



Reading *The Fountainhead*: The Missing Self in Ayn Rand's Ethical Individualism

Author(s): Roxanne J. Fand

Source: *College English*, May 2009, Vol. 71, No. 5 (May 2009), pp. 486-505

Published by: National Council of Teachers of English

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/25652987>

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at <https://about.jstor.org/terms>



National Council of Teachers of English is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *College English*

JSTOR

Reading *The Fountainhead*: The Missing Self in Ayn Rand's Ethical Individualism

Roxanne J. Fand

As a teacher who commiserates with students' struggles to carve out a self-respecting individuality, I have pondered how to navigate the American mythology of individualism that pervades our social ethic—from the notion of rugged individualism in the nineteenth century to the consumer narcissism prevailing in today's corporate-driven culture. Democracy and capitalism are assumed to be the twin pillars of individualism, upholding the doctrine of equal and unalienable rights for all. Yet the principles of majority rule and individual rights conflict within democracy, while private profit and fair public trading conflict within capitalism. Furthermore, egalitarian democracy conflicts with the meritocracy espoused by competitive capitalism. These apparent inconsistencies are compounded when self-interest seems to collide with altruistic religious and secular ideologies and, most of all, with experience that does not fit ideological templates. The result is confused ethics.

Part of the ethical confusion about individualism lies in its opposing principles of equality and difference. On one hand, equality treats individuals generically as members of the human species with characteristics and rights in common, holding their differences in abeyance. On the other hand, capitalist individualism validates rewards based on competing individual differences, which are easily related to one's immediate subjective experience of being unique and apart from others. Equality, by contrast, is an abstract principle derived from cumulative experiences of empathy or solidarity that are extended inductively to all of humanity and thus harder to realize.

In the classroom, confusion about equality may take the form of a relativist self-esteem, which holds that all opinions are created equal and that students have a

Roxanne J. Fand is assistant professor of English at the University of Hawaii at Manoa. She is the author of *The Dialogic Self: Reconstructing Subjectivity in Woolf, Lessing, and Atwood* and "Margaret Atwood's Robber Bride: The Dialogic Moral of a Nietzschean Fairy Tale." Fand's professional interests center on identity and culture theory, feminist-dialogic criticism, and women writers.

College English, Volume 71, Number 5, May 2009

“right” to theirs without a need for evidence or reasoning to support them. As for their individuality, many students ironically base it on variations of conformity, such as body piercing or other “lifestyle” fads. Less superficial, but still tying individuality to group conformity, is racial and ethnic identity. Beyond that, individualism conforms to the broad cultural imperative of material success through cutthroat competition. That competitive self, combined with a “self-esteem” that presumes to deserve gratification as an equal right, may make it easy to justify cheating on the cynical grounds that others would do likewise.

Quite a few students disdain the lures of the mass-media-driven corporatized culture, seeing through crude attempts to “interpellate” them (to use Louis Althusser’s term), and there are plenty of honest students who earn their grades. Personal integrity and community responsibility are strong countercurrents. But even thoughtful students may find it difficult to tread an independent path through minefields of rhetoric when honor and altruism are trumpeted by power brokers. Corporate elites hope to “reduce government” to a function devoted to their interests, by replacing government responsibility for “promoting the general welfare”—a goal enshrined in the Constitution—with isolated individual volunteerism and philanthropy. Their strategy is to divide and conquer: that is, to divide average people from one another, to keep them from collective action, and to divide each person’s mind between self-aggrandizement and guilt over being the sole cause of one’s misfortunes, regardless of circumstances.

I have sought to review my own positions on these ideologies of individualism by returning as a teacher to an author whose work has bothered me for many years. I could not dismiss Ayn Rand out of hand, as many of my literary and leftist friends did, because Rand’s novels resonated with Emerson’s “Self-Reliance,” which had inspired my youth. Her work perennially appeals to the young, because her fiction affirms the value of individual self-realization in a passionately engaging and thought-provoking way. But her knack of presenting her truth compellingly is all the more tantalizing for the ways in which it goes wrong.

Rand was rejected by the literary and academic establishment for her propagandistic writing; nevertheless, her fiction led, in her heyday, to a cult following, which prompted her to write volumes on the philosophy of “Objectivism” that underpinned her fiction. In order to understand why her idea of “the virtue of selfishness” appealed to so many (including me), despite myself, I revisited Rand’s work by trying out a novel of hers in my Literature and Popular Culture course. I chose *The Fountainhead* for a class that was dominated by English majors—not only because it is the shorter of her two most famous novels but also because, more so than *Atlas Shrugged*, her *magnum opus*, it focuses on personal career aspirations that are relevant to students.

In preparing and teaching *The Fountainhead*, I wondered whether I might influence the class excessively if I presented my concept of selfhood, which encompasses

Rand's virtue of selfishness yet retains the altruism that she dismisses. I also did not want to advocate explicitly an alternative theory in class because of my cultural difference from most University of Hawai'i students, which might elicit resistance. As a minority Caucasian, I was aware of some prejudice—especially against Pidgin-suppressing English teachers in the students' past—in the current renaissance not only of Hawaiian culture, but of all of the Asian-Pacific-Portuguese cultures that are amalgamated with pride in the local Pidgin-speaking community. Another aspect of my cultural dissonance was being a woman in authority, a position that is resisted by males from those traditional cultures.

Thus, in conducting the course, I lectured only minimally on Rand's theory, much of which her novel explicitly states and implicitly exemplifies. I preferred to emphasize egalitarian class dialogue, in keeping with the theory of a dialogic self. Students responded to the reading in small groups that fed into all-class discussions, in addition to posting weekly letters on an anonymous feedback website and commenting on one another's letters and remarks. I could enter the conversation disguised as a peer, modeling Socratic-style questioning of their ideas.

Before reading *Fountainhead*, the class read excerpts from Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* and Emerson's "Self-Reliance" for historical perspectives on individualism. *Song of Myself* introduced a debate between egocentrism and other-centeredness in Whitman, to set up the selfishness-altruism dichotomy. The readings following *Fountainhead* included two other long novels, Doris Lessing's *Four-Gated City* and Ralph Ellison's *Invisible Man*, to contrast complex modern protagonists with Rand's one-dimensional hero.

Here I critique Rand's theory by discussing 1) how *The Fountainhead* both carries out and undermines it; 2) how the class responded to the novel; and 3) how a dialogic theory of self corresponds to classroom dialogue and restores what's missing from Rand's ethical individualism.



Rand's insight is to ground the morality of individualism in the instinct for survival in all living entities and in the particular mode of survival of the human species: the ability to conceptualize in higher-order thinking and thus make rational choices, not just automatically react to sensory stimuli as other animals presumably do (*Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology*). Natural human rights, she asserts, require the freedom to make those choices for a purposeful life. The intertwined primary rights of life and liberty are not just the means of mere physical survival but also the means of a happiness that is more than simply wish fulfillment in avoiding pain or seeking pleasure. The purpose is survival as "man *qua* man," she avers, which fulfills the self by employing one's rationality productively as an achievement (*Virtue of Selfishness* 28).

Rand's glorification of human productivity translates into technological control of nature as humanity's supreme achievement—by obeying its laws as objectively and scientifically as one knows how, of course. For her, the pursuit of happiness entails a self-esteem that is founded on coping rationally with the absolute existence of the material world, which is why she calls her philosophy "Objectivism." Her exemplar hero, Howard Roark, as an architect, becomes the embodiment of her anthropocentric ethic. The novel opens with Roark confronting a magnificent landscape, only to be inspired by its potential for him to exploit: "These rocks, he thought [. . .] are here for me; waiting for the drill, the dynamite and my voice" (4). Later, a character who shares Roark's view remarks, "When I look at the ocean, I feel the greatness of man. I think of man's magnificent capacity that created this ship to conquer all that senseless space" (463).

Rand's view is very different from the attitude of Thoreau, an admirer of nature whose highest good was not to produce from it, but simply to reach spiritual epiphanies in contemplating it. That view would be irrational mystical subjectivity to Rand, who disdains such sources of joy. Roark's only respect for nature is to create edifices that aesthetically harmonize with the landscape and that take maximum advantage of the climate in which they are set. This is the major factor in the "objectivity" of his original designs.

Philosophers Douglas Den Uyl and Douglas Rasmussen consider Rand's theory a contribution to ethics, because, instead of defining morality as exclusively centered on others, in a concern traditionally based on supernatural fiat, she bases morality on the teleological necessity of individual self-interest as a living organism ("Life, Teleology" 66–68). In sum, one's existence creates a primary moral imperative for "the virtue of selfishness." This could also be encapsulated in the first of three related rhetorical questions posed by the ancient Jewish sage, Rabbi Hillel: "If I am not for myself, who will be?"

Hillel's second question, "But if I am for myself alone, what am I?," hints not only at the self's relation to others but also at the very constitution of one's self-consciousness. Rand affirms that, because human consciousness exists only at the level of the individual, each rational person deals with other people according to how rational they are. Personal relations are not just a material quid pro quo, but include higher goods she calls "spiritual," defined as "pertaining to one's consciousness," and "moral," which derives the rights of others from one's own (*Virtue* 28–29). Accordingly, the rational person is capable of honoring and even loving another according to the degrees of joy that one takes in the relationship.

The master of nature is likewise the master of his or her own response to others; in Roark's case, "indifferent," as Rand characterizes him, to how "the world whips [him] with its displeasure" for his nonconformity (Emerson 24). The plot is driven by the conflict between society and this supremely self-possessed male hero.

Rand claims to write primarily for her own satisfaction in visualizing her ideal man, as he deflects and inevitably triumphs over the slings and arrows of a fallen world of lost integrity. Secondarily, she aims at readers who recognize her values (*Romantic Manifesto* 161–62).

Rand claims that her fiction is Romantic in that its elements adhere to internal necessity—not to traditional rules or imposed didacticism, but to characters operating out of who they are, illuminated by the author’s vision (*Romantic Manifesto* 17–29). Rand’s vision, however, sneaks in didacticism by creating her ideal hero as being superimposed on a bleak naturalistic world. The inevitable plot flows from Roark’s right choices, antagonists’ wrong choices, and various shades of confused choices in between. Roark is the least-developed major character, having sprung fully formed from his author, like Athena from the head of Zeus, remaining fixed throughout.¹ Students in my class who valued character development considered him to be unrealistic. All that we know of Roark’s history is that, when he was a boy, his working-class father died and he had to fend for himself. He thus learned to make his own choices in following the building trades and aspiring to become an architect. There is no mention of a mother to ameliorate his all-masculine qualities. Rand privileges a hard, linear physique, as she does linear thinking. Roark is all lean angularity, with only a shock of wild orange hair to symbolize his passion for what he does.

Roark’s opening exultation is to celebrate his expulsion from a renowned school of architecture that was dominated by traditionalists whom he calls “second-handers,” mere imitators. Because they dictate artistic taste, the only teachers that he respects and who respect him as competent are those of the engineering faculty, who do not claim aesthetic credentials. Rand assumes that her aesthetic values are as objective as her moral values and that those who think for themselves somehow agree on taste. Glad to be done with the traditionalists, Roark turns to a modernistic mentor whose buildings he admires for their original designs, an architect who once achieved fame but who was drummed out of further success by the establishment. Only those who share one’s independent philosophy are able to influence one, as Emerson also implies: “A great man is coming to eat at my house. I do not wish to please him; I wish that he should wish to please me” (26). Roark is pleased enough by his mentor to learn from him.

Rand does try to humanize her heroes. Even with the right values, Rand’s noble characters are capable of honest error, as Roark admits while discarding draft after draft of “awful stuff” to perfect his designs (629). Yet, when requested to design on the spur of the moment, he produces swift masterpieces, at least according to those who recognize quality. And, although he humbly concedes his lack of “people skills” (606), this is only Rand’s way of ennobling him—those with such skills are invariably portrayed as manipulators. He is clearly a task-oriented person, not a “people” person; he ignores people in their presence, making them uncomfortable by his utter

disregard of them: “His face was closed like the door of a safety vault; things locked in safety vaults are valuable; men did not care to feel that” (52). More than disregard, Rand endows him with “a contemptuous mouth [. . .] the mouth of an executioner or a saint” (4). Rand’s favorite line in the book (which she uncharacteristically admitted was her husband’s suggestion) is Roark’s response to the villainous Ellsworth Toohey’s query, “Why don’t you tell me what you think of me?” Roark replies, “But I don’t think of you” (401). Because most of the students in my class were from Asian-Pacific backgrounds in which family, community solidarity, and “Aloha” are respected as much as—or more than—individualism, many felt uncomfortable about Roark’s unsociability, even empathizing more with the discomfort of those whom Roark ignores than with him. Cultural “face-saving” is an equal-opportunity contract, modified only by status codes, as in deferring to elders, not by ad hoc individualists.

Most of my students admired Roark, however, for his single-minded tenacity in pursuing his career, even though his bitter, alcoholic old mentor tries to discourage him from enduring a fate similar to his own. However, some were skeptical of Roark’s refusing a tempting contract that merely requires him to include some traditional detail in his design: the refusal forces him out of business and temporarily into common hard labor. They could not identify with someone so idealistic that he can’t compromise on details. My suggestion that Roark is a conscientious artist whose work requires the same integrity as his own self did not convince them. This issue raised questions of how compromise may not be a violation of one’s integrity and of how far one is willing to go to protect that integrity, which depends on one’s priorities. Rand is right, I think, to insist that only the person who consciously works out values is qualified to determine when basic principles are non-negotiable and when mere bargaining chips can be negotiated (*Virtue* 85–88). When students had other priorities than Roark’s, most could not explain them, so I pressed them to make their hierarchy of values clear. For me, negotiating with one another their responses was part of their own dialogic self-process. Many maintained that whatever they may say or do is valid because it is honestly felt, regardless of reasoning. Identifying the values behind their feelings was harder than conforming to “anything goes.” Rand’s position is that the more people take the easy road of undisciplined self-interest through mindless conformity or nonconformity, the more they become stereotypes and not genuine self-advocates. The students who struggled between conforming to the spurious equality of “doing your own thing” and to reasoning the merits of their views—such as a student who was coming to terms with his homosexuality—seem to grow in genuine self-esteem during the term.

Rand’s respect for the self-reliant entails contempt for second-handers. Both are derived from placing control over one’s inner life fully within the individual. Her heroes are those who do not choose to feel self-pity. If they suffer from circumstances beyond their control, they are stoic. Any adversity that is a result of their

own failure is taken as a learning experience. She dismisses the Christian adage, “Judge not, that ye be not judged,” as the weak stroking the weak, preferring her stern code of “Judge and be prepared to be judged” (*Virtue* 91). There is nothing wrong with this view if the information by which to judge specific acts is reliable. But blanket judgments about people ignore how much is determined by circumstances and how much more there is to the human heart and mind than “Objectivists” dream of in their rational pretensions to knowledge. This fact cautions us to reserve judgment and to consider the potential of even apparent “losers.”

Rand legitimizes only emotions that flow from one’s prior rational and consciously conceptualized value system, claiming to dismantle the mind-body dichotomy. In this view, self-interest may justify giving up one’s life for those whom one loves rationally and therefore passionately. As Emerson also affirms, “There is a class of persons to whom by all spiritual affinity I am bought and sold; for them I will go to prison, if need be” (22). I agree that, just as self-love is centered on one’s concrete body-mind, love for others flows out of contact with concrete beings, not humanity in the abstract. But what is missing from Randian love, which is based only on exalting the other for rational qualities, is love that includes sympathy, empathy, or compassion, even for oneself, which she translates into disgust and pity for weakness.

Even though there is some justification for not wallowing in one’s own or another’s misery, Rand overlooks evidence that such feelings as empathy spring up spontaneously, even in young children, who are presumed to be self-centered and not yet socialized, but who are quick to sense others’ feelings when confronted by what Emmanuel Levinas calls the compelling “face of the other.” The contagion of laughter and tears bypasses rational control, yet may serve survival. Precisely because self-interest enables one to identify with another’s emotional state, imaginative literature about others can be moving. Rand intuitively knew this when she wrote fiction first and then theory, although her theory intrudes heavy-handedly into her fiction.

Some students admitted to identifying with the incompetent Peter Keating, the main second-hander, who is better developed as a character and thus more interesting and human than Roark. He has genuine inclinations to become a graphic artist, rather than an architect, and to marry his simple, unassuming sweetheart Katie, who loves and accepts him for whatever he is—in contrast to his mother, whose ambitions for him steer him against his heart in both career and marriage. Probably more students than care to admit it feel pressured by parents to choose careers that are more socially ambitious than what their talents best suit them for. So they are confused about where self-interest lies, which Keating’s contrast with Roark is supposed to clarify. However, immigrants and first-generation college students in my class had no such conflict, because their parents’ ambitions for them to achieve “the American dream” became tantamount to their own.

Although Keating's descent into vile actions to get ahead loses students' sympathy, he does not become an unalloyed second-hander. He continues to be plagued by inner conflict between his true impulses and the dictates of society that his mother embodies. Even later, when he ineffectually tries to redeem himself by attempting art, some students sympathized with him—in contrast to Roark's condescending pity—especially because Roark “enabled” Peter to succeed in the wrong career by allowing him to claim credit for Roark's designs. Rand implies that Roark's complicity in plagiarism (with indifference to Peter's choices) is justified as self-interest in seeing his plans materialize. However, Roark is justly punished: these projects turn out to be as compromised as those that he refused—out of integrity—to execute.

Had Roark been a doctor dedicated to his patients' health, his integrity could still have been supported without it making him aloof. Besides having technical expertise, a successful doctor would be more mindful of the doctor-patient relationship, as well as the psychosocial factors of his patients' situation, and could be effective by listening rationally and empathically to their perceptions. But Rand's idea of compassion, like Emerson's, focuses on an exemplar who inspires others to self-reliance, as happens with Roark's benign effect on a hostile crowd that is ready to condemn him in court. His fearless equanimity arouses their sense that “no hatred was possible to him. [. . .] And for that instant, each man was free—free enough to feel benevolence for every other man in the room” (709–10). Here—in contrast to everywhere else in the novel—Roark's indifference allows people to identify with, rather than feel alienated from him.

Surpassing Roark's unsociability is his heroine Dominique's antisociability. A very beautiful, rich young woman, she has been alienated by the world of second-hander conformists like her father, a renowned architect alumnus from the school that expelled Roark. For her own amusement, she writes a column whose subtle satire falls below the radar of her targets, and she specializes in whimsical unpredictability, to the vexation of her father. Students disliked Dominique and were perplexed by her behavior. First, she marries the pathetic Keating in a fit of masochism and then divorces him only to marry someone she regards as even worse, the ruthless tycoon and playboy, Gail Wynand, who owns the tabloid for which she writes. Still worse, she tries to destroy Roark's reputation in her column, writing about how his work does not meet the current criteria of good architecture, which is her way of mocking society for being unable to appreciate his superior work. He is simply too good for this world. That's how she would save him from it, as she is saving herself—by the martyrdom of enduring with disdain the worst that it can inflict, as her active choice, instead of passively at others' hands. Even when Dominique becomes Roark's open ally and returns to him as a lover, most students considered it too late for her to be redeemed in their eyes, but not in Roark's. Although some students gave Dominique credit for modifying her perverse behavior, her heroic stature was lost on the class.

Rand has said that Dominique is like herself when she's in a bad mood (Gladstein 41). Beyond this, Rand's identification with Dominique represents femininity with ambivalence. Dominique's figure is a masculinized angularity like Roark's, only with a slender "fragility" that he lacks. Rand often gives ample figures to pathetic characters, suggesting the bovine passivity of the average housewife, whereas her heroines are liberated from domestic servitude, being highly competent and productive in the public sphere. However, no matter how high their position, they are always dominated by the heroes' superior masculine power. Rand rejected feminism and said that she would not vote for a woman as president because she believed that a woman must always have a man to look up to ("About a Woman President"), which Susan Love Brown shows is inconsistent with self-reliance.²

Rand's principles of self-reliance, rationality, and noncoercion are most violated in having the female want to be sexually dominated.³ Feminists object most vociferously to Rand's depiction of sexuality as a kind of rape (Brownmiller). The sexual encounters in her fiction are violent and brutal, with the heroine nobly struggling against the physical coercion of the man, only to surrender in orgasmic fulfillment of her feminine nature, i.e., being vanquished. Although Roark also acknowledges Dominique's power to make him suffer when she chooses to marry others, he is stoic and respects her need to prove her independence from him, tolerating her misguided way of being true to herself.

Because Rand gives women freedom to make their own choices, some feminists consider Rand's larger, ungendered claim of primary moral obligation to oneself as her better message to women, one that illustrates the true feminist agenda. Sharon Presley, for example, citing psychological studies to support Rand, argues that traits such as self-respect, personal responsibility, self-reliance, rationality, and originality do indeed correlate with respect for others. She concludes that patriarchy creates a false dichotomy between altruism—an ethic of caring imposed on and assumed by women who unduly sacrifice themselves—and the self-aggrandizing, exploitative egotism that is encouraged in men. Presley maintains that both women and men who respect themselves, presumably without superiority complexes, are better able to respect others as well.

Beyond interpersonal relationships, Rand's relation of the individual to society is problematic. One problem is that basing morality strictly on the rational individual seems to depend on each one granting equal rights to others on an ad hoc basis, not as a general social contract agreed on by all, as an "all for one and one for all" arrangement. Yet Rand endorses such a social contract (*Virtue* 28–31). Eric Mack solves that contradiction, suggesting that if *all* internalized the social contract, everyone's self-interest would be served (157–59). Thus, Rand's rational individual could logically extend equal rights to all humans, based on their rational potential.

Although she deplores the prevailing lack of actualization of that potential and has contempt rather than respect for the masses, Rand envisions the possibility of a free, noncoercive, and just society, as depicted near the end of *Atlas Shrugged*, calling it “capitalism” but admitting that it has never existed. This small group of self-and-other-respecting individuals has dropped out of corrupt society to live as an informal meritocracy. Although members may compete, they lack the ruthless competitiveness of social Darwinism (also supposedly modeled on objective nature), because Rand denies conflicts of interest among truly rational persons. For example, those of lesser ability do not envy, but rather admire those of superior achievement as deserving of higher rewards, and, instead of feeling inferior, they take pride in their own more humble but self-reliant contribution to fair trading (*Virtue* 57–67).

Rand’s mini-utopia in *Atlas* seems akin to that of Adam Smith, the father of free market theory, who explicitly claims that a *laissez-faire* approach leads to “a universal opulence [that] extends itself to the lowest ranks of the people” (22), paraphrased as “a rising tide lifts all boats,” as a result of countless self-interested transactions guided by an “invisible hand” (*Wealth of Nations* 456). Smith himself, unlike his merely “self-interested” players, explicitly promulgates a macroeconomic vision that transcends their microeconomic view, regarding the role of government to promote the “general good,” not “partial interests” (472).

Rand, however, considers the notion of “the general good” too vague to be enforceable or too close to majority dictatorship, which violates the exacting justice of free exchange—whereby individuals make decisions based on their values and risks, not on those of others; thus, “the general good” could not entail the protection of everyone’s rights (*Capitalism* 20–21). Although Smith and Rand concede the necessity of a minimal government for protection from domestic miscreants and foreign aggressors in a larger society, Rand’s utopia in *Atlas* dispenses with government altogether. She rejects all doctrines that subjugate rational self-determination to the will of an abstract superior authority such as God or the collective.

Rand’s opposition to collectivism is derived from her bitter experience growing up in Russia in the years following the Revolution of 1917, when the Communists persecuted her bourgeois Jewish family. Born in 1905, she spent her youth as an intellectual loner, alienated from society and critical of both communist ideology and the mystique of Russian Orthodoxy from her atheist perspective. The only mystique that she followed was that of stories of heroism, such as in nineteenth-century romantic novels, which instilled in her the desire to write. Her ideas about rational individualism were deeply entwined with her “sense of life” that gloried in the heroic, self-made individual in early Hollywood movies. Her passionate *jouissance* and reverence for human potential underpinned the ethical philosophy that she had formed early in life—never modifying it, but making a virtue of absolute certainty.

When she realized her dream and went to America in 1926, she changed her name from Alissa Rosenbaum to Ayn Rand and soon found a job as a Hollywood scriptwriter, married an American, and obtained American citizenship (Brandon and Brandon 149–239; Gladstein 7–23).

In America, Rand developed her critique of capitalism, but her analysis inverted Marx's. Even though they both abhor parasitism and exploitation, Rand accuses capitalism and political conservatism of being corrupted by both religious and socialist altruism, instead of allowing individuals to thrive according to their ability. Marx's "To each according to his need" could be rephrased by Rand as "To each according to his merit." She maintains that the right to life entails the right to own, i.e., control, one's means and ends of production. She would add the right to "property" to the Declaration of Independence.⁴ For Rand, there is no worse evil than the collective exploitation of the productive individual.

Rand is, however, more egalitarian than Marx—by recognizing that both productivity and parasitism can arise in any class. She depicts working-class characters that are worthy of Roark's friendship—such as the construction worker Mike—and villains from all classes. There are low-class parasites that middle-class social workers "enable," and high-class parasites, such as stock traders. Marx, by contrast, sets up a class war between noble proletarians and evil capitalists.⁵

Both Rand and Marx hew to the facts of history as objective evidence of their theories, but both founder on their misreading of history. Rand's view has been somewhat vindicated in that the competitive free market has generated more vitality and innovation, unlike what results from top-down, centrally planned socialist societies. Where she goes wrong is in ascribing exploitation to altruism rather than to the abuse of altruistic rhetoric by those—like her villains, Ellsworth Toohey and Gail Wynand—who cynically prey on the guilt and fear of the people. From her observation of such exploitation throughout history, she assumes that altruism *per se* violates the moral claim of self-interest by requiring total self-abnegation. By reversing the binary opposition of selfishness and altruism, totalizing these terms, and attaching them to specific ideologies or persons that she glorifies or demonizes, she contradicts her own observations that power seeking may distort any ideology or corrupt any individual. In particular, her critique of real-life capitalism ignores how her own ideology of self-interest and free markets is cynically abused by opportunists who dupe the unwary into thinking that they are fulfilling their own ends and that the market is free, when it is fulfilling only the corrupted self-interest of exploiters who have rigged it. The concentration of wealth and power in private hands exerts as much centralized control through a bought-off government as does any oligarchic, theocratic, or socialist bureaucracy. The average worker may be exploited whether the government owns business (under socialism) or business owns the government (under corporate capitalism). The appeal to individual self-interest

or altruism depends for legitimacy on the merits of the situation, not on any particular dogma. Rand would claim that perceiving the merits of the situation is precisely what can be done only by the individual mind and that the collective mind does not exist. However, the collective mind simply consists of ideas that are shared among individuals. Although she believes that individuals can learn from one another, she disregards synergy and condemns collaboration as unworkable.

She especially repudiates “Linguistic Analysis” because she thinks that it makes language—and thus thinking—arbitrary and nonreferential (*Introduction* 77–78). Moreover, without ever mentioning deterministic structuralism or post-structuralist indeterminacy, she would object to them, because, either way, individual agency seems to disappear, nullifying any ethical control or responsibility of the individual. Rand assumes that she is an iconoclast taking an end run around indoctrination by revising definitions of selfishness, altruism, and capitalism—unaware that she is practicing deconstruction, producing just another set of inevitably fissured concepts. One’s only recourse is to spot the gaps and inconsistencies in any conceptual framework, including one’s own.

Having hardened her philosophy in cement and achieved a cultlike following as the guru of the school of Objectivism, Rand vilified those who disagreed with her. Sometimes she even “excommunicated” close followers who deviated from her exact line—without seriously considering what they were claiming. In her need for certainty, Rand became as locked into her conceptual framework as one can be in any dogmatic discourse, denying the very independence of thinking to others that she claimed for herself (Walker). Her arrogance reminds us that human excess may lead to error and injustice on the part of an individual or a collective. If reality exceeds conceptualization, so can conceptualization exceed reality. The human capacity for excess invades all utopias, including Rand’s and Marx’s. This propensity is exactly why humanity is capable of immorality, not simply amorality as the Social Darwinists would prefer to think. In other species, killing, theft, and deception are justified and balanced ecologically by being limited to basic survival, but humans may destroy other people, other species, and themselves unjustifiably and thus, as a social species, require a moral social contract that is individually validated. That is why one must examine oneself first in order to deal with wrongs in the rest of society.

The main problem with locating rationality in the single mind alone is Rand’s assumption that the objective world external to consciousness is accurately accessible to consciousness (*Introduction* 55). Although she gives language and socialization a role in individual concept formation, she assumes that social influences contaminate more than assist that process, because groupthink enforces conformity—as if collective experience has little rational basis (*Introduction* 19–21). Crucially, she does not explain how one’s process of interpreting sensory data as percepts and con-

cepts through society's language can allow one to stand outside social influences. Considering that even creatures in the wild find perceptions not only accurate but also deceptive—presumably interpreting sensory data only through collective evolutionary experience, i.e., instinct—how much more uncertain are human perceptions, additionally mediated by concepts? Rand's mistake is not recognizing that one can accept as axiomatic the existence of the world and still realize that, in a sense, it is illusory because it is dependent on a sensory apparatus that is mediated. Rand fears skepticism, which she primarily blames on Immanuel Kant, for abdicating all contact with reality in pure subjectivity. However, by accepting uncertainty and illusoriness, one may be more motivated to test percepts and concepts rationally for greater accuracy, including consulting others' observations.

Self is the key concept that suffers from Rand's need for certainty. I agree with her that the human mind registers not only external phenomena, but also locates the center of observation, the actively conscious subject, in one's own individuality. But the crucial role of society in facilitating a child's cognitive awareness of self, by naming individuals and mirroring self-awareness, is not acknowledged by Rand. In her theory, once the self signifies the child's individuality, it remains constant in that function as a conceptual "unit" of abstraction—an end-product of the cognitive process, not a unified ontological "essence" (*Introduction* 52, 56, 83).⁶ Assuming that the self is a constant unit of identity, operating almost independently of the social imagination, Rand disregards the variable contents of individual self-images. The contents of that "unit," the attributes of one's specific self-concept, change as one ages and depend on internalized experiences, including social influences. By reducing the human mind to a rationality that is relatively free of social influence, Rand oversimplifies the complexity of the human psyche—on physical, emotional, intellectual, and spiritual levels, all interconnected with others. For example, she repeatedly dismisses intuition as the workings of a purely subjective imagination that is disconnected from objective reality, instead of recognizing its correspondence to her idea of how the subconscious works as an "integrating mechanism" at a "preconceptual" stage in touch with that objective reality. This subliminal (intuitive) grasp of reality is one's "sense of life," which is necessary to produce art (*Romantic Manifesto* 31).

The extensive development of her chief villains, both consciously self-directed, belie Rand's simplistic self-formulation. Ellsworth Toohey is the diabolic archvillain of the novel, who, unlike the hapless Keating, does not act simply out of weakness in response to social pressure. When we first meet Toohey, he appears kindly and humble, with even an impressive reputation that precedes him. But, in Toohey's history as a child with a deformed and sickly body, he develops a devious mind—attributable to the martyr complex of his mother, who dotes on his disability as if it made him morally superior. Her twisted notion inculcates his contempt for attractive, healthy, and capable peers, whom he secretly envies and determines to vilify by

clever plotting, while appearing saintly himself. Hence, his villainy is not formed in a vacuum.

In adulthood, he continues his ambition to tear down others who are capable, such as Roark, preaching an ideal of self-effacement to eliminate anyone whose individual achievement might challenge his power. As a popular writer and speaker masterfully manipulating public opinion, Toohey doesn't preach the ideology of "getting ahead" that Keating's mother follows, but that of socialism, which was on the rise during the period that the novel depicts, from the 1920s to the 1940s. Toohey's goal is not mere materialistic success, but power over other minds, which he reveals as a youngster in response to the biblical question "What shall it profit a man if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?" His reply is "Then in order to be truly wealthy, a man should collect souls?" (306). Undermining souls with a self-sacrificing ethic is his way to rule the world. He has cynically chosen socialist activism over a career as a clergyman, because religion's emphasis on the salvation of the individual soul is not as totally demanding of self-sacrifice as is the god of the secular collective. His hypocrisy is realistic, but his stated principles misrepresent socialism and altruism.

The prime victim of Toohey's subtle power is his niece, Katie, the naive and open-minded girlfriend of Keating. She represents a kind of tabula rasa, whose simple generosity is to love her man unconditionally (despite how Keating neglects her in his ambivalence) and to pursue a college education to learn more about the world. She has very little mind of her own and can thus be easily inscribed by her uncle's eloquent discourse. By the time she intuitively understands and wants to escape her uncle's power over her, it is too late. Keating has been lured away from her by his self-hating lust for Dominique, whom he marries knowing that she despises him, leaving Katie to succumb to her diabolical uncle's mantra of self-sacrifice. Her loss of Keating clinches her loss of self in her undesired career as a social worker, which Toohey prods her into (as if a socialist dictates careers).

Rand's fallacy here is to put all the onus on altruism, rather than on Toohey's underhanded effort to induce Katie's guilt for wanting satisfaction from her job. When Katie confesses to her uncle that she feels guilty for wanting egotistical credit for doing good—without honest satisfaction in her clients' successes—her "selfishness" seems common and ignoble, not what Rand would consider true "selfishness" as joy in one's work. But wanting credit is one thing; not being gratified by clients' successes is another—the latter being inconsistent with Katie's original benevolence. One of my students defended Katie for her genuine kindheartedness. Rand contrives Katie's unaccountable fall into mean-spiritedness in order to blame altruism for thwarting her aspiration to true self-fulfillment. The implication is that one cannot feel real happiness in helping others. However, Rand is careless enough to mention a co-worker of Katie's who genuinely loves helping the clients—and thus receives

Toohey's disapproval, in contrast to his approval of his niece's dissatisfaction, which is the "self-sacrifice" necessary for his notion of altruism. Thus, the co-worker's genuine altruism is compatible with Rand's "selfishness."

Another student did not take Rand's bait, but realized, after wrestling with his own personal satisfaction in altruism, that it is compatible with self-interest. Katie's brightest moment brings this idea out when she challenges Toohey's advice "to be willing to suffer, to be cruel, to be dishonest, to be unclean—[. . .] anything to kill the most stubborn of roots, the ego—[. . .] only then will you know the kind of happiness I spoke about, and the gates of spiritual grandeur will fall open before you." Her response is, "But, Uncle Ellsworth [. . .] when the gates fall open, who is it that's going to enter?" (375). Caught momentarily off guard, but quick to regain his supremacy, he brushes off her astute question by belittling the crudeness of logic, which he twists to make selflessness, thus altruism, seem evil.

The other great villain who recognizes the good but deliberately chooses evil is Gail Wynand, the ruthless newspaper tycoon, who has one major difference with Toohey. The latter operates out of an underlying sense of inferiority, despite his great competence in his will to power, guaranteeing his eternal malice against other high achievers. In contrast, Wynand operates out of an inherent sense of superiority in his competence, but he is cynically contemptuous of the popular opinions that he perversely caters to in his tabloid, such as the column that Toohey writes for him, extolling the masses. Each despises the other: Toohey, for Wynand's competence as a rival power broker, and Wynand, for Toohey's cunning cultivation of others' mediocrity and self-sacrifice. Disillusioned about social justice and love, Wynand deliberately destroys people of integrity to confirm his jaundiced view.

Consequently, although our view of Toohey worsens as we become acquainted with him, our view of Wynand begins to improve as we learn about his history and his relations with Dominique and Roark. As a tough, disadvantaged youth, he fights a gang single-handed and becomes their leader. He is the alpha male, a true aristocrat whom circumstances misplaced in the underclass, but who aspired for the high life of respectable achievement. Like Roark, he works his way up, in journalism in his case, by educating himself and eventually buying his own newspaper. Although "self-made," he becomes cynical through others' callousness and injustice.

The intriguing plot is largely driven by Toohey's machinations. He hates Dominique for her independence of mind and arranges for Wynand, a notorious playboy, to notice Dominique's beauty, in order to destroy them in a high-society scandal over her adultery to Keating. What Toohey does not know is that Dominique's contemptuous toying with society matches her boss's. When they meet, Wynand is impressed by her total honesty about prostituting herself, unlike his former mistresses' game playing, and he proposes marriage, to her surprise. She accepts, thinking the more outrageous the liaison is, the better it is to spite the world. In his admiration

for her, Wynand reveals to her his hidden values, symbolized by his secret collection of great art works. She soon realizes how much they have in common in valuing quality, not mass mediocrity as she had thought, and begins to respect and love him, although Roark is her greater love.

When Wynand independently recognizes the value of Roark's work and commissions him to build a house for them, Roark also comes to recognize Wynand's true character and befriends him, although he has reservations about Wynand's past actions when he thinks: "I haven't mentioned to him the worst second-hander of all—the man who goes after power" (636). Wynand, after trying Roark's integrity without shaking it, regains his own. He and Dominique begin to champion Roark in his newspaper against the adverse popular opinion that he has allowed Toohey (and, formerly, Dominique herself) to foment. But in order to save his newspaper from Toohey's plot to take it over, Wynand finally betrays Roark. That betrayal drives Dominique back to Roark, leaving Wynand to confront the loss of her and of his newly reborn integrity.

Wynand's complexity as an admirable antihero, another kind of foil to Roark, makes Rand's point that one is totally responsible for one's choices. Although Wynand is a success by materialist standards, he has not succeeded as "man *qua* man," which is the standard of Rand's ethical individualist. He realizes the irony that in achieving power by catering to the public's taste for mediocrity, no matter how competently, he has handed his power over to the very public opinion that he despises. And, in clinging to the newspaper founded on that rot, he again betrays his deepest values in betraying Roark.

In contrast, Roark's indifference to others—neither dominating them, nor catering to them, nor reacting against them—suggests a "live and let live" harmlessness (except for that contemptuous mouth that Rand dotes on, which subtly poisons his impact). He simply pursues his own empowerment over his craft and his just rewards from those who value it. Although Roark is indifferent to his employees personally, they are stimulated to do their best in admiration of him and, being justly compensated by him, are aware that he, in turn, holds their work in esteem. Rand shows how, paradoxically, Roark's innocuous indifference promotes interdependence, at least among the competent.

As a literary artist, Rand works best when she is paying attention to the truth of human relations on many levels of consciousness, including their intuition. An example is the way that Keating's head can deny what his heart and the pit of his stomach keep telling him at the edge of his consciousness. Another example is the frequent wordless communication through which Roark and Dominique often understand each other's state of mind instantly. Another is when the perceptive Toohey not only says he has no need of logic, but can actually bypass it when encountering the face of someone else—most dramatically, in his instant appraisal of Roark's per-

son before knowing who he is: “He did not know the man’s name, his profession or his past; he had no need to know; it was not a man to him, but only a force” (268).

If Rand had been able to accept the overwhelming evidence of the socialization of the individual mind and still account for one’s independence from that socialization, she might have been on more solid ground. The view of self being developed here would do just that. It would explain how the individual is not only passively subjected to social discourses but also capable as an active subject of observing the inconsistencies within and between those discourses (as suggested by post-Marxist theorist Paul Smith), and thereby account for the critical and creative thinking that she values but does not adequately explain. This concept of self can be summed up as one that not only endorses Rand’s insistence on the integrity of self-interest as primary, but also expands that self-interest beyond the narrow confines of the isolated thinker and actor to become an integral part of a holistic universe. In conceiving oneself as a unique site within a collective network—a site that processes all inputs at both conscious and unconscious levels and then contributes one’s unique insights back to the collective interchange—the seeker of self-knowledge would have the advantage of greater breadth and depth over an isolated thinker. In affirming one’s own sacredness as a unique member of the network, validating one’s honest positions and rightful interests in negotiating with the rightful interests of others, one has a solid basis for self-esteem.

Such a self-concept would recognize the paradox of how our differences make us, as persons, equally important, even if ideas are not judged equally valid. I call this self “dialogic,” because one can think independently by negotiating among ideas to construct, deconstruct, and reconstruct one’s narratives to find meaning in experience. The freer the interchange is, the greater potential there is for a dynamically creative society, a “free market” of selves.

Even the fictional stories of others may intersect with and enlarge one’s own life story, as in reading Rand’s fiction, which still lives as good storytelling when it escapes her ideological control. The strong allegorical aspect of her novel—in the morality plays between Roark and Keating, Roark and Wynand, and all of them versus Toohey—would have worked better had she not contaminated her otherwise observant realism by creating puppets of a static, idealized Roark and a psychopathic Toohey who caricatures socialism and altruism. As Mikhail Bakhtin demonstrates in his dialogic theory of narrative, the work requires the characters to be free from authorial interference to interact in their polyphonic world. Similarly, the dialogic self must be free to interact in the world rather than be dictated to by an authorized self-image or ideology.⁷

Ironically, not focusing on the self per se, but on that process of interacting with the world, one may be truer to that self, whatever it is. Trying to identify oneself definitively by teasing apart all of the deeply intertwined relations between self

and other—to fix one’s true self—may be in vain, because one’s self changes through experience and one need only be in touch with one’s present state. Furthermore, excess attention to one’s identity or self-image risks narcissism, distracting one’s attention from being engaged. Roark is at his intense best when he is precisely not thinking of himself, but deeply immersed in his work, as Rand abundantly makes clear.

Rand’s basic definition of “self-interest” is one that free-market advocates do not emphasize in the marketplace; that secular leftists or religious believers may be too resentful of her slanders to acknowledge; that intellectuals may be too disdainful of her simplistic inconsistencies or didactic art to recognize; and that all understand but may find difficult to practice: that self-interest is not greed for wealth, fame, or power, not even fair compensation for one’s labor, which is secondary and only granted by others. Self-interest is primarily behaving with integrity as “man *qua* man,” developing one’s full potential of mind and body, and insisting on one’s rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness by granting them to everyone else.

In trying not to impose the theory of a dialogic self on the class, but only to encourage students to articulate and question their own values in response to the reading, I found that Rand’s inconsistencies partly reinforced their confusion. For example, one student thought that Roark’s simple indifference to most people—yet contempt for them—reinforced his own right to offend others as a generalized protest against respectability, thus conforming to a stereotype of nonconformity, which neither Emerson nor Rand would approve. At any rate, most students enjoyed the novel and were stimulated to discuss ethical values in questioning the text and each other, citing personal experience as well as textual evidence. Some grappled with their inner conflicts and came to greater understanding of themselves as dialogic through the class process. Others had difficulty negotiating between the equally valid claims of their own self-interest and their need to belong to society, still thinking that negotiation was some kind of cop-out either way, rather than a conscious choice, an assertion of one’s priorities. Had I challenged them to contrast their changing priorities across contrasting scenarios, not just in any given one, they may have realized more fully that trying to negotiate between self-interest and altruism can be negotiated only situationally, not in the abstract as general principles. Overall, *The Fountainhead* aroused the most interest of all the readings, as a controversial vehicle to raise self-aware dialogue on American individualism in a multicultural class.

In response to Hillel’s third rhetorical question, “If not now, then when?” I can say only that this experiment in reading Ayn Rand with my students taught me that, if I teach the course again, I might offer the theory of the dialogic self more explicitly—pointing out the analogy between a class dialogue that examines all views and an inner dialogue that weighs self-interest as intertwined with that of others. The very articulation of the dialogic principle might make a difference in some students’

ability to frame the self versus other relation, not as an either-or disjunct, but as an interactive exchange of carefully considered values.

NOTES

1. Shoshana Milgram traces how Rand developed *Roark* throughout the drafting stages, purifying out all doubt of his “first-handedness” until he was perfected for the final version.

2. Rand shamefully misrepresents feminists in her antipathy to their claims of women’s victimization by patriarchy, accusing them of reinforcing misogynist views by their irrational, self-pitying weakness (*Return of the Primitive* 147–49).

3. Robert Sheaffer argues that Rand cannot reconcile her rational Apollonian understanding of sex—as attraction resulting from shared values, enunciated in *Atlas Shrugged* by Francisco d’Anconia (489–90)—with her irrational Dionysian impulse as a woman to surrender passionately to a man. Although both can coexist, Rand rejects the Dionysian in her article, “Apollo and Dionysus.” Sheaffer’s voluminous literary and historical evidence of women’s need to surrender omits any evidence of men’s sexual vulnerability and surrender to women.

4. The right to property has generally been the claim of the capitalist class, but it could well apply to working people who have the same right to own the profits from their investment of human capital and thus a proportionate share in the enterprise, as even Smith might imply, “The property which every man has in his own labour is the original foundation of all other property, so it is the most sacred and inviolable” (*Wealth of Nations* 138), and Rand might agree (*Capitalism* 326).

5. Surprisingly, Rand endorses labor unions when workers join freely in their own self-interest (*Capitalism* 85).

6. Rand would reverse Descartes’s “*cogito ergo sum*” to, “I am, therefore I think.” The key is the different referent of “I” in both clauses. Here she does not conflate the conceptual self with the individual identified by it. Rand considers the first “I” to be an affirmation of the axiomatic existence of the individual and the second “I” to be the individual’s consciousness, a concept of self that is derived from the individual’s existence, whereas it is generally assumed that Descartes meant that the awareness of self is prior, in “I think,” from which the individual’s existence (and that of the objective world and even God) can be deduced: “therefore I am” (*Introduction* 246, 252–56).

7. See Jonathan Stone on how Bakhtin recognizes that dialogic realism in fiction corresponds to subjective relativity in the holistic space-time universe of Einsteinian physics. Yet “The presence of relativity, and not relativism, shields Bakhtinian carnival from implying a shirking of [. . .] ethical responsibilities” (416).

WORKS CITED

- Althusser, Louis. *Lenin and Philosophy*. Trans. Ben Brewster. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971.
- Bakhtin, Mikhail. *The Dialogic Imagination. Four Essays*. Ed. Michael Holquist. Trans. Caryl Emerson and Michael Holquist. Austin: U of Texas P, 1981.
- Brandon, Nathaniel, and Barbara Brandon. *Who Is Ayn Rand?* New York: Random House, 1962.
- Brown, Susan Love. “The Woman Who Would *Not* Be President.” Gladstein and Sciarra 275–98.
- Brownmiller, Susan. “Ayn Rand: A Traitor to Her Own Sex.” Gladstein and Sciarra 63–65.
- Den Uyl, Douglas J., and Douglas B. Rasmussen. “Life, Teleology, and Eudaimonia in the Ethics of Ayn Rand.” Den Uyl and Rasmussen 63–80.
- , eds. *The Philosophic Thought of Ayn Rand*. Urbana: U of Illinois P, 1984.
- Emerson, Ralph Waldo. “Self-Reliance.” 1841. *Self-Reliance and Other Essays*. New York: Dover, 1993.

- Gladstein, Mimi Reisel. *The New Ayn Rand Companion*. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1999.
- Gladstein, Mimi Reisel, and Chris Matthew Sciabarra, eds. *Feminist Interpretations of Ayn Rand*. University Park: Penn State UP, 1999.
- Levinas, Emmanuel. *Entre Nous: On-Thinking-of-the-Other*. Trans. Michael B. Smith and Barbara Harshov. New York: Columbia UP, 1998.
- Mack, Eric. "The Fundamental Moral Elements of Rand's Theory of Rights." Den Uyl and Rasmussen 122–61.
- Milgram, Shoshana. "The *Fountainhead* from Notebook to Novel: The Composition of Ayn Rand's First Ideal Man." *Essays on Ayn Rand's The Fountainhead*. Ed. Robert Mayhew. New York: Lexington Books, 2007. 3–40.
- Presley, Sharon. "Ayn Rand's Philosophy of Individualism: A Feminist Psychologist's Perspective." Gladstein and Sciabarra 251–73.
- Rand, Ayn. "About a Woman President." 1968. *The Voice of Reason: Essays in Objectivist Thought*. Ed. Leonard Peikoff. New York: New American Library, 1989.
- . "Apollo and Dionysus." Rand. *The Return of the Primitive: The Anti-Industrial Revolution*. 99–118.
- . *Atlas Shrugged*. New York: Random House, 1957.
- . *Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal*. 1946. New York: Signet, 1962.
- . *The Fountainhead*. 1943. New York: Scribner, 2000.
- . *Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology*. 2nd ed. New York: NAL Books, 1979.
- . *The Return of the Primitive: The Anti-Industrial Revolution*. 1970. New York: Meridian, 1999.
- . *The Romantic Manifesto: A Philosophy of Literature*. 2nd ed. New York: New American Library, 1975.
- . *The Virtue of Selfishness: A New Concept of Egoism*. New York: New American Library, 1964.
- Sheaffer, Robert. "Rereading Rand on Gender in the Light of Paglia." Gladstein and Sciabarra 299–317.
- Smith, Adam. (*An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of The Wealth of Nations*. 1776. 2 Vols. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976.
- Smith, Paul. *Discerning the Subject*. Minneapolis: U. of Minnesota P, 1988.
- Stone, Jonathan. "Polyphony and the Atomic Age: Bakhtin's Assimilation of an Einsteinian Universe." *PMLA* 123 (2008): 405–21.
- Walker, Jeff. *The Ayn Rand Cult*. Chicago: Open Court, 1999.