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THE PROCESS, PROSPECTS AND CONSTRAINTS OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN AFRICA

SAMUEL DECALO

POSSIBLY AS DRAMATIC and unanticipated as recent monumental changes in Eastern Europe was the sudden coalescence of a 'critical mass' of pro-democracy pressures in Africa. Demonstrations in favour of a new political order began to be insistently heard in a continent where scholars have argued 'it cannot be said that democracy has failed . . . because in most countries it has never been tried'.¹ President Omar Bongo of Gabon was to refer to these early rumbles of discontent as 'wind from the East that is shaking the coconut trees'²—an effort to belittle a movement soon to overwhelm his own monopolistic political throne. Spawned by stifling political authoritarianism and economic decay, and triggered by the spectacle of the fall of titans in Bucharest and elsewhere, in 1990 a powerful backwash of popular demonstrations for 're-democratization' flooded all corners of Africa. By 1991 the backwash was a veritable tidal wave, methodically transforming the political map of the continent.

The events in Africa took scholars by surprise, since most doubted Africa could move towards democracy. Even in the mid-1980's one argued that 'by reason of their poverty or the violence of their politics' African states were 'unlikely to move in a democratic direction';³ another adding that 'to have expected democracy to flourish would have been historical blindness',⁴ since 'outside the core [industrialized states] democracy is a rarity',⁵ support for Tilly's thesis 'why Europe will not occur again'⁶—'with a few exceptions, the limits of democratic development in the world may well have been reached'.⁷

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1. Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, 'Democracy in Tropical Africa', *Journal of International Affairs*, 1985, p. 293. See also Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour M. Lipset (eds), *Democracy in Developing Countries*, (Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1988), vol. 2.

2. *West Africa*, 9 April, 1990.

3. Samuel Huntington, 'Will more countries become democratic?' *Political Science Quarterly*, 99, (1984), p. 214.

4. P. Chabal (ed.) *Political Domination in Africa: Reflections on the Limits of Power*, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1986), p. 5.

5. Daniel Chirot, *Social Change in the Twentieth Century*, (New York, 1977), p. 22.

6. Charles Tilly (ed.) *The Formation of National States in Western Europe*, (Princeton University Press, Princeton), 1975, p. 81.

7. Huntington, 'Will more countries become Democratic?' p. 218.

Moreover, hitherto the signals emanating from the continent had been different. The administrative 'softness'⁸ of the African state, 'excessively authoritarian to disguise the fact that it is inadequately authoritative'⁹ seemed to argue for greater, not lesser, central authority, in order to contain fissiparous tendencies. Human rights violations were on the rise—especially in hitherto safe havens, such as Kenya—but the threat to democracy, even of the restrictive one-party variety, seemed to be from the direction of budding religious fundamentalism (in Sudan, Algeria, Nigeria) and from youth, intellectuals and unionists, pressing civilian and military regimes alike for the adoption of Afro-Marxism—the epitome of centralized authoritarian state political and economic power.¹⁰

Yet within the space of barely eighteen months fundamental political change has taken place throughout Africa. All the continent's People's Republics have renounced Marxism, moving to adopt a market economy. (Would-be late-comers to the Marxist fold—Zimbabwe, South Africa's ANC, and radicals elsewhere—are biding their time, frustrated.) Gone are yesteryear's fire-eating Maoist advocates of command economies as entire public sectors are privatized, and one non-Marxist leader—Togo's Gnassingbe Eyadema—even aspires to the distinction of having *no* state corporations whatsoever! Instincts of self-preservation and differing degrees of sincerity, have driven benign autocrats (Felix Houphouët-Boigny; Omar Bongo), as well as venal dictators (Mobutu Sese Seko), to metamorphose into born-again democrats. Single-party rule—once hailed as Africa's contribution to political philosophy—has been rolled back across much of the continent, giving way to competitive elections and multipartyism.

Whatever democratic advances have been attained in Africa at this stage are still largely structural and/or constitutional; certainly a strong breath of fresh air, but likely to end up in some countries as only cosmetic and/or temporary. The process has a long way to go in much of the continent. As in Eastern Europe the new democratic hybrids must prove themselves

8. 'The state is simultaneously strong in the sense that the state sector comprises a large proportion of the national economy, weak in the sense that the political leadership lacks legitimacy (i.e. a capacity to command obedience) among its citizens, strong in the sense that the public sector bureaucracy is the only cohesive and organized group in national politics, and weak in the sense that certain regional groups are disaffected and secessionist because excluded from this bureaucracy'. M. Moore, 'Interpreting Africa's crisis—political science versus political economy', *IDS Bulletin*, 18, (1987), p. 8. See also the seminal contribution by Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, 'Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and Juridical in Statehood', in Atul Kohli (ed.), *State and Development in the Third World*, (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1986), and their 'The Marginality of African States', in G. M. Carter and P. O'Meara, *African Independence: The First Twentyfive Years*, (Indiana University Press, Bloomington), 1985.

9. Ali A. Mazrui, 'Political Engineering in Africa', *International Social Science Journal*, 25, (1983), p. 293.

10. Samuel Decalo, 'The Morphology of Radical Military Rule in Africa', in *Journal of Communist Studies*, 1985, also reprinted in John Markakis and Michael Waller (eds), *Military Marxist Regimes of Africa*, (Macmillan, London, 1986).

viable, hardy and lasting; they must prove themselves significant, attesting a real shift of power from autocratic personal rulers (*who in many instances still cling to the pinnacle of authority*) to elites both representative of, and responsive to, society's various groups; and meaningful, in ushering greater civic and human rights, more political space, better and less wasteful styles of governance, with greater political accountability leading to real economic development.

However, whatever the ultimate verdict—that as with all social change, is likely to be mixed—the political *atmosphere* in Africa today is radically different: exhilarating, ebullient, optimistic. Former awe-inspiring leaders have without ceremony been cut down in size. Kenneth Kaunda, for example, was utterly humbled when his pre-independence party headquarters—a Lusaka political shrine—was gutted by rampaging pro-democracy crowds, at one stroke denying his historic relevance as father of the nation; Mathieu Kerekou shed tears of frustration when the National Conference he organized to liberalize Benin denied both the relevance of his seventeen years in office, and even rejected an interim leadership role for him.

Leaders bucking the democratic trend face demonstrations mobilizing crowds at times as large as those in Leipzig as in Lusaka in 1990. Those adept at stage-managing 'popular' support (like Eyadema in Togo) have seen decades of benevolent-leadership negated by spontaneous upheavals of mass hatred, sending them scurrying to the 'safety' of a multiparty system. Already in one country—Mali—the first die-hard holdout, Moussa Traore, incapable of reading the writing on the wall was ousted 'Roumanian-style', with a double-barrelled return to civilian rule and competitive politics pledged by the new military junta. If at the same time of the fall of the Berlin Wall thirty-eight of 45 sub-saharan African states were governed by civilian or military one-party systems of greater or lesser authoritarian hue, eighteen months later a handful had actually travelled the whole road, *and over half* had committed themselves to competitive multiparty elections and major limitations on executive powers.

The failure of the monolithic Party-State in Africa

The prime rationale for constraining political choice—defended by African leaders to the day they were forced to concede multipartyism—is that competitive politics is an imported luxury neither needed nor affordable in developing countries, that can in any case devise other *equally democratic* structures (notably one-party democracy), more suitable to their unique circumstances.¹¹ A multiplicity of political parties merely mirrors, even politicizes, existing social cleavages (ethnic, clan, regional, religious) since

11. See Martin Kilson, 'Authoritarian and Single-party tendencies in African Politics' *World Politics*, 25, (1963).

these are the most easily mobilizable sources of political support and power in Africa, while countries actually need unity and rapid development rather than Western-style liberal democracy.

Sierra Leone's President Siaka Stevens referred to multipartyism as 'a system of . . . institutionalized tribal and ethnic quinquennial warfare euphemistically known as elections [which] contributes an open invitation to anarchy and disunity',¹² a view endorsed by Tanzania's Julius Nyerere to whom 'where there is one party, and that party is identified with the nation as a whole, the foundations of democracy are firmer than they can ever be where you have two or more parties, each representing only a section of the community'.¹³ Zimbabwe's Mugabe even recommended the one-party system for America to an incredulous US Congress during a recent state visit. The idea of an 'Opposition Party' as a check on arbitrary rule is summarily rejected, in Malawi even on quasi-theological grounds: 'there is no Opposition in Heaven. God himself does not want opposition—that is why he chased Satan away. Why should Kamuzu [President Banda] have opposition?'¹⁴ Legitimate programmatic differences of opinion can be accommodated within the single 'national' party where all streams of opinion and societal groups are represented. And even if a developmental-oriented authoritarian system does ensue, the basis would be laid for a better-endowed future generation that could *then* partake of the current generation's forbidden fruits.

Later, the spread of Marxism in Africa, added other rationales in defence of (now vanguard) single-party rule. Afro-Marxism provided lofty and socially-satisfying nationalist goals capable of anchoring society's restless and destabilizing elements—students, urban youth, labour—binding them to military regimes intent on remaining in power. The nationalization of the 'heights of the economy' that accompanied Afro-Marxism also tapped deep anti-colonial sentiments; though rationalized as the engine of the revolution that by siphoning middle-man profits would spin off new development projects, the state sector actually provided scope for patronage, societal loot, and stepping-stones to power. Constant 'refuelling' deficitary state sectors, and disdain for 'capitalist' cost-accounting principles were behind the *economic* collapse of what passed as the 'Marxist' experiment in Africa,¹⁵ just as only slightly less *etatist* policies elsewhere also 'foundered on the

12. *West Africa*, 26 April 1982.

13. Julius K. Nyerere, *Freedom and Unity*, (Oxford University Press, Dar-es-Salaam, 1966), p. 196.

14. *Malawi News* (Blantyre), 20 December 1964.

15. See Samuel Decalo, 'Ideological Rhetoric and Scientific Socialism in Benin and Congo/Brazzaville', and the other contributions in Carl G. Rosberg and Thomas Callaghy (eds), *Socialism in sub-Saharan Africa*, (Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1979). See also Crawford Young's seminal work, *Ideology and Development in Africa*, (Yale University Press, New Haven), 1982.

weak capacity of public institutions . . . [and] far from promoting the private sector, the state often actively curbed private initiative'.¹⁶

One need not rehash old debates on the actuarial possibilities of one-party democracy—which *can* be beguilingly appealing. Suffice it to note that the theory and practice of single party rule is an example of the myth-reality syndrome that plagues much of Africana. With only few exceptions correlations between *either* consensual governance or meaningful economic development and single party rule are empirically negated by three decades of Africa's statehood. Legum notes Africa aspires to democracy as much 'as in any other part of the world', but 'there is no convincing evidence to show that [single party states] achieved better results than the old or the extant multi-party states, either in developing a greater sense of national unity or in promoting economic development'.¹⁷ One could add, however, that the former era's brevity of experience with multiparty systems does not allow for much contrary generalization.

The single party system has been the means to govern society relatively benevolently—by Julius Nyerere, Kenneth Kaunda and Felix Houphouët-Boigny in Tanzania, Zambia and Cote d'Ivoire respectively; more harshly but still responsibly—by Kamuzu Banda and Thomas Sankara in Malawi and Burkina Faso; to venally plunder it—as have Mobutu Sese Sese and Samuel Doe in Zaire and Liberia; or as a camouflage for personal or class tyranny—as under Jean-Bedel Bokassa, Mengistu Haile Mariam or Macias Nguema in the Central African Republic, Ethiopia and Equatorial Guinea. But nearly universally the single party system has 'degenerated into a form of oligarchic patrimonialism that was even unknown in pre-colonial Africa'.¹⁸ Whether ruled by Prince, Autocrat, Prophet or Tyrant,¹⁹ relatively developed or not, unaccountable personal rule in institutionless voids (utilizing clientelism as the method to glue social cohorts to leaders) has helped pile up violations of human rights, stultifying national debts, and chronic systemic instability, contributing to 'the overwhelming majority view . . . that Africa is a disaster'.²⁰ While Edem Kodjo suggests 'there isn't one state in Africa that is independent and worthy of being called a state . . . they are not viable, and only assume sovereignty at the UN'.²¹

Supposed to represent 'the organization and mobilization of all politically relevant sectors of the population for purposes of achieving a number of

16. The World Bank, *Subsaharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Growth*, (Washington, DC., 1990), p. 34.

17. Colin Legum, 'Africa's Search for nationhood and Stability', *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 23 1985, p. 35.

18. P. Chudi Uwazurike, 'Confronting Potential Breakdown in Africa: the Nigerian Re-Democratization Process in Critical Perspective', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 28, 1990, p. 67.

19. Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, *Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant*, (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1982).

20. Colin Legum, 'Africa's Search for nationhood and Stability', p. 21.

21. Edem Kodjo, *Et Demain l'Afrique*, (Stock, Paris, 1985), p. 7.

common objectives of development and national unity . . . [it] has failed with respect to the major objectives of democracy and development. In reality the party is everywhere a network through which ambitious individuals strive to maximize their access to state resources'.²² Julius Nyerere, the greatest champion of single party rule, acknowledged this at a time when there was hardly any opposition to single party rule in Tanzania, when in January 1990 he stated that 'Tanzanians should not be dogmatic and think that a single party is God's wish' especially one that 'was not close to the people, stagnating, losing vitality, and therefore needing competition . . . to re-invigorate it'.²³

Instead of Africa's 'contribution' to the art of governance, the hegemonic Party-State became an 'autocratic patrimonial state . . . that whether in military or civilian guise, whether capitalist or socialist in official ideology, seems detached from the vital creative energies of the African people and their societies'.²⁴ It produced presidential authoritarianism²⁵ of varying degrees of repression, and *de facto* domination by whatever ethnic group 'possesses' the Presidency; it has been instrumental in plundering the economy, directly or indirectly; it resulted in disdain for civic and human rights, and with few exceptions has paid minimal attention to agrarian/rural populations; and the guiding 'party' has often been an atrophied non-entity (Zaire, CAR), a control mechanism (Benin, Congo), a debating society (Malawi, Zambia), or a source of patronage for lesser influentials (Kenya, Cote d'Ivoire, Togo). Presidential family cliques and regional political barons—at times joined by trusted soothsayers (Niger, Benin, Gabon, CAR, Zaire)—have often decided policies, options, priorities. It is not 'just' that nowhere have the masses been the beneficiaries of alleged remedial benefits of single party rule; that rarely have 'national' policies been truly espoused or societal benefits distributed equitably. Rather a small cabal of influentials have eroded all semblance of accountability, legitimacy, democracy and justice in much of Africa.

While globally absence of democracy has not necessarily resulted in economic decline (e.g. Japan, South Korea, Taiwan), 'benevolent' authoritarian rule has *also* not been that frequently the recipe for economic development and nation-building (for instance in the Middle East and Latin America)—the bottom line of justifications for the single party state. In Africa, with extremely few exceptions, there has usually been *neither* democracy *nor*

22. Nzungola-Ntalaja, 'The African Crisis: The Way Out', *African Studies Review*, 32, 1989, pp. 121–2. Since the 1980's most Africans had begun viewing the single-party state as 'a facade for tyranny and an aid to private enrichment'. See 'Africa: The roots of Reform', *Africa Confidential*, 27 July 1990, p. 3.

23. *The New York Times*, 27 January 1990.

24. Cited in 'Needed: More Glasnost', *West Africa*, 13 November 1989.

25. From Peter Anyang' Nyong'o, 'State and Society in Kenya: The Disintegration of the Nationalist Coalitions and the Rise of Presidential Authoritarianism', *African Affairs*, 88, (1989).

economic development, nor national unity; more often there has been *both* authoritarian government *and* economic pauperization and decline.

Even coups—the functional equivalent of elections, virtually the only way of ‘throwing the rascals out’—with time became highly *institutionalized, personalized, patrimonialized*, as military cliques and subcliques—often intervening less out of altruistic motives than for a host of personalist reasons²⁶—arrogated to themselves the function of dictating national goals and ideologies, rather than, as in earlier days, serving as ‘cleansing’ brooms prior to a return to competitive politics. Not surprising by the late 1980’s even Marxists—East Europe’s rejection of Marxism has *not* produced a total ideological catharsis in Africa²⁷—no longer subscribed to arguments in favour of single-party rule, and were more concerned with securing and expanding political space and human rights.

Fundamentally unaccountable, purchasing a measure of stability—in the absence of systemic legitimacy—via the social glue of patronage or external props, assuming ambitious statist economic policies that rest on myopic assessments of their capability to sustain the requisite costs, both civilian and military regimes have bankrupted themselves, mortgaging their futures to the demands of the day.

Factors behind the democratic upheavals in Africa

While the pro-democracy movement came of age in 1990, popular strivings for liberalization emerged from the day the one-party system locked out competitive elections and started impinging upon individual civic and human rights in the name of the ‘collective good’. But in those early days of wine and roses, so to speak, nationalism, patriotism, civic idealism did carry some value as the coin of the realm. Democratic aspirations could temporarily be put aside, especially since competitive elections proved to be little more than ethnic tugs-of-war. Groups pressing for change—youth, unionists, intellectuals—were often more preoccupied with either gaining a greater share of the existing pie, or proselytizing for alternative, more radical developmental roads—entailing similar restrictions on civic freedoms. Still, as Naomi Chazan put it ‘democratic pressures persist while authoritarian rule prevails’,²⁸ and these became irresistible forces in 1990.

It would be ethnocentric and too facile to assume the pro-democracy pressures in Africa were merely knee-jerk reactions to events in Eastern Europe.²⁹ It is true one cannot exaggerate the psychological effect of

26. For concrete illustrations see Samuel Decalo, *Coups and Army Rule in Africa: Motivations and Constraints*, 2nd ed., (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1990), ch. 1.

27. See for example Walter O. Oyugi *et al.* (eds), *Democratic Theory and Practice in Africa*, (James Currey, London), 1988.

28. Naomi Chazan in Diamond, Linz and Lipset (eds), *Democracy in Developing Countries*, p. 119.

29. *The Financial Times*, 10 July 1990.

pictures of the trial and execution of Ceausescu (well-known in Africa as the Soviet Union's surrogate), or of Bucharest's removal of statues of Lenin by a hangman's loop-winch around their neck, which African leaders tried to keep out of their state-controlled media. Africans could clearly see that their own country's 'departures from democratic standards . . . closely parallel defects exposed in Eastern Europe'.³⁰ The redemocratization of Latin America likewise added to the global critical mass of democracy, with the result, according to Bates, that 'the World is experiencing a wave of democratization. Not since the mid-nineteenth century have so many popular uprising toppled rulers and filled the boulevards with crowds affirming freedom and self-governance'.³¹ The spillover-effect, thought it definitely crystallized and catalyzed pro-democracy demonstrations in Africa, does not tell the whole story. The continent was already more than *ripe* for upheaval, and there were additional, internal and external factors that played a crucial role in leading the democratic pressures to successful fruition.

Among the internal variables was the forementioned fact that Africa was at a political dead-end morally, and economically bankrupt, inherently unstable to the degree that 'no state can count itself safe from a wind of change once it starts to blow'.³² The call for democracy was not 'just' for a political birthright, but for a total revision of the fundamental charter of the State, underpinned by political liberalism and accountability. Over the years all ideological and developmental options had been tried—under one-party rule—and found wanting; all styles of governance—including tyranny—had been unsuccessful in controlling or binding masses to leaders in stable relationships,³³ and Africa was also trapped in a free-fall to economic oblivion to boot.

In conference jargon 'The Crisis of the African State' had become intertwined with the 'African Debt Crisis' resulting in morally, politically and economically bankrupt entities. For parallel to the political sterility of the African one-party state, most economies were bankrupt. Latin America's national debts of \$100 billion and more inures us to look down, say, at Togo's puny \$1 billion debt. But debt repayment loads in Africa are much more onerous, even if in absolute terms the amounts are small and the continent's total debt is modest at \$143 billion. For the latter figure is equal to the continent's entire annual GDP, 370 per cent of total export earnings,³⁴ and

30. Douglas G. Anglin, 'Southern African Response to Eastern European Developments', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 28, (1990), pp. 448.

31. Robert H. Bates, 'Socio-Economic Bases of Democratization in Africa; some Reflections', in *African Governance in the 1990's*, (Carter Presidential Center, Atlanta, 1990), p. 29.

32. 'Africa: Winds of Change', *Africa Confidential*, 9 March 1990, p. 1.

33. Samuel Decalo, *Psychoses of Power, African Personal Dictatorships*, (Westview Press, Boulder, 1989).

34. *Africa Research Bulletin*, Economic Series, August 1990; December 1990.

individual repayment ratios are in some instances stratospheric—1,500 per cent for Sudan and Mozambique, 2,000 per cent for Gambia.

Nor are conditions getting better, as Structural Adjustment Programmes and other IMF ‘fixes’ attest to the temporal and limited nature of any improvement. One observer has noted ‘the prevailing view of the continent in the mainstream media is of unremitting gloom’; Africa’s total GNP remains smaller than Belgium’s that has less than 2 per cent of its population, while ‘Africa’s share of world trade is half of what it was a decade ago . . . private investment has virtually stopped . . . [and] at independence Ghana—a classic case—had a larger GNP than South Korea’, which thirty years later was a regional economic super-power while Ghana had become a basket-case.³⁵ Utterly marginalized, Africa is ‘not suffering from a temporary crisis . . . but from a lasting inability to make itself part of the world economy and to hold onto its share of the market there—let alone increase its share’.³⁶ Despite an annual in-flow of \$15 billion of aid, standards of life have declined since independence.³⁷ This has happened both in countries grossly mismanaged (Guinea, Chad, Equatorial Guinea) and in respected states such as Tanzania, where urban real wages fell by 65 per cent and standards fell by 2.5 per cent annually between 1969 and 1983. Today 16 countries have annual per capita incomes below \$370 (the current threshold of absolute poverty); Mozambique (\$100) and Ethiopia (\$120) are at the bottom of the pile, but even Kenya is borderline at \$370.

Africa scores at the bottom of every criteria of development. Average life expectancy is 50 years, and as low as 37; demographic growth is inordinately high; disease and famine ravage the continent. More distressingly, Africa is not just the poorest continent, but the only one *backsliding*, with its meagre advances eroded by high birth rates and economic mismanagement. The World Bank estimates that within 25 years (and some countries, as early as the year 2,000) the continent will need twice current amounts of food-stuffs, hospitals, schools and trained personnel, *merely to maintain existing standards*.³⁸

The causes of this economic decline need not detain us; but one factor is the dissipation of fiscal resources on large, functionally redundant civil services. Already in 1981 the World Bank noted public employment had reached levels of 40–75 per cent of total employment in seven African states; that in an additional twenty, expenditures had been growing at *twice the pace of economic growth*, and in others at even higher rates. By 1989 the picture was worse, with public employment (more determined by ‘patrimonial

35. ‘USA/Africa: Policy? What Policy’, *Africa Confidential*, 11 January 1991, p. 2.

36. *Jeune Afrique* as cited in *Africa Research Bulletin*, Economic Series, April 1990.

37. Nzongola-Ntalaja notes how ‘after nearly 30 years of internationally-supported development programs in Africa, there is little evidence to suggest that standard of living of ordinary Africans has improved’. See his ‘The African Crisis: The Way Out’, *African Studies Review*, 32, (1989), p. 118.

38. The World Bank, *Annual Report for 1990*, Washington, 1991.

interests than economic efficiency³⁹) *everywhere* consuming 60–80 per cent of national budgets, and more than 50 per cent of non-agricultural employment, compared to 36 per cent in Asia, and 27 per cent in Latin America. In many states, assuming a proper rural-urban distribution, a full work-day, and the elimination from the payroll of non-existent phantom-workers, existing civil services could be halved without prejudice to existing state services and activities.

Whether pursuing radical or market-economy developmental strategies, African states have grafted the worst traits of both, not pursuing cost-effectiveness nor harnessing state sectors to *productive* ends. The result has been fiscal paralyses, never-ending budgetary crises, financial constraints on development, mushrooming public debts, greater dependency relationships *vis-a-vis* external donors, and no scope for political manoeuvrability. Corrective measures—IMF structural adjustment programmes and the like—aimed at reintroducing fiscal orthodoxy, supply-demand relationships, and/or caps on public expenditures, are viewed by many Africans (and radicals overseas) as conspiracies to recolonize Africa by imposing Western values.⁴⁰

This moral, political and economic bankruptcy of much of Africa is set against a background of the continent's changed population, the third domestic variable of import. For by the late-1980s Africa's population was both much larger, and compositionally different from that of the 1960s, with the consequence that the continent's internal political dynamics are different today than at independence.

These larger populations in non-Equatorial Africa (some such as Kenya up by as much as 300 per cent) have inevitably greater societal needs. With urbanization in several (including Gabon and CAR) up by 300 per cent, modern/urban expectations rise, and when unfulfilled lead to social frustrations.⁴¹ This in turn leads to impatience and decline in respect for national political leaders, since there are limits beyond which symbolic outputs can satisfy concrete demands; or charisma, ideology and repression can assure political quietism. At the same time there is a vastly expanded number of educated young people—a result of decades of educational advances leading to up to 95 per cent receiving education—which further complicates employment prospects and adds to the undermining of the legitimacy of the political system in populations more aware of the democratic 'option' abroad but denied at home. These changes take place against an economic background at best static and for most countries one of worsening hardship sharpened by inflation and recession; and with growing political indignation

39. Trevor W. Parfitt and Stephen P. Riley, *The African Debt Crisis*, (Routledge, London, 1989), pp. 33–4.

40. See for example the papers in Bade Onimode (ed.), *The IMF, the World Bank and the African Debt*, 2 vol., (Zed Press, London, 1989).

41. For reasons that need not detain us, countries in Equatorial Africa (e.g. Zaire, Central African Republic, Gabon) have extremely depressed population growth rates—e.g. 0.9 per cent in Gabon, versus 3.9 per cent in Kenya at the opposite extremity, and a mean of 3.4 per cent.

directed against authoritarian regimes with little legitimacy arrogantly intent on ruling for ever, errors of omission or commission notwithstanding. As one Zimbabwe critic put it 'You can't have economic problems and fail to blame those who are in charge'.⁴²

It is such a populace that revolted in 1991 after President Eyadema (stage-manager of many a 'spontaneous' demonstration on his behalf) boasted to foreign reporters that Togolese did not desire the multipartyism sweeping neighbouring states, as attested by the absence in Lome of petitions to that effect. Demonstrations the likes of which had never been seen in Lome—even in the days when tens of thousands of Northerners were brought south to 'implore' Eyadema to remain in office—soon broke out. In one clean swoop the Eyadema regime was sent scurrying for the safety of multipartyism.

Fourth and finally, of import also is the fact that in the thirty years since independence a host of sophisticated civic and ecological pressure groups have sprung up in Africa. Monitoring local violations for parent bodies overseas like Amnesty International, such groups were making life difficult for a host of African leaders. One of these was the increasingly beleaguered Daniel arap Moi, who was to discover the muscle of 'environmentalist power' in Kenya. Foreign funds committed for the construction in Nairobi of Africa's highest tower-building—a 'monument' to his reign—were withdrawn when vocal publicity drew attention to the fact the project entailed ruining one of the city's few public parks. And when Moi vent his fury at the person who had most thwarted his pet project, fuming that 'Kenyan tradition demanded that a woman not criticize a man', he discovered that 'woman power' had reached Kenya as well.⁴³ Even Felix Houphouët-Boigny experienced unheard-of criticism of his own monument to posterity (the costly Yamoussoukro Basilica) with the Pope for long postponing its consecration, aware of mobs calling for the urban renewal of progressively seedier Abidjan instead. It is against such a background of internal legitimacy voids, and changed societal forces, that the external pressures, arising out of the changed international picture, can better be appreciated.

The collapse of global Marxism created a unipolar world that at one stroke eliminated the Cold War. And with it disappeared any artificially-enhanced global value that Third World states had been able to extort from the former Cold War protagonists. *What literally transpired was a massive devaluation in the 'worth' of Africa.* African states were transformed from Cold War pawns, into irrelevant international clutter. They are no longer sought-after 'allies', since UN votes (mortgaged to one or another of the major powers) cannot go to the highest bidder in a world of no players.

42. Cited in Colleen Lowe Morna 'Pluralism: A Luxury No More', *Africa Report*, November 1990, p. 34.

43. *The New York Times*, 11 February 1989.

It is no longer necessary to control, or deny to others, sources of mineral ores or geopolitically strategic localities. Even France—in the past jealously guarding former colonial reserves against external encroachments (primarily from the US!)—has relaxed her bear-hug, parallel to a disinvestment from Africa of private French capital. French investments have been in decline since 1980; from a net annual inflow of *circa* one billion dollars at the decade's beginning, to \$53 million in 1985, and a net *outflow* of \$824 million in 1988, part of the fact that as a whole Africa now receives foreign investments at the rate of only \$200–300 million a year, one tenth of the amount estimated to be needed to sustain the continent's economies.⁴⁴ *Le Monde* has observed that risk capital, hurt by the continent's economic decline, and attracted by opportunities in Eastern Europe and the post-1992 EEC, was 'only thinking of packing [its] bags and quitting Africa. Black Africa no longer interests economic circles. Deprived of means of blackmailing Paris, its leaders have a smaller and smaller margin for manoeuvre'.⁴⁵

African states financially or militarily dependent upon the Soviet Union began collapsing first, as their patron withdrew its support. With military 'solutions' to multifaceted internal conflicts no longer feasible in civil strife in Angola, Mozambique, or Ethiopia, these states undertook ideological somersaults, and conciliatory overtures to avert possible defeat. (Ethiopia was unable to do so, in the light of Mengistu's iron mind-set, and the much more generalized nature of the conflict, including separatist movements, hence the continuing war until the May 1991 abandonment of Addis. Other former Afro-Marxist states followed suit, some reluctantly (Congo), others driven by fiscal bankruptcy (Benin), but all under tumultuous pressure by societal allies of yesteryear disillusioned with the nakedness of their former ideological Emperor. For as the Chairman of the Zambian Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) put it, if the 'originators of Socialism' have rejected it as inappropriate 'who were African imitators' to become its main proponents!⁴⁶

But the rollback of Marxism was just the tip of the iceberg. Drastic falls in commodity producer prices completely eroded the viability of most African economies, placing over a score of countries at the mercy of a by now thoroughly exasperated World Bank and IMF. Thus simultaneous with the increased domestic pressures for change, and the new global balance of power, came powerful international demands for 'better governance' (an end to corruption), more democratization (civic and human rights), and ultimately, a free economy. Barber B. Conable Jr., President of the World Bank expressed this new mood well when he noted his 'fear that many of

44. *Le Monde*, 28 February, 31 March 1990. But far more ominous is the very visible *global* psychological disengagement from Africa, and a massive decline in interest in all things Africana—be they social, economic, political or humanitarian issues. Telling was the massive airlift of food stuffs to Kurdish refugees in 1991, at a time when devastating droughts and famines in Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia were not even gaining headlines.

45. Cited in *Africa Research Bulletin*, Economics Series, June 1990.

46. *The Times of Zambia* (Lusaka), 31 December 1990.

Africa's leaders have been more concerned about retaining power than about the long-term development interests of their people'.⁴⁷ The IMF head similarly noted his exasperation at the large amounts of foreign aid that change direction to become an outward 'flood of capital and the buying of big apartments in nice European countries'.⁴⁸

The frustration of the international donor community received a powerful thrust from Paris. Fiscally sustaining one-third of the African states to the point of annually balancing the budgets of many, France had 'not hesitated to make and unmake governments by direct military intervention . . . exercis[ing] the same sort of close and muscular influence over a host of African countries that the USSR used to wield in Eastern Europe'.⁴⁹ In conjunction with the World Bank-IMF and the USA, all 'explicitly demanding political change as a condition for further loans to Africa',⁵⁰ French leverage in Africa attained the deepest and most immediate results.

Virtually from his succession to the Presidency, Francois Mitterand had been itching to disencumber himself of residual unconditional 'Gaullist' obligations to a multitude of oppressive, kleptomaniac client-states, whose heavy-handed domestic policies (notably in Chad, CAR, Gabon) and swollen multiple private Swiss banking accounts had increasingly tarnished France's reputation, and had drawn serious negative domestic political repercussions in Paris as well. The end of the Cold War and Africa's economic decline, which saw a massive erosion in the French economic presence in Africa and in Africa's importance to France,⁵¹ provided the backdrop for the sudden new pressures from Paris on its client-states. Early in 1990 a senior French official suggested in *Le Monde* that France should disengage from an Africa that had become the 'conservatory of the ills of humanity', noting there was actually no debt crisis in French Africa since 'the personal fortunes of Africa's elites outside the continent were greater than the debts of the countries in question'; in 1988, for example, the Bank of France had purchased \$1.8 billion worth of CFA franc banknotes fraudulently transferred to Europe in 'full suitcases and diplomatic bags'.⁵²

Progressively clearer messages conveyed France's new 'line' to Francophone Africa: severe political conditionalities on aid, with higher levels of French budgetary and other subventions to countries introducing

47. *Africa Research Bulletin*, Political Series, May 1990.

48. 'Africa: Winds of Change', *Africa Confidential*, 9 March 1990, p. 1.

49. 'Africa: The roots of Reform', *Africa Confidential*, 27 July 1990, p. 3.

50. For some recent literature on France's role in Africa see *inter alia* John Chipman, *French Power in Africa*, (Basil Blackwell, London, 1989); Paul Chaigneau, *La Politique Militaire de la France en Afrique*, (CHEAM, Paris, 1984); George E. Moose, 'French Military Policy in Africa', in William J. Foltz and Henry S. Bienen (eds), *Arms and the African: Military Influences on Africa's International Relations*, (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1985), and Francis T. McNamara, *France in Africa*, (National Defense University, Washington, 1989).

51. 'La Cooperation avec l'Afrique: perspectives pour les entreprises francaises', *Afrique Contemporaine*, N. 149, 1989.

52. Quoted in Kaye Whiteman, 'The Gallic Paradox', *Africa Report*, January-February 1991, p. 19.

basic political reforms. More ominously, France renounced automatic future honouring of long-standing 'mutual defence' treaties *under whose very loose interpretation* French force of arms had been committed to sustain regimes threatened by insurrection. In this domain too the French position was that such support, *if at all forthcoming*, would be determined by the country's human rights record, and whether it was moving towards democratic reforms.⁵³

Several Francophone leaders did not get the message initially, since Paris had made similar noises before and it was the kind of rhetoric they had become accustomed to hear.⁵⁴ But the threat was made explicit at the June 1990 La Baule Francophonie summit meeting. The meeting ended with a declaration stressing 'the need to associate the relevant population more closely with the construction of their political, social and economic future', towards which extra aid would be forthcoming to countries moving fastest in that direction. Some blunt informal advice by President Mitterand to the effect that 'the sooner you organize free elections, the better it will be for the youth of your countries who need to express themselves'⁵⁵ conveniently 'leaked' out, adding to the budding pressures in Africa.

One leader, Houphouet-Boigny, early on saw the handwriting on the wall and embarked on a programme of liberalization; another, Kerekou in insolvent Benin, was already being bulldozed to implement reform. But Mitterand's tenor at La Baule was resented by some statesmen who viewed it as arrogant neo-colonialism, especially in light of the threatened penalties for non-compliance. A few adamantly rejected France's right to prescribe for them political reform, and many discounted France's resolve; some to subsequently discover their feet of clay in the absence of France's stabilizing military help.

Such was specifically the case of Hissene Habre. The latter viewed himself immune to threats from Paris, since he was a proven bulwark against Libyan designs on Chad that in the past had evoked knee-jerk reactions in Paris. Despite Chad's economic irrelevance, French troops had on several occasions been airlifted to Ndjamena, some to die for the country's defence.⁵⁶ Habre scoffed at French conditionalities at La Baule. His unwillingness to relax Ndjamena's heavy-handed rule over the South, and to move towards national reconciliation, sealed his fate. French troops *in situ* in Chad did not budge from their bases as Habre's estranged Chief of Staff, Idriss

53. For France's 'old' interpretation of its military obligations see Samuel Decalo, 'Modalities of Civil-Military Stability in Africa', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 28, (1990).

54. See Jean-Francois Bayart, *L'Etat en Afrique: la politique du Venue*, (Fayard, Paris, 1989).

55. See *Africa Research Bulletin*, Political Series, July 1990.

56. See Samuel Decalo, 'Regionalism, Political Decay and Civil Strife in Chad', *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 18, (1980) and 'Political Instability and Decay in Chad', *African Affairs*, 79, 1980; M. P. Kelley, *A State in Disarray: condition of Chad's Survival*, (Westview, Boulder, 1986); 'Chad' Special issue of *Politique Africaine*, 16, (1984); and V. Thompson and R. Adloff, *Conflict in Chad*, (Hurst, London, 1981).

Deby, swept in from the Sudanese border with several hundred soldiers to defeat and chase Habre into exile. Libya's complicity in the insurgency (cause for French *and* US military support for Ndjamen in the past) was judged of little import. And as if to attest to the fact that he understood France's new line, once installed in Ndjamen Deby de-emphasized the Libyan 'connection', and pledged a prompt return to civilian rule and multi-party elections, the first since 1961. Other Francophone leaders, hitherto also holding out against populist demonstrations and pressures, began giving in, and the re-democratization bandwagon entered into high gear.

Paradoxically at the outset French pressures for political reforms were quite modest. Certainly Paris did not counsel, expect, or even countenance what was soon to become the norm of re-democratization—convening populist National Conferences (*a la* France's 18th Century Estates General) of all the country's social, ethnic, economic, regional, religious and occupational groups, leading to formal constitutional revisions, and eventually full-fledged multiparty elections. Originally minimalist changes were demanded: 'the catchwords [were] "governance" and "democratization" rather than "democracy" or "multipartyism"'. This meant 'less corruption, and more financial accountability, better human rights observance and freer judiciaries and media, rather than completely open multiparty systems, for which most Africanists think Africa is not yet suited or equipped'.⁵⁷

Certainly when the first Francophone country to re-democratize—Marxist Benin,⁵⁸ brought to its knees by striking civil servants not paid for a year—French counsel (given also to Guinea) was *against competitive multiparty elections*. A single-party system (mass, not vanguard), offering constituency-level choice of a multiplicity of candidates all running under the same party label (*a la* pre-1990 Cote d'Ivoire) was France's advice. Apart from the fact that the democratic flood-gates could not be closed in maverick Cotonou, *France's suggested model of Ivoirien 'democracy' was at that very moment being rejected by demonstrators in Abidjan itself*, who were calling for complete freedom of political association, multipartyism and prompt open elections. Only in mid-1990 did French Premier Michel Rocard see the futility of recommending midway houses, and multiparty democracy became the target.

If change came first to Francophone Africa due to pressures from France and the World Bank, and to Marxist Africa as the result of the disappearance of their ideological model, other states while 'studiously avoiding comparisons' slowly reached the inescapable conclusion that 'the parallels between what has transpired in Eastern Europe and the mounting pressures for

57. 'USA/Africa: Policy? What Policy', p. 3.

58. For better or for worse in many ways Benin has been a pace-setter for Francophone Africa. For background see 'Benin', in Decalo, *Coups and Army Rule in Africa*, and 'Ideological Rhetoric and Scientific Socialism in Benin and Congo/Brazzaville'. For recent events see Vivian Lowery Derryck, 'The Velvet Revolution', *Africa Report*, January-February 1991.

change on the continent are becoming increasingly difficult to ignore',⁵⁹ yielding to increasingly vehemently expressed demands for a return to square one: the multipartyism of the immediate pre- and post-independence eras.

A few leaders continued to hold out complaining they could not implement Structural Adjustment Plans (invariably including dismantling deficitary parastatals, reducing civil service employment levels and staple foodstuff subsidies) without authoritarian policies. These arguments had been sustained by numerous scholars who perceived in the 'praetorian' nature of Third World societies the necessity for 'developmental dictators'.⁶⁰ Such arguments were categorically undermined by recent hard-nosed World Bank and IMF re-assessments of the long-term value and utility of the SAP's themselves *in the absence of political 'pre-conditions'*. For even where solid growth has resulted (criticism in radical circles notwithstanding, there have been striking successes) *sustained growth* has rarely ensued. This rethinking of fundamentals led to the path-breaking conclusions of the recent World Bank assessment of Africa's prospects of sustainable growth—an assessment that is now the 'Red Book' of all democrats! For the gloves are now off, and the World Bank's position is unequivocally that Africa has no chance of attaining meaningful economic growth and development unless it *first* moves squarely into modalities of governance that include political accountability, participatory politics and a free market-economy.

Specifically, 'history suggests that political legitimacy and consensus are a precondition for sustainable development . . . Underlying the litany of Africa's problems is a crisis of governance'.⁶¹ And if radical African intellectuals reject the neo-colonial bondage implicit and explicit in many tenets of IMF and World Bank policy, some are at least agreed that there is 'a definite correlation between the lack of democracy in African politics and the deterioration in socio-economic conditions'.⁶² If only out of pragmatic considerations 'increasingly forces of the left have come to accept liberal democratic platforms and alliances as a means of securing the survival of popular democratic organizations and to expand the "democratic space"'.⁶³ Nigerian Claude Ake, for example, argues that, 'the problem of persistence

59. Colleen Lowe Morna 'Pluralism: A Luxury No More', *Africa Report*, November 1990, p. 33.

60. For some of the literature see especially Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1968); Guillermo O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism*, (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1973), and the latter's 'Reflections on Patterns of Change in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State', *Latin American Research Review*, 13, (1978).

61. The World Bank, *Sub-Saharan Africa: from Crisis to Sustainable Growth*, (Washington DC, 1989), p. 34.

62. Peter Anyang Nyong'o, 'Political Instability and Prospects for Democracy in Africa', *Africa Development*, 13, p. 72.

63. Bjorn Beckman, 'Whose Democracy? Bourgeois versus Popular Democracy', *Review of African Political Economy*, 45/6, (1989), p. 84.

of underdevelopment is related to lack of democracy in Africa . . . democracy is not just a consummatory value but also an instrumentalist one'.⁶⁴

Democracy, valuable in its own right, is also instrumentally valuable because it provides a *politically enabling atmosphere for economic development to proceed*. The World Bank Report posits a *causal relationship* between democracy and sustained growth, claiming it is no mere chance that Botswana and Mauritius, the two African countries with Africa's top economic performances, are the only ones with true multiparty systems on the continent. Other scholars note that states with the high growth rates (not fuelled by mineral and/or petroleum wealth)—Kenya, Cote d'Ivoire and Malawi—also share one feature of the democratic cluster of values: they manifest greater levels of political accountability, *even if only incrementally so*, than other one-party states with depressed growth scores.⁶⁵

In 1991 the US Agency for International Development *explicitly* endorsed past implicit assumptions, that 'there is growing evidence that open societies that value individual rights, respect the rule of the law, and have open and accountable governments provide better opportunities for sustained economic development than do closed systems which stifle individual initiative'. And in March American foreign aid guidelines were clearly spelled out in Congress: 'foreign aid to individual countries will take into account their progress towards establishing democracy . . . democracy will be placed on an equal footing with progress towards economic reforms and the establishment of a market-oriented economy, two key factors which have already been used as criteria for allocating US foreign aid'.⁶⁶

This view is consonant with linkages postulated by some scholars correlating political democracy, a free-market economy and economic development. Charles Lindblom put it most eloquently when he noted that '*only within market-oriented systems does political democracy arise*. Not all market-oriented systems are democratic, but every democratic system is also a market-oriented system. Apparently, for reasons that are not wholly understood, political democracy has been unable to exist except when coupled with the market. An extraordinary proposition, it has so far held without exception'.⁶⁷

That 'the newly articulated demand by senior US and Western officials that the level of democratization within Africa will soon condition the amount

64. Claude Ake, 'The Case for Democracy', in *African Governance in the 1990's*, (Carter Presidential Center, Atlanta, 1990), p. 2.

65. Peter Anyang Nyong'o, 'Democracy and Political Instability: A Rejoinder', in *African Governance in the 1990's*, (Carter Presidential Center, Atlanta, 1990), p. 5. Nyong'o, however, has been attacked from the left since such a position can lead to justifications for development ('accumulation' in Marxist parlance) even at the cost of marginally accountable repressive regimes. See T. Mkandawire, 'Comments on Democracy and Political Instability', *Africa Development*, vol. 3 N. 3, 1988, p. 32.

66. James Butty, 'The Democracy Carrot', *West Africa*, 22 April 1991.

67. Charles E. Lindblom, *Politics and Markets*, (Basic Books, New York, 1977), p. 116. Emphasis in the original.

of assistance allocated to it⁶⁸ was more sincere than previous rhetoric allegedly guiding US policy with respect to Human Rights violations, was best attested by Kenya's recent experience. Very much the darling of the West despite escalating abuses of human rights, growing restrictions on political space, and curtailment of the press and judiciary autonomy, Kenya in 1991 found herself virtually cut off from most American aid programmes to Africa.

The Redemocratization Process

It is too early at this juncture (June 1991) to assess the precise magnitude of what has been attained to date in Africa, and with what long-term significance. Only a handful of countries (notably Benin, Cote d'Ivoire, and Gabon) have *completed* the implementation of structural re-organization, political reform, civilianization (in the case of military regimes), and grass-roots (and external) demand for competitive legislative/presidential elections; many more are only commencing along the road of *pledged* reforms, some with considerable reluctance (Cameroun, Ghana). Indeed, a significant number (e.g. Congo, Niger, Togo) have only very recently, under extreme 'duress', agreed to a rollback of uniparty or military rule, and the dimensions of their re-democratization are not spelled out in detail. And in other states (CAR, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Sierra Leone, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe) African leaders are still fighting rear-guard battles, strenuously haggling with pro-democracy movements.

Zambia is a good example of the 'hold-out' regime. Kaunda for long argued the irrelevance to Africa of events in Eastern Europe, since 'the circumstances which made us rally behind the one-party system have not changed . . . our situation today is in no way similar to the one in Europe'.⁶⁹ Kaunda's conception of Zambian-style democracy is so rosy-tinted that he even suggested Eastern Europe should emulate Africa since 'what we have been doing ever since our hard-won independence Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union are starting to do only now'.⁷⁰ Vacillating under diametric pressures, Kaunda finally gave in to demands for multipartyism but tried to mark time. He set up a constitutional revision committee, to be followed by a plebiscite on the new constitution, a process that could have dragged on for years. Violent riots in Zambia's urban centers 'convinced' Kaunda that the cumbersome process was not necessary; but he continued footdragging on democratization (as updated voter rolls are prepared) knowing full well he could not win in any open election.

While pressures for re-democratization have inter-acted with each state's unique internal dynamics to produce somewhat different outcomes several

68. Salim Lone 'Challenging Conditionality', *Africa Report*, November 1990, p. 32.

69. *Zambia Daily Mail* (Lusaka), 9 March 1990.

70. *Zambia Daily Mail* (Lusaka), 15 March 1990.

common patterns can be detected, and several likely developments in the near future can be projected.

First, it is now clear that the pro-democracy pressures are continent-wide, and are not likely to spare any state except those few (Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia, Gambia, Senegal) with meaningful competitive multiparty systems and significant civic and human rights freedoms. Moreover, since few countries possess reservoirs of popular legitimacy, and most are in socio-economic quagmires, there is a fair chance of a 'spillover' of the pro-democracy turmoil into some *de facto* multiparty countries (e.g. Egypt, Morocco, Senegal) to merge with festering problems that have less to do with democratization (though certainly democracy can be shored) and more with fundamental economic and religious re-alignments of power. (Senegal's Abdou Diouf's recent overtures to the parliamentary opposition, is an example of a country providing 'extra' democracy to avoid inviting the turmoil of neighbouring non-democratic countries.)

Secondly, the more African autocracies resembled in their features the discredited regimes in Eastern Europe, the greater the challenge from below for total change, and a purge of the past: witness the total eclipse of the Afro-Marxist state. For as Anglin notes 'most of the departures from democratic standards . . . closely parallel defects exposed in Eastern Europe . . . The supremacy of the party over the government, the vanguard party concept, politicisation of the public service and security services, monopoly of party power in perpetuity, subordination of mass organisations (such as trade unions, women's and youth groups), the media, etc. to party control, the cult of personality, abuses of power including corruption, permanent states of emergency'.⁷¹

Thirdly, *military* rulers have to date fared poorly in the democratization sweepstakes, and are likely to continue doing so in the future. Some (e.g. Chad's Hissene Habre) completely underestimated France's resolve in disengaging from oppressive and corrupt client-states; others (e.g. Mali's Moussa Traore and Benin's Mathieu Kerekou) totally misjudged the venom and speed with which urban populations would turn on them; and yet others (e.g. Ethiopia's Mengistu Mariam) simply cannot accept the humiliation of withdrawal from power. Kerekou right to the end could not comprehend the 'ungratefulness' of Beninois—whom he ruled under an iron fist for seventeen years—who rejected his leadership in either a new 'above politics' presidential capacity, or even as Chairman of the National Conference he convened to decide the nature of the reforms to be initiated. Other army leaders are likely to vacate office in similar manner through military defeat (Mengistu Mariam in Ethiopia), mass upheavals that split the loyalty of the officer corps (Niger's Seibou?), or consequent to an electoral defeat by the

71. Anglin, 'Southern African responses to Eastern European Developments', p. 448.

democratic forces they unleash under pressure from below (Eyadema in Togo).

Fourthly, notwithstanding the continental dimension of re-democratization, *some* countries may be bypassed until the forces of change spend themselves. This may occur because the modern urban sector is too small or weak to threaten the establishment (Rwanda?); because the country is isolated at the social periphery of the continent (Equatorial Guinea?); or because the forces of repression have too much to lose by relaxing their grip over the reigns of power (Burundi, Sudan?), external pressures notwithstanding. The fact that several countries that fall into these categories have nevertheless relaxed their monopoly of power (Sao Tome e Principe), or have shown signs of flexibility where none was expected (Mauritania), may prove that the pressures are too irresistible. Still a few states might manage to hold out *until the first wave of failures of the 'new democracies' start cropping up, when the 'not by democracy alone' argument is likely to score some points;* that juncture may provide a respite from international pressures for autocratic holdouts.

Fifthly, the image of the political impregnability of Africa's civilian founding-fathers, and of the invincibility of long-ruling iron generals, has been completely eroded by the spectacle of 'people-power' (cum French and IMF-clout), a fact that may well have major long-run repercussions for political generations to come. Direct mass action *has* unseated several political autocracies, and will undoubtedly overthrow others. The lesson seems to have sunk deep: there can be little doubt that mass direct action can be expected in the future to be turned against *benign* but, for whatever reason, unpopular leaders with equally deadly success.

Finally, the few *civilian* leaders who early on grasped the significance of the changed global rules of the game, promptly came to terms with them, liberalized their administrations and created new political space, have usually been able to survive the trauma, at times with enhanced legitimacy and a greater mandate to enact draconian policies called for by their ailing economies. Since the pro-democracy pressures are not spreading at the same pace in every country, this means additional African leaders can avoid political eclipse if they compromise early. Libreville's Omar Bongo and Abidjan's Felix Houphouet-Boigny offer the best examples of how relaxing their grip on the political reigns (in different ways) assured their continuity in office, and with enhanced status and prestige they did not possess previously, whereas even twelve months ago their political futures were to a considerable extent in doubt.

Adjusting to the inevitability of the changed reality, properly assessing societal pressures for change and reacting accordingly, has allowed African leaders—even hitherto relatively unpopular ones—to grasp the democracy tiger by the tail and tame it. They have been able to seize the initiative and

project the image of *leading* (rather than bending to) the movement for reform, in the attending societal euphoria distancing themselves somewhat from the worst abuses of their own *ancien regimes*. But far more importantly, such African leaders have been able to preempt more threatening popular demands they would have faced at later junctures had they not compromised. By their flexibility when political opposition groups are still timid, disorganized, or self-exiled, and political reform still but a hope, such African leaders were able to dictate the pace of reform and its all-important ground-rules, avoiding excessive executive-shackling national-conference pressures while maintaining the centrality of their role in any political outcome. The usual outcome has been a bicephalous executive, with incumbents withdrawing to the sanctity of an above-politics presidency, relinquishing day-to-day government to a 'clean' technocratic premier accountable (or not) to more powerful multiparty National Assemblies with a viable press and judiciary.

The two early quasi-voluntary democratic metamorphoses in French Africa (Cote d'Ivoire and Gabon) are significant for what they illustrate. Master-tactician Houphouet-Boigny, faced by near-daily street riots for liberalization (fuelled by economic stress) completely outmanoeuvred the pro-democracy movement by promptly legalizing all political parties, and acceding to their fullest demands—open presidential and legislative elections—rushing the democratic transformation before opposition leaders could expand or redefine their demands, sharpen their tactics, or properly organize for electoral contests that last saw opposition parties thirty years ago. Indeed, representatives of the 26 political formations that were legalized were called into Houphouet-Boigny's office and peremptorily advised of the forthcoming elections. When some requested a delay (so they could get organized) this was rejected on the grounds of *their own* recent demonstrations for instant national elections. Election funds were allocated to all parties so they could not claim being at a disadvantage (some parties took the funds and withdrew from the elections!), and the outcome was never in doubt.⁷²

Houphouet-Boigny's tactic resulted in elections under his own (PDCI) party's supervision, with a PDCI quasi-monopoly of the media, and oiled in the proper direction by PDCI largess. All this is not to play down the significance of the political reforms in Abidjan, or the opening up of new political space in Cote d'Ivoire; nor does it diminish from the magnitude of Houphouet-Boigny's and the PDCI's subsequent stunning electoral victories though some have pointed at instances of vote-rigging and other irregularities. The outcome of the three-tiered elections were not really in doubt with no opposition party capable of fielding even half a full complement of candidates, while the main presidential challenger (Laurent Gbagbo, who

72. 'Cote d'Ivoire: Hard Work brings results', *Africa Confidential*, 23 November 1990.

won 18.3 per cent of the vote) was simply not geared to run a national race.⁷³ Houphouët-Boigny's early flexibility not only revived from the doldrums his own relevance to Côte d'Ivoire, saved from oblivion a ruling party grown complacent in office, but also prevented a much more fundamental restructuring of the Côte d'Ivoire state.

In Gabon a similar democratic metamorphosis took place when the beleaguered Bongo showed astuteness in giving in to pressures for a convention-brokered re-array of power. By playing upon everyone's fear of the northern Fang bogeyman (prime beneficiaries of democratization), Bongo presided over the economic decentralizing of a state now no longer his private preserve, assuring his own region—rich in mineral wealth, but demographically weak—a measure of future autonomy. Bongo's prompt capitulation to popular pressures removed the presidency and his own tenure in it, from the fray, while gaining some acclaim for ushering in the return of competitive elections to Gabon. Had he tarried, relied, as in the past, on French military assistance (in light Gabon's immense mineral wealth), or tried to suppress mounting unrest with his quasi-mercenary praetorian guard⁷⁴ Bongo—belonging to the tiny Bateke ethnic sliver, hence without a viable ethnic constituency—would no doubt have been overwhelmed by the pro-democracy movement, and relegated to oblivion. Indeed, shortly later massive anti-government riots erupted in Port Gentil after the death of an opposition leader. Though French troops were ferried over from Libreville to protect and evacuate French nationals, Bongo was pointedly reminded that 'he would receive no military help in maintaining law and order', since while France 'would remain actively involved in the continent [it] wished to stay out of the continent's internal affairs'.⁷⁵

In contrast to the presidents of Côte d'Ivoire and Gabon, leaders trying to temporize may well be digging their political graves. One example of a current 'maximization of demands' by the opposition is the experience of Cameroun under the indecisive Paul Biya. Concerned about his progressive dissipation of authority, accompanied by a proliferation of northern, southern (especially Bamileke) and (potentially secessionist) western (Anglophone) political opposition movements, Biya's zig-zag highly equivocal policies, resistance to a National Conference and unwillingness to renegotiate a new political order unless defeated at elections, have aggravated the opposition into mass direct action and a call for his own immediate resignation.

For some leaders, especially military, temporizing, of course—hoping the movement will dissipate itself—is the only viable option, since they have no chance of surviving in an open political system. Mobutu's platitudes about

73. See Gerald Bourke, 'A New Broom', *Africa Report*, January–February 1991.

74. 'Gabon', in Samuel Decalo, *The Stable Minority: Stable Civilian Rule in Africa*, forthcoming.

75. *The Guardian Daily*, 26 May 1990.

commitment to redemocratization in Zaire are rejected outright by political groups above all else wishing his own downfall; Mbosogo has responded with intimidation to pro-democracy tracts in Equatorial Guinea, since possibly the first act of a free legislature would be to order his own arrest for state brutalities since 1975; Kaunda drags his heels in Lusaka while updating voter rolls (demanded by the opposition), gaining time to rebuild an ossified ruling party unlikely to hold its own in competitive elections; and in Addis Ababa the obdurate Mengistu Mariam so misjudged the centre-periphery balance of power that by May 1991 abdication rather than negotiation was his only option. In these and other instances a stage may be reached where pro-democracy groups feel emboldened to dictate the nature of the new rearrangement of power.

The significance, and constraints of the redemocratization of Africa

Assuming the process of redemocratization continues to its logical conclusion in much of the continent, what is its significance, and what are its prospects of survival in the future? What will have been attained—and, given continued external conditionalities, can to some extent be sustained—is Africa's political rebirth. Indeed, it is a sort of return to square one—decolonization, though from *domestic* politically hegemonic groups—but, given the severe aid conditionalities that can be expected, this 'second independence' may well be a virtual *recolonization* by global donor agents, very much in the saddle in a unipolar world with only one source of capital, greatly in demand.

Countries completing the process of redemocratization will have hammered out—most via Constituent National Conferences—a new democratic charter for the African state. This dispensation to govern provides political space for all groups, more modes of political participation and representation than the narrow one of the past, accountability of executives, strengthened legislatures, commitment to a liberal market-economy (in ex-Marxist states), and, everywhere, respect for civic and human rights, and a free judiciary and press. The redemocratization of Africa is of monumental importance, but it also carries negative repercussions. The 'not by democracy alone' argument is *not* without validity, and few economic pay-offs are in the offing for most states since in *substance* nothing has changed with political democratization, and little is likely to in the near term.

A massive debt write-off could turn the economic clock to square one, constituting a New Deal for Africa, but is doubtful. Hence economic benefits are minimal, because any developmental thrusts flowing from politically-enabling atmospheres—*itself*, as noted, an academically contentious question—will only accrue in the distant future, while African states are in economic collapse *now*. Most African states have few economic potentials of *any* significance (many, literally nothing) that could attract

foreign risk capital—which is why entrepreneurs did not flock into them in the past, *irrespective* of ideology or level of democracy! And to rely on local capital to fuel development is to foredoom many to perpetual marginality.

Moreover, current conditionalities do not dangle prospects of increased aid, but rather continuation of existing levels. African states now have to run faster (i.e. be democratic) just to remain in the same place (secure existing levels of aid), that is one tenth of their minimal requirements. No ‘peace dividend’ is in the offing as a result of the end of the Cold War, certainly not for Africa—though Marshall Plans have been mooted for Eastern Europe. Constant economic fiascoes, and the inability of any African state to pull itself up by its own bootstraps, has produced donor fatigue, visible even with respect to humanitarian aid where Kurds are preferred over thrice salvaged Ethiopians. As Former American Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker noted ‘most secretaries of state have just wanted to keep African issues off their desks . . . The idea of putting big money into African economic development remains anathema.’⁷⁶

But democratization has opened political floodgates swamping countries with *scores* of political parties, narrow ethnic and personal power-machines, and thousands of power-aspirants. In Benin, a country of four million, legislative elections saw fully 1,800 candidates of 26 political parties (an Albanian-oriented Communist Party, the main ideological one), seeking election for the drastically reduced (from Marxist-days) 64-deputy National Assembly. And 14 individuals (some ‘fantasy candidates’),⁷⁷ presented themselves for the presidential election. Ethnic voting, political intimidation, vote-trading, political wheeling-dealing spilled into national life as if a lengthy one-party interregnum never took place.

Next door a typically-Nigerian lengthy military transition to civilian rule winds up with the flaws of the yet-to-follow civilian regime clearly visible. Indeed, to Uwazurike current preparations for civilian rule resemble in their ethnic overtones the run-up to the doomed ‘democratic’ civilian Second Republic. These ‘endless rivalries and negative developmental consequences of inter-party violence help explain the general aversion to multi-party systems across much of Africa’.⁷⁸ Bouts of ‘political cleansing’ by several military regimes have not affected Nigeria’s penchant for ‘virtually the worst forms of unstable democracy: most parties were narrowly based, tied to some “great and unassailable” leader who tended to stamp the organization not with any grand ideological vision but his personal biases. Besides, each was ethnically based, mass-mobilizing and confrontational in

76. ‘USA/Africa: Policy? What Policy’, p. 1.

77. A term coined by *L’Aube Nouvelle* (Cotonou) with respect to candidates in the 1968 army-sponsored Presidential elections. Cited in *West Africa*, 27 April 1968.

78. P. Chudi Uwazurike, ‘Confronting Potential Breakdown: the Nigerian Re-democratization Process in Critical Perspective’, *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 28, (1990), p. 55, 66.

in orientation'.⁷⁹ The picture is repeated across the breadth of Africa, reaching its nadir in Zaire where 96 parties have requested registration to date.

Moreover, not everywhere has political democracy resulted in more *social* space; in Algeria the FIS's stunning victory immediately brought *constraints* on social and cultural modes of expression as Muslim fundamentalist power emerged with the opening up of the country via competitive elections. His disillusionment with 'democracy' was summed up by one voter when he noted 'I've always wanted democracy for Algeria, but I expected a modernist party to take power, not a party of the Middle Ages'.⁸⁰ In a dozen other states restrictive fundamentalism is coming into the political centrestage as a result of the democratization of the continent.

Apart from the religious plane of polarization, the voting modality visible in whatever free elections have been held in Africa has been along predictable ethnic lines, underscoring the continued relevance of sub-nationalism three decades into statehood. Houphouet-Boigny's presidential protagonist in Cote d'Ivoire, Laurent Gbagbo, made inroads among youth and urban populations tired with thirty years of PDCI rule; but in the countryside Gbagbo was supported primarily by his own Bete, with a scattering of anti-Baoule (the President's ethnicity) voting in districts bypassed by the now-over Ivoirien 'economic miracle'. In Benin there was an even more exact parallel between ethnic affiliation and voting during the 1990–91 elections: in *percentage* terms the vote in most districts was *nearly identical to that of 1970, which itself was exactly that of a decade earlier*. Politicized ethnic sentiment remains the most meaningful force in Africa's syncretic, marginal, non-nation states, implying that politics in the 'new democracies' will constantly reflect this tug-of-war with all its deleterious and divisive negative effects.

The destabilizing potentials of ethnic politics combined with persevering economic decay, against backgrounds of psychologically heightened expectations attending democratization, can produce explosive results. Multiparty elections may transform 'expressions of principle to discussions of rules',⁸¹ but greater moderation and give and take is entailed in this, which conditions of scarcity and zero-sum mentalities prevent. As Jackson and Rosberg remind us 'in many countries the problem of establishing democracy is secondary to the problem of establishing order, stability and divility . . . [since] in more than a few countries this basic foundation is

79. Uwazurike, 'Confronting Potential Breakdown', p. 66.

80. Cited in *Africa Research Bulletin*, Political Series, July 1990.

81. Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter and Lawrence Whitehead (eds) 'Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies', in their *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy*, (Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1986), vol. 4, p. 58–59. See also Dankwart Rustow, 'Transitions to Democracy: Towards a Dynamic Model', *Comparative Politics*, April 1970.

still lacking'.⁸² Put concretely with respect to Zambia, democracy and Kaunda's removal would not solve a single problem: indeed, 'in the short run, things are likely to get worse'.⁸³

The collapse of authoritarian rule produces widespread feelings that 'the future is open, and that ideals and decisions count as much as interests and structures'.⁸⁴ But the concrete experience of other regions in 'transition' from authoritarian rule suggests that countries not backsliding have *not* experienced a significant degree of economic advance. Since the economic potentials, as well as other social attributes of Greece, Spain, Argentina, Brazil (some of those targeted for research) are simply not comparable to, for example Benin, Mali, Togo and Zambia, the inevitable disjunction between aspirations and concrete attainments and concomitant disillusionments, are likely to be larger in Africa.

Some scholars see in Africa's social pluralism *the* justification for democracy, a consummatory value in its own right quite apart from any linkage to economic development: 'if there is social pluralism, that is in fact an argument for a democratic form of governance',⁸⁵ which *will* work out in Africa since it provides specific solutions to concrete political problems in the most satisfying manner for most groups.⁸⁶ But others focus on the *instrumental* value of democracy, and challenge Lindbolm's correlating political democracy and economic development, and the World Bank's equation of less state intervention in the economy with better governance, maintaining that within the context of weak states only a 'bureaucratic-authoritarian state' can contain fissiparous tensions *and* lead to a free-market economy.⁸⁷ And born-again radicals find they can jettison Lenin while clinging to Marx, arguing *inter alia* that 'Africa cannot have 'bourgeois' democracy so long as there is no proper bourgeoisie'.⁸⁸

At the same time, even French observers question the wisdom of imposing conditionalities linking aid to *Western-style liberal democracy*, which *mutatis mutandi* includes a multipartyism they feel Africa is simply not ready for.⁸⁹ This school of thought—gaining ground in many circles—posits that more surgically precise or specifically-targeted issue-specific conditionalities might have been better, though the end result might have been a more visible recolonization of the continent. Conditionalities could have been

82. Jackson and Rosberg, 'Democracy in Tropical Africa', p. 305.

83. 'Africa: Democracy gathers momentum', *Baltimore Sun*, July 22, 1990.

84. O'Donnell *et al.* *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*, 4, p. 19.

85. Claude Ake, 'The Case for Democracy', in *African Governance in the 1990's*, (Carter Presidential Center, Atlanta, 1990), p. 4.

86. Larry Diamond, 'Beyond Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism: strategies for democratization', *The Washington Quarterly*, Winter 1989.

87. Guillermo O'Donnell, 'Reflections on the Patterns of Change in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State', *Latin American Research Review*, vol. 13, N. 1, 1978.

88. Bjorn Beckman, 'Whose Democracy?'

89. *Le Monde*, 23 June 1990.

linked, for example, to strict respect for civic and human rights; to the principle of executive accountability, legislative responsibility, freedom of the press and the judiciary; they could specify cut off of funds unless bloated civil services are trimmed, deficitary state sectors privatized, strict fiscal accounting of development funds delivered. (There are precedents, such as the American customs-monitoring presence in Monrovia in the mid-1980s.)

Regarding France's budgetary subventions to former colonies (*intended* to assist weak states meet civil service payrolls) it has even been suggested direct payment (by individual checks!) from Paris to civil servants—in order to avoid the common phenomena of a 10–20 per cent ratio of non-existent 'phantom-workers', and the osmosis of foreign funds to Africa's politico-bureaucracies' Swiss banking accounts.⁹⁰ Such variations on political conditionalities would leave intact chastened, externally-circumscribed semi-authoritarian regimes (thinned to weed out the more obnoxious dictators), deemed necessary to keep a lid on societal frustrations and implement what are at the very least highly unpopular and destabilizing policies.

Such disconcerting ideas are emerging as euphoria fades in official circles, and the realization sinks that despite redemocratization 'democratic' leaders are facing exactly the same destabilizing demonstrations their non-democratic brethren (often themselves!) used to face. Both Benin's and Gabon's always volatile student populations have been aggrieved at their decrepit campuses, residences, late payment of grants, food services; the recent momentous changes in these states notwithstanding, students have rioted against the current democratic regimes in office just as they have been doing against authoritarian regimes—with identical concrete results! Ndjamena's relief from Hissene Habre's brute terror and Idriss Deby's pledge of democracy and elections did not prevent massive urban strikes two weeks into his administration when he proposed a 'war effort tax' to assist in the reconstruction of the country.

The dilemma comes into sharp focus if we examine Africa's showcase of the 'new' democracies—Cote d'Ivoire. Never authoritarian like its neighbours, Houphouet-Boigny institutionalized all the reforms asked by France and domestic opposition, and then convincingly proved via competitive elections that he was still nationally popular. But the *political* reforms changed nothing in the economic or fiscal domains. No new capital is flowing into Cote d'Ivoire. Indeed, the outflow of capital and expatriates in Francophone Africa is at its severest in Abidjan that may have lost over half of its original 60,000-odd French residents since 1988. Virtually insolvent

90. Trevor W. Parfitt and Stephen P. Riley, *The African Debt Crisis*, (Routledge, London, 1989).

despite its highly competent Premier Alassane Ouattara and austerity policies (e.g. a cabinet cut from a 29–40-member complement to 19), by mid-1991 Cote d'Ivoire was considering defaulting on its sizeable national debt.

For notwithstanding Abidjan's new 'democracy', none of the country's social and economic parameters have changed an iota. Though 'kicked upstairs' according to the constitution, Houphouët-Boigny still calls the shots whenever he sees fit, at times without the knowledge of his own Premier. He recently personally arranged the sale of the national electricity company to a French firm (at no profit to Abidjan) and paid from state funds the \$20 million funeral costs (!) of an old crony.⁹¹ Normal belt-tightening exercises are simply incapable of ameliorating the country's fiscal crisis; and Ouattara has been unwilling to initiate more traumatic cuts that would be politically suicidal requiring as they do 'strong (authoritative) governments to sack public officials or increase consumer food prices without incurring equivalent off-setting expenditure on the military or on repairing riot damage'.⁹²

Such cuts would involve sharply slashing the country's 130,000-strong civil service (whose upper echelons have already been pruned),⁹³ rolling back salaries and fringe benefits (the highest in Africa, and even higher than in Spain and Portugal) of the country's 45,000 teachers, fully privatizing the country's remaining parastatals, further trimming cocoa and coffee producer prices, whose current depressed levels have already resulted in lower production levels and drops in farmers' income of up to 75 per cent. Such austerity policies would lead to explosive disenchantment with the PDCI in rural areas, and massive unrest in the cities—similar to those in 1988–89 that gave birth to the pro-democracy movement—but now *without the former era's 'immutable'*⁹⁴ *French militarily guarantees for the civilian order in Abidjan*.

More importantly for purposes of illustration, the net effect of all these 'unthinkable cuts', *even if implemented* would in absolute terms be petty compared to the country's interest payments on the public debt. In 1991 these were equivalent to 100 per cent of Cote d'Ivoire's anticipated state revenues. The fiscal shortfall (over \$1 billion) needing coverage if the administration was not to close down, would barely be touched by the economies, and there are no other ones to be adopted short of literally shutting down the state! Nor would the sell-off of the country's 79 parastatals

91. 'Cote d'Ivoire: Unrest Ahead', *Africa Confidential*, 19 April 1991, p. 3.

92. M. Moore, 'Interpreting Africa's crisis—political science versus political economy', *IDS Bulletin*, 18, (1987), p. 9.

93. Most African civil services could be slashed by 35–50 per cent without commensurate decline in services, assuming residual workers were not bunched up in urban centres as they tend to be.

94. Interview with a senior French diplomat, Abidjan, 12 July 1988.

generate much revenue since there are no takers: 'private business has been leaving the country for years and there is a pattern of net disinvestment'.⁹⁵

These are some of the 'constraints' on democracy in Africa, within a very *mechanistic* conception of democracy. But democracy is not just a political system with certain trappings, but a system sustained by a set of cultural values, a democratic ethos. These are not necessarily missing in Africa, but are ingrained, when found, at *subnational levels*. And even then societal scarcity and acute pressures produce inevitable zero-sum mentalities and modalities of interaction which by definition are non-democratic. With a history of authoritarian colonial and post-independence rule, in a context of continued scarcity and ethnic strife, democratic values and commitments are difficult to sustain, and the ethos is difficult to spread.

Larry Diamond notes that 'It is unrealistic to think that such countries can suddenly reverse course and institutionalize stable democratic government simply by changing leaders, constitutions and/or public mentalities. If progress is made toward developing democratic government, it is likely to be gradual, messy, fitful and slow, with many imperfections along the way'.⁹⁶ Some countries—the more important ones, or those with greatest value to the world—are likely, with continued neo-colonial bondages and external aid keeping them in line, to surmount the 'obstacles' posed by democracy, developing relatively stable multiparty systems. But it is hard to escape the conclusion that many other African states, in the absence of constant munificent benefactors (and when the global fervour with 'democracy' possibly goes out of vogue?) will be seen as a bad bet and let loose to drift their own way, backsliding into political strife, social chaos, single-party and military rule.

95. 'Cote d'Ivoire: Unrest Ahead', *Africa Confidential*, 19 April 1991, p. 3. See also Colleen Lowe Morna, 'Enticing Investment', *Africa Report*, January–February 1991, p. 42.

96. Larry Diamond, 'Beyond Autocracy: Prospects for Democracy in Africa', in *Beyond Autocracy in Africa*, (The Carter Center of Emory University, Atlanta, 1989), p. 24.