The Danger of Favoring Capital over Labor
Mason Gaffney
[Reprinted from The Georgist Journal, No.100,
Spring, 2004, pp.30-34]
This paper deals with an anomaly one meets when seeking to teach and
apply the ideas promoted by Henry George. How does one forward the
interests of labor by untaxing capital? George left some unanswered
questions, and later writers and activists have not met them.
George's declared aim in Progress and Poverty (P&P), and
in his life, was to raise wages. "Why do wages tend to a minimum
which will give but a bare living?" (p.17). George declared the
original "War on Poverty"; he kicked off the original
agitation for "Full Employment." He was overtly egalitarian:
he dedicated P&P to those who see "the vice and misery that
spring from the unequal distribution of wealth
" He began
with concern for labor, tenants, the unemployed, the impoverished, the
"mudsills of society." He did not treat them as a special
case, though, to be treated with targeted programs. Rather, he saw the
whole wage structure - everyone's wage and salary - as a pyramid based
on the wages of unskilled labor.
George's thought then led him along a twisting path. Had there been a
wage tax in his day he would surely have fought it, but there was not.
His thought led him to identify capital with labor, and thus to
champion untaxing buildings, machinery, inventories, and other forms
of capital, which he virtually equated with the labor that produced
them.
There were no retail sales taxes to fight then (they burgeoned after
1932), but there were other taxes on consumption, and on commerce,
both internal and external. Consistently, he also fought them.
Untaxing commerce was an end in itself, but even more it was a means
to deny the revenues to governments, so they must raise revenues by
taxing land values instead. The Founding Fathers, with James Monroe
leading, had achieved something of the same end, in part, by
forbidding states to tax interstate commerce, forcing them back on
property taxation. George aimed to reinforce that outcome, and extend
it to the Federal level as well.
George did not champion land taxes for being merely "neutral,"
which is about the most that neo-classical economists will concede,
and that right grudgingly. George saw land taxes as a positive good.
He saw them as overcoming the tendency of free markets in land, beset
by speculation, to keep land from full economical use. He saw that not
as a little glitch in the land market, but as driving down labor's
marginal productivity and wages. He saw it, by the same reasoning,
driving down the marginal productivity of capital, and rates of return
to investors.
He saw "free trade in land," without land taxation, as a
chimerical policy, the brood of a priori dogmatism, uninformed by
observation. Human experience with free trade in land, like the
mid-19th Century English/Irish experiment with it, had shown that such
markets lead to "unequal distribution of wealth and privilege"
-- the very ills that he dedicated P&P to curing.
His emphasis on untaxing buildings, however, meant that by the end of
his life he had shed many of his original allies, the socialists and
unionists, and become more the candidate of small businessmen and
small homeowners. Many of these were moved by short term and petty
self interest of a kind too niggling, too bourgeois, and often mean-
spirited, to co-exist in harmony with the strong pro-labor, spiritual
and idealistic forces that George had evoked earlier. His dedication
to national politics, and free trade, also repelled his powerful
spiritual and crowd-stirring ally, the popular Catholic rebel, Fr.
Edward McGlynn.
George aimed at national goals. He originally got into New York City
politics opportunistically. That was his greatest political success,
in 1886, but thereafter he aimed for State office, failing. The times
changed after the Haymarket Riot of 1886, and economic recovery
weakened the demand for reform. George's political alliance broke up.
After that, in 1894, he coached a team of six Congressmen, associated
with the Populist Party, who forced land taxation into the income tax
act of that year. The six also supported his free trade position,
whose strategic end was to force Washington to tax property in some
manner, by denying the treasury its major source of revenue, the
tariff. This strategy didn't get far until 1913, after George's death.
George's national interest was inherent in the thesis of P&P. He
begins it by denying the possibility of achieving his goals by merely
local action. Unemployment and hard times "can hardly be
accounted for by local causes" (pp. 5-6). Where the conditions of
material progress are most fully realized "we find the deepest
poverty,
and the most of enforced idleness" (p.6). "Social
difficulties
do not arise from local circumstances, but are
engendered by progress itself" (p.8).
"When San Francisco reaches the point where New York now is, who
can doubt that there will also be ragged and barefooted children on
her streets?" (p.10). Score one for "The Prophet of San
Francisco." He even understated his case. Today in San Francisco
it is ragged, barefooted and homeless adults sleeping in her parks and
doorways, and under her bridges, seeking escape in drugs, hard by the
most expensive and luxurious housing in the U.S.A.
How, then, did George's movement segue into a movement mainly to
untax buildings, one town at a time? There have been many factors at
work, but I focus here on one, of paramount importance. This factor is
George's identifying capital with labor. We criticize neo-classical
economists for using "2-factor" thinking, fusing capital
with land. George had his own kind of 2-factorism, fusing capital with
labor. Thus, many Georgists channel their energies into untaxing
capital. Some of them may believe, if only subconsciously, that
untaxing capital is the same as untaxing labor, and reaches George's
goals.
How did George lay the groundwork for that? Few teachers in the H.G.
Schools, or universities either, think highly of George's Book I on
capital, or Book III, Chapter III, "Interest and the cause of
interest". These, if read too closely, are embarrassments. Only
his spritely writing style, filled with illustrations and examples
from George's colorful life, let his early readers survive them, and
get through to the meat of his book - which of course many of them
did. One intelligent and influential critic, Thomas Henry Huxley,
apparently read no further than Book I, and rejected all of George on
the grounds that George simply did not understand capital and interest
very well. On this point (but not otherwise), Huxley was right. What
little we know about the bankruptcy of George's newspaper in San
Francisco suggests he did not manage capital well, and overextended
himself. Most of my readers know that I admire and laud George, and
intend no cheap shot or nasty ad hominem. It is just prudent to be
aware of weaknesses, even of those whom we venerate.
George's attitude toward capital is insouciant. At one point he says
the economy, like an organism, "secretes, as it were," the
needed amount of capital (p. 86). This is cavalier, and inconsistent
with his later activism in the cause of untaxing buildings (to help
the economic organism secrete more capital). At another point (p.79)
he has the path between production and consumption like "a curved
pipe filled with water. If a quantity of water is poured in at one
end, a like quantity is released at the other. It is not identically
the same water, but is its equivalent. And so (laborers) put in as
they take out - they receive in
wages but the produce of their
own labor."
That is the "Fallacy of the Costless Inventory." It is like
saying that planting a seedling Douglas-fir produces the 60-year old
tree, if the firm harvests one at the same time. It is like saying
students go through college instantly and at no cost, because a
freshman enters for every senior who graduates.
The core fallacy, one with a strangely Marxian provenance, is
George's repeated insistence that labor - and only labor - is what
creates capital. In fact, we form capital by consuming less than
income - by saving, that is - and investing a like amount. The income
may come from rent or interest, not just from labor; and the capital
that is produced contains contributions of value from all three
factors. Most of the saving comes, and probably always has come, from
property income: rent, interest, and business profits (which are
mostly rent and interest). A lot of capital, like mature timber,
contains more "stored-up rent" than stored-up labor. It also
contains a high fraction of "stored-up capital." (Those
wanting to pursue this in depth will find the mathematics worked out
in the appendix to this writer's "Toward Full Employment with
Limited Land and Capital," a chapter in Arthur Lynn, Jr. (ed.),
Property Taxation, Land Use and Public Policy. Madison: Univ.
of Wisconsin Press, 1976, pp. 99-166.)
I draw three lessons from this.
1. George never supplied, and we still do not have, a true "3-factor
economics." Georgist economics is just as guilty of "2-factorism"
as is neo-classical economics. They fuse capital with land; we fuse it
with labor. Georgist theorists need to supply a complete theory, and
Georgists need to learn it and teach it and use it. Capital is truly a
third factor of production, with its own complexities and meanings.
2. We must not promote or tolerate untaxing capital more than we
untax labor. That is what has happened with the personal income tax,
creating a huge bias toward substituting capital for labor. Local
zoning policies reinforce this powerfully, too, as most localities
reserve land for capital-intensive uses in preference to
labor-intensive uses.
In one apocalyptic passage, anticipating Karel Capek (author of
R.U.R., or "Rossum's Universal Robots"), George foresees and
warns against this tendency (pp.252-53). Citing the use of farm
machinery in wheat fields, and its displacement of labor, he says we
cannot "assign any limits to the increase of rent, short of the
whole produce.
(This is) the final goal toward which the whole
civilized world is hastening" (my emphasis). Scary Mary! His
readers must have sat up and taken notice at this point. It is strange
that he drops such a powerful bomb in the middle of a paragraph, and
does not make it the center of his thesis from there on, but there it
lies. He does not, like Capek, have the robots take over the world and
eliminate mankind. Rather, the landowners do, and interest falls to
zero, as wages do. Implicitly, he seems to have "labor-saving
inventions" also save capital, so little but land is needed in
production. I cannot unravel all his thinking. The point is, though,
that at one point, at least, he saw the danger in substituting capital
for labor, and he saw it even in the absence of the kinds of bias now
lodged in the Internal Revenue Code. As American jobs disappear
overseas, it behooves us to see it, too.
3. George taught that to raise wages and end poverty we must act at
the national level: local action alone is not enough. This is a
challenge to keep us busy the rest of our lives. On the point, I
modestly refer you to an article, "A Cannan Hits the Mark,"
in the current AJES (April 2004), pp. 275-90.
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