The Austrian Economists
Eugen Bohm-Bawerk
[Part 2 of 2]
After the classical school came the historical. As often happens,
they took the attitude of sceptical superiority and declared
altogether insoluble the problem which they were unable to solve. They
thought it to be in general impossible to say, for example, what per
cent of the value of a statue is due to the sculptor and what per cent
to the marble.
Now if the problem be but rightly put, that is, if we wish to
separate the economic and not the physical shares, the problem becomes
soluble. It is actually solved in practice in all rational enterprises
by every agriculturalist or manufacturer; and theory has nothing to do
but rightly and carefully to hold up the mirror to practice in order
in turn to find the theoretical solution. To this end the theory of
final utility helps in the simplest way. It is the old song again.
Only observe correctly what the final utility of each complementary
factor is, or what utility the presence or absence of the
complementary factor would add or subtract, and the calm pursuit of
such inquiry will of itself bring to light the solution of the
supposed insoluble problem. The Austrians made the first earnest
attempt in this direction. Menger and the author of this paper have
treated the question under the heading Theorie der komplementaren
Guter; Wieser has treated the same subject under the title Theorie der
Zurechnung (theory of contribution). The latter, especially, has in an
admirable manner shown how the problem should be put, and that it can
be solved; Menger has, in the happiest manner, as it seems to me,
pointed out the method of solution.(12*)
I have called the law of complementary goods the counterpart of the
law of cost. As the former disentangles the relations of value which
result from temporal and causal juxtaposition, from the simultaneous
cooperation of several factors toward one common utility. so the law
of cost explains the relations of value which result from temporal and
causal sequence, from the causal interdependence of successive
factors. "By means of the former the meshes of the complicated
network represented by the mutual value relations of the cooperating
factors are disentangled, so to speak, in their length and breadth; by
the latter in their depth; but both processes occur within the
all-embracing law of final utility, of which both laws are only
special applications to special problems." (13*)
Thus prepared, the Austrian economists finally proceed to the
problems of distribution. These resolve themselves into a series of
special applications of the general theoretical laws, the knowledge of
which was obtained by a tedious, but scarcely unfruitful, work of
preparation. Land, labor, and capital are complementary factors of
production. Their price, or what is the same thing, rate of rent,
wages, and interest, results simply from a combination of the laws
which govern the value of the materials of production on the one hand
with the laws of complementary goods on the other hand. The particular
views of the Austrians on these subjects I will here omit. I could
not, if I would, give in this paper any proper statement of their
conclusions, still less a demonstration of them; I must content myself
with giving a passing view of the matters with which they are busied,
and, where it is possible, of the spirit in which they work. I only
briefly remark, therefore, that they have set forth a new and
comprehensive theory of capital(14*) into which they have woven a new
theory of wages,(15*) besides repeatedly working out the problems of
the entrepreneur's profits,(16*) and of rent.(17*) In the light of the
theory of final utility, the last-named problem in particular finds an
easy and simple solution, which confirms Ricardo's theory in its
actual results and corroborates its reasoning in many details.
Of course, all the possible applications of the law of final utility
have by no means been made. It is more nearly true that they are
scarcely begun. I may mention in passing that certain Austrian
economists have attempted a broad application of the law in the field
of finance;(18*) others to certain difficult and interesting questions
of jurisprudence.(19*)
Finally, in connection with the foregoing efforts, much trouble has
been taken to improve the implements, so to speak, with which the
science has to work, to clear up the most important fundamental
conceptions. And, as often happens, the Austrian economists find most
to improve and correct in a department which has heretofore passed as
so plain and simple that the literature of several nations - the
English, for example - has scarcely a word to say about it. I refer to
the doctrine of economic goods. Menger has put a logical implement
into the hands of science in his conception, as simple as it is
suggestive, of the subordination of goods (Guterordnungen),(20*) a
conception which will be useful in all future investigation. The
writer of this paper has especially endeavored to analyze a conception
which appears to be the simplest of all, but which is most obscure and
most misused: the conception of use of goods (Gebrauch der
Guter).(21*)
Questions of practical political economy, on the contrary, have only
just begun to be made the subjects of literary work by the Austrian
economists.(22*) This, however, by no means implies that they have no
faculty for the practical needs of economic life, and still less, that
they do not wish to connect their abstract theory with practice. The
contrary is true. But we must build the house before we can set it in
order, and so long as we have our hands full with simply raising the
framework of our theory, there is little obligation to devote to
numerous questions of practical detail that amount of time-absorbing
care which their literary elaboration would require. We have our
opinions upon them, we teach them from our chairs, but our literary
activities have thus far been bestowed almost exclusively upon
theoretical problems, for these are not only the fundamental ones, but
are those whose long-continued neglect by the other side, the
historical school, must be repaired.
What, now, is the short meaning of this long story? What is the
significance to the science as a whole of the advent of a set of men
who teach this and that in regard to goods, value, cost, capital, and
a dozen other subjects? Has it any significance at all? In answering
this question I feel the embarrassment of belonging to the group of
men whose activity is under discussion. I must, therefore, confine
myself to the statement of what the Austrian economists as a body are,
trying to effect; others may judge whether or not they are successful.
What they are striving for is a sort of renaissance of economic
theory. The old classical theory, admirable as it was for its time,
had the character of a collection of fragmentary acquisitions which
had been brought into orderly relations neither with one another nor
with the fundamental principles of human science. Our knowledge is
only patchwork at best, and must always remain so. But of the
classical theory this characterization was particularly and
emphatically true. With the insight of genius it had discovered a mass
of regularities in the whirlpool of economic phenomena, and with no
less genius, though hindered by the difficulties that beset
beginnings, it commenced the interpretation of these regularities. It
usually succeeded, also, in following the thread of explanation to a
greater or less distance from the surface toward the depths. But
beyond a certain depth it always, without exception, lost the clue. To
be sure, the classical economists well knew to what point all their
explanations must be traced - to the care of mankind for its own
well-being, which, undisturbed by the incursion of altruistic motives,
is the ultimate motive-force of all economic action. But owing to a
certain circumstance the middle term of the explanation, by means of
which the actual conduct of men, in the establishment of prices of
goods, of wages, rent, etc., ought to have been joined to the
fundamental motive of regard for utility - this middle term was always
wrong. That circumstance was the following. A Crusoe has to do only
with goods; in modern economic life we have to do with goods and with
human beings from whom we obtain the goods we use - by means of
exchange, cooperation, and the like. The economy of a Crusoe is
explained when we succeed in showing what relation exists between our
well-being and material commodities, and what attitude the care for
our well-being requires us to take toward such material commodities.
To explain the modern economic order there is, apparently, need of two
processes: 1st, just as in Crusoe's economy, we must understand the
relation of our interests to external goods; 2d, we must seek to
understand the laws, according to which we pursue our interests when
they are entangled with the interests of others.
No one has ever been deluded into thinking that this second process
is not difficult and involved - not even the classical economists.
But, on the other hand, they fatally underrated the difficulties of
the first process. They believed that as regards the relation of men
to external goods, there was nothing at all to be explained, or,
speaking more exactly, determined. Men need goods to supply their
wants; men desire them and assign to them in respect of their utility
a value in use. That is all the classical economists knew or taught in
regard to the relation of men to goods. While value in exchange was
discussed and explained in extensive chapters, from the time of Adam
Smith to that of Mr Macvane, value in use was commonly dismissed in
two lines, and often with the added statement that value in use had
nothing to do with value in exchange.
It is a fact, however, that the relation of men to goods is by no
means so simple and uniform. The modern theory of final utility in its
application to cost of production, complementary goods, etc., shows
that the relation between our well-being and goods is capable of
countless degrees, and all these degrees exert a force in our efforts
to obtain goods by exchange with others. Here yawns the great and
fatal chasm in the classical theory; it attempts to show how we pursue
our interests in relation to goods in opposition to other men without
thoroughly understanding the interest itself. Naturally the attempts
at explanation are incoherent. The two processes of explanation must
fit together like the two cogwheels of a machine. But as the classical
economists had no idea what the shape and cogging of the first wheel
should be, of course they could not give to the second wheel a proper
constitution. Thus, beyond a certain depth, all their explanations
degenerate into. a few general commonplaces, and these are fallacious
in their generalization.
This is the point at which the renaissance of theory must begin, and,
thanks to the efforts of Jevons and his followers, as well as to the
Austrian school, it has already begun. In that most general and
elementary part of economic theory through which every complicated
economic explanation must eventually lead, we must give up dilettanti
phrases for real scientific inquiry. We must not weary of studying the
microcosm if we wish rightly to understand the macrocosm of a
developed economic order. This is the turning-point which is reached
at one time or another in all sciences. We universally begin by taking
account of the great and striking phenomena, passing unobservant over
the world of little every-day phenomena. But there always comes a time
when we discover with astonishment that the complications and riddles
of the macrocosm occur in still more remarkable manner in the
smallest, apparently simplest elements - when we apprehend that we
must seek the key to an understanding of the phenomena of great things
in the study of the world of small things. The physicists began with
the motions and laws of the great heavenly bodies; to-day they are
studying nothing more busily than the theory of the molecule and the
atom, and from no part of natural science do we expect more important
developments for the eventual understanding of the whole than from the
minutiae of chemistry. In the organic world the most highly developed
and mightiest organisms once roused the greatest interest. To-day that
interest is given to the simplest micro-organisms. We study the
structure of cells and of amoebae, and look everywhere for bacilli. I
am convinced that it will not be otherwise in economic theory. The
significance of the theory of final utility does not lie in the fact
that it is a more correct theory of value than a dozen other older
theories, but in the fact that it marks the approach of that
characteristic crisis in the science of economic phenomena. It shows
for once that in an apparently simple thing, the relation of man to
external goods, there is room for endless complications; that
underneath these complications lie fixed laws, the discovery of which
demands all the acumen of the investigator; but that in the discovery
of those laws is accomplished the greater part of the investigation of
the conduct of men in economic intercourse with one another. The
candle lighted within sheds its light outside the house.
It may, of course, be to many who call themselves political
economists a very inconvenient and unpleasant surprise to find that to
the field which they have heretofore ploughed with intellectual toil,
another new field is added-a field by no means small, whose tillage is
particularly laborious. How convenient it has been heretofore to
conclude an explanation of phenomena of price with reference to the
shibboleth of "supply and demand" or "cost". And
now, on a sudden, these supposed pillars tremble, and we are forced to
build the foundations far deeper, at the cost of great and tedious
labor.
Whether inconvenient or not, there is no other course left us than to
do the work which past generations have neglected. The classical
economists are excusable for having neglected it. In their time, when
everything was yet new and undiscovered, investigation per saltum,
scientific exploitation, so to speak, might bring rich results. But
now it is otherwise. In the first place, we of later times, since we
have not the merit of being pioneers of the science, should not lay
claim to the advantage of pioneers: the requirements have become
higher. If we do not wish to remain behind the other sciences, we too
must bring into our science a strict order and discipline, which we
are still far from having. Let us not be beguiled into vain
self-satisfaction. Mistakes and omissions are, of course, to be
expected at any time, in every science; but our "systems"
still swarm with the commonplace, superficial faults, whose frequent
occurrence is a sure sign of the primitive state of a science. That
our expositions end in smoke before essentials are reached; that they
evaporate in empty phrases as soon as they begin to be difficult; that
the most important problems are not even stated; that we reason in the
most undisguised circle; that not only within the same system, but
even within the same chapter, contradictory theories of one and the
same matter are upheld; that by a disorderly and ambiguous terminology
we are led into the most palpable mistakes and misunderstandings - all
these failings are of so frequent occurrence in our science that they
almost seem to be characteristic of its style. I can easily understand
how the representatives of other sciences, which have become amenable
to strict discipline, look down with a sort of pity upon many a famous
work of political economy, and deny to the latter the character of a
true science.
This state of affairs must and shall be changed. The historical
school, which for the last forty years has given the keynote to all
Germany, has unfortunately done nothing at all to this end. On the
contrary, in its blind terror of "abstract" reasoning and
through the cheap scepticism with which at almost every important
point in the system it declares the given problems "insoluble,"
and the struggles to discover scientific laws hopeless, it has done
its utmost to discourage and obstruct the scanty efforts that have
been directed toward the desired end. I do not ignore the fact that in
another direction, in the provision of vast empirical stores, they
have conferred great benefit; but future time will impartially show
how much they have helped in this direction and harmed in the other
with their one-sided zeal.
But what both the classical and the historical schools have
neglected, the Austrian school is to-day trying to accomplish. Nor are
they alone in the struggle. In England, since the days of Jevons,
kindred efforts, to which the great thinker gave the impulse, have
been carried forward by his worthy associates and followers; and
incited partly by Jevons, partly by the Austrian school, a
surprisingly great number of investigators, of all nations, have in
recent times turned to the new ideas. The great Dutch literature is
devoted almost entirely to them; in France, Denmark and Sweden they
have gained an entrance. In Italian and American literature they are
almost daily propagated; and even in Germany, the stronghold of the
historical school, against whose resistance the ground must be fought
for almost inch by inch, the new tendency has taken a strong and
influential position.
Can it be that the tendency which possesses so great a power of
attraction is nothing but error? Does it not in reality spring from a
need of our science, and supply a need which has long been repressed
by one-sided methods, but which must eventually make itself felt --
the need of real scientific depth?
NOTES:
1. Menger, Untersuchungen uber die
Methode der Sozialwissenschaften, 1883; Die Irrthumer des Historismus
in der deutschen Nationaokonomie, 1884; Grundzuge einer Classification
der Wirtschaftswissenschaften, in Conrad's Jahrbuh fur
Nationalokonomie und Statistik, N.F., vol. xix, 1889; Sax, Das Wesen
und die Aufgabe der Nationalokonomie, 1884; Philippovich, Ueber
Aufgabe und Methode der politischen Oekonomie, 1886; Bohm-Bawerk,
Grundzuge der Theorie des wirschaftlichen Guterwerths, in Conrad's
Jahrbuch, N.F., vol. xiii, 1886, pp. 480, et seq.; review of
Brentano's Classische Nationalokonomie in the Gottinger Gelehrten
Anzeigen, 1-6, 1889; review of Schmoller's Litteraturgeschichte in
Conrad's Jahrbuch, N.F., vol. xx, translated in Annals of the American
Academy, vol. 1, no. 2, October 1890.
2. Entwickelung der Gosetze des menschlichen Verkehrs.
3. Theory of Political Economy, 1871, 2nd, ed., 1879.
4. Grundsatze der Volkswirthschafslehre, 1871.
5. Elements d'economie politique pure, 1874.
6. "Philosophy of Value" in the New Englander, July, 1881.
Professor Clark was not then familiar, as he tells me, with the works
of Jevons and Menger.
7. Bohm-Bawerk, Grundzuge, pp. 38 and 49; Wieser, Der naturliche
Werth, 1889, pp. 46 et seq.
8. As for example in Germany, the highest authority on the theory of
price, Hermann; cf. Bohm-Bawerk, Grundzuge, pp. 516, 527.
9. Austrian literature on the subject of price; Menger, Grundsatze de
Volkswirtschaftslehre, p. 142, et seq., Bohm-Bawerk, Grunzuge der
Theorie des wirschaftlichen Guterwerths, Part II, Conrad's Jahrbuch,
N.F., vol. xiii, p. 477 et seq., and on the point touched upon in the
text, especially, p. 516; Wieser, Der naturliche Werth, pp. 37 et
seq.; Sax, Grundlegung der theoretischen Staatswirtschaft, 1887, pp.
276 et seq., Zucherkandl, ZurTheorie des Preises, 1889. I will not
lose this opportunity to refer to the excellent account given by Dr
James Bonar, some years ago, of the Austrial economists and their
views of value in the Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oct. 1888.
10. Der naturliche Werth, p. 170
11. Austrian literature on the relation of cost and value; Menger,
Grundsatze, pp. 123 et seq.; Weiser, Ueber den Ursprung und die
Hauptgesetze des wirtschaftlichen Werthes, 1884, pp. 139 et seq.; Der
naturliche Werth, pp. 164 et seq.; Bohm-Bawerk, Grundsuge, pp. 61 et
seq., 534 et seq.; Positive Theorie des Kapitals, 1889, pp. 189 et
seq., 234 et seq.
12. Menger, Grundstze, pp. 138 et seq. Bohm-Bawerk, Grundzuge, Part
I, pp. 56 et seq., Positive Theorie, pp. 178 et seq.; Wieser, Der
naturliche Werth, pp. 67 et seq.
13. Bohm-Bawerk, Positive Theorie, p. 201.
14. Bohm-Bawerk, Kapital und Kapitalzins: I. Geschichte und Kritik
der Kapitalisinstheorien, 1884. [Translated into English, with a
preface by W. Smart, 1890] II. Positive Theorie des Kapitales, 1889;
differing from the older teaching of Menger's Grundsatze, pp. 143 et
seq.
15. Bohm-Bawerk, Positive Theorie, passim, and pp. 450-452.
16. Mataja, Der Unternehmergewinn, 1884; Gross, Die Lehre vom
Unternehmergewinn, 1884.
17. Menger, Grundsatze, pp. 133 et seq.; Wieser, Der naturlichte
Werth, pp. 112 et seq.; Bohm-Bawerk, Positive Theorie, pp. 380 et seq.
18. Robert Meyer, Die Principien der gerechten Besteuerung, 1884;
Sax, Grundlegung, 1887; Wieser, Der naturliche Werth, pp. 209 et seq.
19. Mataja, Das Recht des Schadenersatzes, 1888; Seidler, "Die
Geldstrafe vom volkswirtschaftlichen und sozialpolitischen
Gesichtspunkt" Conrad's Jahrbuch, N.F., vol. xx, 1890.
20. Menger, Grundsatze, pp. 8 et seq.
21. Bohm-Bawerk, Rechte und Verhaltnisse vom Standpunkt der
volkwirtschaftlichen Guterichre, 1881, pp. 57 et seq.; Positive
Theorie, pp. 361 et seq.
22. By Sax, for example, Die Verkehrsmittel in Volks- und
Staatswirtschaft, 1878-79; Philippovich, Die Bank von England, 1885;
Der badische Staatshaushalt, 1889.
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