CHAPTER TWO

WHAT IS A FUNCTIONING SOCIETY?

We do not today have a functioning industrial society. We have a magnificent technical machine for industrial production, built and run by engineers, chemists, and skilled mechanics. We have a considerably weaker but still very impressive economic machine for the distribution of industrial goods. Politically and socially, however, we have no industrial civilization, no industrial community life, no industrial order or organization. It is this absence of a functioning industrial society, able to integrate our industrial reality, which underlies the crisis of our times.

The physical reality in which live the overwhelming majority of the five hundred million people on the European and North American Continents is that of an industrial world. Few of us could live a single day without the products, services, and institutions of the industrial system. Everything in our lives which relates to the routine of living is shaped and determined by it. Most of us depend upon it directly or indirectly for our livelihood and our pleasures. Its social problems are our individual problems; its crises are direct attacks upon our individual security and our social stability; its triumphs are our proudest achievements. Western Man has become Industrial Man.

But Western society is still fundamentally pre-industrial in its social beliefs and values, its social institutions and economic instruments. It is in the last analysis a mercantile society evolved at the close of the eighteenth century. This pre-industrial society most successfully organized the physical reality of the nineteenth century. But it cannot integrate the industrial reality of today.

Man in his social and political existence must have a functioning society just as he must have air to breathe in his biological existence. However, the fact that man has
to have a society does not necessarily mean that he has it. Nobody calls the mass of unorganized, panicky, stampeding humanity in a shipwreck a "society." There is no society, though there are human beings in a group. Actually, the panic is directly due to the breakdown of a society; and the only way to overcome it is by restoring a society with social values, social discipline, social power, and social organization.

Social life cannot function without a society; but it is conceivable that it does not function at all. The evidence of the last twenty-five years of Western civilization hardly entitles us to say that our social life functioned so well as to make out a prima facie case for the existence of a functioning society.

It is of course not true that a society must grow out of the material reality around it. There can be a social organization of a physical reality on the basis of values, disciplines, ideals, conventions and powers which belong completely to another social reality. Take, for instance, Robinson Crusoe and his man Friday. Undoubtedly they had a society. Nothing is more ridiculous than the traditional view of Robinson as the isolated individualist Economic Man. He had social values, conventions, taboos, powers, etc. His society was not one developed according to the demands of life on a sub-tropical islet in the southern Pacific Ocean, but basically that of Calvinist Scotsmen developed on the cold shores of the North Atlantic. What is so marvellous in Robinson Crusoe is not the extent to which he adapted himself, but the almost complete absence of adaptation. Had he been of a different class and a different time, he would surely have dressed for dinner in the evening. Here we have a case where a successful social life was built on the values and concepts of a society quite different in its physical reality and problems from those to which it was adapted.

A society may be based on concepts and beliefs developed to organize a specific physical reality. Or it
may rest on foundations as alien to its surroundings as were those of Robinson Crusoe's society to San Juan Fernandez. But it must always be capable of organizing the actual reality in a social order. It must master the material world, make it meaningful and comprehensible for the individual; and it must establish legitimate social and political power.

The reality of the industrial system, though it grew out of the mercantile society and the market, was from the start different from, and often incompatible with, the basic assumptions on which the mercantile society rested. Yet during the entire nineteenth century the mercantile society succeeded in mastering, organizing, integrating the growing industrial reality. There was tension even in the early years. The history of the conflict between mercantile assumptions and industrial reality, between Jeffersonian policies and Hamiltonian facts, between the market and the system of industrial production, is very largely the social history of the hundred years before the first World War. During the closing years of the last century it became increasingly clear that the mercantile society was disintegrating, and that the industrial system was getting out of hand socially. But it was not until after 1918—maybe not until after 1929—that the mercantile society broke down. By now, however, it has ceased to be a functioning society.

To define what a society is, is just as impossible as to define life. We are so close to it that the basic simple characteristics disappear behind a bewildering and complex mass of details. We are also so much part of it that we cannot possibly see the whole. And finally, there is no sharp line, no point where non-life turns definitely into life, non-society definitely into society. But, although we do not know what life is, all of us know when a living body ceases to be a living body and becomes a corpse. We know
that the human body cannot function as a living body if the heart has ceased to beat or the lungs stopped breathing. As long as there is a heart-beat or a breath, there is a living body; without them there is only a corpse. Similarly the impossibility of a normative definition of society does not prevent us from understanding society functionally. No society can function as a society unless it gives the individual member social status and function, and unless the decisive social power is legitimate power. The former establishes the basic frame of social life: the purpose and meaning of society. The latter shapes the space within the frame: it makes society concrete and creates its institutions. If the individual is not given social status and function, there can be no society but only a mass of social atoms flying through space without aim or purpose. And unless power is legitimate there can be no social fabric; there is only a social vacuum held together by mere slavery or inertia.

It is only natural to ask which of these criteria is more important or which of these principles of social life comes first. This question is as old as political thinking itself. It was the basis for the first sharp cleavage in political theory, that between Plato and Aristotle, between the priority of the purpose of society and that of its institutional organization. But though hallowed by antiquity and great names, it is a meaningless question. There can be no question of primacy—neither in time nor in importance—between basic political concepts and basic political institutions. Indeed, it is the very essence of political thought and action that they have always one pole in the conceptual realm of beliefs, aims, desires, and values, and one in the pragmatic realm of facts, institutions, and organization. The one without the other is not politics. The exclusively conceptual may be sound philosophy or sound ethics; the exclusively pragmatic, sound anthropology or sound journalism. Alone, neither of them can make sound politics or, indeed, politics at all.
WHAT IS A FUNCTIONING SOCIETY?

Social status and function of the individual is the equation of the relationship between the group and the individual member. It symbolizes the integration of the individual with the group, and that of the group with the individual. It expresses the individual purpose in terms of the society, and the social purpose in terms of the individual. It thus makes comprehensible and rational individual existence from the point of the group, and group existence from that of the individual.

For the individual there is no society unless he has social status and function. Society is only meaningful if its purpose, its aims, its ideas and ideals make sense in terms of the individual's purposes, aims, ideas and ideals. There must be a definite functional relationship between individual life and group life.

This relationship might lie in an identity of purpose under which there would be no individual life other than social life, and under which the individual would have none but social aims. This was basically the position of the great Greek political philosophers, especially of Plato; and the Socratic attack against the Sophists was largely directed against an "individualist" concept of personality. The "polis" of the Socratic school is absolutely collectivist in the sense that there is no possibility of distinction between group purpose and individual purpose, group virtue and individual virtue, group life and individual life. But it is just as possible to assume no group purpose and no social life except in individual purpose and individual life—the position of the extreme, early nineteenth-century individualists.

There need not even be an assumption of identity between individual and social purposes. Indeed, one of the most rigid of all theories of functional relationship between group and individual is the class-war theory of the Marxists which assumes a permanent conspiracy of the propertyed minority against the property-less majority. Organized society in the Marxist pattern is the instrument
of oppression. And to this assumption of conflict, Marxism—otherwise discredited and disproved—owed its appeal during the Depression years; it alone seemed able to explain rationally what was happening at a time when the traditional theories of harmony between individual and social purposes could not make sense at all.

For the individual without function and status, society is irrational, incalculable and shapeless. The "rootless" individual, the outcast—for absence of social function and status casts a man from the society of his fellows—sees no society. He sees only demoniac forces, half sensible, half meaningless, half in light and half in darkness, but never predictable. They decide about his life and his livelihood without possibility of interference on his part, indeed without possibility of his understanding them. He is like a blindfolded man in a strange room, playing a game of which he does not know the rules; and the prize at stake is his own happiness, his own livelihood, and even his own life.

That the individual should have social status and function is just as important for society as for him. Unless the purpose, aims, actions and motives of the individual member are integrated with the purpose, aims, actions and motives of society, society cannot understand or contain him. The asocial, uprooted, unintegrated individual appears not only as irrational but as a danger; he is a disintegrating, a threatening, a mysteriously shadowy force. It is no coincidence that so many of the great myths—the Wandering Jew, Dr. Faustus, Don Juan—are myths of the individual who has lost or repudiated social function and status. Lack of social status and function, and absence of a functional relationship between society and individual are at the bottom of every persecution of minorities which either are without social status and function—that is, not integrated into society (like the Negro in America)—or ate
made the scapegoat for the lack of integration in society (like the Jew in Nazi Germany).

That the individual must have definite social status in society does not mean that he must have a fixed social status. To identify “definite” with “frozen” was the great mistake of the early nineteenth century Liberals such as Bentham. It was a tragic misunderstanding as it led to a social atomism which repudiated social values altogether. Of course, a society may give fixed status and function to the individual. The Hindu caste system is the expression of a definite functional relationship between the group and the individual integrating them in a religious purpose. It obtains its rationality from the religious doctrine of perpetual rebirth until complete purification. On that basis even the Untouchables have a social status and function which make society and their individual life in it meaningful to them, and their life meaningful and indeed necessary to society. It is only when this religious creed itself disintegrates that the Hindu social system loses its rationality for both, individual and society.*

On the other hand, in the society of the American frontier with its complete fluidity, the individual had just as much definite social status and function as the Untouchable or the Brahmin in the Hindu society with its absolutely rigid castes. It may even be said that no society ever succeeded as perfectly in integrating its members in a functional relationship between individual and group as the frontier of Jackson, Henry Clay or Lincoln. What counts is that the status is definite, functionally understandable and purposefully rational, and not whether it is fixed, flexible or fluid. To say that every boy has an equal chance to become president is just as much a definition of a functional relationship between group and in-

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* This is not, of course, saying that the Hindu social system grew out of the Hindu religion. It would be just as compatible with my argument if Hinduism had been "invented" as a rationalization of a system of graduated slavery imposed by a conqueror. Ours is a purely functional analysis and not a philosophy of history.
individual as to say that the individual is born only that he may try to escape being reborn in the same caste.

It will be clear from the foregoing that the type and form of the functional relationship between society and individual in any given society depend upon the basic belief of this society regarding the nature and fulfilment of man. The nature of man may be seen as free or unfree, equal or unequal, good or evil, perfect, perfectible or imperfect. The fulfilment may be seen in this world or in the next; in immortality or in the final extinction of the individual soul which the religions of the East preach; in peace or in war; in economic success or in a large family. The belief regarding the nature of man determines the purpose of society; the belief regarding his fulfilment, the sphere in which realization of the purpose is sought.

Any one of these basic beliefs about the nature and fulfilment of man will lead to a different society and a different basic functional relationship between society and the individual. Which of these beliefs is the right one, which is true or false, good or evil, Christian or anti-Christian, does not occupy us here. The point is that any one of these beliefs can be the basis for a working and workable society; that is, for one in which the individual has social status and function. And conversely, any society, regardless of the nature of its basic beliefs, can work only as long as it gives the individual a social status and function.

Legitimate power stems from the same basic belief of society regarding man's nature and fulfilment on which the individual's social status and function rest. Indeed, legitimate power can be defined as rulership which finds its justification in the basic ethos of the society. In every society there are many powers which have nothing to do with such a basic principle, and institutions which in no way are either designed or devoted to its fulfilment. In other words, there are always a great many "unfree" insti-
tutions in a free society, a great many inequalities in an equal society, and a great many shames among the saintly. But as long as that decisive social power which we call rulership is based upon the claim of freedom, equality or saintliness, and is exercised through institutions which are designed toward the fulfillment of these ideal purposes, society can function as a free, equal or saintly society. For its institutional structure is one of legitimate power.

This does not mean that it is immaterial whether non-decisive powers and institutions of a society are in contradiction to its basic principles. On the contrary, the most serious problems of politics arise from such conflicts. And a society may well feel that a non-decisive institution or power relationship is in such blatant contrast to its basic beliefs as to endanger social life in spite of its non-decisive character. The best case in point is that of the American Civil War when the chattel-slavery of the South was felt to endanger the whole structure of a free society. Yet the decisive power of ante-bellum America was undoubtedly legitimate power deriving its claim from the principle of freedom, and exercised through institutions designed and devoted to the realization of freedom. American society did thus function as a free society. It was indeed only because it functioned as such that it felt slavery as a threat.

What is the decisive power, and the decisive institutional organization in any society cannot be determined by statistical analysis.

Nothing could be more futile than to measure a society by counting noses, quoting tax receipts or comparing income levels. Decisive is a political, and that means a purely qualitative term. The English landed gentry comprised never more than a small fraction of the population; furthermore, after the rise of the merchants and manufacturers it had only a very modest share of the national wealth and income. Nevertheless, down to our times it held the decisive social power. Its institutions were the
decisive institutions of English society. Its beliefs were the basis for social life; its standards the representative standards; its way of life the social pattern. And its personality ideal, the gentleman, remained the ideal type of all society. Its power was not only decisive; it was legitimate power.

Equally, laws and constitutions will rarely, if ever, tell us where the decisive power lies. In other words, rulership is not identical with political government. Rulership is a social, political government largely a legal category. The Prussian Army between 1870 and 1914 was, for instance, hardly as much as mentioned in the Imperial German Constitution; yet it undoubtedly held decisive power and probably legitimately. The government was actually subordinated to the army, in spite of a civilian and usually antimilitaristic Parliament.

Another example is that of British "indirect rule" in certain African colonies. There the socially decisive power is within the tribes. At least in theory the government of the white man wields no social power at all; it confines itself to mere police matters designed to support and to maintain the social organization of the tribes within a loose and purely normative framework of "law and order." Yet, constitutionally, the governor and his council have absolute power.

Finally, it should be understood that legitimacy is a purely functional concept. There is no absolute legitimacy. Power can be legitimate only in relation to a basic social belief. What constitutes "legitimacy" is a question that must be answered in terms of a given society and its given political beliefs. Legitimate is a power when it is justified by an ethical or metaphysical principle that has been accepted by the society. Whether this principle is good or bad ethically, true or false metaphysically, has nothing to do with legitimacy which is as indifferent ethically and metaphysically as any other formal criterion. Legitimate power is socially functioning power; but why it functions
and to what purpose is a question entirely outside and before legitimacy.

Failure to understand this was responsible for the confusion which made "legitimism" the name of a political creed in the early nineteenth century. The European reactionaries of 1815 were, of course, absolutely within their rights when they taught that no society could be good except under an absolute monarch; to have an opinion on what is desirable or just as basis of a society is not only a right, it is a duty, of man. But they were simply confusing ethical choice with functional analysis, when they said that no society could function unless it had an absolute monarch. And they were probably wrong when they proclaimed the dogma that only absolute monarchy was legitimate. Actually, after the Napoleonic Wars, absolute monarchy was illegitimate in Europe; the dynastic principle had ceased to be a legitimate claim to decisive power. The revolutionary half century before 1815 had resulted in a change in basic beliefs which made illegitimate any but constitutionally limited government. This change may have been desirable or deplorable; but it was a fact. The Legitimists might have tried to make undone this change in beliefs. They might have maintained that it would be better for the individual and for society to have an illegitimate absolute rule than a legitimate constitutional one. Or they might have invoked a "right of resistance," of secession or of revolution. The only basis on which their claim could not be based politically was that of legitimacy.

The functional analysis as to what is legitimate power does not in any way prejudge the ethical question of the individual's right or duty to resist what he considers pernicious power. Whether it is better that society perish than that justice perish is a question outside and before functional analysis. The same man who maintains most vigorously that society can function only under a legitimate power may well decide that society is less of a value
than certain individual rights or beliefs. But he cannot decide, as the Legitimists did, that his values and beliefs are the socially accepted values and beliefs because they ought to be.

Illegitimate power is a power which does not derive its claim from the basic beliefs of the society. Accordingly, there is no possibility to decide whether the ruler wielding the power is exercising it in conformity with the purpose of power or not; for there is no social purpose. Illegitimate power cannot be controlled; it is by its nature uncontrollable. It cannot be made responsible since there is no criterion of responsibility, no socially accepted final authority for its justification. And what is unjustifyable cannot be responsible.

For the same reason, it cannot be limited. To limit the exercise of power is to fix the lines beyond which power ceases to be legitimate; that is, ceases to realize the basic social purpose. And if power is not legitimate to begin with, there are no limits beyond which it ceases to be legitimate.

No illegitimate ruler can possibly be a good or wise ruler. Illegitimate power invariably corrupts; for it can be only "might," never authority. It cannot be a controlled, limited, responsible, or rationally determinable power. And it has been an axiom of politics—ever since Tacitus in his history of the Roman emperors gave us one case study after another—that no human being, however good, wise or judicious, can wield uncontrolled, irresponsible, unlimited or rationally not determinable power without becoming very soon arbitrary, cruel, inhuman and capricious—in other words, a tyrant.

For all these reasons a society in which the socially decisive power is illegitimate power cannot function as a society. It can only be held together by sheer brute force—tyranny, slavery, civil war. Of course, force is the ultimate safeguard of every power; but in a functioning society it is not more than a desperate remedy for exceptional and
rare diseases. In a functioning society power is exercised as authority, and authority is the rule of right over might. But only a legitimate power can have authority and can expect and command that social self-discipline which alone makes organized institutional life possible. Illegitimate power, even if wielded by the best and the wisest, can never depend upon anything but the submission to force. On that basis a functioning, institutional organization of social life cannot be built. Even the best tyrant is still a tyrant.

What have we proved so far? That a society cannot function unless it gives the individual member social status and function, and unless its socially decisive power is legitimate power. This may be called a "pure theory of society." Like all "pure theories" it is exclusively formal. It says nothing about the contents of a society, about freedom, religion, equality, justice, individual rights, progress, peacefulness and all the other values of social life. And to think, as a great many social efficiency engineers think today, that functioning is all that matters in social life is a complete misunderstanding of the limits and the importance of sheer efficiency. In itself functional efficiency is nothing unless we know the answer to the question: efficiency to what purpose and at what price?

I cannot dissociate myself sharply enough from the relativists to whom every society appears equally good, provided it functions. But I am just as opposed to the extremists on the other side who brush aside all questions of function and efficiency, and who refuse to consider anything but basic beliefs and ideas. It seems to me not only that this group—we might call them the Absolutists—refuse to see that basic values can only be effective in a functioning society. They also refuse to see that there is only one alternative to a functioning society: the dissolution of society into anarchic masses.

Perhaps the greatest fallacy of our age is the myth of the masses which glorifies the amorphous, societyless, dis-
integrated crowd. Actually, the masses are a product of social decomposition and a rank poison.

The danger does not lie in a "revolt of the masses" as Mr. Ortega y Gasset thought. Revolt is, after all, still a form of participation in social life, if only in protest. The masses are completely incapable of any active social participation which presupposes social values and an organization of society. The danger of the masses lies precisely in this inability to participate, in their apathy, cynical indifference, and complete despair. Since they have no social status and function, society to them is nothing but a demonic, irrational, incomprehensible threat. Since they have no basic beliefs which could serve as basis for legitimate power, any legitimate authority appears to them as tyrannical and arbitrary. They are therefore always willing to follow an irrational appeal, or to submit to an arbitrary tyrant if only he promises a change. As social outcasts the masses have nothing to lose—not even their chains. Being amorphous, they have no structure of their own which would resist an arbitrary tyrannical attempt to shape them. Without beliefs, they can swallow anything provided it is not a social order. In other words, the masses must always fall prey to the demagogue or the tyrant who seeks power for power’s sake. They can only be organized by force, in slavery and in negation. And they must be thus organized unless they can be reintegrated into a functioning society. Any society which cannot prevent the development of masses is doomed. That it is the fault of the society which fails to integrate its members rather than that of the masses, which are the unwilling product of social failure, does not change the pernicious character of the amorphous, basically anarchic masses.