Land Tax Reform:
We Need Better Battle Plans!
Mason Gaffney
[Reprinted from Land & Liberty, Summer
1997]
BIG PLANS and Grand Visions inspire small ones. They also help orient
and coordinate them. They help us divide the major from the minor, to
direct our work most efficiently.
Big Plans can also scare people. That does not mean they won't
prevail. They scare some because they move many others. Abstract
philosophies, living only in intellectual undergrounds, build up
slowly until suddenly they take command. This is how change occurs.
Superficially it seems "sudden," but intellectually the way
has been paved by years of Grand Visions and Big Plans.
Safeguarding the property tax
WE NEED TO UPHOLD and safeguard the property tax as the mainstay of
state and local finance. It is partly a tax on land value. We speak of
reforming the property tax, but first there must be a property tax.
Because it exists, we can modify it to tap land rent for public uses
in a non-catastrophic way, using traditional laws, administrative
agencies and land tenures. Capping the property tax rate, as in
California, ties the hands of reformers.
There has been much ado about Hawaii's phased-in shift to a graded
property tax plan. However, Hawaii raises only 16% of its state and
local revenues from the property tax, so the rate is very low. You can
focus the Hawaiian property tax on land values 100%, and still have an
84%-messed-up tax system. Studies would then show little visible
result from the reform. Critics would say "Ho-hum, we told you
so."
New Hampshire is another story. It raises 64% of its state and local
revenues from the property tax, double the U.S. mean of 32%. New
Hampshire is called a "low-tax" state, but its property tax
is highest in the nation,
per capita, at $1344. The U.S. mean is $699 per capita,
and it goes down to $174 in Alabama. Politicians whose priority is
raising sales taxes for property tax relief might study Alabama's
economy overall, and ask if that is the model to which they aspire.
Its per capita income ranks 41st in the U.S. May Georgists
please stop looking for miracles from Fairhope, AL? At Alabama
rates, the Fairhope plan is tokenism. Meantime, New Hampshire's marshy
peneplains, barren granites, icy winters, and impassable mountains are
producing the 7th highest per capita income in the nation.
In New Hampshire, fortunately, Assemblyman Richard Noyes is
hard at work upgrading the property tax. He is chair of the
legislative committee overseeing assessment quality; his priority is
bringing land assessments up to market, and building assessments down.
He does this by pushing for more frequent reassessment. Whatever he
thus achieves in The Granite State is magnified by its high dependence
on the property tax.
How about New York? It ranks near the middle in the ratio of
property taxes to all state and local taxes, at 33% (the U.S. mean is
32%). That is not because New York property taxes are low, but its
other taxes are high. So New York is an OK place to sow the seed of
two-rate tax-plan, but the harvest of any success will be sparser than
it would be in New Hampshire.
How about Pennsylvania? This state stands out for its efforts
to reform local property taxation but, sad to relate, it ranks below
the middle in the ratio of property taxes to all state and local
taxes, at 29%. It is low in property taxes per capita, at $609, less
than half the New Hampshire level. Property tax reform in Pennsylvania
is, therefore, heavily diluted. Add to that the problem of overlapping
tax jurisdictions: when a city reforms its property tax, its county
and school district carry on as before. What changes, then, is just
1/3 of 28%, or about 9% of the complex of state and local taxes.
Federal taxes are totally untouched. Trench warfare in Pennsylvania
cities is therefore inchmeal, and the results hard to measure.
LANDOWNERS in California are only taxed now if they use their land to
hire people and produce something useful. When they do so, they meet
the drag of our high business and employment and sales taxes,
necessitated by the fall of property taxes. A handful of oligopolistic
landowners control most of the market; small businesses are squeezed
out. This helps us segue from being at the cutting edge of industrial
progress to a third-world economy -from the New Hampshire model to the
Alabama model -- with little relief in sight.
Enforcing Good Laws
IT IS IMPORTANT to assess land for tax purposes early and often,
especially on a rising market. (Landowners will see to it you do so on
a falling market.) Over time, land appreciates more years than not;
buildings depreciate every year. Lagging assessments therefore
automatically overtax buildings relative to land.
Assemblyman Noyes has published data on the effect of reassessment in
New Hampshire. The land fraction of assessed value rises each time
there is a reassessment. Keene, NH, is in the lead, with frequent
reassessments, a high fraction of land in the mix, and a particularly
strong track record attracting enterprise and jobs.
In California, where we used to have good assessment, we now have bad
assessment legally mandated by Prop. 13. So long as land is unsold,
and/or not newly improved, its assessment rise is capped at 2% a year,
while market prices soar. Here is one example of the results. In 1995
the Metro Water District of Southern California condemned 410 acres
for a new reservoir to expand the system (to accommodate land
speculators in the desert boonies). A local jury hit them for $43
millions, which works out to about $1.95 a square foot.
ASSESSORS' problem today is that the strongest pressures they feel
are from owners wanting to allocate as much value as possible to
buildings that they may depreciate for federal income tax purposes.
Here is where we must study how the parts fit together to form the big
picture; here is where federal and local tax policies intersect.
Some traditional Georgists have disdained, neglected and
misunderstood the income-tax treatment of land income, to their great
unawareness, insularity, and weakness. Let us see how this works.
Congress and the IRS let one depreciate buildings, but not land, for
income tax. This important distinction harks back to when the income
tax was new, and Georgist Congressmen like Warren Worth Bailey, from
Johnstown, PA, and Henry George Jr., from Brooklyn, were instrumental
in shaping it.
When a building is new, the depreciable value is limited to the cost
of construction. The non-depreciable land is the bare land value
before construction. So far, so good. Overtime, however, building
owners have converted this into a tax shelter scheme. Owner A, the
builder, writes off the building in a few years, much less than its
economic life, and sells it to B. "A" pays a tax on the
excess of sales price over "basis." The basis is reduced by
all depreciation taken, so any excess depreciation is "recaptured"
upon sale. It is defined by Congress as a "capital gain,"
and given the corresponding package of tax preferences: deferral of
tax, lower rate, step-up of basis at time of death, tax-free
exchanges, etc.
Thus far, any tax preference goes to A, the builder, and may be seen
as a well-considered stimulus to building. Watch, however, what
happens next. "A" sells to B, and B depreciates the building
all over again, from his purchase price. To do so, B must allocate the
new "basis" -- i.e. his purchase price -- between
nondepreciable land and depreciable building.
How shall B allocate the new basis? Enter the local tax assessor.
Here is where local assessment intersects with Federal income tax
policy. The IRS does not try to assess land and buildings: it is
not set up for that. Instead, IRS instructions tell taxpayers they may
use locally assessed values to allocate basis between depreciable
buildings and nondepreciable land. The IRS accepts this allocation as
conclusive. As a result, influential local owners of income property
press their locally elected or appointed assessors to allocate as much
value as possible to buildings, and as little as possible to land.
This does not affect their local taxes, but lowers their federal
taxes. It lets them depreciate land.
Assessors don't care as much as they should: local revenues are not
immediately nor obviously affected. Local assessors have little reason
not to accommodate their constituents, local landowners, to help them
depreciate land for federal and state income tax purposes. Thus, they
have little reason to use the correct "building-residual"
method of allocating value, and a compelling reason to use the
incorrect alternative, the "land- residual" method. This
latter method understates land value, thus converting non-depreciable
land value into depreciable building value. It is the modern version
of "competitive underassessment." In the process it also
converts the local property tax from a land tax into a building tax.
After a while B sells to C, who in turn sells to D, so each building
is depreciated many times. So is a large part of the land under it,
time after time, although it should not be depreciated at all. This is
carried so far that real estate pays no federal or state income taxes
at all.
Within each city the property tax is progressive, but when your data
meld cities like poor little Parlier and Lynwood with Beverly Hills
you sometimes find poor people paying more of their income in property
taxes than rich people, and getting less for it. Switching just
the local property tax to land ex buildings will do little to correct
such disparities. It will therefore make little progress toward
overall distributive justice, and the wide support that would evoke.
There is, in fact, a natural cap on local property tax rates imposed
by local particularism. The City Council of Beverly Hills will not
raise taxes in Beverly Hills for the benefit of voters in Parlier.
To avoid such regressivity we must work out some formula for power
equalization. The most straightforward formula is simply a
statewide land tax.
What Tax to Fight First?
WE ALSO NEED to set priorities on what tax to lower or kill. The
Georgist objective is dual: to raise taxes on land, and to untax
production, exchange, and capital formation. Some Georgists have
gotten locked into minding just the local never George's main point.
It certainly should not be ours today, when there are other new or
augmented taxes more damaging and noxious even than the part of the
property tax that falls on reproducible buildings and movable capital.
These other taxes include state taxes on retail sales, payroll taxes,
personal income taxes falling on wages and salaries, excise taxes,
etc.
Some Georgists have supported untaxing "personal" (movable)
capital, and rejoiced when it occurred. If political success be the
test, this movement has won massively (although silently) in state
after state, and in all Canadian provinces. The result, though, is as
baleful as benign, for the exemption of capital here is only partial,
and therefore discriminatory. "Real" (immovable) capital
remains taxable, which biases the way investors allocate their
capital. Indeed, some "real" capital is transmuted into "personal"
capital merely by unbolting it from the floor, putting it on casters
instead.
This result is also regressive, because "personal" capital
in most industries is more concentrated in ownership than "real"
(immovable) capital. In farming, for example, "personal"
capital includes breeding cattle and race horses, whose ownership is
highly concentrated among the very wealthy, while the working farmer's
dwelling is "real" capital. Stored grain and farm machinery
are also concentrated in ownership.
Other Georgists (like Larry Rathbun and George Duncan in NH, ca.
1935-50) diverted their efforts into deleting the property tax on
standing timber, replacing it with a "yield" tax (at rates
much too low to be revenue-neutral). Again, the result is partial and
discriminatory, biasing investors to allocate more capital in the form
of timber, and correspondingly less in other forms. As noted earlier,
the present system works as though you exempted woodframe buildings
from the property tax, and raised the rate on brick buildings.
This timber bias is highly regressive, too, because the ownership of
timber is much more concentrated than the ownership of the dwellings
of loggers, mill-workers, and retirees in timber counties. It would
not be so bad if the reformers had seen that land taxes on timber
growing-sites were raised enough to compensate for exempting the
growing stock, but they failed in this: these land taxes are also held
down to token levels.
The net result has been to turn timber and timberland owners into
a gigantic public welfare case, a case supported by a sophisticated
brainwashing machinery paid by the discretionary income and wealth of
timberlandowners.
Most Georgist activists today devote their main efforts to lowering
the property tax rate applied to urban buildings. As we have seen,
this effort is only effective in those few remaining states, notably
NH, that still rely heavily on the property tax. Even in such states,
all the gains won laboriously, trench by trench, can be lost overnight
should the state legislature or the electorate be gulled into capping
property tax rates, shifting taxes to sales, incomes, and productive
business. This occurred in California (1978), in Michigan (1995), and
has been threatened in several other states, including PA where
Georgist activists make so much of the "two-rate" property
tax that some localities have adopted it.
The local "two-rate" approach is potentially productive,
even in states with low rates, because it sets the stage for raising
property tax rates. Once buildings are exempted, a polity may raise
property tax rates as high as you please without driving away any
industry, capital, or talented people. Today, politicians like
California Governor Pete Wilson make their careers out of starving
schools and libraries and police in order to attract and retain
employers by offering them lower tax rates. Given a property tax on
land-ex-buildings we could support all public services without
penalizing industry, or thrift, or home-building at all.
However, to achieve that end we must stifle sales and payroll and
income taxes. These are the chief alternatives to property taxes. All
are inherently counterproductive because all hang on some "taxable
event," meaning some constructive act of production or exchange.
Henry George put it like this. A packhorse can bear a heavy load on
its back, but hardly any bound to its shins. Theorists write of the "excess
burden" of excise taxes, and of the "Laffer Curve Effect."
Lawyers write of "taxable events." Both are describing the
same thing in their own slangs. Sales and payroll and income taxes are
like the load strapped to the horse's shins, dragging on every pace.
Indeed, they are more like a load bonded under each hoof, for they are
burdenless when the horse refuses to move at all.
What, then, makes these bad taxes so attractive to landowners? Why
this constant clamour to raise them to provide "relief from
property taxes? It is because they appear to shift taxes off
landowners, who are well organized and vocal, and onto workers who are
not. They shift back onto landowners by repelling labour and capital,
but seeing that calls for an act of insight and analysis beyond the
ambition of many lazy thinkers.
Closing Landowners' Escape Routes
THE SOLUTION is to make the bad taxes pinch landowners in ways they
cannot fail to perceive. The income tax, when new, was designed to do
exactly that. First, the corporate income tax (from 1909) preceded the
personal income tax (from 1913 constitutionally, and 1916
de facto). Then, Georgist Congressmen like Henry George, Jr.
(Brooklyn) and Warren Worth Bailey (Johnstown, PA) took the lead in
shaping it to focus the personal income tax on property income
primarily. Over time, though, Congress has converted it, inch by inch,
into the present payroll tax. State income taxes, riding piggy-back on
the Federal model, followed suit. As the income tax changed it became
increasingly popular with landowners, with their constant clamour for
"property tax relief." measure -- we must all do our duty,
you know. College professors were mindlessly indoctrinating their
students that the income tax is the perfect tax: fair, progressive,
and allocationally neutral, all at once.
Then, with landowners so well protected, income tax rates on "ordinary"
income went wild, rising as high as 92%. Federal and state personal
income taxes became the mainstay of public finance. Owners of income
property learned to avoid most income taxes by claiming short tax
lives. This device lets an owner offset all taxable cash flow with
overstated depreciation.
Once Owner A has thus exhausted her depreciation "basis,"
she sells to Owner B, who depreciates the property all over again, and
so on through several rounds of depreciating the same capital. The
Treasury nominally "recaptures" this fictional depreciation
when A sells to B and has to report the excess of sales price over
undepreciated basis as a capital gain. In effect, thus, the rent of
income property shows up as a capital gain. This tax burden is capped,
however, by capping rates on capital gains. This helps explain the
constant drumbeat in Congress to lower tax rates on capital gains.
Many who think of themselves as "Georgists" have donned
blinders on this central matter. Some simply declare a pox on all
forms of income tax, as though all sources of income were the same.
Others even join the hue and cry for preferentially exempting "capital"
gains from taxation. These positions are, I submit, worse than
foolish. So long as we have an income tax that treats land income
kindlier and gentler than wage and salary and interest income, so long
will we have perpetual crying for "property tax relief via
income-tax exacerbation. Landowners will shift the burden until no
burden remains to shift - the condition we are approaching in half the
states. Nor will they stop there. The freer they are from taxation,
the greater is their motive to demand more subsidies, of which they
already get many, to raise land rents and values.
However, landowners and their advocacy groups are already ahead of
potential income tax reformers, and will remain so until we wake up
and smell the coffee. They are already lobbying to replace or
supplement income taxes with what they miscall "consumer"
taxes, a generic euphemism that covers most taxes on exchange. The
euphemism includes various excise taxes, retail sales taxes, revised
income taxes that allow expending of all capital outlays and land
purchases (e.g. the mislabelled "flat" tax), the proposed "cash
flow tax," VAT, et hoc genus omne.
These taxes are mislabelled because they all exempt land-consumption
from the base. Land-consumption is holding land without using it to
earn any cash. A true, comprehensive consumer tax would include such
land-consumption. At the same time it would exclude retail purchases
of necessities used to form and maintain human capital. It would,
thus, look less like the present retail sales tax and more like a land
tax. It is only by bending the meaning of words to a class-biased goal
that the apologists of private rent-taking and land-hoarding have sold
sales taxes and VATs as taxes on "consumption."
Again, to turn back the ongoing drive for more consumer taxation, we
need only insist that the base include land-consumption. Then either
the drive would achieve a Georgist goal, or, more likely, turn tail
and stampede back whence it came.
We cannot accomplish those ends if we glue our eyes only on the next
fifty feet of no-man 's-land and fight only for local tax reform,
trench by trench. We have to survey the whole battlefield and marshal
forces where they will do the most good.
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