natural forces, not to drive them; to free them, not to fetter them. There is no more misleading expression than the one so commonly used to the effect that Franklin "chained the lightning." So far from his chaining it, he found for it an unobstructed path, albeit one in following which it not only could do no harm, but could do and has done incalculable good. And all subsequent dealings on the part of science with this wonderful agent have only served to increase its power. The most violent thunderbolt that ever rent the clouds was not equal to the great Baltimore dynamo that recently forced a train through the tunnel against the power of the strongest locomotive.

And so it will be with the social forces when once we learn how to control and utilize them. This is social science in its applied stage. Its purpose is to find unobstructed paths along which they may operate to their full extent. It will minimize the social friction and utilize the social energy. It will devise the requisite social apparatus to this end. Just as material progress under science consists in the development of the practical arts of which machinery is the highest expression, so social progress will consist in the development of the supreme social art of which social machinery will constitute the highest manifestation.

This is not, of course, the place, even if it were advisable,

to offer any hints as to the character which this social machinery is likely to assume. As well might our ancestors have sought to predict the machinery of to-day. But on numerous previous occasions I have attempted to indicate some of the initial steps in social invention. My chief purpose, however, has been to emphasize the fact that sociology is a science, that it is a domain of natural forces of which man may take advantage precisely as he has taken advantage of the physical forces of nature. Until this truth can be perceived and vividly brought home, not only to philosophers, but especially to men of affairs, statesmen, and legislators, it is vain to speculate upon methods and details.

It is only within the scope of the present paper to deal with the ethical aspects of the question, and I must end as I began by repeating that all science is essentially ethical. Social science is more so than other sciences only because it deals more directly and exclusively with the collective welfare of mankind. It seeks not merely to reduce the social friction and thus accomplish all that the old ethics has so vainly striven to secure, viz., negative moral progress, but also and chiefly to put the manifold existing and prospective wants of mankind in the way of satisfaction, and thus to bring about a progressive and unlimited train of benefits and a truly scientific or positive moral progress.

I have called these ethical aspects. In this I may be mistaken, but it is only a question of the meaning of words. As I said at the outset, I have never entered the field of ethics, and if the universal betterment of man's estate does not belong to ethics, it is a field into which I do not care to enter.

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