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World War II and the Japanese in the Prewar Philippines

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When World War II reached the Philippines many Japanese residing in this Asian neighbour of Japan had for years been fighting their own little war against what, to them, were anti-Japanese policies of the Commonwealth Government, but from the Filipino point of view were economic measures to strengthen the Philippine economy in preparation for its coming independence. Not a few Japanese immigrants and investors felt it was very hard to live and do business in a country which was not under Japanese control. A Japanese businessman in Davao commented that in contrast to Davao, it was much easier for Japanese to operate in the South Seas because the islands were under the Japanese mandate.[1]

The Japanese interned by Filipino and American forces felt the natural human feeling of joy over release from incarceration when they were set free by the invading Japanese. Many more had an additional reasons to be happy: at last, they must have thought, they could continue operating in the Philippines under the Japanese flag. Very few foresaw the destruction and suffering that wars bring regardless of which side wins. Most Japanese including those in the Philippines welcomed the Second World War, and many Japanese residents in the Philippines may have seen the war as a culmination of the long years of toil they had put in the country's lands and natural resources.[2]

This paper will describe Japanese economic expansion in the Philippines in the decades before World War II and what happened to the Japanese during the war in the Philippines. It will show the interweaving relationship between Japanese interests and Philippine independence. To do this, it will first describe the role of the Philippines in Japan's "nanshin-ron" (southward expansion) and pan-Asianism.

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[1]This point was made in a speech given by Masaki Kichiemon, an agent of the recruitment agency for Japanese emigrants, before the Gakuto Shisei Kai (Student Sincerity Society). *Gakuto Shisei Kai hakendan kenkyū hōkoku, 1935 nen* [Research Report of the Gakuto Shisei kai Delegation, 1935], ed. Gakuto Shisei Kai (Tokyo: Gakuto Shisei Kai, 1936), pp. 74–87.

[2]Accounts by prewar Japanese in the Philippines who got caught in the war are too numerous to mention here, but two of the most often quoted are Kanegae Seitarō, *Aruite kita michi Hiripin monogatari* [The Path I Walked: A Story of the Philippines] (Tokyo: Kokuseisha, 1968) and Furukawa Yoshizō, *Dabao kaitaku ki* [Development of Davao] (Tokyo: Furukawa Kabushikigaisha, 1956). One that is less well known but nevertheless provides a useful Japanese view of the Philippines in the early 1920s and the rumoured coming of a war between the United States and the Philippines is that of Mikami Keichō, branch manager in Manila of the Mitsui Bussan. His "Economic Alliance", first published in the *Philippine Review* of December 1916, was later appended to a longer work entitled *Hiripin jijō* [Philippine Conditions] (Tokyo: Takushoku Shimpōsha, 1922). He wrote that capitalists would be the last group to welcome any war, for war meant the disruption of business and a cessation of profits. Furukawa, proprietor of the Furukawa Plantation Company, on the other hand, saw some profitable opportunities in wars. Kanegae, proprietor of the famous Nippon Bazaar on the Escolta was one of the many Japanese who rejoiced over the landing of the Japanese in Manila.

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Dictates of Geography: From "Nan'yō" to the "Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere"

The Philippines is situated in what the Japanese used to call the "nan'yō" (literally, "south seas") an area at present called Southeast Asia.[3] In Japanese literature of the 1920s and 1930s "nan'yō" usually referred to any or all countries south of Japan. At times, however, when Japanese writers identified the countries that constituted the "nan'yō" , some would exclude what others would include. The prewar Japanese Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce defined the "nan'yō" as "the area consisting of innumerable big and small islands scattered between the Southeast part of the Asian continent and the continent of Australia"; Soejima Yasoroku listed the countries comprising the "nan'yō" as the Straits Settlements, the Malay States, Siam, French Indo-China, the Dutch East Indies, British Borneo, Portuguese Timor, British (formerly German) New Guinea, the Pacific Islands, and the Philippines; and a newspaper, *Shin Aichi* had a vast concept which took in Taiwan and China.[4]

Some writers were inconsistent: sometimes they included the Philippines in the "nan'yō", sometimes they excluded it. Others arbitrarily excluded the Philippines from the concept: the "nan'yō" comprised the Pacific Islands, Australia and New Zealand, but not the islands "belonging to Asia or America", said Yoshino Sakuzō.[5] Arbitrary deletion of the Philippines from the "nan'yō" was a gesture, sincere and otherwise, to placate the United States which was becoming suspicious of Japan's activities in Asia.

Regardless of how the Japanese intellectuals defined its boundaries, the "nan'yō" had attracted Japanese labourers and investors since the early years of the twentieth century. By the 1920s the growing number of Japanese immigrants and expanding Japanese investments in the Philippines added to the dictates of geography in definitely placing the Philippines within the "nan'yō", in the path of Japan's southward expansion. Toward the end of the 1930s advocates of "nanshin-ron" wrote about the importance of the Philippines as "the cradle" of Japan's southward advance, or as the "stepping stone" to other islands in the South.

Still, the boundaries of the "nan'yō" remained undefined until the term gradually faded out of use. In 1940, when the Japanese government finally came out with an official policy to expand beyond its traditional sphere of concern (Korea, China, and Manchuria), instead of "nan'yō" the term used was Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. And again, the Philippines was arbitrarily deleted from the list of countries that comprised this sphere. On 27 July 1940 the Liaison Conference between the Japanese Imperial Supreme Military Command and the Japanese Government decided to advance militarily into Southeast Asia. Indo-China, Hong Kong, the Dutch East Indies and the French South Pacific Islands were mentioned, but not the Philippines. The only references to the Philippines in these and related documents are in connection with Japan's statements that it wanted to prevent the United States from joining Great Britain in a war against

[3]To avoid mistaking this vague geographical concept with the South Seas Islands or the Pacific, which were also referred to in Japanese as Nan'yō, it is translated here either as "countries south of Japan", or "countries on the southern seas". When the original Japanese is used, the initial letter is not capitalized except at the beginning of a sentence.

[4]Shimizu Hajime, *Southeast Asia in Modern Japanese Thought: The Development and Transformation of "Nanshin-ron"* (Australia: Australian National University, 1980), passim.

[5]Ibid., pp. 2–3.

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Japan. Japan emphasized its "peaceful" economic interests in the Philippines and its readiness to guarantee the neutrality of the Philippines should the country decide to be neutral.[6]

The arbitrary deletion of the Philippines from official Japanese statements regarding the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere was an attempt on the part of Japan to salvage deteriorating relations with the United States, but it was geographically impossible to pluck the Philippines out of its natural location. Regardless of this official definition by the Japanese government, not a few Japanese journalists and propagandists included the Philippines in their writings about the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.

Pan-Asianism and Philippine Independence

The ideological counterpart of the southward expansion was pan-Asianism, a movement that began in the 1880s. Japanese pan-Asianism was the ideal of patriotic and expansionist organizations such as the Genyōsha, founded in 1881, and the Kokuryūkai, founded in 1901. The leaders of these two organizations wanted to foster "Asian brotherhood", "justice", "liberty", and an "independent Asia under the leadership of Japan". However, a perusal of the literature put out by the Genyōsha and the Kokuryūkai would show that by "Asia" the writers usually meant only China and Korea. The Philippines was hardly known to them.[7]

Of course the Japanese government was aware of international developments, including events in the Philippines. By the 1890s it knew that Spain's power in Asia was waning, and that Germany was slowly moving into the islands south of Japan. When the Philippine Revolution broke out in 1896, its leaders approached some pan-Asianists for help, and the Japanese government discreetly encouraged these pan-Asianists to promise to sell weapons to the revolutionaries and to send men to fight with the Filipinos against Spain.[8] The Japanese government, however, did not get involved in the Philippine Revolution for the altruistic reason of helping the Philippines become independent. Rather Japan wanted the weak Spanish government removed because under a weak colonial power the Philippines would be a temptation for a stronger power, Germany in particular, and in that location Germany would become a threat to Japan's own security. Moreover, Japan

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[6]Among the related documents were the Kokusaku no kijun [Basis of National Policy], approved at a meeting of the Prime Minister, the Foreign, the Army, and the Navy Ministers on 7 Aug. 1936, and Teikoku kokusaku suikō yōkō [Guidelines for the Implementation of the Imperial Policy], adopted by the Imperial Conference on 6 Sep. 1941, in *Nihon gaikōshi* [Diplomatic History of Japan], ed. Kajima Heiwa Kenkyūjō, vol. 22, pp. 7–17, and vol. 23, pp. 197–99.

[7]Reprints of the publications of the Kokuryūkai are in *Kokuryūkai kankei shiryō-shū* [Collection of Kokuryūkai Publications] (Tokyo: Kashiwa Shobō, 1992) 10 vols. Kokuryūkai, *Tōa senkaku shishi kiden* [Biographies of East Asian Nationalist Pioneers] (Tokyo: Hara Shobō, 1936) also gives a summary of the activities and interests of major pan-Asianists.

[8]On the contacts between Filipino revolutionaries and some members of the Genyōsha and the Kokuryūkai, Josefa M. Saniel, *Japan and the Philippines, 1868–1898* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1969), is still a good reference. A more recent and clear scholarly thesis arguing that Japan had aggressive motivations in its involvement in the Philippine revolution is Ikehata Setsuho, "Hiripin kakumei to Nihon kan'yo" [Japan's Involvement in the Philippine Revolution], in *Seiki tenkan-ki ni okeru Nihon-Hiripin kankei* [Philippine-Japan Relations at the Turn of the Century], ed. Ikehata Setsuho, Terami Motoe and Hayashi Shinzō (Tokyo: Tokyo Gaikokugo Daigaku Ajia-Afrika Gengo Bunka Kenkyūjo, 1989), pp. 1–36.

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would not have accepted an independent Philippines because the Filipinos, at least as the judgement of the Japanese, were not capable of defending their country from a possible German takeover.[9] The discreet support of Philippine independence, in short, was a Machiavellian move on the part of the Japanese government to maintain good relations with the Western powers with whom it was negotiating for the abrogation of the unequal treaties, and to guard against any development in the Philippines which might be detrimental to Japan's security and economic interests in the south.

The pan-Asianists approached by the revolutionaries saw their adventure in the Philippines during the Revolution as an exciting but fleeting diversion from their more enduring involvement in China and Manchuria. One of them even bewailed his "lack of discipline" for allowing himself to "succumb to the new enthusiasm" of helping in the Philippine Revolution.[10]

From the mid-nineteenth century to the beginning of the twentieth, there were very few Japanese in the Philippines, and among them those who entered the country in order to observe the Revolution. There were just 16 Japanese in the Philippines in 1896, 24 in 1898, and 93 in 1899. They included Lt. Col. Kususe Kiyohiko (alias K. Yamada), who was sent to the Philippine in 1896 by the Japanese Colonial government in Taiwan, Shiroo Sakamoto, who arrived in 1897, and Tokizawa Uikichi who arrived in 1898. One other man deserves special mention, for he had come much earlier on his own, in search of greener pastures. His name was Tagawa Moritarō, perhaps the only Japanese to stay continuously in the Philippines for an extended period, almost 30 years beginning in 1890. In the last years of his life, however, he frequently visited his homeland, where he died in 1920. Tagawa, who had married a Filipina and had learned the local language, acted as interpreter for the Japanese observers and the leaders of the Philippine Revolution. But he also lent out his carriage to the Spanish government in Manila for the transport of ammunition to be used against the revolutionaries. Tagawa made the government pay damages when the carriage was returned in a deplorable condition, with the horse almost dead. He was indeed first and foremost a merchant, and not a person imbued with ideals of "Asian brotherhood and independence of all of Asia".[11]

Secret Japanese "aid" to the Filipino revolutionaries continued even during the Spanish-American War, when the announced policy of Japan was neutrality. However, genuine independence of the Philippines was never part of Japanese policy. When Foreign Minister Okuma Shigenobu formulated Japan's policy towards the Philippines by September 1898, it included either support for the U.S. colonization of the islands, or for administration

[9]For samples of Japanese opinion on the Filipino capacity for independence, see Nitobe Inazō, "Genjūmin seisaku" [Colonization Policy], in *Nitobe Inazō zenshū* [Collected Works of Nitobe Inazō], vol. 4 (Tokyo: Kyōbunkan, 1969), pp. 130–67, and Tsurumi Yūsuke, *Nan'yō yu ki* [Nan'yō Travels] (Tokyo: Shōbundō, 1928), passim.

[10]Miyazaki Tōten, *My Thirty-Three Years' Dream* (The Autobiography of Miyazaki Tōten), trans. Etō Shinkichi and Marius B. Jansen (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982), p. 141.

[11]The information on the number of Japanese in the Philippines during this period is from Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Records Archives (hereafter JMFA), 7.1.5.4, Kaigai zairyū hōjin shōgyō betsu jinkō chōsa ikken, dai 3-kan [Population of Overseas Japanese Classified According to Occupation, vol. 3]. Regarding Tagawa Moritarō, see Yoshikawa Yōko, "Bei-ryō ka Manira no shoki Nihonjin shōgyō, 1898–1920: Tagawa Moritarō no nan'pō kan'yo" [Development of the Japanese Commercial Sector in Manila, 1898–1920: The Case of Jose M. Tagawa], *Tōnan Ajia kenkyū* 18,3 (1980): 387–421.

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of the islands either by Japan alone or in conjunction with the United States and/or Great Britain.[12] The United States decided to colonize the Philippines on its own, a decision the Japanese government immediately supported.

With the stabilization of conditions in the Philippines under American rule, the Japanese feeling of insecurity towards the potential presence of a hostile power on Philippine soil disappeared; Japan now wished the U.S. would stay forever in the Philippines: as far as it was concerned, Filipinos were better off under American rule and the Filipinos should stop agitating for independence. "The Americans should continue colonizing and civilizing the Philippines", said Nitobe Inazō (1862–1933), a Japanese intellectual and diplomat. Very few Japanese intellectuals expressed an opinion in favour of immediate independence for the Philippines.[13] There were still some remnants of the pan-Asianists of the Genyōsha and the Kokuryūkai who gave minimal support to General Artemio Ricarte who, instead of pledging allegiance to the U.S. government opted to live in exile in Japan, but there was hardly any definite plan on their part to help the Philippines become independent. Moreover, the Japanese government, concerned with Japanese emigrants, goods, and investments in the Philippines, distanced itself from the pan-Asianists.[14]

By the 1930s American suspicion of Japan's real intention in the Philippines, a suspicion that had arisen during the 1920s, became stronger, and in 1939 American High Commissioner Paul McNutt proposed abandoning the plan of making the Philippines independent and granting the country dominion status instead. The Manila Chamber of Commerce suggested that independence be postponed for 25 years. The Japanese government was even more vehement than the Filipinos in opposing these proposals. For the first time in the history of Philippine-Japan relations Japan openly and officially spoke for the right of the Filipinos to be independent. "Asia for the Asiatics" became the slogan of Japan's foreign policy. Pan-Asianism now clearly extended to the Philippines. Japan's invasion of the Philippines for the cause of "pan-Asianism" and "independence of all of Asia" happened only a year after the Japanese government openly spoke for Philippine independence, and while Japan did give independence to the Philippines in October 1942, in the light of the history of its motivations in the Philippines, it was and still is hard to believe the sincerity of this act.

The Japanese in the Philippines

The Japanese had a heyday in the Philippines under American rule. In spite of laws limiting immigration into the U.S. and its colonies, Japanese emigrants entered the Philippines virtually without restriction. Japanese goods and capital also entered the country, the latter originating in part with old-time immigrants who had accumulated

[12]Saniel, *Japan and the Philippines*, p. 219.

[13]Nitobe Inazō *zenshū* dai 4 kan [Collected Works of Nitobe Inazō, vol. 4] pp. 139, 160–61; Matsunami Niichirō, "Hiripin no dokuritsu to Nichi-Bei kankei" [Philippine Independence and U.S.-Japan Relations], *Gaikō jihō* 74,2 (1935): 36–59; for more examples of Japanese views on Philippine independence, see Lydia N. Yu-Jose, *Japan Views the Philippines, 1900–1944* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1992), passim.

[14]See speech of Yoshida Tan'ichirō, consul general to Manila from 1939 to 1940, "Dokuritsu katei no Hiripin" [The Philippines on the Road to Independence], *Hiripin jōhō* 42 (Nov. 1940): 1–20, and Gaimushō Chōsa Bu, dai 2 ka, *Hiripin minzoku shi* [History of the Filipino People] (Tokyo: Nihon Kokusai Kyōkai, 1941).

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wealth through long years of labour in the Philippines, and in part with Japanese who came to the Philippines as investors.

Partly due to the effect of the literature of the advocates of "nanshin-ron" or southward advance, especially the material that appeared in magazines such as *Seikō* and *Jitsugyō no Nihon*, and partly because of the poor economic conditions faced by Japanese peasants and their desire to have a better life, many Japanese emigrated in the 1920s and 1930s. Most of them settled in Hawaii, mainland United States, Canada, Brazil, Peru, and the Philippines.

The Japanese population in the Philippines before 1903 was so small and transient that except for those who had a role in the Philippine Revolution, and Tagawa Moritarō, it was hardly worthy of mention. In 1903 the first large group of Japanese — a hundred or so — was sent to the Philippines by recruitment agencies to work on the Kennon Road in Benguet, around 300 kilometres north of Manila. They were followed every one or two months by batches of 100 or so until the number reached more than a thousand. In 1904 some 150 labourers transferred to Davao. The following year, when work on the Kennon Road was finished, more went to the south, while others stayed in Trinidad Valley in Baguio and grew vegetables or moved to Manila where they became merchants or craftsmen. The remainder went back to Japan.

Unlike the Japanese who went to other destinations, those who came to the Philippines had no intention of staying in the country permanently. They wanted to work at most for three years, and then go home with their savings. When by the 1920s more abaca plantations were opened by Japanese entrepreneurs in Davao, the length of intended stay became as long as ten years, but there was always the intention to go back to Japan. Gradually, however, their life in the Philippines, especially in Davao, became so stable that many decided to raise families and settle there permanently. The Japanese government and the advocates of "nanshin-ron" actually looked with disfavour on the Japanese who stayed only for short periods of time in the Philippines. The sending of labourers accompanied by their families was encouraged in order to give them an incentive to remain in the Philippines.

In 1912 there were 3,654 Japanese in the Philippines. Those in Manila numbered 1,318, and those in Davao numbered only 429. By 1919 Japanese population in the Philippines had reached 9,874, with 5,621 in Davao and 2,068 in Manila. The number gradually declined over the next four years because of the slump in the market price of Manila hemp cultivated by the Japanese in Davao, but the size of the Japanese population again started to increase in 1924 when the market price of Manila hemp improved, and rose until in 1927 there were 11,092 Japanese in the Philippines — 7,002 in Davao and 2,222 in Manila. In 1935 Japanese population in the whole Philippines reached 21,468, with 13,535 in Davao and only 4,159 in Manila. There had been a shift in the centre of the Japanese community from Manila to Davao. In 1941 the estimated number of Japanese in Davao was 20,000.[15]

The Philippines had the highest concentration of Japanese in Southeast Asia before the war. Between 1907 and 1917, 30 per cent of all Japanese in Southeast Asia were in the

[15]The estimate for 1941 is from Dabao Kai, *Dabao natsukashi no shashin shū* [A Nostalgic Pictorial of Davao] (Tokyo: Dabao Kai, 1985), p. 318; the rest are from Yoshikawa, [Development of the Japanese Commercial Sector in Manila], p. 55.

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Philippines. The percentage rose to 45 per cent in 1918, 50.3 per cent in 1929, hovered around 60 per cent throughout the 1930s, and surged to 63.7 per cent in 1940.[16] In comparison with other Southeast Asian countries, the Japanese in the Philippines consistently sent the biggest amount of remittances to Japan. Tables 1 and 2 show the remittances of the Japanese from different Southeast Asian countries between 1918 and 1935, and in 1941 and 1943.

TABLE 1
JAPANESE REMITTANCES TO JAPAN, 1918–35
(Amounts in Yen)

	Philippines	**British Malaya**	**Dutch East Indies**	**Others**
1918–22	2,814,938	934,472	542,578	1,155,971
1923–27	3,847,624	1,411,946	687,683	1,230,856
1928–32	4,170,144	1,940,998	915,863	786,042
1933	875,965	494,706	166,595	14,881
1934	1,001,119	247,601	266,650	77,193
1935	857,240	198,104	250,313	106,924

Source: Constructed from JMFA, J.1.2.0 – J8 – 2, Imin ni kansuru tōkei oyobi chōsa zakken, zaigai Honopōjin jin'in oyobi sōkin gaku chōsa (dai 4–6 kan) [Emigration Statistics: Number of Japanese Overseas and Total Amount of Remittances] (vols. 4–5).

TABLE 2
JAPANESE REMITTANCES TO JAPAN IN 1941 AND 1943
(Amounts in Yen)

	1941	**1943**
Philippines	1,166,086	156,772
Thailand	35,656	10,980
French Indo-China	55,138	78,396
Burma	3,000	55,028
Malaya	148,952	135,221
Java	4,037	12,657
Sumatra	1,458	7,500
Borneo	35,060	23,401
East Indies	254,309	3,831

Source: Constructed from JMFA, J.1.2.0 –58, Imin ni kansuru tōkei oyobi chōsa kankei zakken dai 2 kan [Miscellaneous Matters on Statistics and Investigations Regarding Japanese Emigrants, vol. 2].

[16]Hashiya Hiroshi, "Sen zen ki Hiripin ni okeru hōjin keizai shinshutsu no keitai" ["The Pattern of Japan's Economic Expansion to the Philippines Before World War II"], *Ajia keizai* 26,3 (1985): 33.

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The Japanese in the Philippines had a humble beginning. Most of the men were carpenters, fishermen, vendors of Japanese rice cookies (*sembei*), or operators of brothels. A majority of the women were prostitutes. By the 1920s prostitution by the Japanese had been virtually eradicated, and those who were not banished from the Philippines moved into other businesses. Those who were originally in respectable but small enterprises progressed to bigger operations, running bazaars in cities and agricultural plantations in the rural areas.

In 1915 only five out of 48 Japanese companies in the Philippines had ten or more employees. In 1921 there were 217 Japanese companies and 52 of them had ten or more employees. In 1938 there were 353 companies, 86 of which had ten or more employees.

Heightened prosperity could also be seen in the agricultural population of the Japanese community. There were nine agricultural companies owned by Japanese in 1915. The number increased to more than forty-eight in 1929. Almost all of these companies engaged in cultivation and export of Manila hemp. Three were engaged in coconut planting and copra exportation and one in coconut and rubber cultivation; a few combined coconut and hemp cultivation, and others also engaged in lumbering. Two of the most influential companies, the Ohta Development Company and the Furukawa Plantation Company had only a capital of 500,000 pesos and 100,000 pesos respectively in 1915. In 1929 the estimated capital of Ohta Development was 11 million and that of Furukawa Plantation 1.5 million pesos. Most of the hemp plantation companies used two systems of land cultivation. One employed plantation workers paid in daily or monthly wages, the other leased lots to independent cultivators who paid the rent with a certain percentage of the harvest. Since some capital was needed to be an independent cultivator, the increase in the number of independent cultivators over the number of plantation workers would indicate progress. Between 1924 and 1932 plantation workers constituted from 45 per cent to 59 per cent of the total Japanese agricultural population in the Philippines; but from 1933 to 1940 they constituted only from 37 per cent to 45 per cent while independent cultivators constituted from 55 per cent to 66 per cent of the total agricultural population.[17] As of February 1935 the Japanese owned or controlled 57,350 hectares of Davao land. They held about two-thirds of the cultivated land and were responsible for 80 per cent of the hemp, 50 per cent of the copra, and all the lumber produced in the province.[18]

Contact with the local population in the Philippines depended on the kind of job a Japanese held and his social standing in the community. Table 3 shows the number of Japanese engaged in agriculture, commerce, manufacturing, fishing, and other occupations in the 1930s in the Philippines and Guam (although the number of Japanese there was negligible) compared with other Southeast Asian countries. It can be seen in the table that majority of the Japanese in the Philippines were in agriculture, and this was mainly hemp cultivation. Considering that almost all the hemp plantation companies were in Davao

[17]For figures on Japanese companies and plantation workers and independent cultivators see Hashiya, pp. 49 and 41 respectively; for the number of agricultural companies in 1915 see JMFA 3.4.6-3 Nan'yō ni okeru Hōjin kigyō kankei zakken, dai 1 kan [Matters on Japanese Enterprises in the nan'yō, vol. 1, Dec. 1915–Jan. 1919] and for 1918, see Taiwan Sōtoku Kanbō Chōsaka, Nan'yō kakuchi Hōjin saibai kigyō yōran [Tables of Japanese Agricultural Plantation Companies in the nan'yō] (Taipei, 1929), pp. 7–13.

[18]Sidney Fine, *Frank Murphy, The New Deal Years* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1979), p. 102.

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TABLE 3
OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF JAPANESE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA IN 1934

Countries/ Occupation	Agriculture	Commerce	Manufacturing	Fisheries	Mining	Transportation	Public Works	Househelp	Others	Unemployed/ Dependents
Philippines & Guam	6045	3081	1263	1113	3	121	221	99	153	8217
Dutch East Indies	137	2415	335	599		35	206	167	22	2958
British Malaya	171	1169	351	900	69	159	280	275	10	2480
British North Borneo & Sarawak	91	81	16	110			15			266
French Indo-China	13	62	9	16		2	13	20	3	127
Burma	2	73	14	2	2	1	51	10	3	132

Source: Iriye Toraji, *Hōjin kaigai hatten shi*, Volume 2 (1942; reprint, Tokyo: Hara shobō, 1981), pp. 408–409.

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where the Japanese population was concentrated and that almost all these companies were owned and managed by Japanese, it would not be hard to imagine that the social contact of an ordinary worker, much more so that of an independent cultivator, was limited to contacts with his fellow Japanese. Unless a Japanese worker or an independent cultivator took extra efforts, he would not have any opportunity to interact with a Filipino. The same thing can be said of the workers in the manufacturing and fishing sectors.

Due to the nature of their occupation, those in commercial activities, such as those tending bazaars and stores had superficial interaction with Filipinos who patronized their stores. Many of these commercial establishments employed Filipino houseboys, *cargadores* (men who handled heavy boxes or sacks of goods), cooks, or laundry women. Japanese employees and Japanese housewives of the managers of these commercial houses had limited interaction with these Filipino workers. Japanese wives in Davao were affluent enough to hire Filipino servants with whom they interacted. Japanese employees of commercial houses that supplied goods to the retail stores which were monopolized by overseas Chinese had to interact with the Chinese merchants.[19] And of course, the very few Japanese working as household help — gardeners and houseboys employed in Filipino, Chinese, and households of the foreign community — had a closer and broader view of the life of the affluent in the Philippines.

Members of the Japanese elite community in the Philippines — the consul general, the managers of big commercial enterprises, the presidents of the Japanese clubs all over the archipelago had close friends and business partners among the Filipino politico-economic elites. They socialized with the president, senators, congressmen, local government officials, big businessmen, journalists, and other influential Filipinos.

A majority of the Japanese in the Philippines came to the country in search of a better life. Their motivation was purely personal and while a few might have been inspired by "nanshin-ron" ideas, they were moved by the dream of personal enrichment first; the motivation of living a successful life in the nan'yō for the sake of Japan came much later in the 1940s, if it ever came at all to some of them.

Even now people relate stories about how when World War II broke out in the Philippines the gardener of this person, the cook in that restaurant, a certain employee in a certain Japanese bazaar, or a local barber suddenly appeared in Japanese military uniform. There are also still questions as to whether the Japanese in the Philippines before the war were spies of the Japanese government. There were indeed spies among the Japanese community in the Philippines, but they were only a handful. It is public knowledge that years before the outbreak of the war Japanese army and navy men sent to survey strategic landing areas in the Philippines and to gather other vital information mixed freely with the civilian Japanese community. The man who would become Chief of Staff of the Japanese expeditionary force in the Philippines, Lt. Gen. Maeda Masami, was in the Philippines in the 1920s and operated a store selling electrical appliances under the assumed name of Takeda. Morita Noboru, a reserve rear admiral of the Japanese

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[19]See Takahashi Torao, *Hiripin zai-ryū hōjin no omoide no kiroku* [Reminiscences of a Japanese in the Philippines] (handwritten) and Gunji Tadakatsu, *Omoide wa Manira no umi ni* [My Memories are in the Sea of Manila] (Tokyo: Sangatsu Shōbo, 1993) for description of a life of an employee in a Japanese Bazaar in Cebu and in Baguio respectively. Regarding Davao, information on the life of the wife of an officer in Furukawa Plantation was gathered through an interview with Mrs. Migitaka (now deceased) at her residence in 1989. See also Kanegae Seitarō, [The Path I Walked].

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Navy, went to the Philippines in 1933 on a secret mission. Under the assumed name of Moriya, he frequented the Nippon Bazaar on Escolta and pretended to be interested in trade and industrial exhibits. He purchased goods from the Nippon Bazaar and travelled in rural areas disguised as a peddler. He also went to Manila Bay at night and mixed with Japanese fishermen. In 1937 some Japanese in Davao approached Hata Shunroku, the commanding general of the Taiwan Army, for help in their problems with the Philippine government over land holdings. The military was not supposed to get involved in the problems of the Japanese in Davao but felt "[it] could not just keep quiet". Lt. Col. Hayashi Yoshihide (who, from January to July 1942 with the rank of Major General became the deputy chief of staff of the 14th Army and concurrently the Director General of the Japanese Military Administration in the Philippines) was sent to look into the problem. Before his departure in June he was also asked to spy on strategic areas in Lingayen Gulf. One of his contacts in the Philippines was the owner of the Nippon Bazaar, Kanegae Seitarō, who introduced him to Jose Laurel (later the president of the Japanese-sponsored Philippine Republic). Hayashi, however was not able to go to Lingayen, for the China War broke out and he was ordered to return to Taiwan immediately.[20]

More significant and numerous than the spies were the leaders of the Japanese communities in the Philippines. These men were not spies but provided reliable information on political and economic developments in the Philippines as well as on matters of military importance. The 1939 Conference on Economic Conditions in the Nan'yō (Nan'yō keizai kondan kai), sponsored by the Nan'yō Kyōkai (South Seas Association), one of the foremost associations promoting economic expansion to the countries south of Japan, provides an example of the way information was systematically collected by tapping overseas Japanese sources. Japanese living in British colonies in Asia (India, Borneo, and Malaya), the Dutch East Indies (Sumatra and Celebes), French Indo-China, and the Philippines were invited to talk on the economic conditions in their respective countries. Five delegates from the Philippines were invited, including Kanegae Seitarō, proprietor of the Nippon Bazaar and Furukawa Yoshizō, president of the Furukawa Plantation Company. Taking opportunity of Kanegae's presence in Tokyo, the Navy General Staff requested him to give a briefing on the Philippines to some thirty admirals and staff officers. Imamura Eikichi, in the lumber industry and married to a daughter of the governor of Cavite, established contact with the military and together with Morokuma Yasaku, president of the Ohta Development Corporation, attended the meetings on strategic landings in the Philippines.[21]

Philippine Nationalism and the Japanese

Under U.S. colonial rule, there was an on-going programme of gradually making Filipinos stand on their own feet. Political education on democratic government was done side by side with economic measures to prepare Filipinos for independence, although these measures included a measure of American self-interest. Concerning the large issue

[20]Information on Morita Noboru and Maeda Masami is from Kanegae, [The Path I Walked], pp. 517–19 and 543, respectively; information on Hayashi Yoshihide is from Yomiuri Shimbunsha hen, *Shōwa shi no tennō 10* [The Emperor in Shōwa History, vol. 10] (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbunsha, 1970), pp. 101–102.

[21]Kanegae, [The Path I Walked], pp. 296, 365–66.

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it is for present purposes sufficient to say that in spite of the economic measures making the Philippine economy dependent on the United States, the free trade between the two countries being the most controversial, there were also laws enacted by the Philippine Assembly under the tutorship of the U.S. government that aimed at preserving the country's patrimony for Filipinos and Americans.

The Philippine desire to develop the economy autonomously was incompatible with the desire of the Japanese to be needed by the Filipinos. From the Japanese point of view, Japan's economic advance to the Philippines could be maintained only if Filipinos continued to depend on Japanese labour and capital to develop Philippine natural resources. Thus, when Filipino government leaders announced protective economic measures the Japanese tried diplomacy, agitation, illegal means and other ingenious methods to block the plans, and when laws were passed, to thwart their successful implementation or to adapt to them without losing their economic foothold.

One fascinating response of the Japanese to Filipino economic nationalism could be seen in the area of manufacturing, a relatively new Japanese concern in the Philippines compared to agriculture, commerce, or trade and fishing. In 1931 the tariff on imported goods was increased, a measure which worried the Japanese because it would be harder for Japanese products to compete with American goods, which entered the Philippines duty-free. The Japanese solution was to manufacture the goods in the Philippines, instead of importing finished products from Japan. Thus, manufacturing became a new area of investment for them. The Nippon Bazaar previously imported rubber shoes and boots from the Takegawa Rubber Company in Kobe, but following imposition of the heavy tariff the proprietor, Kanegae, decided to manufacture rubber shoes locally. The National Rubber Company, established in 1935, got its supply of rubber from the rubber plantation of Jorge Vargas (who became Executive Secretary of the Commonwealth Government and Philippine Ambassador to Japan during the Japanese Occupation), from an American rubber plantation in Zamboanga, and when these sources proved insufficient, from Singapore.[22]

Similarly, Japanese beer used to enter the Philippines through two Japanese businesses, the Osaka Bazaar (which handled Asahi Beer) and the Takahashi Bazaar (Kirin Beer). When the tax on imported beer was increased, the Dai Nihon Brewery, Mitsui Bussan Company and Osaka Bōeki Company joined with Filipino and Chinese investors in establishing the Balintawak Beer Brewery in January 1937.[23]

Diplomacy and illegal means were used in the areas of fishing and public lands. In 1930 fishing along the coastal waters of the Philippines was restricted to Filipinos and American citizens. Japanese fishermen, however, continued to monopolize the Philippine fishing industry by using Filipino and American dummies. When the Public Land Act was passed in 1919 disallowing ownership of public lands by non-Filipino or non-American citizens and stipulating that a corporation could purchase or lease land only if 61 per cent of its capital stock was owned by Filipinos or Americans, intensive lobbying by the influential Japanese in the Philippines and by the Japanese consul in Washington secured an exemption for seventeen Japanese companies. No additional lands were legally acquired

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[22]Ibid., pp. 256–60.

[23]Takahashi Torao, [Reminiscences of a Japanese], pp. 254–60; Goodman, "Japan and Philippine Beer: the 1930s", *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 1,1 (1970): 54–59.

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by Japanese after 1919, but some were entered under partnership with Filipino or American citizens, and others were put under alleged Filipino owners.[24]

The Japanese land problem in Davao surfaced, disappeared, and reappeared along with the changing political climate of the times. In the 1930s the Philippine government carried out a number of inspection tours to Mindanao to look into allegations of illegal possession of lands by Japanese. On 24 June 1935 Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Eulogio Rodriguez declared that sub-leasing of lands by Filipinos to Japanese was illegal. In August the Japanese in Davao were informed that illegal sub-leases would be cancelled and the Japanese concerned would be paid compensation after improvements on the lands they had rented had been inventoried by the government.

In September 1935, two months before the inauguration of Manuel Quezon as the first president of the Philippine Commonwealth, the Japanese Club in Davao issued a declaration that the Japanese would defend "to the last drop of their blood" their "rights" over the lands they were cultivating. The Japanese Club in Manila issued a statement of support for this determination; and telegrams of the same nature were received from the Japanese clubs in Sulu and Zamboanga.[25] And, as mentioned above, some Japanese in Davao approached the Taiwan Army headquarters for help. During the campaign to elect the first president and vice-president of the Philippine Commonwealth, Manuel Quezon, running for the presidency, deemed it wise to be silent on the land issue, but after his inauguration in November 1935 he stopped the enforcement of Rodriguez' orders, saying that the Japanese in Davao were not violating any law. This remained the position of the government until the outbreak of World War II.

One of the priorities of the Commonwealth leaders was to lay down laws that would protect the nation's patrimony for Filipinos. Pursuant to the constitutional provision that exploitation of lands and other natural resources should be confined to Philippine and American citizens, or corporations the capital of which was not less than 60 per cent Filipino or American, laws were passed by the Philippine Assembly that limited foreign participation in fishing, forestry, mining and agriculture. To put more teeth into these laws and to discourage Filipinos from illegally lending their names to foreigners so that the latter could obtain licenses or franchises under a Filipino name, an anti-dummy law was also passed. In 1940 a new immigration law limited to 500 annually the number of immigrants from any country that could be admitted to the Philippines.[26]

All of these laws directly affected the Japanese immigrants and elicited from them complaints of unfairness and injustice. The Japanese in the Philippines did more than

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[24]Fine, *Frank Murphy*, pp. 101–111; Grant K. Goodman, *Davao, A Case Study in Japanese-Philippine Relations* (Lawrence: University of Kansas East Asian Series, 1967), p. 53; for a contemporary Japanese point of view, see Furukawa, [Development of Davao], pp. 451–82.

[25]Matsumoto Katsuji, *Davao tochi mondai to hōjin jijō* [The Davao Land Problem and the Japanese] (Tokyo: Nan'pō Keizai Chōsa Kai, 1936), pp. 27–28; Kamohara Kōji, *Dabao hōjin kaitaku ki* [History of Development of Davao by Japanese] (Dabao: Nippi Shimbunsha, 1938), pp. 318–44.

[26]See *Commonwealth Acts of the Philippines, 1935–1946, Public laws of the Commonwealth, Enacted by the National Assembly During the Period 21 December 1935 to 9 March 1937, Comprising Acts Nos. 1–232* (Manila: Bureau of Printing, 1938); Commonwealth Act Number 421, An Act to Punish Acts of Evasion of the Laws on the Nationalization of Certain Rights and Franchises or Privileges, 31 May 1939; Commonwealth Act Number 613, An Act to Control and Regulate the Immigration of Aliens into the Philippines, 26 Aug. 1940.

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complain: they also thought of ways to adapt to the new economic nationalism. The government in Tokyo helped them, although on the surface it maintained a hands-off policy and tried to prevent the deteriorating diplomatic ties with the United States from breaking down completely.

The Nan'yō Kyōkai, the foremost organization dedicated to Japanese economic expansion in the nan'yō was elevated to the status of a semi-governmental foundation enjoying financial subsidies from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of Colonial Affairs. Its functions of sending Japanese apprentices to Japanese stores in the nan'yō and disseminating information about the countries in the nan'yō were expanded to include cultural and propagandistic activities. Thus, by 1939, the branch of the Nan'yō Kyōkai in Manila reported that it gave financial "encouragement" to several local publications in order to counteract anti-Japanese propaganda spread by the Chinese.[27] In 1937 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs gave to the Manila Chamber of Commerce one thousand yen to support the chamber's activities of lobbying for Japanese interests in the Philippines.[28]

In the 1930s the "Philippine problem", the difficulties of the Japanese in the Philippines, became a topic of symposia held in Tokyo and in Taiwan, and the Davao land problem was discussed in the Japanese Diet. The head of the Taiwan Foreign Affairs Division suggested in one of the symposia that inasmuch as American citizens had the same rights as Filipinos in the exploitation of Philippine natural resources, second-generation Japanese in the United States who were American citizens should be encouraged to emigrate to the Philippines and obtain economic rights there. Another suggestion was for Japanese born in the Philippines to adopt Filipino citizenship through naturalization.[29] With regard to the Davao land problem, Foreign Minister Arita Hachirō stated in the May 1936 question hour in the Lower House of the Japanese Imperial Diet that the situation resulted from the growing nationalism in the Philippines and was not, as alleged by many, instigated by the United States. The achievements of the Japanese in Davao should be defended, but the problem should be solved without detriment to Philippine-Japan relations. The Foreign Minister, however, did not offer any concrete solution, and there were men within the Diet who saw the Davao problem not as an expression of Filipino nationalism but as an anti-Japanese movement encouraged by the United States or the Chinese, or both.[30]

Another indication of growing Filipino nationalism was the adoption in December 1937 of Tagalog as the basis of the Philippine national language. The Philippine Institute of National Language was authorized in April 1940 to print a dictionary and a grammar book; the teaching of the national language in schools was to begin in the school year 1940. The Japanese in the Philippines were faster than the Philippine government in

[27]The activities of the Nan'yō Kyōkai are described in Lydia N. Yu-Jose, "Japanese Organization and the Philippines, 1930s–1941", *The Journal of International Studies* 33 (Apr. 1994): 83–105 and Lydia N. Yu-Jose, "Organizations and Philippine-Japan Relations, 1890s–1941: Friends But Not Brothers", *Solidarity* 141–42 (1994): 125–34.

[28]Grant K. Goodman, "America's 'permissive' Colonialism: Japanese Business in the Philippines, 1899–1941", in *The Philippine Economy and the United States: Studies in Past and Present Interactions*, ed. Norman G. Owen (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan, Papers on South and Southeast Asia, No. 22, 1983), p. 57.

[29]Chiyōda Tsūshin hen, *Dokuritsu mondai o chūshin ni Hiripin o kataru* [A Symposium on the Philippines: Focus on the Independence Problem] (Tokyo: Chiyōda Tsūshinsha, 1936), pp. 113–14; Ikeda Takuichi, *Hiripin jijō* [Philippine Conditions] (Tokyo: n.p., 1935), p. 28.

[30]Kamohara, [History of Development of Davao by Japanese], pp. 421, 436–37.

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coming out with study materials: the *Japan Information Bulletin*, which served as a venue through which the Japanese community countered unfavourable information about Japan, began a Tagalog column in April 1938, and in February 1939 a handy Tagalog conversation book for Japanese came off the press.[31]

Meanwhile, Japan's aggression in China together with the growing Japanese population in the Philippines and the ever expanding Japanese economic interests in the country deepened U.S. suspicion of Japan's real intentions and prompted a reconsideration of the U.S. plan to give independence to the Philippines.[32] As mentioned earlier, proposals for the postponement of Philippine independence elicited a strong opposition from the Japanese community and the Japanese government, and for the first time, the Japanese government openly spoke in favour of immediate Philippine independence.

Japan had been hoping that once the U.S. left the Philippines free trade between the two countries would end, allowing Japanese goods to compete on an equal footing in the Philippine market. Also, since many Japanese businessmen had established friendship with the Filipino political and economic leaders, many Japanese felt — they might be wrong but this was the way many of them felt — that it would be possible for them to persuade these Filipinos to revise or bend the nationalistic and protective laws in their favour once the "anti-Japanese" Americans were gone. For these reasons, it was understandable that Japan opposed the postponement of Philippine independence. Japan was hoping that problems with the Philippines could be solved through a bi-lateral negotiation.

World War II: Brief Glory and a Big Loss

Events quickly unfolded and the much rumoured U.S.–Japan war finally broke out. On 7 December 1941, a day before the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the Japanese Club in Davao instructed the Japanese residents to prepare clothes, food and other basic necessities for emergency. War was coming, thought many of them, but they were convinced that the Japanese army would come at once. They might have to put up with two or three bad weeks, but there was no doubt in their minds about Japanese victory.[33] It can be assumed that the same preparation was made and the same optimism was held by other Japanese residents in other places in the Philippines.

Pearl Harbor was bombed on 8 December. German and Japanese nationals were rounded up and interned, closely watched by Filipino soldiers. The Japanese consulate, Japanese schools, offices and factories of Japanese corporations, and the Japanese clubs were used as concentration camps. On 20 December the Japanese army entered Davao City; the Japanese men were released on the same day, and the women and children who were interned separately, the following day, amidst shouts of "banzai". Almost exactly the same pattern of events happened in places where there were Japanese residents: they were interned soon after the war broke out and released when the Japanese army occupied the area.

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[31]The book, *Hiripin Tagalog-go kaiwa* [Tagalog conversation] was written by Oki Jitsuo and published in Manila by Atlas Supply company.

[32]Frank Murphy, the American Governor General at the time did not wholly share this predominant suspicious view. See Fine, *Frank Murphy*, p. 104.

[33]Ōkita Sueno, "Philippine Death Diary", in *Women Against War*, comp. Women's Division of Soka Gakkai (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1986), p. 46; Dabao Kai, [A Nostalgic Pictorial], p. 317.

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During the occupation, Japanese residents were mobilized to render service according to their expertise and experience in the country. Thus, Kanegae Seitarō, the proprietor of the Nippon Bazaar and the National Rubber Corporation, with his political connections and insights into the idiosyncrasies of the Filipino leaders became useful as an adviser to the Japanese Military Administration. Takahashi Torao, a sales agent of Osaka Bōeki who was based in Cebu but had also operated in Manila, Iloilo, and other islands, was initially employed to calculate what goods would be needed for rationing, and in what quantities. Later, he was assigned to the association that rationed beer. Beer produced by the Balintawak Beer Brewery was provided to civilians, and the products of the San Miguel Brewery, which were of better quality, to the military. Ōsawa Kiyoshi, a Japanese who came to the Philippines in the 1920s and became a successful businessman, was appointed general manager of the Liquid Fuel Distribution Union. Shishido Zensaku, who arrived in 1931 and after three years as a mere company employee had ventured out on his own to do experiments with raising vegetables, became head of vegetable plantations in Central and Northern Luzon under the Japanese military.[34] And there were many more examples.

Japanese companies were of course obligated to cooperate.[35] The Japanese Navy ordered the Ohta Development Corporation to manage a slaughterhouse on a 300-hectare plot of confiscated land. This became a source of meat for the Japanese soldiers. The Ohta Development Corporation also took over rubber plantations in Cotabato and vegetable plantations in Calamba, and by order of the Japanese Army managed farms in Mandaluyong and Pangasinan where experiments on cultivation of *Hōrai* (Formosa) rice were carried out. In cooperation with the Furukawa Plantation Company the Ohta Development Corporation handled copra production throughout Mindanao, and together with Daidō Bōeki managed the production of salt in Manila.

The Furukawa Plantation Company took over a 2,300 hectare abaca plantation belonging to International Harvester, and land in Los Baños to raise vegetables. The management of several lumber companies was also transferred to the Furukawa Company. When the Japanese Army forcibly established cotton production in the Philippines, Furukawa was one of ten companies ordered to cooperate in the task. Since *miso* (bean paste), a favourite Japanese ingredient for soup, could not be imported from Japan, the Furukawa Company was also ordered to manufacture it in Manila and in Davao for distribution to Japanese civilians and the military. In Manila, it was put in charge of a cast metal factory where copper, brass, and other metals were made into ingots and exported to Japan.

Japanese men were locally conscripted to serve in the Japanese Army and Navy. Of 5,027 conscripted from Davao, only 374 survived the war.[36] Those who did not pass the military requirements but had fluency in English, Spanish, or other local languages were made to act as interpreters between the Japanese soldiers and the Filipinos, Americans,

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[34]Takahashi Torao, [Reminiscences of a Japanese], pp. 217–37; Ōsawa Kiyoshi, *The Japanese Community in the Philippines Before, During, and After the War* (Manila: Joshu Bunko Library, 1994), p. 61; Shishido Zensaku, *Watashi to Ruson-to: senzen senchū no tsuisō* [Luzon and Me: Reminiscences Before and During the War] (Tokyo: Zensaku Shishido, 1990), pp. 48–49.

[35]Furukawa, [Development of Davao], pp. 334–40.

[36]Shirota Yoshiroku, *Dabao imin-shi o aruku: konketsu nisei no sono ato* [A Flashback on the History of the Japanese Immigrants in Davao: What Happened to the Second Generation Japanese] (Fukuoka: Ashi Shobō, 1985), p. ii.

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Spaniards, Chinese, Germans, and other members of the foreign community. Others carried out miscellaneous tasks. Through the Japanese Club, they were made to render free labour.[37]

It is hard to know how many Japanese residents actually benefitted from the Japanese victory and how many suffered loss of life or property. As the occupation went on and economic conditions deteriorated, however, there was a general shortage of basic necessities, and only a few lucky ones were not affected. The average Japanese in Davao had a stock of rice good for two years but this quickly disappeared. The rice ration for one person was 250 grams a day. There was a lot of stealing, and Japanese soldiers killed fellow Japanese caught stealing food. Milk too was rationed, and adults were prohibited from drinking it.[38]

The Japanese lost the war. Japanese civilians were repatriated to Japan in November 1945, and their properties were confiscated. One Japanese who arrived in the Philippines in 1927 had tried to sell his land a year before the war broke out but could find no buyer. He died while escaping in the mountain. His wife who survived the war, wrote: "Of course I was happy [to return to Japan], but I was ashamed too. Even if the war was to blame, I was unhappy to have to return with nothing but what I had on my back."[39] Stories like this are common among the thousands of former Japanese residents in the Philippines who survived.

After the war Japanese citizens and their children who were sixteen years old and above were repatriated, but Filipino wives and children of Filipino and Japanese parentage who were fifteen years old and below were not. For a long time, these children of Japanese descent tried to hide their racial origin for fear of Filipino reprisals, and out of shame for the defeat of Japan. It is only recently that a few of them have come out; some expressed a desire to see Japan and many have fulfilled the wish; still others expressed a desire to be recognized as Japanese citizens. The paper work to prove their Japanese origin was laborious, and only a few succeeded in getting Japanese citizenship.

Epilogue

There are many aspects of the lives of the Japanese immigrants in the Philippines which should be explored to gain a deeper understanding of Philippine-Japan relations before the war. Certainly, their contribution to the development of the Philippine economy, about which has been much written in the Japanese literature, has still to be examined from a Filipino perspective. This paper has tried to shed light on certain aspects of the Japanese presence in the Philippines from the turn of the century to the Second World War. It has shown that the Philippines, due to its geographical proximity to Japan and its rich natural resources, was unavoidably on the path of Japan's southward advance and

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[37]Hiroshima ken, *Hiroshima ijū shi* (tsūshi hen) [History of Emigration From Hiroshima (main text)] (Hiroshima Prefecture, 1993), pp. 475–76; Dabao Kai hen, *Senka ni kieta Dabao kaitaku imin to Manira asa* [The Japanese Immigrants and World War II: The Destruction of the Manila Hemp Industry] (Tokyo: Dabao Kai, 1993), p. 317.

[38]Interview with Tanaka Yoshio, in *Nihon no Hiripin senryō* (The Japanese Occupation of the Philippines, 1941–45, Interviews of Japanese Civil and Military Personnel), ed. Ikehata Setsuho *et al.* (Tokyo: Ryukei Shyosha, 1994), p. 257; Shirota, [A Flashback on the History of the Japanese Immigrants], p. ii.

[39]Ōkita, "Philippine Death Diary", p. 59.

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that Philippine independence was never a genuine part of Japanese policy nor of the pan-Asianists' "idealism". Philippine nationalism, the object of which was independence, proved incompatible with continued Japanese expansion into the Philippines. The article has also emphasized that the Japanese immigrants originally came for personal economic gains, and not in the service of Japan. However, when the Japanese military invaded and occupied the Philippines the Japanese immigrants naturally rejoiced and cooperated with their government. Many Japanese enjoyed the short glory of victory. Some who went back to Japan before the war broke out shared the difficulties of a nation at war, but almost all who lost the properties they had established in the Philippines realized after the defeat of Japan that war was not a desirable method for pursuing national and individual interests.

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