Improving How Government Raises Its Revenue
James Galbraith
[A statement before the U.S. Senate Finance
Committtee hearing on Principles of Efficient Tax Reform, 8 March,
2011. James Galbraith is Professor of Government, University of Texas,
Austin and Senior Scholar at the Levy Economics Institute]
Chairman Baucus, Senator Hatch, Members of the committee, it is an
honor for me to appear before you this morning, to discuss the
fundamental principles of an efficient tax reform.
Should we tax capital, labor -- or rent? is it a good idea to shift
the tax burden from high-income to low-income Americans, in the guise
of shifting the tax burden from capital to labor, in order to promote
"saving and investment"? In particular, will this create new
jobs? History say not: we have been shifting this burden for decades
with no appreciable effect on savings, investment or jobs.
And there is also no shortage of capital in our economy. As the
economist Mason Gaffney wrote in a paper delivered to the National Tax
Association in 1978: "The key to making jobs is changing the use
and form of capital we already have. Tax preferences for property
income, in their present and proposed forms, bias investors against
using capital to make jobs, doing more harm than good."
Economists from Smith to Ricardo to Mill understood that fixed
investments, however useful, do not generate many permanent jobs. What
creates jobs is the revolving capital that supports payrolls. A tax
policy aimed at supporting employment would shift the tax burden away
from labor, and off of snort-term capital, and place it instead on
long-term capital accumulations, if this reduces the investment in
fixed capital that is desired for other reasons --in particular,
investment with broad public benefits -- then that sort of investment
should be done by public authority, funded by an infrastructure bank.
Thus as a general rule fixed assets -- notably land should be taxed
more heavily than income. The tax on property is a good tax, provided
it is designed to fall as heavily as possible on economic rents. This
basic argument, going back to Ricardo, remains sensible, for it aims
to not-interfere where there is, in fact, no public purpose to
interfere with private decision-taking. Payroll taxes and profits
taxes do interfere directly with current business decisions. Taxes
effectively aimed at economic rent, including land rent and mineral
rents, and at "absentee landlords" as Veblen called them, do
not. An important question is how best to treat the "quasi-rents"
due to new technology and thus the incentives for innovation. These
are presently held as long-term capital gains and they tend to escape
tax to a very large degree, with the consequence that a small number
of successful innovators (and patent holders) have become an oligarchy
of never-before-equaled wealth.
The incentive for innovation is an important public policy objective.
But it does not require the vast prizes presently available. And it
does not require that those prizes escape tax indefinitely. A sensible
approach is to tax unrealized capital gains after a certain amount of
time has elapsed -- perhaps at fates that rise with time -- and again
subject to a full charitable deduction. In the final analysis -- that
is to say at death -- once again setting the estate tax at a high rate
with a high exemption encourages the early transfer of large
quasi-rents to independent foundations or other non-profit
institutions (universities, hospitals, churches), and into activities
consistent with public purpose. I would also favor raising required
foundation payout rates, so as to assure that foundations do not last
in perpetuity unless they find new donors, ...
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