The Gap in Economic Thinking
Norman K. Gardner
[Reprinted from the Henry George News,
August-September, 1965]
MOST of the writings on economics over the past twenty years have
been devoted to the subject of managing the economy, but the trouble
with making any sort of survey of these writings is that the position
is - to put it mildly - confused.
In the December 1964 issue of the Economic Journal, for
example, there is a review of a book by J. C. R. Dow called The
Management of the British Economy 1945-1960. The author is quoted
as saying: ". . . budgetary and monetary policy failed to be
stabilising and must, on the contrary, be regarded as having been
positively destabilising." Shorn of its jargon, this is saying
that those who were attempting to manage the economy achieved
precisely the opposite of what they set out to do.
The reviewer of the book is generally hostile, but he says that "most
members of the Economic Section (of the Treasury) will now find
themselves agreeing very closely with Mr. Dow's interpretation of
events."
There are, broadly, two ways in which governments have attempted to
manage the economy: one has been by varying government expenditure, as
suggested by Keynes. One cannot do better here than refer to the
Plowden Report on Public Expenditure, of 1961.
"The emphasis here is on stability of expenditure
policy. In the past, however, successive Governments have sought to
vary public expenditure as a means of maintaining the short-term
stability of the national economy. It must be accepted that some
changes in plans for Government expenditure policy are inevitable.
The Government is required by public opinion to seek to manage the
national economy with only small variations in the level of
employment. It is natural, therefore, to explore the possibilities
of using variations in public expenditure to help in this task.
Experience shows, however, that Government current expenditure
cannot be varied effectively for this purpose. Attempts, at moments
of inflationary pressure, to impose short-term "economies"
(or to make increases at moments when "reflation" is
called for) are rarely successful and sometimes damaging, and we
think that these attempts should be avoided.
"There has been a tendency in the past to over-estimate the
possibilities of useful short-term action in public investment, and
to under-estimate the indirect losses caused by sudden changes.
Experience shows that at least six to nine months (and often more)
must elapse before short-term changes in either direction take full
effect. In the two-year period from high to low, which seems to
characterise post-war fluctuations in the economy, the effect of the
action taken may well appear at the very moment when the economy is
already on the turn. The remedy may, therefore, be worse than the
disease."
This method having been tried and having been shown to have failed,
the remaining method is to influence private spending by manipulating
the monetary system.
In this field the academic economists have no cause to complain that
the politicians have ignored their advice. Indeed, it is a most
remarkable fact that as soon as a new idea appears, however
theoretical, the Treasury and the Bank of England act upon it
immediately. This seems to have been true whichever government was in
power. In fact, the theories of monetary control which were put
forward by the professors in the mid 1950s were so rapidly accepted
that they became known as the New Orthodox Theory.
What they were saying was that the economy could be controlled by
regulating the issue of Treasury Bills and that it really did not
matter very much how much cash was in circulation. Everyone accepted
it. So it was that when the Radcliffe Committee on the Working of the
Monetary System came to present its report in 1959, it said that "the
supply of Treasury Bills and not the supply of cash has come to be the
effective regulatory base of the domestic banking system."
For a Chancellor of the Exchequer this was a very useful piece of
magic. It meant that he could have more money printed without worrying
too much about inflation - because he could always get the experts to
keep the monetary system under control.
It is not often that a piece of economic theory can be put directly
to the test in the same way as a theory in, say, chemistry. But here
is an occasion in which it has been. For the results of this method of
managing the economy are on record and they tell a story as clearly as
any laboratory notebook. The results show that the New Orthodox Theory
did not work at all!
An analysis of the past ten year's figures appears in the Economic
Journal for December 1964. The author concludes that control of
Treasury Bills is ineffective and that it is the supply of cash which
is important. This is, of course, the exact opposite of the
conclusions of the Radcliffe Committee. The author also finds that
policies which the New Orthodoxy would expect to be contractionary
turn out in fact to be expansionary.
In case the reader finds it hard to believe that learned gentlemen
who are so willing to manage our lives for us can be so neatly,
completely and utterly wrong, I would refer to an article in The
Economist of June 19, aptly titled "Whatever happened to
Credit Control?":
"
Ten years ago The Economist, among
others, went to great pains to expound a new and modern theory of
credit control to its readers, and not least to the Bank of England.
The Bank accepted the theory, but shrank from its full implications.
It now turns out that the theory was based on assumptions that
events have shown to be invalid.
The new monetary orthodoxy,
it would seem, had been found unworkable almost before it had been
fully enshrined in the text-books."
One could not ask them to eat their words more thoroughly than that!
Inflation has been taken by this journal to be simply the issue of
unbacked cash, and the intricate questions of credit creation have
been ignored on the grounds that their effects are merely consequent
upon the volume of cash. Here is one point on which other schools of
thought would have considered this approach naive or irrelevant. It
would appear, however, that this simple-minded approach was after all
the right one.
Where does this leave the modern economists? Perhaps it would be
going too far to say that they have failed to find any effective way
of putting Keynes's theory into effect. But certainly they must be
conscious of a very big gap in their economic theory.
In many ways this is a time of great opportunity in economics. The
long period of complacency that followed the general acceptance of
Keynes's philosophy is at last over. It will not be said that Keynes
was wrong - in the sense of making an error of logic. He was logically
right about how his model worked - and his model was intended to be a
simplification of reality. In the acid test of practical usefulness,
however, it has been shown to be lacking..
The economists in the universities are undoubtedly able, painstaking
and conscientious. The same, however, could be said of those who
attempted to dissuade Gallileo from his belief that the earth revolves
around the sun. If the premises on which these* gentlemen had founded
their arguments had been correct, one could not have faulted them on
their logic.
Before Gallileo's theory could be accepted, the prevailing approach
to the problem bad to change. What is it about the current approach to
economics that should be changed? One is a change in the philosophical
approach.
The present philosophical weakness lies, I believe, in an attachment
to the notion of the economic model. The thinking behind the use of
models runs something like this. Supposing that it was required to
analyse the working of a factory. It would not be practicable to do so
by examining the behaviour of every man and every machine in the
factory - any more than a botanist examines the behaviour of every
individual molecule that makes up a plant. All that would be
necessary, or indeed practicable, would be to examine the effects of
varying the inputs-labour, capital and materials -- upon the outputs,
the finished products.
When one does this one is looking, not at the factory, but at a
mental model of the factory. However, if the model is well enough
constructed it will behave overall in the same way as the factory
itself. The advantage of this approach is that the model is easier to
think about than the factory. In fact, it is often not difficult to
write down a set of mathematical expressions that describe the working
of the model. Then all one has to do is to feed whatever information
one wishes into these equations and they will tell one what the
outcome would be.
This model method is a very powerful way of examining a factory. It
is also a powerful way of examining the operation of a market in which
articles are bought and sold. But is not the national economy after
all just an aggregate of factories and markets? So why not set up a
model representing the whole national economy? We can then perform
experiments on the model and use the results to guide our actions in
managing the national economy.
For people trained in mathematics this is a very fascinating idea.
The fact that the mathematics may be difficult only adds to its appeal
as an intellectual challenge. With the development of the electronic
computer, moreover, the tedium of performing vast quantities of
routine calculations has been removed.
This process has already been carried almost to its logical
conclusion. A group working at Cambridge has already published a
computer programme representing the British economy.
This is all very marvelous - but there are several snags. One of them
was pointed out by G. K. Chesterton as long ago as 1904. His book The
Napoleon of Notting Hill opens with the following paragraph:
"The human race, to which so many of my readers
belong, has been playing at children's games from the beginning, and
will probably do it to the end, which is a nuisance for the few
people who grow up. And one of the games to which it is most
attached is called 'Keep tomorrow dark', which is also named 'Cheat
the prophet.'
The players listen very carefully and respectfully to all that the
clever men have to say about what is to happen in the next
generation.
The players then wait until all the clever men are dead, and bury
them nicely. They then go and do something else. That is all.
For a race of simple tastes, however, it is great fun."
This is just how the New Orthodox monetary theorists were caught out.
They observed that the majority of bills held by the banks were
Treasury Bills, with comparatively few commercial bills. Accordingly
their model was constructed on this basis. In the event the banks
reduced their holdings of Treasury Bills and increased their holdings
of commercial bills. They did so not out of an impish sense of humour
(this is not the way of bankers) but because the policies of the New
Orthodox methods made it attractive to do so.
This illustrates one of the great temptations of the model method.
That is to choose the basic assumptions in such a way as to make a
definite conclusion possible without a lot of ifs and buts - and then
to forget that they were only assumptions and not statements of
immutable fact.
When the users of models are more cautious, their results tend to be
less simple. An illustration is provided by a pair of mathematical
papers by Professors Kemp and Samuelson in the Economic Journal
of December 1962 on Gains from International Trade. Using a very
cautious set of assumptions they proved with great mathematical vigour
that the world as a whole would be better off under Free Trade than
under any possible system of Protection. They also arrived at a whole
series of heavily qualified conclusions regarding the circumstances
under which protection could benefit certain individuals, groups or
even countries - at the expense of the rest.
Now this highly logical piece of work can be used to show that the
economic case for free trade is not impregnable. The next stage would
be to accuse anyone who says that he is for free tra3e, without adding
a lot of qualifications and reservations, of being ignorant or
bigoted.
What Professors Kemp and Samuelson do not see is the absurdity of
tackling what is essentially an ethical question by purely
mathematical methods. One could make an analytical attack on the
proposition that "crime does not pay." A rigid analytical
demonstration would no doubt show that the world as a whole would be
better off without crime than with it, but that certain individuals,
groups or countries could conceivably benefit from crime. This would
have absolutely no influence upon the ordinary man's attitude to crime
- he knew this all along in his own muddled way.
There may be general agreement on the ethical basis for certain human
actions, but there is any amount of scope for logical error in its
application. To illustrate let me refer to Henry George's analysis of
the rights of property.
His ethical starting point is: "Every man has a right to
himself." This is, of course, unprovable, but it is a proposition
that hardly anyone would deny. It is not the starting point that
causes the difficulty, and yet its logical conclusion - that private
property in land as opposed to private property in the products of man
is wrong - gets comparatively small support.
To examine economic policy without an ethical starting point is like
exploring a wilderness without a compass. The compass of ethics is
necessary, but it is not enough. Unless the exploration is logical and
systematic we shall still be lost.
The essential appeal of land-value taxation and free trade is an
ethical, not a purely technical, appeal, although the technicalities
can be fully met.
We have today a whole host of devices that divert wealth and activity
towards certain sections of the community. Subsidies, special loans,
government contracts, licensing systems, purchase tax etc. all have a
similar effect. The practical question is not whether there could be
circumstances in which protection can benefit certain groups, but
whether the actual protective measures now proposed or in force are
justified.
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