9 RADICALISM RAMPANT

"It is not that the Liberal Government want to tax land . . . The time has come when they have to find a new policy with which to get votes."

R. L. Outhwaite, MP
Quoted in Pall Mall Gazette, 24 October 1913

Many people regard the period between the Parliament Act of 1911 and the outbreak of war in 1914 from one of two angles: as an aftermath to the constitutional struggle; or as a curtain-raiser to the War, and to the social and political developments which occurred during the War and the supervening period. Neither of these views is a satisfactory one. It is doubtful whether anybody, in any of the parties, considered the constitutional and economic position which had been reached in 1911 to be final. Many people did not see the war coming; and those who did foresee it had, for the most part, no idea whatever of the scale of the slaughter and destruction.

The Parliament Act had provided that a Bill which passed the Commons in three successive sessions of the same Parliament should become law notwithstanding the continued opposition of the Lords. There was little doubt that any drastic and contentious land reform would be resisted by the Lords; while the current Parliament would normally be dissolved not later than 1915. It was therefore important for the various land reformers to ensure that the measures which they desired should be inaugurated at the earliest possible moment.

A Scottish Smallholders Bill, similar to the one which the Lords had wrecked twice before, was introduced. The Government — in the person of John Sinclair, who had become Lord Pentland — gave support, and this time it passed both Houses with little trouble. This measure, which is usually known as the Pentland Act, proved rather a damp squib. It came into force in April 1912. By the end of 1914, the total rent reduction and arrears cancellation together amounted to less than £10,000; while fewer than 500 smallholdings had been provided, and fewer than 300 existing holdings enlarged.
The principal concern of the land reformers, however, was not the promotion of smallholdings but the taxation of land values. Lloyd George’s land taxes were of very little use; by far the most important ingredient of the celebrated Budget; from the land-taxers’ point of view, was land valuation, on which a proper system of taxation might later be founded. The taxes as they stood, indeed, could easily prove counter-productive; for if the voters saw that nothing much happened as a result of the tremendous conflict, the whole land campaign might easily lose credibility and run into the sands. Was it possible to set a real scheme of land taxation into operation, while the public was still interested?

On 18 May 1911, several months before the Parliament Bill became law, an important delegation of backbenchers met Asquith and Lloyd George, in order to present them with a Memorial demanding speedier land valuation, and the collection of certain local and national taxes on the basis of land values. This Memorial was signed by 183 MPs, of whom eight expressed certain reservations. The full list comprised most of those Liberals who were not actually members of the administration, and all the Labour MPs, except Ramsay MacDonald. Both the Prime Minister and the Chancellor gave the Memorialists a very friendly reception; but Lloyd George somewhat spoiled the effect by telling them that the valuation was expected to be complete “within five years from the date of the passing of the Budget of 1909” — that is, from 29 April 1910. It is striking to contrast the time which he considered necessary for work of this kind with that which he took for some far more difficult operations a few years later. On Lloyd George’s estimate, land value taxation could not be set into operation before 1915 at the earliest. If the Government lost the next Election, or the Lords proved particularly obstreperous, the delay might be indefinite.

Needless to say, the Chancellor’s information did not please the land-taxers. The Scottish Liberal Association and other Liberal bodies passed critical resolutions. Friendly remonstrances of that kind might be of some value, but they could scarcely force anyone’s hand. At a time when there were so many other political issues to which attention might easily be diverted, it was exceedingly difficult for the land-taxers to keep public interest focused in their direction, for four more years at least. The fact that they were able to retain that interest right down to the outbreak of
the war is a most remarkable testimony to the inherent vitality of the movement.

Not least of their difficulties was to decide on the general strategy which they should adopt towards the Government. Lloyd George's Budget had certainly stirred the nation, and it might look factious in the extreme to turn round and attack him for failing to exhibit sufficient sense of urgency about valuation. The land-taxers had many undoubted friends in high places, of whom perhaps the most conspicuous was the Lord Advocate, Alexander Ure. Yet, as the months went by, and little or nothing was done by the Government to follow up the demands of the Memorialists, some land-taxers became restive. Josiah Wedgwood, one of the most ardent of their number, and a Liberal MP, declared openly that "... the valuation could be completed in a year if the Government were in earnest. ... There are many in the Liberal Party who have had about enough of this."2

The Daily Herald, organ of the more rebellious and socialistic section of the Labour Party, took up the same theme — contending, in May 1912, that Lloyd George "... can tax land values, and he can tax them now, and so he can fulfil his pledges to the electorate and justify the hopes of his own followers. ... The time for talk about land reform is over, and we are sick with the sickness of hope deferred, of (Liberals') protests and promises. They have the means to carry those promises out, for they are in power. Let them do so, or let them for ever hold their peace." This was an oversimplification of the Liberals' difficulties, but it demonstrates well the feelings which were being roused.

The immediate task of the land taxers was to demonstrate the popularity of their movement in the country; to prove that it really was a vote-winner for the Government, if they cared to take it up with determination. In May 1912, a keen land-taxer, E. G. Hemmerde, stood as Liberal candidate in the NW Norfolk by-election. The constituency was agricultural and Liberal, but it was by no means safe. Hemmerde defended the seat on what he called "a campaign of robust Liberalism, on the lines of land reform". He had the exceedingly difficult task of explaining this policy to people who were unfamiliar with it, and he was triumphantly returned. A few weeks later, another Liberal land taxer, Sydney Arnold, was returned at Holmforth, in Yorkshire — incidentally beating off a serious challenge from Labour in a strongly industrial constituency.
NW Norfolk and Holmfirth were followed swiftly by an even more exciting campaign at Hanley. This constituency, now part of Stoke-on-Trent, was a mixed pottery and coal mining area, bordering on Newcastle-under-Lyme, which was represented by Josiah Wedgwood. For many years the MP for Hanley was Enoch Edwards, a nominee of the Miners’ Federation. Edwards had originally sat as a Liberal; but when his Trade Union seceded to the Labour Party, he dutifully followed his paymasters and contested Hanley in the Labour interest — without opposition from the Liberals.

When Edwards died in 1912, a most complex situation arose. Both the Liberal and Labour Parties claimed the seat, each contending that their own man was entitled to stand as the sole “Progressive” defender under arrangements which had been concluded in 1903. No agreement was reached, and both parties advanced candidates. The Liberals put forward R. L. Outhwaite, a journalist and one of the most active and enthusiastic of the land-taxers; the Labour Party an elderly Trade Unionist of Liberal antecedents, Samuel Finney.

From the start, the Hanley by-election seemed driven by cross-currents. Many Liberals and Labour men regarded it as something of a trial of strength; and yet their leaders were anxious, for considerations of general strategy, to avoid antagonising each other too much. The Master of Elibank, Chief Liberal Whip, stoutly defended the Liberal claim to the seat, and both Asquith and Lloyd George were prevailed upon to send messages of support to Outhwaite; yet, in a sense, the Liberal leaders had one hand tied behind their backs. A further complication was the knowledge that the Unionists had a reasonable expectation of capturing Hanley on a divided “Progressive” vote.

The land taxing question swept all others aside. At one point in the campaign, three public meetings were being conducted by the land-taxers each day from 11 a.m. until midnight. The “Land Song” — “God gave the land to the people!” — was sung on innumerable occasions, and played from innumerable gramophone records. Outhwaite himself was making about ten speeches a day. Labour by no means allowed Hanley to go by default, and one night had twelve MPs supporting Finney.

Outhwaite was triumphantly returned. A Parliamentary deposit did not exist in 1912; if it had done, Finney would have forfeited his, for he secured less than one-eighth of the votes.
cast. With such results as Norfolk, Holmfirth and Hanley behind them, the land-taxers could fairly claim that the most disparate constituencies would respond enthusiastically to a strong land-taxing challenge. In a very different way, another by-election provided an oblique justification for the land-taxers' claims. The Labour Party was so incensed by Liberal intervention at Hanley that they resolved to put forward a candidate for the vacant Liberal seat of Crewe. The Liberal candidate at Crewe was a much more orthodox, middle-of-the-road man than Outhwaite, and refused to devote his main attention to the land question. The Unionist won the seat. In several other by-elections which followed, other Liberal candidates who lacked Outhwaite's enthusiasm for the land question were also defeated.

Thus the Government leaders were put in a tight position. They were afraid that by appearing to condone the extremists they would lose support from many people who had previously helped them. To placate the "moderates", Asquith and Lloyd George were brought publicly to repudiate the assertion that they were single-taxers. On the other hand, they were no less conscious that land taxing was an immensely popular policy, and they had no wish to alienate the enthusiasts. They therefore met the situation by setting up a Land Enquiry Committee. This was composed of Government supporters, among whom land-taxers were included. The formation of that Committee led to a remarkable Parliamentary incident, which gives some idea of the depth of feeling at the time. Asked by Austen Chamberlain whether the names of witnesses to the Enquiry would be published, Lloyd George replied: "Now I see what they want to get at. They want to get the names of the men who dared to give information about wages, about the conditions of labour, about management, and about game..." The last audible word from the Chancellor was "game"; at this point, the Unionist MPs hooted and booed until he left the House.

The Unionists evidently misunderstood the whole object of the Enquiry, for the aim was not "to collect accusations against particular landlords" but to provide information and recommendations which could form the basis of legislation. The Government intended that the Committee should produce separate reports on urban and rural land, and also two further reports which would deal with specifically Scottish and Welsh problems. These various studies were undertaken more or less completely
in isolation from each other — although, as we shall see, they were eventually to be co-ordinated in a political campaign.

Attention was first directed to the rural question. Here the Ministers were evidently motivated both by political considerations and by a genuine concern for the agricultural labourers in particular. Earl Beauchamp, a junior member of the Cabinet, wrote to Lloyd George: "... It does seem to me that the important person for whom we should in the first instance do all we can is the agricultural labourer. While we need an economic revolution with regard to his wage, a moral revolution which will give his independence — i.e., an untied cottage under fair tenure — is no less necessary."

On the other hand, many Liberals had doubtless noted the phenomenon which Outhwaite described after his unsuccessful candidature at Horsham in 1910: "... Polling day was a revelation to me. So enthusiastic had been the labourers at my village meetings that I thought I had stirred them to revolt. The last two nights the labourers did not attend, and on polling day I saw them driven to the booths by their lords and masters who polled them like Tammany bosses." The farm labourers, most depressed of all the major occupational groups in Britain, were also by far the most Conservative section of the working class. It was reasonable to think that if the Government did anything really substantial to assist them, enormous numbers would move to the Liberal camp.

Although the aims of the rural Enquiry were somewhat restricted — "the prevention . . . of abuses arising out of the present system of land tenure rather than the substitution of any new system" — yet several Cabinet Ministers took an active interest in its work.

The proposals which emerged seemed exceedingly radical to most contemporaries. They included the establishment of minimum wages; provisions for the acquisition of land for allotments, smallholdings and housing; further compensation for the tenant-farmer in respect of disturbance; and guarantees for him against increases of rent which might arise through his own efforts and improvements. A Ministry of Lands would be set up, partly to implement these proposals, and partly to take over the existing functions of the Board of Agriculture.

The rural report was published in October 1913. The Liberals arranged to synchronise this event with the inauguration of a great
Land Campaign. This Campaign would first publicise the rural report, and then, when the other Land Enquiry proposals began to appear, would take them also within its scope. It was evidently intended that the Land Campaign should work up to a crescendo, and gradually merge into the wider political campaign which would lead on to the next General Election.

The land campaign was managed on a very substantial scale. At least eighty lecturers were appointed. Between ninety and 120 meetings were held daily. Nearly ten million items of literature were issued, and well over a quarter of a million posters produced. A somewhat wry regret was expressed by the secretary of the Central Land and Housing Council: "So far we have very little opposition from any quarter. The Campaign would go with a greater swing if we had somebody to fight".16

A week after the inauguration of the Campaign, Lloyd George addressed a great gathering at Swindon. He reported to the Chief Liberal Whip, Percy Illingworth: "Swindon was electric. I have rarely addressed such an enthusiastic audience. They were the picked Liberals of the West and they were as keen as mustard. The land caught on. Winston found the same thing at Manchester. His allusions to our programme were received with wild cheering."15

A few weeks later, Illingworth described Asquith's reception at the National Liberal Federation meeting in Leeds: "The Prime Minister's speech last night was I think the best I ever heard him make. 'Land' went like hot cakes at the delegates' meeting."16

The interest roused by the Land Enquiry's rural proposals was both deep and sustained. One of the many reports which Lloyd George received declared: "Speaking of the country as a whole I may say without any exception the Government's proposals are arousing unprecedented enthusiasm in the rural constituencies. In a large number of villages every elector physically capable of doing so has attended the meetings. Men walk five, six or seven miles to be present. The women are as enthusiastic as the men. The people will stand for an hour or more in drenching rain or piercing wind to hear the proposals explained. For the first time in the history of modern Liberalism farmers who do not support the Liberals are attending Liberal meetings to get information..."17 The Liberals had evidently stirred the rural areas very deeply indeed, and had contrived to win massive support from farm labourers without antagonising the tenant-farmers.
Although the Land Enquiry produced such outstandingly successful political effects from its rural report, it experienced far more difficulty when it came to study the urban areas. The people who joined the Committee started from widely different economic standpoints, and were also subjected to a great deal of pressure in different directions from outsiders.

The representative of the land nationalisers' viewpoint on the Committee was Baron de Forest (later Count Bendern), Liberal MP for an East London constituency. His most crucial demand was that compulsory powers of land acquisition should be given to the Government "irrespective of any need for land for public services" — in other words, that public money should be employed to buy out landowners, as part of a policy of gradual State acquisition of land. This view, however, was amenable to criticism from very different angles. If the landlord's title was a just one, why should his land be taken from him, save where there was some demonstrable public need for that land? Alternatively, if the landlord's title was an unjust one, why should he be compensated? Thus de Forest's view did not commend itself to the Committee. He eventually insisted on writing a Minority Report, and the Committee rather reluctantly acceded to his demand that it should be published with the main document — partly because they realised that they would not otherwise secure his promised contribution of three or four thousand pounds, and partly because they feared that he would publish damaging statements about irregularities in the Committee's work. Inevitably, the land nationalisers were far from pleased with the proposals which eventually began to leak from the Committee.

The keen land-taxers were also unhappy with the rumours which began to emerge about the impending urban proposals; but they were in a very difficult tactical position. The general view among them seems to have been that expressed by P. Wilson Raffan MP, one of their more balanced spokesmen: "We do not distrust (Lloyd) George, but the feeling is gaining ground that some influence must be at work to keep him silent on the Rating Question." Trevelyan decided that the Chancellor was "only gradually gathering the full meaning of the change. . . . He is steadily moving in our direction. As he gets to closer grips with his subject he sees more and more."

Nevertheless, some enthusiasts were more dubious. At one moment, the United Committee for the Taxation of Land Values
— an important source of propaganda — came near to a public revolt against the Government. Outhwaite wrote bitterly to Lloyd George, complaining that — in deference to him — the land-taxers had checked their propaganda at a time when by-elections "showed the workers rallying to our policy in preference to that of the Labour Party" — while "we now find that we have been swept to one side, an alternative policy to our own substituted, and that for the moment we have suffered eclipse at the hands of a Government that exists through our past activities." Trevelyan reported to the Chancellor that "a large part of our best Liberals, especially where we are strongest, are remaining lukewarm about your land campaign until you are explicit about land values."

Perhaps in order to allay some of these disappointments, and perhaps in order to determine the strength of the various currents of opinion before the Government had firmly committed itself, the Land Campaign spokesmen began to discuss urban land reform long before the urban report had been issued. A particularly important speech was delivered by Lloyd George at Glasgow on 4 February 1914. On the central question of site value rating, he announced that: "The Government have already, through their chief, accepted the principle of the rating of site values, and intend to give effect to it by legislation. . . . Some desire the whole burden to be transferred from the structure to the site. Others, on the other hand, object to any portion of the rates being put upon the site. As usual, I am to walk in the midst of the paths of judgement. Frankly I consider — having regard to the vested interests which have grown up — I regard the first proposition as impracticable. I regard the second proposition as pusillanimous. . . ."

The Urban Report of the Land Enquiry Committee eventually appeared in April 1914. The first section dealt with urban housing questions. Noting that "over three million people, according to the 1911 census, are living under over-crowded conditions, while the great majority of the working classes dwell in long and featureless streets with no gardens or adequate playgrounds for the children", the Committee made a series of proposals for government or municipal control over existing bad housing and future developments; but the Committee itself admitted that: "They offer no single panacea with a promise that it will cure all housing evils; and on this account the recommendations,
though the result of exhaustive enquiry, may fail to strike the
imagination."

The second section dealt with land acquisition. Provision was
made for a simplified procedure for compulsory acquisition by
public authorities, and for improvements in the basis of compen-
sation and the price-fixing machinery. The greatest concession
to the land nationalisers was that: "... Local authorities should
be given a general power to acquire land in advance either to use
it themselves for public purposes as necessity arises, or to lease
it to other persons."

The third section dealt with urban tenures. The Committee
agreed with "immediate and universal enfranchisement" of the
ancient copyhold tenures; but had much more difficulty in dealing
with the far more widespread problem of leaseholds. The Com-
mittee came down against straight leasehold enfranchisement,
except in a few special cases; but proposed a greater security of
tenure for the leaseholder.

The fourth, and probably the most crucial, section dealt with
rating reform. The Committee considered, rather in the spirit
of Lloyd George's Glasgow speech, that universal site value rating
would "...in practice, involve considerable hardship in individual
cases, and would be neither just nor politic". Instead, they pro-
posed a rather strange compromise. There should be a penny rate
on all capital site values (roughly, one-twentieth of annual values)
while local authorities should have power to transfer a further
proportion to site value rating if they wished. It was further
recommended that "all the future expenditure of the Local
Authority over and above the amount which it is expending at the
time when the scheme is started, must be levied by a rate upon
site values". Rather remarkably, the Committee came out against
the simultaneous application of a national land value tax.

If we regard these proposals as essentially experimental, there
was much to be said for the approach which the Land Enquiry
Committee had taken. Power was given to those local authorities
who favoured either land nationalisation or land value taxation
to develop pilot schemes in those directions, and proceed far
beyond the national norm. There was certainly nothing which
would serve seriously to block further developments in any direc-
tion which the various bodies of land reformers and social re-
formers might later desire.

The urban proposals stirred far less interest than the rural
report had done. At the end of May, information about public reactions was sent to the Chancellor from the Area Federation organisations of the Liberal Party, and from the Central Land and Housing Council, which was managing the campaign. This last report summed up the situation: “In the North East counties, Lancashire, Eastern Counties, Devon and Cornwall, the urban campaign has gone fairly well. Nothing like so well as the rural campaign, but still it has been fairly satisfactory. But for the rest of the country, the campaign in the boroughs has been disappointing... Public attention has been so occupied with gun-running, army revolts and Parliamentary manoeuvres that it has been difficult to arouse interest on land or housing...”

The fundamental weakness of the urban report, from a political point of view, was its failure to rouse any of the groups of enthusiasts by an unambiguous commitment to their cause. A few years earlier, almost any move, however slight, in the direction of land reform would stir them all. By 1914, their sights were far higher, and they were in no mood for even temporary compromise.

The Government gave very close attention to the effect which the various land proposals were producing on the public. At the beginning of the whole Campaign, Lloyd George stated the position frankly enough to the Government Chief Whip: “The Tory Press have evidently received instructions from headquarters to talk Ulster to the exclusion of land. If they succeed we are ‘beat’, and beat by superior generalship.” The Government, after all, was not only engaged in a Land Campaign; it was also engaged in pushing the Home Rule Bill through Parliament in spite of a serious possibility that Ulster Protestants would resort to arms, and the military might refuse to suppress the revolt. If a referendum of the people of Britain could have been held, there is little doubt that they would have favoured the Government’s line on the questions of land reform and Free Trade, and the Opposition’s line on the question of Home Rule. The practical question, therefore, was whether the Government or the Opposition could stir the greater interest and excitement on its own selected issues.

The problems which confronted the Liberal Government when it spoke on land questions were bad enough; those which confronted the Conservative Opposition were even worse. The Enquiry’s rural proposals might or might not be approved in Conservative circles, but they were immensely popular among the
people who would be most affected, and it would be political suicide in the county constituencies to condemn them. One prominent MP wrote to Bonar Law, by then Leader of the Party: "It is clear to me now that in the south of England and to some extent in the west the 'Land Campaign' is going down, in fact is carrying off their feet a considerable number of Conservative labourers who have voted Conservative all their lives." 28 Only atavistic and politically embarrassing figures like E. G. Prettyman could be heard to declare that the "underpayment of the agricultural labourer was grossly exaggerated". 29 As for the urban proposals, a considerable number of Unionists had come out in favour of a greater or lesser measure of site value rating themselves — ever since Lord Balfour of Burleigh's Minority Report of 1901 — and no doubt all of their leaders were immensely relieved that the Enquiry had failed to recommend a national land value tax.

The Conservative leaders were very conscious of the threat which Liberal land reform agitation posed to their ascendancy in the rural constituencies. The secretary of Jesse Collings's Rural League wrote to a Conservative peer in 1912: "I cannot understand . . . why it is the speakers of the Unionist Party are not put in a position to do more for the Party's interest than is at present the case . . . I do not hesitate to say that unless our Party leaders come out with some bold policy of Land Reform, as well as Housing Reform, in the country districts, we shall lose very heavily indeed at the next General Election . . . I feel deeply concerned at the present apathy in the Counties, and I see no hope of overcoming it unless our Leaders come out with a policy which appeals to the country people. The one topic they understand is the Land . . ." 30

The Earl of Malmesbury upheld these views: "... The Radicals (confound them!) are always much more ready with a policy than we are. All we have ever had in the past is the great Negative Policy of an 'Anti-xxx'!" 31 Those comments, it may be noted, were written before the Liberals had even won Hanley, much less commenced the Land Campaign which made such incursions in Unionist support among the farm labourers.

In the autumn of 1913, when the Land Campaign had just begun, an influential body of Unionists — including Stanley Baldwin — wrote to the new Party Leader, Bonar Law, to the same effect: "... An attempt simply to ignore the land problem
cannot in the nature of things meet with success. . . . The ordinary Member or Candidate . . . will be compelled by the force of circumstances in the greater part of the country to give some considerable portion of his time to expounding his views on this topic . . . ." 32 Sir Arthur Steel-Maitland, Chairman of the Unionist Party Organisation, urged that a Party conference should deal with the land question; but the reaction of Lord Lansdowne was to "confess I am dismayed at the idea of introducing fresh complication into a question which is sufficiently complicated already."

Pretoman was "afraid there are great differences in the Party about Land Policy". 34 Lord Edmund Talbot, Chief Whip of the Unionist Party, appointed a joint committee of various interested bodies 35 and some recommendations emerged in the early part of 1914. Inevitably, serious difficulties were encountered over the question of agricultural wages, 36 and by the outbreak of war there was still little or nothing available or in active preparation which could possibly be called an answer to the Government's proposals. The Unionists were unable either to condemn or to accept the Liberal proposals, or, a fortiori, to devise a policy of their own which would reconcile the competing claims of various interests within their Party.

Meanwhile, the Government prepared to implement the Land Enquiry proposals. Lloyd George's 1914 Budget statement fore-shadowed a Bill to value land and improvements separately for local purposes. This proposed legislation encountered a good deal of technical difficulty, 37 but the latest plans of the Government immediately before the War were to introduce a separate Revenue Bill for that purpose in the late autumn of 1914, and to push it through Parliament in time for the Budget of 1915. The recommendation to establish a Ministry of Lands was also under active consideration, and Cabinet memoranda and proposals for a bill on the subject were being circulated in the course of 1914. 38

Then, with dramatic suddenness, came the most unnecessary and disastrous war in the history of man. The Land Campaign, along with all other questions which were likely to evoke public controversy, was thrust aside as expeditiously as possible in the interest of "national unity". By the time that war came to an end, all the apparently fixed points of politics had shifted beyond recognition. Here, the historian of the land problem finds himself rather in the position of a critic who has attended a theatre in
order to report an exciting and intricate play, and who finds himself instead recording a calamitous fire which threatens to destroy theatre, actors and audience alike.

Notes

6. Asquith at Ladybank, 5 October 1912; Lloyd George (quoted by George Lambert) at Chawleigh, 7 October 1912.
7. House of Commons, 15 October 1912.
8. C. P. Trevelyan to Lloyd George (copy), 23 October 1913. CPT 15.
9. Beauchamp to Lloyd George, 15 April 1913. LG(B) C/3/5/1.
11. Memorandum (not signed), 21 August 1913. CAB 37/116/56.
12. See, for example, Haldane to Lloyd George, 21 July 1913. LG(B) C/4/17/3.
14. *Idem*; see also Rowntree to Lloyd George, 2 December 1913. LG(B) C/2/3/56.
15. Lloyd George to Illingworth, 24 October 1913. LG(B) C/5/4/7.
17. G. Wallace Carter to Lloyd George, 28 May 1914. LG(B) C/2/4/22.
18. De Forest to Lloyd George, 11 August 1913. LG(B) C/2/2/36.
19. B. S. Rowntree to Lloyd George, 4 October 1913. LG(B) C/2/3/15.
20. J. St G. Heath to Lloyd George, 4 December 1913, LG(B) C/2/3/57.
23. Outhwaite to Lloyd George, 13 November 1913. LG(B) C/10/2/32.
24. C. P. Trevelyan to Lloyd George, 6 January 1914. LG(B) C/4/12/4.
26. G. Wallace Carter to Lloyd George, 28 May 1914. LG(B) C/2/4/22.
27. Lloyd George to Illingworth, 24 October 1913. LG(B) C/5/4/7.
28. Charles Bathurst to Bonar Law, 4 December 1913. ABL 31/1/6.
29 At Southport, 28 January 1914.
30 J. L. Green to Lord Malmesbury, 29 June 1912. ABL 26/5/1.
31 Malmesbury to Bonar Law, 5 July 1912. ABL 26/5/9.
32 Memorandum to Bonar Law, ? October 1913, from Waldorf Astor, W. J. Ashley, Stanley Baldwin, Charles Bathurst, Henry Bentinck, John W. Hills, P. Lloyd Greame, Lord Malmesbury, Leslie Scott, Edward Strutt, Christopher Turnor, Fabian Ware, Edward Wood and Maurice Woods. ABL 30/4/12.
33 Landsdowne to Bonar Law, 26 September 1913. ABL 30/3/64.
34 Pertyman to Bonar Law, 28 October 1913. ABL 30/3/64.
35 John Baird to Bonar Law, 11 July 1913; A. E. Weighall to Bonar Law, 25 September 1913. ABL 29/6/19; 30/2/24.
36 The 4th Marquis of Salisbury to Bonar Law, 18 February 1914. ABL 31/3/33.
37 See Liberal Magazine, 1914, pp. 398-403; 483.
38 See Cabinet memoranda etc., January 1914; CAB 37/118/5. June 1914; CAB 37/120/71. 5 June 1914; CAB 37/120/74.