On the nature of
liberty and license
Mortimer J. Adler
[An excerpt from The Common Sense of Politics]
I turn at once to the consideration of liberty for all. It is
necessary to distinguish three forms of social freedom -- the
freedom of the individual in society. It is only the first of these
that the philosophical anarchist has in mind.
The first is the unlimited freedom of complete autonomy, a freedom
that is incompatible with civil law and government, for it consists
in each man's obeying himself alone and being able to do exactly as
he pleases.
The second is the limited freedom of the residual autonomy that
the individual retains when he acknowledges the limited authority of
a de jure government, of which he is a consenting constituent. This
is the freedom of being able to do as he pleases with respect to all
matters not prescribed by the civil laws of a just government. Let
us call such limited freedom "individual civil liberty."
The third is the freedom of the individual as a consenting
constituent and a participating citizen. In contrast to individual
civil liberty, which consists in doing as one pleases where just
laws prescribe no course of conduct, this freedom which I shall call
"political liberty" consists in obeying laws that are made
by an authority to which the individual has consented and made by a
process in which, through his suffrage, he has participated. While
they are not laws wholly of his own making, neither are they laws
wholly imposed upon him by force. The citizen as a self-governing
individual has the freedom of political liberty in his lawful
conduct.
Now, if the only liberty worthy of the name were the unlimited
freedom of complete autonomy (which is the only freedom that the
philosophical anarchist acknowledges), it would follow that such
liberty cannot exist for men living in states and under government.
However, it also follows that if such liberty were to be exercised
without the restraints of justice, some individuals might enjoy
unlimited freedom to the maximum, but in doing so they would
encroach upon, limit, or reduce the freedom of others to do exactly
as they pleased. In other words, unlimited freedom -- freedom
unrestrained by justice -- cannot be maximized for all.
Herein lies the distinction between liberty and license. Liberty
is freedom exercised under the restraints of justice so that its
exercise results in injury to no one. In contrast license is freedom
exempt from the restraints of justice and. therefore, injurious to
others in infringing their freedom as well as violating other
rights. When no distinction is made between liberty and license, the
freedom of the strong an destroy the freedom of the weak. For the
freedom of any one individual to be compatible with In equal measure
of freedom on the part of all others, the freedom of each must be
limited and limited precisely for the purpose of preventing the
freedom of one from encroaching upon or destroying the freedom of
others. Hence maximization of freedom for all, with an equal measure
of freedom for each, is impossible without the restraints of
justice. which confines the freedom of doing as one pleases to
conduct that in no way injures anyone else.
It may be objected at this point, on behalf of the philosophical
anarchist, that what has so far been shown is only that the
maximization of liberty for all and with an equal measure for each,
requires the restraints of justice. It has not been shown that it
requires civil law and government. Let me meet that objection by
proposing a hypothesis that I regard as contrafactual.
Let us suppose that individuals living together in a society
without law and government not only could act in concert for their
common good and cooperate peacefully, but also that each and
everyone of them had perfect moral characters so that they would all
act under the restraints of justice in everything that they did
which affected others. On this supposition, they would have complete
autonomy, for each would obey himself alone, but that complete
autonomy would no longer be an unlimited freedom, for it would be
limited by the self-imposed restraints of justice. This limited
freedom exercised by completely autonomous individuals with complete
moral integrity would not differ an iota from the limited freedom
that can be enjoyed by individuals living in the state under just
laws and government. I say "can be enjoyed" because, in
civil society, those who are impelled to act unjustly may be
coercively restrained by government, but even then they are not
deprived of liberty when that is distinguished from license.
Hence if the philosophical anarchist admits that the restraints of
justice are required for the maximization of liberty for all, with
an equal measure for each, he must abandon his conception of liberty
as an unlimited freedom for each individual to do exactly as he
pleases whether he injures anybody else or not. Then the only
question which remains is whether this liberty -- freedom limited by
justice -- is compatible with the retention by everyone of complete
autonomy. If so, then it can exist in a society without government;
but if not, then it cannot exist in the absence of the state and
government.
In proposing the hypothesis that we have been considering, I said
that it was contrafactual. I need only recall points made earlier to
show why that is the case. We have seen that it is impossible for
individuals who retain their complete autonomy to live together in
peace and act in concert for their common good. That would be true
even if the individuals were men of perfect moral integrity, for
even so they still have the finite intelligence of human beings.
They would be men, not angels or gods. In addition, men being as
they are or even as they might be under the best of circumstances,
they are rational animals, not purely rational begins; and it is
therefore unlikely, to say the least, that all would achieve the
perfect moral integrity that presupposes the power of reason
completely to control the animal appetites and drives.
Hence, taking men as they are or as they might be under the best
of circumstances, the limited freedom that is the only liberty that
can be maximized for all in equal measure cannot be achieved solely
by the self-imposed restraints of justice. For the whole assembly of
men, including the criminal and the vicious along with the virtuous
and including all degrees of moral character short of perfect
integrity, the instructive prescriptions of just laws are required
to supplement self-discipline where it is inadequate, and the
coercive force of law is required to prevent the unrestrained
exercise of freedom by those whose uncontrolled impulses are unjust.
Let me briefly sum this up. The unlimited freedom that some men
would have access to in the absence of government and law would
defeat the realization of the ideal of maximizing liberty for all.
It is anarchy, not the state and government, that is incompatible
with the realization of this ideal. When a man's limited freedom is
seen as consisting in his individual civil liberty in all mattes not
regulated by just laws, together with his political liberty as a
consenting constituent and a participating citizen of a de jure
state and government, then, in principle at least, we can see no
reason for denying that the fullest possible realization of freedom
for all is not only compatible with, but is also dependent upon, the
institutions of a just state with just government.