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Static and Dynamic Sociology

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## STATIC AND DYNAMIC SOCIOLOGY.

### I.

THE terminology of social science is at the present time in process of formation. It seems to be pretty generally agreed that Comte's word "sociology" is the best name for the science as a whole; but how the science shall be subdivided and what names shall be given to the subdivisions, are questions by no means settled. The real cause of this unsettled terminology is a lack not only of uniformity but of clearness in the views of different writers upon, and teachers of, the subject.

As one of a considerable number who think that the primary subdivision should be into static and dynamic, I shall attempt in this article to indicate the boundaries which it seems to me proper to set to these two departments. The division, of course, is not my own. It was first employed by Comte, who, notwithstanding his adoption of the name sociology, preferred to consider the phenomena of society as constituting a science of "social physics," and as capable, like those of the inorganic world, of being contemplated in both their static and their dynamic aspects. Mathematician as he was, he sought to carry the subdivision employed in mechanics into this most complex field of phenomena.

Social dynamics [he says] studies the laws of succession, while social statics seeks those of coexistence; so that the general application of the first is properly to furnish to practical politics the true theory of progress, at the same time that the second naturally forms that of order.<sup>1</sup>

Mr. Herbert Spencer in his *Social Statics*, even as "abridged and revised" in 1892, nowhere attempts to explain the scope of the term he adopts as the title of his work, but admits that his original use of it was due, though indirectly and uncon-

<sup>1</sup> *Philosophie Positive*, 3d edition (Paris, 1869), vol. iv, pp. 263-264.

siously, to Comte. The work itself has so little to do with systematic sociology that we may accept the statement of one of its reviewers that the name seems to have been chosen "only as a means of indicating vaguely that it proposed to treat of social concerns in a scientific manner."<sup>1</sup> In criticising Comte Mr. Spencer has, however, said :

Respecting M. Comte's application of the words *statics* and *dynamics* to social phenomena, now that I know what it is, I will only say that while I perfectly understand how, by a defensible extension of their mathematical meanings, the one may be used to indicate social *functions in balance*, and the other social *functions out of balance*, I am quite at a loss to understand how the phenomena of *structure* can be included in the one more than in the other.<sup>2</sup>

Passing over other attempts to define static sociology, I will confine myself to noting some recent definitions by American writers. Small and Vincent, in their *Introduction to the Study of Society* (page 66), say :

The conception of static sociology, to which the method of this book leads, corresponds in form, but not in content, with that of Herbert Spencer ; it is the doctrine of the "equilibrium of a perfect society." This use of terms is in sharp contrast with that of Comte.

They define sociology as "the science of social ideals," and add :

It is a qualitative and approximate account of the society which ought to be. By universal consent inquiry about what ought to be has been made the task of ethics. Static sociology is, therefore, an ethical discipline. Social statics is, in brief, social ethics.

I will not say that I do not agree with this, but simply that I do not understand it.

Mr. Ira W. Howerth has recently<sup>3</sup> asked the principal students of social science in this country whether they approve of the

<sup>1</sup> *North British Review*, XV, 321 (August, 1851).

<sup>2</sup> Reasons for dissenting from the Philosophy of M. Comte. Appendix to the Classification of the Sciences (London and New York, 1864), p. 44. Also, *Essays Scientific, Political and Speculative* (New York, 1891), II, 135.

<sup>3</sup> *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, V, 119 (September, 1894).

subdivision of sociology into descriptive, static and dynamic. Of twenty-three answers received he says that nine are in favor of such a subdivision and fourteen are "opposed," but he does not inform us how these fourteen would subdivide it, if at all. Dr. Small, in his answer, substantially repeats the definition of static sociology above quoted, by calling it "the ideal of society in equilibrium, essential social structure and needs being the criterion." Dr. Ross says that static sociology "seeks to distinguish social types and the forms of institutions, in order to determine the laws of their coexistence and sequence." Professor Dewey says: "Statical, I consider the principles of social organization as such; the structural relations, the morphology."

Most of the authors above quoted also give definitions of dynamic sociology, but I pass these over for the present and speak first of the static side. This I wish to emphasize the more, as it is the side to which I have given little attention in my works. Since nearly all the scientific work thus far done in sociology has been in that field, I have hitherto purposely omitted to treat it; but I have never been at a loss to separate it clearly from the other. Now that the dynamic side is beginning to receive attention, it seems to me that most writers confuse it with the static and that there is great need of making clear the fundamental distinction between the two. While the definitions quoted above doubtless contain much that is true, and do, in a manner, mark off the two departments of scientific sociology (descriptive sociology is only the work of the collector), still they do not seem to me at all satisfactory, and they fail to reach the fundamental principles upon which the distinction rests. Without discussion of the definitions, therefore, I will now proceed to set forth briefly what I conceive those principles to be.

## II.

The deeper truths of a complex science are, as a rule, much more clearly apparent in the simpler science upon which it rests. The leading criterion of a true science is the recogni-

tion of the natural forces in obedience to which its phenomena appear. So long as botany and zoölogy consisted entirely in collecting and labeling specimens, they were not entitled to be called sciences ; but as soon as form and structure began to be studied, which was necessary even for the rudest classification, law was recognized ; and law is only the expression of the uniform inherent forces.

Now, in the entire animal kingdom, which of course includes the human species, the most fundamental antithesis in phenomena is between those of *feeling* on the one hand and of *function* on the other. Feeling is the one distinguishing characteristic of the animal world. In the celebrated phrase of Linnæus : “ Minerals grow ; plants grow and live ; animals grow, live and feel.”<sup>1</sup> For the first time we here encounter a psychic attribute, and throughout the entire range of animal, human and social operations, we must deal with this, which is the only true psychic force. Our distinction between the static and the dynamic begins right here, and it never leaves this primordial base. Feeling is the force of the sentient world ; it is equally that of the social world. It is the spring of all activity and that without which no proper action can take place ; for motion or movement in inanimate bodies is called action only in a metaphorical sense, as borrowed from feeling beings. Everything connected with feeling is therefore primarily dynamic. The equilibrating principle resides in organization. Unorganized force is ineffectual. Organization has for its end the creation of forms which concentrate and inhibit forces and ultimately expend them with economy in intensifying effects. These forms are the various organisms that people the earth. Human beings are the most highly organized of these, and by dint of his intelligence man has become the most numerous of all the developed races. Biotic organization culminates with man, but social organization goes on without change in the principle, and not only creates a great variety of social and political bodies by the orderly grouping of individual

<sup>1</sup> *Lapides crescunt ; vegetabilia crescunt et vivunt ; animalia crescunt, vivunt et sentiunt.* *Philosophia Botanica* (Stockholm, 1751), p. 1.

men, but also establishes a multitude of effective institutions as the social machinery through which economic results are accomplished.

Processes which relate to the production of organisms, social organizations and human institutions are broadly grouped under the head of function. The object of organization being to store energy, — *i.e.*, to bring the psychic forces into a state of equilibrium, so that they can be economically drawn upon and directed into efficient channels, leaving a reserve for future use, — it is clear that, from the very definition, function is essentially static. And here again, as in the case of feeling, there is no stage in the entire range of vital and social organization at which this ceases to be true.

The organized product adapted to economize force consists exclusively of appropriate structures; therefore the study of structures, whether physical or social, is static. Structures exercise functions, and it is these functions that sustain, continue and mitigate life. All this is also purely static, and in general it may be said that all considerations of structure and function are static. The object of function is essentially the preservation of forms. It has nothing to do with their modification. That a particular organism shall preserve its existence as long as its inherent powers of duration permit, is the first law of functional life; and this is secured by the process called nutrition. That before the limit of duration is reached it shall provide for the renewal of its form in other individuals of its kind, is the second law; and this is secured by the process called reproduction. But involved in these processes, and equally belonging to the domain of static phenomena, are the respective facts of growth and multiplication. That an organism, through abundant nutrition, shall increase in size, or that a species, through fecundity, shall increase in numbers, does not alter the general law according to which these processes go on. This is a common stumbling-block to writers on these subjects, who are apt to confound mere growth or simple multiplication with properly dynamic phenomena. This has been done in a conspicuous manner by Mr. Benjamin Kidd in his

*Social Evolution*, in which all along the growth of population is confounded with "progress." The same kind of mistake is made by Messrs. Small and Vincent in their *Introduction to the Study of Society*, where, at the beginning of Book IV (page 237), after clearly and accurately premising that "social activities have their source in the desires of individuals," they wrongly proceed (§ 114) to apply the term "social growth" to "progress" and "evolution." This is simply to confound static and dynamic sociology. Merely *quantitative* change is static. In dynamic phenomena the change is *qualitative*.

It is easy to see that in biology the greater part of all that has been done, beyond the necessary accumulation of data for study, has been in its static department. All studies of structure (anatomy, histology, morphology) and function (physiology) must be so classed, and some may be at a loss to see what remains. In sociology, though much less has been done, the same is practically true. Sociologists rarely overstep the border of social statics. When they take up the laws of preservation or sustentation, they at once find themselves confronted by the "social organism"; and thereupon they devote themselves either to analyzing the structures of the several organized bodies of society — states, churches, business associations, *etc.* — or to investigating the social operations that produce and distribute the nutritive pabulum of society; that is, they confine themselves to the anatomy and the physiology of society. If they enter the field of the reproductive forces, they encounter on the threshold the institution of marriage and that primary social structure, the family, and rarely go beyond these. All ethnological studies, as of the customs, mythology, religion and arts of primitive peoples, their government, their proprietary laws, and their tribal relations, also belong to this class. Here again it might be supposed that the list was exhausted. And yet we frequently find in the midst of this static work the treatment of topics, such as political revolutions, religious reforms, and the reversal of economic opinion, which clearly belong to social dynamics.

## III.

If, then, the static phenomena of sentient life are so clearly marked off and easily recognized, what are the criteria of its dynamic phenomena? Going back to our primary antithesis, we see that they are those that grow directly out of the fundamental fact called feeling. Compelled as we are by the defectiveness of language, due in turn to the defectiveness of human knowledge when language was formed, to express genetic truths in teleological phrase, we may say, without danger of being misunderstood by the well-informed, that the end of nature and that of the organism are not the same, but are entirely distinct. Nature aims only at the preservation of the organism and the continuation of the race. The organism, on the contrary, knows nothing of these ends and has no concern for them. The opposite view which prevails is an illusion. The sole end of the organism is the satisfaction of its desires, which is that which yields pleasure. More accurately speaking, every organism is engaged during its entire life in the business of pursuing pleasure and avoiding pain. If we call the pleasures *plus* and the pains *minus*, the end which the organism has singly in view is to attain the maximum algebraic sum of these conscious states. This is what is meant by feeling as an end.

Now, the conditions under which life has been developed have been such, and could only have been such, that the pursuit on the part of the organism of its end is that which secures the ends of nature. Feeling is adapted to function. Only such desires could be developed under the laws of survival as tended to preserve and perpetuate the creatures possessing them. This to the biologist is a full explanation of the existing state of things, and no other "preëstablished harmony" is required. If, therefore, the creature does but seek its own ends, those of nature will take care of themselves.

The mere action necessary to the satisfaction of desire is the primary dynamic element, but it would be little effective if satisfaction followed immediately. In fact, this rarely or never



happens, and in the great majority of cases there intervenes the state called *effort*. The organism is perpetually striving to attain its ends. The efforts put forth are often intense and prolonged. The activity manifested is great and the energy expended is correspondingly great. This expenditure of energy has its results quite independent of those of function. Even if the end be not attained, these results are secured. In fact, the more remote and difficult the end, the greater the direct effort applied to removing the difficulties; and the maximum effect is reached in those enlightened human activities in which the attainment of the end depends upon careful calculations and patient elaboration of the means.

In its broadest sense the word dynamic may be taken to describe an advantage, benefit or good, independent of both the individual (feeling) and the race (function) — something that is useful to the world at large or to the general scheme of development or evolution. That is to say, it does not benefit that individual or that race, but institutes processes that are to benefit many or all individuals and races. The direct effects of activities, the results of efforts to secure the ends which the individual has in view, are dynamic in this sense. So far as either nature or the organism is concerned they are incidental and unintended. They have significance and value only to the world at large; in short, they form the elements, and the sole elements, of progress.

But here a precaution is necessary, and a more exact term than progress is needed. The antithesis between the static and the dynamic requires to be still more incisively drawn than has yet been done. We have seen that both growth and multiplication belong to the department of statics. What is the corresponding fact in the department of dynamics? "Progress" is not always sufficiently comprehensive, and "evolution" is open to the same objection. In biology this fact is expressed with considerable accuracy by the word *transmutation*. So long as the type remains the same, the phenomena, whatever they may be, are static; there is permanence and stability. The law that works for this permanence of type is called

*heredity*. The counter-law that antagonizes heredity and works for instability is called *variation*. Under the harmonious operation of these two antithetical laws *development* has taken place. Variation is primarily due to intense, prolonged and often unsuccessful efforts on the part of organisms to secure their ends. The necessity for such efforts is due to the imperfect adaptation of the organism to its environment. The efforts<sup>1</sup> bring about a more perfect adaptation through modifications in the type, and this usually, but not always, secures an advance in the type. This is development. If, however, a lower type is better adapted, the result is degeneracy. In either case it is transmutation. In either case it is a dynamic phenomenon.

It would be easy to expand this part of the subject and show that all the transformations that have taken place in the animal world have been the result of such efforts on the part of the creature for the attainment of its ends.<sup>2</sup> Some idea of the vivifying influence that springs from the study of any science on its dynamic side may be gained by a comparison of what biology has become since Darwin, who may be said to have founded dynamic biology, with what it was under Cuvier, when the dynamic principles of Lamarck were treated with disdain. What Darwin taught is not so much the origin of species as the transmutation of species. He diverted attention from life structures to life movements. Just as geologists, before Hutton and Lyell had established the uniformitarian law of dynamic geology, regarded the earth's crust as stationary and accounted for changes that they perceived had taken place by the doctrine of cataclysms, so pre-Darwinian biologists, with a few notable exceptions, regarded species as fixed, and accounted for variety and

<sup>1</sup> The word "efforts" is not used here in a strictly Lamarckian sense, but is intended to include all modifications due to natural selection and the mingling of different ancestral germ plasmata that tend to variation. All these conditions of change are due to the universal *nisus* of life, pressing everywhere for more perfect adaptation, which may properly be characterized as effort. Darwin himself, who cannot be suspected of not clearly seeing the indirect influences, characterized it as the "struggle of the favored races," or the "struggle for existence," but it would be more accurately described as a struggle for the satisfaction of desire.

<sup>2</sup> I have done this to some degree in *Psychic Factors of Civilization*, chap. xiv, to which I venture to refer the reader.

multiplicity of organic forms by the doctrine of special creation in each case. The revolution in geology was not more complete than that in biology. The static laws of both still remain, but it needed the dynamic laws also to make the two sciences complete. Both the static law of heredity and the dynamic law of variation are summed up in the happy phrase of Darwin, "descent with modification."

Is anything analogous to this in store for sociology? Surely this youngest of the sciences need not complain if it is compelled to wait yet a long time in its static stage. But the world moves, and the history of other sciences proves that this too must possess a dynamic department. The search for the key to it has already begun, and if rewarded with success, will doubtless reveal the secret of social evolution. That the dynamic principle must reside in the affective department of man's psychic nature, admits of no doubt; and that it should be essentially different from that of all other life, is not to be expected. A slight modification of the terms and the substitution of synonyms more applicable to the human sphere of action are all that is required. If the lower organisms seek pleasure — so does man, but we may call it happiness. If desire is their sole motive power — so it is his, but we may call it want. Efforts and satisfactions are the same in both spheres, only, as already remarked, the former are much more prolonged in a being that can foresee future results, and the dynamic effects are correspondingly increased. These effects are transmutations and adaptations in the one case as in the other, but here we encounter an essential difference. In the one case the organism is transformed to adapt it to the environment; in the other the environment is transformed to adapt it to the organism. In so far as we deal with physical modifications in man's bodily structures, we are treating of dynamic biology. When we deal with modifications in his surroundings and in his relations to the universe, we are treating of dynamic sociology.

All social structures may be embraced under the general term *institutions*. Social functions are the operations con-

ducted by institutions. Institutions, like bodily structures, are exceedingly numerous and multiform, and social functions are correspondingly manifold and varied. Looked at for any given point of time, they seem stationary ; but viewed from the standpoint of history, they give evidence of continuous though slow and uneven change. Compared with the changes going on in organic structures the modifications of social structures are, it is true, very rapid ; but to those who see and are trying to remedy defects the persistence of social structures seems to be needlessly great. Dynamic sociology is the science which considers this change in social structures and functions. There is a principle in society called *conservatism* — corresponding to that of heredity in biology — which tends to preserve social structures. Their very existence, as in organic structures, is a proof of their usefulness and their destruction, or even their modification, is strenuously resisted. But no structure is ever perfectly adapted, and all must ultimately reach a point at which the adaptation begins to grow less and less. The time at length arrives when change is essential to continued existence. In societies, no less than in races of animals, those which cannot change must perish. The persistence of social structures is that which we understand by social order. The change of social structures in the direction of greater adaptation is social progress, and this must be true even though it require a lower type to secure the adaptation. Such cases, however, are rare, and progress in society, like development in the organic world, is in the main an advance in the direction of perfecting the types of structure. As a rule these advantageous modifications take place gradually and imperceptibly, though seldom at a uniform rate ; but the rhythm is often more marked, and long periods of stagnation are followed by what are called reforms or even revolutions.

In a general way all this has been recognized, but very few attempts have been made to arrive at the initial principle according to which these qualitative changes in the types of social structure take place. Bastiat struck the keynote when he said that the whole science of man could be summed up in

the three words : wants, efforts, satisfactions.<sup>1</sup> But really the last of these factors, though the end of the other two, would be fatal to movement if it followed immediately upon the first. Want is the motive power to all social phenomena—the real social force, but all change is the result of effort, and would attend it even if satisfaction were not attained. Comte utters the purely dynamic truth even more correctly when he says that “mental activity [which he explains in the next sentence not to mean the higher speculative activities of the mind] is only persistently maintained by the continued pressure of the various human wants, the immediate satisfaction of which is happily not possible without persistent efforts.”<sup>2</sup> Herbert Spencer has recognized the same truth,<sup>3</sup> and in fact it forms the basis of what is true in individualism, in defending which he and other writers have made an entirely unwarranted application of it. Professor Clark sees it in its proper light,<sup>4</sup> and several of the replies to Mr. Howerth’s question embody the germ of it. For example, Professor Dewey says : “Dynamic is the theory of social movement as such ; the functioning of the organs so far as they involve *modifications of structure.*” Dr. Ross also says : “Dynamic studies the forces underlying social phenomena and causing *movement* and change.” Still more recently<sup>5</sup> he has slightly elaborated his view and furnished some examples, showing a clear grasp of what may be called economic uniformitarianism.

The principle according to which efforts become so important is that their influence is not confined to the individual, but extends to all individuals and to society at large. Just as in

<sup>1</sup> “Besoins, efforts, satisfactions, voilà le fond général de toutes les sciences qui ont l’homme pour objet.” *Journal des Économistes* for September, 1848, vol. xxi, p. 110. The article (pp. 105–120) is entitled : “Harmonies Économiques,” which is also the title of the sixth volume of his complete works (Paris, 1854). The second chapter of this volume (pp. 40–54) is entitled : “Besoins, Efforts, Satisfactions,” and consists of the article considerably expanded, but does not contain the sentence quoted. The article and chapter as a whole are somewhat disappointing when read from the present standpoint.

<sup>2</sup> *Philosophie Positive*, vol. iv, p. 224.

<sup>3</sup> See his *Principles of Biology* (New York, 1873), vol. ii, p. 499 (§ 373).

<sup>4</sup> *Philosophy of Wealth*, p. 56.

<sup>5</sup> *University Extension* for November, 1894, vol. iv, p. 138.

biology it is not the particular organism or the particular race, but the organic world in general that is benefited by the struggle for existence, so in the social sphere it is neither the individual nor his direct family or line, but society at large that is the recipient of the advantageous consequences of dynamic activities. In breaking a new way to the satisfaction of a particular individual's wants, a means is secured of satisfying like wants of all other individuals, and they appropriate it and reap the benefits. Just as the pioneer who cuts a road through a forest and goes on, never to use it again, is soon followed by others until it becomes a great highway, so the results accomplished by the efforts of the individual, though only useful to him for the time being, remain as the initial steps in the material civilization of the world. A dynamic action is one that affects not merely the primary agent at the particular time, but all other agents for all time. Such actions are sometimes called "fructifying causes." They are pregnant with future consequences. Static actions leave matters in the same state after as before their performance. Dynamic actions create a new state in which small efforts produce relatively great results. The routine work of the housewife in preparing meals, washing dishes, making beds and cleaning house, is purely static, and must be done over and over again each day in a perpetual round with no ulterior effects; but one who organizes new and improved methods of housekeeping or invents labor-saving machines and utensils is engaged in dynamic work, which economizes social energy and husband's the strength of thousands forever afterward. Charity work is chiefly static and supplies only temporary and ever-recurring wants. The highest philanthropy consists in such deeds as tend to diminish the number of indigent persons and thus to render charity unnecessary.

This principle applies with equal force to all three of the primary classes of social wants—the life-sustaining, the life-continuing and the life-mitigating forces. The first of these classes constitutes *par excellence* the field of political economy, or social economics, since it relates directly to the means of

subsistence. In this department the dynamic point of view is that of *consumption*. The older economists almost completely ignored this factor, recognizing it, if at all, only to deny its legitimacy as a part of political economy. Mr. John Stuart Mill probably reflected the consensus of opinion on this question when he said: "Political economy . . . has nothing to do with the consumption of wealth, further than as the consideration of it is inseparable from that of production, or from that of distribution."<sup>1</sup> But some of the economic writers of our day have begun to understand the true meaning of consumption, and are working along that line. As early as 1871 Professor W. Stanley Jevons, after intimating that "dynamical branches of the science of economy may remain to be developed,"<sup>2</sup> proceeds to say:

Political economy must be founded upon a full and accurate investigation of the conditions of utility; and to understand this element we must necessarily examine the character of the wants and desires of man. We first of all need a theory of the consumption of wealth.<sup>3</sup>

Gen. Francis A. Walker approached the problem in the following language:

The chief interest of political economy to the ordinary reader, its chief value to the student of history, must be in the explanation it affords of the advance or the decline of the productive power of nations and communities; and it is only in the consumption of wealth that we find the reasons for the rise of some and the fall of others, from age to age.<sup>4</sup>

It is seen by such writers that from the standpoint of the individual the sole object of production and distribution is the satisfaction yielded in consumption, and that although the individual cares nothing for benefits that accrue to society from his efforts to attain that satisfaction, still these efforts do furnish such benefits, advantageously modifying human institutions and thus causing social progress.

<sup>1</sup> Essays on some Unsettled Questions of Political Economy, 1st edition (London, 1844), p. 132, footnote.

<sup>2</sup> The Theory of Political Economy, Preface, pp. viii-ix.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 46.

<sup>4</sup> Political Economy (New York, 1883), pp. 298-9 (§ 329).

The second primary group of social wants, the life-continuing forces, are still unrecognized in their dynamic aspect. And yet fully one-half of the energy of society is expended in this direction. It is not conceived that anything scientific can be coupled with such a passion as love. This field is turned over exclusively to the poets and romance writers. These, however, probably produce more literature than all other writers combined, and their books are greedily devoured by millions who do not know what science means. A well-conceived romance constitutes one of the best illustrations of the distinction between social dynamics and social statics. It represents the former exclusively. It paints the passion and records the struggle, but satisfaction once attained, it ends. In scientific phrase, it deals with a social want and the effort to supply it; but when these culminate in the social institution, marriage, and crystallize into the social structure, the family, the romance is ended, and the scientific treatise may begin. Yet it is through these prolonged and eventful struggles — the wooings and waitings, the rivalries and jealousies, the chivalry and constancy, the obstacles and disappointments — that character is formed, heroism displayed, labor performed, wars waged, empires founded, fame achieved, and the face of nature transformed.

The third primary class of social wants, the life-mitigating forces, are chiefly derived from the other two, and represent the surplus energy that any given social state may afford after satisfying these. They are the aesthetic, moral and intellectual cravings of civilized men. The efforts put forth for the realization of ideals of beauty, righteousness and truth are the noblest that life elicits, and from them flow art, beneficence and intelligence. The study of these highest aspirations of the soul and the dynamic transformations that attend them is clearly a thing apart from the study of the institutions to which they give rise, considered as finished products.



## IV.

To sum up, then, the test of a static phenomenon is that it shall relate to function, *i.e.*, shall have directly or indirectly to do with some one of nature's ends in sustaining, continuing or mitigating life. This includes all structures and the metabolic processes necessary to maintain, renew, increase and multiply them, but not the conditions which change or modify them. Social structures are institutions, in the broadest sense of that term, and static sociology embraces the study not only of the nature of institutions, but of all that they accomplish in their normal capacity — their anatomy and physiology. However well it may be known that they are undergoing change, this must be left out of view, and they must be studied as so many facts, *i.e.*, contemplated as fixed, just as the systematic botanist or zoölogist contemplates the species of plants or animals.

Sociology as a science recognizes society as a theater of forces, and this as well in its static as in its dynamic aspect. The three primary groups of social forces are the life-sustaining, the life-continuing and the life-mitigating wants. These result in organization, and the purpose of organization is the production of mechanisms for economizing energy. Such mechanisms accomplish their object by securing an equilibrium of forces, and the study of social forces in equilibrium is static sociology.

The organs adapted to sustaining social life are chiefly those institutions within the scope of political economy that may be studied from the standpoint of their nature or of their action — anatomically or physiologically — both of which studies belong to static sociology.

The organs adapted to continuing social life are chiefly marriage institutions and the family, but they may be studied comparatively and made to include all forms of marriage and the whole subject of kinship. So long as these various institutions, no matter how diverse in different nations and ages, are considered as they actually are, or as they were at any given time,

and not as in process of transformation, the limits of social statics are not transgressed.

The organs adapted to mitigating social life include all the institutions that cluster round art, religion, ethics, literature and science. Each of these vast fields is capable of being studied in its statical aspects as a product of social organization.

In sharp contradistinction to all this, the test of a dynamic phenomenon is that it shall relate to feeling and shall have to do with the direct effects of action in the effort to satisfy want, *i.e.*, with the ends of the individual in some one of the three primary classes. The effects themselves are incidental and unintended so far as the ends of the agent or of nature are concerned, but they constitute the only element of change in the types of structure.

In society these changes serve to adapt man to his surroundings, to modify and reform human institutions, and in general to cause social progress. Dynamic as well as static sociology deals with the social forces, *i.e.*, with social wants; and in the one case as in the other these are divisible into such as respectively sustain, continue and mitigate life. The dynamic factor in each is effort. In the first the satisfaction comes in the act of appropriating, or, in economic phrase, of consuming. This stimulus leads to every form of economic movement, and is what makes the wealth of nations. In the second the stimulus not only prompts the greatest deeds, but, what is more important, its quiet universal working makes the homes of all lands. In the third we see the simultaneous development of art, religion, morals, education, science and industry. All these movements in harmonious coöperation work the changes that go on in social institutions, and constitute what is known as social progress.

It may be remarked, in conclusion, that there has been a perceptible tendency during most of the nineteenth century to break away from the objective or static standpoint in thought and to consider things in their subjective or dynamic aspects. This tendency has manifested itself in all the higher departments of science. The great biological revolution has already

been referred to. In psychology it took the form of a transfer of attention from thought to feeling, from intellect to sense. Kant led the way by recognizing the subjective aspect of mind (*Sinnlichkeit*) as worthy of scientific study, though he did not himself study it, but Schopenhauer, embodying it in the term *Will*, made it the "thing-in-itself," and revolutionized the philosophy of mind. Bain's study of the emotions and the will and Spencer's estho-physiology gave this side of the subject the sanction of science, and led the way to modern experimental psychology. In sociology Comte insisted upon the "affective" faculties as a factor in social physics, and in his later writings elaborated his *philosophie du cœur*, which as eminent and conservative a psychologist as Professor Wundt, notwithstanding the prevailing opinion, declares not to indicate a diseased mind.<sup>1</sup> All these influences, coupled with the universal study of the sub-human stage of life, where feeling is well-nigh supreme, worked a great change in the standpoint from which everything was to be viewed, amounting to little less than an *Umwerthung aller Werthe*. The economists who are founding a dynamic economics, based on consumption as the prime factor, may imagine that they are independent of these influences; but in such a supposition they are greatly mistaken. They may not have gone back to learn the sources of their thoughts, but the air is full of the new philosophy, and they have simply drawn from the common reservoir. They are as much the creatures of the modern *Zeitgeist* as was the author of *Dynamic Sociology* in 1883, and the entire movement is one of the clearest examples of the dynamics of mind.

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<sup>1</sup> See Heinrich Waentig, *Auguste Comte und seine Bedeutung für die Entwicklung der Socialwissenschaft* (Leipzig, 1894), p. 92.