XVIII. Whither the National Interest?
America's Unknown Enemy: Beyond Conspiracy
Editorial Staff of the
American Institute for Economic Research
[1993]
In recent years, critics on both the political left and right often
have opined that American foreign policy has been adrift in the "postmodern"
world. It goes without saying that the diversity of views about what
constitutes proper policy is extreme. While some have argued that even
the most vicious dictators deserve our understanding and sufferance,
others have expressed preference for a policy that would "bomb
our enemies back to the Stone Age." But virtually all agree that
the lack of clearly stated goals and procedures for assessing the
national interest has entangled us in all sorts of predicaments.
Beyond this, foreign policy analysts are nearly unanimous in the view
that, far from simplifying America's role in the "new world
order," the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold
War have eliminated the principal referents of the State Department's
ad hoc foreign policy of the past 30 years and so have complicated
matters. Despite vague appeals to such diverse notions as the "end
of history," a "Pax Americana," or "neo-Manifest
Destiny," few have offered any specific advice as to what we
should do next.
Rather, a resurgent current of isolationism suggests that at this
juncture many Americans simply are tired of what they perceive as
their leaders' half-century preoccupation with foreign affairs. A
major reason the Bush administration was not returned to office seems
to have been President Clinton's promise to turn his attention away
from international affairs and toward domestic concerns. Viewed
politically, it may be difficult to exaggerate the windfall effect for
President Clinton of the public's apparent expectations about the "peace
dividend" in the 1992 elections. But international problems do
not just "go away" with a change of administrations in
Washington, D.C. It is more than mildly ironic that, with the domestic
economy indicating robust recovery, the principal ''crises (other than
those that were self-inflicted) that President Clinton and his
advisers faced early in his administration were international ones.
Almost surely, many others await.
Here we review broadly some of the main currents of thought that have
shaped the foreign policy debate during recent decades and assess the
foreign affairs outlook of the new Administration in light of what is
known about the views of the President and his advisers. Whatever the
President's stance, many questions remain about the likely
effectiveness of any foreign policy that relies principally or even
largely on the prescriptions of the past. The record to date strongly
suggests that a major hindrance to the conduct of American foreign
policy is the lack of any coherent view of the national interest. The
final sections of this discussion seek to develop such a view, and
reflect on the possibility of conducting foreign policy in ways that
are consistent with the behavioral science procedures to which AIER
endeavors to adhere.
Globalism ...
Most recent discussions of American foreign policy
per se have tended to follow the rough outlines of one of two
major intellectual constructs. Respectively called "globalism"
and "realpolitik" by their detractors, they have shaped
debate over America's role in the international arena for the past 4
decades. The origins of these competing currents of thought extend
back many decades, indeed centuries, and involve by implication a
number of the same behavioral issues that have described religious and
other sociocultural conflicts throughout the centuries. Given the
historical distance between these two views, it is highly unlikely
that a "consensus" foreign policy derived solely from either
will be forthcoming soon, if ever. Indeed, each has been modified in
late 20th-century America in ways that have tended to blur the
distinction between them, even though fundamentally they remain based
on irreconcilable "world views" that rely intellectually on
markedly differing notions of human behavior. It would be impossible
in a brief discussion to consider all of the differences between these
two lines of thinking or even to begin to explore the many nuances
involved. But even a brief recollection of their origins and
development may, from a behavioral science perspective, suggest the
many difficulties they tend to introduce.
Stated briefly, contemporary globalism in foreign policy -- sometimes
called "globalist internationalism" or "disinterested
globalism" inasmuch as it generally eschews or seeks a diminished
role for national interests in policy calculations -- derives
principally from Enlightenment notions of human perfectibility and is
largely an extension of the Wilsonian liberal internationalism
embraced for decades by the Council on Foreign Relations and resident
State Department intellectuals. Viewed broadly, it has ruled the
theoretical base of American foreign policy since 1917, and its
adherents have included influential members of both major political
parties. In its most simplistic expression, it posits the development
of a "world community" (a.k.a. New World Order) based on
self-detemination, nonaggression, conciliation, arbitration, and, most
important, "collective security" that is enforced through an
international administration of some sort. Accordingly, national
sovereignty at some point must submit to supranational authority --
the League of Nations, the World Court, the United Nations, the
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the like. During the
Cold War decades it found its principal expression in the U.S. policy
of "containment," and, following the collapse of the Soviet
Union, has as its dominant foreign policy motif the "enhancement
of democracy" around the world.
In view of the less-than-perfect results achieved thus far by the
application of some of its tenets, virtually no one has been satisfied
with the product of globalist-internationalist foreign policy. (it
should be noted that not even its adherents credit it with forcing the
demise of the Soviet Union, which generally is acknowledged to have
self-destructed. Its detractors argue that the globalist elements of
Cold War policy tended to perpetuate the communist regime.) Its
numerous critics, including some former adherents, have observed that
the unprincipled application of the precept of "enhancing
democracy" has resulted in what Irving Kristol terms "self-debilitating
equivocations" that belie American intentions.[1] Why were
American policymakers ready to defend self-determination in Kuwait but
not in Bosnia? (We need the oil; the Bosnians have nothing to offer.)
To send troops to Somalia but not to other African nations where
sociopolitical conditions are just as bad or worse? (Starving Somalis
got television coverage.) To denounce "human rights violations"
in, say, Iraq, while we overiook them in Southeast Asia (who wants war
with Indonesia?) or China (a mighty big market). And so on.
Others (including this organization) have observed that economic aid,
which is presumed to be a major tool of globalist strategy (as well as
realist strategy, discussed below), tends to enhance neither democracy
nor the economic well-being of its intended recipients. Rather, it
often feeds corruption and further entrenches those in power. Inasmuch
as it may distort markets and divert resources from better uses, it
impedes economic growth and thwarts improvements in standards of
living.
But globalism's most effective opponents may be those who have
observed that, stripped of its moralistic and legalistic language, it
amounts to an elitist fantasy that is contrary to the views of a
majority of Americans, who simply do not concur in the wisdom of
relinquishing national sovereignty for the sake of some vaguely
conceived notion ol world community. Even former U.N. Ambassador Jeane
Kirkpatrick has called for the development of a foreign policy that is
"ratified by popular majorities" rather than left to the
devices of an out-of-touch elite.[2] So widespread have resentments
against the globalist elite become that, given the burgeoning market
for "New Age conspiracy literature, unlikely support from both
the political left and right apparently has grown for the view that
globalist plans have been and are being directed by a vast
international conspiracy said variously to be ruled by Wall Street
financiers and international bankers, a Jewish cabal, "big oil,"
Vatican bankers, Yale's Skull and Bones, the Council on Foreign
Relations, the Trilateral Commission, the Bilderbergers, the Club of
Rome, or one or more other secret orders.
… vs. Realpolitik
In contrast, realpolitik (called realism by its adherents) derives
broadly from a pre-Enlightenment Western tradition which holds, in the
words of the political scientist and realist strategist Hans
Morgenthau, that "the sinfulness of man is conceived not as an
accidental disturbance of the order of the world sure to be overcome
by a gradual development toward the good, but as an inescapable
necessity."[3] Contrary to the notions of human perfectibility
that apparently propel globalist thinking, realists generally
subscribe to a view of human behavior that closely parallels the
Judeo-Christian doctrine of original sin. Although there are many
nuances in realist thinking that admit the possibility of "the
good" in the behavior of humans, a primary consideration in all
human affairs is the establishment of various protections against the
human propensity to do evil. While the theoretical underpinnings of
American foreign policy during the past 4 decades generally have
mirrored a globalist-internationalist outlook, its practical conduct
often has reflected the application of the principles of realpolitik.
In international affairs, a distinguishing characteristic of realist
thinking is its insistence that international relations differ
crucially from domestic affairs, inasmuch as the international system
is and will continue to be fundamentally anarchic. Accordingly, the
various nations have discrete interests and the distribution of power
among them -- which permits amoral powerful nations, unless
restrained, to obtain by force whatever they wish -- becomes an
overriding consideration. Where the strength of one or another of
several competing powers becomes so great, or others become so weak,
that their ambitions may threaten vast disruption, realism holds that
international peace and prosperity are best advanced through fostering
and maintaining a "balance of power," an international
equilibrium somewhat akin to notions of general equilibrium described
by economists.
To sustain such a balance of power over the long run, and especially
in times of crisis, according to realist thinking requires that "ideological
preferences" occasionally be subordinated to strategic
considerations. Hence, the necessity sometimes for alliances with
unsavory regimes and the sacrifice even of (usually minor)
ideologically friendly powers. As a practical matter, concerts of
power, even if fairly long lasting, always will be
ad hoc arrangements subject to change.
Not surprisingly, realist views have been described by their
detractors variously as "cold-blooded," "heartless,"
and "immoral," and have been blamed for many of the apparent
inconsistencies that have plagued the practical conduct of American
foreign policy. Hypocritical alliances with and aid to dictatorial
regimes are said not only to have discredited American resolve to
defend democracy, but also to have created situations where we have
been obliged to arm our very enemies. Expedient promises that were
made but not kept are said to have fostered resentments among
potential friends. And assorted military adventures that many believe
lacked purpose (or were undertaken for wrong purposes) and resolved
nothing are said to have discouraged our allies, heartened our
adversaries, and fostered domestic discontents.
The Administration's Foreign Policy Dilemma
Regrettably little is known about the President's views on foreign
policy
per se. Indeed, his campaign seems to have been conducted with
the implicit promise that he would neglect foreign affairs. An obscure
-- but to date the broadest -- clue as to his possible thinking about
foreign policy comes from acomment he made during a campaign
appearance. When questioned about the development of his views, he
replied that the work of one of his history professors at Georgetown
University, Dr. Carroll Quigley, had been a seminal influence on his
thinking. If he took Professor Quigley's erudition to heart, there may
be hope that he will explore more productive foreign policy avenues
than have his predecessors. For Professor Quigley's 1966 work Tragedy
and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time, which almost surely
formed the basis for his courses while the President was his student,
tends to be critical of both the elitist foreign policy establishment
and globalist thinking in general.[4]
This may be a dim hope, however. Judging from the personnel the
President since has appointed to conduct the affairs of state, it
would appear that the same thinking that has muddled foreign policy
during prior Administrations probably will hold sway in the Clinton
State Department. The majority of Clinton foreign policy appointees
appear to have been recruited from the Council on Foreign Relations
group. From Secretary of State Warren Christopher on down, there are
now so many familiar faces at Foggy Bottom from the CFR-Trilateral
Commission-dominated Carter administration that it has been dubbed "Carter
II."
Thus the new Administration would seem to face a familiar dilemma --
a hopeless choice between either an astonishingly naive or an
appallingly cynical view of human affairs, neither of which appears to
have gained, or can be expected to gain, much support from the
American public. Indeed, inasmuch as Cold War foreign policy generally
reflected a mix of the two views despite the State Department's
ideological bias toward globalism, there apparently has been little,
if any, practical preference for either view among those who actually
do the business of state. The predictable result has been contusion
and contempt abroad with respect to our aims and, as noted above, the
weakening of domestic support for almost any involvement in foreign
affairs. From an economic perspective, the predictable adverse
consequences of the new State Department's notions of "fairness"
are that they may play into the hands of special interests and produce
a new wave of protectionism. In short, unless President Clinton
himself influences policy in untried ways, we probably are in store
for "more of the same." It need not be so.
A Behavioral Science Critique
From a behavioral science perspective, both of the above lines of
thinking would seem to be irreparably flawed. As we have written
extensively elsewhere, a principal requirement of inquiry into any
human problem, including foreign affairs, is that analysis not be
clouded by
a priori assumptions about human behavior, the reliability of
results obtained primarily through the development of theory without
benefit of observation, or the certainty of any outcome.[5] Even the
briefest reflection suggests that both globalism and realism fall to
meet this basic requirement.
Insofar as globalist notions rely on unobserved but presumed
characteristics of human behavior that are supposed to propel humanity
toward some harmonious world community fashioned after the liberal
democratic model, they fly in the face of human history, which
chronicles not the durability but the fragility of all prior human
civilizations. Indeed, an empirical assessment of our own situation
indicates that, as AIER's founder E. C. Harwood observed 4 decades ago
(in "The Counterrevolution," reprinted as Appendix B in this
volume), the termination of the American experiment, which posits a
civilization based on human freedom, is probable without a renewed
commitment to the fundamental principles upon which the Nation was
founded. From this perspective, the globalist vision is a dangerous
fantasy.
… And An Analogy from Economics
Realpolitik, on the other hand, might appear to be grounded in a more
"scientific" approach to human behavior than that of the
globalists. However, on close inspection its principal tenets are just
as flawed. In brief, the successful conduct of a foreign policy based
on theories of realism depends on the unwarranted assumption that
foreign policy planners somehow can "manage" relations
between nations in ways that achieve some presumed ideal outcome (
i.e., balance of power). It ought to come as no surprise that
in practice, realpolitik has tended to be even more interventionist
than globalist-directed policy.
The difficulties of knowing under a realpolitik regime either what
the desirable balance between foreign powers might be -- or how best
to manage it - may be made clearer by way of analogy to economics.[6]
In a number of respects, the situation of the practitioners of
realpolitik is similar to that of central economic planners who seek
to "fine tune" an economy through government intervention in
business affairs. Such economic management presumes that some
activities are more desirable than others, and that (in both the short
and long run) a small group of elite policymakers will make better
decisions than do the aggregate millions of market participants.
Often, developing policy requires decisions about "proper"
levels of activity (the economic "balance of power") and
incentives or disincentives for any number of economic endeavors.
The record clearly has shown that the main result of such efforts in
the economic realm has been to perpetuate inefficiencies and the
misallocation of resources and to make eventual adjustments (i.e.,
economic contractions) more severe than they otherwise would be. In
the foreign policy arena the implication seems more ominous: instead
of recessions or depressions, mistaken policy invites war.
In a broad sense, the problems introduced by globalism and
realpolitik are inherent in all "top down" regimes that rely
on some grand model, however elegantly constructed, as a basis for the
conduct of policy. The formulation of an approach to foreign policy
that meets the minimal requirements of behavioral science would seem
to demand a reconsideration of such central planning and the
abandonment of policy that is not grounded in observable human
behavior. Foreign policy strategy might usefully follow the process of
"incremental decisionmaking" developed by Thomas Sowell in
Knowledge and Decisions[7] Simply stated, incremental
decisions distribute risks and permit the consequences of bad
decisions to be minimized.
When applied to foreign affairs, incremental decisionmaking may imply
vastly reduced expectations about the effectiveness of American
initiatives in the rest of the world. But it does not necessarily
imply isolationism. Our prosperity requires a relatively unrestricted
international flow of goods and capital, and this circumstance alone
requires that we maintain some sort of foreign relations. But those
relations might be developed more effectively through the greater "privatization"
of foreign policy -- that is, by requiring private entities to assume
the risks of their international business dealings. This approach
would, in practice, rely on incremental decisionmaking.
"Friends of Liberty Everywhere, But Defenders of Our Own"
More fundamentally, however, such an approach requires a coherent
view of the national interest, which often has been portrayed in the
professional literature as a vague and possibly menacing (to "world
unity") notion. A renewed understanding of our national interest
in turn demands a broad understanding and appreciation of the
principal tenets of American civilization, both of which seem lost to
a large segment of American society. Indeed, relatively few apparently
have any notion of how brief the American experiment with human
freedom has been, how exceptional its successes, or how fragile its
grip in the face of present circumstances.
There is nothing vague or menacing about our national interest: it
resides in the protection and preservation of those institutions that
were established by the Nation's governing documents and that have
permitted the great revolution in human freedom to proceed and
flourish here. This is, in fact, the only thing the President is
charged with under his Oath of Office. What seems to have escaped many
Americans is that these bulwarks of freedom now are threatened (as
they have been for decades) by a broad counterrevolution within
Western civilization. In the broadest sense, then, the pursuit of the
national interest must begin at home through a redirection of effort
toward creating a greater understanding of those fundamental goals
enunciated in the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution of the
United States, and, most especially, its Bill of Rights.
Decades ago, E. C. Harwood concluded "that the only sound
foreign policy for the United States in the long run is to resume our
former place in the vanguard of the great revolution, to press on
toward the goals of more nearly complete individual freedom, and to
encourage other nations to follow." He cautioned, however, that "we
shall be ill-prepared for such a position of leadership until we have
reoriented the policies that we apply at home." In this respect,
he observed that "corrective action will be needed along at least
three general lines. First, the distortion of and interference with
free market relationships must be reduced as rapidly as possible and
ultimately ended; second, all special privileges must be eliminated;
and third, the activities of the Federal Government must be reduced to
the role of national defense and prevention of license or abuse of
freedom."[8]
The corrective action required in all three areas now is much greater
than when the above words first were penned. In our view, this alone
is reason to observe more closely the maxim that as a nation we be "friends
of liberty everywhere, but defenders of our own" -- especially at
home.
NOTES
- Irving Kristol, "Defining
Our National Interest" (The National Interest, Fall
1990, pp. 16-25) is a useful review of some of the ideologies that
have shaped foreign policy since 1917. Kristol is founder and
publisher of The National Interest, the principal foreign
policy publication that is editorially critical of the dominant
CFR-Trilateral Commission-State Department line of thinking found
in such publications as Foe'ign Affairs. The above summary
of globalism draws heavily from his discussion.
- See Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, "A
Normal Country in a Normal Time," op. cit., pp.40-44.
- Morgenthau is cited in Fareed
Zakaria, "Is Realism Finished?," The National
Interest, Winter 1992-93, p.22. Zakaria's article is a recent
sophisticated explication and defense of realist views, and served
as a basis for this summary.
- See Carroll Quigley, Tragedy
and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time (New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1966), available in reprint from Angriff Press.
- A full discussion of AIER's
views on scientific inquiry is contained in Useful Procedures
of Inquiry, by Rollo Handy and E. C. Harwood, available from
AIER (price $15, hardbound).
- Reportedly, foreign policy
strategy as developed under "realism" relies heavily on
game and decision theory. For a discussion and critique of game
and decision theory, see our publication A Current Appraisal
of the Behavioral Sciences (price $15, hardbound).
- Thomas Sowell, Knowledge
and Decisions (New York: Basic Books, 1980). This volume is
crucial to understanding the fundamental difficulties with all
central planning.
- See Appendix B, "The
Counterrevolution," pages 134-142.
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