

CHAPTER III

THE FUNCTIONS OF GOVERNMENT

“Governments may be corrupted and public misfortunes induced by the failure to assume, as governmental, functions that properly belong to government,—as well as from interferences by government in the proper sphere of individual action.”

HENRY GEORGE.

IN considering the functions of government, the uses to which the power of the State may be put in order to effect the purpose of its organisation in no way affect the rights of any individual or of the people as a whole, except as it wisely secures or ignorantly interferes with their enjoyment. As citizens, or members of the State, the people have no greater or other right to interfere with the conduct of any man than they have as members of Society merely. What they gain in that regard through organisation of the State, is simply the power to do that which they individually had and have the right to do but

lack the power of doing, namely, to maintain through exercise of the right of self-defence the public peace and order necessary to enjoyment of their natural rights. It is, moreover, evident that, since no majority can justly compel any man to do what it would be unjust for him to do of his own volition merely, the State can not justly do that which would be unjust if done by an individual acting of his own accord and without civil authority. It should, however, be at the same time observed that, because it may do nothing that the individual may not do, it by no means follows that the State may do everything and all that individuals may justly do. By reason of the compulsory method of its organisation and support it can justly do only such things as any one of its members having the power might rightly compel the others to do, namely, whatever is essential to self-defensive maintenance of a just peace and an equitable public order. Distinction should ever be made between civil power and civil authority. The State must of necessity have the power, or ability to do much that it has and can have no authority, or right to do.

It has already been seen that in order to maintain a just peace the State must not only adopt

such measures as may be necessary to direct, immediate preservation of the peace, but must also secure its members individually against infringement of their primary natural rights by other individuals, security from such infringement being essential not only to the permanence but also to the justice of any peace maintained. An unjust peace will sooner or later be disturbed, the sooner the better for all concerned. The State must also of necessity perform either directly or indirectly all services of a public nature, that is, such as are essential to an equitable public order and can not be performed without exercise of public, or civil authority. It must also do whatever is necessary to a just maintenance of its own integrity and supreme power. The various activities necessary to accomplishment of these four distinct objects constitute the only legitimate functions of government.

The different activities of the State all have one and the same ultimate and only authorising purpose, namely, the maintenance of peace and an equitable public order, but, for convenience of treatment, they may be classified according to their respective direct, immediate objects. Those activities which have the preservation of peace

and order for their immediate object, as well as for their ultimate and only purpose, may be said to constitute the Peace-preserving function of government; those whose immediate object is to secure individuals against infringement of their natural rights by other individuals, constitute what may be called the Right-preserving function; those which have the performance of some public service for their immediate purpose belong to the Public-serving function; while those whose direct object is to maintain the integrity and supreme power of the State itself fall within the Self-preserving function.

All the legitimate uses of civil power are included in the above named four and only functions of government. Different classification would in no way affect the activities to be considered. A single activity may serve more than one governmental purpose and so fall within more than one of such functions, but it can not be legitimate, a proper exercise of civil power, unless it be necessary to performance of one or more of them. To use that power for accomplishment of any other purpose however desirable is to abuse it.

In the discharge of its first, or Peace-preserving function, the State prescribes and enforces regu-

lations whose direct and only object is to maintain peace and public order. This function is exercised largely in direct and timely prevention of peace-disturbing self-defence, conduct commonly characterised as taking the law into one's own hands, that is, doing for one's self that which the State for the sake of peace and order undertakes to do for him. It has been seen that the State can not justly prevent exercise of any primary right, but that peace-disturbing exercise of the subsidiary right of self-defence may be prohibited in cases where adequate protection is provided for the person foregoing such exercise. For instance, if property be stolen or unjustly detained or premises be wrongfully occupied, the person injured has an undoubted self-defensive right to use force if necessary in retaking such property or possession of such premises; but the State for the sake of public order forbids the use of peace-disturbing force for such purpose and subjects whoever uses it to penalties imposed in the discharge of its Peace-preserving function. In order, however, to insure uniform and prompt obedience to its peace-preserving regulation as well as in justice to him who observes it, the State makes provision for peaceable restoration of the property

or premises through exercise of its Right-preserving function. As already suggested, however, in case of direct aggression upon one's person, property or premises, he may make such forcible resistance as may be necessary to that immediate defence which from the circumstances of the case the State is unable to provide.

The Peace-preserving function is also exercised in regulating conduct in public places and thoroughfares wherever conditions are such that lack of regulation would result in public disorder; requiring, for instance, that vehicles shall keep to the right or to the left, as the rule may be, or that they shall avoid certain thoroughfares altogether.

Care should of course be taken in the discharge of this function, as well as of every other, not to interfere with or infringe upon any primary natural right, to the end that the peace maintained may be always just and equitable.

The second, or Right-preserving function, embraces whatever is to be done by the State for direct protection of individuals from the aggressions, the fraud or intentional violence of other individuals. It is sometimes loosely said that Society owes such protection to its members. It is true that they are each in duty bound to refrain

from aggression, but Society owes nothing to anybody, nor does anybody owe anything to Society, except to its members individually. The State is under obligation to protect its members for the reason only that in commanding the peace it forbids them to protect themselves.

Efficient discharge of this function requires not only a clear conception of natural rights, but also a ready apprehension of their infringement as well as of rational methods of preventing it. No right will be secure unless it is affirmatively recognised by the State, and even when nominal recognition is accorded it, a right will nevertheless be insecure if there be not a definite and correct understanding as to what constitutes infringement of it. Moreover, the adoption of irrational methods or measures in attempting to provide for the security of rights will eventually result in greater injustice than any so sought to be prevented. Attempt to secure one right at the expense of another tends not only to impair the latter but also to vitiate enjoyment of the former.

The State recognises the rights of life, liberty, property and contract, through imposition of deterrent penalties for certain violations of the first three of them, as well as by requiring repa-

ration as far as practicable to be made for their wilful or negligent infringement. It also provides for equitable adjustment of controversies arising out of contract, sometimes by enforcing performance, sometimes by the award of damages, as well as by providing for the collection of debts. State regulation of marriage and divorce has its warrant in the necessity for securing the natural rights of the persons interested, including children of the parties to the marriage contract, to which the State is, however, no more a party than to any other private contract.

The State can not justly lend its power to purposes of revenge, retaliation being foreign to the functions of government, which has properly nothing to do with so-called retributive justice. Penalties imposed by the State can have but one legitimate object, the self-defensive purpose of rendering the enjoyment of natural rights more secure than it would be without such penalties. The penalty most likely to promote general security of those rights from individual aggression is evidently whatever one is best calculated to render all persons, especially those upon whom it is inflicted, less inclined to aggression. Experience has shown what reason teaches, that men are

deterred from crime not so much by the severity of ultimate punishment as by the certainty of immediate restraint. It is also known that brutal and degrading punishments, not only fail to improve the character of those upon whom they are inflicted, but also tend to brutalise and degrade a people that inflicts them. In fixing the penalty for any offence however heinous, care should be taken not to subject the offender to any treatment tending to lessen his or any other man's self-respect or regard for the rights of others. In all its acts the State should as by example endeavour to strengthen rather than weaken popular sense of the sanctity of human rights, and ought never to countenance the fiction of their forfeiture to Society or to the State, for they are inalienable.

Like offences by whomsoever committed should be visited with like penalties. There should, for instance, be no imprisonment of any for offences to be atoned for by others in a different way, as by payment of a fine. The payment of money should never be exacted as a deterrent penalty, but only in reparation for an injury or in satisfaction of a just claim. The luxury of disobeying the law should be beyond the means of any citizen however wealthy. Reparation for an in-

jury incident to a criminal offence should always be separate and distinct from any deterrent penalty imposed, and the damages awarded should be collected like any other indebtedness. Provision for the collection of debts that the debtor is able but unwilling to pay, has its warrant if any in the rights of property and contract. If two men enter into a contract, and one of them after receiving value thereunder refuses to perform his part of the contract, he is of course justly indebted to the other, who has a natural right to recover from him, if he has it, the value so received. The State, however, for the sake of peace forbids disorderly recovery and is therefore in justice bound to provide for peaceable restitution, the object being, not to insure any one against the ordinary, voluntarily assumed hazards of trade, but to compel payment whenever refusal to pay evidences the intentional wrong of withholding that which belongs to another.

The activities of the first and second functions of government are seen to be of a somewhat negative and restrictive character, their immediate purpose being to prevent interference with the enjoyment of natural rights. Those of the third, or Public-serving function, on the other hand, will

be found to have the more constructive purpose of providing facilities for such enjoyment, their direct object being to render positively helpful services, necessary to an equitable public order, but exceeding the compass of unprivileged private enterprise, such services being termed public in contradistinction to such as can be rendered by private persons without civil authority. All human services and functions are in the nature of things either private or public; that is, they either can or can not be performed by unprivileged natural persons. There are no quasi-public functions.

The performance of private services can not be undertaken by the State without thereby unjustly interfering with the natural right of individuals to render them. By virtue of the right of contract every human being is entitled to a natural market in which to offer whatever services he may be able to render his fellow men. It is mainly through exchange of such services that the labour-made necessities and comforts of life are produced and enjoyed. If the State were to enter the competitive field the natural market for exchange of services, and with it all economic freedom, would be utterly destroyed.

On the other hand, since in the rendering of public services there is no natural competition possible, that is, since they can not be rendered by unprivileged natural persons, their performance by the State involves no interference with natural rights. It is, however, a serious interference with those rights for the State to farm out or entrust to private persons the performance of any public service. To the persons so privileged advantages are thereby given as unnatural and unjust and as eagerly sought as any arising from the bestowal of rank and title, advantages which can not be given to the few except to the disadvantage of the many. The State can not justly lend to or share with any part of the people any portion however small of that power which it holds in its corporate capacity for the common benefit of all. It should mind its own business and have no partners.

The first in time and importance of services distinctly public are those which are rendered in regulating the occupancy and facilitating the use of its territory by the people of the State. All the members of Society, by virtue of their common relation to the earth and of their equal right to liberty, have one and the same inalienable

right to occupy and use land necessary and natural to their individual support and happiness, the right of location. Disputes in regard to the location or extent of holdings for such purpose would naturally be among the first of those disturbances of the peace which render government necessary. In order to maintain peace the State must prescribe uniform terms and conditions upon which it undertakes to secure individuals in exclusive, permanent and undisturbed possession of their respective holdings. Those terms should of course be just and equitable, giving no man any advantage over any other and securing to all alike their equal, natural, right to the earth. Unjust and most inequitable would be a peace maintained on any other terms, upon terms, for instance, allowing any greater or less number of persons to appropriate more than an equitable share of the land or of its values.

It is, however, not in the nature of things possible so to apportion the territory of the State that all shall enjoy exclusive individual possession of equal areas of equally valuable land or of equally valuable holdings of whatever land. Land cannot be so divided, nor can the enjoyment of equal rights to land be secured by any mere

allotment of it; lands so differ in value, some having no value at all, that they are not susceptible of equitable distribution in kind.

Those who occupy land having no value, the least desirable in use, enjoy thereby no economic advantage over any of their fellow men, for such land yields no return beyond the wages and interest of any labour and capital expended upon it, the holder realising therefrom only what he earns. On the other hand, those who hold valuable land do enjoy such advantage, for the returns from such land exceed the mere wages and interest of the labour and capital spent upon it, the excess being in proportion to the value of the land, of which it is indeed the cause. To the extent of such excess the holder of the land receives a value which he does not earn, and which does not belong to him in particular any more than does the land from which it is derived. The State by securing him in the exclusive possession and control of such land enables him not only to appropriate as he should the values answering to the wages and interest of the labour and capital expended on it, but also to receive into his possession the excess, or ground rent arising from superiority of location.

Bearing in mind that the use of the earth at any time belongs to the people then living upon it, and that they are equally entitled not only to occupy and use it, but also to share alike in the economic advantages arising from the possession of superior locations, or valuable land, one having as much right to such possession as another, it is clear that land values are social; that they belong to no particular individual or class of individuals but to the people collectively; and that the only way for all to enjoy their equal rights to land, is for each to account for and pay over to all, to the public, the value if any of whatever occupancy of it he is by the State enabled to maintain to the exclusion of others. To require such payment would not only secure equal participation by all in advantages arising from the use of valuable land, but would also insure equal opportunity for all to occupy and use land whether valuable or not, for when its values shall be no longer appropriated to private uses it will not be sought or held for speculation, but will in its natural and beneficent abundance become available for the equitable occupancy of any and all persons desiring to use it.

The system of land-holding maintained by the

State is as it were the ground in which its other institutions have their root and of whose elemental character they necessarily partake, the injustice of an inequitable system being so broadly fundamental and all-pervasive that no public institution, no governmental function, no private interest nor personal relation, industrial or social, can fail to be injuriously affected thereby.

Complementary to the service which the State renders in adopting and maintaining a system of land tenure for private purposes, is that of regulating and facilitating public or common uses of land. Every human being has not only a natural right to exclusive possession of land essential to his abode and self-employment, the right of location, but also the right to go to and from one place to another, the right of locomotion, and it is necessary to peaceable exercise of the latter right as well as to undisturbed enjoyment of land held for permanent occupancy, that stretches of land convenient for the purpose be set apart over which one may pass to and fro without trespassing upon the private holdings of other persons. And since it would be impracticable to provide a separate right of way for each and every individual, the State establishes and maintains public thoroughfares for

the accommodation of all in common, as well as places for public assembly and recreation.

And not only is the establishment and maintenance of such highways a public service, but no less so is any and every necessary service requiring exclusive or monopolistic use of a highway, since such use can not be enjoyed without special authority of the State. To this class of services belong the construction and operation of railways, of telegraph and telephone lines, and of plants for general distribution of water, light, heat and power. The transportation of passengers and freight and the transmission of intelligence, in so far as they require monopolistic use of rights of way, are also public services, since they can not be rendered without special exercise of the authority and power of the State.

That the monopolistic use of a public highway or right of way for whatever purpose is a public use or service, appears further from the fact that, whenever the mistake is made of farming out any such service and authorising its performance by private persons, the State finds it necessary to supplement its authority by the loan of its power, which it does by creating an artificial person, the so-called public-service corporation. The State

has no right to create artificial persons, or corporations for any purpose whatever. Such exercise of its power is not only unnecessary to the discharge of any of its functions, and therefore *prima facie* a misuse of that power, but is also destructive of the natural market, which obtains among natural persons only.

Further indication that such services are public rather than private is to be seen in the necessity for State regulation of the charges, if any, to be made therefor, no such necessity ever existing in case of private services so long as rendered by unprivileged natural persons. The only way of ascertaining the just price of any service or commodity is through competition in a natural market. Such competition being impossible in the case of public services, which are necessarily and naturally monopolistic, there is no way justly to determine the price to be paid for their performance by private persons. If a charge is to be made for their performance by the State, it should of course not exceed the cost of the service, any greater charge so made being an arbitrary and unjust tax, as it also is, in so far as the State is concerned, when exacted by a public-service corporation.

Argument that this or that public service can be

rendered by private enterprise at a less cost than by the State, is not to the point. The State should mind its own business. It might entrust to the lowest bidder the discharge of all its functions together with the authority and power necessary to their performance, but there would be no just warrant for such delegation of its authority or power, nor is there any better reason for farming out some of its activities, those that the farmers-general find profitable, than for placing them all in private hands. The State is not organised to make or even to save money, nor to make anything cheap, nor to provide opportunities for the investment of capital or the employment of labour, but rather to maintain an equitable public order in which natural opportunities for the employment of labour and capital shall be equally open to all. The power which it forcibly assumes for that sole and only authorising purpose can not justly be granted or loaned for any purpose whatever.

Objection to direct performance of all its functions by the State itself, on the ground that the number of public servants and the power of patronage would be thereby increased, might as well be made to any and all such servants and patronage. There would seem to be no stronger argu-

ment in support of the theory that government is unnecessary and therefore unjust, than that suggested by government itself, when it practically concedes that some of its most important functions can be better performed by private persons than by the State. The seeming force of the argument of course disappears when it is considered that in no instance can a really public service be rendered without authority and power derived from the State. Not only is that authority essential to the monopolistic control necessary to such service, but the public-service corporation, now so-called, is, as it was formerly wont to be termed, an arm of the State, without whose aid the service could not be rendered by private enterprise. Evils to be apprehended from direct exercise of its power by the State can not be greater than those arising from the grant or loan of it to private persons. The former, moreover, can be overcome by efficient government, but evils of the latter class will inevitably persist in spite of all that government can do, so long as it continues their causal abuse.

Another important public service is that of providing a circulating medium of exchange. In order to maintain itself and perform its other functions, the State calls upon individuals for com-

modities and services for which it pays value for value, expending for that purpose the public revenue which it collects from the people. Since neither payment for such commodities and services nor collection of such revenue can be effected through barter, the State adopts some more or less convenient medium of exchange to be accepted by individuals in payment of claims against the State, and also by the State in payment of its revenue. In order that it may be the more readily accepted, and also that it may be of service in the judicial settlement of disputes between individuals, the State provides that it shall be recognised as a measure of values and be receivable throughout the State in payment of all dues public and private, making it a legal-tender currency. This, like any other public service, should be performed by the State itself without intervention of private persons, natural or artificial, to the end that it may be just and equitable, affording no man any advantage over any other.

In the discharge of its Public-serving function, the State should also make whatever equitable general regulations may be necessary to protect the public against false weights and measures, impure foods, dangerous employments, unsanitary hous-

ing, fire, communicable disease, and any other evils against which the individual can not effectually guard, or, at least, not without disturbance of the peace. Much of present necessity for such regulations, including regulation of the hours of labour for men, women and children, as well as provision for support of the disemployed, will, however, disappear when natural opportunities for existence are secured to all, as they will be whenever the State, instead of making needless, ever-increasing and seemingly endless work for itself, shall limit the use of its power to efficient discharge of its legitimate functions.

The fourth, or Self-preserving function of government, embraces whatever has to be done by the State to maintain its integrity and supreme power, including whatever is necessary to its defence against insurrection from within or invasion from without. The surest defence against each of these dangers is to be found in a just and equitable administration by the State of its own affairs, which necessarily precludes any intermeddling with the affairs of other States. There can be little danger of dissension within a State where the enjoyment of natural rights is secured to all. It should be observed, moreover, that the State is organised to

secure that enjoyment within its own territory only, and has no legitimate concern in what may be done within or by other States, so long as its own peace is not necessarily disturbed thereby. If citizens of one State elect to invest their capital in territory of another or to lend it to another State, they can justly look for protection in their venture only to the State in which they have chosen to make it. The best and only legitimate way for a State to promote just government abroad is to maintain it at home, affording the oppressed of other States an asylum within its own territory. The State that really does this need fear no invasion, for it will grow stronger as others become weaker, by reason of the immigration it invites, and its example will sooner or later be followed by other States, if merely to keep their people at home, for it is only through exploitation of the many that the few can largely profit. Landlords might as well lose their land as to lose the people who labour on it, and capital even is profitable only when used as an adjunct to labour.

It is in the discharge of this function that the State is warranted if at all in making provision for compulsory education of its citizens. Such

provision is not necessary to immediate preservation of the peace; nor to direct prevention of the infringement of natural rights; nor is the education of the young a public service in the sense that it could not be performed by unprivileged natural persons. When the State shall efficiently discharge its legitimate functions, industrial and social conditions may perhaps be such that the people individually in their private capacity will as naturally and as surely make suitable provision for the education of their children as for the feeding, clothing and sheltering of them. The only valid reason there can be for a system of compulsory education by the State, is that under existing conditions, for which the State itself is more or less responsible, it may be necessary in order to insure the general intelligence essential to stability of popular government. To what extent and to what particular, intermediate ends the State should for that purpose assume control and direction of opportunities and methods for education, is a question worthy of more attention than it has yet received. No majority however learned can be wise enough to warrant its using the power of government to mould the opinions, or, Sparta-like, to shape the habits of a people.

That the maintenance of a compulsory system of education, however necessary it may seem under existing conditions, is not a normal activity of the State, appears from the difficulty encountered in attempting to maintain an efficient system without interfering with natural rights of both parent and child. Such a system would seem to require not only that the pupil shall be in regular, continuous attendance upon a more or less extended course of study calculated to make him an intelligent citizen, but also that he be in such attendance after his mind has become sufficiently mature to profit thereby, say, from twelve or fourteen to eighteen or twenty years of age. It is evident, however, that during those same years he must acquire if ever the skill and proficiency essential to efficient prosecution of whatever vocation he may afterwards follow, and that if he is required during those years to devote all his time to improvement of his mind he must necessarily go without the industrial training essential to efficient self-support in after life. Hence it is that the State vainly attempts to give him the required mental discipline while he is yet too young to profit, and may indeed be injured, by it, dismissing him from compulsory school attendance at about the time he

should begin it, if its purpose be to make him an intelligent citizen. And even if from voluntary attendance upon a secondary, or high-school course of study, provided for such as can afford to take it, he thereafter attains a certain intellectual discipline, it must be at the loss of a practical business training.

If the necessity for popular education be so imperative as to warrant the State in assuming the imperious and virtually exclusive control over the education of children which it now begins to exercise almost as soon as they are out of the cradle, it is at least pertinent to ask whether that so necessary end is to be accomplished by such arbitrary interference with parental prerogatives and such prison-like detention of those whose only offence is that they are children and too young to defend themselves. The scheme is too unnatural to be lasting, and the day will come when the State, in defence of the child and in the interest of rational education, will prohibit the doing of much that it now compels to be done. Under its present compulsory system of so-called education the State is acting more as nursery maid than as school-master.

State-enforced school attendance should not be

required of children until after they are at least twelve years of age, and then for one-half only of each day, in which to form habits of thinking, the other half being left open to employments in which to acquire habits of doing. Let a student, from the time he is twelve or fourteen until he is eighteen or twenty years of age, give but one half of each day to mental effort and the other half to some industrial pursuit, as long as, at that age, he should be continuously held to either task, resting alternately in the one from fatigue of the other, and coming fresh to each; and he will have not only a better intellectual development and equipment than one who even from an earlier age devotes the entire day to study, but also a practical acquaintance with business, which the other will necessarily lack, having been prevented from acquiring it at the proper time, that is, during the habit-forming age. The former, moreover, will have acquired none of that contempt for manual labour which continuous exclusive attendance upon school is wont to develop in minds it is fondly supposed to educate. He will also be likely to have formed lasting habits of industry both bodily and mental, together with some intelligent idea of his own vocational tastes and capabilities. Any

educational training enforced by the State should be the same for all, each being allowed to profit therefrom according to his ability, and that without having his perhaps more or less mediocre ability emphasised and stigmatised by the ostentatious conferring of invidious and needlessly discriminating honours upon those who happen to have greater natural ability. Any attempt by the State to prescribe for the child an educational training suited to some particular station in life officiously assumed to be his proper one, would be a long step toward his exclusion by government from any better station. The legitimate object of compulsory education by the State is, not to educate for this or that trade or profession or for any particular station in life, but so to develop and train the mind as to form the habit of correct thinking, especially in regard to matters of government, a habit quite as essential to good citizenship as that of saluting the flag, but demanding for its acquirement greater maturity of mind than is ordinarily possessed before the age at which most children now leave school.

In the discharge of its Self-preserving function it devolves upon the State to make equitable provision for defraying the expenses of government.

This has never yet been done, the history of taxation being a continued story of fiscal injustice.

The very generally accepted doctrine that the individual should be taxed according to his ability to pay, is of course inequitable unless he owes his ability to the State; nor is attempted practise of the theory any less iniquitous because those ostensibly so taxed generally shift the burden to those having less ability, with result that the people are in reality taxed not so much according to ability to pay as to their inability to avoid paying.

So unsuccessful have been all attempts in that direction that it has come to be regarded as impossible to devise an equitable system of taxation, it being said that nature gives no whisper about any taxes. Certain it is that there is not in the nature of things any principle or just warrant by virtue of which any man or majority of men, any State, can forcibly take or tax from any man that which he does not owe. Even if the State could devise some plan by which to compel every man to contribute to its revenue exactly the same amount as every other, it could in no case rightly enforce such contribution unless it was for some reason due and owing to that corporate body; nor as al-

ready suggested can it justly take from any man more than from others simply because he has more than they have. A public revenue is necessary to the support of government, but it must be a just one if government is to be just. If the collection of a just revenue be indeed impracticable, the Anarchists are right in their contention that all government by force is unjust.

The State is a self-defensive organisation in which all the people of its territory are entitled to equal membership, whose services should be for the equal benefit of all, and for whose expenses all are equally responsible and should therefore be equally assessed, if any assessment be necessary. More can not be justly exacted from any one member than from others except in payment for some advantage which the State enables him to enjoy over them, and then not as an assessment or tax, but as the value of the advantage, for which he should account regardless of any public expenses and of any assessments therefor. If the amount realised from payments so made should prove sufficient to defray all the expenses of government, it is clear that no assessments or taxes would be necessary. It has already been seen that individuals who are by the State enabled to

enjoy the advantages of holding valuable land ought to account to the public for their values. When the State shall require such accounting to be made and shall apply all such values to public uses there will be no need of any taxation, nor will there be any difference in amounts contributed by individuals to the support of government, since those values belong to the people in common. The distinction between services that are public and those that are private is not more marked than is that between public and private revenues. Land values constitute the natural revenues of the State. They could not be collected or even determined without the action of government, for without it there would be neither buyers nor sellers of land, and so no market in which to determine its values. The relation of landlord and tenant is neither natural nor primarily contractual but institutional, the landlord being a duly authorised collector of specific public revenues for which he should duly account.

In studying the functions of government it will be observed that considerations of expediency are never of themselves a sufficient warrant for exercise of its power; they are of weight in civic affairs only in deciding upon the best, the most

rational way of doing what justice between man and man requires to be done. It is not the business of the State to do good, or to make anybody good; to promote the greatest good of the greatest number, or, better still, even of the whole number; to promote this or that, be it industry, morality, progress, the socially useful, or whatever else; for even if such ends were really and directly attainable through government, they would not, desirable as they are, justify the compulsion necessary to its support. Nor can any human conception or forecast of what would be good or useful for mankind be taken as a guide, much less as a warrant, for civil action. Whatever the State may do toward promotion of the good or the useful will be incidental to rational government, to the maintenance of an equitable order in which men shall be free to be as good as they like, and to promote whatever they will, provided they do not interfere with that order.

The question whether any existing or proposed use of civil power is or would be legitimate, may always be determined by inquiring as to which one, if any, of the four functions of government it belongs, any action by the State not necessary to performance of some one or more of them being

wholly unwarranted and an abuse of its power.

As its members become less and less disposed to aggression, as they will under more rational government; as fraud and violence among them shall gradually diminish, there will be less and less necessity for exercise of its Right-preserving function by the State. There will doubtless be at the same time an also resulting diminution in activities of the Peace-preserving and Self-preserving functions, whose exercise may eventually be necessary, the one merely to provide the orderly direction essential to the peace and safety of public thoroughfares and assemblies, and the other to collection of the public revenues, the tendency being to ultimate disappearance of all necessity for punitive or sensibly coercive government. On the other hand, it is evident that activities of the Public-serving function will increase with increasing necessity for services of a public nature, those which are essential to an equitable public order and can not be rendered without civil authority; and that government will, for that reason also, tend to become preponderatingly administrative rather than coercive in the exercise of its power. The maintenance of its highways, including its legalised circulating medium of exchange, to-

gether with any necessarily monopolistic uses of those public utilities, will eventually constitute the principal activities of the State, all private business, enterprises and affairs being of course left to the unhampered conduct and control of unprivileged private persons and associations.