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## EVOLUTIONARY WORLD GOVERNMENT

*James A. Yunker*

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Development of the concept of “evolutionary socialism” around the turn of the twentieth century had a major impact on political and socioeconomic trends throughout the century. Revisionist thinkers such as Eduard Bernstein abandoned the orthodox Marxist position that socialism must necessarily involve social ownership of the nonhuman factors of production, and that socialism in this pure sense could only be achieved through violent revolution. In so doing, they laid the basis for the later success of social democracy in Western Europe and throughout the world. This essay argues that an analogous concept, “evolutionary world government,” might lay the basis for a successful world federalist movement during the twenty-first century. By abandoning the current world federalist ideal of the omnipotent world state, and envisioning as the immediate objective a limited rather than an unlimited world government, a solid foundation might be laid for gradual, evolutionary progress toward the long-term goal of an authoritative and effective, yet democratic and benign, federal world government.

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### INTRODUCTION

The currently prevailing concept of world government, among both the large majority of world government skeptics and the small minority of world government supporters (the “world federalists”), is that of a very strong state entity that would stand in relation to its component member nations much as the federal government of the United States stands in relation to the fifty component states. Such a government would encompass all nations

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in the world without exception, would not tolerate the withdrawal of any nation from the federation under any circumstance, and would monopolize all heavy weaponry, including nuclear weapons. This concept of world government is referred to here as the “omnipotent world state.” In addition, the world government would be subject to pure democratic control by its citizens through free and contested election of high government officials. According to proponents, such a government would virtually eliminate the possibility of nuclear holocaust, and would enable effective global action to be taken against such long-term threats as economic inequality and environmental deterioration. According to skeptics, such a government would either quickly dissolve amid civil war, or it would stabilize itself by means of imposing a draconic totalitarian regime on the world, most likely of a dictatorial nature.

Aside from the small minority of world federalists, it is almost universally assumed that there is no credible peaceful transition path from the current international status quo to the omnipotent world state described above. This essay does not challenge this consensus opinion. However, it does challenge the widespread view that no federal world government short of the omnipotent world state would be a worthwhile undertaking. The basis of the challenge is the proposition that there exist viable world government possibilities whose authority and effectiveness would lie somewhere between that of today’s relatively ineffectual United Nations and that of the omnipotent world state, and that these intermediate possibilities would both significantly improve the processes of global governance in the proximate future, and lay a secure foundation for further gradual, evolutionary progress over the long term toward a highly authoritative and effective, yet democratic and benign, world government. In other words, a limited world government, as opposed to an unlimited world government, is both achievable and desirable; at least, a more persuasive case can be made to this effect than can be made for the omnipotent world state. In fact, it is arguable that were the notion of limited world government to become sufficiently familiar to the international relations profession and the general public, this might result in such a fundamental reappraisal of the general concept of world government that the establishment of an actual world government within the foreseeable future would become significantly more likely.

In support of this proposition, this essay explores the analogy between “evolutionary socialism” and “evolutionary world government.” At the turn

of the twentieth century, revisionist socialists such as Eduard Bernstein laid a secure foundation for the increasing success of social democracy during the twentieth century in Western Europe and throughout the world by redefining the objectives of socialism, and by rethinking the strategy for attaining these objectives. By revising the orthodox Marxist concept of socialism, and renouncing the orthodox Marxist doctrine of the necessity of violent revolution to achieve socialism, the revisionists made this new concept of socialism more attractive to a broad range of people. It is possible that in the twenty-first century, an analogous revision of the world federalist objective away from the omnipotent world state and toward a limited federal world government would lay the basis for a viable and effective real-world political movement toward this revised objective. On the basis of real-world experience, it is now widely accepted that many if not most of the institutions and policies associated with social democracy have had a generally beneficial effect on the welfare of most of the world's population. If, in the future, a limited world government were to be established and given time to prove itself, it might at some point thereafter also be widely acknowledged as having significantly improved the welfare of most if not all of the world's population.

The remainder of this essay is organized as follows. First, we present a brief history of the idea of world government, with special emphasis on the rise and fall of the world federalist movement in the aftermath of World War II. We propose that the rapid decline of world federalism into political insignificance during the postwar period is largely attributable to the inability of both proponents and opponents, in both noncommunist and communist nations, to conceive of world government as anything other than the omnipotent world state. We proceed to a brief account of the socialist movement from its origins in the early nineteenth century to the present day. A pivotal point in this history was the recognition by a significant number of socialists, toward the end of the nineteenth century, that a viable alternative existed to the hard-line Marxist concept of socialism, a recognition that was signaled by the publication in 1899 of Eduard Bernstein's profoundly influential book *Evolutionary Socialism*. This recognition enabled the social democratic component of the socialist movement to attain significant political influence within several Western European nations during the course of the twentieth century and into the twenty-first, as well as within numerous other nations throughout the world. Ensuing sections of the essay return to

world federalism. We note some promising recent developments in world federalist thinking; these developments may presage a revision of the world federalist goal away from the omnipotent world state and toward some alternative form of limited world government that might be a more serious contender for actual implementation in the foreseeable future. Parallels are observed between such a potential revision in world federalist thinking in the twenty-first century and the actual revision in socialist thinking that occurred around the turn of the twentieth century. We consider the salient practical distinctions between limited and unlimited world government, and take up the related issue of global economic inequality as an impediment to global political utility. The essay concludes with a brief summary of the argument that a properly designed limited federal world government would be an improvement over the existing international political status quo.

#### A BRIEF HISTORY OF WORLD GOVERNMENT

The notion of a single political organization encompassing the whole of humanity—a world state—has intrigued humankind since earliest recorded history.<sup>1</sup> It is clear, however, that our contemporary idea of world government (formed peacefully through universal contract, with purposes encompassing not only the preservation of peace but the general advancement of the human condition throughout the world) did not reach full fruition until the recent modern era. Well-known earlier proposals for a supernational political organization encompassing all the nations of the earth, such as the Council of Ambassadors of the French monk Émeric Crucé, and the Congress of States of the German philosopher Immanuel Kant, were actually for no more than a universal mutual assistance alliance for the exclusive purpose of preserving peace.<sup>2</sup> The essence of these early concepts was eventually realized in the form of the League of Nations, established in 1919 immediately after World War I. The League was notably unsuccessful in its primary objective not only because of the non-adherence of the United States, but also because it had the misfortune of operating during what turned out to be an uneasy truce separating World Wars I and II. The successor organization to the League of Nations, the United Nations, established in 1945 immediately after World War II, has also compiled an unimpressive peacekeeping record. Although it has indeed intervened successfully in a few cases of relatively minor regional conflicts, the UN was powerless against the Cold War confrontation between the communist and noncommunist blocs of nations that

threatened a nuclear World War III. That such a horrific war did not erupt at some point during the perilous Cold War decades cannot reasonably be attributed to the existence and activities of the United Nations.

Prior to the mid-twentieth century, there had been numerous proposals for political organizations superior to the nation-states. Edith Wynner and Georgia Lloyd, world federalist activists of the 1930s and 1940s, compiled a large collection of such proposals.<sup>3</sup> Part II of their compilation (“There Is Nothing New under the Sun—Old Plans to Unite Nations Dating from 1306 to 1914,”) briefly describes seventy-four plans. Part III (“Theoretical Plans to Unite Nations since 1914”) contains more detailed descriptions of an additional twenty-five plans (included in the categories “Universal” and “Federal” but not pertaining to the United Nations established in 1945) that were published between 1915 and 1944. However, a large proportion of these plans are for regional associations of relatively small subsets of nations, often amounting to little more than formalized military alliances. For example, many of the plans from the early modern era were motivated by the prospect that a tighter association among the Christian nations of Europe would enable more effective resistance against Muslim aggression, especially that emanating from the Ottoman empire.

The years just after World War II saw the most intensive envisioning and development of plans for world government in the current sense: a full-fledged government organization encompassing all the world’s nations with purposes confined not merely to peacekeeping, but extending also to overall human welfare improvement by means beyond simply preventing wars. In other words, the current concept of world government involves a direct extrapolation of the manifold purposes of national governments toward their respective citizens, to the entire population of the world. Such plans were not unknown prior to World War II. During the World War I year of 1918, for example, Raleigh C. Minor, a professor of constitutional and international law at the University of Virginia, published a treatise describing a quite modern concept of world government.<sup>4</sup> Although Minor used the same name (League of Nations) as the real-world organization soon afterwards established by the Treaty of Versailles (1919), his proposal was for something far more ambitious than the real-world League. Minor’s League would have been a genuine world state with strong enforcement powers and democratic control by its citizens. Proposals analogous to that of Professor Minor became far more abundant following World War II.

The dramatic but highly ephemeral post-World War II “world government boom” is plausibly attributed to a shock reaction to the first (and thus far only) use of nuclear weapons in warfare, the August 1945 atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This quantum leap in the destructiveness of weaponry lent more credence than ever before to the long-standing world federalist contention that the costs of war have become unendurable, and that the establishment of a strong world state is the only reliable means of avoiding these costs in the future. During the five years between the end of World War II in 1945 and the start of the Korean War in 1950, sympathetic interest in world government reached an unprecedented peak. An impassioned plea for world government (*The Anatomy of Peace* by Emery Reves) became an international bestseller, world-renowned intellectuals (Albert Einstein, Bertrand Russell, Robert Hutchins, and numerous others) declared their support for world government, world federalist organizations proliferated, and millions of people around the world began thinking seriously about the possibility.<sup>5</sup>

However, enthusiasm for world government subsided almost as quickly as it had arisen. It soon became apparent that the wartime alliance between the USSR and the Western powers had not abrogated the underlying ideological conflict between communism and noncommunism. The Soviet government still adhered to the orthodox Marxist doctrine that capitalism is doomed, and in reaction to this the people of the Western nations came to regard the USSR, especially as it had progressed from being a wobbly infant in 1917 to a military colossus in 1945, as a dire threat to their accustomed way of life. Such events in 1949 as the communization of China and the first detonation of an atomic bomb by the Soviet Union, which ended the short-lived US nuclear monopoly, convinced many in the West that the communist leadership was seriously entertaining the possibility of a communist world empire within the relatively near future. As early as 1947, US president Harry Truman proclaimed the “containment” doctrine: further expansion of communism must be resisted by all means including military action, until such time as the communist leadership abandoned its messianic aspirations.

As for fears of nuclear war, human beings are—mentally, emotionally, and physically—remarkably resilient and adaptive. Within a remarkably short time, most people had filed away the threat of dying in a worldwide nuclear holocaust in the same compartment as the threat of dying in an

automobile accident. It was a regrettable but inevitable hazard; therefore, there was nothing to be done about it. Furthermore, almost as soon as nuclear weapons became a part of reality, a general consensus arose among the large majority of the population that no one would be “stupid enough” to start a nuclear war. To some extent, this consensus, which is still prevalent today, may manifest wishful thinking. Among other things, a nuclear World War III could occur as a result of miscalculated brinkmanship, the same thing that was responsible for both World War I and World War II. Be that as it may, this consensus was (and remains) undeniably reassuring.

World federalists took a far less sanguine view of the nuclear war threat. In their view, the development of nuclear weapons immeasurably increased the overall threat to human civilization embodied in warfare. While the prospect of nuclear destruction might somewhat reduce the propensity toward provocative and belligerent behaviour among nations, it would by no means eliminate it, and sooner or later some nation would stray over the line separating peace from unimaginably devastating warfare. What was obviously needed, in the view of world federalists, was something far stronger than the United Nations; what was needed was a genuine, fully functional world government with direct control over a large and dominant military force, with the power of taxation, and guided by officials subject to direct democratic accountability to the world population through free and open elections.

Although post-World War II world government proposals are highly diverse, most of them adhere in general terms to the 23 August 1947 declaration of the first World Congress of the World Movement for World Federal Government held in Montreux, Switzerland. Taken together, the six points of the declaration are a prescription for a very centralized, powerful, and authoritative world state, for what this article calls the “omnipotent world state.” This became the common conception of world government at the time of the postwar world government boom, and it remains the common conception today. This conception was (and remains) simultaneously the world federalist ideal, and the *bête noire* of world government skeptics.

Contributions by postwar world federalists such as Giuseppe Borgese, Grenville Clark and Louis Sohn, and various others, that advocated the omnipotent world state, were summarily rejected by mainstream opinion.<sup>6</sup> As early as 1951, Gerard Mangone’s comprehensive and influential treatise distilled the final postwar majority verdict on world government: a fine



and noble idea in principle, but (alas) thoroughly impractical in the real world owing to the great strength of ideological preconceptions, cultural differences, and nationalistic prejudices. The basic problem, according to Mangone, is the absence of sufficient consensus within humanity on what constitutes a just and legitimate social order.

If a structure of world government is to be imagined, then its size, strength and shape will be conditioned by the social order it intends to establish. Should there be a genuine consensus among the members on the hierarchy of values within such a community, the coercive element will be minimized; if but little consensus exists, an autocratic leadership would be the obvious recourse for universal conformity.<sup>7</sup>

The problem of “little consensus” was especially serious in the area of communist versus noncommunist ideology: disagreements over the relative merits of socialism versus capitalism, planning versus the market, Western-style democracy versus Party democracy, and so on. The negative verdict on world government enunciated by Mangone rapidly achieved consensus status among the vast majority of professional academics, political leaders, and rank-and-file citizens. On the other side of the ideological gap, communist ideologues were equally skeptical of world government. Just as Western analysts were leery of world government on grounds that it might be subverted and made into a tool of communist expansionism, so too communist ideologues were leery of world government on grounds that it might be subverted and made into a tool of capitalist reaction.<sup>8</sup>

The end of the Cold War in the early 1990s could reasonably have been perceived as opening up new opportunities for world government. Throughout the Cold War, the first and foremost reason commonly cited for disregarding the possibility of world government had always been the ideological gap between the communist and noncommunist nations. But this impediment became less important. Just as the end of World War I had seen the establishment of the League of Nations, and the end of World War II had seen the establishment of the stronger United Nations, it seemed to world federalists that perhaps the end of the Cold War might see a further advance toward an even stronger form of supernational organization, possibly even a legitimate, full-fledged, authoritative world government.

However, this did not happen. For one thing, World Wars I and II had been “hot” wars whereas the Cold War, as the term implies, was not.

Although the threat of nuclear war had imposed a certain amount of psychic strain on humanity, this was not at all comparable to the prodigious amount of physical death, disability, and destruction wreaked by World Wars I and II. Furthermore, the collapse and dissolution of the Soviet Union had not totally abrogated the problem of ideology in the contemporary world. For example, the People's Republic of China still maintains formal allegiance to communist principles, although it is apparently not currently interested in having these principles adopted by other nations. In the Middle East, the continuing unrest sparked by Israel's 1948 creation, which has been directly responsible for several wars in the region and indirectly responsible for terrorist attacks throughout the world, including most horrifically 9/11, is to some extent exacerbated by religious doctrinal differences.

Last but not least, the economic gap between the richest First World nations and the poorest Third World nations continues to grow. Although the ideological impediment to world government has been markedly reduced by the subsidence of the Cold War, the economic impediment remains as significant as ever. People in the rich First World nations envision the possibility that an authoritative world government will decide to establish a global welfare state, by which the populations of the rich nations will be heavily taxed in order to provide welfare entitlements mostly benefiting the impoverished masses of the poor nations. Meanwhile, the poor nations are also apprehensive, envisioning the possibility that an authoritative world government will impose a global trade and investment regime that will essentially re-establish the exploitative relationships of the colonial era.

With these thoughts in mind, the contemporary mainstream consensus (the "conventional wisdom") is that, ideology aside, there is far too much heterogeneity in the world today for world government to be a viable proposition. In the hundreds of articles and dozens of books published every year in the popular and professional literature on contemporary international relations, terms such as "world government," "global government," "world state," and the like rarely appear, and when they do, more often than not it is in the context of a cursory dismissal. The following typical example has been provided by the prominent authority on international relations, Anne-Marie Slaughter:

People and their governments around the world need global institutions to solve collective problems that can only be addressed on a global scale. They must be able to make and

enforce global rules on a variety of subjects and through a variety of means. . . . Yet world government is both infeasible and undesirable. The size and scope of such a government presents an unavoidable and dangerous threat to individual liberty. Further, the diversity of peoples to be governed makes it almost impossible to conceive of a global demos. No form of democracy within the current global repertoire seems capable of overcoming these obstacles.<sup>9</sup>

### A BRIEF HISTORY OF SOCIALISM

Although the modern history of socialism is commonly said to have commenced with the French Revolution of 1789, vague “socialistic” ideas (or ideals) of economic egalitarianism may of course be traced back to long before then. According to some sources, the term “socialism” itself was coined in 1832 by Pierre Leroux in the liberal French newspaper *Le Globe*. In its earliest and most general form, socialism was perceived as a means by which the adverse socio-economic consequences of the Industrial Revolution, especially the poverty, misery, and insecurity of the urban proletariat, could be ameliorated. Various avenues toward amelioration were envisioned. Some reformers, such as Charles Fourier, proposed the creation of relatively small, economically self-sufficient communes. Others, such as Robert Owen, proposed a sort of progressive capitalism by which the owners, perhaps under the authority of government regulators, would pay their workers generously and treat them fairly in the interest of higher productivity and greater workforce loyalty.

In their profoundly influential pamphlet *The Communist Manifesto* (1848), Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels dismissed these proposals as “utopian socialism.” Fourier’s ideas would not work because they ignored the economies of large-scale production only achievable through factory methods. Owen’s ideas would not work because the capitalists were incapable of the sort of enlightened self-interest necessary to make them feasible. Marx and Engels’ “scientific socialism,” on the other hand, involved two core propositions: (1) fundamental reform of the modern industrial economy requires nothing less than the ownership of the capital means of production by society; (2) the only way this fundamental reform can be achieved is through violent revolution. Just as violent revolution had been necessary to the overthrow of the land-owning nobility by the industrial bourgeoisie, so

too it would be necessary to the overthrow of the industrial bourgeoisie by the proletariat.

The Marx-Engels specification of socialism soon became dominant, to the point where the primary dictionary definition of “socialism” became (and remains today) “public ownership of capital.” As the second half of the nineteenth century wore on, however, increasing doubt emerged even among committed Marxists. For one thing, intermittent efforts to achieve a socialist revolution, such as the Paris Commune of 1871, were notably unsuccessful. For another, the material condition of the working class seemed to be improving. It was becoming apparent that technological progress was enabling the improvement of general living conditions, while (perhaps) the threat of socialist revolution was persuading capitalists and political authorities to take advantage of these emerging economic opportunities. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, what we would today describe as the “social safety net” had taken hold throughout much of Western Europe and the world. Even such undemocratic nations as Imperial Germany under Chancellor Otto von Bismarck were leading the way in certain areas such as social insurance. In 1899, the ongoing reorientation of a substantial part of the socialist movement was dramatically manifested by the appearance of Bernstein’s seminal contribution.

In that year, Eduard Bernstein (1850-1932) published *Die Voraussetzungen des Sozialismus und die Aufgabe der Sozialdemokratie* (*The Preconditions of Socialism and the Tasks of Social Democracy*). In 1911, a somewhat abridged English translation by Edith C. Harvey was published by the New York publishing house B. W. Huebsch under the famous title *Evolutionary Socialism: A Criticism and Affirmation*.<sup>10</sup> In 1875, Bernstein had been one of the founders of the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD—Social Democratic Party of Germany), in which he remained active until his retirement in 1928. Based on a series of articles published in the party newspaper during the latter 1890s, his book explicitly rejected such fundamental tenets of conventional Marxist thought as the inherent immorality and inefficiency of private ownership of land and capital, the inevitable immiserization of the proletariat, and the necessity for violent revolution to overthrow capitalism and inaugurate socialism. Bernstein argued that the condition of the working class was manifestly improving, that such reforms as business regulation, social insurance, and progressive taxation were effective means of achieving the underlying objectives of socialism, and that these reforms could and

should be pursued through peaceful democratic means. From its initial appearance, his book was recognized as a major contribution to the theory and practice of socialism, eliciting both enthusiastic acclaim and furious denunciation.<sup>11</sup>

Among the denouncers was Vladimir Lenin, later to become famous as a prime mover of the successful Bolshevik revolution in Russia in 1917, and afterwards the first head of state of the newly established Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. To Lenin and like-minded critics such as SPD members Karl Kautsky, Karl Liebknecht, and Rosa Luxemburg, revisionist socialism was a craven reformist sell-out of the traditional socialist vision, a sell-out that sought only “crumbs off the table” of the dominant class of capitalist plutocrats. To their minds, the only way to fully achieve the objectives of socialism was through socialism in the pure sense of public ownership and control of the means of production, and such a transformation could only come about by means of violent revolution. Although Marx’s original view had been that the preconditions for revolution would eventually emerge through ever-worsening business depressions afflicting the industrially advanced capitalist nations, the vicissitudes imposed on the mainly agrarian Russian nation by World War I enabled Lenin’s successful Bolshevik revolution in 1917 that established the USSR. But when Liebknecht and Luxemburg attempted an analogous revolution in defeated Germany in 1919, the revolution failed and its leaders were executed. This outcome seemed to vindicate the position of such centrists as Karl Kautsky that it would probably require a very long period of time to bring about conditions in the advanced capitalist nations under which a socialist revolution would be successful.

Whether the Bolshevik revolution in Russia in fact contradicted Kautsky’s position ultimately turns on the question of the degree of “success” attained through that revolution. The radical nature of Soviet communism, seen in policies such as the nationalization of agricultural land and industrial capital with little or no compensation paid to the former owners and actions such as the execution of the Romanov royal family, elicited determined opposition from the outset. (Such policies might be compared to a rash attempt to establish the omnipotent world state in today’s world.) Years of civil war and famine ensued. Although the Soviet Union recovered somewhat under the relatively moderate New Economic Plan of the 1920s, radical transformation was again pursued through the collectivization of

agriculture and the crash industrialization program of the 1930s. Although impressive economic progress was achieved, the drastic internal stresses and strains imposed on the Soviet people by such policies were seen in the consolidation of Joseph Stalin's dictatorial powers, comprehensive Party purges, mass executions, and the creation of the gulag archipelago of concentration camps to confine actual and suspected dissidents, and to extract slave labor from them under horrific conditions. Under Marxist leadership, the Soviet people then suffered through a second world war, followed by more than four decades of a perilous Cold War confrontation with the bloc of noncommunist nations, a confrontation that threatened nuclear holocaust. To aggravate matters, the sluggish performance of the Soviet economy in the later stages of the Cold War was making a mockery of the leadership's promises to overtake the major Western nations in terms of per capita living standards. By the early 1990s, the Soviet people had finally had enough. The Marxist leadership was ousted and the Soviet Union was dissolved. (A peaceful political transformation of this magnitude had been almost unknown in prior human history—an extraordinary event that might hold out some hope that a federal world government, assuming it were properly designed, might be established peacefully at some point in the future.) Since then, its successor republics and former Eastern European satellites have been endeavouring to emulate the economic and political characteristics of the more successful Western nations. (In most cases, the emulation effort has not been easy.) Over the more than seven decades separating the Bolshevik revolution of 1917 from the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, it cannot be said that the revolution was a success.

Neither can success be plausibly attributed to such offshoots of Soviet communism as the People's Republic of China (PRC), Vietnam, North Korea, and Cuba. At the present time, the PRC is making dramatic economic progress, the result of abandoning Soviet-style central planning and strict egalitarianism, both of which were once considered fundamental to genuine socialism. But its political system remains fully oligarchic, fueling speculation that perhaps the contemporary Chinese model is incompatible with democracy as known elsewhere in the world. Aside from China, the economic and political performance of the handful of other nations in the contemporary world that continue to subscribe to communism is generally unimpressive.

Meanwhile, various key elements of social democracy as specified by

Eduard Bernstein in *Evolutionary Socialism* have become integral parts of socioeconomic and political reality in all the most successful First World nations. Leaders of social democratic parties in these nations have taken an active part in governance throughout the twentieth century and into the twenty-first. For example, the German SPD was at times the largest political party in Germany (when not being suppressed by the Nazi government from 1933 through 1945), often participated in coalition governments, and remains today a major player in German politics. Even “less progressive” nations such as the United States and Australia, which for the most part adamantly deny being tainted in any way by “socialism,” are characterized by an abundance of business regulations, welfare programs, and progressive taxation. These elements of social democracy may be more advanced in other nations, especially in the Western European nations comprising the European Union (EU), but this is arguably a matter of degree rather than of essence.

Of course, any real-world level of achievement falls short of the imaginable ideal. Even in those nations that proudly advertise themselves as “socialist” in the social democratic sense, retention of private ownership of most of the means of production under modern conditions (domination of economic production by large corporations, separation of ownership and control, important role of institutional investors, and so on) results in highly unequal distribution of capital property income, a category of income that has the appearance of being unearned. Aside from that, there are other continuing problems with the existing system (whether it be deemed “capitalist” or “socialist”): recurrent business recessions, persistent unemployment, speculative bubbles, and so on—though many of these may be the necessary concomitants of any market system, whether it be market capitalist or (in the case of the PRC) market socialist. It is held by some idealists that until all these kinds of shortcomings are completely eliminated, society cannot be described as “genuinely socialist.” If this viewpoint were accepted, then nothing short of utopia would be genuinely socialist.

The success or failure of a socioeconomic system is necessarily evaluated in terms of some basis. If, for example, we compare nations such as the United States, Britain, France, and Germany as they were in the year 2000 relative to what they were in the year 1900, only the most contrarian mentalities would refuse to acknowledge significant progress. Living standards are higher, equality is higher, and democratic influence on the government is

higher. Not that there was a linear trend of progress throughout the twentieth century. During the tumultuous decades of the first half of the twentieth century, the nations of Western Europe suffered through economic depression, fascist dictatorships, and devastating warfare. But during the second half of the twentieth century, Western Europe sailed through calmer waters. Among the reasons for its long-run success would appear to be the renunciation of the orthodox Marxist doctrine of pure public ownership socialism through violent revolution, and its replacement by the revisionist Marxist doctrine of virtual socialism through peaceful evolution.

What, if anything, does the above-described historical development within the socialist movement imply about the potential future development of the world federalist movement? There are two salient questions to be addressed: (1) whether an analogous renunciation might be possible within the world federalist movement away from the omnipotent world state concept and toward a limited federal world government concept, and (2) if so, whether such a renunciation would strengthen the world federalist movement and enhance the prospects that a real-world federal world government might be achieved within the foreseeable future. Prior to addressing these central questions, it will be useful to consider certain recent trends in world federalist thought that might be promising indicators, and to specify in more detail what is implied, in a practical sense, by the notion of “limited” federal world government.

#### RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN WORLD FEDERALIST THINKING

Despite the continued prevalence of the conventional wisdom on world government exemplified by the above quotation from Anne-Marie Slaughter’s *A New World Order*, the historian Campbell Craig has written of a recent “resurgence” of interest in world government.<sup>12</sup> What evidence is there for this alleged resurgence? To begin with, during the mid-2000s, perhaps in response to the traumatic 9/11 event, there may have been a spike in the production of appeals for world government from world federalist enthusiasts whose strident “one world or none” message harks back to the 1945-50 world government boom.<sup>13</sup> Of course, if appeals of this nature went unheeded during the perilous decades of the Cold War, they are even less likely to be effective now that the Cold War is history and the threat of nuclear world war in the near future has greatly receded.



What may be more significant is that a trickle has apparently begun of more restrained and scholarly world government advocacies from authors with reputable academic credentials.<sup>14</sup> While these more reflective and balanced advocacies are more likely to elicit serious interest among those who are currently skeptical of world government, the fact remains that they are still very few in number. Moreover, they are generally somewhat vague on the institutional specifics of the world government being advocated. Advocacies that focus on the potential benefits of world government without paying sufficient attention to the potential costs, specifically the danger that an omnipotent world state of the sort envisioned in conventional world federalist thought might soon degenerate into totalitarian tyranny, are unlikely to be taken seriously.

A major focus in Craig's "resurgence" article is on a very unusual article by the eminent international relations authority Alexander Wendt, provocatively entitled "Why a World State Is Inevitable" (2003).<sup>15</sup> Inasmuch as the question of inevitability is only sensibly considered with reference to existent reality, and as world government is not yet part of existent reality, Wendt's proposition is clearly not meant to be taken literally. Rather it is deliberately provocative, intended merely to elicit additional serious thought about the world government possibility. Wendt's inevitability essay has indeed been cited in a substantial number of contributions to the professional literature.

Whether this attention will engender a serious challenge to the existing strong consensus against world government remains to be seen. While most of the contributions that cite Wendt's article seem at least somewhat sympathetic toward world government, none of them significantly amplifies or expands Wendt's argument. In fact, thus far the only full-scale engagement with Wendt's "inevitability thesis" has been a critical commentary by Vaughn Shannon.<sup>16</sup> Many of the citations fall into the "see also" category. Eric Posner points out the lack of immediate relevance of the thesis: "Wendt is in a very small minority, and as he puts off the creation of world government for at least another century, the possibility has no relevant short-term implications even if he is correct";<sup>17</sup> while Thomas G. Weiss suggests that there is nothing especially innovative about the thesis: "From time to time a contemporary international relations theorist, like Alexander Wendt, suggests that 'a world state is inevitable' (Wendt 2003, 2005; Shannon 2005), or Daniel Deudney (2006) wishes one were because war has become too dangerous."<sup>18</sup> If indeed the inevitability thesis is eventually recognized as a serious challenge to the

mainstream consensus against world government, the outcome may simply be a further refining and strengthening of the conventional case against world government that underpins the current consensus.

In support of his argument that a world state is “inevitable,” Wendt marshals an argument based on teleological reasoning. According to teleological reasoning, everything in the universe has a purpose toward which it inevitably tends. Just as human babies tend to fulfill their purpose by developing into human adults, so too global human civilization is tending toward its final purpose: a global state. The argument is clever and fleshed out impressively with facts and concepts derived from a wide range of human knowledge. As a piece of erudite writing, Wendt’s article is quite impressive. But it is more likely to be persuasive to a theoretical philosopher than to the typical international relations professional, let alone to the typical international relations practitioner or the typical member of the general public.

Be that as it may, Wendt offers skeptical readers of his inevitability essay two pieces of reasonably solid practical evidence that a world state will eventually be established: (1) the very long-run historical trend toward greater and greater political consolidation that has brought humanity from the tens of thousands of small, autonomous tribal units of pre-history down to the 200-odd nation-states of today, several of which encompass populations in the tens and even hundreds of millions; and (2) the fact that a world state would benefit both large nations (lower probability of debilitating wars with other large nations) and small nations (lower probability of being subjected to the oppressive hegemony of large nations). Both of these points are significant and worthy of consideration, but in and of themselves, they are far from conclusive.

With respect to the long-term trend toward ever greater political consolidation, the hard fact remains that almost all of this consolidation was brought about, in one way or another, by means of warfare. In the nuclear age, it seems unlikely that additional warfare offers a plausible avenue toward further political consolidation leading to a world state. One must also consider the fact that there has been much political deconsolidation in the recent past, ranging from the dissolution of the great European colonial empires to the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.

With respect to the potential benefits of world government for both the large nations and the small nations, these must be acknowledged and taken

into account in any sensible evaluation of the world government possibility. But potential benefits have to be weighed against potential costs. The contemporary consensus is that the potential costs of world government (totalitarian tyranny, bureaucratic suffocation, cultural homogenization, global civil war) far exceed the potential benefits. Simply enumerating benefits while paying little or no attention to costs is unlikely to be rhetorically effective, given that the costs are so widely accepted.

Although there are obvious difficulties with Professor Wendt's "inevitability of world government" thesis, the facts that the author is a recognized and respected international relations authority, and that his article was published in a reputable, mainstream international relations periodical, are quite significant. It is not too much to suggest that thirty years ago, with the Cold War still raging, no recognized and respected international relations authority would have dreamed of writing such an article, and no reputable, mainstream international relations periodical would have dreamed of publishing it. Therefore, the appearance of this article alone may be a significant indicator of increased receptivity toward the concept of world government, at least among academic professionals in the international relations discipline. In due course, increased receptivity among the attentive elite may lead to increased receptivity among the intelligentsia generally, the general public, and the political leadership.

Also relevant for our present purposes is that within his influential article, Wendt suggests that the putatively "inevitable" world state he has in mind might well be something quite different from the traditional world federalist ideal of the omnipotent world state:

Lest I be accused of lacking imagination, however, it should be emphasized that the systemic changes needed for a world state could be fulfilled in various ways, and so a world state might look very different than states today. In particular, it could be much more decentralized, in three respects. First, it would not require its elements to give up local autonomy. Collectivizing organized violence does not mean that culture, economy or local politics must be collectivized; subsidiarity could be the operative principle. Second, it would not require a single UN army. As long as a structure exists that can command and enforce a collective response to threats, a world state could be compatible with the existence of national armies, to which enforcement operations

might be sub-contracted (along the lines of NATO perhaps). Finally, it would not even require a world “government,” if by this we mean a unitary body with one leader whose decisions are final. . . . As long as binding choices can be made, decision-making in a world state could involve broad deliberation in a “strong” public sphere rather than command by one person.<sup>19</sup>

It is the position of the present author that in a practical sense, no world state is inevitable, and this holds especially for the omnipotent world state. On the spectrum of possibility over the foreseeable future, limited world government is far more likely than unlimited world government. This perception seems generally consistent with the above-quoted remarks of Professor Wendt.

#### LIMITED VERSUS UNLIMITED WORLD GOVERNMENT

What may eventually be perceived as the single most significant post-Cold War challenge to the conventional wisdom on world government is simply increased awareness, among both world government skeptics and world government supporters, that there might exist viable world government possibilities that would go well beyond the existent United Nations, but would stop well short of the traditional world federalist ideal of the omnipotent world state. Just as Eduard Bernstein made social democracy a politically viable movement throughout the twentieth century through his development of “evolutionary socialism,” world federalism might become a politically viable movement in the twenty-first century through the development of “evolutionary world government.” According to Bernstein’s redefinition, “socialism” need not involve public ownership of all or most of the stock of nonhuman factors of production. Its goals can be substantially achieved by means other than public ownership of capital, such as progressive taxation, social welfare programs, and business regulation. Consequently, in this more widely acceptable form—a “kinder, gentler socialism”—it need not be achieved by means of violent revolution.

An analogous redefinition of a “kinder, gentler world government” would remove such requirements as universal membership, prohibition of withdrawal from the world federation of member nations, and monopolization by the world federation of all heavy weaponry. If potential member nations in a world government do not expect to be disarmed as a consequence of taking membership, and if they are allowed freedom to

leave the federation in the future if they so desire, resistance to the idea of world government could decline. Most people today are opposed to world government—even though they will grant that such a government would be, at minimum, a reliable guarantor against nuclear holocaust—because they fear that a militarily all-powerful world government would undertake policies that would be detrimental to their nation and to themselves personally, and there would be no means available for their nation to opt out of the world federation. Their nation would be “trapped” within a hostile and dysfunctional political structure. A constitutional promise to the member nations of the right of free exit from the world state if they so desire—and of independent control over sufficient military force to back up this right—would reassure the people of potential member nations that a means of escape would be available if needed. These rights would play the same role as putting fire escapes on buildings and equipping ships with lifeboats. The hope is that these safeguards will never be needed—but if the need does arise, they are available.

The obvious question presents itself, however, whether a government that shares military power with its subsidiary components, and that allows the departure of subsidiary components at their own unilateral discretion, can be considered a legitimate state. Certainly these provisions are incompatible with the common conception of statehood at the national level. For example, the United States does not permit the state governments to exercise independent control of military forces (as opposed to police forces) stationed within their borders, and the US Civil War of 1861-65 manifested the determination of the national government to maintain the integrity of the union against secession efforts by some of the component states. Be that as it may, the common conception of statehood at the national level is not necessarily the only legitimate conception of statehood. The power and authority of a given state entity might lie anywhere along a wide spectrum from weakest to strongest. As long as power and authority are not totally absent, the entity may arguably be deemed a legitimate state.<sup>20</sup>

Perhaps the most comprehensive and detailed blueprint for a limited federal world government currently available in the international relations literature is James A. Yunker’s proposal for a Federal Union of Democratic Nations.<sup>21</sup> Although the word “democratic” is included in the name of the proposed federation, for those nations in which democratic institutions do not currently exist, the only requirement for membership would be the

intention to establish them once their citizen bodies have been properly prepared for their responsibilities under the democratic form of government. No time frame would be specified for such preparation. The practical purpose of this provision, of course, is to make available membership to various nations that are not presently fully democratic in the generally accepted sense, the prime example of this being the People's Republic of China.

The proposed Federal Union would be a full-fledged government entity, composed of legislative, executive, and judicial branches, whose high officials would be directly elected by the populations of the member nations. It would be constitutionally based, would possess the authority to levy taxes, and would directly control an armed force roughly comparable to the armed force of one of the smaller nuclear powers such as the UK. It would possess the ordinary trappings and emblems of state authority: flag, anthem, capital city, permanent administrative apparatus, and so on. On the other hand, it would operate under the critical constraints mentioned above: member nations would be free to depart the federation at their own unilateral discretion, and member nations would retain independent control over as much military force as desired, even including strategic nuclear weapons.

Another important safeguard against possible tendencies toward unacceptable policy directions would be adoption of a "dual voting system" in the federation legislature. Proposed legislation would have to be approved by a majority on two different bases: the population basis and the material basis. In the population vote, the weight given to the vote of each particular representative would be proportional to the population of the district represented relative to the total population of the federation. In the material vote, the weight given to the vote of each representative would be proportional to the financial revenues derived from the district represented relative to the total financial revenues of the federation. Representatives from the rich nations would be disproportionately represented in the material vote, while representatives from populous poorer nations would be disproportionately represented in the population vote. Since measures would have to be approved on both the material basis and the population basis, only measures on which rich nations and poor nations could achieve reasonable consensus would be approved by the federation legislature. The dual voting system is designed to preclude the passage of any legislation that would be unacceptable to either the First World nations or the Third World nations. Prime examples would be legislation aimed at a drastic redistribution of current

world income by means of a global welfare state (which would be opposed by the rich nations), and legislation that might be deemed an effort to re-establish conditions of colonial exploitation (which would be opposed by the poor nations).

Obviously the proposed dual voting system is inconsistent with the ideal of pure democracy, wherein each citizen of the polity exercises one and only one vote. This is a third major departure, along with free exit and independent national military forces, from the conventional world federalist concept. In an ideal world in which all nations had comparable living standards, this departure from the one-person-one-vote principle would not be necessary. But it is important to recognize that the distinction between the population vote and the material vote would not be necessary were all nations of the world to have approximately equal per capita income. In that case, the revenues raised from each district would tend to be proportional to the district's population.

#### PROSPECTS FOR GLOBAL ECONOMIC EQUALITY

To realize the long-term objective where the results of the population vote and the material vote are identical, Yunker proposes a complementary economic proposal for a World Economic Equalization Program, in effect a Global Marshall Plan. Since he is an economist by profession, it is understandable that Yunker's political proposal for a Federal Union of Democratic Nations is closely linked to his proposal for a greatly expanded, worldwide economic development assistance program. The idea of greatly reducing, or even eliminating, the world poverty problem through the global equivalent of the Marshall Plan, which facilitated the rebuilding process in Europe following World War II, has long been a staple of visionary thought, and continues notably in the activities of the Global Marshall Plan Initiative, a pressure group primarily active in Europe.<sup>22</sup>

Against the currently prevalent opinion that an increase in the level of foreign development assistance would have little impact on global economic inequality (since the aid resources would be diverted and/or misallocated), Yunker has adduced evidence derived from computer simulation of a model of the world economy to the effect that, despite the very formidable size of the current economic gap, it could in fact be overcome within a relatively brief period of time, something on the order of fifty years, by a sufficiently massive and coordinated economic development assistance effort.<sup>23</sup> The

benchmark simulation results suggest that a dramatic acceleration in the rate of growth of living standards in the poor nations could be achieved at the very minor cost of a slight retardation in the rate of growth of living standards in the rich nations. The cost to the rich nations would not be a decline in their living standards, nor even a noticeable decline in the rate of growth of their living standards. In other words, the material cost to the people of the rich nations would be very minor. That said, the benchmark parameter values used to obtain these positive results may be too optimistic. Sensitivity analyses using sufficiently adverse values of certain critical model parameters demonstrate that the outcome could be just as pessimists would predict: despite huge investments, very little improvement in average living standards within the recipient nations. Therefore the results of these computer simulations do not prove that the outcome from a Global Marshall Plan would be favourable. However, they do demonstrate the possibility that the outcome would be favourable.

Yunker's argument is not that world government and a Global Marshall Plan would assuredly be successful. These initiatives should be regarded as experiments, experiments which may or may not succeed. The currently available evidence is inconclusive, because these experiments have not thus far been undertaken. Unless we actually undertake such experiments, we cannot know how they will turn out. If, after a reasonable period of time, it is becoming compellingly evident that they are not working, then the Global Marshall Plan could be shut down and the world federation disbanded. There is a workable "exit strategy," so to speak. Even in the event of failure, however, no doubt some lessons will have been learned that will be useful to the future development of global human civilization.

Perhaps the most potent argument against world government at the present time is that if such a government were to be established, there would be no way to return to the *status quo ante* short of violent revolution. Were this argument to be widely recognized as specious, this might significantly improve the odds that an actual world government will be established in the real world within the foreseeable future. It has long been acknowledged that the main basis of progress in physical science is experimentation. Clearly there might be a role for experiment in social policy. The repeal of alcohol prohibition in the United States in 1933, and the renunciation of communism by the Soviet Union in 1991, are two examples of a society "changing its mind" on the basis of experience ("experience" being a form of



“experiment”). What happened to alcohol prohibition in the United States and communism in the Soviet Union might also happen to a world government in the future. Nevertheless, most policy analysts will agree that most of the social and political innovations that come about in the real world, against much opposition and with great difficulty, are eventually recognized by the large majority as having been generally beneficial, and thus they become permanent.

The vision of world government as a probable catalyst to global civil war is so firmly embedded in many people’s minds that they might think it implausible for a global government to permit the peaceful departure of component nations following its formation—whether or not this is a constitutionally guaranteed national right. They may invoke the example of the United States Civil War of 1861 to 1865: the US national government, supported by the northern states, undertook a long and costly civil war rather than allow the peaceful secession of the southern states. But aside from the fact that the US Constitution that went into effect in 1789 did not address the issue of secession, either to allow it or disallow it, the question of slavery introduced an extremely emotional element into the situation, an element that made it impossible for either the northern states or the southern states to give in and allow a peaceful compromise. Since the legal institution of slavery has been outlawed throughout the contemporary world, this particularly emotional and combustible issue should not disturb the equilibrium of a potential future world government.

#### THE CASE FOR (LIMITED) FEDERAL WORLD GOVERNMENT

It was during the hyper-violent twentieth century, with its two world wars and the threat of a nuclear third world war, that the world federalist concept of a world state to ensure world peace came to full fruition. But just as the case for world government came into sharper focus during the twentieth century, so also did the case against world government. The two most important arguments against world government are as follows: (1) it would quickly degenerate into a horrific totalitarian nightmare, as in Kenneth Waltz: “And were world government attempted, we might find ourselves dying in the attempt, or uniting and living a life worse than death”;<sup>24</sup> and (2) there is no need for world government because the intelligence and good sense of national leaders will keep nations from going to war with one another, as in the “anarchical society” of Hedley Bull.<sup>25</sup> For obvious reasons, the second

argument is hardly mentioned when wars are in progress, as in 1914-18 or 1939-45. But in peacetime, the longer the peaceful interlude, the more it flourishes.

This second argument is nowadays frequently enunciated using the vocabulary of “global governance.” In the early 1990s, following the collapse and dissolution of the Soviet Union, the idea emerged that now that the ideological problem had greatly diminished, international cooperation through the United Nations and other trans-national organizations could advance to such a high level that the results would be comparable to what would be achieved if there were an actual world government in operation. This idea has since been explored in numerous contributions in the international relations literature.<sup>26</sup> In its neutral sense, “global governance” simply refers to the existent degree of international cooperation, whether that degree be high or low. But according to most dictionaries, “governance” is what governments do, so that the phrase “governance without government” (utilized as the title of the seminal 1992 contribution of Rosenau and Czempiel) might suggest that a very high level of peaceful, cooperative coordination among the nations might be achieved in the absence of an effective governmental authority.<sup>27</sup> In fact, use of the term “global governance” to characterize the present international regime may be wishful thinking.<sup>28</sup>

Despite the ebbing of the Cold War twenty years ago, the military superpowers still feel it necessary to maintain large armed forces equipped with nuclear weapons. Some small, non-nuclear nations (“rogue” nations) are endlessly fascinated by the prospect of acquiring such weapons, as are terrorist groups desirous of surpassing the 9/11 success of al-Qaida. This situation elicits concern over such questions, for example, as just how far the other nuclear powers will allow the United States and its allies to go in quest of security against nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. Leaving aside apocalyptic visions, localized conflict situations (as in Rwanda, Bosnia, Darfur, and elsewhere) continue to produce much human misery, the population explosion throughout the world over the last century is putting ever-greater pressure on both the natural resource base and the purity of the natural environment, and the AIDS crisis has reminded us of our potential vulnerability to catastrophic epidemics of contagious diseases. These are global problems in that they have important ramifications in almost every nation on the planet. The extent to which humanity will be able to cope effectively with these problems is critically affected by the predisposition

among nations toward mutual respect, trust, and cooperation. The persistence of us-versus-them attitudes in the various national populations makes it more difficult for national governments to reach effective, binding agreements on global problems.

If the world federalist ideal of the omnipotent world state existed in the real world, then clearly there would be little or no possibility of a nuclear holocaust, and it also seems likely that dramatic progress would be assured toward the amelioration of other global hazards such as environmental deterioration. But despite these advantages of the omnipotent world state, which have been virtually self-evident for many decades, the possibility has been thoroughly rejected by the vast majority of the world's people for fear of totalitarian tyranny, bureaucratic suffocation, cultural homogenization, and so on. Common sense would seem to dictate that the possibility of establishing an omnipotent world state in the real world within the foreseeable future is negligible to non-existent.

According to the ancient proverb, "half a loaf is better than none." What may be possible in the real world within the foreseeable future is the establishment of a limited federal world government along the lines of the Federal Union of Democratic Nations described above. Clearly, the establishment of such a limited world government, even if it were accompanied by the initiation of a Global Marshall Plan, would not immediately abrogate the problems of the world. At the outset membership would probably not be universal, and moreover, even among the charter members, some nations would retain virtually the same military machines they possess now. This is especially true of military superpowers such as the United States, the Russian Federation, and the People's Republic of China. The possibility of nuclear world war would not be eliminated, and in the very short run it might not even be noticeably reduced. Furthermore, even with a massive Global Marshall Plan in operation, it would almost certainly require several decades to achieve virtual economic parity between First World and Third World nations. Until then, economic differences will continue to generate conflicts of interest between rich and poor nations, conflicts that will continue to impede effective global action against such long-term threats as natural resource depletion and environmental deterioration.

But the fact that global perfection will not be instantaneously achieved is not a sensible argument against proposals for a limited world government and a Global Marshall Plan. The appropriate comparison is between the

status quo as it exists now, and the probable situation were these possibilities to be implemented. A plausible case can be made that the global human condition would be better were these initiatives undertaken. There would be some improvement in the processes of global governance in the short run, but more importantly, a more secure basis would have been laid for accelerating improvement in these processes in the long run.

Despite the terrible vicissitudes of the twentieth century (World Wars I and II, the Nazi holocaust, the gulag archipelago, and numerous other instances of gross inhumanity), that century also witnessed unprecedented progress toward higher forms of international harmony: the United Nations and the European Union, to name only the two most obvious examples. The ongoing work of these institutions is supplemented by the activities of a host of international non-governmental organizations. The network of global cooperation described by the term “global governance” is steadily advancing and strengthening. True, progress has not been linear, and obviously existent institutions such as the UN and the EU are not without serious problems. Still, they keep forging ahead, doing their part to ensure a benign future for global human civilization. Now that we are well into the twenty-first century, it is perhaps time for humanity to start giving serious consideration to the next step: to the foundation of a properly designed, properly limited federal world government. No doubt such a government would be subject to problems and liabilities, no less than the UN and the EU. But it would also probably continue to forge ahead.

An existing, functioning world government would provide a focus for the furtherance of impulses within national governments toward international cooperation, and for deepening cosmopolitan tendencies within the global human population. Many people today, not just world federalists, believe that it would be good if people everywhere thought of themselves as “citizens of the world.” A possible difficulty with this objective is that the condition of citizenship normally implies a political entity of which one is a part, and to which one owes a significant degree of loyalty and allegiance. The “world” as such is a planetary body and not a political entity. But if there existed an operational supernational federation open to all the nations of the world, of which a certain nation happened to be a member, in a juridical sense a citizen of that nation would also be a citizen of the world federation. It might then be easier for him or her to subscribe whole-heartedly to the positive attitudes, sentiments, and behaviours associated with the phase

“citizen of the world.”

The existence of a formal world government, even though relatively weak at first, would tend to support a growing sense of world community, and strengthening world community would enable a stronger and more effective world government, which in turn would further strengthen the spirit of world community, and so on. A snowballing effect could be set in motion, leading eventually to a very strong sense of world community, and a commensurately authoritative and effective world government. Reserved national rights such as free exit and independent military forces, rights required to permit the foundation of the world government in today’s nationally oriented world, would by then be little more than dimly remembered historical relics. Thus the concept of “evolutionary world government” might underpin a successful world federalist movement in the twenty-first century, in much the same way that Eduard Bernstein’s concept of “evolutionary socialism” enabled the success of the social democratic movement throughout most of the world in the twentieth century.

#### ENDNOTES

1. According to Derek Heater’s authoritative history, *World Citizenship and Government: Cosmopolitan Ideas in the History of Western Political Thought* (New York: St. Martin’s, 1996), the conceptual roots of the notion of world government may be traced back to the ancient Greeks.
2. Émeric Crucé’s *The New Cyneas* was originally published in French in 1623. Its English translation by Thomas Willing Balch was published under the title *The New Cyneas of Émeric Crucé* (Philadelphia: Allan, Lane and Scott, 1909). The 1909 edition was reprinted by Kessinger Publishing in 2010. Originally published in German in 1795, Immanuel Kant’s *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay* was translated into English by Mary Campbell Smith (London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1903). The 1903 edition was reprinted by Cosimo Classics in 2005.
3. Edith Wynner and Georgia Lloyd, *Searchlight on Peace Plans: Choose Your Road to World Government* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1944).
4. Raleigh C. Minor, *A Republic of Nations: A Study of the Organization of a Federal League of Nations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1918).
5. Emery Reves, *The Anatomy of Peace*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1945). For accounts of the period, see Joseph P. Baratta,

*The Politics of World Federation*, Vol. I: *United Nations, UN Reform, Atomic Control*, Vol. II: *From World Federalism to Global Governance* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004), and James A. Yunker, *The Idea of World Government: From Ancient Times to the Twenty-First Century* (London and New York: Routledge Global Institutions Series, 2011).

6. Giuseppe A. Borgese, *Foundations of the World Republic* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953). Borgese's volume included as an appendix the "Preliminary Draft of a World Constitution" that was developed after World War II by a committee of distinguished citizens chaired by Robert M. Hutchins, then president of the University of Chicago. Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn, *World Peace through World Law*, 3<sup>rd</sup> enlarged ed. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966). The Clark-Sohn volume took the form of an annotated revision of the existing United Nations Charter.
7. Gerald J. Mangone, *The Idea and Practice of World Government* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951), 19.
8. Eliot R. Goodman, *The Soviet Design for a World State* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), 396.
9. Anne-Marie Slaughter, *A New World Order* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 8.
10. Eduard Bernstein, *Evolutionary Socialism: A Criticism and Affirmation*. Originally published in German in 1899. Translated by Edith C. Harvey (New York: B. W. Huebsch, 1911). Reprinted by Random House in 1961 and Kessinger Publishing in 2009.
11. Illustrative of the substantial literature on this pivotal development in the history of socialist thought are the following: Peter Gay, *The Dilemma of Democratic Socialism: Eduard Bernstein's Challenge to Marx* (New York: Octagon, 1979); David McLellan, *Marxism after Marx: An Introduction* (New York: Harper and Row, 1979); J. M. Tudor, ed., *Marxism and Social Democracy: The Revisionist Debate, 1896-1898* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988); Manfred B. Steger, *Eduard Bernstein and the Quest for Evolutionary Socialism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
12. Campbell Craig, "The Resurgent Idea of World Government," *Ethics & International Affairs* 22, no. 2 (Summer 2008): 133-42.

13. Examples include Jerry Tetelman and Byron Belitsos, *One World Democracy: A Progressive Vision for Enforceable World Law* (San Rafael, CA: Origin, 2005); Errol E. Harris, *Earth Federation Now: Tomorrow Is Too Late* (Radford, VA: Institute for Economic Democracy, 2005); Jim Clark, *Rescue Plan for Planet Earth: Democratic World Government through a Global Referendum* (Toronto: Key, 2008).
14. Examples include Luis Cabrera, *Political Theory of Global Justice: A Cosmopolitan Case for the World State* (New York: Routledge, 2004); Louis Pojman, *Terrorism, Human Rights, and the Case for World Government* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006); Torbjörn Tånnsjö, *Global Democracy: The Case for a World Government* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2008).
15. Alexander Wendt, "Why a World State Is Inevitable," *European Journal of International Relations* 9, no. 4 (October 2003): 491-542.
16. Vaughn P. Shannon, "Wendt's Violation of the Constructivist Project: Agency and Why a World State is *Not* Inevitable," *European Journal of International Relations* 11, no. 4 (October 2005): 581-87. Wendt's response is contained in "Agency, Teleology, and the World State: A Reply to Shannon," *European Journal of International Relations* 11, no. 4 (October 2005): 589-98.
17. Eric A. Posner, "International Law: A Welfarist Approach," *University of Chicago Law Review* 73, no. 2 (Spring 2006): 487-543.
18. Thomas G. Weiss, "What Happened to the Idea of World Government," *International Studies Quarterly* 53, no. 2 (June 2009): 253-71.
19. Wendt, "Why a World State Is Inevitable," 506.
20. See, for example, recent work on "governance in areas of limited statehood": Thomas Risse and Ursula Lehmkuhl, "Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood: New Modes of Governance," SFB-Governance Working Paper 1, December 2006; Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse, "Governance without a State: Can It Work?" *Regulation and Governance* 4, no. 2 (June 2010): 113-34. Also relevant is the abundant literature on the mixed political nature of the European Union; examples include Jeremy J. Richardson, ed., *European Union: Power and Policy-Making* (New York: Routledge, 1997); Richard McAllister, *From EC to EU: An Historical and Political Survey* (New York: Routledge, 1997); Clive

- Archer, *The European Union* (New York: Routledge, 2008).
21. James A. Yunker, *Political Globalization: A New Vision of Federal World Government* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2007); James A. Yunker, *The Grand Convergence: Economic and Political Aspects of Human Progress* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).
  22. Franz Josef Rademacher, *Global Marshall Plan: A Planetary Contract* (Hamburg: Global Marshall Plan Foundation, 2004); Florian J. Huber, *Global Governance and the Global Marshall Plan* (Saarbrücken, Germany: Verlag, 2007); Andreas Pichlhöfer, *World in Balance—Global Marshall Plan* (Saarbrücken, Germany: Verlag, 2010).
  23. James A. Yunker, *Common Progress: The Case for a World Economic Equalization Program* (New York: Praeger, 2000); James A. Yunker, “Could a Global Marshall Plan Be Successful? An Investigation Using the WEEP Simulation Model,” *World Development* 32, no. 7 (July 2004): 1109-37.
  24. Kenneth N. Waltz, *Man, the State and War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), 228.
  25. Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977).
  26. Illustrative references from the abundant literature on global governance include the following: Albert J. Paolini, Anthony P. Jarvis, and Christian Reus-Smit, eds., *Between Sovereignty and Global Governance: The United Nations, the State and Civil Society* (New York: St. Martin’s, 1998); Martin Hewson and Timothy J. Sinclair, eds., *Approaches to Global Governance Theory* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1999); Rorden Wilkinson and Stephen Hughes, eds., *Global Governance: Critical Perspectives* (New York: Routledge, 2002).
  27. James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, eds., *Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
  28. See James A. Yunker, “Effective Global Governance without Effective Global Government: A Contemporary Myth,” *World Futures* 67, no. 7 (2004): 503-53, for an argument that the term “global governance” is an example of “tendentious terminology,” defined as the putting forward of a controversial proposition not by means of direct, explicit



statement but rather by indirect, implicit means that utilize certain terms with generally understood and accepted meanings, according to which the proposition would be true. In this case, the controversial proposition is “The current level of international cooperation and coordination is equivalent to what would be achieved if there existed a functioning global government.”